Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41971 November 29, 1983
ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and
EMETERIA S. GARCIA, respondents.
Benjamin H. Aquino for petitioner.
Alfredo Kallos for respondents.

Will with the least interference from the GARCIAS who were "mere
pretenders to be illegitimate children of SOLANO".
On April 6, 1970, the GARCIAS filed their "Reply to ZONIA's Appearance
and Supplemental Cause of Action" impugning the recognition of ZONIA
as an acknowledged natural child with the prayer that she be declared
instead, like them, as an adulterous child of the DECEDENT. ZONIA did
not file any responsive pleading and the case proceeded to trial. The
GARCIAS further moved for the impleading of the SOLANO estate in
addition to ZONIA, which was opposed by the latter, but which the Trial
Court granted in its Order dated April 15, 1970. 1
In the hearing of May 13, 1970, the Trial Court specified the legal issues
to be treated in the parties' respective Memoranda as: 1) the question of
recognition of the GARCIAS; 2) the correct status of ZONIA, and 3) the
hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated Will. 2
On July 14, 1970, the Trial Court, presided by Judge Ezequiel S.
Grageda, rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which decrees:

MELENCIO HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1

A Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the then Court of
Appeals affirming the judgment rendered by the former Court of First
Instance of Albay, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 3956, an action for
Recognition.
On July 7, 1969, Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia (GARCIAS),
claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton SOLANO, filed an action
for recognition against him. In his Answer, SOLANO denied paternity. On
February 3, 1970, during the pendency of the suit, SOLANO died.
Petitioner ZONIA Ana Solano was ordered substituted for the
DECEDENT as the only surviving heir mentioned in his Last
1 Will and
Testament probated on March 10, 1969, or prior to his death, in Special
Proceedings No. 842 of the same Court. ZONIA entered her formal
appearance as a "substitute defendant" on March 4, 1970 claiming
additionally that she was the sole heir of her father, SOLANO, and asking
that she be allowed to assume her duties as executrix of the probated

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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring

the plaintiffs Bienvenido S. Garcia and Emeteria S.
Garcia and the defendant Sonia Ana Tuagnon as the
illegitimate children of the late Dr. Meliton Solano under
the class of ADULTEROUS CHILDREN, with all the
rights granted them by law. The institution of Sonia Ana
Solano as sole and universal heir of the said deceased
in the will is hereby declared null and void and the three
(3) children shall share equally the estate or one- third
(1/3) each, without prejudice to the legacy given to
Trinidad Tuagnon and the right of any creditors of the
estate. No pronouncement as to costs.
Appealed to the Court of Appeals by ZONIA, said Court affirmed the
judgment in toto (CA-G.R. No. 49018).
ZONIA seeks a reversal of that affirmance in this petition, which was
given due course.

At the outset, we should state that we are bound by the findings of fact of
both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, particularly, the finding that
the GARCIAS and ZONIA are, in fact, illegitimate children of the
DECEDENT. The oral testimony and the documentary evidence of record
inevitably point to that conclusion, as may be gleaned from the following
background facts: SOLANO, a resident of Tabaco, Albay, married Pilar
Riosa. The latter died. On a world tour he met a French woman, Lilly
Gorand, who became his second wife in 1928. The union was short-lived
as she left him in 1929. In the early part of 1930, SOLANO started having
amorous relations with Juana Garcia, out of which affair was born
Bienvenido Garcia on March 24, 1931 (Exhibits "A" & "3"); and on
November 3, 1935, Emeteria Garcia was born (Exhibits "B " & "2"). Their
birth certificates and baptismal certificates mention only the mother's
name without the father's name. The facts establish, however, that
SOLANO during his lifetime recognized the GARCIAS as his children by
acts of support and provisions for their education.
In 1935, SOLANO started living with Trinidad Tuagnon. Three children
were born out of this relation but only petitioner ZONIA Ana Tuagnon,
born on July 26, 1941, is living. In her Birth Certificate, her status was
listed as "illegitimate"; her mother as Trinidad Tuagnon; her father as
"P.N.C. " (Exhibit "V"), or "padre no conocido".
During the Japanese occupation, SOLANO obtained a divorce from Lilly
Gorand on November 29, 1943 (Exhibits "R-1" and "S-1"). On December
22, 1943, SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon executed an "Escritura de
Reconocimiento de Unit Hija Natural" (Exhibit "Q"; "7"), acknowledging
ZONIA as a "natural child" and giving her the right to use the name
ZONIA Ana Solano y Tuagnon. The document was registered with the
Local Civil Registrar on the same date.
On January 18, 1969, SOLANO executed his "Ultima Voluntad y
2 heir to all
Testamento" (Exhibit "11"), instituting ZONIA as his universal
his personal and real properties in Camalig, Tabaco and Malinao, all in
the province of Albay, except for five parcels of land in Bantayan, Tabaco,
Albay, which were given to Trinidad Tuagnon in usufruct Upon
SOLANO's petition (Exhibit "10"), the Will was duly probated on March
10, 1969 in Special Proceedings No. 842 of the Court of First Instance of
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Albay, Branch II, in a Decision also rendered by Judge Ezequiel S.

Grageda (Exhibit "12").
As above stated, these facts are not in question.
Petitioner maintains, however, that: t.hqw
I
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction in
declaring substitute defendant Zonia Ana Solano, now
petitioner, an illegitimate child of the late Dr. Meliton
Solano in an action where private respondents, as
plaintiffs in the Court below, sought recognition as
natural children of Dr. Meliton Solano.
II
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering
the division of the estate of Dr. Meliton Solano between
the petitioner and private respondents, when said estate
is under the jurisdiction and control of the probate Court
in Special Proceedings No. 842.
III
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial Court, acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction in
declaring nun and void the institution of heir in the last
will and testament of Dr. Meliton Solano, which was duly
probated in special proceedings No. 842 of the Court of
First Instance of Albay, and in concluding that total
intestacy resulted there from. 3
Directly challenged is the jurisdiction of the lower Court, in an action for
recognition: 1) to declare ZONIA as an illegitimate child of SOLANO; 2)

to order the division of the estate in the same action despite the
pendency of Special Proceedings No. 842; and 3) to declare null and
void the institution of heir in the Last Win and Testament of SOLANO,
which was duly probated in the same Special Proceedings No. 842, and
concluding that total intestacy resulted.
It is true that the action below was basically one for recognition.
However, upon notice of SOLANO's death, the Trial Court ordered his
substitution by ZONIA, "the only surviving heir ... as of as of now" 4 In her
"Appearance of Substitute Defendant Zonia Ana T. Solano ... Sole and
Universal Heir", ZONIA specifically prayed that she be 6 allowed to
assume her duties as executrix and administratrix of the probated will
and testament of the late Dr. Meliton Solano, under Special Proceedings
No. 842, which is already final and executory, with least interference from
the plaintiffs (GARCIAS) who may be classified for the moment as only
pretenders to be illegitimate children". In other words, ZONIA did not only
rely upon SOLANO's Answer already of record but asserted new rights in
her capacity as sole and universal heir, "executrix and administratrix,
"and challenged the right of the GARCIAS to recognition. Thus, she was
not defending the case as a mere representative of the deceased but
asserted rights and defenses in her own personal capacity. So it was that
the GARCIAS filed a "Reply to Appearance of ZONIA ... and
Supplemental Cause of Action ... "vigorously denying that ZONIA was
SOLANO's sole and universal heir; that ZONIA could not legally be
considered as SOLANO's acknowledged natural child because of a legal
impediment; that the admission to probate of SOLANO's Will was merely
conclusive as to its due execution; that the supposed recognition under a
notarial instrument of ZONIA as an acknowledged natural child was
fraudulent and a product of misrepresentation; that ZONIA's recognition
in the Will as an acknowledged natural child is subject to nullification and
that at most ZONIA is, like them, an adulterous child of SOLANO with
Trinidad Tuagnon.
3

During the trial, the GARCIAS presented evidence to prove their

allegations not only in their main complaint but also in their "Reply to
Appearance and Supplemental Cause of Action". ZONIA presented no
objection to the presentation by the GARCIAS of their oral and
documentary evidence and even cross-examined their witnesses.
ZONIA, for her part, presented her own testimonial and documentary
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evidence, denied the relationship of the GARCIAS' to SOLANO and

presented the notarial recognition in her favor as an acknowledged
natural child by SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon (Exhibit "Q"). Thus, as
raised by the parties in their own pleadings and pursuant to their
respective evidence during the trial, the litigation was converted into a
contest between the GARCIAS and ZONIA precisely as to their correct
status as heirs and their respective rights as such. No error was
committed by either the Trial Court or the Appellate Court, therefore, in
resolving the issue of ZONIA's status.
ZONIA additionally assails the jurisdiction of the Trial Court in declaring
null and void the institution of heir in SOLANO's will; in concluding that
total intestacy resulted therefrom; and distributing the shares of the
parties in SOLANO's estate when said estate was under the jurisdiction
and control of the Probate Court in Special Proceedings No. 842.
Normally, this would be the general rule. However, a peculiar situation is
thrust upon us here. It should be recalled that SOLANO himself instituted
the petition for probate of the Will during his lifetime. That proceeding
was not one to settle the estate of a deceased person that would be
deemed terminated only upon the final distribution of the residue of the
hereditary estate. With the Will allowed to probate, the case would have
terminated except that it appears that the parties, after SOLANO's death,
continued to file pleadings therein. Secondly, upon motion of the
GARCIAS, and over the objection of ZONIA, the Trial Court ordered the
impleading of the estate of SOLANO and proceeded on that basis. In
effect, therefore, the two cases were consolidated. The records further
disclose that the action for recognition (Civil Case No. 3956) and Spec.
Procs. No. 842 were pending before the same Branch of the Court and
before the same presiding Judge. Thirdly, it is settled that the allowance
of a Will is conclusive only as to its due execution. 5 A probate decree is
not concerned with the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the
Will. 6
Thus, the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to conclude
that, upon the facts, the GARCIAS and ZONIA were in the same
category as illegitimate children; that ZONIA's acknowledgment as a
"natural child" in a notarial document executed by SOLANO and Trinidad
Tuagnon on December 22, 1943 was erroneous because at the time of

her birth in 1941, SOLANO was still married to Lilly Gorand, his divorce
having been obtained only in 1943, and, therefore, did not have the legal
capacity to contract marriage at the time of ZONIA's conception, 7that
being compulsory heirs, the GARCIAS were, in fact, pretended from
SOLANO's Last' Will and Testament; and that as a result of said
preterition, the institution of ZONIA as sole heir by SOLANO is null and
void pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code. t.hqw
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious. ... 8
As provided in the foregoing provision, the disposition in the Will giving
the usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the five parcels of land in
Bantayan, Tabaco, Albay, is a legacy, recognized in Article 563 of the
Civil Code, 9and should be respected in so far as it is not inofficious. 10
So also did the Trial Court have jurisdiction in resolving the issue of the
hereditary shares of the GARCIAS and ZONIA. However, contrary to the
conclusions of the Courts below, holding that the entire Will is void and
intestacy ensues, the pretention of the GARCIAS should annul the
institution of ZONIA as heir only insofar as the legitime of the omitted
heirs is impaired. The Will, therefore, is valid subject to that limitation. 11 It
is a plain that the intention of the testator was to favor ZONIA with certain
portions of his property, which, under the law, he had a right to dispose of
by Will, so that the disposition in her favor should be upheld as to the
one-half (1/2) portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose
of. 12 Since the legitime of illegitimate children consists of one half (1/2) of
the hereditary estate, 13the GARCIAS and ZONIA each have a right to
4 ZONIA's
participation therein in the proportion of one-third (1/3) each.
hereditary share will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of the estate,
while the GARCIAS will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of the
value of the estate.
As heretofore stated, the usufruct in favor of Trinidad Tuagnon over the
properties indicated in the Will is valid and should be respected.
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The case of Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al., 14 reiterating the ruling in Neri, et
al. vs. Akutin, et al., 15 which held that where the institution of a universal
heir is null and void due to pretention, the Will is a complete nullity and
intestate succession ensues, is not applicable herein because in the
Nuguid case, only a one-sentence Will was involved with no other
provision except the institution of the sole and universal heir; there was
no specification of individual property; there were no specific legacies or
bequests. It was upon that factual setting that this Court declared: t.
hqw
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in
question 'a complete nullity. Article 854 of the Civil Code
in turn merely nullifies 'the institution of heir'.
Considering, however, that the will before us solely
provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir,
and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will
is null." (at p. 459)
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is a specific bequest or legacy so
that Article 854 of the Civil Code, supra, applies merely annulling the
"institution of heir".
Lastly, it should be pointed out that the jurisdiction of the Trial Court and
the Appellate Court was never questioned before either Court. ZONIA
herself had gone, without objection, to trial on the issues raised and as
defined by the Trial Court. Neither had ZONIA assigned lack of
jurisdiction of the Trial Court as an error before the Appellate Court. She
should now be held estopped to repudiate that jurisdiction to which she
had voluntarily submitted, after she had received an unfavorable
judgment, The leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 16 on this point,
declared: t.hqw
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question the same
jurisdiction. The question whether the court has
jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of
the parties is not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication but for

the reason that such practice cannot be tolerated

obviously for reasons of public policy. After voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified in that the
hereditary share in the estate of the decedent of petitioner Zonia Ana T.
Solano is hereby declared to be (1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of said estate,
while that of private respondents, Bienvenido S. Garcia and Emeteria S.
Garcia, shall each be (1/3 of 1/2) or (1/6) of the estate. The usufruct in
favor of Trinidad Tuagnon shall be respected. The judgment is affirmed in
all other respects. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

now stopped, after getting an adverse verdict, from repudiating belatedly

the jurisdiction of the trial and appellate courts to which she had
submitted without question her cause.

Solano vs. CA, Bienvenido/Emeteria Garcia

GR L 41971 November 29, 1983
FACTS:

Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
The record shows that the probate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. 842) was
not one for settlement of estate of a deceased but one instituted by the
testator himself, Dr. Meliton Solano, for the allowance of the will during
his lifetime under Article 838 of the Civil Code. Such allowance was
granted and this terminated the proceeding, although as noted in the
Court's opinion, the parties continued to file some pleadings therein after
Dr. Solano's death. But the issues between the parties as to their status
and hereditary shares in view of the probated will naming petitioner as
sole heir were expressly delineated, tried and determined in the action
for recognition (Civil Case No. 3956) filed by respondents Garcias
5
against their father Dr. Solano who was substituted by petitioner as
defendant (and sole heir of the estate under the probated will) after his
death. In effect, therefore, the two cases (assuming that the probate
proceeding could be deemed as having continued notwithstanding its
termination with the allowance in vitam of Dr. Solano's will) which were
pending before the same judge and the same branch of the trial court
could be correctly said to have been. consolidated. Finally, petitioner is
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Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against Melita

Solano Meliton died during the pendency of the petition and his daughter
substituted him while asking for the probate of the will of the decedent.
RTC specified the legal issues as 1) the recognition of Garcias, 2) correct
status of Zonia, 3) the hereditary share of each of them in view of the
probated will. In deciding, RTC declared Garcias as illegitimate children
of late Meliton.; the institution of Sonia as sole heir declared null and
void, the 3 children shall share equally the estate CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the
institution of sole heir from decedents will.
RULING:
That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Melitons
will, and as a result, Sonias institution as sole heir is null and void
pursuant to Art. 854
The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,

shall annul the institution of heir, but the devises and legacies
shall be valid
The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his
property which the testator had the right to such so that it should be
upheld as to the one-half portion of the property that the testator could
freely dispose of Sonias share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate
and Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of will should not be
invalidated all together.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31703

February 13, 1930

CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria

Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the
Court of First Instance of Manila,defendants-appellants.
L. D. Lockwood and Jose M. Casal for appellants.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Leoncio B. Monzon for appellee.
6

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the
association known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the
liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said
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plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his

son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against
Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez,
the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment,
levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana.
The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary
heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary
injunction restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so
attached. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's
universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the injunction.
The court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the
plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and
granted a final writ of injunction.
The defendants insist in their contentions, and, in their appeal from the
decision of the trial court, assign the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in holding that a trust was created by
the will of Doa Ana Maria Alcantara.
2. The lower court erred in concluding and declaring that the
amount of P21,428.58 deposited with La Urbana is the property
of the children of the plaintiff as "herederos fidei-comisarios."
3. The lower court erred in making the injunction permanent and
condemning defendant to pay the costs.
The question here raised is confined to the scope and meaning
of the
7
institution of heirs made in the will of the late Ana Maria Alcantara already
admitted to probate, and whose legal force and effect is not in dispute.
The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the
parties are the ninth, tenth, and eleventh, quoted below:

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Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my

gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age,
married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living in
this same house with me, I institute her as my sole and universal
heiress to the remainder of my estate after the payment of my
debts and legacies, so that upon my death and after probate of
this will, and after the report of the committee on claims and
appraisal has been rendered and approved, she will receive from
my executrix and properties composing my hereditary estate,
that she may enjoy them with God's blessing and my own.
Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that
my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving children;
and should any of these die, his share shall serve to increase the
portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters) by accretion, in
such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my
heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible.
Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena,
die after me while her children are still in their minority, I order
that my estate be administered by my executrix, Mrs. Josefa
Laplana, and in her default, by Attorney Ramon Salinas and in
his default, by his son Ramon Salinas; but the direction herein
given must not be considered as an indication of lack of
confidence in my nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I
relieve from the duties of administering my estate, because I
recognize that his character is not adapted to management and
administration.
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a
simple substitution, while the appellee contends that it is a
fideicommissary substitution.
This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of the three
cases that might give rise to a simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code),
only the death of the instituted heiress before the testatrix would in the
instant case give place to such substitution, inasmuch as nothing is said
of the waiver of inheritance, or incapacity to accept it. As a matter of fact,
however, clause XI provides for the administration of the estate in case

the heiress instituted should die after the testatrix and while the
substitute heirs are still under age. And it is evident that, considering the
nature of simple substitution by the heir's death before the testator, and
the fact that by clause XI in connection with clause X, the substitution is
ordered where the heiress instituted dies after the testatrix, this cannot
be a case of simple substitution.
The existence of a substitution in the will is not and cannot be denied,
and since it cannot be a simple substitution in the light of the
considerations above stated, let us now see whether the instants case is
a fideicommissary substitution.
In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and
universal heiress, and provides that upon her death (the testatrix's) and
after probate of the will and approval of the report of the committee on
claims and appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole
hereditary estate. Although this clause provides nothing explicit about
substitution, it does not contain anything in conflict with the idea of
fideicommissary substitution. The fact that the plaintiff was instituted the
sole and universal heiress does not prevent her children from receiving,
upon her death and in conformity with the express desire of the testatrix,
the latter's hereditary estate, as provided in the following (above quoted)
clauses which cannot be disregarded if we are to give a correct
interpretation of the will. The word sole does not necessarily exclude the
idea of substitute heirs; and taking these three clauses together, such
word means that the plaintiff is the sole heiress instituted in the first
instance.
The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall receive and
enjoy the estate, is not incompatible with a fideicommissary substitution
(it certainly is incompatible with the idea of simple substitution, where the
heiress instituted does not receive the inheritance). In fact the enjoyment
8
of the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary
substitution, by virtue of which the heir instituted receives the inheritance
and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass
it on the second heir. On this point the illustrious Manresa, in his Civil
Code (Vol. 6, pp. 142 and 143, 5th ed.), says:

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Or, what amounts to the same thing, the fideicommissary

substitution, as held in the Resolution of June 25, 1895,
February 10, 1899, and July 19, 1909, requires three things:
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and
transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate.
3. A second heir.
To these requisites, the decision of November 18, 1918 adds
another, namely that the fideicommissarius be entitled to the
estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to inherit from
the latter and not from the fiduciary. (Emphasis ours.)
It appears from this quotation that the heir instituted or the fiduciary, as
referred to in articles 783 of the Civil Code, is entitled to enjoy the
inheritance. And it might here be observed, as a timely remark, that the
fideicommissum arising from a fideicommissary substitution, which is of
Roman origin, is not exactly equivalent to, nor may it be confused with,
the English "trust."
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the
right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may
enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an indication of
the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution.
Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not
say whether the death of the heiress herein referred to is before or after
that of the testatrix; but from the whole context it appears that in making
the provisions contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a
fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the transmission of her
estate to the children of the heiress by this provision, "in such wise that
my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children
in so far as it is legally possible." Here it clearly appears that the testatrix
tried to avoid the possibility that the substitution might later be legally
declared null for transcending the limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil

Code which prescribed that fideicommissary substitutions shall be valid

"provided they do not go beyond the second degree."
Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution
in clause X is the provision that the wholeestate shall pass unimpaired to
the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve
the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to
the fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with another of the
requisites of fideicommissary substitution according to our quotation from
Manresa inserted above.
Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary
substitution, when a provision is therein made in the event the heiress
should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case
where the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and after
receiving and enjoying the inheritance.
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a
fideicommissary substitution, according to the quotation from Manresa
above inserted, are present in the case of substitution now under
consideration, to wit:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In
this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the
enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and
transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate. Such
an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the
"whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving
children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose
of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in
9
case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the
estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the
disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted,
who are referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in
clause XI.
SUCCESSION

Finally, the requisite added by the decision of November 18, 1918, to wit,
that the fideicommissarius or second heir should be entitled to the estate
from the time of the testator's death, which in the instant case, is, rather
than a requisite, a necessary consequence derived from the nature of the
fideicommissary substitution, in which the second heir does not inherit
from the heir first instituted, but from the testator.
By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not
belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute
property, but to her children, from the moment of the death of the
testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.
Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the
beginning, which is on deposit with the association known as La
Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it
be subject to the execution of the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who
is not one of the fideicommissary heirs.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant,
Mariano Garchitorena. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Street, J., reserves his vote.

to take its course in case she dies intestate, said clause not only
disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides
for the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.

FACTS:
P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name, with the La Urbana in
Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria
Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres
Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the defendant
Mariano Garchitorena.The latter held a judgement for P7,872.23 for due
execution against the husband of Ana Maria,Joaquin Perez Alcantara
hence the deposited amount in La Urbana was attached. The plaintiff,
alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the
decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction
restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The
defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress,
and pray for the dissolution of the injunction. The court held that said La
Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as fideicommissary
heirs ofAna Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, or a
fideicommissary substitution.
RULING: There is a fideicommissary substitution.All the elements of this
kind of substitution are present:
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case
the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the
10
estate, according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to
a third person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is
imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass
unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children; "thus, instead of leaving
the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law
SUCCESSION

3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are
referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI. As a
consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress
instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her
children, from the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria
Alcantara. Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at
the beginning, which is on deposit with the association known as La
Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it
be subject to the execution of the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who
is not one of the fideicommissary heirs.The judgment appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Mariano Garchitorena.

approximately 193 square meters, and the improvements existing

thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their complaint alleged that
Singson owned one half pro-indiviso of said property and that
Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of
the duly probated last will of Doa Leona Singson, the original owner,
and the project of partition submitted to, and approved by the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur in Special Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs
had made demands for the partition of said property, but defendant
refused to accede thereto, thus compelling them to bring action.
Defendants defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere
usufructuary of, and not owner of one half pro-indiviso of the property in
question, and that, therefore, she was not entitled to demand partition
thereof.

EN BANC

After trial upon the issue thus posed, the lower court rendered judgment
as follows:

[G.R. No. L-13876. February 28, 1962.]

CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., PlaintiffsAppellees, v. DR. MANUEL SINGSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Felix V. Vergara, for Defendant-Appellant.

"2. Ordering the aforesaid co-owners to execute an agreement of

partition of the said property within 30 days from receipt of this judgment
unless it be shown that the division thereof may render it unserviceable,
in which case the provisions of Art. 498 of the New Civil Code may be
applied;

B. Martinez for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

SYLLABUS
1. WILLS AND TESTAMENTS; DESIGNATION OF HEIRS; PURPOSE
OF FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION. It is of the essence of a
fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon
the first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the
estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a
particular event.
DECISION

11

DIZON, J.:
Action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion Florentino
and Francisco Crisologo against Manuel Singson in connection with a
residential lot located at Plaridel St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of
SUCCESSION

1. Declaring that the plaintiff is a co-owner pro-indiviso with the

defendant of the house and lot described in the complaint to the extent
each of an undivided 1/2 portion thereof;

"3. That in the event the said parties shall fail to do so, this Court will
appoint the corresponding commissioners to make the partition in
accordance with law; and
"4. Without special pronouncement as to costs."
From the above judgment, defendant Singson appealed.
It is admitted that Doa Leona Singson, who died single on January 13,
1948, was the owner of the property in question at the time of her death.
On July 31, 1951 she executed her last will which was admitted to
probate in Special Proceeding No. 453 of the lower court whose decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in G. R. No. 3605-R. At the time of
the execution of the will her nearest living relatives were her brothers
Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, and her nieces Rosario, Emilia
and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolacion, all surnamed Florentino.

Clause IX of her last will reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"NOVENO. Ordeno que se de a mi nieta por parte de mi hermana mia
y que al mismo tiempo vive en mi casa, y, por tanto, bajo mi proteccion, y
es la CONSOLACION FLORENTINO:
"(A). La mitad de mi casa de materiales fuertes con techo de hierro
galvanizado, incluyendo la mitad de su solar, ubicado en la Poblacion de
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Calle Plaridel, actualmente arrendada por los
hermanos Fortunato, Teofilo y Pedro del apellido Kairuz. Pero si
falleciere antes o despues que yo mi citada nieta, esta propiedad se dara
por partes iguales entre mis tres hermanos Evaristo, Manuel y Dionisio,
o a sus herederos forzosos en el caso de que alguno de ellos muriere
antes.
.
.
.
.
(Exhibit
F)."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The issue to be decided is whether the testamentary disposition above
quoted provided for what is called sustitucion vulgar or for a sustitucion
fideicomisaria. This issue is, we believe, controlled by the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code in force in the Philippines prior to the
effectivity of the New Civil Code, in view of the fact that the testatrix died
on January 13, 1948. They are the following
"ART. 774. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute
the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before
him, or should not wish or should be unable to accept the inheritance.
"A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it is to
apply, shall include the three mentioned in the next preceding paragraph,
unless the testator has otherwise provided."
"ART. 785. Fidei-commissary substitutions by virtue of which the heir is
charged to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or part of
the inheritance shall be valid and effective, provided they do not go
beyond the second degree, or that they are made in favor of persons
living at the time of the death of the testator."
"ART.
785.
The
following
shall
be
inoperative
12
1. Fiduciary substitutions not made expressly, either by giving
them this
name or by imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute obligation of
delivering the property to a second heir.." . . .
In accordance with the first legal provision quoted above, the testator
may not only designate the heirs who will succeed him upon his death,
but also provide for substitutes in the event that said heirs do not accept
SUCCESSION

or are in no position to accept the inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of

him.
The testator may also bequeath his properties to a particular person with
the obligation, on the part of the latter, to deliver the same to another
person, totally or partially, upon the occurrence of a particular event (6
Manresa, p. 1112)
It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration
provides for a substitution of the heir named therein in this manner: that
upon the death of Consolacion Florentino whether this occurs before
or after that of the testatrix the property bequeathed to her shall be
delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts to the testatrixs three
brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs should
anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this clause
created what is known as sustitusion vulgar, the necessary result would
be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became
the owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it provided for a
sustitusion fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than
usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she would
undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter. As Manresa
says, if the fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of the property
bequeathed by will, but mere usufructuary rights thereon until the time
came for him to deliver said property to the fideicomisario, it is obvious
that the nude ownership over the property, upon the death of the
testatrix, passed to and was acquired by another person, and that person
cannot be other than the fideicomisario. (6 Manresa, p. 145).
It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an
obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit
to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his
death or upon the happening of a particular event. For this reason Art.
785 of the old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary substitution
shall have no effect unless it is made expressly ("de una manera
expresa") either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon the first heir
the absolute obligation ("obligacion terminante") to deliver the inheritance
to a substitute or second heir. In this connection Manresa says:
"Para que la sustitucion sea fideicomisaria, es preciso segun el art. 781,
que se ordene o encargue al primer heredero, cuando sea tal, que
conserve y transmita a una tercera persona o entidad el todo o parte de
la herencia. O lo que es lo mismo, la sustitucion fideicomisaria, como
declaran las resoluciones de 25 de Junio de 1895, 10 de Febrero de
1899 y 19 de Julio de 1909, exige tres requisitos:

"1.o Un primer heredero llamado al goce de los bienes preferentemente.

"2.o Obligacion claramente impuesta al mismo de conservar y transmitir
a un tercero el todo o parte del caudal.
"3.o Un segundo heredero.
"A estos requisitos aade la sentencia de 18 de Noviembre de 1918, otro
mas, el del que el fideicomisario tenga derecho a los bienes de la
herencia desde el momento de la muerte del testador, puesto que ha de
suceder a este y no al fiduciario.
"Por tanto, cuando el causante se limita a instituir dos herederos, y por
fallecimiento de ambos o de cualquiera de ellos, asigna la parte del
fallecido o fallecidos, a los herederos legitimos o a otras personas, solo
existe una sustitucion vulgar, porque falta el requisito de haberse
impuesto a los primeros herederos la obligacion de conservar y
transmitir los bienes, y el articulo 789, en su parrafo primero, exige que
la sustitucion sea expresa, ya dandole el testador el nombre de
sustitucion fideicomisaria, ya imponiendo al sustituido la obligacion
terminante de conservar y transmitir los bienes a un segundo heredero."
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows
that the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of
the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the
effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary
rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof
being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely
provides that upon appellees death whether this happens before or
after that of the testatrix her share shall belong to the brothers of the
testatrix.
In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of
the deceased Da. Leona Singson established a mere sustitucin vulgar,
the substitution of Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix
13
to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former,
whether it
happens before or after that of the testatrix.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with
costs.
SUCCESSION

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,

J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and De Leon, JJ., concur.

Whether the testamentary disposition provided for sustitucion vulgar or

for sustitucion fideicomisaria? SUSTITUCION VULGAR
RATIO:
The old Civil Code governs this case. Testator may not only designate
heirs wholl succeed him, but also substitutes in the event that said heirs
dont accept or are in no position to accept inheritance or legacies, or die
ahead of him.- Testator may also bequeath his properties to particular
person w/ obligation, on part of latter, to deliver the same to another,
totally or partially, upon occurrence of particular event.
- The particular testamentary clause provides for substitution of heir in
this manner: upon death of Consolacion Florentino, whether before or
after that of testatrix, property bequeathed to her shall be delivered or
shall belong in equal parts to testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel,
Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of
Consolacion Florentino.

CRISOLOGO v SINGSON
NATURE Action for partition by Sps Crisologo against Singson
FACTSThis involves a lot and improvements thereon. Complaint alleged that
Singson ownedhalf pro-indiviso of said prop and that Florentino owned
the other half by virtue of theduly probated last will of Singson (the orig
owner).- Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a
mere usufructuary of andnot owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the
property in question, and that therefore, shewas not entitled to demand
partition thereof.- Lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff.
Singson appealed.- At the time of the execution of the will, the nearest
14 Manuel
living relatives of the original owner were her brothers Evaristo,
and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emiliaand Trinidad, and her
grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.
ISSUE:

SUCCESSION

- If this created sustitucion vulgar, necessary result would be that

Consolacion Florentino, upon death of testatrix, became owner of one
undivided half of the property, but if it provided for sustitution
fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary
rights over same half. In the former, she would be entitled to partition,but
not in the latter. As Manresa says, if fiduciary did not acquire full
ownership of property bequeathed by will, but mere usufructuary rights
until time came for him to deliver said property to the fideicomisario, its
obvious that nude ownership over property, upon death of testatrix,
passed to and was acquired by another person, and the person cannot
be other than the fideicomisario.
- It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an
obligation be clearly imposed upon first heir to preserve & transmit to
another the whole or part of estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or
upon happening of particular event. For this reason, Art 785 of old Civil
Code provides that fideicommissary substitution has no effect unless
made expressly either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon firs
their the absolute obligation to deliver the inheritance to a substitute or
second heir.The substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of
fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect
that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over

the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in

the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that
upon appellee's death, whether before or after that of testatrix, her share
shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.

DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 3 dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the
decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and
ordered the defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs
of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with
its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja
Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein
petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855
square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and
admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in
my name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 113725

June 29, 2000

15

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y
BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
SUCCESSION

(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the

aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set forth
hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx

FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die
and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the
said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the
lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla
shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and
Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the
sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the
event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall
later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee,
shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE
HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza,
on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and
TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die,
lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have
respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my
16
heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants,
(sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE
HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further
command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this
Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to
sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near
descendants and my sister."4
SUCCESSION

Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and
children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed
Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos
brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52
of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned
heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.
The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of
the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank
and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's
specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near
descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver
one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25
piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y
Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the
complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated
demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the
Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or
mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall
likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per
crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendantheirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late
Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of
title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but

on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to
defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.

For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY

(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 198990;

During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:

For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY

(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 199091; and

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain

Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the
property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an
amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on
the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following
effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of
TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more
specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of
our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during
December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is
considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same
manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop
years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 198788, will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as
mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into
consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year,
which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a
17
staggered cash installment, payable on or before the end of December of
every sugar crop year, to wit:

For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY

(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 199192."5
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of
Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar
corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision,
dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds
that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the
defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the
non-performance of the command as mandated exaction from them
simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title
holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the
present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the
category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate
the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla
and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the
Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely
filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."6

For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY

(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 198889;
SUCCESSION

On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed

the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:

"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiffappellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja
Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver
such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's
admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the
punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of
seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in
case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the
reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge
Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must
institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure
the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja
Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the
codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one
entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to
reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to
the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."7
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition, contending
that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to
the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the
Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the
New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.

18

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the

appeal in accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal
institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised which is the
absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that
Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution
SUCCESSION

and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near
descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private
respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and
without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary
provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for
the reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted
heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite
identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore,
under Articles 8438 and 8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution
should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition
that the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which
was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of
Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against
the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely,
to stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right
against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the
Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights
are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent 10 and
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The
legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate
parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. 11 Thus, the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law,
without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were
transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his
death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of
subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his

death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of
the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the
Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to
his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would
be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death
of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and
title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's)
obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private
respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the
fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter
through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent
has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal
institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a
substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's
near descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to
deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to
take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in
general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another
heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as
in a simple substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with
19
the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or
13
others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon
contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of
the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. 14 In the
case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide
SUCCESSION

that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or

renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What
the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not
fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall
be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point,
petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is
strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same
later to the second heir.15 In the case under consideration, the instituted
heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided
the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix.
Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is
lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir.
"Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his
will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." 16 Also, the near
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property
will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also
missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary
to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from
the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore,
void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir.17 In
the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and
therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in
point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application
of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall
not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his
intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided
that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the
wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may
receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should
disregard this obligation.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality,

an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition
unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of
the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as
modal and not conditional.22

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the
preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the
testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in
conformity with his wishes.

Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the

private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize
the property itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was
expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is

known in the law of succession as aninstitucion sub modo or a modal
institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the
institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the
testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.18 A
"mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not
affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. 19 On the other hand, in
a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be
fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The
condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but
does not suspend.20 To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory
condition.21

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of

the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made. 23 Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be
adopted.24

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned

unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix
imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-ininterest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter.
However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and
the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the
performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that20
should the
obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it
imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the
efficacy of such institution.
SUCCESSION

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to

deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza
Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they
sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The
Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the
sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the
property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The nonperformance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of
the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants.
Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on
the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction
imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation
should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the
amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been
assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become
the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a
substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the
consummated settlement between the lessee and the private

respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner,

the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation
under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act
by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his
death.25 Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends
how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator
must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of
making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
334 SCRA 522 Civil Law Succession Transmissible Obligations
A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla as a devisee to a 511, 855 hectare land. A condition was
however imposed to the effect that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja,
during the lifetime of said Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near
descendants, shall continue delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;
21

4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to
a relative of Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.

SUCCESSION

In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny

to reconvey the said land to the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is
alleged that Johnny failed to comply with the terms of the will; that since
1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the land was
mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term near descendants in the will
of Aleja pertains to the near descendants of Aleja and not to the near
descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near
descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on
the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with
the terms of the Will left by Aleja Belleza.
HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The
near descendants being referred to in the will are the heirs of Dr.
Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised property was already transferred
to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died,
ownership over the same property was transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla
by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property,
rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since
obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear therefore, that Johnny should
have continued complying with the terms of the Will. His failure to do so
shall give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey the property to the
estate of Aleja.

Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably,
whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since
obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his death.

RABADILLA vs. CA June 29, 2000

FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja
Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein
petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of
land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation
until he dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75)
(sic) piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the
said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.
ISSUE:

22

WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited
by his heirs.
HELD:
SUCCESSION

those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the
right of representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit
either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession
provided for in the Civil Code, or by the right of representation
provided for in Article 981 of the same law.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DAUGHTER-IN-LAW, NOT AN INTESTATE HEIR OF
HER SPOUSES PARENT. There is no provision in the Civil Code
which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of
her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which
entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own right
or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which
relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous
absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate
heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the
legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of
the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
3. ID.; ID.; WIDOW OR WIDOWER MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 887 OF
THE CIVIL CODE REFERS TO SURVIVING SPOUSE. Petitioner
argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the
provisions of article 887 of the Civil Code. the aforesaid provision of
law refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does
not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-40789. February 27, 1987.]
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES. IRENEA C.
ROSALES, Petitioner, v. FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES
ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and ANTONIO
ROSALES,Respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for Petitioner.

23

Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for Respondents.

SYLLABUs

1. CIVIL
LAW;
WILLS
AND
SUCCESSION;
INTESTATE
SUCCESSION; INTESTATE OR LEGAL HEIRS; CLASSIFICATION.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely,
SUCCESSION

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SURVIVING SPOUSE CONSIDERED A THIRD PARTY

WITH RESPECT TO ESTATE OF PARENT-IN-LAW. Indeed, the
surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate
of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in
Lachenal v. Salas, to wit: "We hold that the title to the fishing boat
should be determined in Civil Case No., 3597 (not in the intestate
proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio,
the decedents son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his
estate. . . . ." (Emphasis supplied).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION; BLOOD
RELATIONSHIP; BASIS THEREOF. Article 971 explicitly declares
that Macikequeroz Rosales is called to succession by law because of

his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio

Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would
have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-inlaw.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCHOATE RIGHT TO ESTATE EXTINGUISHED BY
DEATH OF HEIR. Petitioner contends that at the time of the death
of her husband Corterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent
right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heirs. Be that
as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by this death
that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from
Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his
deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband
predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs.
Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was
survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children
Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio
Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox
Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The
estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R.
24 Acebes
Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales
administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order
dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs
of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate
SUCCESSION

Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes

(daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio
Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated
February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share
of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio
Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of
her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned
Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition.
First is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-inlaw? Second are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the
widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the
said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those
who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his
own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the
same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always
inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the
former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by
right of representation.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag

inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them
should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion
pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in
equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children or their descendants and illegitimate
children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to
the same share as that of a legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire
Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her
mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation.
The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate
succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude
the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir.
The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law
an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation.
If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir
of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the
provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
25

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and

ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;

SUCCESSION

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children

by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they
exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be
duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three
classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner
and to the extent established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased
spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the
estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation
in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be
determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate
proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope
L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although
married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is
nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code
aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of
the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the
estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of
the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased
Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate

of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the

inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the
Code.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED

for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be
remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.

The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by

Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz

SO ORDERED.

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of

law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the
place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession
by the law and not by the person represented. The
representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented
would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to
succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not
succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who
predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his
father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband
Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties
of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her
husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio
26
Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it
unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a
surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
SUCCESSION

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and

Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES,

petitioner, vs.FORTUNATO ROSALES, ET AL
Principle:
A widow/widower cannot inherit from the parent-in-law by right of
representation. Article 971 explicitly declares that the representative is
called to succession by law because of blood relationship. The
representative does not succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have succeeded. A widow of the
person represented cannot assert the same right of representation as
there is no filiation by blood.
Facts: Petra Rosales is the decedent. She is survived by her husband,
their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales.
Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein
petitioner.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order
dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs
of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate

Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;

Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share
of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio
Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of
her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Petitioner contends that she is a compulsory heir as enumerated in Art.
887 being the widow or widower of the son of the decedent and that at
the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an
inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as her
compulsory heir.
Issue: Can a widow inherit from the mother-in-law?
Held: NO
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire
Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her
mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation.
The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate
succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude
the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir.
The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law
an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation.
If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir
of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Article 887 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not
27
apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the
estate of the parent-in-law.

SUCCESSION

ROSALES vs ROSALES
Facts:
Irenea Rosales, wife of Carterio Rosales insisted on getting a share from
the estate in her capacity as surviving spouse from the estate of her
mother-in-law.
Issue:

Whether or not a daughter-in-law is entitled to the estate of a her parentin-law in her capacity as the surviving spouse of a son who predeceased
his mother;
Ruling:
Classification of intestate succession: intestate successors re classified
into two:
1.

Those who inherit by their own right;

2.

Those who inherit by right of representation (Art. 981)

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a a widow is an

intestate heir of her mother-in-law;
Art. 887 (961) refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case
the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir;
Surviving spouse is a third party in the estate of a parent-in-law;
The basis for right of representation is blood relationship;
Inchoate right is extinguished by death of an heir;
3.

Order of the share in the intestate succession

Art. 962. In every inheritance, the relatives nearest in degree excludes

the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly
takes place;
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit equal shares, subject
to the
28
provisions of Article 1006
-

With respect to relatives of the full blood and half blood,

And or Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between

the paternal and maternal lines;

SUCCESSION

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO
LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.
SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION; NATURE OF

ACTION; EFFECT OF DEATH OF PLAINTIFF BEFORE FINAL
DECREE. The death of the plaintiff before final decree in an
action for legal separation abates the action. An action for legal
separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this
jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines
recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent
spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation and in its article
108, by providing that the spouses can, by reconciliation, stop or
abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the
death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
actio personalis moritur cum persona.
29

2.

ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF DEATH OF PLAINTIFF BEFORE FINAL

DECREE ON PROPERTY RELATIONS. A review of the resulting
changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are
solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can
not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIM TO RIGHTS UNDER ART. 106, CIVIL CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTINGUISHED UPON THE DEATH OF
THE SPOUSE INVOLVED. From Art. 106 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership or gains (or of the absolute community of
property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of
the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his
disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as
well as revocation testamentary provisions in favor of the offending
spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that,
by the very terms of Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the
persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims
and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or
transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not
thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under section 17 Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a
substitute of the deceased party. The same result flows from a
consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or
against administrators in Section 1, Rule 67, of the Revised Rules of
Court which shows that neither action for legal separation or for
annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included therein.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. The reason why an action is
abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a decree of
separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree
such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY AB INITIO
OF MARRIAGE; EFFECT OF DEATH OF PLAINTIFF UPON
DEFENDANTS PROPERTY RIGHTS. A petition for a declaration
of nullity ab initio of marriage becomes moot and academic upon the
death of the wife, and there could be no further interest in continuing
the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a
result of Art. 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines could be
resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the Appellant.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF BIGAMOUS VOIDABLE

SUCCESSION

MARRIAGE; EFFECT OF DEATH OF ONE PARTY; PROPER

PROCEEDINGS FOR LIQUIDATION CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP.
Even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only
voidable under Article 83, par. 2 of the Civil Code, because the second
marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an
absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as
soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in
Article 87, par. 2 of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment
should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.
And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership might have
resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate
or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided
in section 3 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceedings.
REYES J.B.L., J.:p

In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent

Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along
with several other claims involving money and other properties, counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen
O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage,
celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok,
alias Ngo Hiok.

Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review
by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387,
dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death of
the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the
pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as well as the action
itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario
Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who
sought to substitute the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to
final judgment.

On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for

legal separation" 1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal
separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article
102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for
legal separation.

On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal

separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they
were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30
September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife
continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had
no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she
discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman30
named Go
Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed
for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others,
would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived
of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

SUCCESSION

Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed (the
respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9
and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular
accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of
her death.

On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute

the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio
opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the
case. 2 In the body of the order, the court stated that the motion to
dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the
question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived,
which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider
but the motion was denied on 15 September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the
order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic relations court, the
petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was
given due course and answer thereto was filed by respondent, who
prayed for the affirmance of the said order. 3

Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S.

Eufemio, filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court
below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said
counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed
not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to
declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute
for the lower court did not act on the motion for substitution) stated the
principal issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by the
counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a
marriage, does the death of a party abate the
proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of
a legal separation suit to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage,
which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent
has acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief,
page 22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the
counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand
independent and separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor
was the action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of
nullity by the counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid
marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a precondition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before
final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does,
will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? .
31

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bedand-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in
this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines
recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse
(and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by
providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already
SUCCESSION

rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one

party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio
personalis moritur cum persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for
divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs
cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse
takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244,
Section 3). The action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27,
1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933,
332.") 4 .
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under
the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a
proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a
dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a
personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the
contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action
abates the action, for the reason that death has settled
the question of separation beyond all controversy and
deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons
of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of
the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost
unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a
divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the
action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72;
Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196
N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann.
Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817;
Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659;
McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717;
Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A.
141. 5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and
maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses
shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation;

hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to
the decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .

Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the

action through a substitute of the deceased party.

Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the

following effects:

Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim
is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased
to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within
a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may
be granted...

(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from

each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
.
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute
conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right
to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, without prejudice to the provisions of article
176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded
to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the
court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court
may appoint a guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from
inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made in the will of the innocent one
shall be revoked by operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property),
the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits
earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit
32
by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the
innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the
Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses;
and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to
conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is
not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under
SUCCESSION

The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the

actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of
the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be
brought against executor or administrator. No action
upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate,
or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be
deemed fairly included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death
of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before
the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation;
and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of
nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such

action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and
there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her
demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property
rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action
for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but
only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because
the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been
an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been
generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became
extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as
provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action
for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the
parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal
partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must
be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and
not in the annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile
and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement
as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio
Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21,
1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as
husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their
marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would
order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go
Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective
evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a
vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of
her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on
June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the
one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the
death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners
counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father,
Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for
legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action
involved property rights.
HELD:

33

SUCCESSION

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even
if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of
separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during
the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic

and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her
demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property
rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action
for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990
JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and
VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents.
Domingo Lucenario for petitioners.
Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to
existing relevant laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1987 which reversed and set aside
that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines
Sur. 2 The challenged decision adjudged the petitioners liable to the
private respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and for costs.
The facts are as follows:

34

SUCCESSION

In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by

Bienvenido Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San
Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus
No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by
petitioner Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his

passenger died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal case

arising from the incident was ever instituted. 6

private respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants

(petitioners). 10

Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial

settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer
Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity)
Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario,
received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia
executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the
petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all
actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted in
her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased
was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in
which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case,
either civil or criminal, against the petitioners. 7

The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the

judgment of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release
executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the
liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by the private
respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs, representatives,
successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly
waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since
she was not the one who suffered these damages arising from the death
of their son. Furthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners
"failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that
they were the ones who bought the tricycle that was damaged in the
incident. Appellants had the burden of proof of such fact, and they did
establish such fact in their testimony . . . 11Anent the funeral expenses,
"(T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by the
appellants (the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the
appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the
appellants, therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor. 12

On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date
of the accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are
the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against
the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. 8 In
their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for
their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives
promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement,
they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral
expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle
the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to
the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and
instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged
wife of their late son. The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants,
petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of
P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the
damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary
35 9
damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages.
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the
payment by the defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her
child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the
deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein
SUCCESSION

Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to

pay the private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle,
P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery lot,
P55.00 fororacion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. 13 The
petitioners
moved
for
14
a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision but their motion was
denied. 15 Hence, this petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in
holding that the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents
the aggregate amount of P20,505.00 despite the agreement of
extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and the victim's
compulsory heirs.
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by
payment. Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:

(1) By payment or performance;

2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and

ascendants with respect to their legitimate children and
decendants;

(2) By the loss of the thing due;

3. The widow or widower;

(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;

4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by

legal fiction;

(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor

and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
(Emphasis ours.)
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition
arising from the accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only
question now is whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who
received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons
to whom payment to extinguish an obligation should be made.
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose
favor the obligation has been constituted, or his
successor in interest, or any person authorized to
receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the
deceased are the successors in interest referred to in law as 36
the persons
authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
SUCCESSION

5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they
exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and
descendants of the deceased, his parents and
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of
collateral relatives.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when
the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the
surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been
established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a
child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of
Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore
acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of
Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so
even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement
is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an
heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of
Bienvenido, seek relief and compensation from the petitioners. While it
may be true that the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the
purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for

his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims
against the estate of their deceased son. 16 These money claims are not
the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released
by the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with
Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as
the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she
executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Baritua v. CA (Mar. 22, 1990)
CAPTION/PROBLEM: Tricycle collided with bus, tricycle driver died. Bus
operator settled with tricycle drivers estranged wife. A year later, tricycle
drivers parents sued bus operator for damages alleging that the latter
promised to indemnify them for the death of the son, his funeral
expenses and the damaged tricycle (which was allegedly bought with the
parents money). Who is entitled to the indemnity the estranged wife or
the parents?
HELD: Tricycle drivers parents cannot claim because they are not his
compulsory heirs. His wife and child are the compulsory heirs. Spouse
concurs with all classes of heirs but parents are compulsory heirs only
when decedent dieswithout a legitimate descendant.
FACTS:
37

Nov. 7, 1979 - BIENVENIDO Nacarios tricycle collided with JB Bus No.

80 operated by Jose BARITUA and driven by Edgar BITANCOR, along
the National Highway, San Cayetano, Baao, CamSur. Bienvenido and
his passenger died because of the accident.

SUCCESSION

Bienvenido was survived by his estranged wife ALICIA Baracena (with

whom he had a child), and his PARENTS, NICOLAS and VICTORIA
Nacario. Mar. 27, 1980 The bus companys insurer paid P18,500 to
Alicia by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement wherein Alicia agreed to not
to prosecute Baritua and Bitancor for her husbands death.o She
executed a Release of Claim in favor of Baritua, Bitancor, and the
insurer releasing them from all claims and damages resulting from the
accident which killed Bienvenido. Sep. 2, 1981 Nicolas and Victoria
filed a suit for damages before the CamSur CFI against Baritua and
Bitancor.o Parents alleged that Baritua went to Bienvenidos wake and
promised them indemnity for Bienvenidos death, the funeral expenses,
and the damaged tricycle (which was bought from money loaned by the
parents to their son). CFI dismissed the complaint, holding that the
payment to Alicia (and the child) extinguished any claim against Baritua
et.al. for the death of Bienvenido since Alicia and her child are the
preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of Bienvenido. CA reversed
the CFI, holding that:o The parents brought the case in their personal
capacity and not as heirs.o Alicia could not have validly waived the claim
of the parents since she was not the one who suffered such damages.o
The parents were able to establish that they bought the tricycle and
Baritua et.al. failed to prove otherwise, hence they must pay for the
damage to the tricycle.o AWARD: P10,000.00 for the damage of the
tricycle, P5,000.00 for complete funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery
lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorneys fees.
Baritua and Bitancor appealed to the SC. ISSUE (HELD)W/N Baritua
et.al. are still liable to pay damages to the parents despite the extrajudicial settlement with the wife (NO)RATIO NCC 1231(1): Obligations
are extinguished by payment or performance. NCC 1240: Payment
shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been
constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to
receive it. It has been established that Baritua et.al. have paid the
claim to Alicia. The question now: Is Alicia entitled tosuch payment?
According to NCC 887, No. 2, legitimate parents and ascendants
become compulsory heirs in default of legitimate children and
descendants. NCC 985 provides: In default of legitimate children and
descendants of the deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit
from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives. On the other hand,
NCC 887 also provides that the surviving spouse is also a compulsory
heir; and s/he is not excluded by the legitimate children/descendants or
by the legitimate parents/ascendants. SC: It is patently clear that the
parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a
legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs
with all classes of heirs.