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TRACE

Peter Sloterdijk
Theory of the Post-War Periods
Observations on Franco-German relations since 1945

With a Foreword by
Klaus-Dieter Mller

Translated from the German by


Robert Payne

SpringerWienNewYork

Prof. Dr. Peter Sloterdijk


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Contents

Klaus-Dieter Mller: Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 Europe, post-historical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 Heiner Mhlmanns Maximal-StressCooperation-Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12


3 Europe after Napoleon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 Italy 1918: Falsication of the results of war,
politics in a big way. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5 France 1945: The double falsication . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6 Germany1945: Metanoia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7 France 2007: Imperial temptation and the
implosion of the left-wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8 Germany 2007: The idiot of the European family
in the phase of normalization the Walser Affair . . . 36
9 Happy disassociation: Polemological prospects
with Ren Girard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Foreword
Klaus-Dieter Mller

Following defeat in battle every culture receives the opportunity to re-evaluate its normative basic attitudes or as Sloterdijk
puts it its moral grammar. Procedures of this kind either end
in a process assuming energies of revenge or the decision is
made to transform the cultural rules ascertained as detrimental
to behavioural patterns of a less harmful form. Is there such a
thing as a civilizing inuence of cultures by reorientation which
brings about post-heroic values? Peter Sloterdijk uses the term
metanoia to describe this process. He does not mean by this
Christian repentance but pragmatic relearning in order to increase civilisational viability (see p. 14). Sloterdijk calls the
victors post-stressory work of evaluation afrmation.
In his, in reference to metanoia and afrmation, exemplary
excursion into the jubilee culture of Franco-German relations Sloterdijk awards the Germans a process which at no
time complicated but also at no time threatened the metanoethical tranformation process of the vanquished German people,
which in its extreme forms consisted of triumphant self-hate
and aggression towards each and every national tradition.This
is reected in the biographies of many Germans. In my case it
was the same as in many other families, quarrels arose as to
guilt and responsibility.
While German criticism spoke to a population which despite
all antagonistic tendencies could not deny being guilty of the
accusations made, French criticism was directed at a society
acquitted and in need of elucidation as to their drle de libration. This may well be the reason why the intellectual Ger1

many is the only place in the world where an old-fashioned


correspondence theory of truth still dominates. Here defeat is
called defeat (and a crime a crime) and the remaining words
are also gauged to this semantic primal scale. It is only here
that the religion of the objective referee holds sway. The intellectual France prefers the politically more elegant and rhetorically more attractive position where words and things belong to
separate systems. (see p. 26).
Despite disparate post-war processes, in Germany metanoia
and in France afrmation of the imaginary victor, both nations have come a long way together. It is a common belief that
nothing will work in Europe unless France and Germany are in
agreement. Franco-German relations, Franco-German affairs,
Franco-German friendship: What next? The Franco-German
methods of dealing with each other are often described as being exemplary; it has almost become a legend. Peter Sloterdijk
calls this legend into question by turning the political credo
upside down.
He talks about Franco-German relations, regardless of the fact
that there is nothing new that can be said on this theme which
could not come from audiotape (see p. 10), Sloterdijk offers
a preliminary rehearsal for philosophical commentary on the
Franco-German day of commemoration taking place on 8th July
2012 marking the ftieth anniversary of Charles de Gaulle and
Konrad Adenauer attending the historical service of reconciliation in the coronation cathedral in Reims. He calls the arrangement made by the French President and the German Chancellor the healing disentanglement of the two nations (see p. 45)
According to Sloterdijk this represented the termination of a
fatally closeknit relationship which reached back to the era of
the Napoleonic wars at least. For a long time the Germans and
the French had become caught up in an endless cycle of mim2

icry, imitation, one-upmanship and projective empathy with


each other. What de Gaulle and Adenauer pledged each other
was an everlasting non-attachment and in some ways even a
permanent state of indifference. The good relationship, or at
least functional relationship, which has existed since then rest
on the solid foundations of the non-attachment which has been
nally achieved diplomatically described as friendship between the two nations.
The post-war period began with a French policy of occupation,
which was strongly characterized by improvisation1. Nevertheless in the spirit of afrmation the objective was unanimously
clear: to restore France to its former national greatness. Only
as a late occupying power was France able to participate in the
post-war policies concerning Germany by means of the concessions made by the other allies or as Sloterdijk puts it the
re-interpretation of the results of the war. France was certainly
not in a position to prepare for this role in advance. However,
there had been considerations on the side of the French in the
resistance groups in Algier and London before the end of the
war in reference to a re-educational programme for Germany
emanating from France2.
Right from the very beginning the French policy of occupation was typied by a comprehensive cultural policy, partly as
an aspect of the security policy and partly as a demonstration
of Frances cultural superiority in comparison with the other


Cheval, Ren: Die Bildungspolitik in der Franzsischen Besatzungszone in: Heinemann, Manfred (Hg.): Umerziehung und Wiederaufbau. Die Bildungspolitik der Besatzungsmchte in Deutschland und sterreich, Stuttgart 1981, p. 190200, here p.
190
Gerard, Francis: Que faire de lAllemagne? Algier 1943, see Ruge-Schatz: Grundprobleme der Kulturpolitik in der franzsischen Besatzungszone in: Scharf, Claus
und Schrder, H.-J. (Hgs.): Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die Franzsische
Zone 19451949, Wiesbaden 1983, p. 91110

Allies. This so-called Machtersatzpolitik3 which arose from


intellectual-cultural Messianism had well-established roots in
France. Among these were the Roman legacy, the inuence of
the Catholic church with its universal pretensions and the very
early formation of a powerful central state drawing on the Catholic religion for support4. In addition the French Revolution
supplied the values of democracy, liberty and progress. They
made the civilisatory consciousness the business of an entire
people. The Federal Republic of Germany seemed to France
to be a land in need of cultural missionary work5. Eighteen
French cultural institutes were created in the rst ten years
after the end of the war in Germany, considerably more than
in any other western European country. The Germans on their
part were, in the spirit of metanoethical re-orientation, initially very interested in the French cultural imports.
The scale on which this re-orientation and self-discovery in
the framework of rebuilding the nation progressed meant that
the Germans began to develop a new self-assurance. They also
became more condent and independent in their Franco-German initiatives in communication and a kind of de-fascination emerged. Those actively shaping the Franco-German cultural exchange observed an increasing disinterest in France in
general and especially in contemporary French art and culture.
Many Germans cling to a specic image of French culture as if




Clemens, Gabriele: Die britische Kulturpolitik in Deutschland: Musik, Theater,


Film und Literatur in: Clemens, Gabriele (Hg.): Die Kulturpolitik im besetzten Deutschland, Stuttgart 1994, p. 200218, here p. 203
Salon, Albert: LAction culturelle de la France dans le monde, Paris 1983, p. 31 ff
see Hammer (1957): Gemeinsamer Markt des Geistes in: Echo der Zeit 1954,
quoted from: Mller, Horst und Hildebrand, Klaus (Hg.), Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich: Dokumente 1949-1963, Bd. 3: Parteien, ffentlichkeit,
Kultur, Mnchen 1997, Dok.-Nr. 339, S. 895898, here p. 896

the German idea of French culture has simply just stood still.6
This stagnation is conrmed in the statistics on the atrophy in
Franco-German communication skills. While 1950 in a survey
in Allensbach 15% of Germans claimed to be able to read
a text written in French, in 1997 it was 16% according to a
survey in the Spiegel. Current studies assume similar results.
In France the situation is no different. Since the end of the war
Germans status as the rst foreign language has dropped from
30% to 10% and as a second foreign language French was overtaken by Spanish long ago. In his speech to the French National
Assembly on 30th November 1999 Gerhard Schrder reassured
the French people that French culture and civilisation enjoy
an elevated and lasting status in Germany. Ingo Kolbohm7 exposed this speech as a stereotype and says: If the Chancellor
wishes to be courteous in his statements this is all very well
and good, but if this is supposed to reect the actual facts of the
case then he must be contradicted.
With normalisation as euphemism of estrangement Sloterdijk
applies an apparent paradox: The pragmatic way in a benevolent and non-violent co-existence by means of mutual disinterest
and defascination. Do it the same way that we did, dont be too
interested in each other! This could be the message that people
of Germany and France have the rest of the world to offer.
Fixed rituals are no longer adequate to justify the specialness of
the Franco-German relationship. They no longer sufce to envigorate this relationship and to capture the interest of present


Mehdorn, Margarete, 19952007 president of the Deutsch-Franzsischen Gesellschaft Schleswig-Holstein e. V., since 2005 member of the board of directors of the
Vereinigung Deutsch-Franzsischer Gesellschaften in Deutschland und Frankreich, VDFG/FAFA
Kolbohm, Ingo: Pldoyer fr eine neue deutsch-franzsische Nhe: Wider die
Normalisierung als Diskurs der Entfremdung. In: Dokumente. Zeitschrift fr den
deutsch-franzsischen Dialog, Heft 3, Juni 2000, p. 207214

generations. This is because the functioning of the FrancoGerman mechanisms seems have been put into question by the
ckelness and impusiveness of the new French President. The
new normality will certainly require a bit more than just staging some event on 8th July 2012 where we can expect to hear
further speeches from audiotape. Peter Sloterdijks assumptions could prove to be a valuable contribution to this process
of re-orientation.
Despite all the attention to detail and interest in the intellectual
highlights the brilliant philosopher does not lose sight of the
triangular relationships which transcend the bipolar FrancoGerman system. And he does not lose sight of global inuences
either, for somewhere in the world there is always a post-war
period there should be a theory of post-war periods. And
hardly a conict in the world remains unnoticed. Sloterdijk
quite rightly points out that great affective military mobilisations of recent decades could only be implemented by the mass
media in the form of coverage and sensationalism and that
these media, as a vehicle of the dangerous mimesis are today
even more effective than before (see p. 48).
Sloterdijk refers to Herbert Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980)8
and postulates: Anybody wishing to get to the bottom of extremism gone global cannot avoid combining the mimetological
analysis with the mediological. The medium is the news the
terror is news and medium at the same time. Terrorism in a
media driven society turns media into a plaything and into a
tool and thus into potential abettor of terror. The terrorists are
dependent on the media because they want to trigger off a psychological effect on the greatest number of people possible and


see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: McLuhan wird wiederentdeckt, 21.02.2007,


Nr. 44, S. N 3 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Mosaiksteinchen, 19.04.2006,
Nr. 91, S. N 3

add authority to their demands. Seen analytically we are dealing with a functional symbiosis between media and terrorism9.
The media driven battle of the cultures which is taking place
beyond the borders of the European peace became the new
boundary long ago running through all Europes territorial order. A new type of stress has arisen which is however fed to the
majority of people from virtual space. Its tripping device a images taken from executions and torture or pictures of destruction of towers of power considered to symbolize hubris10.
The ow of stress-images will not run dry. The spread of maximal-stress-cooperation (MSC) against terror has been reality for a long time now. Its unfolding is undifferentiated and
paranoid. It seeks and nds its enemies and turns Huntingtons
clash of civilisations into self fullling prophecy.
Sloterdijks Freiburg lecture, available here in the form of a
book, is a milestone. He presents to the world a philosophy
which is simultaneously German and French. At the same time
he presents a new type of consulting philosophy. A political
rhetoric has been developed by means of a new kind of cultural
theoretical approach which is capable of having lasting effects.
*
Prof Dr Klaus-Dieter Mller, born 1951 in Neumnster, Germany, is honorary professor at the Film & Television Academy
(HFF) Konrad Wolf and head of the IBF Institut Berufsforschung und Unternehmensplanung Medien e.V. in PotsdamBabelsberg.




Weichert, Stephan A.: Der inszenierte Terrorist. In: cover-Medienmagazin, 3,


2002, p. 7475
see Neverla, Irene in: Michael Beuthner u. a.: Bilder des Terrors Terror der Bilder?,
Kln 2003, p. 158

Th e o r y o f th e P o st-War P erio ds
Ob se r v a t i o n s on Franco-G erm an
re l a t i o n s si nce 1945
1 Eu r o p e , p o st-h istorical
Ladies and Gentlemen,
If one were to attempt to summarize in one sentence the shift
in consciousness of Europeans in the period after 1945 from a
German point of view, then this would have to summarize the
following facts. The inhabitants of this continent, exhausted by
the excesses and the pressures of the era from 1914 to 1945,
turned their backs on historical passion and developed a posthistorical modus vivendi in its stead. By historical I understand
ad hoc the unity resulting from the tragedy enacted and written,
as well as the unity resulting from the epic both enacted and
written. Conceived in this sense history for Europeans is a
discarded option. By entering the shadow of catastrophe they
have decided against an existence in tragic and epic style. They
have chosen a form of coexistence in which a civilising force replaces tragedy and negotiation replaces the epic. From another
perspective one would say that Europeans have ceased to prepare for war and have become much more concerned with the
economic situation and having renounced the gods of warfare
converted from heroism to consumerism.
It becomes apparent with this very abstract assumption, as in
the appearance of the words post-war periods of the title, that
there is a shift in the meaning as compared to its everyday usage.
Indeed, I would like to emphasize and demonstrate the function
of the post-war period for the self-regulation of cultures and, on
what scale the interpretation of the outcome of wars, by those
8

waging them, becomes a decisive factor for the way in which they
conceive themselves. What must above all be emphasized, is the
extent to which the victors and those defeated by them tend to
attach importance to the fact of their being victorious or being
defeated and, how this inuences their languages and ways of
life subsequently. In the case of this observation the somewhat
generalized initial assumptions will disintegrate in more specic
information on local post-war cultures. Then, it will be possible
to focus clearly on German and French phenomena and then to
discuss the so-called relationship existing between them, if such
a thing exists I am already giving a hint as to what my nal thesis is, and it is: that, due to strongly disparate post-war processes
characterising these two countries, there can be no relations between them and that their relationship which is ofcially set out
in a treaty of friendship is, at best, what could be described as
benevolent mutual disregard or benign estrangement as can be
observed sometimes between two former partners in love and
why not also then between two former partners in hate.
Among the traits of the post-tragic and post-epic ways of life
which the Europeans have adopted nolens volens, is the widespread sentiment of living in a disassociated reality in which
there are no incidents of any consequence. The only exception is
the sequence of political events between 1989 and 1991, which
in retrospect, could be titled The collapse of Communism yet
even this eventful period which is deeply engraved into the biographies of those born between 1930 and 1975 was, to a certain
degree, merely a late sequel to the tragic-epic period which we
discarded. This nal great event is like a letter, mailed at some
time in history, which then got lost in the mail and nally reached
the addressee at a much later date. One cannot help thinking of
Sergei Krikalev who was at that time, 1990/1991, on the space
station Mir and thus took off into outer space from the Soviet Union and found himself in the new Russia when he landed again.
9

As a form of compensation for the post-historic deprivation of


events which can be assessed as one of the all in all positive,
albeit difcult to understand, traits of the new modus vivendi,
contemporary civilisation has produced a number of surrogates
apparent on all levels which close the gulf between the differences in higher civilization and mass culture. I will mention only
two peculiarities of this tendency which are especially noticeable, rstly the omnipotence of the principle of staging contemporary event culture, and secondly the replacement of events
by commemorative events which has given rise to a ourishing
jubilee industry a haute cuisine where there are only warmed
up leftovers. In order to avoid any misunderstandings I would
like to add that these tendencies, including excrescences, are a
part of the price which has to be paid for the emancipation from
heroism and tragicism. But we pay it gladly if we consider what
the historical alternatives used to look like.
I will now take the liberty of taking an excursion into the jubilee culture and will refer to a commemorative event which we
on both sides of the Rhine are awaiting. Despite the fact that it
still lies four and a half years away, but inasmuch as one feels a
certain attraction for hazardous themes, and moreover that one
enjoys browsing through the calendar for culture and the arts
it will have become evident how it already casts a shadow, or
at least the shadow of a shadow. If we speak of Franco-German
relations, regardless of the fact that there is nothing new that
can be said on this theme which could not come from audiotape, then only because we are already able to think about what
should be said at the approaching event instead of the previous
event and these things normally remain unsaid and relatively
pressing. The 8th of July of the said year will commemorate the
ftieth anniversary of the day when Frenchmen and Germans,
represented by their fully justiably termed statesmen Charles
de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer attended a service of recon10

ciliation in the coronation cathedral in Reims which anticipated the signing of a treaty of friendship, the so-called Elyse
Treaty of January 1963, which followed shortly afterwards. The
solemn proceedings, which we will, when the appropriate time
comes, re-enact with a contemporary cast, occurred under the
highest symbolic auspices drawn from the traditions which we
share. The Te Deum of Reims, commemorated in the presence
of the Archbishop Franois Marty, was carried out under the
dais of longstanding Catholic universalism which was used,
for albeit a sentimental instant, in order to declare the chapter
of historical excesses between our peoples, the era of infections
and mobilisations and jealous murder and armed mass hysteria
which crossed the Rhine in both directions, to be closed.
One can well imagine what the festivities in Reims, Paris, Berlin and other metropolises will be like around the time of the
8th July 2012. The protocol that the politicians will be required
to carry out step by step will be prescribed to a T, leaving practically no room for new gestures. Hardly any fantasy is required
to envisage the speeches that we will have to hear given by both
presidents and by other incumbent speakers from the elds of
politics, culture, economics and religion. A little more fantasy
is required in order to answer the question as to whether philosophers and cultural scientists from the two countries concerned should make their own contribution to this anniversary
and should this be the case, what form it should assume. What
I am about to suggest would serve better as a dry run for a
philosophical commentary to the commemoration days which
are approaching. A response as such, should in its nal form,
reconstruct the Franco-German rivalry which lasted a thousand years from the division of the empire by Charlemagnes
descendants until the disintegration of the Third Reich in the
20th century.

11

2 H e i n e r M h lmann s Maximal- St r essCo o p e r a tion -T heo ry


It therefore follows that I can but only touch on a few points of
this ambitious enterprise and then only eetingly and tentatively. I will rstly conne the space of time of my considerations to the last 200 years, or to put it more precisely the era
following the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars and
then narrow this down to the epoch after 1945. The term postwar period applies eminently to both time spans and that they
should be understood not only chronologically but more in regard to the mental and psychopolitical conditions of the times.
Now that my analysis is under way the time has come where
I must elucidate more clearly what I understand by Post-war
period. The usage of this term prior to now implies that I see
reasons to not only apply it in an everyday sense but to attach
additional more discriminating meanings to the term. They will
become apparent as soon as we transfer the term into the context of a general theory on the Nature of Cultures. The phrase
Nature of Cultures stems from the cultural theorist Heiner
Mhlmann who with his book of the same name in the year
1996 caused a stir rstly in system-theoretical, polemological,
mediological and neurorhetorical circles. Mhlmanns work is
devoted to the extremely ambitious resolution namely to penetrate the interrelationships between war and culture in the
light of a generalized model of collective formations generated
by stress. This undertaking, which in its descriptive part could
also bear the title The Selsh Culture, is initially illustrated
by examples stemming from ancient European history, starting
with the Greek phalanx and to reveal step by step its ethical implications ending with the ambitious model of the civilizing
impact by cultures through reorientation of post-heroic values
and to an aesthetics of renouncement.
12

At the centre of the new culture dynamic explanatory model


was a theory of stressory processes as discussed by circles associated with Bazon Brocks Wuppertal school on the basis of
the differentiation between eustressory and dysstressory phenomena introduced by Hans Seyle. Mhlmanns ingenious idea
was to employ stress analysis to explain the possibility of social
cohesion under maximum pressure. He succeeded in arriving
at an extremely original vision in the spirit of eustressory cooperation of the birth of cultural groups resistant to conict,
transgenerational in nature and able to learn. This forms Mhlmanns basic theory, which he succinctly calls the MSC-model,
the abbreviation MSC stands for Maximal-Stress-Cooperation
or eustressory tness in successful groups. Accordingly, cultures are entities whose continuity is safeguarded horizontally
by means of MSC-viability and vertically through memoactive
tness procedures (vulgo the creation of tradition through education). In everyday terms this says nothing more than that
groups which attach importance to long term success must be
able to master existential crises through performance involving
a high degree of cooperation under maximum pressure (which
normally means proving oneself in war against competing cultures) at the same time they are also dependent on the ability
to remain vigilant in respect to the results of their conicts with
other groups and especially to be able to take the consequences
of defeat and to anchor them in the cultural memory. Here one
perceives by means of system theoretical alienation a modern
echo of the Platonian allegory pertaining to weaving which
claims that the arts of state and the arts of kingship consist of
plaiting the heroic andreia and moral self-control sophrosyne
into the fabric of the polity so as to render it resilient.1

Politiks, 306a311c.

13

After what has been said, it should now be apparent why, within
the scope of such a theory, such signicance is attached to the
post-war period of all things for moderating and controlling cultural units. At the end of bellicose conicts Mhlmann speaks
of post-stressor phases of relaxation and introspection by the
combatants in the wake of stress the victors and also the vanquished inevitably must evaluate their own cultural assumptions in the light of recent combat. This means that the victors
generally construe their own positive result as a reinforcing signal and feel their decorum conrmed, whereas the vanquished,
as long as they do not seek refuge in renouncement, resentment
and the excuses associated with these, feel prompted to ascertain the causes of their failure. This can lead to revolutionary
change in the decorum of ones own culture i.e. the embodiment
of locally dened norms and ways of life, if and inasmuch that
the losers introspection arrives at the conclusion that the roots
of their defeat not only are to be found in the strength of their
opponent, but is also due to their own weakness and failure to
adapt to the situation and in the most serious cases their own
hubris and distorted picture of the world. Processes of this kind
either give way to reform, thanks to moral, cognitive and technical rearmament assume form (as is blatantly obvious in the case
of Prussian reforms after the defeat of 1806 in Jena). Or one
makes the decision in the phase of post-stressor contemplation
to team up with the victorious culture in a peaceful alliance of
a higher level as practised by the Germans after 1945 as they
decided to proclaim Westintegration as their the maxim. For
the willingness to convert cultural rules diagnosed as detrimental into less noxious patterns, I use the term metanoia. In this
context it does not mean Christian repentance as such, but the
embracing of new thought for the betterment of the viability of
ones civilisation.

14

3 E u r o p e after N ap o leo n
These intimations will sufce, I hope, to make clear why from
a cultural theoretical point of view an analysis of Franco-German relations, with the interactions of the two cultures whether
this be in their changeful history of wars or also their just as
changeful consolidatory phase in psychopolitical processes
should be of such importance in recent times.
If we now look at the potent time span from 1806 to 1945,
which is for our theme of the greatest priority, we are confronted
by an entire sequence of entangled but yet culturally productive post-war periods, (although this productivity had primarily
pathological roots). In his recent book Ren Girard has provided important stimuli in understanding the mimetic processes of exchange in the Franco-German duel and its extremist
dynamic I will return to this later. Sufce it to say I can only
but broadly outline the agenda in such an enterprise as this.
We will content ourselves with the fact that it was Napoleons
appearance that marked a fateful turning point in the relations
between the two countries. The abundant consequences of his
interventions were literally incalculable for the course of German affairs and would possibly still be if it had not been
for Germanys and Frances rapprochement and reconciliation
under the two previously mentioned statesmen which nally
unshackled the two countries from this fatal state of affairs. For
it is Napoleon, from a German standpoint, who was not only the
liquidator of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation,
not only the man whose military genius defeated Austria and
Russia in the Battle of Austerlitz of 1805, not only the victor of
Jena and Auerstedt in 1806 in short not only the war god, as
according to Clausewitz, through whose intensity France, torn
apart by the revolution, succeeded in transforming the transition from monarchy to republic from an internal to an external
15

affair and moreover to a global messianic campaign for the dissemination of French principles in the form of launching a global war of conquest. Through this, his impact became so great,
that he created the epoch making archetype of political genius
which due to his brilliant successes fatally sowed the seeds of
resentment and imitatory rivalry fed by love and hate, and this
in all the European countries he had attacked from the Atlantic
to the Urals.
If one wishes to attach full meaning to the term post-war period
in regard to the entire European development after 1815 then
there is no avoiding the fact that the chain of reactions triggered
off by French attacks, despite the inuence regional diversity,
spanned more than 150 years, was most effective in the antiliberal and anti-modern currents in Germany which lasted until
Hitlers suicide in the spring of 1945, and in Spain where the
blockade against political and cultural modernity continued
until Francos death in 1975. It should also be pointed out in
reference to the post-war period that Napoleons image as role
model or bogeyman in the art, in the philosophy and the politics
of Europe remained virulent for over a century. From a clinical
point of view too, it was not until the second half of the 20th
century that the number of patients who considered themselves
to be Napoleon began to steadily drop at least in asylums. The
way in which the Corsican continued to make his presence felt
on the scene is called to account by Andr Glucksmann in a
chapter of his political autobiography which he titled not without a touch of bitter humour A nous deux, Napolon!. Here
we learn what price had to be paid but until recently before a
French adolescent was healed of the disease of Napoleonitis
including homeopathic treatment employing Maoism.2 Historians of political ideas have quite rightly pointed out the fact


Andr Glucksmann: Une rage denfant, Plon 2006, p.104127

16

that reviewing the Napoleon shock in the European countries


most effected, led to the separation of nationalistic tendencies
from the liberal modernistic currents. This modernising pathology typical of large parts of the 19th and early 20th centuries is
due to an immediately transparent but nonetheless irresistible
psychopolitical mechanism which was to play an especially important role for the Germans in their catastrophe dictated by
the resentments of having been vanquished. Incidentally the
outcome of this rst European experiment in nation building
under French leadership leads one to fear that the results for
enterprises along the same lines in our own times will be similarly poor.

17

4 It a l y 1 9 1 8 : F alsificatio n s o f t he
r e su l t s of w ar, po litics in a big way
At this point I do not wish to restrict my focus to the post-war
periods of the 20th century. And it is here that attention will be
paid to German and French developments which took place after 1945 and their possible correlation. In order to illustrate the
conceptual framework of this examination which is becoming
more concrete, it will be essential to introduce an analytical intermezzo dealing with certain anomalies of consequence in the
post-war period starting in 1918 so that the processes are coherent. We will focus our attention on Italy because it is the key
to understanding further considerations, and it is here that the
concept of war result falsication rst materializes clearly. In
connection with Mhlmanns model of post-stressory decorumrevision we have already mentioned that the rule is that after
battles fought a culture gets the opportunity to re-evaluate and
possibly revise its basic normative attitudes, one could also say
its moral grammar, in the light of the results of the combat. The
benchmarks for this examination are called afrmation in the
case of victory and metanoia in the case of defeat.
Now we should remember that in 1918 the Italians found themselves in a position where neither of these two alternatives was
applicable. As is generally known the Italians withdrew from
the alliance of 1882 with Germany and Austria-Hungary (the
so-called Triple Alliance) in August 1914 thus signalling their
having become ambivalently neutral. Sometime later as a result
of the secret treaty of London (which promised Italy in the event
of victory considerable territorial gains) it defected to the Allied camp by declaring war on Austria-Hungary at the end of
May 1915. But despite many heroic sacrices victory was not
to be for the Italians. Only thanks to massive allied assistance
was it possible that Italy, although it was completely nished
18

militarily and on the verge of political collapse (especially after


the disastrous defeat in the 12th Battle of the Isonzo near Tolmein in October 1917), found itself on the winning side at the
end of the war.
The ambiguity of this position accounts for the troubles of postwar history in Italy. One spoke of vittoria mutilata when one
should have termed it a defeat which had turned into a counterfeit victory. This explains why Italy was only in a position
to achieve a semi-metanoia. The rst signs of this manifested
themselves in the initial successes of the Socialists in 1919 and
1920 in which a newly emerged ultra-nationalist party called
for an immediate heroic afrmation and shortly afterwards established itself along these lines Mussolini winning nothing
less than 66% of the votes in the elections in January 1924.
Out of this situation, which fed the most vehement forms of disclamatory afrmation, emerged the movement of pure activism,
mobilization for its own sake, which went down in history under
the name of Fascism. Among the countless enquiries devoted to
this subject there is hardly one which bettingly sheds light on
the basic fact that primary Fascism was the result of a falsication
of the actual outcome of the war in which the real or virtual loser
presented himself as victor nevertheless, or better still as hypervictor. It wished to indulge in the illusion that it could avoid the
work involved in reviewing its cultural decorum and substitute
it by reinforcing the pattern which had led to failure. In general
terms this merely proves that of all people, it was those who had
most reason for a metanoic turnaround contrary to the rules that
had applied up till that time, who often most furiously plunged
into the afrmation of values which had all but propelled them
into total disaster. There is no need to demonstrate in detail that
this also applied to the extreme German rightwing of the Weimar
Republic. In Germany the falsication of the results of the war
19

had begun shortly after November 1918 with the infamous stab
in the back of the supposedly undefeated army and as of 1933
displayed the well-known consequences.
In the light of these considerations, Fascism in its original form
appears not only as the much discussed transfer of modern warfare to the modus operandi of the entire culture and eo ipso as
the neutralization of the difference between war and peace under the prex of permanent mobilization, but moreover its psychopolitical form betrays its wilful falsication of the outcome
of war and rejection of metanoia. Its distinguishing marks are
the triumphalism of the loser and the forced afrmation of the
heroistic code by those, who in view of their recently acquired
experience, would have been better advised to radically review
their relationship to the set of rules of the heroic life.

20

5 F r a n c e 19 4 5 : T he d o u b le fa lsif icat ion


At this point of my discussion I can leave the stage of previewing and explication of theoretical premises and turn to the subject matter proper, the comparative examination of the FrancoGerman post-war periods as of 1945. What immediately strikes
us is the similarity of the French position after 1945 with the
Italian position of 1918. Just as the Allies erected a last front
for the Italians as of November 1917 who were then able to stay
the course until the German surrender, so did the Allies bear
the brunt of the war for the French until the unforgettable day
of libration in August 1944 on which de Gaulle, at the head
of his own improvised forces, returned to Paris. The decisive
difference lies in the fact that the defeat of the French in 1940
turned out to be much more unequivocal than that of Italy in
1917 in that the French ranks (who were absent only in Yalta)
were much more conspicuous under the allied powers than the
Italians at the end of the 1st World War. It is well known that
the latter were only conceded a subordinate role in the peace
treaties of 1919. Above all one is astonished at the analogy
between the Italian and the French dilemmas as soon as they
nd their basis in the above-mentioned model of post-stress
self-evaluation. In both cases we can see that after being given
victory there is an oscillating between metanoethical and afrmative tendencies, an oscillation which nally is neutralized
in order to initiate a more or less comprehensive falsication of
the results of the war.
All the same one can say that the French, while reviewing the
shadows of stress after 1945 despite all tendencies to reverse
the facts, against all the odds, were lucky, because in the end
their form of national reconstruction only led to Gaullism. The
trivial phrase de Gaulle was not Mussolini assumes formidable meaning in this context. It marks, despite all the simi21

larities, the considerable gap between the post-war reactions of


these peoples. While the Italians with their near defeat made
things much worse by taking ight by marching forwards, the
French, after the indecisive and ambivalent interlude of the
Fourth Republic, chose the lesser of two evils, the Gaullistic
therapy. Furthermore the French interpretation of the defeat of
1940 which miraculously led to victory in 1945 was deeply divided right from the beginning. Running parallel to the Gaullist
evasion in the national afrmation the French left-wing developed a second front of falsication according to which the better France or the France of the rsistance, we may now, evoke
German analogies, was supposed to have won the war on the
side of Stalin and the Red Army.
Only within the framework of such a theory of the post war period is it possible to grasp that the much cited division of the
overpolarized political camps, that hermeneutic gallic war between the French post-war right-wing and the French post-war
left-wing, was in reality the conict between two incompatible
strategies the purpose of which in both cases was to falsify the
results of the war.
At this point it is not necessary to expound in detail how the
Gaullist departure into neo-grandeur took place. Nor does a
mention have to be made of the beginnings of an authentic
French metanoia which miscarried during the Fourth Republic
mainly due the humiliations the nation suffered in the conicts
in Indochina and North Africa at time of decolonialization. It
will have to sufce to point out the main symptom of the French
reaction: As de Gaulle returned a second time as a knight in
shining armour to the pinnacle of power he dictated the constitution of the Fifth Republic which is still valid today and
whose strong presidential xation was to prove a problem for
the country itself and for the rest of Europe. The elevation of
22

the presidency only makes sense if one suspects the Elyse of


wanting to be a sort of European White House, or to use examples closer to home, something somewhere between Versailles
and Bayreuth. The fantasy had been prevalent in the Elyse
Palace for some decades as Parisian students suddenly got it
into their heads that their fantasy should replace the prevalent
one in a turbulent month of May. The Presidents command of
Frances newly acquired nuclear weaponry (the Force de dissuasion nuclaire fully operational since 1964) utterly embodies the form of expression which has come to a head of a poststressor strategy of afrmation, or to use clinical terminology a
contraphobic compensation.
De Gaulle never wanted to be a Gaullist and it would be unjust
to simply deny that the Generals work had certain metanoethical qualities the scene in Reims mentioned at the beginning
alone speaks against a one-sided afrmationistic interpretation. Moreover the fact that terms such as dtente, entente and
coopration increasingly appeared in his vocabulary emphasized like leitmotivs, reveal how he was trying to show the conservative elements in France the way to reviewing their colonial, imperial and heroistic legacy. One of his greatest achievements will always be his reconciling of the old right-wing with
modern republicanism.
The more interesting as far as the history of ideas are concerned, and in terms of ideology much more alluring form of
falsication of results of war took place however on a different
side of the inner French front. While the Gaullist departure into
semi-imperial afrmation succeeded in getting by with standard emotions and basic processes of accentuation of a national
identity, i.e. patriotic enlargement of the self and modernising
their weaponry, an ideological and psychopolitical transformation occurred in the left wing which was to have unforeseeable
23

consequences. It was here that as of 1944 a singular form of


pseudo-metanoethical literature developed the critical reection of which has still hardly begun.3 It simultaneously triggered off a large importation of German philosophers such as
Hegel and Heidegger or Marx, Nietzsche and Carl Schmitt.
This occurred as if to illustrate the observation put forth by cultural theoreticians that romanticism ourishes if, in the realm
of ideas, a compensation for political defeat is on the agenda.
The main approach of the Left in falsifying war results was not,
as was the case of the Right in escaping into the national tradition of greatness, but an escape into socialist super-greatness.
This naturally had the grave error that its representative on
the world stage in that critical time bore the name of Stalin.
Strangely enough this detail hardly seemed to trouble anybody
as long as the French left-wing, thanks to this manoeuvre, not
only could save its injured conscience but also could construe
a victory of its own simply as if it were possible to reattribute
the successes of the Red Army to the left-wing resistance. And
by means of this, one was free to pseudo-metanoethically deal
with the failure of the Third Republic, with the infamy of collaboration and French colonialism not to mention the internal
contradictions of Gaullist reconstruction without ever having
to come down from the victors high horse. As a result a rhetorical apparatus for the articulation of triumphal self-hate and
hypermoralistic aggression against national and bourgeois traditions came into being which lent itself well for use at home
and abroad.
In the second nucleus of victory falsication a culturally hegenomous scene speedily consolidated and raised the banner

Cf. Tony Judt: Past Imperfect. French Intellectuals 19441956, Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford 1992

24

of militantism thus managing to make the word commitment


a synonym for French intellectualism throughout the world.
By these means every form of collaboration was to be severely
criticized in future including collaboration with the elementary facts. This battling church of belated resistance grasped
how to promote itself for the general criticism of the bourgeois
society and neo-capitalistic age by blending Marxism, semiology and psychoanalysis into a suggestive amalgam. The export
successes of French theoretical literature which continued on
into the 90s relied above all on their polemical utility value
for analogous critical subcultures of the countries importing it,
notably Italy and Germany. In the USA it was made especially
welcome as the young intelligentsia of the country were, after
the debacle in Vietnam, suddenly willing to learn a foreign language in order to radically and critically talk about their own
culture. Even today the remains of this product under the categories of French Theory or Critical Theory can be acquired in
bookshops on American campuses.
In these shelves, and only in these shelves by the way, has
the only phenomenon occurred which perhaps deserves to be
termed a Franco-German relationship that is the convergence
of all those discursive machines purporting to explain everything, which were to be found on both sides of the Rhine in suggestive elaboration and with which young people were taught
until recently to see through and to condemn the existing conditions as if they themselves did not have a part in them. Since
however, the analogous discourse in German criticism of itself
and the world after 1945 arose in an entirely different context
and operated in entirely different climate than the French one,
then even this seemingly close afnity must be considered to
be a misunderstanding.

25

What distinguishes French from German criticism is their entirely different types of cultural integration and consequently
their diametrically opposed tendency as to policies of the truth.
While German criticism speaks to a population which, despite their reluctance, was not able to deny being guilty of the
charges, French criticism was directed at a society acquitted,
and in need of elucidation as to their drle de libration. This
may well be the reason why the intellectual Germany is the
only place in the world where an old-fashioned correspondence
theory of truth still dominates. Here defeat is called defeat (and
a crime a crime) and the remaining words are also gauged to
this semantic primal scale. It is only here that the religion of the
objective referee holds sway. The intellectual France prefers
the politically more elegant and rhetorically more attractive position where words and things belong to separate systems.

26

6 G e r m a n y 1 9 4 5 : Metano ia
It goes without saying that the German population had plenty
work to do after 1945 which was generally termed the Wiederaufbau (rebuilding the nation). The priorities for rebuilding
the nation were something they had in common with their defeated and yet liberated French neighbours even though this
assumed an entirely different manner. In its German connotation the word of course particularly signies the material aspect
of dealing with the damage done by the war which was evident
enough after the bombardment by allied forces. Furthermore,
it signied the sum of the efforts which the Germans subjected
themselves to in order to recover morally and culturally. Certainly Adenauer was not de Gaulle yet another trivial sentence
with formidable implications. The name of the rst German
chancellor stands for national reconstruction with very little in
common with the afrmative arts of Gaullism. He symbolizes
the pragmatic and everyday side of the metanoethical work in
Germany. In the course of its unwavering progress the Wiederaufbau combined the reconstruction of the towns and cities
with a political and moral reorientation. The German economic
boom as it was subsequently named, acted as an economic conrmation of the course that had been taken to bring about the
metamorphosis.
In order to plot the graph showing the progress of this selfreconstruction it will sufce to recall the admission of guilt by
all German Protestant Christians in Stuttgart on 19th October
1945 which can be legitimately termed the beginning of spiritual history in what was to become the Federal Republic of
Germany. Further points along the curve mark, apart from the
treaty of reparation with Israel in 1952, were the scene of 12th
July in 1962 in Reims and Willy Brandt kneeling at the memorial in the Warsaw ghetto on 7th December 1970. The inaugu27

ration of Berlins memorial to the Jews killed in Europe, the


subject of many years of discussion, on 10th May 2005 forms a
contemporary cornerstone of this evolution.4
From the point of view of the theory of post-stressor decorum
reviews in post-war periods it can be easily seen that the abovementioned events all lie on the same line. They may all be attributed to the same process which at no time was uncomplicated, but at no time threatened by a reversal of the metanoethical tranformation process of the vanquished German people.
Seen from todays standpoint one may justiably claim that it
formed the most reliable of constants in the history of ideas
and mentality of Europeans after 1945. Only if we look at the
process as a whole can we comprehend how it was possible for
Germany to rearm itself without this involving a general remilitarisation of politics, and how social and cultural rebuilding
could occur without any connection worth mentioning to nostalgia for antidemocratic traditions, and how there was a boosting of efciency nationwide without re-germanication, and a
West German economic boom without submitting to imperialist
temptations, and a national recovery without opinionatedness.
Nobody will deny that political and cultural life in Germany
did not have to face some hard tests during this period. In the
notorious bleak period (die bleierne Zeit), the suffocating atmosphere of which those who experienced it recall with the
greatest uneasiness, the silence reigned long concerning what
had happened. As the silence was nally broken the pendulum suddenly veered in the other direction. Therefore hybrid
forms of hate also ourished against their own kind. Here also,
outraged later generations exploited their interest in achieving


The fteen-year debate is well-documented in the book Der Denkmalstreit das


Denkmal? Die Debatte um das Denkmal fr die ermordeten Juden in Europa (Ute
Heimrod, Gnter Schlusche, Horst Seferens (eds.), Philo Verlagsgesellschaft, Dresden 1999.

28

rapid superiority over the older generations with their complex


life stories, and here also as on the other side of the Rhine appeared pseudopolitical Maitre Penseur to boot, who treated
the distinction between a totalitarian state of the past and a
democratic state of the present like something of negligible
signicance so that one had the impression of seeing revenants from the NS period everywhere when it would have been
enough to observe unpractised democrats learning their roles.
Here too there were as was the case in France, a heinous repudiatory hardening on the right-wing and self-righteous pseudometanoethical excesses on the left-wing. One almost anticipated a restaging of left-wing fascism which for the purposes
of sidetracking called itself anti-fascism and just like its role
model advocated the use of weapons which is why in the style
of Lenin it claimed the right to kill self-proclaimed enemies of
the people for the better good. Nevertheless, these eruptions
were not able to bring the German post-war process decisively
off its basic course. It remained unperturbedly orientated to its
task and that was to re-evaluate and review the German decorum handed down complete with its gloomily romantic, heroistic and resentful hereditary burden in the light of the results
of the war and, moreover in the light of the catastrophe in which
they had been complicit.

29

7 F r a n c e 2 0 0 7 : Imp erial tempt at ion and


t h e i m p l osio n o f th e left-w ing
In front of the backdrop of these observations on French and
German post-war periods and the differences which have thus
come to light during the cultural evaluation and integration of
results of war, I would like to now pursue the question as if one
had to give a speech based on the cultural political aspects
of both countries. To begin with the case of France, one thing
would be appear to be clear especially in the light of 2007,
and that is that the Gallic war for the political and ideological
appropriation of the Libration has been decided in the meantime. The result lies on the borderline of average psychopolitical plausibilities. With increasing remoteness from the critical
events a post-Gaullist moderate left wing has established itself
on the broadest of fronts, which no one wishes to call middleclass simply because nobody is really certain what the word
middle-class means under todays conditions. The unusually
compact centre-right currents in France at present cater for the
everyday political Narcissm as a matter of routine and at a safe
distance from the dramatic tension of the rst post-war period.
It is this Narcissm which supplies the material from which patriotism is created in non-neurotic peoples.
The rest of Europe including Germany could live with that if it
were not for the fact that Frances Gaullist structural heritage
has developed a life of its own which is by no means harmless. This ranges from the scantily veiled unilateralism of the
French nuclear doctrine, to the anti-European tendencies of
Frances sovereignism and on to the sub-imperialistic antics
of the French army in Africa and overseas.5 However the most

Which will be compensated for by President Sarkozys announcement of Frances


return to NATO

30

dubious is the hysterogenous potential growing out of the liaison between presidentialism and media populism, a potential
with which de Gaulle as a political Nietzschean and illusionist
reverted to with great virtuosity in serving the whole. Even with
its worn down prole the genetic material of Gaullism poses a
volatile risk for Europe. And members of the European Union
will be well advised to observe closely the Sarkozy experiment
which the French chose in May 2007. After the new president
was forced to realize that a Cecilia Ciganer cannot be a second Jacky Kennedy the next lesson for him would be, despite
suggestions to the contrary, that there is denitely no room in
Europe for a White House. If he really wants to show generosity
of spirit and make a big impact by remodelling France in a contemporary manner he could, by introducing the much overdue
post-Gaullist constitution and thus becoming the rst man of
the sixth republic to make the headlines.
The clear outcome of the neo-gallic war over the interpretation
of Libration contains a historically ideological and remarkable
characteristic. Numerous observers have recently unanimously
come to the conclusion that the previously high-prole French
left-wing has after a prolonged weak phase, beginning in Mittrands last years if not earlier, sunk into oblivion within a
very short time. This process which was to recently become
apparent by the number of ballot boxes, is accompanied by an
intellectual erosion which beggars all description. Even the interpretation of the above by those concerned leaves a lot to be
desired, (there has been for some time talk of the demise of la
Grande Nation as if France had happened to collide with an
iceberg one cold night) but this heavy-handedness comes as no
surprise in view of its record. All the same the new theoretical
nonentity of the left camp in France and its far-reaching practical disintegration represents a serious brainteaser for historians of mentality and ideas.
31

With reference to what was mentioned above we now have a


plausible explanation why the implosion of the left-wing in
France should not be entirely attributed to local appropriation
of the neo-capitalist and postpolitical Zeitgeist which has been
impressing every Western nation for well over twenty years. The
question with this phenomenon has much more to do with the
nal collapse of the pseudo-metanoethical system with which
the French left-wing understood how to create falsied victories and phantomatic sovereignty in the troubled area of postwar affects and post-war discourse. They continued to defend
these achievements for decades without taking contexts into
account well over the best-before-date for illusions. In the
meantime however, they too have been overtaken by the change
in affairs. The disruption of French discoursal culture becomes
apparent simply by the fact that the countrys left-wing has for
many years failed to produce a book of any merit not to mention new perspectives. What was left was only the romantic polemical stance which allows it adepts to swear by militancy and
deviation as in the good old days. The intellectual decomposition has been most evident during recent years in the media
driven witchhunts sweeping the nation against alleged converts
or traitors of the progressive cause who one tried to sacrice to
public opinion after pseudo-moralistic propaganda trials on the
Place de Grve. For the external observer these attacks were
against the new reactionaries as they are derisively called or
more recently the conservateurs, unmistakable evidence that
the French left-wing having stooped to resorting to helpless and
hysterical progressivism has been standing in the rain for a long
time and whose day is only brightened by the occasional ash
in the pan. The analogy to the German phenomena of scandal
of the last fteen years is obvious for here in Germany too, the
dominant leftist liberal feuilleton was only able to compensate
for its ever increasing disassociation from the workings of the
world by getting overexcited and moralising. In this connection
32

the number of votes by the Left in the referendum against the


European Constitution was symptomatic. Those who appreciated and loved la belle France with its savoir vivre and generosity were well advised, in the view of the predominantly piteous niveau of the nonistic propaganda at the time, to spread a
cloak of silence over these events.
All the same it would be unjust to assess the French left-wings
attempts to re-evaluate national decorum as being totally negative. It can above all, thanks to its more moderate spokesmen,
produce a number of authentic metanoethical achievements,
which will have enduring signicance, even if they have never
managed to secure hegemonic status trapped as they are between rivalling systems of successful, much too successful,
falsication of the results of war. In this context Jean Paul Sartres bitter defeat of Albert Camus in the 50s is of special signicance. It betrays the precarious status of the energies which
were aimed at a genuine intellectual prevention of failed ideological traditions. Voices like those of Camus sought to enforce
a theory of human moderation and the symbolic relativity of
existence, while all around them neo-revolutionary symbolism and extremist surrealism were running wild. With all their
might the authors of this radical tendency attempted to maintain faith in life, above all the defeat of 1940 had proved that
the world was in urgent need of French ideas particularly after
they had taken an invigorating Stalinist or Maoist bath.
In the long run it has become more than clear that it was Camus
who had the right answers to the fundamental questions back in
the late 40s. He was the one who, after the excesses of violence
of the rst half of the century, incorruptibly reminded us to keep
our feet on the ground and it was he who raised the banner of
the nonnegotiable obligation to civilizing reection. Each tells
the other he is not God; this is the end of romanticism. with
33

this sentence his Lhomme rvolt of 1951, much maligned and


ridiculed by commentators of the left-wing, ends, thereby articulating an axiom which outshone all other metanoethical work.
It was Camus who found the words of reconciliation for all of
Europe after the war as he wrote, Today the calamity is we
all share the same mother country. As of 1945, although at a
safe distance certainly, Sartre was playing with the re of armed
revolt from his fatal foreword to Franz Fanons The Wretched
of this Earth (1961) an anti-colonial manifesto of violence to his
foolhardy visit to Stammheim, where to his disappointment he
encountered a moron by the name of Baader who was not worthy
of a visit of such a great mind. Whether this showed a dubious
appetite for understatement or not, Sartre made himself available as a gurehead for French pseudometanoia until the last.
I need hardly emphasize that the names of Camus and Sartre
in the context of these observations have a purely typological
function and imply no judgement as to their literary and philosophical ranking in the case of both, we raise our eyes to
heights which hardly any contemporary author can climb. With
the former I associate tendencies which stand for the return
of a self-critically level-headed, post-imperial, post-ideological
France at the centre of Europe. With the latter however we nd
a still virulent tendency to neurotic exceptionalism and messianic export of aggression.
If I am not entirely mistaken I will conclude by commenting
that the Camusian position has gained importance in recent
years. The few living authors who, unnoticed by the general
intellectual mediocritisation of France, have succeeded in joining the ranks of the countrys glorious era, can be characterized
as being Camusians from the typological standpoint. The political moralists, also called the Nouveaux Philosophes, by nature
stood typologically closer to the Camus-pole than to the Sartre34

pole. This also applies to Bernard-Henri Lvy who, with his


hastily written pamphlet Idologie franaise of 1981, produced
a sensitive if not, due to its polemic exaggeration, justiably
controversial contribution to French metanoethical literature.
In the light of this analysis he now appears as a Camusian who
has mistaken himself for a Sartrian.

35

8 G e r m a n y 2 0 0 7 : T he id io t of t he
Eu r o p e a n family in the p h ase of
n o r m a l i z atio n the Walser Af f air
With reference to the German position in the light of the particulars and sentiments of 2007 it is sufcient to recognize the
obvious. This country has entered a phase where it may start to
reap the benets of its metanoethical efforts. It has won back
the trust of its neighbours if we ignore a few poisoned depots
in England and Poland where anti-German emotions reproduce
anaerobically as it were and there too, where forgiveness is
beyond the realms of what is humanly possible, it has evoked a
certain respect as to its metamorphosis. There is no better expression of this situation as the election of a German Pope. When
on 19th April 2005 the cardinals in Rome elected Joseph Ratzinger as the new head of the Catholic church their main concern
may have been expressing the continuity of the Catholic issues
in the world, be that as it may, but from a neutral standpoint it
is clear that this decision involved more. It set an example at
the same time of overwhelming perspicuity which said: German
ancestry does not have to be a reason for withdrawal of trust; a
German name can signify integrity at the highest level. It is up
to each and every expositor to decide whether this was mere coincidence or, that this was the result of purely internal Catholic
circumstances, but anybody who takes a closer look at the matter cannot help realizing that this decision has a history outside
the realms of Catholicism. It indirectly yet unmistakably throws
light on the sixty years of work that the Germans have done on
themselves. From this standpoint the election of Benedict XVI,
whatever else it may signify, is the external ratication of the
political and moral process the beginnings and motives of which
have already been mentioned above.

36

One of the characteristics of the cultural climate in Germany


is that many protagonists in the eld of public opinion have
difculties in nding the opportunities and realities to express
the hard earned new German integrity appropriately. They cannot and do not want to know and believe that the post-war period in the everyday as well as in the sophisticated sense of
the word is coming to an end in Germany too, and this can be
attributed to chronological, psychopolitical and, if the expression be permissible, cultural-biological reasons. Yes, it seems
an unreasonable demand to be expected to accept that the work
the Germans have done on themselves should have led to such
exemplary results. If one inverts the angle of observation one
might interpret the tenacious continued existence of the opponents to normalisation as a sign of success for their part. Nothing would be more abnormal in Germany than if everybody simultaneously overstepped the threshold of healthy patriotism
with some sort of narcissistic cacophony. The German approach
to psychopolitical normality therefore unavoidably involves a
certain coiling in on oneself. The articulation of which includes
the division of labour between those who can experiment somewhat less inhibitedly with the licence of self-love and can make
use of the new opportunities of the metanoethically ltered afrmation and those who nd any impulse of this nature totally
in opposition to their deeply habitualized reluctance.6
If these observations are aimed in the right direction then one
may arrive at the conclusion that the long series of typically
ery scandalisations which ranged from Botho Strausz essay
Anschwellender Bocksgesang and Hans Magnus Enzensbergers

This reluctance also includes the memory of German victims of the war. When during a service in commemoration of the bombing of Dresden on 13th February 2004 in
Munich demonstrators turn out with slogans such as Bomber Harris, do it again! This
is more a manifestation of black humour but above all shows how some opponents
to normalisation have distanced themselves from the realms of the norms of civil
society.

37

Aussichten auf den Brgerkrieg, both stemming from 1993, and


Martin Walsers speech in the Pauluskirche in the autumn of
1998 to the publicizing in 2006 of Gnther Grass confessions
about the Waffen-SS would soon exhaust themselves for reasons
resulting from the facts. The fact itself from which the inner
laws caused this excitement, namely the psychopolitical constitution of the Federal Republic has, in the course of the last
decade, unmistakably entered into a new physical state thus
rendering the repetition of such previous storms increasingly
less likely. This does not necessarily mean that the semi-totalitarian media which are in effect, would relinquish their power
of authority to unleash symbolic lynchings and opportunistic
mass psychoses.
That which I term the critical facts are nothing other than Germanys long expected entry into the manifest stage of its normalisation whereby one has to admit that this will be, after
such a long deformation of its history, a paradoxical rst-timeround normality. One should here avoid reading too much into
the expressions normality and normalisation. Although we are
talking about a developed country of the West, at the same time
it exhibits paradoxes which are typical for its phase in development, and the question as to whether there could be anything as
stable normality in a world driven by capital is not the subject
matter of our investigations. As far as the series of scandals are
concerned, they only make sense if regarded as a cascade of
temporary crises with which the high tension of German postwar work on itself was lowered to midrange values.7 It heralds
the end of the permanent metanoethical state of emergency and
the transition into normal everyday patriotic conditions.


Cf. The monography inspired by the systemsatic theories of Gnter Sautter, Politische Entropie. Denken zwischen dem Mauerfall und dem 11. September 2001 (Botho
Strau, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Martin Walser, Peter Sloterdijk), Paderborn
2002.

38

It might well have been typical for such a transition if in its


crisis, the names of authors, who during the German post-war
work on ourselves were considered the most reliable new guarantees of integrity, became disputed; I am thinking of Martin
Walser and Gnther Grass in particular here. But while Grass
has only been outrun by his own exaggerated moralism in recent times, whose occasionally hollow tones suddenly resulted
in belated indignation, Walser attracted a much more vehement
and fundamental resentment, if resentment can be described
as being fundamental. This happened because he, somewhat
earlier than the others, or too prematurely for some or even unashamedly early for others, took the liberty of announcing the
possibility of a normalisation, something which could not be
taken lying down in a hypermoral location such as Germany.
The conict didnt become evident until the 80s as Walser was
so wonderfully imprudent as to declare German reunication as
a desirable option, his remark soon proved to be a prophecy, the
fullment of which many nd hard to forgive. And just before
the Millenium it happened again as he even more imprudently
dared to give an intimistic, literary Sunday speech rich in overtones to the German nation in order to signal that, based on
his observations, he considered his audience mature enough
to be able to keep at a safe distance from certain pseudo-metanoethical rituals. In this context the metaphor of the moralistic
cudgel has its place and it is still proving to be indigestible
for producers of such cudgels as it debilitates their chances in
the bazaars of morality. Ten years after the speech in the Pauluskirche we now know that yet again Walser was right a bit too
early, and the audience at that time who unanimously gave him
a standing ovation knew it in situ, too. With this applause they
were ten years ahead of their time and endorsed the rhetorically

39

brilliant anticipation of a possible German normalisation which


they had just experienced. 8
What followed was, to put it mildly, a phase of confusion. Without doubt the caustic reaction from the incumbent chairman of
the central council of German Jews at that time, Ignaz Bubis
was the most understandable. Fullling his role in that position
he warned of the potential dangers of German self-exculpation
which might be concealed behind pretences of normalisation.
He later withdrew his angry comments about intellectual arson which had been applied not only to Biedermnner since
Frischs time* and admitted that Walsers intentions had been
with integrity despite some unclear formulations. Admittedly
the accusatory hyperbole which Bubis resorted to had the advantage of reminding everybody that no normalisation in the
sense of forgive and forget could possibly occur between Germans and Jews and certainly not prescribed on the part of Germans. A good sense of hearing belongs to the moral privileges
and duties of those who have the word for the victims and
Bubis will have had a particularly good sense of hearing at
this critical moment.
On the other hand what occurred on the German side of the
tumult around Walsers speech was unambiguously startling.
If one wished to practise positive thinking then one could fall
back on the formula so prevalent among homoeopaths i.e., a
crisis is often the way to recovery. What was cause for the greatest concern in this orgy of opinions which joined in the BubisWalser collision was without doubt the observation that as in
the case of the scandal a strong homogenisation took place by
means of which the principle supporting culture, according to
which acquired merits do not expire, was temporarily overrid

For Frank Schirrmacchers voluminous documentation concerning the speech and the
controversy initiated by Ignaz Bubis see: Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, Frankfurt 1999
* Translators note Allusion to Max Frischs drama Biedermann und die Brandstifter

40

den. The principle of scandal is always the expropriation of


perception by means of paraphrase and its consummate form
is the annihilation of intention by rumour. The fact that Walser
had been one of the most industrious workers in the vineyard
of German metanoia and that for several decades, was apparently forgotten overnight by his accusers. In addition the fact
that he had spoken in a rhetorically rich, subjective mode was
suddenly of no importance. In a frenzy of tendentious reading
into what had not been said like that and of sadistic delight
in adherence to an easily rectied misunderstanding Walser
was accused of having wanted to unchain Germany from its
obligations, although it was perfectly obvious to any unbiased
person who could listen or read that the author had declared a
denite, strongly ritualised if not mechanized form of pseudometanoethical German self-reproaching rhetoric as contraproductive which then again of course provoked hearers anew.
By wishing to emphatically remind the inner forum of the individual about their answerability to the horrors carried out by
Germans, Walser, who as an observer does not have an advantage over his contemporaries, appeals for a form of metanoia
which addresses the event with more authenticity than any form
of well-meant maintenance of monuments might do. Whether or
not he will satisfy the requirements of commemorative policies
in their ofcial form remains yet to be seen, (he himself later
conceded somewhat more clearly the eligibility of ofcial acts
of commemoration and formal symbols) however, Walsers assumption, that without inner integral realization there can be no
serious involvement of the conscience in the horrors of German
war crimes, forms an essential corrective to the commemorative
events seen as a matter of course.
Now that the sea has calmed it may be hoped that the activists of
this accusation, namely the non-Jewish ones, will at sometime
calm down and be fair enough to have another look at this affair.
41

The German feuilleton which was at that time to blame by succumbing to its habitual scandal-loving imitative reexes would
be well advised to reconsider whether there might be a connection between the names Martin Walser and Benedict XVI which
deserves to be made explicit. The way I see things there most
denitely is one, and viewed from the right perspective it is
transparent enough. Both these names represent renewed German symbols of integrity with extraordinary and uninterrupted
achievements in the era since 1945. As far as their interests,
themes and tendencies are concerned they could not be more
divergent. Nevertheless, they stand side by side together with
some others like Heuss, Niemller, Adorno, Dahrendorf, Willy
Brandt, Weizscker, Grass, Kluge and Enzensberger for nothing less than - the rebound from the depths of despair of German post-war civilization as a whole. If the Popes name here
in Germany shines brighter than that of the writer this, aside
from the added astral value associated with the papal rank,
may partly be attributed to the fact that in some places there
is still resistance to the obvious; one can reproach an author of
Walsers Balzac-like stature for the duration of a crisis but not
if he told the truth, in his rather obstinate southern German
way, ten or twenty years too early the word truth is taken
here as elsewhere as our knowledge of existence corresponds
in perspectives.9
As far as the considerations on the history of mentalities are
concerned for the appraisal of future relations between the Germans and the French the answer is obvious. With Germanys
completed metamorphosis into a metanoethical, civilisatory
and more or less regenerated nation, the days have come to an
end where phrases such as German interests can be interpreted as a return to patterns of thought from the NS period.
If it was in German interests to show as few interests as pos

Also the criticism raised against Walser due to his satire on Marcel Reich-Ranicki
in Tod eines Kritikers remains after scrutiny irrelevant.

42

sible over the last fty years, then the future of the country can
only lie in a return to a moderate afrmativity. Incidentally,
this is expected by Germanys foreign partners because in the
eld of international politics one wishes to be able to rely on a
predictable egoism of each and every ally and opponent in the
EU and the rest of the world. In fact Germany is in the process
of discarding its temporary role as the idiot of the European
family and simply developing into an ordinary political egoist.
Nobody will be offended if one notes that Germany could learn
a lot from France in this respect.
It may well appear as if I have taken stock of the metanoethical balance very one-sidedly in favour of Germany and rebuked
France for being a breeding ground for two lies about reality. I
do not wish to contradict this impression, but by means of an
additional comment wish to provide for a more evenly balanced
evaluation. The poles of both countries as to post-war truth and
post-war lie indeed start reversing as soon as one touches the
sensitive points of German as well as French raison. I am talking about the new denition of military functions in both countries after the defeats of 1940 and or 1945. Here it can be seen
that France has managed to create a truth from its lie in as much
as it has set itself up as a nation willing and able to defend itself.
Germany on the other hand has created a lie out of the truthfullness of its metanoia because it bears before it like a standard
its total dependence on others for its military defence as if it
were a moral achievement. The Germans have tendency to be
convinced that on the basis of their previous crimes they have a
greater entitlement to live in a world where there is no war. From
this has resulted a syndrome of pretentious weakness which will
not be able to stand up to the trials that are to come. Therefore
we will have to wait and see, if and how, in this basal segment of
the new adjustment of cultural decorum a normalisation in the
realistic sense will follow on the part of Germany.
43

9 H a p p y d isasso ciation : P olem ological


p r o sp e c t s w ith R en G irard
In conclusion I would like to go into the question as to what
sense the expression Franco-German relations has from the
standpoint of what has been considered here. It will presumably come as no surprise if the word relations acquires a somewhat ironic aspect here. Of course I have no intention of belittling the multifaceted network of Franco-German interactions
which came into being as a result of the Elyse treaty from the
transformation of state visits into routine consultations, to the
regular meetings of foreign and defence ministers, from joint
economic boards to the production of the Airbus. The exchange
of students is also an excellent idea as well as bilingual education wherever it is practised. However, I would at this point
like to refrain from dealing with these, in themselves valuable
forms of organized contact, leaving them to those in charge and
relying on these professionals of such encounters to keep these
relations functioning irrespective of any philosophical and cultural theoretical commentary.
I would like to conclude by dealing with the question as to the
inner distance between both countries after the last war. I believe I have offered arguments for that and why this is much
greater than can be expressed by the customary speeches of
friendship and cooperation. The reasons for this can be found
in both countries poststressor evaluations of the results of the
war which have been briey mentioned here. After 1945, the
French and the Germans in cultural and psychopolitical terms
went each their separate ways while at the same time on the
level of ofcial political relations they formed a new mutually
benecial friendship. I contend that these two aspects, the
drifting apart and the friendship, signify one and the same.

44

This hypothesis requires further explanation. Let us return


again to, from the Franco-German perspective, the most moving scene of the second half of the 20th century, de Gaulle and
Adenauers meeting under the arches of Reims Cathedral. What
these two old men in fact negotiated was nothing other than the
healing disentanglement of the two nations. It was the disintegration of something fatal, something that had been more than
just a relationship going back at least as far as the era of the
Napoleonic Wars whereby the Germans and the French had,
culturally and politically, become caught up in an endless cycle
of mimicry, imitation, one-upmanship and projective empathy
with each other. This began acutely with the French importing
German romanticism with Germaine de Stals inuential book
De lAllemagne of 1813 and the Prussians importing the Napoleonic art of war through Clausewitz book Vom Kriege (posthumus 1832-1834). In this sense one could say that it was in
Reims that the two nations ofcially parted company and what
de Gaulle and Adenauer pledged each other was an everlasting non-attachment and in some ways even a permanent state
of not understanding each other, including refraining from any
new attempts in this direction. The good relations which since
then have been enjoyed between Germany and France rest on
the solid foundations of the non-attachment which was nally
achieved diplomatically described as friendship between the
two nations.
On the 8th July 2012 we will be commemorating the ftieth
anniversary of Franco-German reconciliation in doing so we
should remain aware of the fact that this is the date when our salubrious estrangement from each other, our growing disinterest
for each other, our serene coexistence, which has remained for
the large part unperturbed by any detailed knowledge, assumed

45

denite shape.10 It was then, in the talks between the two great
elders that the deadly clinch was released which had caught
both nations in its spell in a political form of animal magnetism
ever since the confrontation at Valmy in September 1792. The
cannonade of Valmy not only signied as is well known the moment of neutrality as of which the French Revolution switched
from the defensive to the offensive but also the restrained foreplay to the age of the masses which began with the French invention of general mobilization. This led in a straight line to the
synchronized excitation of an entire people through national
panic, national enthusiasm and national outrage against the
common enemy. The French were the rstborn of the new mass
dynamic and taught Europe a lesson with after-effects lasting
150 years by overrunning her. Yet Prussia hit back at Leipzig and Waterloo and since that time the spark of reciprocal
hypnosis had been jumping to and fro in a dance which Ren
Girard in his recently published work Achever Clausewitz has
described as the unication of modle and repoussoir.
For me there is no doubt that the above-mentioned book, which
by attempting to unveil the mystery of a pathogenic mutual fascination, is the rst to appear for a long time giving new impulses about reconsidering France and Germany. It shows very
impressively how Clausewitz enviously emulated Napoleon
and, how the highly gifted Prussian ofcer wished to repeat the
unprecedented successes of revolutionary French bellicism for
the German side. It suggestively explains how the Napoleonisation of the cultures of conict in Europe took place via a detour
through the book Vom Kriege, and especially the copious use of
contingents of young volunteers and later in conscripted armies
a trail leading almost in a straight line from Jena to Verdun.


Crosscheck: It is where there is more knowledge that the irritation signicantly increases. Then the maligne fascination continues to act anti-cyclically by means of
evoking seemingly indispensable images of an enemy.

46

It was in Reims that de Gaulle and Adenauer de-Napoleonized


their nations and thus paved the way for a defascinated neighbourhood.
One is tempted by Girards stimulating insights to go one step
further. It would indeed not be difcult to demonstrate how
the stress eld of our two countries was not only structured by
Napoleonic magnetism and its Prussian-Austrian mirror images but also, if not more so, by the stress which the drama
called the French Revolution caused on this side of the Rhine.
Apart from the imitatio Napoleonis it was above all the imitatio revolutionis which took effect affectively dynamically and
ideologically not only in Germany but beyond it on a gigantic
and precarious scale. Seen through eyes of studies in mimicry
it is nally possible to see Karl Marx for what he really was,
namely the central consolidation point of German ambitions
provoked by the French. In him both imitations coincide, the
commander on horseback embodying the soul of the world and
the triumphantly aggressive people of the revolution whose role
it was to be lled by the mobilized Proleteriat of the world after
the intervention of German intellectualism. Marxs entire work
conrms the thesis proposed by Heinrich Heine that wherever
Germans meddled in French affairs these became one degree
more universal, acrimonious and disastrous. When nally the
double fascination of the Russians through the dual partners of
Germany and France intervened and when Germany reciprocated this fascination for the unleashing of violence of October
1917 felt throughout the world, then the facts of the case are
fullled which Girard calls in the case of Clausewitz la monte
aux extrmes striving for extremes.
If one imagines the Girardian stimuli beyond being a global
dramaturgy of mimetic frictions then we begin to understand
why it is not possible to simply understand Franco-German re47

lations in merely bipolar terms. In truth our relaxed and defascinated bipolar rapport is for its part a segment of a domain
of some complexity which contains several three-way relationships full of tension. Here the energies of fascination, still
strong, ow charged with attraction and repugnance. Among
these is especially a triad with a French, a German and a Jewish pole as well as a triad with the US-Americans replacing
the third in the above-mentioned constellation. In these triads
relations actually occur in the real sense of the word, but to
describe them here and to fathom their potential for collision
is beyond the scope of this work. Let us at least note the battle rancorously fought between French and American spheres
which could be described as the jealous duel of two sinking
forms of political messianism.
If there is anything to be questioned about Ren Girards masterstroke it is the lack of dimensions of theoretical media in his
work. This will come as somewhat of a surprise since the huge
affective and military mobilisation between the duelling nations,
of which the author quite rightly notes: la mobilisation gnrale
est la pure folie,11 could be given more than adequate coverage
by the mass media and these media, as a vehicle of the dangerous mimesis, are today with the addition of electronic technology
even more effective than before. More than ever, they present
themselves as channels to stimulate the madness, whether it be
virtual or real, and only in them can that phantasmal event take
place which is called international terrorism. Anybody wishing
get to the bottom of extremism gone global cannot avoid combining the mimetological analysis with the mediological. By this I
mean, in order to study Girard seriously, and that will prove to be
indispensable, one will also have to reread Karl Kraus (a critic



Ren Girard: Achever Clausewitz, Paris 2007, p. 242: Die allgemeine Mobilmachung ist der pure Wahnsinn.

48

of a semi-totalitarian and degenerate press) and to lend our ears


to Hermann Broch (the author of Massenwahntheorie). And without further ado we go to Marshall McLuhan and reconsider his
elegant theoretical media deductions on nationalism. Then we
begin to understand why the global village has not only not found
peace, but also why it could not help becoming the all encompassing arena for anger and envy that it has become.
Furthermore Ren Girard emphasizes that the people who
shaped the Franco-German reconciliation were sons of the
Catholic church, Adenauer no less than de Gaulle and Schumann. We will note this hint. All the same I nd I cannot adopt
Girards convictions as my own, that Europe and the world can
only be helped by means of a general conversion to Christian
truths which are at the same time the truths of mimetology. The
pragmatic way into a benevolent and non-violent coexistence as
I have already suggested leads if anything to mutual disinterest
and defascination without us misinterpreting the value of the
symbolic reconciliatory highlights. Only after detachment from
one another has occurred can the good and useful things, which
we describe with such contemporary cardinal words such as
cooperation and integration, start to gain momentum.
If Germans and Europeans have any advice for the rest of the
world, especially for those contemporary arenas of conict where
the duellists are hot with fascination for each other, such as India
and Pakistan, Israel and its neighbours, the Islamists and the Occidentalists and possibly also the USA and China then it might
well sound like this. Do it the same way that we did, dont be too
interested in each other! And be careful how you choose your
foreign correspondents for the newspapers, make sure that those
reporting from neighbouring countries are sure to bore their readers to death! Only in this way can those happily separated from
one another live in friendship and peace with each other.
49

Ab o u t t h e Autho r
P e t e r S l o t e r dijk:
1947: Born in Karlsruhe
1968-74: Studied philosophy, history and German language
and literature in Munich.
1975: Postdoctoral studies on the philosophy and history of
modern autobiographical literature in Hamburg
Since 1980 freelance writer. Publication of numerous works
concerning questions on temporal diagnostics, cultural and religious philosophy, artistic theory and psychology
Since 1992 Professor of Philosophy and Media Theory at the
Karlsruhe University for Arts and Design
Since 1993: Director of the Institute for Cultural Philosophy at
the Academy of Visual Arts in Vienna
Since 2001: Principal of the Karlsruhe University for Arts and
Design
Since Januar 2002: Chief coordinator of the TV programme
(ZDF) Im Glashaus Das Philosophische Quartett, with Rdiger Safranski
1993: Ernst-Robert-Curtius-Prize for essay writing
2000: Friedrich Mrker- Prize for essay writing
2001: Christian-Kellerer-Prize for the future of philosophical
thought
2005: Sigmund-Freud-Prize for scientic prose
2006: Commandeur de lOrdre des Arts et des Lettres of the
Repulic of France
2008: CICERO-Prize for outstanding rhetoric
Guest lectureships at Bard College, New York, at Collge International de Philosophie, Paris and at the ETH Eidgenssische
Technische Hochschule, Zurich

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