Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
<:)+ <ZIV[UQ[[QWVQV:PM\WZQK[
)Z\[IVL+]T\]ZIT-^WT]\QWV
);MZQM[Ja\PMB]ZQKP=VQ^MZ[Q\aWN)Z\[B0L3
-LQ\MLJa
/MZPIZL*TMKPQVOMZ
;KQMV\QK)L^Q[WZa*WIZL
<PWUI[/Z]V_ITL
5IZ\QV3]Z\PMV
0MQVMZ5PTUIVV
TRACE
Peter Sloterdijk
Theory of the Post-War Periods
Observations on Franco-German relations since 1945
With a Foreword by
Klaus-Dieter Mller
SpringerWienNewYork
ISBN
Contents
1 Europe, post-historical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foreword
Klaus-Dieter Mller
Following defeat in battle every culture receives the opportunity to re-evaluate its normative basic attitudes or as Sloterdijk
puts it its moral grammar. Procedures of this kind either end
in a process assuming energies of revenge or the decision is
made to transform the cultural rules ascertained as detrimental
to behavioural patterns of a less harmful form. Is there such a
thing as a civilizing inuence of cultures by reorientation which
brings about post-heroic values? Peter Sloterdijk uses the term
metanoia to describe this process. He does not mean by this
Christian repentance but pragmatic relearning in order to increase civilisational viability (see p. 14). Sloterdijk calls the
victors post-stressory work of evaluation afrmation.
In his, in reference to metanoia and afrmation, exemplary
excursion into the jubilee culture of Franco-German relations Sloterdijk awards the Germans a process which at no
time complicated but also at no time threatened the metanoethical tranformation process of the vanquished German people,
which in its extreme forms consisted of triumphant self-hate
and aggression towards each and every national tradition.This
is reected in the biographies of many Germans. In my case it
was the same as in many other families, quarrels arose as to
guilt and responsibility.
While German criticism spoke to a population which despite
all antagonistic tendencies could not deny being guilty of the
accusations made, French criticism was directed at a society
acquitted and in need of elucidation as to their drle de libration. This may well be the reason why the intellectual Ger1
Cheval, Ren: Die Bildungspolitik in der Franzsischen Besatzungszone in: Heinemann, Manfred (Hg.): Umerziehung und Wiederaufbau. Die Bildungspolitik der Besatzungsmchte in Deutschland und sterreich, Stuttgart 1981, p. 190200, here p.
190
Gerard, Francis: Que faire de lAllemagne? Algier 1943, see Ruge-Schatz: Grundprobleme der Kulturpolitik in der franzsischen Besatzungszone in: Scharf, Claus
und Schrder, H.-J. (Hgs.): Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die Franzsische
Zone 19451949, Wiesbaden 1983, p. 91110
the German idea of French culture has simply just stood still.6
This stagnation is conrmed in the statistics on the atrophy in
Franco-German communication skills. While 1950 in a survey
in Allensbach 15% of Germans claimed to be able to read
a text written in French, in 1997 it was 16% according to a
survey in the Spiegel. Current studies assume similar results.
In France the situation is no different. Since the end of the war
Germans status as the rst foreign language has dropped from
30% to 10% and as a second foreign language French was overtaken by Spanish long ago. In his speech to the French National
Assembly on 30th November 1999 Gerhard Schrder reassured
the French people that French culture and civilisation enjoy
an elevated and lasting status in Germany. Ingo Kolbohm7 exposed this speech as a stereotype and says: If the Chancellor
wishes to be courteous in his statements this is all very well
and good, but if this is supposed to reect the actual facts of the
case then he must be contradicted.
With normalisation as euphemism of estrangement Sloterdijk
applies an apparent paradox: The pragmatic way in a benevolent and non-violent co-existence by means of mutual disinterest
and defascination. Do it the same way that we did, dont be too
interested in each other! This could be the message that people
of Germany and France have the rest of the world to offer.
Fixed rituals are no longer adequate to justify the specialness of
the Franco-German relationship. They no longer sufce to envigorate this relationship and to capture the interest of present
Mehdorn, Margarete, 19952007 president of the Deutsch-Franzsischen Gesellschaft Schleswig-Holstein e. V., since 2005 member of the board of directors of the
Vereinigung Deutsch-Franzsischer Gesellschaften in Deutschland und Frankreich, VDFG/FAFA
Kolbohm, Ingo: Pldoyer fr eine neue deutsch-franzsische Nhe: Wider die
Normalisierung als Diskurs der Entfremdung. In: Dokumente. Zeitschrift fr den
deutsch-franzsischen Dialog, Heft 3, Juni 2000, p. 207214
generations. This is because the functioning of the FrancoGerman mechanisms seems have been put into question by the
ckelness and impusiveness of the new French President. The
new normality will certainly require a bit more than just staging some event on 8th July 2012 where we can expect to hear
further speeches from audiotape. Peter Sloterdijks assumptions could prove to be a valuable contribution to this process
of re-orientation.
Despite all the attention to detail and interest in the intellectual
highlights the brilliant philosopher does not lose sight of the
triangular relationships which transcend the bipolar FrancoGerman system. And he does not lose sight of global inuences
either, for somewhere in the world there is always a post-war
period there should be a theory of post-war periods. And
hardly a conict in the world remains unnoticed. Sloterdijk
quite rightly points out that great affective military mobilisations of recent decades could only be implemented by the mass
media in the form of coverage and sensationalism and that
these media, as a vehicle of the dangerous mimesis are today
even more effective than before (see p. 48).
Sloterdijk refers to Herbert Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980)8
and postulates: Anybody wishing to get to the bottom of extremism gone global cannot avoid combining the mimetological
analysis with the mediological. The medium is the news the
terror is news and medium at the same time. Terrorism in a
media driven society turns media into a plaything and into a
tool and thus into potential abettor of terror. The terrorists are
dependent on the media because they want to trigger off a psychological effect on the greatest number of people possible and
add authority to their demands. Seen analytically we are dealing with a functional symbiosis between media and terrorism9.
The media driven battle of the cultures which is taking place
beyond the borders of the European peace became the new
boundary long ago running through all Europes territorial order. A new type of stress has arisen which is however fed to the
majority of people from virtual space. Its tripping device a images taken from executions and torture or pictures of destruction of towers of power considered to symbolize hubris10.
The ow of stress-images will not run dry. The spread of maximal-stress-cooperation (MSC) against terror has been reality for a long time now. Its unfolding is undifferentiated and
paranoid. It seeks and nds its enemies and turns Huntingtons
clash of civilisations into self fullling prophecy.
Sloterdijks Freiburg lecture, available here in the form of a
book, is a milestone. He presents to the world a philosophy
which is simultaneously German and French. At the same time
he presents a new type of consulting philosophy. A political
rhetoric has been developed by means of a new kind of cultural
theoretical approach which is capable of having lasting effects.
*
Prof Dr Klaus-Dieter Mller, born 1951 in Neumnster, Germany, is honorary professor at the Film & Television Academy
(HFF) Konrad Wolf and head of the IBF Institut Berufsforschung und Unternehmensplanung Medien e.V. in PotsdamBabelsberg.
Th e o r y o f th e P o st-War P erio ds
Ob se r v a t i o n s on Franco-G erm an
re l a t i o n s si nce 1945
1 Eu r o p e , p o st-h istorical
Ladies and Gentlemen,
If one were to attempt to summarize in one sentence the shift
in consciousness of Europeans in the period after 1945 from a
German point of view, then this would have to summarize the
following facts. The inhabitants of this continent, exhausted by
the excesses and the pressures of the era from 1914 to 1945,
turned their backs on historical passion and developed a posthistorical modus vivendi in its stead. By historical I understand
ad hoc the unity resulting from the tragedy enacted and written,
as well as the unity resulting from the epic both enacted and
written. Conceived in this sense history for Europeans is a
discarded option. By entering the shadow of catastrophe they
have decided against an existence in tragic and epic style. They
have chosen a form of coexistence in which a civilising force replaces tragedy and negotiation replaces the epic. From another
perspective one would say that Europeans have ceased to prepare for war and have become much more concerned with the
economic situation and having renounced the gods of warfare
converted from heroism to consumerism.
It becomes apparent with this very abstract assumption, as in
the appearance of the words post-war periods of the title, that
there is a shift in the meaning as compared to its everyday usage.
Indeed, I would like to emphasize and demonstrate the function
of the post-war period for the self-regulation of cultures and, on
what scale the interpretation of the outcome of wars, by those
8
waging them, becomes a decisive factor for the way in which they
conceive themselves. What must above all be emphasized, is the
extent to which the victors and those defeated by them tend to
attach importance to the fact of their being victorious or being
defeated and, how this inuences their languages and ways of
life subsequently. In the case of this observation the somewhat
generalized initial assumptions will disintegrate in more specic
information on local post-war cultures. Then, it will be possible
to focus clearly on German and French phenomena and then to
discuss the so-called relationship existing between them, if such
a thing exists I am already giving a hint as to what my nal thesis is, and it is: that, due to strongly disparate post-war processes
characterising these two countries, there can be no relations between them and that their relationship which is ofcially set out
in a treaty of friendship is, at best, what could be described as
benevolent mutual disregard or benign estrangement as can be
observed sometimes between two former partners in love and
why not also then between two former partners in hate.
Among the traits of the post-tragic and post-epic ways of life
which the Europeans have adopted nolens volens, is the widespread sentiment of living in a disassociated reality in which
there are no incidents of any consequence. The only exception is
the sequence of political events between 1989 and 1991, which
in retrospect, could be titled The collapse of Communism yet
even this eventful period which is deeply engraved into the biographies of those born between 1930 and 1975 was, to a certain
degree, merely a late sequel to the tragic-epic period which we
discarded. This nal great event is like a letter, mailed at some
time in history, which then got lost in the mail and nally reached
the addressee at a much later date. One cannot help thinking of
Sergei Krikalev who was at that time, 1990/1991, on the space
station Mir and thus took off into outer space from the Soviet Union and found himself in the new Russia when he landed again.
9
ciliation in the coronation cathedral in Reims which anticipated the signing of a treaty of friendship, the so-called Elyse
Treaty of January 1963, which followed shortly afterwards. The
solemn proceedings, which we will, when the appropriate time
comes, re-enact with a contemporary cast, occurred under the
highest symbolic auspices drawn from the traditions which we
share. The Te Deum of Reims, commemorated in the presence
of the Archbishop Franois Marty, was carried out under the
dais of longstanding Catholic universalism which was used,
for albeit a sentimental instant, in order to declare the chapter
of historical excesses between our peoples, the era of infections
and mobilisations and jealous murder and armed mass hysteria
which crossed the Rhine in both directions, to be closed.
One can well imagine what the festivities in Reims, Paris, Berlin and other metropolises will be like around the time of the
8th July 2012. The protocol that the politicians will be required
to carry out step by step will be prescribed to a T, leaving practically no room for new gestures. Hardly any fantasy is required
to envisage the speeches that we will have to hear given by both
presidents and by other incumbent speakers from the elds of
politics, culture, economics and religion. A little more fantasy
is required in order to answer the question as to whether philosophers and cultural scientists from the two countries concerned should make their own contribution to this anniversary
and should this be the case, what form it should assume. What
I am about to suggest would serve better as a dry run for a
philosophical commentary to the commemoration days which
are approaching. A response as such, should in its nal form,
reconstruct the Franco-German rivalry which lasted a thousand years from the division of the empire by Charlemagnes
descendants until the disintegration of the Third Reich in the
20th century.
11
Politiks, 306a311c.
13
After what has been said, it should now be apparent why, within
the scope of such a theory, such signicance is attached to the
post-war period of all things for moderating and controlling cultural units. At the end of bellicose conicts Mhlmann speaks
of post-stressor phases of relaxation and introspection by the
combatants in the wake of stress the victors and also the vanquished inevitably must evaluate their own cultural assumptions in the light of recent combat. This means that the victors
generally construe their own positive result as a reinforcing signal and feel their decorum conrmed, whereas the vanquished,
as long as they do not seek refuge in renouncement, resentment
and the excuses associated with these, feel prompted to ascertain the causes of their failure. This can lead to revolutionary
change in the decorum of ones own culture i.e. the embodiment
of locally dened norms and ways of life, if and inasmuch that
the losers introspection arrives at the conclusion that the roots
of their defeat not only are to be found in the strength of their
opponent, but is also due to their own weakness and failure to
adapt to the situation and in the most serious cases their own
hubris and distorted picture of the world. Processes of this kind
either give way to reform, thanks to moral, cognitive and technical rearmament assume form (as is blatantly obvious in the case
of Prussian reforms after the defeat of 1806 in Jena). Or one
makes the decision in the phase of post-stressor contemplation
to team up with the victorious culture in a peaceful alliance of
a higher level as practised by the Germans after 1945 as they
decided to proclaim Westintegration as their the maxim. For
the willingness to convert cultural rules diagnosed as detrimental into less noxious patterns, I use the term metanoia. In this
context it does not mean Christian repentance as such, but the
embracing of new thought for the betterment of the viability of
ones civilisation.
14
3 E u r o p e after N ap o leo n
These intimations will sufce, I hope, to make clear why from
a cultural theoretical point of view an analysis of Franco-German relations, with the interactions of the two cultures whether
this be in their changeful history of wars or also their just as
changeful consolidatory phase in psychopolitical processes
should be of such importance in recent times.
If we now look at the potent time span from 1806 to 1945,
which is for our theme of the greatest priority, we are confronted
by an entire sequence of entangled but yet culturally productive post-war periods, (although this productivity had primarily
pathological roots). In his recent book Ren Girard has provided important stimuli in understanding the mimetic processes of exchange in the Franco-German duel and its extremist
dynamic I will return to this later. Sufce it to say I can only
but broadly outline the agenda in such an enterprise as this.
We will content ourselves with the fact that it was Napoleons
appearance that marked a fateful turning point in the relations
between the two countries. The abundant consequences of his
interventions were literally incalculable for the course of German affairs and would possibly still be if it had not been
for Germanys and Frances rapprochement and reconciliation
under the two previously mentioned statesmen which nally
unshackled the two countries from this fatal state of affairs. For
it is Napoleon, from a German standpoint, who was not only the
liquidator of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation,
not only the man whose military genius defeated Austria and
Russia in the Battle of Austerlitz of 1805, not only the victor of
Jena and Auerstedt in 1806 in short not only the war god, as
according to Clausewitz, through whose intensity France, torn
apart by the revolution, succeeded in transforming the transition from monarchy to republic from an internal to an external
15
affair and moreover to a global messianic campaign for the dissemination of French principles in the form of launching a global war of conquest. Through this, his impact became so great,
that he created the epoch making archetype of political genius
which due to his brilliant successes fatally sowed the seeds of
resentment and imitatory rivalry fed by love and hate, and this
in all the European countries he had attacked from the Atlantic
to the Urals.
If one wishes to attach full meaning to the term post-war period
in regard to the entire European development after 1815 then
there is no avoiding the fact that the chain of reactions triggered
off by French attacks, despite the inuence regional diversity,
spanned more than 150 years, was most effective in the antiliberal and anti-modern currents in Germany which lasted until
Hitlers suicide in the spring of 1945, and in Spain where the
blockade against political and cultural modernity continued
until Francos death in 1975. It should also be pointed out in
reference to the post-war period that Napoleons image as role
model or bogeyman in the art, in the philosophy and the politics
of Europe remained virulent for over a century. From a clinical
point of view too, it was not until the second half of the 20th
century that the number of patients who considered themselves
to be Napoleon began to steadily drop at least in asylums. The
way in which the Corsican continued to make his presence felt
on the scene is called to account by Andr Glucksmann in a
chapter of his political autobiography which he titled not without a touch of bitter humour A nous deux, Napolon!. Here
we learn what price had to be paid but until recently before a
French adolescent was healed of the disease of Napoleonitis
including homeopathic treatment employing Maoism.2 Historians of political ideas have quite rightly pointed out the fact
16
17
4 It a l y 1 9 1 8 : F alsificatio n s o f t he
r e su l t s of w ar, po litics in a big way
At this point I do not wish to restrict my focus to the post-war
periods of the 20th century. And it is here that attention will be
paid to German and French developments which took place after 1945 and their possible correlation. In order to illustrate the
conceptual framework of this examination which is becoming
more concrete, it will be essential to introduce an analytical intermezzo dealing with certain anomalies of consequence in the
post-war period starting in 1918 so that the processes are coherent. We will focus our attention on Italy because it is the key
to understanding further considerations, and it is here that the
concept of war result falsication rst materializes clearly. In
connection with Mhlmanns model of post-stressory decorumrevision we have already mentioned that the rule is that after
battles fought a culture gets the opportunity to re-evaluate and
possibly revise its basic normative attitudes, one could also say
its moral grammar, in the light of the results of the combat. The
benchmarks for this examination are called afrmation in the
case of victory and metanoia in the case of defeat.
Now we should remember that in 1918 the Italians found themselves in a position where neither of these two alternatives was
applicable. As is generally known the Italians withdrew from
the alliance of 1882 with Germany and Austria-Hungary (the
so-called Triple Alliance) in August 1914 thus signalling their
having become ambivalently neutral. Sometime later as a result
of the secret treaty of London (which promised Italy in the event
of victory considerable territorial gains) it defected to the Allied camp by declaring war on Austria-Hungary at the end of
May 1915. But despite many heroic sacrices victory was not
to be for the Italians. Only thanks to massive allied assistance
was it possible that Italy, although it was completely nished
18
had begun shortly after November 1918 with the infamous stab
in the back of the supposedly undefeated army and as of 1933
displayed the well-known consequences.
In the light of these considerations, Fascism in its original form
appears not only as the much discussed transfer of modern warfare to the modus operandi of the entire culture and eo ipso as
the neutralization of the difference between war and peace under the prex of permanent mobilization, but moreover its psychopolitical form betrays its wilful falsication of the outcome
of war and rejection of metanoia. Its distinguishing marks are
the triumphalism of the loser and the forced afrmation of the
heroistic code by those, who in view of their recently acquired
experience, would have been better advised to radically review
their relationship to the set of rules of the heroic life.
20
Cf. Tony Judt: Past Imperfect. French Intellectuals 19441956, Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford 1992
24
25
What distinguishes French from German criticism is their entirely different types of cultural integration and consequently
their diametrically opposed tendency as to policies of the truth.
While German criticism speaks to a population which, despite their reluctance, was not able to deny being guilty of the
charges, French criticism was directed at a society acquitted,
and in need of elucidation as to their drle de libration. This
may well be the reason why the intellectual Germany is the
only place in the world where an old-fashioned correspondence
theory of truth still dominates. Here defeat is called defeat (and
a crime a crime) and the remaining words are also gauged to
this semantic primal scale. It is only here that the religion of the
objective referee holds sway. The intellectual France prefers
the politically more elegant and rhetorically more attractive position where words and things belong to separate systems.
26
6 G e r m a n y 1 9 4 5 : Metano ia
It goes without saying that the German population had plenty
work to do after 1945 which was generally termed the Wiederaufbau (rebuilding the nation). The priorities for rebuilding
the nation were something they had in common with their defeated and yet liberated French neighbours even though this
assumed an entirely different manner. In its German connotation the word of course particularly signies the material aspect
of dealing with the damage done by the war which was evident
enough after the bombardment by allied forces. Furthermore,
it signied the sum of the efforts which the Germans subjected
themselves to in order to recover morally and culturally. Certainly Adenauer was not de Gaulle yet another trivial sentence
with formidable implications. The name of the rst German
chancellor stands for national reconstruction with very little in
common with the afrmative arts of Gaullism. He symbolizes
the pragmatic and everyday side of the metanoethical work in
Germany. In the course of its unwavering progress the Wiederaufbau combined the reconstruction of the towns and cities
with a political and moral reorientation. The German economic
boom as it was subsequently named, acted as an economic conrmation of the course that had been taken to bring about the
metamorphosis.
In order to plot the graph showing the progress of this selfreconstruction it will sufce to recall the admission of guilt by
all German Protestant Christians in Stuttgart on 19th October
1945 which can be legitimately termed the beginning of spiritual history in what was to become the Federal Republic of
Germany. Further points along the curve mark, apart from the
treaty of reparation with Israel in 1952, were the scene of 12th
July in 1962 in Reims and Willy Brandt kneeling at the memorial in the Warsaw ghetto on 7th December 1970. The inaugu27
28
29
30
dubious is the hysterogenous potential growing out of the liaison between presidentialism and media populism, a potential
with which de Gaulle as a political Nietzschean and illusionist
reverted to with great virtuosity in serving the whole. Even with
its worn down prole the genetic material of Gaullism poses a
volatile risk for Europe. And members of the European Union
will be well advised to observe closely the Sarkozy experiment
which the French chose in May 2007. After the new president
was forced to realize that a Cecilia Ciganer cannot be a second Jacky Kennedy the next lesson for him would be, despite
suggestions to the contrary, that there is denitely no room in
Europe for a White House. If he really wants to show generosity
of spirit and make a big impact by remodelling France in a contemporary manner he could, by introducing the much overdue
post-Gaullist constitution and thus becoming the rst man of
the sixth republic to make the headlines.
The clear outcome of the neo-gallic war over the interpretation
of Libration contains a historically ideological and remarkable
characteristic. Numerous observers have recently unanimously
come to the conclusion that the previously high-prole French
left-wing has after a prolonged weak phase, beginning in Mittrands last years if not earlier, sunk into oblivion within a
very short time. This process which was to recently become
apparent by the number of ballot boxes, is accompanied by an
intellectual erosion which beggars all description. Even the interpretation of the above by those concerned leaves a lot to be
desired, (there has been for some time talk of the demise of la
Grande Nation as if France had happened to collide with an
iceberg one cold night) but this heavy-handedness comes as no
surprise in view of its record. All the same the new theoretical
nonentity of the left camp in France and its far-reaching practical disintegration represents a serious brainteaser for historians of mentality and ideas.
31
35
8 G e r m a n y 2 0 0 7 : T he id io t of t he
Eu r o p e a n family in the p h ase of
n o r m a l i z atio n the Walser Af f air
With reference to the German position in the light of the particulars and sentiments of 2007 it is sufcient to recognize the
obvious. This country has entered a phase where it may start to
reap the benets of its metanoethical efforts. It has won back
the trust of its neighbours if we ignore a few poisoned depots
in England and Poland where anti-German emotions reproduce
anaerobically as it were and there too, where forgiveness is
beyond the realms of what is humanly possible, it has evoked a
certain respect as to its metamorphosis. There is no better expression of this situation as the election of a German Pope. When
on 19th April 2005 the cardinals in Rome elected Joseph Ratzinger as the new head of the Catholic church their main concern
may have been expressing the continuity of the Catholic issues
in the world, be that as it may, but from a neutral standpoint it
is clear that this decision involved more. It set an example at
the same time of overwhelming perspicuity which said: German
ancestry does not have to be a reason for withdrawal of trust; a
German name can signify integrity at the highest level. It is up
to each and every expositor to decide whether this was mere coincidence or, that this was the result of purely internal Catholic
circumstances, but anybody who takes a closer look at the matter cannot help realizing that this decision has a history outside
the realms of Catholicism. It indirectly yet unmistakably throws
light on the sixty years of work that the Germans have done on
themselves. From this standpoint the election of Benedict XVI,
whatever else it may signify, is the external ratication of the
political and moral process the beginnings and motives of which
have already been mentioned above.
36
This reluctance also includes the memory of German victims of the war. When during a service in commemoration of the bombing of Dresden on 13th February 2004 in
Munich demonstrators turn out with slogans such as Bomber Harris, do it again! This
is more a manifestation of black humour but above all shows how some opponents
to normalisation have distanced themselves from the realms of the norms of civil
society.
37
Cf. The monography inspired by the systemsatic theories of Gnter Sautter, Politische Entropie. Denken zwischen dem Mauerfall und dem 11. September 2001 (Botho
Strau, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Martin Walser, Peter Sloterdijk), Paderborn
2002.
38
39
For Frank Schirrmacchers voluminous documentation concerning the speech and the
controversy initiated by Ignaz Bubis see: Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, Frankfurt 1999
* Translators note Allusion to Max Frischs drama Biedermann und die Brandstifter
40
The German feuilleton which was at that time to blame by succumbing to its habitual scandal-loving imitative reexes would
be well advised to reconsider whether there might be a connection between the names Martin Walser and Benedict XVI which
deserves to be made explicit. The way I see things there most
denitely is one, and viewed from the right perspective it is
transparent enough. Both these names represent renewed German symbols of integrity with extraordinary and uninterrupted
achievements in the era since 1945. As far as their interests,
themes and tendencies are concerned they could not be more
divergent. Nevertheless, they stand side by side together with
some others like Heuss, Niemller, Adorno, Dahrendorf, Willy
Brandt, Weizscker, Grass, Kluge and Enzensberger for nothing less than - the rebound from the depths of despair of German post-war civilization as a whole. If the Popes name here
in Germany shines brighter than that of the writer this, aside
from the added astral value associated with the papal rank,
may partly be attributed to the fact that in some places there
is still resistance to the obvious; one can reproach an author of
Walsers Balzac-like stature for the duration of a crisis but not
if he told the truth, in his rather obstinate southern German
way, ten or twenty years too early the word truth is taken
here as elsewhere as our knowledge of existence corresponds
in perspectives.9
As far as the considerations on the history of mentalities are
concerned for the appraisal of future relations between the Germans and the French the answer is obvious. With Germanys
completed metamorphosis into a metanoethical, civilisatory
and more or less regenerated nation, the days have come to an
end where phrases such as German interests can be interpreted as a return to patterns of thought from the NS period.
If it was in German interests to show as few interests as pos
Also the criticism raised against Walser due to his satire on Marcel Reich-Ranicki
in Tod eines Kritikers remains after scrutiny irrelevant.
42
sible over the last fty years, then the future of the country can
only lie in a return to a moderate afrmativity. Incidentally,
this is expected by Germanys foreign partners because in the
eld of international politics one wishes to be able to rely on a
predictable egoism of each and every ally and opponent in the
EU and the rest of the world. In fact Germany is in the process
of discarding its temporary role as the idiot of the European
family and simply developing into an ordinary political egoist.
Nobody will be offended if one notes that Germany could learn
a lot from France in this respect.
It may well appear as if I have taken stock of the metanoethical balance very one-sidedly in favour of Germany and rebuked
France for being a breeding ground for two lies about reality. I
do not wish to contradict this impression, but by means of an
additional comment wish to provide for a more evenly balanced
evaluation. The poles of both countries as to post-war truth and
post-war lie indeed start reversing as soon as one touches the
sensitive points of German as well as French raison. I am talking about the new denition of military functions in both countries after the defeats of 1940 and or 1945. Here it can be seen
that France has managed to create a truth from its lie in as much
as it has set itself up as a nation willing and able to defend itself.
Germany on the other hand has created a lie out of the truthfullness of its metanoia because it bears before it like a standard
its total dependence on others for its military defence as if it
were a moral achievement. The Germans have tendency to be
convinced that on the basis of their previous crimes they have a
greater entitlement to live in a world where there is no war. From
this has resulted a syndrome of pretentious weakness which will
not be able to stand up to the trials that are to come. Therefore
we will have to wait and see, if and how, in this basal segment of
the new adjustment of cultural decorum a normalisation in the
realistic sense will follow on the part of Germany.
43
44
45
denite shape.10 It was then, in the talks between the two great
elders that the deadly clinch was released which had caught
both nations in its spell in a political form of animal magnetism
ever since the confrontation at Valmy in September 1792. The
cannonade of Valmy not only signied as is well known the moment of neutrality as of which the French Revolution switched
from the defensive to the offensive but also the restrained foreplay to the age of the masses which began with the French invention of general mobilization. This led in a straight line to the
synchronized excitation of an entire people through national
panic, national enthusiasm and national outrage against the
common enemy. The French were the rstborn of the new mass
dynamic and taught Europe a lesson with after-effects lasting
150 years by overrunning her. Yet Prussia hit back at Leipzig and Waterloo and since that time the spark of reciprocal
hypnosis had been jumping to and fro in a dance which Ren
Girard in his recently published work Achever Clausewitz has
described as the unication of modle and repoussoir.
For me there is no doubt that the above-mentioned book, which
by attempting to unveil the mystery of a pathogenic mutual fascination, is the rst to appear for a long time giving new impulses about reconsidering France and Germany. It shows very
impressively how Clausewitz enviously emulated Napoleon
and, how the highly gifted Prussian ofcer wished to repeat the
unprecedented successes of revolutionary French bellicism for
the German side. It suggestively explains how the Napoleonisation of the cultures of conict in Europe took place via a detour
through the book Vom Kriege, and especially the copious use of
contingents of young volunteers and later in conscripted armies
a trail leading almost in a straight line from Jena to Verdun.
Crosscheck: It is where there is more knowledge that the irritation signicantly increases. Then the maligne fascination continues to act anti-cyclically by means of
evoking seemingly indispensable images of an enemy.
46
lations in merely bipolar terms. In truth our relaxed and defascinated bipolar rapport is for its part a segment of a domain
of some complexity which contains several three-way relationships full of tension. Here the energies of fascination, still
strong, ow charged with attraction and repugnance. Among
these is especially a triad with a French, a German and a Jewish pole as well as a triad with the US-Americans replacing
the third in the above-mentioned constellation. In these triads
relations actually occur in the real sense of the word, but to
describe them here and to fathom their potential for collision
is beyond the scope of this work. Let us at least note the battle rancorously fought between French and American spheres
which could be described as the jealous duel of two sinking
forms of political messianism.
If there is anything to be questioned about Ren Girards masterstroke it is the lack of dimensions of theoretical media in his
work. This will come as somewhat of a surprise since the huge
affective and military mobilisation between the duelling nations,
of which the author quite rightly notes: la mobilisation gnrale
est la pure folie,11 could be given more than adequate coverage
by the mass media and these media, as a vehicle of the dangerous mimesis, are today with the addition of electronic technology
even more effective than before. More than ever, they present
themselves as channels to stimulate the madness, whether it be
virtual or real, and only in them can that phantasmal event take
place which is called international terrorism. Anybody wishing
get to the bottom of extremism gone global cannot avoid combining the mimetological analysis with the mediological. By this I
mean, in order to study Girard seriously, and that will prove to be
indispensable, one will also have to reread Karl Kraus (a critic
Ren Girard: Achever Clausewitz, Paris 2007, p. 242: Die allgemeine Mobilmachung ist der pure Wahnsinn.
48
Ab o u t t h e Autho r
P e t e r S l o t e r dijk:
1947: Born in Karlsruhe
1968-74: Studied philosophy, history and German language
and literature in Munich.
1975: Postdoctoral studies on the philosophy and history of
modern autobiographical literature in Hamburg
Since 1980 freelance writer. Publication of numerous works
concerning questions on temporal diagnostics, cultural and religious philosophy, artistic theory and psychology
Since 1992 Professor of Philosophy and Media Theory at the
Karlsruhe University for Arts and Design
Since 1993: Director of the Institute for Cultural Philosophy at
the Academy of Visual Arts in Vienna
Since 2001: Principal of the Karlsruhe University for Arts and
Design
Since Januar 2002: Chief coordinator of the TV programme
(ZDF) Im Glashaus Das Philosophische Quartett, with Rdiger Safranski
1993: Ernst-Robert-Curtius-Prize for essay writing
2000: Friedrich Mrker- Prize for essay writing
2001: Christian-Kellerer-Prize for the future of philosophical
thought
2005: Sigmund-Freud-Prize for scientic prose
2006: Commandeur de lOrdre des Arts et des Lettres of the
Repulic of France
2008: CICERO-Prize for outstanding rhetoric
Guest lectureships at Bard College, New York, at Collge International de Philosophie, Paris and at the ETH Eidgenssische
Technische Hochschule, Zurich
50