protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

[80]
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited
to
existing
conditions
only;
and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.[81] Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.[82]
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.[83] The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be
made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess
the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long
as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The
mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long
as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the nonapplication of the law to him.[84]
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as
to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as
to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It
must not leave out or underinclude those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union[85] and
reiterated in a long line of cases,[86]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement,
in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons

according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of

rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must
be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration[87] only. The intent to single
out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been
made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and
finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the
offenders and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this
end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock

and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector,
if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of
justice shall be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving
third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not
to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and
other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the
restriction of the investigation to the previous administration only. The reports of
widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for
distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also
blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and
do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it,
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.[88]
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope
of the intended investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to
opine that to include other past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily
overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness.[89] The reason given is

specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the PTC
to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it breeds.[90]
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier
reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the
point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no
longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct
simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the bodys limited time
and resources. The law does not require the impossible (Lex non cogit ad
impossibilia).[91]
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the
unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact
remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be
true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be
arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language
of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,[92]
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within
the prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]