First Division: IGMIDIO MADRIGAL, Petitioner, vs. People OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

FIRST DIVISION
Laguna,
Philippines
and
within
the
jurisdiction of this [honorable] [c]ourt,

[G.R. No. 182694. August 13, 2008.]
the said accused during and within the

election period from January 11 to June
IGMIDIO
MADRIGAL, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
10, 1998 did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and criminally have in his
possession,
custody
and
control
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson [r]evolver

with no serial number containing live
RESOLUTION
ammunition, without first securing from

the [COMELEC] the required permit to
carry
CORONA, J p:
the
same
outside
his
residence. STaAcC
For possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver

during the 1998 election period, petitioner Igmidio
Madrigal was charged in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Contrary to law.
while that in Criminal Case No. 1026-SPL stated:
of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93 with two separate
That on or about March 31, 1998, in the
crimes: (1) violation of P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A.
Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
8294 1 and (2) violation of the Omnibus Election Code,
Laguna,
as
jurisdiction of this [honorable] [c]ourt,
amended
by R.A.
7166 (Gun
Ban). 2 The
information in Criminal Case No. 1025-SPL read:

That on or about March 31, 1998, in the
Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Philippines
and
within
the
the said accused, without the required

license/permit from lawful authorities
did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control a caliber .38 Smith
[nine]
&
twenty (20) days of prision
Wesson
[r]evolver
with
live
(4)
months
and
ammunition and a split [(sic)] shell
correccional as
without any number.
and to pay a fine of Fifteen

Thousand
Contrary to law.
on the merits, the RTC ruled:

view
thereof,
2. [2.]
In
Criminal
the
Court
hereby
Igmidio
accused
Igmidio
guilty
beyond reasonable doubt
(Gun
of the crime of [v]iolation
sentencing
ofP.D.
suffer
amended
8294 and
sentencing
hereby
accused
to
beyond
crime of [v]iolation of the

Omnibus
1866 as
penalty
Election
Ban)
Code
hereby
accused
to
the
indeterminate
of
imprisonment
from one year as minimum
the
indeterminate
to
of
imprisonment
maximum
from two (2) years, eleven
accessory
(11) months and ten (10)
provided for by law.
penalty
reasonable doubt of the
Madrigal y Macaraig guilty
suffer
No.
Madrigal
Macaraig
1. In Criminal Case No. 1026-SPL,
by R.A.
[C]ase
1025-SPL, finding accused
renders judgment:
finding
(P15,000.00)
Pesos; DSHTaC
Petitioner pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial
In
maximum
three
(3)
years
with
as
the
penalties
days
of prision
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision. The CA affirmed
correccional as
minimum
petitioner's conviction in both offenses but reduced the
to [f]ive (5) years, [f]our
penalty imposed on him in Criminal Case No. 1026-SPL
convicted for illegal possession of firearm if another
(illegal possession of firearm). 3
crime was committed:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner seeks
SEC. 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree
his acquittal from the charges against him. He
No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
questions the findings of the RTC, as upheld by the CA,
amended to read as follows:
of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of

illegal possession of firearm and violation of the
election gun ban. He also questions his conviction for
both offenses on the ground that R.A. 8294 proscribes
conviction
under
it
if
another
crime
has
been
committed.
finding of the RTC, as upheld by the CA, that petitioner

was in possession of an unlicensed firearm with live
ammunition during the election period in 1998. This is
entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be
disturbed on review by us, in the absence of any clear
showing that the lower courts overlooked certain facts
and circumstances which would substantially affect the
disposition of the case. 4 EHSIcT
petitioner
for
both
is
correct
offenses.
Manufacture,
Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or

Possession
of
Firearms
or
Ammunition or Instruments Used

or Intended to be Used in the
of
Ammunition.
At the outset, we see no reason to disturb the factual
conviction
1. Unlawful
Manufacture
We partially grant the petition.
However,
SEC.
of prision
Firearms
The
or
penalty
correccional in
its
maximum period and a fine of not

less than Fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000) shall be imposed upon
any
person
who
shall
unlawfully . . . possess any low

powered
firepower,
firearm
part
of
of
similar
firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or

instrument used or intended to
in
assailing
Section
his
of R.A.
8294 expressly provides that a person may not be
be used in the manufacture of

any
firearm
or
ammunition: Provided, That no
SET ASIDE insofar as petitioner was found guilty of
other
illegal possession of firearm. Criminal Case No. 1026-
crime
was
committed. (emphasis supplied)
SPL is DISMISSED and petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED
Whether there can be a separate offense of illegal

possession of firearm and ammunition if there is
another crime committed was already addressed
inAgote v. Lorenzo. 5 Agote, like petitioner herein, was
convicted of separate charges of (1) illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition and (2) violation of the
therein.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Azcuna and Leonardo-de Castro,
JJ., concur.
||| (Madrigal v. People, G.R. No. 182694, [August 13,
2008], 584 PHIL 241-245)
election gun ban by the RTC and the CA. However,

applying Section 1 of R.A. 8294, we set aside Agote's
conviction for illegal possession of firearm since
FIRST DIVISION
another crime was committed at the same time

(violation of the election gun ban). HSEcTC
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
hereby
PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The January 21, 2008 decision and April 24,

2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 26869 are AFFIRMED insofar as petitioner was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case
No.
1025-SPL
and
sentenced
to
suffer
the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from one year

as minimum to three years as maximum with the
accessory penalties provided for by law. The said
decision and resolution are, however, REVERSED and
[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997.]

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

EMILIANO
CATANTAN
TAYONG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
that to sustain the defense and convert the case of

piracy to grave coercion would be to ignore the fact
Accused-appellant, together with one Jose Macver
that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was
Ursal, were charged with violation of PD 532, otherwise
seized by the accused by means of violence against or
known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of
intimidation of persons, the very act punished by PD
1974. The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial,
532.
found both accused guilty of the crime charged and

sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. Only accusedappellant appealed. In his appeal, accused-appellant
contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of
piracy as the facts proved only constitute the crime of
grave coercion, and not piracy. Accused-appellant
argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is
essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a
vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not
attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers
by using force and intimidation but merely boarded the
boat, and it was only when they were already on board
that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take
them to some other place. LLpr
Judgment of conviction affirmed. SCDaET
SYLLABUS
CRIMINAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 532; CASE
AT BAR FALLS SQUARELY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF
PIRACY, NOT GRAVE COERCION. Under the definition
of piracy in P.D. No. 532 as well as grave coercion as
penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this
case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While
it may be true that Eugene and Juan, Jr. were
compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of
destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the
act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one
The Supreme Court ruled that the case at bar falls
of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized
squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be
the vessel through force and intimidation. To sustain
true that the Pilapils were compelled to go elsewhere
the defense and convert this case of piracy into one
other than their place of destination, such compulsion
of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a
was obviously part of seizing their boat. The Court said
fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized
by the accused by means of violence against or
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias
intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the
"Bimbo"
accused suddenly approached them and boarded their
532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway
pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as
Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while
he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to
armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in
"dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then
conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and
struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower
intimidation,
portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told his
assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene
victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.
Pilapil and Juan Pilapil, Jr. who were then fishing in the
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning.
seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing
The sudden appearance of another pumpboat with
boat, to their damage and prejudice. 1
four
passengers,
all
strangers
to
them,
easily
intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled

to submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The
moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he
had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn
revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence
were
charged
wilfully
with
and
violation
feloniously
of PD
No.
attacked,
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both

accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven
Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. 2 Of the duo
only Emiliano Catantan appealed. cdtai
avert
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial
situations like the case at bar and discourage and
court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts
prevent piracy in Philippine waters. LLphil
proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art.
the
issuance
of PD
No.
532 designed
to
286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD

No. 532.
DECISION
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock

in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers
BELLOSILLO, J p:
Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea
some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon,
stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist
Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them.
his brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs
One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano
were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres
Catantan, boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and
cantos 4 held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan

struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him
and Juan Jr. to "dapa." 3 Then Catantan told Ursal to
follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they
hog-tied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom
of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his
neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry
them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another

boat. Catantan asked whose boat that was and the
Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain
Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon learning
this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach
the boat cautioning them however not to move or say
anything.
used
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan
together with its passengers one of whom was visibly
boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered
tied.
the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another
pumpboat
which
the
accused
had
earlier
Noting that they were already far out into the sea,
Eugene reminded Catantan that they were now offcourse but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he
would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan
Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be
set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was
threatened with bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as
they went farther out into the open sea the engine
town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying

that he would still pull up his net and harvest his
catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You
choose between the two, or I will kill you." 5 Juanito,
obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal
hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined
Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat,
its outrigger caught the front part of the pumpboat of
the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt
threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water
person who, without authority of law, shall, by means
headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and
of violence, prevent another from doing something not
the
prohibited by law, or compel him to do something
two
swam
together
clinging
to
their
boat.
Fortunately, another pumpboat passed by and towed

them safely ashore.
against his will, whether it be right or wrong."

Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as
be committed it is essential that there be an attack on
"any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the
or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his
taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of
equipment,
the
the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation
were already on board that they used force to compel
of persons or force upon things, committed by any
the Pilapils to take them to some other place.
person, including a passenger or member of the
Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no
complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall
intention
be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter
fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered
provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b),
the brothers right away to approach that boat so they
of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used
could
for transport of passengers and cargo from one place
Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed
to another through Philippine waters. It shall include
grave coercion and not piracy.
or
the
personal
belongings
of
all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in

fishing (emphasis supplied).
of
leave
permanently
the
Pilapils
taking
behind
possession
in
their
or
boat.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD

No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art.
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art.
286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely
286 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any
within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that
Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere

other than their place of destination, such compulsion
was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The
testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that
the appellant actually seized the vessel through force
and intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is
A: Four.
Q: When you said the passengers of
that
pumpboat
boarded
your
pumpboat, how did they do that?

A: They
approached
somewhat
suddenly and came aboard the
significant and enlightening
pumpboat (emphasis supplied).

Q: Now, while you and your younger
brother
were
fishing
at
the
Q: How many suddenly came aboard

your pumpboat?
seawaters of Tabogon at that
A: Only one.
time, was there anything unusual
Q: What did that person do when he
that happened?
A: Yes.
came aboard your pumpboat?

A: When he boarded our pumpboat he
Q: Will you please tell the Court what

that was?
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon
aimed
his
revolver
us (emphasis supplied).
Q: By the way, when he aimed his
another pumpboat arrived and
revolver
the passengers of that pumpboat
anything to you?
boarded our pumpboat.

Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said
approached you, how many were
riding in that pumpboat?
at
to
you,
did
he
say
xxx xxx xxx

A: He said, "dapa," which means lie
down (emphasis supplied).
COURT:
the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine

waters was seized by the accused by means of
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
violence against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene
A: He aimed the revolver on me.
Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
them and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan

aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining
Q: What else did he do?
witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face
A: Then he ordered his companion to
downwards, and then struck his face with a revolver,
come aboard the pumpboat.
hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which,

Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to
Q: What did he do with his revolver?
Daan Tabogon.
A: He struck my face with the revolver,
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning.
hitting the lower portion of my
The sudden appearance of another pumpboat with
left eye.
four
passengers,
all
strangers
to
them,
easily
Q: Now, after you were struck with the
intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled
revolver, what did these persons
to submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The
do?
moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he

had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn
A: We were ordered to take them to a
revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence,
certain place.
the issuance of PD No. 532designed to avert situations
To
Q: To what place did he order you to go?
like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy
A: To Daan Tabogon. 6
in Philippine waters. Thus, we cite the succeeding
sustain
the
defense
and
convert
this
case
of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to ignore
"whereas" clauses of the decree
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only
agencies reveal that lawless elements
means of livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave
are still committing acts of depredations
the natural elements and contend with the unknown
upon the persons and properties of
forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It
innocent and defenseless inhabitants
is on these small fishermen that the townspeople
who travel from one place to another,
depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood
thereby disturbing the peace, order and
would be to deprive them of their very subsistence,
tranquillity of the nation and stunting
and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD
the economic and social progress of the
No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social,
people;
educational and community progress of the people."
Whereas, such acts of depredations

constitute
either
piracy
or
highway
robbery/brigandage which are among

the
highest
forms
of
lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all

countries; and,
Whereas, it
is
imperative
that
said
perpetrating such acts of depredations

by imposing heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view of
economic,
pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone

helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a
broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea,
could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no
lawless elements be discouraged from
eliminating
Had it not been for the chance passing of another
all
social,
obstacles
to
the
educational
and
community progress of the people.
intention of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their

boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with
their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned
the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down
and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat
that would take them back to their lair. Unfortunately
for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so
they were apprehended by the police soon after the
Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to
VICENTE
seize the boat was not produced in evidence cannot
MATOL, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL
exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and
F. LORENZO, Presiding Judge, RTC,
we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused
Branch 43, Manila and PEOPLE OF
Ursal
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
seized
through
force
and
intimidation
the
AGOTE
pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in

Philippine waters.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision

appealed from, the conviction of accused-appellant
SYLLABUS
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy

penalized
under PD
No.
532 and
sentencing
him
1.REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs
CERTIORARI; PROPER REMEDY WHERE PARTY RAISES
against accused-appellant. cdasia
ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW; REMEDIES OF APPEAL AND

CERTIORARI ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE AND NOT
SO ORDERED.
ALTERNATIVE OR SUCCESSIVE. At the outset, it must
Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur.
be stressed that petitioner never put in issue the
||| (People v. Catantan y Tayong, G.R. No. 118075,

[September 5, 1997], 344 PHIL 315-323)
factual findings of the trial court. What he questions is

said
court's
8294 cannot
legal
be
conclusion
retroactively
that Rep.
applied
Act
to
No.
him.
Unquestionably, the issue raised is one purely of law.

EN BANC
As we have said in Macawiwili Gold Mining and

Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals: For a
[G.R. No. 142675. July 22, 2005.]
question to be one of law, the same must not involve

an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any one of them. And the
distinction is well-known: there is a question of law in a
the remedies of appeal and certiorari being mutually
given case when the doubt or difference arises as to
exclusive
what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, what
question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as
petitioner should have done was to take an appeal
to the truth or the falsehood of the facts alleged.
from the trial court's order of July 15, 1999 which
Considering that "judgments of regional trial courts in
denied his motion for reconsideration of the May 18,
the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be
1999 judgment of conviction.
elevated to the Court of Appeals in cases when

appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law," while "appeals from judgments of the
[same
courts]
in
the
exercise
of
their
original
jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme

Court in cases where the appellant raises only
questions of law," petitioner should have appealed the
trial court's ruling to this Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, pursuant
to Rule 41, Section 2 (c) of the same Rules, viz.: . . . .
By reason, then, of the availability to petitioner of the
remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45, his right
to resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was
effectively foreclosed, precisely because one of the
requirements for the availment of the latter remedy is
that "there should be no appeal, or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,"
and
not
alternative
or
successive.
As
2.ID.; RULES OF PROCEDURE; MAY BE RELAXED OR

SUSPENDED WHENEVER THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE
REQUIRES; CASE AT BAR. Petitioner's case is worse
compounded by the fact that even his period for
appeal had already prescribed when he filed with the
Court of Appeals his certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 2991-UDK. The Rollo of said case reveals that
petitioner received his copy of the trial court's order
denying his motion for reconsideration on July 20,
1999. As the same Rollo shows, it was only on August
23, 1999, or after more than fifteen (15) days when
petitioner filed his wrong remedy of certiorari with the
appellate court. Be that as it may, the Court feels that
it must squarely address the issue raised in this case
regarding the retroactivity of Rep. Act No. 8294, what
with the reality that the provisions thereof are
undoubtedly favorable to petitioner. For this purpose,
then, we shall exercise our prerogative to set aside
technicalities in the Rules and "hold the bull by its
UNDER P.D. NO. 1866; NO SEPARATE OFFENSE OF
horns," so to speak. After all, the power of this Court to
SIMPLE ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS WHERE
suspend its own rules whenever the interest of justice
THE
requires is not without legal authority or precedent. In
COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME. As early as
Solicitor General, et al. vs. The Metropolitan Manila
August 1997, the month after Rep. Act No. 8294 took
Authority, we held: Unquestionably, the Court has the
effect, this Court has pronounced in Gonzales vs. Court
power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of
of Appeals that said law must be given retroactive
its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the
effect in favor of those accused under P.D. No. 1866.
Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning 'pleading,
Since then, this Court had consistently adhered to the
practice and procedure in all courts.' In proper cases,
Gonzales ruling. For sure, in People vs. Valdez, where
procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the
the accused was charged with the complex crime of
interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be
multiple murder with double frustrated murder and
miscarried
formalistic
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under
adherence to such rules. . . . We have made similar
two separate informations, this Court even took a
rulings in other cases, thus: Be it remembered that
bolder
rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
8294 retroactively so that the accused therein may not
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
be
rigid application, which would result in technicalities
possession of firearms, but refused to apply the same
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
retroactively so as to aggravate the crime of murder.
justice, must always be avoided. . . . Time and again,
The Valdez ruling had been applied in a host of
this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a
subsequent cases. Yet, in other cases, although the
particular case from their operation whenever the
Court had given Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactive effect so
higher interests of justice so require.
as to prevent the conviction of an accused of the
because
of
rigid
and
3.CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8294; GIVEN

RETROACTIVE EFFECT IN FAVOR OF THOSE ACCUSED
UNLICENSED
stance
convicted
of
FIREARM
by
the
IS
USED
applying Rep.
separate
crime
IN
Act
of
THE
No.
illegal
separate crime of illegal possession of firearm when

the said unlicensed firearm was "used" to commit the
crime of murder or homicide, the Court did not
intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant
appreciate this "use" of such unlicensed firearm as an
cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal
aggravating circumstance as provided therein, when
possession
the "use" of an unlicensed firearm was not specifically
attempted homicide. . . . The law is clear: the accused
alleged in the information, as required by the Rules on
can be convicted of simple illegal possession of
Criminal Procedure.
firearms, provided that 'no other crime was committed
4.ID.; ID.; SECTION 1 THEREOF, CONSTRUED. In

People
vs.
Walpan
M.
Ladjaalam,
this
Court,
interpreting the subject proviso in Section 1 of Rep. Act

No. 8294, applied the basic principles in criminal law,
and categorically held: . . . A simple reading thereof
shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence,
if the 'other crime' is murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct
assault
with
multiple
attempted
homicide
was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be

held liable for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover,
penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's
simple language is most favorable to herein appellant.
Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the
language of the new law demonstrates the legislative
of
firearms
and
direct
assault
with
by the person arrested.' If the intention of the law in

the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide
and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did
in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we. The aforementioned
ruling was reiterated and applied in the subsequent
cases of People vs. Garcia, where the judgment of
conviction
of
the
accused-appellants
for
illegal
possession of firearms was set aside there being

another crime kidnapping for ransom which they
were perpetrating at the same time; People vs. Bernal,
where the Court retroactively applied Rep. Act No.
8294 in accused-appellant's favor because it would
mean his acquittal from the separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms; and People vs. Bustamante,
where, in refusing to convict the accused-appellant of
the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms,
the Court declared that insofar as it is favorable to the
appellant, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294 should
be applied liberally and retroactively in that appellant
8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Court's
must be acquitted of the charge of illegal possession of
review. Any perception that the result reached here
firearms.
appears unwise should be addressed to Congress.
5.ID.; ID.; WISDOM THEREOF NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW;

THE SOLEMN POWER AND DUTY OF THE COURT TO
INTERPRET AND APPLY THE LAW DOES NOT INCLUDE
THE POWER TO CORRECT BY READING INTO THE LAW
WHAT IS NOT WRITTEN THEREIN. Guided by the
foregoing, the Court cannot but set aside petitioner's
conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal
possession
of
firearm
committed
at
the
since
same
another
time,
i.e.,
crime
violation
was
of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban.

Admittedly, this ruling is not without misgivings
considering that it would mean petitioner's acquittal of
the more serious offense of illegal possession of
firearms which carries a much heavier penalty than
violation
of
the
COMELEC
gun-ban
resolution.
However, as we have rationalized in Ladjaalam: . . .

Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal
possession of firearms by using such weapons in
committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and
scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are
punishable
by
arresto
menor.
This
consequence,
however, necessarily arises from the language of RA
Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a

new meaning detached from the manifest intendment
and
language
of
the
legislature.
Our
task
is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and

jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done
so in this case. The solemn power and duty of the
Court to interpret and apply the law does not include
the power to correct by reading into the law what is
not written therein. While we understand respondent
People's contention that the "use" of the firearm
seemed to have been the main consideration during
the deliberations of the subject provision of Rep. Act
No. 8294, the fact remains that the word "use" never
found its way into the final version of the bill which
eventually became Rep. Act No. 8294. The Court's
hands are now tied and it cannot supply the perceived
deficiency in the final version without contravening the
most basic principles in the interpretation of penal
laws which had always leaned in favor of the accused.
Under our system of government where powers are
allocated to the three (3) great branches, only the
Legislature can remedy such deficiency, if any, by
set aside the following resolutions of the Court of
proper amendment of Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294.
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK, to wit:
6.ID.; ID.; ACCUSED CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF THE
1.Resolution
dated
September
SEPARATE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM
1999, 1 dismissing
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE UNLICENSED FIREARM
for Certiorari with Prayer for the
WAS NOT ACTUALLY USED TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE
Issuance
OF VIOLATION OF THE COMELEC GUN-BAN. As
Restraining Order filed by the
written, Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 restrains the Court
petitioner against the Honorable
from convicting petitioner of the separate crime of
Manuel
illegal possession of firearm despite the fact that, as in
Judge,
Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was not actually
Manila, Branch 43 for refusing to
"used." For sure, there is, in this case, closer relation
retroactively
between
favor Republic Act No. 8294 2 ;
possession
of
unlicensed
firearm
and
violation of the COMELEC gun-ban than the illegal

possession of unlicensed firearm to the crime of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs in Almeida.
of
F.
the
14,
Temporary
Lorenzo,
Regional
Petition
Presiding
Trial
Court,
apply
in
his
and,
2.Resolution
dated
2000, 3 denying
February
8,
petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

DECISION
As culled from the pleadings on record, the following

are the undisputed factual antecedents:
GARCIA, J p:
Petitioner Vicente Agote y Matol was earlier charged

before the sala of respondent judge with Illegal
In this appeal by way of a petition for review
Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No.
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
1866 4 and
petitioner Vicente Agote y Matol seeks to annul and
2826 5 (Gun Ban), docketed as Criminal Cases No. 96-
violation
of
COMELEC
Resolution
No.
149820
and
96-149821,
respectively,
allegedly
then and there carrying the same along
committed, as follows:
V. Mapa Ext. Sta. Mesa, this City, which

is a public place on the aforesaid date
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149820
which is covered by an election period,
That on or about April 27, 1996 in the
without
City of Manila, Philippines, the said
authority
accused did then and there willfully,
provided for by the COMELEC Resolution
unlawfully,
No.
knowingly
have
in
possession and under his custody and
first
2828,
securing
from
in
the
the
written
COMELEC,
relation
to RA
as
No.
7166 (Gun Ban).
control, One (1) .38 cal. Rev. without
CONTRARY TO LAW. CAcIES
serial no. with four (4) live bullets.

Without first having secured from the
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty" to
proper authorities the necessary license
both charges. Thereafter, the two (2) cases were tried
therefor.
jointly.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Eventually, in a decision dated May 18, 1999, the trial

court rendered a judgment of conviction in both cases,
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 96-149821
separately sentencing petitioner to an indeterminate
That on or about April 27, 1996, in the
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
City of Manila, Philippines, the said
mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years eight (8)
accused did then and there, willfully,
months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as
unlawfully and knowingly have in his
maximum, in accordance with PD. No. 1866 in Crim.
possession and under his custody and
Case No. 96-149820 (illegal possession of firearm), and
control one (1) .38 cal. Rev. without
to a prison term of one (1) year in Crim. Case No. 96-
serial
149821 (violation of the COMELEC Resolution on gun
number,
with
four
(4)
live
ammunition/bullets in the chamber, by
ban).
Meanwhile,
on
June
6,
1997, Republic
Act
No.
time of the appellant's commission of
8294 6 was approved into law.
the offense for it is a rule that laws are

repealed
Pointing out, among others, that the penalty for illegal
only
by
subsequent
ones.
Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers
possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 has already
to respect and apply the law as it
been reduced by the subsequent enactment of Rep.
stands.
Act No. 8294, hence, the latter law, being favorable to

him, should be the one applied in determining his
Therefrom, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on
penalty for illegal possession of firearms, petitioner
a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary
moved for a reconsideration of the May 18, 1999
restraining order, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
decision of the trial court.
2991-UDK.
In its order dated July 15, 1999, 7 however, the trial
In the herein assailed resolution dated September 14,
court denied petitioner's motion, saying:
1999, 8 the
While the law (R.A. 8294) is indeed

favorable to the accused and therefore
should be made retroactive we are also
guided by Art. 4 of the Civil Code which
states
that
laws
shall
have
no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
appellate
court
dismissed
petitioner's
recourse on two (2) grounds, to wit: (a) the remedy

of certiorari availed of by petitioner is improper since
he should have appealed from the July 15, 1999 order
of the trial court; and (b) lack of jurisdiction, as the
issue involved is a pure question of law cognizable by
the Supreme Court.
provided. Republic Act 8294 did not so
With his motion for reconsideration having been
provide that it shall have a retroactive
denied
effect. The Supreme Court likewise in
subsequent resolution
the case of Padilla vs. CA declared: 'The
2000, 9 petitioner is now with us, submitting for
trial court and the respondent court are
resolution the following issues: (1) whether the Court
bound to apply the governing law at the
of
by
Appeals
the
erred
appellate
of
in
court
February
dismissing
his
in
its
8,
petition
for certiorari; and (2) whether the courts below erred
Considering that "judgments of regional trial courts in
in
the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be
not
giving Rep.
Act
No.
8294 a
retroactive
application.
The petition is partly meritorious.
elevated to the Court of Appeals in cases when

appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions
of fact and law", while "appeals from judgments of the
At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner never
[same
put in issue the factual findings of the trial court. What
jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme
he questions is said court's legal conclusion that Rep.
Court in cases where the appellant raises only
Act No. 8294 cannot be retroactively applied to him.
questions of law" 11 , petitioner should have appealed
Unquestionably, the issue raised is one purely of law.
the trial court's ruling to this Court by way of a petition
As we have said inMacawiwili Gold Mining and
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of
Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 10
the
courts]
1997
in
the
Rules
exercise
of
Civil
of
their
original
Procedure,
as
For a question to be one of law, the
amended, 12 pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 (c) of the
same must not involve an examination
same Rules, viz:
of the probative value of the evidence

presented by the litigants or any one of
them. And the distinction is well-known:
there is a question of law in a given
case when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts; there is a question of fact
when the doubt or difference arises as
to the truth or the falsehood of the facts
alleged. DAEICc
SEC. 2.Modes of appeal.

(a) . . .
(b) . . .
(c)Appeal by certiorari. In all cases
where only questions of law are raised
or involved, the appeal shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
By reason, then, of the availability to petitioner of the
after more than fifteen (15) days when petitioner filed
remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45, his right
his wrong remedy of certiorari with the appellate court.
to resort to a petition for certiorari underRule 65 was

effectively foreclosed, precisely because one of the
requirements for the availment of the latter remedy is
that "there should be no appeal, or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law", 13 the remedies of appeal and certiorari being
mutually
exclusive
and
not
alternative
or
successive. 14
Be that as it may, the Court feels that it must squarely

address the issue raised in this case regarding the
retroactivity of Rep. Act No. 8294, what with the reality
that the provisions thereof are undoubtedly favorable
to petitioner. For this purpose, then, we shall exercise
our prerogative to set aside technicalities in the Rules
and "hold the bull by its horns", so to speak. After all,
the power of this Court to suspend its own rules
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, what
whenever the interest of justice requires is not without
petitioner should have done was to take an appeal
legal authority or precedent. In Solicitor General, et. al.
from the trial court's order of July 15, 1999 which
vs. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, 15 we held:
denied his motion for reconsideration of the May 18,

1999 judgment of conviction.
Unquestionably,
the
Court
has
the
power to suspend procedural rules in
Petitioner's case is worse compounded by the fact that
the exercise of its inherent power, as
even his period for appeal had already prescribed
expressly recognized in the Constitution,
when
to
he
filed
with
the
Court
of
Appeals
promulgate
rules
concerning
hiscertiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK.
'pleading, practice and procedure in all
The Rollo of said case reveals that petitioner received
courts.'
his copy of the trial court's order denying his motion
rules may be relaxed or suspended in
for
the
the interest of substantial justice, which
same Rollo shows, it was only on August 23, 1999, or
otherwise may be miscarried because of
reconsideration
on July
20,
1999.
As
In
proper cases,
procedural
a rigid and formalistic adherence to
Here, the two (2) crimes for which petitioner was
such rules. . . .
convicted by the trial court, i.e., (1) illegal possession

of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 and (2) violation of
xxx xxx xxx
COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 on gun ban, were both
We have made similar rulings in other
committed by the petitioner on April 27, 1996. For the
cases, thus:
crime of illegal possession of firearms in Crim. Case
Be it remembered that rules of
No. 96-149820, he was sentenced to suffer a prison
procedure are but mere tools
term ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day
designed
of prision mayor, as minimum, to (18) eighteen years,
to
facilitate
the
attainment of justice. Their strict
eight
(8)
months
and
one
(1)
day
of reclusion
and rigid application, which would
temporal, as maximum, in accordance with P.D. No.
result in technicalities that tend
1866, Section 1 of which reads:
to frustrate rather than promote
SECTION 1.Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
substantial justice, must always
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
be avoided. . . . Time and again,
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments
this Court has suspended its own
Used or Intended to be Used in the
rules and excepted a particular
Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition.
case
The penalty of reclusion temporal in
from
their
operation
whenever the higher interests of
its
justice so require.ADEHTS
perpetua shall be imposed upon any
maximum
who
period
to
We shall now proceed to determine whether the
person
provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294 amending P.D. No.
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose,
1866 can be retroactively applied to this case.
or possess any firearm, part of firearm,

ammunition
or
shall
reclusion
machinery,
unlawfully
tool
or
instrument used or intended to be used
in the manufacture of any firearm or
rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and
ammunition. (Emphasis supplied)
other firearm of similar firepower,
When Rep.
Act
No.
8294 took
effect
on
July
6,
1997, 16 the penalty for illegal possession of firearms

was lowered, depending on the class of firearm
possessed, viz:
SECTION
part of firearm, ammunition, or

machinery,
tool
or
instrument
used or intended to be used in

the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided,
1.Section
of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby

further amended to read as follows:
'SECTION
Manufacture,
Sale,
Disposition
Firearms
or
or
That
no
other crime was committed.

The penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period and a fine of
1.Unlawful
Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000)
Acquisition,
shall be imposed if the firearm is
Possession
of
classified as high powered firearm
Ammunition
or
which includes those with bores
Instruments Used or Intended to
bigger
be Used in the Manufacture of
caliber and 9 millimeter such as
Firearms or Ammunition. The
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also
penalty of prision correccional in
lesser
its maximum period and a fine of
considered
not less than Fifteen thousand
caliber
pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed
center-fire
upon
shall
firearms with firing capability of
unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
full automatic and by burst of two
acquire, dispose, or possess any
or three: Provided, however, That
low powered firearm, such as
no other crime was committed by
any
person
who
in
diameter
calibered
than
firearms
powerful
.357
.38
and
magnum
but
such
caliber
and
as
.22
other
the person arrested. (Emphasis
under P.D. No. .1866. Since then, this Court had
supplied)
consistently adhered to the Gonzales ruling. 21
Based on the foregoing, petitioner contends that the
For sure, in People vs. Valdez, 22 where the accused
reduced penalty under Rep. Act No. 8294 should be
was charged with the complex crime of multiple
the
in
murder with double frustrated murder and illegal
itsManifestation In Lieu of Comment, 17 the Office of
possession of firearms and ammunitions under two
the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner,
separate informations, this Court even took a bolder
positing further that the statement made by this Court
stance by applying Rep. Act No. 8294retroactively so
in People
the
that the accused therein may not be convicted of the
provisions for a lighter penalty under Rep. Act No.
separate crime of illegal possession of firearms, but
8294 does not apply if another crime has been
refused to apply the same retroactively so as to
committed, should not be applied to this case because
aggravate the crime of murder. The Valdez ruling had
the proviso in Section 1 of said law that "no other
been applied in a host of subsequent cases. 23
one
imposed
vs.
on
him.
Jayson 18 to
the
Significantly,
effect
that
crime was committed" must refer only to those crimes

committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm and
not when the other crime is not related to the use
thereof or where the law violated merely criminalizes
the possession of the same, like in the case of election
gun ban, as here.
Yet,
in
other
cases, 24 although
the
Court
had
given Rep. Act No. 8294 retroactive effect so as to

prevent the conviction of an accused of the separate
crime of illegal possession of firearm when the said
unlicensed firearm was "used" to commit the crime of
murder or homicide, the Court did not appreciate this
As early as August 1997, the month after Rep. Act No.
"use" of such unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
8294 took
pronounced
circumstance as provided therein, when the "use" of
in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals 20 that said law must
an unlicensed firearm was not specifically alleged in
be given retroactive effect in favor of those accused
the information, as required by the Rules on Criminal
effect, 19 this
Court
has
Procedure. EaHDcS
In the light of the existing rulings and jurisprudence on
of the enactment of Republic Act No.
the matter, the present case takes center stage
8294, there can be no separate offense
presenting, this time, another twist, so to speak.
of illegal possession of firearms and
Petitioner, who was charged of illegal possession of
ammunition if there is another crime
firearms was also charged of another offense: Violation
committed such as, in this case, that of
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban), but the
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
unlicensed firearm was not "used" or discharged in this
(Emphasis supplied)
case. The question then which appears to be of first

impression, is whether or not the unlicensed firearm
should be actually "used" and discharged in the course
of committing the other crime in order that Sec.
1, Rep. Act No. 8294 will apply so that no separate
crime of illegal possession of firearms may be charged.
Let us take a look at the jurisprudence once again.
In Cupcupin vs. People, 25 the accused was charged
and convicted for two (2) separate crimes of illegal
possession of firearms, and illegal possession of
prohibited drugs. In the more recent case of People vs.
Almeida, 26 however,
although
the
accused
was
In Almeida, it should be noted that the unlicensed

firearm was merely found lying around, together with
the prohibited drugs, and therefore, was not being
"used" in the commission of an offense.
Given
this
Court's
aforequoted
pronouncement
in Almeida, can the accused in the present case still be

separately convicted of two (2) offenses of illegal
possession of firearms and violation of gun ban, more
so because as in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was
not actually "used" or discharged in committing the
other offense?
acquitted of the separate charge of illegal possession
In People vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam, 27 this Court,
of firearm for lack of evidence, the Court nevertheless
interpreting the subject proviso in Section 1 of Rep. Act
made the following clear pronouncement:
No. 8294, applied the basic principles in criminal law,
Furthermore, in any event, the Court

has ruled in previous cases that in view
and categorically held:

. . . A simple reading thereof shows
that if an unlicensed firearm is used
in the commission of any crime,
xxx xxx xxx
there can be no separate offense of

simple
illegal
possession
. . . The law is clear: the accused
of
can be convicted of simple illegal
firearms. Hence, if the 'other crime' is
possession of firearms, provided
murder or homicide, illegal possession

of
firearms
aggravating
becomes
merely
circumstance,
that 'no other crime was committed
an
not
by
paragraph
with multiple attempted homicide was

held
liable
for
not
Moreover, penal laws are construed
simple language is most favorable to

herein
appellant.
interpretation
is
Verily,
justified,
no
other
for
the
language of the new law demonstrates

the
legislative
intent
to
favor
the
accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot

be convicted of two separate offenses of
illegal possession of firearms and direct
assault with attempted homicide. . . .
were
to
refer
only
to
paragraph. Verily, where the law does
possession of firearms.
case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's
the
expressly said so, as it did in the third
illegal
liberally in favor of the accused. In this
arrested'. If
homicide and murder, it should have
committed in this case, appellant can no

be
person
intention of the law in the second
separate offense. Since direct assault
longer
the
distinguish,
neither
should
we.
(Emphasis supplied).
The aforementioned ruling was reiterated and applied
in
the
subsequent
cases
of People
vs.
Garcia, 28 where the judgment of conviction of the

accused-appellants for illegal possession of firearms
was set aside there being another crime kidnapping
for ransom which they were perpetrating at the
same time; People vs. Bernal, 29 where the Court
retroactively applied Rep. Act No. 8294 in accusedappellant's favor because it would mean his acquittal
from the separate offense of illegal possession of
firearms; and People vs. Bustamante, 30 where, in
refusing to convict the accused-appellant of the
injuries, both of which are punishable by
separate offense of illegal possession of firearms, the
arresto
Court declared that insofar as it is favorable to the
however, necessarily arises from the
appellant, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8294should
language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is
be applied liberally and retroactively in that appellant
not subject to the Court's review. Any
must be acquitted of the charge of illegal possession of
perception that the result reached here
firearms. DIHETS
appears unwise should be addressed to
menor.
This
consequence,
Congress. Indeed, the Court has no
Guided by the foregoing, the Court cannot but set
discretion
aside petitioner's conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-
to
give
statutes
new
meaning detached from the manifest
149820 for illegal possession of firearm since another
intendment
crime was committed at the same time, i.e., violation
and
language
of
the
legislature. Our task is constitutionally
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban.
confined only to applying the law and
Admittedly, this ruling is not without misgivings
jurisprudence to the proven facts, and
considering that it would mean petitioner's acquittal of
we have done so in this case.
the more serious offense of illegal possession of

firearms which carries a much heavier penalty than
violation
of
the
COMELEC
gun-ban
resolution.
However, as we have rationalized in Ladjaalam: 31
The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret

and apply the law does not include the power to
correct by reading into the law what is not written
therein.
While
we
understand
respondent People's contention that the "use" of the

. . . Indeed, the accused may evade
firearm seemed to have been the main consideration
conviction
of
during the deliberations of the subject provision
firearms by using such weapons in
of Rep. Act No. 8294, the fact remains that the word
committing an even lighter offense, like
"use" never found its way into the final version of the
alarm and scandal or slight physical
bill which eventually became Rep. Act No. 8294. The
for
illegal
possession
Court's hands are now tied and it cannot supply the
Since petitioner has already served more than the
perceived deficiency in the final version without
penalty imposed upon him by the trial court in Criminal
contravening
the
Case No. 96-149821, his immediate release from
interpretation of penal laws which had always leaned
custody is hereby ORDERED unless detained for some
in
other lawful cause. HIESTA
favor of
the
the
most
basic
accused.
principles
in
Under our system of
government where powers are allocated to the three

(3) great branches, only the Legislature can remedy
such deficiency, if any, by proper amendment of Sec. 1
SO ORDERED.
||| (Agote y Matol v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 142675, [July 22,
2005], 502 PHIL 318-335)
of Rep. Act No. 8294.

As written, Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 restrains the
Court from convicting petitioner of the separate crime
SECOND DIVISION
of illegal possession of firearm despite the fact that, as

in Almeida, the unlicensed firearm was not actually
"used". For sure, there is, in this case, closer relation
between
possession
of
unlicensed
firearm
and
violation of the COMELEC gun-ban than the illegal

possession of unlicensed firearm to the crime of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs inAlmeida.
[G.R. No. 162864. March 28, 2007.]

SPS.
PEBLIA
ALFARO
PROSPEROUS
ALFARO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT
OF
APPEALS,
SPS.
WHEREFORE, Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal
BAGANO
possession of firearms is hereby DISMISSED while the
BAGANO, respondents.
and
OLEGARIO
CECILIA
judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149821

for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 in
relation to Rep. Act No. 7166 (Gun Ban), is AFFIRMED.
and
DECISION
P.
C.
TINGA, J p:
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 78445; that on 22
There lies an inherent oxymoron to the term "duplicate

originals" as applied to documents. Yet, even as two
"duplicate originals" of the same document are not
exactly identical, they may be considered as identical
for all legal intents and purposes. Indeed, each
"duplicate original" may be considered as the best
evidence of the transaction embodied therein.
June
1994,
respondents
executed
Real
Estate
Mortgage over the lot in favor of petitioners to secure

payment
of
an
obligation
in
the
amount
of P180,000.00; that upon payment of the mortgage

debt,
Cancellation
and
Discharge
of
Mortgage 2 dated 20 June 1995 was executed; that

when respondents demanded the return of their title,
petitioners refused, prompting the former to check
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the
with the Register of Deeds; that upon verification,
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 17 November
respondents learned that their title had already been
2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72335, as well as the
cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 92783 3 was
Resolution dated 3 March 2004, denying the motion for
issued in the name of petitioners by virtue of a
reconsideration.
spurious Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 June 1995

(Deed of Absolute Sale) purportedly executed by
First, the facts on record.
respondents.
Thus,
respondents
sought
the
On 15 April 1996, Spouses Olegario and Cecilia Bagano
nullification of the deed of sale on the ground that
(respondents) filed a complaint against Spouses Peblia
their signatures thereon were forged. cDHCAE
and Prosperous Alfaro (petitioners) for Declaration of

Nullity
of
Sale
with
Damages
and
Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu

City. In the complaint, respondents as plaintiffs alleged
the following: that they were the previous registered
In their answer, petitioners as defendants denied the

alleged forgery. They insisted that respondents sold
Lot No. 1710 to them in consideration of the amount
of P534,000.00 sometime in June 1995.
owners of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1710,
Respondents' evidence tend to establish that they sent
located at San Roque, Talisay, Cebu and covered by
letter-request
to
Romeo
Varona
(Varona),
handwriting expert from the Cebu City PNP Crime
On the same trial date, petitioners manifested their
Laboratory, for the examination of the questioned
intention to have Varona examine another set of
signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale. The request
documents which according to them contain the
was accompanied by a set of documents consisting of
genuine signatures of respondents. Hence, on 12
the Deed of Conditional Sale dated 23 October 1989
March 1999, petitioners sent a letter to Varona,
(Exh. "H") 4 together with documents containing the
requesting him to examine the signatures on the other
specimen signatures of respondents, namely: five (5)
set of documents, namely: Real Estate Mortgage dated
receipts with corresponding dates (Exhs. "I," "I-1," "I-
22 June 1994 (Ex. "2"), 11 Acknowledgement Receipt
2," "I-3," "I-4"), 5 Community Tax Certificate dated 13
for the sum of P216,000.00 dated 14 June 1995 (Ex.
January 1995 (Exh. "J"), 6 Individual Taxpayer's ID
"3"), 12 six (6) deeds of conditional sale (Exhs. "4" to
(Exh.
"9"), 13 China Bank Check No. A-190308 dated 5
"K"), 7 Partido
ng
Masang
Pilipino ID
(Exh.
"L"), 8 and a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh.
August
"B"). 9 After examining Exh. "B" and comparing the
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 19886842 dated
signatures
8 February 1995 (Exh. "11"). 15 At the continuation of
thereon
purporting
to
be
those
of
1994
for P52,000.00
the
documents provided by respondents, Varona issued
signatures on the documents provided him, which
Report
purport to be those of respondents, as well as the
006-96 10 dated
11
January
1996
containing his findings.

On 25 November 1998, respondents presented Varona
as an expert witness on their behalf. Varona affirmed
Varona
"10"), 14and
respondents with the specimen signatures on the

No.
cross-examination,
(Exh.
stated
that
the
signatures on another copy of the Deed of Absolute

Sale (Exh. "13"), which similarly purport to be those of
respondents, were affixed by the same persons. 16
the conclusion embodied in his Report that the
According to petitioners' evidence, respondents had
questioned signatures appearing on Exhibit "B" were
initially
forged.
for P180,000.00 on 22 June 1994, as evidenced by a

Real
mortgaged
Estate
Lot
No.
1710
Mortgage. 17 Two
in
their
months
favor
later,
respondents sold a different set of lots, i.e., Lot Nos.
809-C, 809-D, 809-J, 809-K, 809-T and 809-U, by virtue
Sale null and void ab initio, reinstated TCT No. 78445
of six (6) deeds of conditional sale in favor of
in the name of respondents, and ordered petitioners to
petitioners who paid the sum of P138,000.00 as
pay the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages and
downpayment. Thereafter, petitioners discovered that
attorney's fee to respondents.
the lots subject of the conditional sale were also sold

on installment basis to other parties. To placate
petitioners, respondents sold to them the lot in
question,
Lot
No.
1710,
in
consideration
of P534,000.00, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute

Sale. Petitioners paid an additional P216,000.00 after
being
credited
the
amounts
of P180,000.00
representing the debt secured by the Real Estate

Mortgage and P138,000.00 representing the aggregate
downpayments for the six (6) conditional deeds of
sale. 18
On
23
In the present petition, petitioners maintain that the

Court of Appeals committed an error in reversing the
judgment of the trial court. Issues were raised,
concerning the following points, to wit: first, the
selective reversal by the appellate court of the RTC's
factual findings; second, the selective discussion of the
elements of a contract of sale as basis for the
invalidation of the Deed of Absolute Sale; third, the
ruling that failure to offer in evidence the second
questioned report proved fatal to petitioners' cause;
fourth, the blanket denial of petitioners' motion for
April
2001,
reconsideration; and fifth, the citing of respondent
Decision 19 dismissing the complaint and ordering
Olegario Bagano's testimony in the Decision despite its
respondents
having been stricken off the records for his failure to
to
damages, P20,000.00
the
RTC
pay P50,000.00
as
rendered
as
moral
attorney's
fees
and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses, plus costs of

suit. DTEIaC
be cross-examined. 21
The first three (3) points raised obviously relate to the
determinative issue whether or not the questioned
On appeal, the Court of Appeals promulgated the
signatures of respondents on the Deed of Absolute
assailed Decision, 20 reversing and setting aside the
Sale were forged, thereby rendering the document
Decision of the RTC. It declared the Deed of Absolute
spurious. Such determination is evidently factual in
nature, and the well-entrenched rule is that in the
that the Deed of Absolute Sale was indeed forged. Was
exercise of this Court's power of review, the findings of
the witness successful in that regard?
facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and

binding
on
this
Court. 22 However,
there
are
recognized exceptions, 23 among which is when the

factual findings of the trial court and the appellate
court are conflicting. 24 This case falls under the
exception. The disagreement between the trial court
and the Court of Appeals in the factual conclusion,
especially with regard to the alleged forgery of
respondents' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale,
has constrained us to minutely examine the evidence
submitted by the parties.
as such, it enjoys the presumption of regularity and

carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution. 25 Absent evidence that
clear,
convincing,
preponderant,
the
examination, as well as his findings in the examination

of the copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale as Exh. "B."
On that basis, they claim forgery. In their effort to
refute respondents' allegation, petitioners hinge on the
testimony on cross-examination of the same expert
and his findings in the examination of another original
of the Deed of Absolute Sale, marked as Exh. "13." The
two varying findings led the trial court to conclude that
Varona had retracted his earlier finding of forgery,
thus:
On its face, the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized;
is
Respondents rely on Varona's testimony on direct
and
more
presumption
than
must
merely
be
upheld. 26ICHAaT
When Mr. Romeo Varona was

presented by the defendants to identify
and give his expert opinion about the
signatures appearing in the documents
marked as annexes 1 to 13, he
categorically told the Honorable Court
that the signatures of Olegario Bagano
In their bid to establish "clear, convincing and more
and Cecilia Bagano appearing in the
than merely preponderant evidence," respondents
said documents are genuine, thus
presented an expert witness, Varona, who attested
belying the claim of the plaintiff that

said signatures are forged.
It should be noted[,] however,
premise, i.e., that in the second examination which
that in an earlier testimony, Mr. Romeo
involves
Varona testified that the deed of sale in
submitted by petitioners, Varona did not actually
question is a forgery, but he later on
receive and examine the original of the Deed of Sale,
retracted his earlier testimony after he
Exh. "13." It explained, thus:
conducted an examination of the
the
standard
and
specimen
signatures
Records show that the signatures of
documents sent to him by the
Spouses Bagano appearing in the Deed
defendants. 27 SEDIaH
of Sale dated June 14, 1995 were
The trial court further sustained the validity of the
forged. Witness Romeo O. Varona, a
Deed
document examiner of the PNP Crime
of
Absolute
Sale
by
citing
the
rule
that
instruments are evidence, even against third persons,
Laboratory
of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of
Questioned Document Report No. 006-
the
also
96 dated January 11, 1995 which states
emphasized the character of the questioned deed as a
that after a careful examination of the
notarial document, which cannot be disproved by mere
questioned
denial
Spouses Bagano, he found out that the
date
of
of
the
the
latter. 28 The
alleged
signatory,
trial
court
and
bears
the
came
out
document
with
his
submitted
by
presumption of regularity. 29 Moreover, the RTC noted
signatures
that respondents filed the case in bad faith to appease
appearing in the questioned Deed of
their buyers and cover up their wrongdoings in
Sale
subdividing the lot and selling the resulting lots to
forged. . . .
different parties. 30
dated
of
June
Spouses
14,
Bagano
1995
were
xxx xxx xxx

Likewise, he confirmed on the
The
Court
conclusion
of
Appeals
and
rejected
proceeded
the
from
trial
a
court's
witness stand on November 25, 1998
different
that indeed the signatures of Spouses
Bagano appearing in the questioned
June 16, 1999, Mr. Varona categorically
Deed of Absolute Sale are forgeries.
testified that he had examined the said
However, on cross-examination
deed of sale and when asked if he
conducted on February 10, 1999,
prepared a report on the said
counsel for Spouses Alfaro manifested
examination he answered in the
that they would submit for examination
affirmative. But when again asked
the subject documents and that she
where that report was, Mr. Varona
would cross-examine Mr. Varona after
referred to Questioned Document
the latter's examination of the
Report No. 039-39 dated March 12.
submitted documents. On February 28,
1999, which was the same report that
1999[,] counsel for the Spouses Alfaro,
he prepared previously on the basis of
Atty. Montesclaros, submitted other
the first request of Atty. Montesclaros
documents for examination, except the
dated February 28, 1999, where it did
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 14,
not include for examination the
1995. On May 19, 1999, during Mr.
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale
Varona's cross-examination, he testified
dated June 14, 1995. ASIETa
that his findings and conclusions, as
Such a testimony cannot be taken
stated in the Questioned Document
as a retraction of his previous testimony.
Report No. 039-39 dated March 12,
What the lower court failed to realize
1999, were that the signatures
was that Romeo Varona did not actually
appearing thereon were written by one
receive and examine the original copy
and same person. On May 28, 1999,
of the questioned Deed of Absolute
Atty. Montesclaros again requested Mr.
Sale, as testified to by him. . . .
Varona to examine the Deed of

Absolute Sale dated June 14, 1995. On
xxx xxx xxx
Such a statement categorically
same report that he prepared previously
means that Romeo Varona did not
on the basis of the first request of Atty.
actually receive any copy of the
Montesclaros dated February 28, 1999,
questioned deed of absolute sale during
wherein it did not include for
his first examination upon the request of
examination the questioned Deed of
Atty. Montesclaros. This Court observed
Absolute Sale dated June 14, 1995, and
that during Mr. Varona's cross-
which he had already identified on May
examination on June 16, 1999,
19, 1999. This only means that the
defendants-appellees' counsel, Atty.
Deed of Absolute Sale was not received
Juanita Montesclaros, tried to make it
and examined by Mr. Varona and yet his
appear that Mr. Varona examined the
testimony on cross, dated June 16,
Deed of Absolute Sale, when in truth
1999[,] still referred to the same report.
and in fact, he did not. . . .
There was[,] therefore no report made
xxx xxx xxx

It is very clear that Atty.
Montesclaros tried to make it appear
that the questioned document which
was the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 14, 1995 was indeed examined.
However, this was not the case because
Mr. Varona's alleged report on the
second request for examination still
refers to the previous report,
Questioned Document Report No. 03939 dated March 12, 1999, which was the
on the second request for examination

dated May 28, 1999 on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 14, 1995 as
Mr. Varona merely referred to his
previous report as his alleged second
report on the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Moreover, the date of the second
Written Request for examination is May
28, 1999 and the date of the
Questioned Document Report No. 03939 is March 12, 1999, and Mr. Varona's
testimony of June 16, 1999 referred to
the said report of March 12, 1999 which
through the Clerk of Court concerned, where he
report was made on the basis of the first
secured his notarial commission. 36 When he gives all
written request for examination. 31
the other copies to the parties, the latter agree
The disparate conclusions reached by the courts below
between themselves how many copies should be kept
are such because they originated from different but
by each. The parties also agree which copies shall be
similarly erroneous basic premises.
presented to the Register of Deeds for registration, the
When a document in two or more copies is executed at

or about the same time, with identical contents, all
such
copies
are
equally
regarded
as
originals.32 Original does not mean the first paper

written, in contrast to a copy or transcript made later.
The
original
depends
upon
the
issue
to
be
city or municipal assessor in connection with the

payment of transfer tax and other fees, and the
Bureau of Internal Revenue in connection with the
payment of the capital gains tax. All the notarized
copies are originals. They are sometimes loosely
referred to as "original copies" or "duplicate originals."
proved. 33 It is immaterial whether that document
In the case at bar, presented in evidence were two
was written before or after another, was copied from
copies of one and the same Deed of Absolute Sale
another, or was itself used to copy from, 34 as long as
dated 14 June 1995. These are respondents' Exh.
its contents are the subject of inquiry. 35 Hence, one
"B" 37 and petitioners' Exh. "13" 38 which was also
or some of these copies are still considered as
marked by respondents as their Exh. "O." 39 Exh. "B"
originals,
appears to be a certified true copy of the original of
and
they
have
equal
claims
to
authenticity. AIECSD
As a matter of practice, deeds of conveyance are
prepared in several copies for notarization and record
the Deed of Absolute Sale presented to and kept as

part of the records of the Register of Deeds. 40 Exhibit
"13" is a copy of the original retained by petitioners.
purposes. After notarization, the notary public retains
Respondents had engaged Varona to determine the
copies pursuant to the Rules on Notarial Practice, one
genuineness of the signatures purporting to be theirs
for his record and the other for transmittal to the court,
on Exh. "B" by comparing them with the specimen
signatures on the documents 41 which they also
The trial court erred in using the supposed retraction
provided
Varona.
as basis for its ruling. It cannot properly speak of
affirmed
his
On
finding
the
in
witness
his
stand,
Varona
Report 42 that
the
retraction of one finding by the other because the
questioned signatures on Exh. "B" were not affixed by
examinations
the same persons who affixed the specimen signatures
different standard signatures and two different sets of
and thus the questioned signatures were forged. 43
specimen signatures. It would have been a retraction
However, after Varona testified on direct examination,

petitioners manifested that they would engage him to
examine a different set of documents which contain
the
signatures
of
respondents. 44 On
cross-
examination, Varona stated that he examined the

signatures on Exh. "13" and the specimen signatures
conducted
by
Varona
covered
two
or repudiation of the first conclusion if the standard

signatures analyzed and compared with the specimen
signatures were one and the same in the two
examinations, even if the specimen signatures were
contained in two different sets of documents which is
not even the case here.
on the other documents furnished him and that after
Yet clearly, Varona came out with inconsistent findings.
making the examination he arrived at the conclusion
On one hand, he concluded that Exh. "B" is spurious
that the signatures on the documents, including Exh.
because the questioned signatures thereon were
"13," were affixed by the same persons. 45 caHASI
forged.
On the basis of the two findings of Varona, the first

involving Exh. "B" and the second relating to Exh. "13,"
the trial court concluded that the questioned deed is
genuine as the signatures thereon which purport to be
those of respondents are really theirs. It ratiocinated
that Varona had retracted his first opinion when he
came out with his second opinion.
On
the
other,
he
issued
different
determination as regards Exh. "13," finding that the

signatures thereon which purport to be those of
respondents and the counterpart specimen signatures
were affixed by the same persons. Since Exhs. "B" and
"13" are copies of two originals of one and the same
deed, his conclusions with respect to the two exhibits
should
be
common, i.e.,
either
the
questioned
signatures thereon were both affixed by the same

persons or they were affixed by different persons.
The disharmonious findings render Varona's testimony
the
additional
unconvincing. Thus, the presumption of validity of the
respondents.
cash
payment
of
petitioners
to
Deed of Absolute Sale as a notarized document is left

unscathed.
Respondents seek to downplay the determinations
made by Varona concerning Exh. "13" by impugning
the
authenticity
of
the
specimen
signatures,
specifically the signature of Olegario Bagano on the

CTC, Exh. "11." They claim in particular that the
issuance date of the CTC was altered. Respondents,
however, did not present any tangible proof to support
their
allegation.
On
the
other
hand,
petitioners
On the part of the Court of Appeals, it chose to

disregard Varona's conclusions on Exh. "13" on the
premise that the written report which contained the
conclusions was not presented in evidence. However,
as borne out by the record, Varona repeated his
findings in open court in the course of his testimony on
cross-examination and even was asked on re-direct
examination by respondents' counsel thereon. 47
procured a certification from Cebu City Treasurer
Generally, it has been held that handwriting experts,
Eustaquio B. Cesa to the effect that the subject CTC
while
belonged to Olegario Bagano. 46 As regards the other
examining or comparing handwriting. 48 Yet without
documents which contain the specimen signatures,
Varona's testimony, the Court is hard-pressed to find
namely: the Real Estate Mortgage (Exh. "2"), the
any other basis on the record to establish the forgery.
Acknowledgment Receipt (Exh. "3"), the six deeds of
One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish
conditional sale (Exhs. "4" to "9") and the China Bank
his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence
check
which is of greater weight or more convincing than
(Exh.
"10"),
respondent
failed
to
adduce
probably
useful,
are
not
indispensable
in
is
that which is offered in opposition to it. 49 Aside from
noteworthy that the parties to the deeds of sale were
the opinion of the handwriting expert which this Court
also petitioners and respondents themselves. Also, the
finds inconsequential, the bare assertion on the part of
amount covered by the Acknowledgment Receipt was
respondent
countervailing
evidence
of
spuriousness.
It
Cecilia
Bagano
that
the
signature
appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale is not that of
her husband is not enough. No additional witnesses
due execution and the validity of the contents therein.
were presented. DHSaCA
Even
We reassert that forgery is not presumed; it must be

proven by clear, positive and convincing evidence.
Those who make the allegation of forgery have the
burden
of
proving
it. 50 Respondents
failed
to
substantiate with sufficient evidence their claim that

their signatures appearing on the deed of sale were
forged.
We are moreover influenced in our ultimate finding by
the fact that there is also sufficient evidence on record
to bolster the presumption that the notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale was genuine. Ultimately worthy of
consideration is petitioner Plebia Alfaro's positive
testimony that she actually saw respondent Olegario
Bagano
affix
his
signature
document. 51 However
on
self-serving
the
that
questioned
allegation
respondent
Cecilia
Bagano
admitted
the
genuineness of said document in her testimony. 52 No

specific objection was raised by respondents as to the
validity of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, their
blanket
objection
thereto
being
confined
to
an
overarching allegation against its materiality and

relevancy,
which
is
not
sufficient
to
rebut
the
presumption of authenticity of the notarized deed.

And it must be said that our own comparison of the
signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale to the
specimen signatures submitted by the parties reveals
no substantial variance to warrant the conclusion that
there was forgery. Mere variance of the signatures
cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the
same were forged. 53
What could respondents have done in order to fortify
may seem, it corroborates the other evidence that
their
claim
of
respondents did affix their signatures on the deed.
indecisiveness of the expert witness they had relied
Equally relevant in this supposition is the comparison
on?
of the standard signatures on Exh. "13" with the
respondents to establish the alleged forgery, they
signatures of respondents found in the Real Estate
should have presented evidence on rebuttal, which
Mortgage, Exh. "2," a document which was duly
they did not do, or even another expert witness to
notarized and thus bears prima facie proof as to its
attest to their claim of forgery, which again they failed
Considering
forgery
that
following
the
the
burden
manifest
was
upon
to do. Disingenuous as petitioners' tactic may have
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
seemed, in using their opponent's expert witness to
SECOND DIVISION, THE HONORABLE
advocate the contrary cause, respondents were not
SECRETARY HERMOGENES EBDANE
without remedy to mitigate the damage wrought by
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
said witness. That they failed to introduce rebuttal
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS ("DPWH"
evidence finally led to the collapse of their cause of
FOR BREVITY), THE OFFICE OF THE
action. TAaEIc
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ("OSP" FOR

BREVITY),
With the foregoing disquisition, discussion of the other
AND
ANTONIO
BALTAZAR, respondents.
issues raised by petitioners is unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
DECISION
the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the

Regional
Trial
Court
of
Cebu,
Branch
12,
REINSTATED. TcaAID
is
QUISUMBING, J p:
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
162864, [March 28, 2007], 548 PHIL 202-218)
The
petition
Resolution 1 dated
for certiorari assails

October
12,
2005
the
of
the
Sandiganbayan, granting the motion of the Office of

the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to suspend pendente
lite the petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal
SECOND DIVISION
Case No. 27911, and its Resolution 2 dated March 2,

2006
[G.R. No. 172123. April 16, 2009.]

MACARIOLA
S.
BARTOLO
denying
the
petitioners'
reconsideration.
and
VIOLENDA B. SUCRO, petitioners, vs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
motion
for
On November 13, 2003, an Information 3 was filed
LLENTADA, being the Engineer III of
against the petitioners and their co-accused for
[the] Bureau of Design; ROEL BLANCAS
falsification
and
y BAUTISTA, being the Engineer III of
penalized under Article 171 (4) 4 of the Revised Penal
[the] Bureau of Maintenance, LOURDES
Code. The Information alleged:
ANINIPOT
of
public
documents,
defined
That during the year 1998, or sometime

prior or subsequent thereto, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused NONITO FANO y FAMARIN, a
high ranking public officer, being the
Project Director with Salary Grade 29 of
the Project Management Office (PMO) of
the Department of Public Works and
Highways
(DPWH);
MACARIOLA
BARTOLO y SUBARDIAGA, being the

Project Manager II of PMO; VIOLENDA B.
SUCRO, being the Engineer V of PMO;
NORBERTO GALVE y SONEJA, being the
Engineer IV of [the] Bureau of Research
and Standard (BRS); CRISPIN REAL y
REDOQUE, being the Engineer III of BRS;
ROMEO LACORTE y LIAC, being the
Engineer
III
Construction;
of
[the]
LEONARDO
Bureau
LINGAN
of
y
FLORANDA,
being
the
Engineer III, Bureau of Maintenance, alllow ranking public officers and all of
whom
are
Department
Highways
employed
of
with
the
Works
and
committing
the
Public
(DPWH),
offense in relation to their office and

taking
advantage
of
the
same,
conspiring, confederating and mutually

helping
one
another,
together
with
accused SHUICHI MORITA, a private

individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify the
following public documents which they
prepared,
checked,
verified
certified
correct and accepted in discharge of

their
respective
duties
and
official
functions, namely: Statement of Time

Elapsed
and
Work
Accomplished,
Inspection Report for Final Acceptance

and Certificate of Acceptance relative to
the Metro Manila Flood Control Project II,
which they failed to disclose despite
Package A in the amount of One Billion
legal
Four Hundred Ninety-Nine Million One
perverting the truth to the damage and
Hundred
prejudice of the public interest. EaISDC
Eleven
Thousand
Eight
Hundred Five Pesos and [S]ixty [T]hree

[C]entavos
CONTRARY
(P1,499,111,805.63)
Pumping
Station
and
Balut
to
TO
do
so,
thereby
LAW. 5 (Emphasis
supplied.)
intended for the construction of [the]

Vitas
obligation
During their arraignment, the petitioners and their co-
Pumping Station and Improvement of
accused
Estero de Vitas, Pampanga-Earnshaw
charged. 6 Thereafter, pre-trial and trial of the case
Drainage Main, Estero de Sunog Apog,
ensued.
Estero
Buendia
During the trial of the case, the OSP moved for the
Drainage Main, by making it appear
suspension pendente lite of the petitioners and their
in the said documents that the
co-accused
project
Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
de
is
Maypajo
one
and
hundred
percent
(100%) complete when, in truth and

in fact, and as the above-named
accused knew well, the project was
not
fully
completed
considering
that there is an unaccomplished

construction of the parapet wall
pleaded
in
not
guilty
accordance
with
to
the
Section
offense
13
of
Practices Act. 7
In
its
Resolution
dated
October
12,
2005,
the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and accordingly

ordered the suspension pendente lite of the petitioners
and their co-accused for 90 days.
with a length of 320 lineal meters
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but it was
on the right bank of Estero de
denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
Sunog
March 2, 2006.
Apog from
Pastor
Street
to
Paulino Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila,
Hence, this petition based on this lone assigned error:
THE
SANDIGANBAYAN,
DIVISION,
ACTED
SECOND
WITHOUT
OR
IN
against
whom
any
criminal
prosecution under
valid
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH
information under this Act or under
GRAVE
DISCRETION
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
Code or for any offense involving
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE
fraud upon government or public
RESOLUTION
DATED
12,
funds or property whether as a simple
2005]
DIRECTING
THE
or as a complex offense and in whatever
THE
stage
ABUSE
OF
[OCTOBER
SUSPENSION PENDENTE
LITE OF
of
execution
and
mode
of
PETITIONERS FOR NINETY (90) DAYS
participation, is pending in court, shall
AND THE RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 2,
be suspended from office. Should he be
2006
PETITIONERS'
convicted by final judgment, he shall
FOR
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
WHICH
URGENT
DENIED
MOTION
RECONSIDERATION. 8
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he
Simply stated, the issue is, did the Sandiganbayan

commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
suspension pendente lite of petitioners?
Petitioners
primarily
argue
that
the
assailed
offense of falsification of public documents does not

fall within the purview of Section 13 of Rep. Act No.
3019, which reads: TADaES
13. Suspension
the salaries and benefits which he failed

to receive during suspension, unless in
the
resolutions were erroneously issued because the
SEC.
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
meantime
administrative
proceedings have been filed against

him.
In the event that such convicted officer,
who may have already been separated
from the service, has already received
and
loss
of
benefits. Any incumbent public officer
such benefits he shall be liable to
restitute the same to the Government.
resolved in the case of Bustillo v. Sandiganbayan.13 In
(Emphasis supplied.)
that case, we held that "the term fraud as used in
To support their aforesaid submission, the petitioners

point out that the offense of falsification of public
documents falls under Title Four, 9 Book II of the
Revised
Penal
Code
and
not
under
Title
Seven, 10 Book II thereof. They also argue that the

offense of falsification of public documents does not
amount to fraud upon government or public funds. 11
Section 13 of Rep. Act No. 3019 is understood in its

generic sense, which is, referring to an instance or an
act of trickery or deceit especially when involving
misrepresentation". 14 In
Merriam
Webster's
Dictionary of Law, fraud had been defined"as any act,

expression, omission, or concealment calculated to
deceive another to his or her disadvantage; or
specifically, a misrepresentation or concealment with
The OSP counter that Section 13 of Rep. Act No.
reference to some fact material to a transaction that is
3019 extends to any offense involving fraud upon the
made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless
government or public funds or property, and is not
disregard of its truth or falsity and with the intent to
merely limited to the offenses under Title Seven, Book
deceive another and that is reasonably relied on by
II of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, it insisted that
the other who is injured thereby". 15 We thus ruled in
falsification falls within the general definition of fraud,
the afore-cited case that falsification of municipal
considering that it involved a false representation of a
vouchers, although penalized under Title Four and not
fact, and hence within the ambit of Section 13,
Title Seven, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
Rep. Act No. 3019. 12
constitutes fraud upon public funds, and accordingly
After a careful study of the matter at hand, we find
upheld the suspension pendente lite of the petitioner
that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
therein
discretion in ordering the suspension pendente lite of
3019. 16
the petitioners and their co-accused.
In the present petition, it is undeniable that the
The contentions raised by the petitioners are nothing
allegation of falsification of the three public documents
new, considering that the same had already been
by making it appear that the flood control project was
pursuant to Section
13 of
Rep. Act
No.
100% complete constitutes fraud upon public funds.
because a reading thereof reveals that not only figures
This is in light of the uncontroverted allegation of the
and numbers, as asserted by the petitioners, but also
OSP
words 20 were used therein giving an account of the
that
it
was
on
the
basis
of
such
false
representation that the government was defrauded or
status of the flood control project.
suffered loss because it paid Toyo-Ebara Joint Venture

P1,499,111,805.63, the full amount corresponding to
the project despite the non-construction of the 320-m
Finally, petitioners' argument that they have not
parapet wall on the right bank of Estero De Sunog
falsified any public document because the 320-m
Apog. 17 ITScAE
parapet wall was deleted from the project by Change
Petitioners' argument that their certification in the

Statement
of
Time
Elapsed
and
Work
Accomplished 18 does not constitute a narration of

facts as contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code since the said statement merely
consisted of a table of figures and numbers 19 is also
Order No. 1 21 is not a proper question for us to

resolve in this petition, considering that it would
require us to make a crucial finding of fact, and to pass
upon the merits of the pending criminal case against
the
petitioners
and
their
co-accused
the
petition
before
the
Sandiganbayan.
without merit. This is because a narration of facts is
WHEREFORE,
merely an account or description of the particulars of
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated October 12,
an event or occurrence. Hence, the use of words or
2005 and March 2, 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
figures or numbers or any combination of two or three
against petitioners.
of said things, as long as it describes an event or
SO ORDERED.
occurrence is sufficient to make a "narration of facts"

as defined under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal
Code. In this case, it is evident that the questioned
statement qualifies as a "narration of facts" as defined
under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code
is DISMISSED.
The
||| (Bartolo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172123, [April

16, 2009], 603 PHIL 377-384)
SECOND DIVISION
public document under Article 171 of the Revised

Penal Code (RPC). HESIcT
[G.R. No. 168437. January 8, 2009.]

LAURINIO
GOMA
and
UMALE, petitioners, vs.

OF
APPEALS,
PHILIPPINES,
MEMBER
THE
NATALIO
On the basis of the affidavit-complaint of Manuel
COURT
Torralba and two other members of the Sangguniang
THE
Barangay of Brgy. Cabanbanan, Pagsanjan, Laguna,
SANGGUNIAN
the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon filed with the
PEOPLE
and
The Facts
OF
MANUEL
G.
RTC in Sta. Cruz, Laguna an Information for falsification

of public document under Art. 171 (2) of the RPC
TORRALBA, respondents.
against
petitioners
Laurinio
Umale. 3 Specifically,
Laurinio
DECISION
and
Natalio,
the
Goma
complaint
and
Natalio
alleged
as barangaychairperson
that
and
secretary, respectively, falsified a barangay resolution

dated September 24, 1995, allocating the amount of
VELASCO, JR., J p:
PhP18,000 as disbursement for a seminar for the two

officials. The indicting information, docketed as Crim.
The Case
Appealed,
via
this
Petition
Case No. SC-6712 and raffled to Branch 26 of the Sta.

for
Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45, is the Decision 1 dated

June 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 27963, affirming the J0uly 28, 2003 Decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26 in Santa Cruz,
Laguna in Criminal Case No. SC-6712. The RTC
convicted petitioners of the crime of falsification of
Cruz RTC, alleged as follows:

That on or about September 24, 1995 in
Barangay
Laguna,
Cabanban [sic],
Philippines
and
Pagsanjan,
within
the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

above-named accused LAURINIO GOMA
and NATALIO A. UMALI, both public
officials, being the Barangay Chairman
The prosecution presented the three complaining
and Barangay Secretary, respectively,
witnesses, 5 who testified that, for lack of quorum, no
taking
official
actual session of the sanggunian of Brgy. Cabanbanan
positions and committing the offense in
took place on September 24, 1995, the day the
relation to their office, in connivance
disputed resolution was allegedly passed. On that day,
and conspiracy with each other, did
according
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
the barangay health center to attend a pre-scheduled
feloniously falsify a Resolution dated
session which, however, did not push through as, apart
September
official
from them, only one other member, i.e., Laurinio,
document, by indicating therein that
came. But they later got wind of the existence of
aforesaid Resolution was passed on
subject
motion
Dizon,
September 24, 1995, in which it was made to appear
seconded by Kagawad Recaredo C. Dela
that all the sanggunian members attended the session
Cruz and unanimously approved by
of September 24, 1995 and unanimously approved,
those present in the meeting held on
upon motion of kagawad Renato Dizon, duly seconded
September 24, 1995 at 2:00 P.M., when
by kagawad Ricaredo dela Cruz, the allocation of
in truth and in fact no meeting was held
PhP18,000 to defray the expenses of two officials who
as no quorum was mustered, to the
would attend a seminar in Zamboanga. On the face of
damage and prejudice of public interest.
the resolution appears the signature of Natalio and
advantage
of
24,
of
their
1995,
Kagawad
an
Renato
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
When arraigned, both Laurinio and Natalio, assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the above charge. Pretrial and trial then ensued.
Laurinio,
to
the
Resolution
in
No.
their
three,
T-95
they
(Res.
respective
went
T-95)
to
dated
capacities
as barangay secretary and chairperson. It also bore

the official seal of the barangay.
On October 15, 1995, the sanggunian held a special
session during which it passed a resolution therein
stating that no session was held on September 24,
each of said accused the penalty of four
1995. 6
(4) years and two (2) months of prision

correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
In their defense, Natalio and Laurinio, while admitting

having
affixed
their
signatures
on
the
years, and two (2) months of prision
adverted
mayor, as maximum.
falsified resolution, alleged that said resolution was

nothing more than a mere proposal or a draft which
Costs against both accused.
Natalio, as was the practice, prepared and signed a
SO ORDERED. 7
week before the scheduled September 24, 1995. They

also alleged that the same resolution was not the
The RTC found Res. T-95 to have all the appearance of
enabling instrument for the release of the seminar
a complete and "true and genuine document", sealed
funds.
and signed by the Sanggunian secretary. 8And for

reasons set out in
The Ruling of the RTC
its decision, the trial
dismissed, as incredulous, the defense's theory, and
After trial, the RTC rendered on July 28, 2003
the
judgment, finding both Laurinio and Natalio guilty as
resolution being just a mere proposal.
charged and, accordingly, sentenced them, thus:

WHEREFORE,
this
Court
finds
both
accused Laurinio Goma and Natalio A.

Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principals in the felony of falsification
of public document punishable under
Section [sic] 171 of the Revised Penal
Code
and
aggravating
circumstance,
there
nor
hereby
being
neither
mitigating
imposes
court
upon
arguments
propping
it,
about
the
subject
The Ruling of the CA

From the RTC decision, Laurinio and Natalio appealed
to the CA, their recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
27963, raising three issues, to wit: (a) whether Res. T95 is a public document; (b) whether they violated Art.
171 (2) of the RPC; and (c) whether the penalty
imposed is proper. Answering all three issues in the
affirmative, the CA, by its Decision dated June 6, 2005,
affirmed that of the trial court, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the 28 July 2003 Decision
As a preliminary consideration, petitioners, in this
of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court of
recourse, merely highlight and discuss their defense
Santa Cruz, Laguna finding accused-
that the subject resolution is a mere draft or proposed
appellants Laurinio Goma and Natalio A.
resolution not acted upon by the sanggunian for lack
Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
of quorum on September 24, 1995, and that they
the
never had any criminal intent when they signed such
crime
of
falsification
of
public
document under Article 171(2) of the
proposed
Revised Penal Code and sentencing
the barangay official seal on the subject resolution.
them to suffer the penalty of four (4)

years and two (2) months of prision
correctional [sic], as minimum, to eight
(8) years, and two (2) months ofprision
mayor, as
maximum,
is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against appellants.
resolution.
They
deny
having
affixed
Subject Resolution a Public Document

Under Sec. 19 (a) of Rule 132, Revised Rules on
Evidence, public documents include "[t]he written
official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
SO ORDERED. 9
foreign country." Verily, resolutions and ordinances
Petitioners are now before this Court raising the very
of sanggunians,
same issues they earlier invoked before the CA, the
panlalawigan, panlungsod, bayan, or barangay, come
first two of which may be reduced into the following
within the pale of the above provision, such issuances
proposition: Whether Res. T-95 may be characterized
being their written official acts in the exercise of their
as a public document to bring the case, and render
legislative authority. As a matter of common practice,
petitioners
an
liable
on
the
basis
of
adduced, under Art. 171 (2) of the RPC.

The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
the
evidence
action
be
they
appropriating
of
money
the sanggunian
for
some
public
purpose or creating liability takes the form of an

ordinance or resolution.
Black defines a public document as "a document of
testimonies of the witnesses and its
public interest issued or published by a political body
assessment of the probative weight
or otherwise connected with public business."10 The
thereof,
term is also described as a document in the execution
anchored on said findings, are accorded
of which a person in authority or notary public takes
high respect if not conclusive effect.
part. 11 There can be no denying that the public
This is more true if such findings were
money-disbursing and seemingly genuine Res. T-95, in
affirmed by the appellate court. When
the preparation of which petitioners, in their official
the trial court's findings have been
capacity, had a hand, is, in context, a public document
affirmed by the appellate court, said
in a criminal prosecution for falsification of public
findings are generally binding upon this
document. And it bears to stress that in falsification
Court. 13
under Art. 171 (2) of the RPC, it is not necessary that

there be a genuine document; it is enough that the
document fabricated or simulated has the appearance
of a true and genuine document or of apparent legal
efficacy. 12
Petitioners Guilty of Falsification
as
well
as
its
conclusions
And this factual determination, as a matter of long and

sound appellate practice, deserves great weight and
shall not be disturbed on appeal, except only for the
most
convincing
reasons, 14 such
as
when
that
determination is clearly without evidentiary support on

record 15 or
when
judgment
relevant facts which, if properly considered, would
more so when such findings receive a confirmatory
justify a different conclusion. 16 This is as it should be
nod from the appellate court. We explained in one
since it is not the function of the Court under Rule 45
case:
of the Rules of Court to evaluate and weigh all over
the trial court, its calibration of the
supportive
overlooked
on
usually defers to factual findings of the trial court,
The rule is that the findings of fact of
or
based
misapprehension
the
facts
is
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Court
again
of
the
evidence
presented
of
factual
courts. 17 IHTaCE
the
or
the
holdings
certain
premises
of
lower
proceeding when they did not in fact so

The case disposition of the CA and the factual and
logical
premises
holding
it
together
commend
themselves for concurrence. Its inculpatory findings on

the guilt of petitioners for falsification under Art. 171
(2) of the RPC, confirmatory of those of the trial court,
participate.
The elements of the crime of falsification of public
documents, as above defined and penalized, are:
1. That the offender is a public officer,
employee, or notary public.
are amply supported by the evidence on record,

consisting mainly of the testimony of the complaining
2. That he takes advantage of his official

position.
witnesses and a copy of the subject resolution.
3. That he falsifies a document by
Art. 171 (2) of the RPC provides as follows:
causing it to appear that persons
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer,
have participated in any act or
employee; or notary or ecclesiastical

minister.
The
penalty
proceeding.
of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000
4. That such person or persons did not
pesos shall be imposed upon any public
in
fact
so
participate
officer, employee, or notary who, taking
proceeding. 18
in
the
advantage of his official position, shall
The first two elements clearly obtain, petitioners,
falsify a document by committing any of
during the period material, being local government
the following acts:
elected officials who, by reason of their position,

certified,
xxx xxx xxx

(2) Causing it to appear that persons
have
participated
in
any
act
or
as
Natalio
did,
as
to
the
holding
of
a barangay session and falsely attested, as Laurinio

did, as to the veracity of a resolution supposedly taken
up therein. The other two elements are likewise
present. As correctly observed by the CA:
. . . [Petitioners] made it appear in the

Barangay
resolution
dated
24
September 1995 that all members of

the Sangguniang Barangay deliberated
upon and unanimously approved the
questioned resolution, when in fact no
such
deliberation
and
approval
occurred. The non-participation of the
xxx xxx xxx

b) the opening paragraph unequivocally
states that the contents thereof were
copied from the minutes of the ordinary
session
of
Sanggunian
held
on
September 24, 1995 meeting, at 2:00

o'clock pm;
members of the Sangguniang Barangay
c) it announces all the names of the
in the passage of the resolution was
members
established by the 15 October 1995
attended the session during which said
resolution issued by 7 of the 8 members
resolution [was] passed;
of the Sangguniang Barangay denying
d) it bears the resolution number, not
that
the proposed resolution number;
the
challenged
resolution
was
passed upon and approved by the

council. 19 ICHAaT
e) the
of
title
the
Sanggunian
clearly
states
that
who
the
Sanggunian had already approved the
Petitioners' bid to pass off the resolution in question as
allocation of P18,000.00 for two (2)
a mere proposal or a draft cannot be accorded merit in
barangay officials . . .;
the light of the manner they worded and made it

appear. Consider the following apt observations of the
trial court:
f) it made mention that Kagawad Renato

M.
Dizon
made
motion,
duly
seconded by Kagawad [Ricaredo] C. de
Barangay Resolution No. T-95 does not
la
appear to be a proposed resolution in all
resolution; and
aspects . . .
the
Cruz,
for
the
passing
of
said
g) accused Natalio A. Umali, in his
petitioners falsified the subject resolution, but only to
official capacity as Barangay Kalihim,
be exposed by private complainants. ECcDAH
certified said resolution as true and
Petitioners' allegation that kagawad Torralba was the
correct, and accused Laurinio A. Goma,

Punong
Barangay,
attested
to
one who affixed the seal or that he harbored ill-
the
feelings towards them strikes this Court as a mere
truthfulness of said resolution. 20
afterthought, absent convincing evidence to support
Indeed, the contents and appearance of Res. T-95

argue against the very idea of its being merely a
proposal
or
draft barangay enactment. Res
ipsa
loquitur. A draft resolution would not be numbered or

be carrying certificatory and attestative signatures, let
alone impressed with the dry seal of thebarangay. It
would
not
also
include
such
particulars
as
the
attendance of all members of the sanggunian and the

identity
of
the
moving
and
secondingkagawads relative to the passage of the

resolution, for such details are not certain; unless they
have been rehearsed or planned beforehand. But the
notion
that
plan
had
been
arranged
by
the sanggunian as a body would be negated by

subsequent development which saw the approval of a
resolution dated October 15, 1995 duly signed by
seven kagawads virtually trashing Res.
T-95 as a
falsity. The sequence of events would readily show that
the imputation.
Finally, petitioners urge their acquittal on the theory
that they did not benefit from, or that the public was
not prejudiced by, the resolution in question, it not
having been used to obtain the PhP18,000 seminar
funds. The argument holds no water. Falsification of a
public document is consummated upon the execution
of the false document. And criminal intent is presumed
upon the execution of the criminal act. Erring public
officers' failure to attain their objectives, if that really
be the case, is not determinative of their guilt or
innocence. The simulation of a public document, done
in a manner so as to give it the appearance of a true
and genuine instrument, thus, leading others to errors
as
to
its
authenticity,
constitutes
the
crime
of
falsification. 21
In fine, the element of gain or benefit on the part of
the offender or prejudice to a third party as a result of
the
document's
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
integrity, is not essential to maintain a charge for
imposable would be that of a degree lower than the
falsification of public documents. 22 What is punished
medium period of prision mayor as minimum, and the
in falsification of public document is principally the
maximum is any period included in the medium period
undermining of the public faith and the destruction of
of prision mayor. The degree lower than the medium
truth as solemnly proclaimed therein. In this particular
period of prision mayoris the medium period of prision
crime, therefore, the controlling consideration lies in
correccional which ranges from two (2) years, four (4)
the public character of a document; and the existence
months, and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least,
months. SIDTCa
the
falsification,
intent
to
or
tarnishing
cause
such
of
damage
becomes
immaterial. 23
The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months

of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
Third Issue: Imposed Penalty Proper
and two (2) months of prision mayor, as maximum,
Finally, the penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by
thus
the CA, is proper. Art. 171 of the RPC provides for a
authorized imposable range, and is, therefore, proper.
single divisible penalty of prision mayor to public
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of
officers or employees who, taking advantage of their
merit. Accordingly, the appealed CA Decision dated
official positions, shall cause it to appear that persons
June 6, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27963 is hereby
have participated in any act or proceeding when they
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
did
not
in
fact
participate.
And
where
neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the

execution of the offense, as here, the imposable
penalty is, according to Art. 64 of the RPC, that of the
medium
period
provided.
The
medium
imposed
on
petitioners
well
within
No pronouncement as to costs.
||| (Goma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168437,
[January 8, 2009], 596 PHIL 1-14)
period
for prision mayor is from eight (8) years and one (1)
day to ten (10) years.
is
EN BANC
the
[G.R. No. 180314. April 16, 2009.]
That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or

sometime prior or subsequent thereto in
NORMALLAH
A.
Cotabato City, Philippines and within the
PACASUM, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
accused NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, a

high ranking public official being the
Regional Secretary of the Department of
DECISION
Tourism in the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, while
in
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
the
performance
of
her
official
functions, committing the offense in
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which
relation thereto, taking advantage of
seeks
her official position, did then and there,
to
set
aside
the
Decision 1 of
the
Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 promulgated
willfully,
unlawfully
on 7 August 2007 which found petitioner Normallah A.
falsified
her
Pacasum guilty of Falsification under Article 171,
Clearance 3 submitted to the Office of
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and its
the
Resolution 2 dated
Autonomous
22
October
2007
denying
Regional
and
feloniously
Employee
Governor
Region
of
in
the
Muslim
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Mindanao, by imitating the signature of
New Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.
Laura Y. Pangilan, the Supply officer I of
On 2 May 2002, petitioner was charged before the

Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Public Documents,
defined and punished under paragraph 1 of Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
the DOT-ARMM, for the purpose of

claiming her salary for the months of
August and September 2000. 4
On 29 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation
asking
that
she
be
given
the
opportunity to file her counter-affidavit during a
Cotabato
preliminary investigation in order that her right to due
Employee Clearance, which she
process would not be violated. 5 Petitioner further filed
submitted to the Office of the
an Urgent Motion for Preliminary Investigation and/or
Regional
Reinvestigation with a Prayer to Recall or Defer
Autonomous Region
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. 6 TaDAHE
Mindanao,
for
decreeing that petitioner was not deprived of the
by
of
the
in Muslim
imitating
the
purposes
of
claiming
her
salary for the months of August
opportunity to be heard before the Office of the
and September 2000;
Ombudsman as she had waived her right to be heard

on preliminary investigation. 7
2. Whether or not the accused took

advantage of her official position
On 16 June 2004, petitioner, assisted by counsel de

guilty
Governor
her
Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM,
motion for preliminary investigation/reinvestigation
not
falsified
signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the
On 4 May 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's
parte, pleaded
City,
to
the
in order to commit the crime
crime
charged. 10 EICScD
charged. 8 Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held

and the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order. 9 The
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely:
parties did not enter any admission or stipulation of
Subaida
facts, and agreed that the issues to be resolved were
Management Officer V of the Autonomous Region in
as follows:
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Laura Y. Pangilan, former
1. Whether or not accused Normallah

Pacasum, being then the Regional
Secretary of the Department of
Tourism
Region
in
in
the
Muslim
Supply
K.
Pangilan, 11 former
Officer
ARMM; 12 and
of
the
Rebecca
Human
Department
A.
of
Resource
Tourism,
Agatep, 13 Telegraph
Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City.
Autonomous
Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan) testified that she was a
Mindanao,
retired government employee and formerly a Human
Resource Management Officer V of the ARMM which
was not hers. She said Laura Pangilan was her
position she held from May 1993 to 28 May 2003. As
daughter-in-law, and that the latter's signature was
such, one of her duties was to receive applications for
very
clearance of Regional Secretaries of the ARMM. She
photocopied 15 the original Employees Clearance with
explained
the intention of sending the same to her daughter-in-
requirement to be submitted to the Office of the
law for the purpose of having the latter confirm if the
Regional Director by retiring employees, employees
signature on top of her name in the Employees
leaving the country or those applying for leave in
Clearance was hers. There being no messenger
excess
for
available, she instead called up Laura to come to her
clearance shall get a copy of the employees clearance
office to verify the signature. Laura, whose office was
and shall accomplish the same by having the different
only a walking distance away, came and inspected the
division heads sign it.
clearance, and denied signing the same. After she
of
that
an
thirty
Employees
days.
The
Clearance
person
was
applying
Mrs. Pangilan disclosed that she knew the accusedpetitioner Norma Pacasum to be the former
Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism
familiar
to
her.
Mrs.
Pangilan
immediately
denied that she signed the clearance, and while they

were
conversing,
the
bearer
of
the
Employees
Clearance took said document and left. ICESTA
(DOT), ARMM. She narrated that in the year 2000,
Mrs. Pangilan said she did not know the name of the
petitioner submitted the original of an Employees
person
Clearance
with the
Clearance, but said that the latter was a niece and
memorandum 14 dated 8 August 2000 issued by
staff member of the petitioner. She said that all the
Governor
signatures 16 appearing in the Employees Clearance
to her office in compliance

Nur
Misuari,
directing
all
officers
and
employees to clear themselves of property and money

accountabilities before their salaries for August and
September 2000 would be paid. Upon inspection of the
Employees Clearance, she noticed that the signature
of Laura Pangilan (Laura) contained in said document
who
took
the
original
of
the
Employee
were all genuine except for Laura's signature.

The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y.
Pangilan, the person whose signature was allegedly
imitated. Laura testified that presently she was holding
the position of Human Resource Management Officer II
Thereupon, Marie Cris Batuampar, the representative
of the Department of Tourism ARMM. Prior to said
of petitioner, took the Employees Clearance and left.
position, she was the Supply Officer of the DOT

ARMM from 1994 to January 2001. As such, she issued
memorandum receipts (MR) to employees who were
issued government property, and received surrendered
office properties from officers and employees of the
DOT ARMM. She said she knew the accused, as she
was their Regional Secretary of the DOT ARMM.
Laura
revealed
she
affidavit 19 dated
executed
28 August
joint
complaint-
2001 regarding
the
instant case. She issued a certification 20 with a

memorandum receipt 21 dated 23 November 1999,
signed 22 by petitioner. The certification attested she
did not sign petitioner's Employees Clearance because
all the office properties issued to petitioner had not
Laura recounted that on 9 August 2002, Marie
been turned over or returned to the Supply Officer of
Cris 17 Batuampar,
of
the DOT ARMM. Finally, she said that as of 2 January
petitioner Pacasum, went to her house with the
2005, her last day as Supply Officer, petitioner had not
Employees
returned anything.
an
Clearance
officemate
of
and
petitioner.
niece
Batuampar
requested her to sign in order to clear petitioner of all

property accountabilities. She refused to sign the
clearance because at that time, petitioner had not yet
turned over all the office properties issued to her. A
few days later, she was called by her mother-in-law to
go to the latter's office and inspect the Employees
Clearance
submitted
by
the
representative
of
petitioner. She went to her mother-in-law's office and

was shown the Employees Clearance of petitioner.
Upon
seeing
the
signature 18 appearing
same,
on
she
top
of
denied
her
the
name.
The last witness for the prosecution, Rebecca A.

Agatep, Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon
City, testified that she had been a telegraph operator
for nineteen years. On 31 May 2005, she was at the
Telegraph Office in Commission on Audit, Quezon City.
She received two telegrams 23 for transmissions both
dated 31 May 2005. One was addressed to petitioner
and the other to Marie Cris Batuampar. Upon receiving
said
documents,
through
she
telegram.
transmitted
The
telegram
the
documents
addressed
to
petitioner was received by her relative, Manso Alonto,
in her residence on 1 June 2005, while that addressed
cash advances were required to get an Employees
to Ms. Batuampar was transmitted to, and received in,
Clearance before they could receive their salaries. She
Cotabato City on 1 June 2005. 24
then instructed her staff to work on her salary.
On 4 July 2005, the prosecution formally offered 25 its

documentary evidence consisting of Exhibits A, A-1, A1-a, A-2, A-2-a, A-2-b, A-2-c, A-2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f, A-2-g,
A-3, A-3-1, A-4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, and A-9, to
which the accused filed her objections. 26 The trial
court admitted all the exhibits on 10 August 2005. 27
For the defense, petitioner and Atty. Jose I. Lorena,
former ARMM Regional Solicitor General, took the
stand.
Petitioner said she did not know where the original of

her Employees Clearance was. Neither did she know if
the signature of Laura Pangilan therein had been
imitated or forged. She likewise said that although the
Employee Clearance was in her name, she did not
cause Laura's signature to be affixed thereto.
Petitioner disclosed that she was able to get her salary
for the month of August 2000 sometime in said month,
For her defense, petitioner testified that she was
because
appointed by ARMM Regional Governor Nur Misuari
Parcasio told her that she did not need a clearance
(Gov. Misuari) as Regional Secretary of the DOT of the
before she could get her salary because she was re-
ARMM in 1999. She said she was familiar with the
appointed. 28
Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov.

Misuari directing all ARMM officers and employees to
liquidate all outstanding cash advances on or before
31 August 2000 in view of the impending expiration of
the Governor's extended term. At first, she said the
memorandum applied to her, she being a cabinet
secretary, but later she said same did not apply to her
because she had no cash advances. Only those with
ARMM
Executive
Secretary
Randolph
C.
Petitioner explained that she has not seen the original

of the subject Employees Clearance. 29 When she first
saw the photocopy of the Employees Clearance, the
signature of Laura was not there. She was able to see
the photocopy of the Employees Clearance again after
this case had been filed with the Sandiganbayan,
already with the alleged signature of Laura. Petitioner
said it was not she who placed or caused Laura's
On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her
purported signature to be affixed there.
receipt of her salary, she believed that an Employees
Petitioner added that the memorandum of Gov. Misuari

did not apply to her, because she had no cash
advances and she could receive her salary even
without clearance. At that time, she said the Cashier,
Accountant and the Auditor checked her records and
Clearance was necessary, and for this reason she had

this document prepared by her staff. She said her
Employees Clearance was always in the possession of
Marie Cris, her assistant secretary. It was Marie Cris
who showed her the document twice. 31
found that she had no cash advances. 30Because she
Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Solicitor General,
was elsewhere, she instructed her secretary to get her
testified that he was familiar with the Memorandum
salary. However, she was informed by her staff that her
dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari because
salary could not be released because the Office of the
the same was the product of consultation among him,
Governor required a clearance. Her staff worked on her
Gov. Misuari and ARMM Executive Secretary Parcasio.
clearance, the purpose of which was for the release of
He explained that this memorandum pertained only to
her salary for the months of August and September
outstanding
2000. She was able to get all the needed signatures
Employees Clearance was not a requirement and was
except for Laura's signature. With the refusal of Laura
not sufficient to comply with the directive contained in
to sign, her staff went to Executive Secretary Parcasio
the memorandum, because what was required for the
and explained the situation. IAaCST
purpose of release of salaries was a credit notice from
Petitioner denied receiving a telegram from Asst.
cash
advances.
He
added
that
an
the Resident Auditors of the Commission on Audit.
Special Prosecutor I Anna Isabel G. Aurellano ordering
On 16 February 2007, the defense formally offered its
her to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor
documentary exhibits 32 consisting of Exhibits 1 to 5,
the original of the Employees Clearance of the DOT-
with sub-markings. The prosecution objected to the
ARMM issued in her name sometime on 22-23 August
purpose for which Exhibit 1 was offered. The trial court
2000.
admitted all the defense exhibits. 33
On 7 August 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the
falsified/forged. It did not give much weight on
assailed decision convicting petitioner of the crime
petitioner's defense denying she was the one who
charged in the information. The dispositive portion of
actually falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating
the decision reads:
the signature of Laura Pangilan and that she had no
WHEREFORE,
judgment
is
hereby
rendered finding accused Normallah A.

Pacasum
GUILTY
beyond
reasonable
doubt of the offense charged in the

Information and, with the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentencing her to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO
(2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE
(1)
DAY
OF prision
correccional as
minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE

(1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum
with the accessories thereof and to pay
a
fine
of
TWO
THOUSAND
(P2,000.00)
with
costs
PESOS
against
the
accused. 34
idea about the alleged falsification, because it was her

assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked
for her clearance and the one who submitted the said
clearance to the Office of the Regional Governor of the
ARMM.
The
trial
court
found
said
denial
unsubstantiated and ruled that while there was no

direct
evidence
"actually"
to
show
falsified/forged
that
the
petitioner
signature
herself
of
Laura
Pangilan, there were circumstances that indicated she

was the one who committed the falsification/forgery,
or who asked somebody else to falsify/forge the
subject signature in her Employees Clearance. The
Sandiganbayan
added
that
considering
it
was
petitioner who took advantage of and profited from the

use of the falsified clearance, the presumption was
that she was the material author of the falsification.
Despite full opportunity, she was not able to rebut said
presumption, failing to show that it was another
The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-ARMM
person who falsified/forged the signature of Laura
Supply Officer Laura Y. Pangilan appearing in the
Pangilan, or that another person had the reason or
Employees Clearance of petitioner to have been
motive to commit the falsification/forgery or could
cash advances and the only way to do this was by
have benefited from the same. ACaTIc
obtaining a clearance.
The
Sandiganbayan
sustain
Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her Employees
petitioner's contention that she did not stand to
Clearance had no probative value in proving its
benefit
Employees
contents and was inadmissible because the original
Clearance and from the submission thereof to the
thereof was not presented by the prosecution. The
Office of the Regional Governor, because she allegedly
Sandiganbayan
had no existing cash advances. She claimed that an
presentation and admission of secondary evidence,
Employees Clearance was not needed to enable her to
like a photocopy of her Employees Clearance, was
draw her salary for the months of August and
justified to prove the contents thereof, because
September
2000
despite reasonable notices (telegrams) made by the
the
prosecution to petitioner and her assistant secretary to
presumption that he who benefits from the falsification
produce the original of her Employees Clearance, they
is presumed to be the author thereof does not apply to
ignored the notice and refused to present the original
her.
of said document.
from
the
2000
Memorandum
The
of
lower
likewise
falsification
under
Gov.
court
did
of
the
Misuari,
not
her
August
and
explained
that
that
the
aforementioned memorandum applied to petitioner,

she being an official of the ARMM. It said that the
applicability of said memorandum to petitioner was
even admitted by her when she, in compliance
therewith, instructed her staff/assistant secretary to
work for her Employees Clearance to enable her to
collect her salary for the month of August 2000. It said
that the fact that she (allegedly) had no existing cash
advances did not exempt her from the coverage of the
memorandum, because she must show she had no
did
not
agree.
It
said
that
the
On 21 August 2007, petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration
of
the
decision
of
the
Sandiganbayan 35 to which the prosecution filed a

Comment/Opposition. 36 Subsequent
thereto,
petitioner filed a Supplement to Accused's Motion for

Reconsideration & Motion for New Trial/Reception of
Newly Discovered Evidence. 37 Petitioner prayed that
her motion for new trial be granted in order that the
testimony of Marie Cris Batuampar be introduced, the
same
being
newly
discovered
evidence.
The
prosecution filed its Opposition. 38
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion,
On 22 October 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its

resolution
denying
Petitioner assails her conviction arguing that the
for
I. Finding that petitioner benefited from
reconsideration for lack of merit; and the motion for
the alleged falsification, hence
new
must
trial,
presented
because
did
not
petitioner's
the
evidence
qualify
as
motion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in:
sought
newly
to
be
discovered
evidence. 39
our
Resolution 40 dated
27
November
2007,
respondent People of the Philippines, through the

Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), was required to
file its Comment on the petition. 41 After two motions
for extension to file comment on the petition, which
were granted by this Court, the OSP filed its Comment
dated
18
February
2008. 42 Petitioner
was
required 43 to file a Reply to the Comment, which she

did on 5 June 2008. 44 acAESC
On 5 August 2008, the Court resolved to give due
course to the petition for review on certiorari and
required
the
deemed
the
author
thereof, when the evidence on

record does not support, but even
On 16 November 2007, the instant petition was filed.

In
be
parties
to
submit
their
respective
memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. They

filed their respective memoranda on 21 November
2008 and on 5 November 2008. 45
contradicts, such a conclusion.

II. Presuming
that
unliquidated
petitioner
cash
had
advances
hence was required under the

Misuari Memorandum to submit
her
Employee's
Clearance
to
clear herself of these, when there

is no evidence to that effect and
the prosecution even admitted
so.
III. Not
resolving
doubt
as
to
the
authenticity of the photocopy of

the allegedly forged Employee's
Clearance,
in
favor
of
innocence of the Accused.
the
IV. In short-circuiting the right of the
TO: ALL CONCERNED
petitioner to present additional

evidence
on
her
behalf,
SUBJECT: AS STATED
thus
DATE: AUGUST 8, 2000
denying her due process. 46
1. In view of the impending expiration of

Petitioner
contends
that
under
the
Misuari
memorandum dated 8 August 2000, she was not

required to file an Employees Clearance to draw her
salary,
since
what
was
required
under
said
memorandum was a Credit Notice from the COA. She
the
extended
term
of
the
undersigned, it is hereby directed

that
all
outstanding
cash
advances be liquidated on or
before August 31, 2000.
further contends that since she was not required to file
2. Effective September 1, 2000, the
said Employees Clearance because she had no cash
salaries and other emoluments of
advances, the signature in her Employees Clearance
all ARMM officials/employees with
was "irrelevant and a non-issue" because what was
unliquidated cash advance shall
required was a Credit Notice.
be
As to the first contention, we agree with petitioner that

under the aforesaid memorandum, what was required
before she could draw her salaries was a Credit Notice
from the COA and not an Employees Clearance. The
full text of the Memorandum 47 form the Regional
Governor reads:
MEMORANDUM FROM THE REGIONAL
GOVERNOR
withheld
settled
their
until
they
accounts
have
and
a
is
corresponding
Credit
Notice
issued
them
by
to
the
Commission on Audit.
3. Due
to
budgetary
and
financial
constraints brought about by the

drastic
cut
memorandum
of
our
dated
budget,
December
01, 1998 is hereby reiterated.
Therefore all releases for financial
The Credit Notice requirement was therefore irrelevant
assistance is hereby suspended
and a non-issue as regards the release of salaries prior
effective immediately.
to 1 September 2000.
4. For strict compliance. cTCADI
The questions to be answered are: (1) Was the

signature of Laura Pangilan in petitioner's Employees
PROF. NUR MISUARI
Clearance imitated? If yes, (2) Who imitated or caused
It is clear from said memorandum that what was

required from officers/employees who had unliquidated
cash advances was the corresponding Credit Notice
issued by the COA after they had settled their
accounts. There was indeed no mention of any
Employees Clearance therein. Up to this point, we
agree with petitioner. However, on her contention that
the signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees
Clearance
was
"irrelevant
and
non-issue",
we
the imitation of said signature?

On the first query, the same was answered by Laura
Pangilan. She said that the signature in petitioner's
Employees Clearance was not hers. The same was an
imitation. When a person whose signature was affixed
to a document denies his/her signature therein,
a prima facie case for falsification is established which
the defendant must overcome. 48
disagree. Whether the signature of Laura Pangilan was
Petitioner argues there was no need for her to file an
imitated or not is the main issue in this case for
Employees Clearance to draw her salary. She adds that
falsification.
Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of the
From the memorandum of Gov. Misuari, the Credit

Notice requirement was effective only starting 1
September 2000 and not before. In the case at bar, the
ARMM,
told
her
and
her
secretary,
Marie
Cris
Batuampar, that she did not need an Employees

Clearance because she was re-appointed.49
information charges petitioner not with failure to
These arguments are untenable. There was a need for
secure a Credit Notice, but with allegedly falsifying her
petitioner to file an Employees Clearance not only for
Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of
compliance with the Misuari memorandum but, more
Laura Y. Pangilan, Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM.
importantly, because her term of office was about to
end, since her position was coterminous with the term
made use of or uttered the Employees Clearance,
of Gov. Misuari, the appointing authority. 50 She even
because there was no evidence that she submitted it
admitted that before she received her salary for
if not, at least caused it to be submitted to the
August,
was
Office of the Regional Governor. To support such claim,
necessary. 52 Moreover, her claim that Atty. Parcasio
she said there were no "receipt marks" in the
told her and her secretary that she did not need an
Employees Clearance to show that the Office of the
Employee Clearance to get her salary does not
Regional Governor received said documents.
2000, 51 an
persuade
us.
appointment",
Employees
In
Employees
fact,
when
Clearance
we
she
at
find
was
Clearance
her alleged
"re-
working
her
around
for
August
2000,
improbable. How could she have been re-appointed by

Gov. Alvarez, 53 whom she claims re-appointed her
sometime in the year 2000, when Gov. Misuari was still
the Regional Governor of the ARMM when she had her
Employees Clearance prepared sometime in August
2000? Clearly, her statement that she did not need an
Employees Clearance because she was re-appointed
does not inspire belief. ADaEIH
It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified

document
is
separate
and
distinct
from
the
"falsification" of a public document. The act of "using"

falsified documents is not necessarily included in the
"falsification" of a public document. Using falsified
documents is punished under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the falsification
of the Employees Clearance was consummated the
moment the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated.
In
the
falsification
of
public
document,
it
is
immaterial whether or not the contents set forth
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the
therein were false. What is important is the fact that
presumption that if a person had in his position a
the signature of another was counterfeited. 54 It is a
falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it),
settled rule that in the falsification of public or official
taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, he is
documents, it is not necessary that there be present
presumed to be the material author of the falsification.
the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person
He argues that the Sandiganbayan overlooked the fact
for the reason that in the falsification of a public
that there was no evidence to prove that petitioner
document, the principal thing punished is the violation
of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as
secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her
therein solemnly proclaimed. 55 Thus, the purpose for
Employees Clearance.
which the falsification was made and whether the

offender
profited
or
hoped
to
profit from
such
falsification are no longer material.
Petitioner's
denial,
unsubstantiated
and
uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Denial, when

unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
The records further show that petitioner "used" or
negative and self-serving evidence, which deserves no
uttered the Employees Clearance. The fact that the
greater evidentiary value than the testimony of
same was circulated to the different division heads for
credible
their signatures is already considered use of falsified
matters. 56Denial
documents as contemplated in Article 172. The lack of
negative and self-serving assertion. 57
the
stamp
mark
"Received"
in
the
Employees
Clearance does not mean that said document was not

received by the Office of the Regional Governor. We
find the certification signed by Atty. Randolph C.
Parcasio, Executive Secretary of Office of the Regional
Governor ARMM, as contained in the Employees
Clearance, to be sufficient proof that the same was
submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. It
must be stressed that the Executive Secretary is part
of the Office of the Regional Governor.
Petitioner
denies
having
"actually"
witnesses
is
who
testify
intrinsically
on
weak,
affirmative
being
In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as

her witness Marie Cris Batuampar, the person whom
she instructed to work for her Employees Clearance.
Her failure to present this person in order to shed light
on the matter was fatal to her cause. In fact, we find
that the defense never intended to present Marie Cris
Batuampar as a witness. This is clear from the pre-trial
order, because the defense never listed her as a
witness. 58 Her attempt to present Ms. Batuampar to
help her cause after she has been convicted is already
falsified
her
too late in the day, and Ms. Batuampar's testimony,
Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of
which is supposed to be given, cannot be considered
Laura Pangilan, claiming that she had no knowledge
newly discovered evidence as to merit the granting of
about the falsification because it was her assistant
her motion for new trial and/or reception of newly
signature
discovered evidence. ATCaDE
Employees Clearance, to wit
The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner
1. that the accused instructed her staff
"actually" imitated the signature of Laura Pangilan in
Maricris Batuampar to work for her
her Employees Clearance will not exonerate her. We
Employees
Clearance
have ruled that it is not strange to realize that in cases
with
Memorandum
of forgery, the prosecution would not always have the
Regional Governor Nur Misuari and that
means for obtaining such direct evidence to confute
the forged signature of Laura Pangilan
acts contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely on
was affixed on her clearance are strong
circumstantial evidence consisting of pieces of facts,
evidence that the accused herself either
which if woven together would produce a single
falsified the said signature or caused
network establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
the same to be falsified/imitated, and
reasonable
that
doubt. 59 We
totally
agree
with
Sandiganbayan, which said:
show that the accused herself "actually"

forged the signature of Laura Pangilan in
the Employees Clearance in question,
Court
nevertheless
Laura
possession
by
Pangilan
in
in
her
compliance
of
Maricris
ARMM
of
the
falsified clearance of the accused is
While there is no direct evidence to
the
the
the
of
finds
possession
by
the
accused
herself
because the former was only acting

upon the instructions and in behalf of
the latter;
the
following circumstances, obtaining in

the records, to establish/indicate that
she was the one who committed the
forgery or who asked somebody else to
forge or caused the forgery of the
2. that it was the accused who is

required to accomplish and to submit
her Employees Clearance to enable her
to collect her salary for the months of
August and September 2000 is sufficient
and strong motive or reason for her to
inference is justified that such person is
commit the falsification by imitating the
the forger or the one who caused the
signature of Laura Pangilan or order
forgery
someone else to forge it; and
falsification.
3. that the accused was the only one

who profited or benefited from the
and,
therefore,
Thus,
guilty
in People
of
v.
Sendaydiego, the Supreme Court held

that
falsification as she admitted that she
The rule is that if a person had in
was able to collect her salary for the
his
month of August 2000 after her falsified
document and he made use of it
Employees Clearance was submitted
(uttered it), taking advantage of it
and approved by the ORG-ARMM and
and
therefore, she alone could have the
presumption is that he is the
motive for making such falsification.
material
On
the
basis
of
the
foregoing
circumstances, no reasonable and fairminded man would say that the accused
a Regional Secretary of DOT-ARMM
had no knowledge of the falsification. It
is an established rule, well-buttressed
upon reason, that in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation, when a person
has in his possession or control a
falsified document and who makes use
of
the
same,
the
presumption
or
possession
profiting
thereby,
author
falsification.
falsified
This
of
is
the
the
especially
true if the use or uttering of the

forged documents was so closely
connected
in
time
with
the
forgery that the user or possessor

may
be
proven
to
have
capacity
of
committing
forgery,
or
to
have
the
the
close
connection with the forgers. (U.S.

v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People v.
de Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v.
Domingo, 49 Phil. 28;People v.
Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People v.
therefore, guilty of falsification. 61The effect of a
Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the
In line with the above ruling, and

considering that it was the accused who
took advantage and profited in the use
of the falsified Employees Clearance in
question, the presumption is inevitable
that she is the material author of the
falsification.
And
despite
full
need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima

facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is
offered, will thereby prevail. 62 A prima facie case of
falsification having been established, petitioner should
have presented clear and convincing evidence to
overcome such burden. This, she failed to do.
Petitioner
assails
the
weight
given
by
the
opportunity, she was not able to rebut
Sandiganbayan to the testimonies of the two Pangilans
such presumption by failing to show
when they failed to report the alleged falsification to
that it was another person who forged
the police or alert the Office of the Regional Governor
or
of said falsification, or tried to stop petitioner from
falsified
the
signature
of
Laura
Pangilan or that at least another person

and not she alone, had the reason or
motive
to
commit
the
forgery
or
falsification, or was or could have been

benefited
by
such
falsification/forgery. 60CDHcaS
getting her salaries.

We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule
that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment
of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded
The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan,
high
respect
as against the denials of petitioner, convince us to
determination of the credibility of witnesses is the
apply the rule that in the absence of satisfactory
domain of the trial court, as it is in the best position to
explanation, one who is found in possession of, and
observe
who has used, a forged document, is the forger and,
Sandiganbayan has given full probative value to the
the
if
not
conclusive
witnesses'
effect. 63The
demeanor. 64 The
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. So have we.
court and the adverse party for a
We find no reason to depart from such a rule.
fraudulent or devious purpose which its
Aware that the prosecution failed to present the

original from which the photocopy of petitioner's
Employees Clearance was supposed to have been
obtained, she maintains that the Sandiganbayan
should have doubted the authenticity and probative
value of the photocopy of the Employees Clearance.
production would expose and defeat.

Hence, as long as the original evidence
can be had, the Court should not
receive
in
evidence
substitutionary
in
that
nature,
which
is
such
as
photocopies, in the absence of any clear

showing that the original has been lost
The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the
or destroyed or cannot be produced in
photocopy of the Employees Clearance. We agree
court.
when it ruled:
disregarded,
being
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
evidence
barren
provides
weight. DAHSaT
that
when
the
subject
of
Such
photocopies
and
must
be
inadmissible
of
probative
inquiry is the contents of a document,
The foregoing rule, however, admits of
no evidence shall be admissible other
several exceptions. Under Section 3(b)
than the original document itself. The
of Rule 130, secondary evidence of a
purpose
the
writing may be admitted "when the
production by the offeror of the best
original is in the custody or under the
evidence if the prevention of fraud,
control of the party against whom the
because if a party is in possession of
evidence is offered, and the latter fails
such evidence and withholds it and
to
presents inferior or secondary evidence
notice". And to warrant the admissibility
in its place, the presumption is that the
of secondary evidence when the original
latter evidence is withheld from the
of a writing is in the custody or control
of
the
rule
requiring
produce
it
after
reasonable
of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule
the
130 provides as follows:
subpoena duces
Sec. 6. When original document

is in adverse party's custody or
control. If the document is in
the custody or control of the
adverse
party,
he
must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If

after
such
notice
party
or
via
tecum, provided
a
that
the party in custody of the original has

sufficient time to produce the same.
When such party has the original of the
writing and does not voluntarily offer to
produce it, or refuses to produce it,
secondary evidence may be admitted.
after
Here, the accused admitted that her
satisfactory proof of its existence,
Employees Clearance was always in the
he fails to produce the document,
possession of her assistant secretary,
secondary
[Marie
evidence
and
adverse
may
be
presented as in the case of loss.

Thus, the mere fact that the original is
in the custody or control of the adverse
party against whom it is offered does
not warrant the admission of secondary
evidence. The offeror must prove that
he has done all in his power to secure
the best evidence by giving notice to
the said party to produce the document
which may be in the form of a motion
for the production of the original or
made in open court in the presence of
Cris]
Batuampar.
So
the
prosecution in its effort to produce the

original copy of the said Employees
Clearance of the accused, thru Assistant
Special
Prosecutor
Anna
Isabel
G.
Aurellano of the Office of the Prosecutor,

sent on May 31, 2005 thru the COA
Telegraph Office at Quezon City two (2)
telegram
subpoenas
addressed
to
accused Normallah Pacasum, and [Marie

Cris]
Batuampar
ordering
them
to
submit to the Office of the Special

Prosecutor on or before June 8, 2005,
the original of the Employees' Clearance
in
the
name
questioned
Employees
Lucman-Pacasum for the release of her
secondary
evidence
August and September 2000 salary as
contents thereof was justified. 65
DOT
of
Normallah
Regional
Notwithstanding
Alonto
Secretary.
receipt
of
the
said
telegram subpoena by her uncle Manso

Alonto in her residence on June 1,
200[5], the accused did not appear
before or submit to Assistant Special
Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, the
original
of
the
said
Employees
Clearance, much less offered to produce

the same.
was proof of the existence of the

Employees Clearance as evidenced by
the photocopy thereof, and despite the
reasonable
notices
made
by
the
prosecution to the accused and her

secretary
to
produce
the
original of said employees clearance

they ignored the notice and refused to
produce
to
prove
as
the
This Court decrees that even though the original of an

alleged falsified document is not, or may no longer be
produced in court, a criminal case for falsification may
still prosper if the person wishing to establish the
contents of said document via secondary evidence or
substitutionary evidence can adequately show that the
best or primary evidence the original of the
document is not available for any of the causes
mentioned in Section 3, 66Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Under the circumstances, since there
assistant
Clearance
the
original
document,
the
Petitioner claims she was denied due process when the

Sandiganbayan severely restricted her time to present
evidence, allowing her only two hearing dates, thus
resulting in her failure to present another important
witness in the of person of Atty. Randolph Parcasio.
Petitioner was not denied due process. She was given
every
opportunity
to
adduce
her
evidence.
Sandiganbayan outlined the proceedings of the case

as follows:
the
After the prosecution rested its case, by
photocopy of the original copy of the
agreement of the parties, the initial
presentation
and
admission
of
The
hearing for the reception of defense
despite due notice. In compliance with
evidence was scheduled on September
this Order, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, filed
19 and 20, 2005 both at 8:30 in the
his
morning. However, upon motion of the
Appearance, respectively, which were
prosecution, the Court, in its Order of
both Noted by the Court in its Resolution
September
of January 19, 2006. HAaDTE
16,
2005,
cancelled
the
Explanation
and
Withdrawal
of
setting as the handling prosecutor, Pros.

Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, had to attend
in
In view of the absence of the accused in
September 19-23,
the March 13, 2006 hearing and her
2005 and scheduled anew the hearing
continued failure to get a substitute
on November 23 and 24, 2005, both at
counsel considering that her counsel,
8:30
However, for
Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, had already
failure of the defense counsel, Atty. Rico
withdrawn from the case since January
B.
the
16, 2006, the Court cancelled the March
November 23, 2005 hearing despite due
13 and 14, 2006 hearings and moved
notice,
the
the same to July 3 and 4, 2006 both at
November 23 and 24 hearings, and
8:30 in the morning and designated
moved the same to March 13 and 14,
Atty. Conrado Rosario of the PAO as
2006 both at 8:30 in the morning, and
counsel de oficio of the accused and
at the same time directed the said
directed the accused upon receipt of the
defense
in
order to immediately confer with said
writing within five (5) days from receipt
counsel for purposes of preparing for
of the Order why he should not be held
her defense in the case.
5-day
Tagaytay
in
workshop
City on
the
morning.
Bolongaita,
the
at
to
Court
counsel
to
PHINMA
appear
at
cancelled
show
cause
in contempt for his failure to appear
On March 20, 2006, the Court issued the
On July 3, 2006, upon the manifestation
following Resolution, which reads:
of Atty. Conrado Rosario, counsel for the
Accused Normallah L. Pacasum's letter

of February 17, 2006 (received by mail
on
March
extension
16,
of
2006)
time
to
requesting
engage
the
services of counsel is merely NOTED

WITHOUT ACTION as the next hearings
are scheduled on July 3 and 4, 2006 and
said accused would have more than
ample time to engage the services of
counsel
of
her
choice. For
this
accused,
that
since
appointed counsel
de
he
was
oficio,
the
accused has not communicated with

him and therefore he was not ready to
present any evidence for the accused,
the Court cancelled the hearing in order
to give the defense another opportunity
to present its evidence and reset it to
July
4,
2006, the
following
day
as
previously scheduled.
reason, any excuse from the accused on
On July 4, 2006, the Court issued the
said settings that she failed to engage
following Order, which reads
the services of counsel or that her

counsel needs more time to prepare will
be
unacceptable. At
all
events,
this
Court, in its Order of March 13, 2006,

had already appointed Atty. Conrado
Rosario of the PAO as a counsel de oficio
to represent the accused, with specific
orders to the latter to confer with Atty.
Rosario and assist him in preparing for
her defense.
"When this case was called for

hearing, accused asked for the
resetting of the case on the
ground that she just hired a new
counsel who
thereafter
arrived
and entered his appearance as

Atty.
Napoleon
Uy
Galit
with
address at Suite 202 Masonic

Building,
#35
Matalino
St.,
Diliman, Quezon City. With the
appearance of her new counsel,
accused herself cannot also attend the
Atty. Conrado C. Rosario is hereby
said hearing because she is undergoing
discharged as counsel de oficio of
fasting
the accused.
observance of Ramadan, he asked to
"As
prayed
for
by
the
accused, she is given the last

chance to present her evidence
on October 9 and 10, 2006, both
until
October
2006, the Court issued the following,

which reads
For
Appearance,
of
the
in
10, 2006. At the hearing on October 9,
"Acting
failure
2006
postpone the settings on October 9 and
at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

repeated
24,
on
the
Entry
Motion
of
for
accused to acknowledge receipt
Postponement of October 9 and
of the notices of the Court, her
10, 2006 Hearing filed by accused
waiver of appearance is hereby
Normallah
cancelled and she is ordered to
counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman,
personally
finding the same to be without
appear
in
the
scheduled hearings of this case.
L.
Pacasum,
thru
merit, as this case has been set

for hearing several times and the
SO ORDERED.
accused has been given the last
On October 6, 2006, the accused thru
chance to present evidence, the
counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, filed an
Court hereby denies the motion
Entry
for postponement. TEIHDa
of
Appearance,
Motion
For
Postponement of October 9 and 10

Hearings stating therein that since his
service
as
new
counsel
was
just
engaged by the accused, and that the
"In
this
regard,
the absence
of
in
view
of
accused
Normallah L. Pacasum in today's
hearing despite the Order of the
The
Court
thirty (30) days to submit their
dated
canceling
July
her
4,
2006,
waiver
of
parties are
respective
hereby given
memoranda.
appearance, and ordering her to
Thereafter,
personally
appear
before
this
deemed submitted for decision.
Court,
prayed
for
the
as
by
prosecution, let a Bench Warrant
the
case
shall
be
SO ORDERED.
of Arrest be issued against the
Subsequently, the accused thru counsel,
said
bond
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
posted for her provisional liberty
above Order dated October 25, 2006,
is ordered confiscated in favor of
and Motion to Set Hearing For Motion for
the government. The accused is
Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of
given thirty (30) days from notice
Arrest dated October 31, 2006.
to explain in writing why final
At the hearing of accused's motion for
judgment shall not be rendered
reconsideration on November 3, 2006,
against the said bond.
the Court issued the following Order,
With the Manifestation of Atty.
which reads
accused. The
Bantreas
cash
Lucman
the defense
is
not
that
ready
to
"When the 'Motion To Set Hearing

for Motion
for Reconsideration
present its evidence today and
and to Lift Warrant of Arrest' was
tomorrow, the last chance for it
called for hearing this morning,
to present its evidence, the Court
only
is
the
Lucman and Jose Ventura Aspiras
present
appeared. Accused Normallah L.
constraint
accused's
to
consider
right
evidence as waived.
to
Attorneys
Bantuas
Pacasum was absent.
M.
In view of the absence of the
is
accused, the Court is not inclined
issuance of the warrant of arrest,
to give favorable action to the
she has to voluntarily surrender
Motion
and appear before the Court or
must
for
be
Reconsideration. It
stressed
that
the
primordial reason for the issuance

of
the
order
sought
to
be
reconsidered in the presence of

the
accused
in
the
previous
hearing in violation of the Court's

Order
for
her
to
reminded/advised
that
the
be arrested and brought to the

Court.
WHEREFORE,
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED. aCTcDH
personally
Acting on the Omnibus Motion to Hold in
appear in the hearings of this
Abeyance Consideration of Prosecution's
case and for her indifference to
Memorandum (And for a Second Look
the directives of the Court. With
on the Matter of Accused's Right to
the absence anew of the accused,
Present
the Court has no alternative but
accused dated November 21, 2006, and
to deny the Motion.
the prosecution's Opposition thereto,
Moreover, the Court notes the
the Court issued the following Order,
allegation in the Motion that the
which reads
counsel sought the assurance of
"This refers to the Accused "Omnibus
the accused (and she promised)
Motion
to appear before this Court if the
Consideration
motion will be granted, as if the
November 7, 2006 Memorandum (And
Court owes the accused the favor
For a Second Look on the Matter of
to appear before it. The accused
Accused's Right to Present Defense
Defense
to
Evidence)
Hold
of
in
of
the
Abeyance
Prosecution's
Evidence)" dated November 21, 2006
Court gave her ample opportunity to
and the plaintiff's Opposition thereto
present her evidence. 67
dated November 28, 2006.
The Sandiganbayan properly dealt with the situation.
"Inasmuch as the accused has already
In fact, we find that the trial court was lenient with the
appeared before the Court and posted
petitioner. The failure of the defense to present Atty.
an
P10,000.00
Parcasio was its own doing. The defense failed to
despite the aforesaid opposition of the
prepare its witnesses for the case. As proof of this, we
prosecution, in the interest of justice,
quote a portion of the hearing when petitioner was
the Court is inclined to reconsider and
testifying:
additional
bond
of
give favorable action to the motion and

grant the accused another and last
ATTY. ASPIRAS
Q Would you know where (sic) the
opportunity to present here evidence.

"WHEREFORE, the motion is granted
and this case is set for hearing for the
accused's last chance to present and/or
whereabouts of this Sec. Parcasio

would be (sic) at this time?
A He lives in Davao but after what
her
happened to Gov. Misuari, we
6,
have not got together with the
2007 both at 8:30 in the morning in the
other members of the cabinet of
Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in
Gov. Misuari, but he lives in
Quezon City.
Davao, sir.
complete
the
evidence
on
presentation
February
of
and
SO ORDERED.
Thus, despite the initial indifference of
the accused to present her defense, the
Q Would
it
be
possible,
Madame
Witness, to request or ask him to

testify in this case?
A After this hearing, I will look for Sec.

Parcasio just to clear my name,
sir.
handwriting, signature or rubric.

All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently
CHAIRMAN
established. There is no dispute that petitioner was a
Not after this hearing, you should have

already done that. Because we
already
falsifies a document by counterfeiting or imitating any
gave
you
enough
opportunity to present your side,

right? You should not be telling
the Court that only after this
hearing, you will start looking
(for) people who will, definitely,
clear your name. You should be
doing that months ago, correct?
WITNESS
Yes, your Honors. 68 IADaSE
Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees
Clearance under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. For one to be convicted of
falsification under said paragraph, the followings
elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public
officer, an employee, or a notary public; (2) that he
takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he
public officer, being then the Regional Secretary of the

Department of Tourism of the ARMM, when she caused
the preparation of her Employees Clearance (a public
document) for the release of her salary for the months
of
August
and
September
2000.
Such
being
requirement, and she being a public officer, she was

duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit said
document.
Were
it
not
for
her
position
and
employment in the ARMM, she could not have

accomplished
falsification
said
of
Employees
public
document,
Clearance.
the
In
offender
is
considered to have taken advantage of his official

position when (1) he had the duty to make or prepare
or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the
document; or (2) he had official custody of the
document which he falsified. 69 It being her duty to
prepare and submit said document, she clearly took
advantage of her position when she falsified or caused
the
falsification
of
her
Employees
Clearance
imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan.
by
Leonardo-de
Going now to the penalties imposed on petitioner, we
find the same proper. The penalty for falsification
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code isprision
mayor and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. There
Castro,
Brion,
Peralta and Bersamin,
JJ.,concur.
Quisumbing, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Tinga, J., joins J. Quisumbing's dissent.
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the

Separate Opinions
commission of the felony, the imposable penalty

is prision mayor in its medium period, or within the
range of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from
the
medium
period
of prision
mayor, while
the
minimum shall be taken from within the range of the

penalty
next
lower
in
degree,
which
is prision
correccional or from six (6) months and one (1) day to

six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of
the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 dated 7
QUISUMBING, J., dissenting:

With due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion. I
vote to grant the petition and reverse the decision of
the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Normallah A.
Pacasum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code.
In my view, it is erroneous to convict petitioner
because of the following grounds:
August 2007 and its resolution dated 22 October 2007
First, there is lack of sufficient evidence to prove
are hereby AFFIRMED.
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Article 171,

paragraph 1 1 of the Revised Penal Code punishes
SO ORDERED.
"any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
advantage of his/her official position shall falsify a
Corona,
document
Carpio
Morales,
Velasco,
Jr.,
Nachura,
by
counterfeiting
handwriting, signature, or rubric".
or
imitating
any
The elements of falsification of public document are as
There is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, showing
follows:
that petitioner imitated or caused to be imitated the

(a) the
offender is a public officer,
employee or notary public;

(b) s/he
takes
advantage
of
falsifies
merely
testified
that
the
signature
in
not sufficient proof beyond reasonable doubt that she

is guilty of falsification.
by
The Sandiganbayan, for lack of proof of petitioner's
acts
direct participation in falsifying the document, relied
mentioned in Article 171 of the
on the disputable legal presumption that the possessor
Revised
as
of a falsified document who makes use of such to her
counterfeiting or imitating any
advantage is presumed to be the author of the
handwriting,
falsification. 3 At any rate, for the presumption of
committing
witnesses
petitioner's clearance was falsified. This fact alone is

his/her
official position;
(c) s/he
alleged falsified signature in the clearance. The
document
any
Penal
of
Code
the
such
signature
or
rubric. 2
authorship of falsification to apply, the possessor must
Elements (b) and (c) are absent in this case. Petitioner
stand to profit or had profited from the use of the
could not have taken advantage of her official position
falsified document. 4 In this case, petitioner does not
to have her employee clearance falsified because she
stand to profit nor profited from the use of the alleged
had no need for the clearance. Moreover, the mere act
falsified document.
of an employee of having his/her clearance signed is
Second, the allegedly falsified document, petitioner's
not taking advantage of one's official position. It is
employee clearance, was not needed by her to get her
erroneous to conclude that were it not for her position
salaries for the months of August and September 2000
and her employment in the ARMM, petitioner could not
and therefore, no criminal intent or ill motive could be
have accomplished her clearance.
attributed to petitioner to warrant her conviction for
falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1, of the
ROSARIO
S.
Revised Penal Code. SDEHCc
PANUNCIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

Criminal intent must be present in felonies committed

by means of dolo, such as falsification. 5 In this case,
there is no reasonable ground to believe that the
DECISION
requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present.

Petitioner had no ill motive to falsify her own
employee's clearance. She had no need to do so since
CARPIO, J p:
the employee clearance was not needed by her in the

procurement of her salaries. Even if she had her
The Case
employee clearance prepared, this act, by itself, is not
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the
felonious. There was nothing willful or felonious in
15
petitioner's acts that would warrant her prosecution for
Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
falsification.
25254.
June
I therefore vote to set aside the Decision dated August

7, 2007 of the Sandiganbayan and acquit petitioner of
the charges against her.
||| (Pacasum v. People, G.R. No. 180314, [April 16,
2009], 603 PHIL 612-649)
2004
Decision 1 and
15
October
2004
The Antecedent Facts

On 3 August 1992, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon,
operatives of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and
the Special Mission Group Task Force Lawin of the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) led by then
Philippine
National
Police
Superintendent
Panfilo
Lacson and Police Senior Inspector Cesar Ouano, Jr.,

FIRST DIVISION
armed with Search Warrant No. 581-92 issued by then

Regional Trial Court Judge Bernardo P. Pardo, raided the
[G.R. No. 165678. July 17, 2009.]
residence of Rosario S. Panuncio (petitioner), a jeepney
operator, at 204 E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, Quezon City.
he was only a visitor of the house when the raid took
The operatives confiscated LTO documents, 17 pieces
place. An Information for violation of Article 172 (1) in
of private vehicle plates, a copying machine, several
relation to Article 171 of the RPC was filed against
typewriters, and other tools and equipment. One of the
petitioner, thus: IECcaA
LTO documents confiscated was MVRR No. 63231478

issued to Manlite Transport Corporation (Manlite). The
document was photographed during the raid while it
was still mounted on one of the typewriters.
That on August 3, 1992 at about 4:00

p.m., accused ROSARIO PANUNCIO y SY,
a private individual and owner/operator
of a residence/office located at 204 E.
Petitioner signed a certification of orderly search,
Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, did,
together with Barangay Chairman Antonio Manalo
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
(Manalo),
feloniously with intent to cause damage
petitioner's
employee
Myrna
Velasco
(Velasco), and one Cesar Nidua (Nidua). Petitioner,
falsified
Manalo, Velasco, and Nidua also signed a Receipt of
appearing on Land Transportation Office
Property Seized issued by PO3 Manuel Nicolas Abuda.
(LTO) official receipt no. MVRR No.
Petitioner and one Jaime L. Lopez (Lopez) were
63231478 dated July 31, 1992 changing
arrested and brought to the PACC.
the meaning of the document and
Juan V. Borra, Jr., Assistant Secretary for the LTO,

Department of Transportation and Communications,
who was representing his office, filed a complaint
against petitioner for violation of Articles 171, 172,
176, and 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended; Presidential Decree No. 1730; Sections 31
and 56 of Republic Act No. 4136; and Batas Pambansa
Blg. 43. Lopez was not charged since it was shown that
causing
the
the
vital
informations
document
to
as
speak
something false, when in truth and in

fact, accused knew fully well that the
document as falsified do not legally
exist and is different from the official file
of the LTO, to the prejudice of public
interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation, which the
Route Arroceros-Project 4, Binangonan-Cubao
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107 (trial
via
court), granted in its order of 1 March 1993. 4The trial

court gave the public prosecutor 20 days within which
to submit his report on the reinvestigation. On 1 June
1994,
the
Prosecutor
Department
Mario
of
A.M.
Justice,
Caraos,
Resolution 5 recommending
that
through
State
submitted
its
petitioner
be
prosecuted for falsification. The trial court set the

arraignment, and on 28 June 1994, petitioner entered
a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, pre-trial and the trial of
Quezon City via Espaa Marcos Highway and

viceversa
Motor No. 179837 100002
Serial No. SP-MM-12857-87-C MEL-3002-C
Gross Weight 3,000 2,700
Net Capacity 1,500 1,350
the case ensued.
Payment of 1992 P513 P468
During the trial, a photocopy of the duplicate original
Renewal Registration
of MVRR No. 63231478 dated 31 July 1992, which was

a faithful reproduction of the document in LTO's file,
was
presented
and
compared
with
MVRR
No.
Owner Manlite Transport Co., Inc. Manlite

Transport Co., Inc.
63231478 confiscated from petitioner's residence. The
Address 204 E. Rodriguez Ave., Q.C. 204 E.
following discrepancies were noted: cCDAHE
Rodriguez Ave., Q.C. 6
As Per EDP/LTO File As Per Photocopy of

Owner's
Copy
(recovered
from petitioner's residence)

File No. 4B-0476-20101 0478-50065
Plate No. DFK 587 DEU 127
Petitioner denied that she was the source of the

falsified documents. She alleged that Manlite, which
she used to co-own with her late husband, already
stopped operating in April 1992 and her business was
operating under the name Rosario Panuncio. She
alleged that she was not at home when the raid took
place, and when she returned home, the police
authorities had already emptied her shelves and she
Penal Code which carries the penalty
was just forced to sign the search warrant, inventory
of prision correccional in its medium and
receipt, and the certificate of orderly search. She
maximum period and a fine of not more
further alleged that she was charged with falsification
than
because she refused the police authorities' demand for
Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused
money.
Rosario
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its 2 September 1997 Decision, 7 the trial court

found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of a public document under
Articles 171 and 172 of the RPC. The trial court ruled
that the facts established by the prosecution were not
substantially disputed by the defense. The trial court
ruled that the raid yielded incriminatory evidence to
support the theory that petitioner was engaged in
falsifying LTO documents and license plate registration
receipts. The dispositive portion of the trial court's
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having
proven the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the accused is found
guilty as charged with the crime of
Falsification of Public Document under
Art. 171 and Art. 172 of the Revised
P5,000.00.
Panuncio
sentenced
Applying
y
Sy
to suffer the
is
the
hereby
penalty of
imprisonment of Six (6) Months and One

(1) Day of arresto mayor as minimum to
FOUR (4) Years or prision correccional as
maximum, and a fine of P2,000.00 with
subsidiary
imprisonment
in
case
of
insolvency. Without costs.

SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 15 June 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's Decision with modification.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner committed
falsification of a public document. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the search warrant did not suffer from any
legal infirmity because the items to be seized were
already specified and identified in the warrant. The
Court of Appeals declared that the court's designation
of the place to be searched and the articles to be
WHEREFORE,
seized left the police authorities with no discretion,
conviction rendered by the trial court
ensured that unreasonable searches and seizures
against
would not take place and abuses would be avoided.
Panuncio y Sy is AFFIRMED, but with the
The Court of Appeals further ruled that the Rules of
MODIFICATION that she should be, as
Court do not require that the owner of the place to be
she hereby is, sentenced to serve an
searched be present during the conduct of the raid.
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years
The Court of Appeals noted that the search was
and
conducted not only in the presence of petitioner but
correccional as
also
years
in
the
presence
of
Manalo,
Velasco,
and
Nidua. IHCESD
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals reads:
the
judgment
accused-appellant
four
(4)
months
minimum
of prision
of
Rosario
of prision
to
six
(6)
correctional as
maximum. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 15
October 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether the elements of falsification
of
public
document
under
Article 172 (1) in relation to
Article 171 of the RPC have been
particulars or a motion to quash the information.
established;
Petitioner's failure to object to the allegation in the
2. Whether the search was regularly

conducted;
3. Whether
the
gathered
in evidence; and
the
amounted
to
waiver
of
the
defect
in
the
information. 10 Objections as to matters of form or

evidence
during the search are admissible
4. Whether
information before she entered her plea of not guilty
Indeterminate
first time on appeal. 11

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article
Court
properly
substance in the information cannot be made for the
of
Appeals
172 12 in relation to Article 171 13 of the RPC refers
applied
the
to falsification by a private individual, or a public
Law
officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
Sentence
(ISL).
official position, of public, private, or commercial
The Ruling of this Court
documents. 14 The
The petition has no merit.

Falsification of Public Documents
elements
of
falsification
documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC

are:
(1) that
the
offender
is
private
At the outset, petitioner argues that the Information
individual or a public officer or
was defective because it did not specifically mention
employee
the provision that she violated. As such, she was not
advantage of his official position;
informed of the specific violation for which she was

held liable.
We cannot sustain petitioner's argument. Petitioner
failed to raise the issue of the defective information
before the trial court through a motion for bill of
of
who
did
not
take
(2) that he committed any of the acts of

falsification enumerated in Article
171 of the RPC; and
(3) that the falsification was committed
she had participation in the criminal act. The Court
in a public, official or commercial
disagrees with petitioner. The falsified copy of MVRR
document. 15
No. 63231478 was found during a valid search

conducted in petitioner's residence. It was issued in
the name of Manlite which petitioner admitted as co-
In this case, petitioner is a private individual. MVRR No.
owned by her together with her late husband. Thus,
63231478, denominated as LTO Form No. 2, is an
there is a presumption that she falsified it and she was
official document issued by the LTO. It is the owner's
using it for her benefit. The falsified document,
copy of the Official Receipt of the payment of the
purportedly issued in the name of Manlite, could be
vehicle's
the
used for another vehicle operated by Manlite to make
owner's copy of MVRR No. 63231478 by making it
it appear that it was validly registered with the LTO. In
appear that it was an owner's copy issued to a vehicle
this case, the original document in LTO's files was
of Manlite with Plate No. DEU 127 when in the LTO's
issued to a Manlite vehicle with Plate No. DFK 587
files, it was issued to a vehicle of Manlite with Plate No.
plying Arroceros-Project 4, Quezon City via Espaa.
DFK 587. The discrepancies between the document in
The falsified document was purportedly issued to a
LTO's files and the document confiscated in petitioner's
Manlite
house were duly noted by the trial court and remained
Binangonan-Cubao via Marcos Highway.
registration
fee.
Petitioner
falsified
undisputed. The alteration made by petitioner changed

the meaning of the document within the context of
Article
171
falsification
(6)
the
of
the
making
RPC
of
which
"any
punishes
as
alteration
or
intercalation in a genuine document which changes its

meaning". aHIEcS
Petitioner argues that MVRR No. 63231478 was not
found in her possession and that it was not proved that
vehicle
with
Plate
No.
DEU
127
plying
Petitioner further argues that only a photocopy of the

purported owner's copy was presented to the trial
court and there could be no falsification of a mere
photocopy.
Again, we do not agree with petitioner. It has been
established that there is a genuine copy of MVRR No.
63231478 in the LTO's files and the owner's copy of it
was in petitioner's possession. The original copy of
SEC.
MVRR No. 63231478 was not presented during the trial
premises, to be made in presence of
because petitioner kept it in her possession. However,
two witnesses. No search of a house,
it has been established during the trial that as per
room, or any other premise shall be
usual practice, the owner's copy is usually photocopied
made except in the presence of the
and it is the photocopy which is usually kept inside the
lawful occupant thereof or any member
vehicle. 16 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
of his family or in the absence of the
presentation of a mere photocopy of the document to
latter, two witnesses of sufficient age
any traffic enforcer is enough to convince the traffic
and discretion residing in the same
enforcer that the public vehicle was validly and
locality.
lawfully registered. The fact remains that LTO Form No.

2, which petitioner falsified, is a genuine and public
document.
8. Search
of
house,
room,
or
Even assuming that petitioner or any lawful occupant

of the house was not present when the search was
conducted, the search was done in the presence of at
Validity of the Search and Admissibility of the
least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
Articles Seized
residing in the same locality. Manalo was the barangay
Petitioner assails the validity of the search which was
chairman of the place while Velasco was petitioner's
allegedly conducted while she was not in the house.
employee. 17 Petitioner herself signed the certification
Petitioner alleges that since the search warrant was
of orderly search when she arrived at her residence.
defective, the items seized during the search could not
Clearly, the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the
be used in evidence against her.
Rules of Court were complied with by the police
We will discuss these issues together.

Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
authorities
who
conducted
the
search.
Further,
petitioner failed to substantiate her allegation that she

was just forced to sign the search warrant, inventory
receipt, and the certificate of orderly search. In fact,
the records show that she signed these documents
together with three other persons, including the
In this case, the Court of Appeals sentenced petitioner
barangay chairman who could have duly noted if
to serve an indeterminate penalty of two years and
petitioner was really forced to sign the documents
four months of prision correccional as minimum to six
against her will.
years of prision correccional as maximum. There being
Articles
which
are
the
product
of
unreasonable
searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence

pursuant
to
Article
III,
Section
(2)
of
theConstitution. 18 However, in this case, we sustain

the validity of the search conducted in petitioner's
residence and, thus, the articles seized during the
search are admissible in evidence against petitioner.
Application of the ISL
individual under Article 172 (1) in relation to Article

171 of the RPC is punishable by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods, which ranges from
two years, four months and one day to six years, and a
fine of not more than P5,000. Applying the ISL,
petitioner may be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty the minimum of which must be within the
of arresto
mayor in
its
maximum
period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four

months
and
one
months. SCHcaT
day
to
two
years
it proper in this case to lower the maximum penalty

imposed by the Court of Appeals from six years to four
years,
nine
months
and
eleven
days
of prision
correccional. Further, the penalty for falsification of a

public document under Article 172 (1) in relation to
Article 171 of the RPC includes a fine of not more than
P5,000 which the Court of Appeals failed to impose.
Hence, we also modify the penalty to include the fine.
Falsification of a public document by a private
range
no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, we deem
and
four
WHEREFORE, we DENY the
petition.
We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 15 June 2004

Decision and 15 October 2004 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25254. We find petitioner
Rosario S. Panuncio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of falsification of a public document under
Article 172 (1) in relation to Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentence her to suffer the
indeterminate penalty ofIMPRISONMENT from two
years
and
four
months
of prision
correccional as
minimum to four years, nine months and eleven days
of prision
correccionalas
maximum
and
to
pay
a FINE of P3,000.
2003, convicting petitioner of ten (10) counts of

Falsification of Public Document defined and penalized
under paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Costs against petitioner.
Code, and [2] Resolution 2 dated September 24, 2003,
SO ORDERED.
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
||| (Panuncio v. People, G.R. No. 165678, [July 17,

2009], 610 PHIL 594-608)
Petitioner Romeo D. Lonzanida, then Municipal Mayor

of San Antonio, Zambales, was among those criminally
charged with Falsification of Public Document as
defined and penalized under Paragraph 2 of Article 171
FIRST DIVISION
of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the

Provincial Prosecutor on separate complaints 3 filed on
[G.R. Nos. 160243-52. July 20, 2009.]
various dates by Efren Tayag, Elsie de Dios, Daniel

Alegado
and
Rene
Abad.
Also
included
in
the
ROMEO D. LONZANIDA, petitioner, vs.
complaints was Romulo Madarang (Madarang), the
PEOPLE
Assistant Municipal Treasurer.
OF
THE
The complaints alleged that petitioner, as Municipal

Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, notarized thirteen
DECISION
(13) Affidavits
of
Ownership 4 of
parcels
of
117-
hectare public land located at Barangay Pundakit, San

Antonio, Zambales, particularly described as Lot No.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
On appeal to this Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the [1] Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan dated July 25,
5504. The Affidavits of Ownership appeared to have

been executed by Edzel L. Lonzanida, Leo Lonzanida,
Japhet Lonzanida, Peter John Madarang, Leo Madarang,
Dolores
Joy
Madarang,
Elsie
de
Dios,
Medardo
Domingo, Pedro Lacorte, Efren Tayag, Cedric Legrama,
Thus, ten (10) Informations for Falsification of Public
Charlie
Document against petitioner were filed before the
Lacap
and
Raphael
Gonzales
(Edzel
Lonzanida, et al.). The purported affiants either denied

executing and signing the same or were the minor
children of petitioner and of Madarang.
thirteen (13) identically worded Joint Affidavits 5 of

two disinterested persons purportedly executed and
signed by Rufino Aniceto who is an illiterate and
Roberto Querubin who was already deceased at the
time of their execution.
March
16,
1998,
Criminal Case Nos. 24644 to 24652, 8 except for the

names of the alleged affiants of the falsified Affidavits
The complaints also alleged that petitioner notarized
On
Sandiganbayan.
of Ownership, were similarly worded, viz.:

That on or about the 17th day of
October, 1995, in the Municipality of
San Antonio, province of Zambales,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused
Special
being then the Municipal Mayor of San
Prosecutor issued a Memorandum 6 recommending
Antonio, Zambales, taking advantage of
that petitioner be charged with ten (10) counts of
his official position and committing the
falsification, one for the Joint Affidavits and nine in
offense in relation to his duties, did then
connection
and
with
the
Office
the Affidavits
of
of
the
Ownership. The
there,
willfully,
unlawfully
and
recommendation was based upon the finding that of
feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified
the
the
thirteen
(13)
Ownership, seven
(7)
affiants
were
in
the Affidavits
minors. 7 Hence,
of
Affidavit
of
Ownership
dated
their
October 17, 1995 which he subscribed
signatures appearing thereon and the facts stated in
thus making said document a public or
the said documents were all false. In addition, two (2)
official document, by making it appear,
affiants, Efren Tayag and Elsie de Dios denied their
as it did appear, that said document
participation in the Affidavits of Ownership. HaAIES
was made, prepared and signed by

DOLORES
JOY
MADARANG
thereby
The
attributing to the latter participation and
executed and signed before him by
intervention
Rufino Aniceto and Roberto Querubin, as
in
the
making
and
preparation of said document by signing
affiants
his name and affixing his signature
personally the owners of the parcel of
thereon when in truth and in fact, said
land
accused well knew, the said DOLORES
Pundakit as Edzel L. Lonzanida, Peter
JOY MADARANG did not so participate
John
nor authorize the herein accused or
Madarang,
Leo
anybody else to prepare and sign the
Lonzanida,
Dolores
same, thereby causing damage and
Medardo Domingo, Pedro Lacorte, Efren
prejudice to public interest. 9
Tayag, Cedric Legrama, Charlie Lacap
Information
in
Criminal
Case
23850 10 contained the following allegations:
No.
at
who
Sitio
Madarang,
declared
Talisayen,
Elsie
de
to
Barangay
Dios,
Lonzanida,
Joy
know
Leo
Japhet
Madarang,
and Rafael Gonzales and who have

openly and continuously occupied the
said land for thirty (30) years, when in
truth and in fact, as said accused well
October, 1995, in the Municipality of
knew, the said "Joint-Affidavit" was not
San Antonio, Province of Zambales,
executed and signed by Rufino Aniceto
and Roberto Querubin, the latter having
this Honorable Court, the said accused
died prior to the execution of the said
being then Municipal Mayor of San
joint-affidavit, nor said affiants, ever
Antonio, Zambales, did then and there,
appear before the accused for the
willfully,
unlawfully
feloniously
purpose of swearing and subscribing the
prepare
which
said document, to the damage and
and
Joint-Affidavit
he
ratified by stating and making it appear

in the said document that the same was
prejudice of the government.
Upon arraignment on November 5, 1998, petitioner,
applicants, Sketch Plan and the Certification from the
assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to
CENRO. According to Cacho, after preparing the Tax
all the charges.
Declarations, he advised Madarang to present to him
During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses

Municipal Assessor Leopoldo Cacho; complainants
Efren Tayag, Elsie de Dios and Daniel C. Alegado; and
relatives
of
purported
affiants
in
the Joint
Affidavits Rodolfo Querubin and Lydia Aniceto y dela

Cruz.
Municipal Assessor Leopoldo Cacho testified that he is
in charge of the preparation of Tax Declarations. He
explained that for Tax Declarations of undeclared
lands, the applicant is required to submit a Joint
Affidavit of the neighboring owners of the property
subject of the application together with the Affidavit of
the applicants to personally sign their respective Tax

Declaration.
However,
Madarang
took
the
Tax
Declarations and assured Cacho that he [Madarang]

would be the one to make the declarants sign. Cacho
found out later that the Tax Declarations were already
approved by the Provincial Assessor.
Efren Tayag testified that he is the real occupant of Lot
No. 5504. He has been occupying the subject land
since 1971 together with twenty-four (24) other
persons and that none of the individuals who executed
the Affidavits of Ownership were ever in possession of
the said parcel of land. IECAaD
Ownership, a sketch plan and a Certification from the
Daniel
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
Development
(CENRO). Cacho disclosed that in the latter part of
narrated that sometime in July 1996, he visited Vice-
1995,
Governor Saturnino Bactad in his office at Capitol
Madarang
filed
13
applications
for
Tax
C.
Alegado,
Officer
the
of
San
Planning
Antonio,
Zambales,
Building,
Iba,
said parcel of land were, as mentioned earlier, Edzel
13 Joint
Affidavits, 13 Affidavits
Lonzanida, et al. Attached to each application were
Mayor's Certification and a Special Power of Attorney.
the Joint Affidavits of Rufino Aniceto and Roberto
According to Alegado, said documents unraveled an
Querubin, Affidavits
attempt to sell Lot No. 5504. He also testified that
Ownership of
each
of
the
Bactad
and
Declaration for Lot No. 5504. The applicants for the
of
Zambales.
Municipal
showed
of
to
him
Ownership, a
Edzel, Leo and Japhet, all surnamed Lonzanida, who
Rodolfo
appear to have signed the Affidavits of Ownership, are
testified that his brother Roberto could not have
the minor children of petitioner. He stated further that
executed the Joint Affidavits on October 17, 1995
Peter
because Roberto died in Tarlac on May 3, 1981.
John,
Leo
and
Dolores
Joy,
all
surnamed
Madarang, are the minor children of Romulo Madarang

while Cedric Legrama is the son of Municipal Treasurer
Cecilia Legrama and was only one year old at the time
of the execution of the Affidavits of Ownership on
October 17, 1995. Alegado added that on the same
day October 17, 1995, petitioner also administered
the oath in the 13 Joint Affidavits making it appear that
the same were executed by Rufino Aniceto and
Roberto Querubin and that petitioner personally knew
the two affiants to be the owners of the land adjacent
to that subject of the Affidavits of Ownership.
Elsie de Dios testified that the signature appearing in
the Affidavit of Ownership she purportedly executed
was not hers and was in fact a forgery. She had not
been in possession of any portion of Lot No. 5504 for
thirty (30) years and she did not apply for the issuance
of a Tax Declaration of the same.
Querubin,
brother
of
Roberto
Querubin,
Lydia Aniceto y dela Cruz, the widow of the late Rufino

Rafanan Aniceto who died on June 25, 1998, testified
that she had been married to Rufino for 16 years.
According
to
Lydia,
the
signatures
in
the Joint
Affidavits appearing over the typewritten name Rufino

R. Aniceto could not have been her husband's because
the latter was illiterate and only used his thumbmark
in affixing his signature on any document. As proof
thereof, she presented a community tax certificate of
Rufino with the latter's thumbmark.
The prosecution also presented the Counter-Affidavit of
Cecilia Legrama, the mother of said Cedric Legrama
wherein Cecilia declared that her son Cedric Legrama
was only eleven (11) months old at the time of the
execution of the purported Affidavits of Ownership and
could not have therefore executed the same.
On the other hand, petitioner testified in his own
defense. He acknowledged the signatures in the Joint
Affidavits as
his.
According
to
petitioner,
the
documents were brought to him by Madarang and he
signed on each of the affidavits as oath administering
Rules of the Sandiganbayan in relation to Section 2 (a)
officer. He also admitted that he did not know Roberto
of Rule 121 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. 12
Querubin and Rufino Aniceto, the affiants therein.

Petitioner posited that the affidavits in question or the
documentary exhibits of the public prosecutor are not
documents, as contemplated under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and therefore, they cannot be
falsified and made a criminal act thereunder. As to
the Affidavits of Ownership, petitioner insisted that no
witness was presented to show and state under oath
On January 8, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied the

motion for reconsideration. 13 On January 19, 2001,
petitioner filed a Manifestation and Submission of
Evidence
Which
Became
Available
Only
Recently. 14 The evidence consisted of affidavits of

recantation executed by Elsie de Dios, Rene Abad and
Rodolfo Querubin. AETcSa
that the signatures on the contested documents
In
the
resolution 15 dated
April
5,
2001,
the
belong to him. He contended that in the absence of
Sandiganbayan deferred ruling on the Manifestation
such evidence, he should be acquitted.
with Motion to Consider the Motion for Reconsideration

as a Motion for New Trial and required Elsie de Dios,
Rene Abad and Rodolfo Querubin, to appear and testify
On October 20, 2000, the Sandiganbayan through its

Fourth
Division
rendered
decision 11 convicting
petitioner of ten (10) counts of Falsification as charged

in Criminal Case Nos. 23850, 24644 to 24652.
before it.
In
the
resolution 16 dated
petitioner's Motion
to
October
Consider
the
30,
2001,
Motion
for
Reconsideration as a Motion for New Trial was treated
On October 24, 2000, petitioner filed a motion for
as a second motion for reconsideration, and denied on
reconsideration. Again on December 22, 2000, without
the ground that the same was filed without leave of
awaiting
for
court and that the filing of a second motion is
reconsideration, petitioner filed a Manifestation with
proscribed by the rules. With the denial of his motion,
Motion to Consider the Motion for Reconsideration as a
petitioner filed a third motion for reconsideration which
Motion for New Trial as per Rule VIII of the Revised
was opposed by the prosecution.
the
resolution
of
said
motion
Unperturbed, petitioner filed a Manifestation and/or
geared towards proving that no one was prejudiced
Explanation with Leave of Court to File a Motion for
with the issuance of the Tax Declaration.
Reconsideration 17 questioning the October 30, 2001

resolution.
In
as witnesses for the prosecution. Recanting her

the
previous testimony, Elsie de Dios testified that the
Sandiganbayan gave in to petitioner's plea for a new
complaint-affidavit which she signed was already
trial and allowed him a last chance to present evidence
prepared at the time she first laid eyes on it in the
in his behalf.
office of Atty. Hermana Bactad, who was allegedly a
The
the
Elsie de Dios and Leopoldo Cacho previously testified
resolution 18 dated
prosecution
January
filed
3,
2002,
petition
for certiorari, prohibition with prayer for a temporary

restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
with this Court assailing the Sandiganbayan's January
3, 2002 resolution. The petition was docketed as G.R.
political opponent of petitioner. She claimed that no

prejudice had been caused her by the execution of
the Joint-Affidavits and Affidavit of Ownershipbecause
she did not apply for the issuance of a Tax Declaration
on any portion of Lot No. 5504.
Nos. 152365-74 but eventually dismissed by the Court
Leopoldo Cacho's recantation was to the effect that no
in the resolution 19 dated July 24, 2002.
one was prejudiced by the issuance of subject Tax
Petitioner was thus given a new trial and allowed to

present, before the Sandiganbayan, witnesses Elsie de
Dios, Leopoldo Cacho and Rene Abad as part of his
testimonial evidence.
Declarations. He rationalized that the government was

not prejudiced by the issuance of the Tax Declarations
in favor of the thirteen (13) applicants because the
taxes therefor had been duly paid. He added that no
person, other than the thirteen persons who signed
The three claimed that they were compelled by the
the
political enemies of petitioner to testify against him
claimed ownership over Lot No. 5504 which remains a
and to sign the document, the contents of which they
public land until a title is issued to cover it.
did not understand. Principally, their testimony was
applications
and Affidavits
of
Ownership, has
Rene Abad claimed that he was used as a pawn by
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer in
petitioner's political adversaries. According to him, he
each
was brought by Atty. Hermana Bactad to the Office of
imprisonment of four (4) years and one
the Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales where he was
(1)
made to sign a prepared affidavit which he neither
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1)
read nor fully comprehended. He likewise claimed that
day of prison mayor (sic) as maximum,
he was not prejudiced by the execution of the
and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, in each
affidavits of ownership and the issuance of the tax
of
declarations over the subject land.
imprisonment
On July 25, 2003, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
of
the
day
the
cases
of prision
cases
the
penalty
correccional as
without
in
of
subsidiary
case
of
insolvency. cTESIa
Decision convicting petitioner of the crimes charged. In
Considering that this decision is the
so ruling, the Sandiganbayan belittled the recantation
result of the new trial granted upon
of the three prosecution witnesses. Dispositively, the
motion
decision reads:
notwithstanding that the same finding
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
judgment is hereby rendered finding

accused
Mayor
Romeo
Lonzanida
Dumlao guilty of ten (10) counts of

Falsification of Public Document defined
and penalized under Article 171 par. 2
of the Revised Penal Code, and in the
absence
of
aggravating
any
mitigating
circumstances,
and
applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said
of
the
accused
and
of guilt was arrived at despite the

evidence presented in the new trial, the
resolution of this court promulgated on
January 21, 2003, ordering the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against the
accused, and which is the subject of
accused's Motion
Clarification/Reconsideration
for
(With
Prayer to Recall/Set Aside Warrant of

Arrest), is hereby set aside and the
arrest accused is held in abeyance until
such
time
that
the
new
decision
JUSTIFYING THE CONVICTION OF THE
becomes final and executory, pursuant
ACCUSED
WHEN
to the provisions of Secs. 22 and 24,
WHICH THE INFERENCE WERE DERIVED
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. 20
WERE
NOT
THE
FACTS
ESTABLISHED
FROM
THEREBY
DEPARTING FROM THE RULING OF THE
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME
COURT
IN PEOPLE
V.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a
GENOBIA,234 SCRA 699 ON JUDGMENT
supplemental motion for reconsideration but both
OF
motions were denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
CONVICTION
Resolution 21 dated September 24, 2003.
elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review

on certiorari imputing the following errors against the
Sandiganbayan:
ALL THE REQUISITES FOR CONVICTION

OF
AN
ACCUSED
BASED
ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WERE NOT

PRESENTED/PROVEN,
COURT A
ON
III
Unable to accept the judgment of conviction, petitioner
THE
BASED
HENCE
HE
IS
ENTITLED TO AN ACQUITTAL AS HIS

QUO SERIOUSLY
MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS THEREBY
GUILT
WAS
NOT
PROVEN
BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
LEADING IT TO A CONCLUSION NOT IN
In the Resolution 22 dated July 14, 2004, the Court
ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE
denied the petition, thus:
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Considering the allegations, issues, and
II
arguments adduced in the petition for
THE COURT A QUO RELIED ON PURELY
review on certiorari of the decision and
CIRCUMSTANTIAL
resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
EVIDENCE
IN
July 25, 2003 and September 24, 2003,
respectively, the Court further Resolves
and Roberto Aniceto, the affiants
to DENY the petition for failure of the
therein;
petitioners to sufficiently show that the

Sandiganbayan
reversible
committed
error
in
the
any
3. A Joint Affidavit is an indispensable

requirement in an application for
challenged
a tax declaration; EaCSHI
decision and resolution as to warrant

the
exercise
by
this
Court
of
its
4. It
was
upon
the
submission
of
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in
the Joint Affidavits, Affidavits of
this case.
Ownership, Certification
However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Court,

in its Resolution 23 of January 26, 2005, reinstated and
gave due course to the petition. We now take a second
look at this case and the facts and circumstances
CENRO and the sketch plan that

Tax Declarations were issued in
favor of the thirteen applicants
for Tax Declaration;
5. Of the thirteen applicants for Tax
obtaining herein.
In handing down a verdict of guilty, the Sandiganbayan
appreciated against petitioner the following factual
circumstances:
Declarations, three were minor

children of petitioner; one was a
two-month old child of Municipal
Treasurer Cecilia Legrama; and,
1. Petitioner did not deny having signed

as
from
subscribing
officer
the
thirteen Joint Affidavits;
three
were
Assistant
the
children
Municipal
of
Treasurer
Romulo Madarang;
2. Even as petitioner admitted that he
6. None of the 7 children were more
signed as subscribing officer the
than thirty years old, yet, there
subject Joint Affidavits, he denied
was a declaration in the Affidavits
that he knew Roberto Querubin
of
Ownership that
the
affiants
were in possession of the subject
The general rule is that the factual findings of the
lot for more than thirty years;
Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except
7. Two of the alleged applicants for tax

declaration, Elsie de Dios and
Efren Tayag, never applied for the
issuance of a Tax Declaration in
their
favor
nor
filed
any
document relative to the said

application;
8. Petitioner
where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely

on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a
mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and
(5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of
evidence
and
are
contradicted
by
evidence
on
record. 24
issued
Mayor's
Certification dated February 19,

1996 attesting that the thirteen
A perusal of the records reveals that none of the above
applicants
Declaration
exceptions obtains in this case. There is no showing
were the actual occupants of Lot
that the conclusion made by the Sandiganbayan on
No.
the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution is
for
5504
Tax
and
had
been
in
possession of the same for more
manifestly
than thirty years; and,
speculation and conjectures.
9. The applicants for Tax Declaration

executed
Attorney
Special
giving
Power
Madarang
of
the
authority to sell the land subject

thereof
and
to
proceeds of the sale.
receive
the
mistaken
or
grounded
entirely
on
Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, for

falsification of a public document to be established,
the following elements must concur:
1. That the offender is a public officer,
employee, or notary public;
2. That he takes advantage of his official

position;
f) Making
any
alteration
or
intercalation in a genuine
3. That he falsifies a document by

committing any of the following
acts:
document which changes

its meaning; TSIDaH
g) Issuing in authenticated form a
a) Counterfeiting or imitating any

handwriting, signature or
rubric;
b) Causing
it
document purporting to be
a
copy
of
an
original
document when no such

original exists, or including
to
appear
that
in such copy a statement
persons have participated
contrary
in any act or proceeding
from, that of the genuine
when they did not in fact
original;
so participate;
c) Attributing
to
persons
to,
or
different
h) Intercalating any instrument or

who
note
relative
to
the
have participated in an act
issuance
or proceeding statements
protocol, registry or official
other than those in fact
book . . . 25
made by them;
thereof
in
Undeniably, the foregoing elements of the crime were
d) Making untruthful statements
proven in the present case. Petitioner is a public officer
in a narration of facts;
who has taken advantage of his position to commit the
e) Altering true dates;
felonious acts charged against him, i.e., knowingly

subscribing or signing the oath as administering officer
the affidavits mentioned in the informations under
false circumstances. The petitioner's acts of signing
officers in the public service of the
the oaths as administering officer in the said affidavits
government of the Philippines whose
were clearly in abuse of the powers of his office for his
appointments
authority to do so was granted to him by law as
President
municipal mayor and only in matters of official
confirmation by the Commission on
business.
Appointments; all other constitutional
As alleged in the Informations and proven during the
are
and
vested
are
in
the
subject
to
officers; and notaries public.
trial of the cases, the accused was exercising his
Sec. 42. Duty to Administer Oath.
authority to administer oath as a municipal mayor
Officers authorized to administer oaths,
when he committed the acts complained of. The
with the exception of notaries public,
Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by R.A. No.
municipal judges and clerks of court, are
6733 (July 25, 1989), pertinently provides:
not obliged to administer oaths or
Sec.
41. Officers
Administer
officers
Oath.
have
administer
Authorized
The
general
oaths:
to
following
authority
President;
to
Vice-
President; Members and Secretaries of

both Houses of the Congress; Members
of
the
Judiciary;
Secretaries
of
execute certificates save in matters

of official business; and with the
exception of notaries public, the officer
performing the service in those matters
shall charge no fee, unless specifically
authorized
by
law.
(emphasis
supplied) 26
Departments; provincial governors and
As for the petitioner's defenses, this Court finds them
lieutenant-governors;
to be without merit.
mayors; municipal
city
mayors; bureau
directors; regional directors; clerks of

courts; registrars of deeds; other civilian
In Lumancas v. Intas, 27 this Court held that in the

falsification of public or official documents, whether by
public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary
that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to
whether the allegations contained therein are true. In
injure
in
addition to these, and as evidenced by the questioned
contradistinction to private documents, the principal
affidavits, petitioner attested that the affiants swore
thing punished is the violation of the public faith and
and signed their affidavits in his presence when in fact
the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
they never did. Petitioner likewise issued a Mayor's
proclaimed.
Certification falsely attesting to the fact that the
third
person,
for
the
reason
that,
Petitioner repeatedly decries that there was no proof

that he authored such falsification or that the forgery
was done under his direction. This argument is without
merit. Under the circumstances, there was no need of
alleged applicants for tax declaration (three of whom

are his children while the other four are the minor
children
of
his
municipal
officials)
hadve
been
occupying the said lot for thirty years. DTAcIa
any direct proof that the petitioner was the author of
These Affidavits of Ownership and Joint Affidavits were
the forgery. As keenly observed by the Sandiganbayan,
material to the issuance of a Tax Declaration after
petitioner
Affidavits allegedly
which, the alleged applicants would then able to use
executed by Querubin and Aniceto whom petitioner
as proof of ownership of the lot subject thereof. Here,
admittedly never met and who were later proven to
the Tax Declarations were successfully obtained and
have been incapable of signing the said affidavits.
the applicants, in the exercise of their purported right
Petitioner's signature also appeared as the attesting
of ownership over the subject land, executed a Special
officer in the Affidavits of Ownership, nine of which
Power of Attorney authorizing Madarang to sell their
were undoubtedly without the participation of the
respective lots.
notarized
the Joint
indicated affiants.
Petitioner maintains that he had no participation in the
As attesting officer, petitioner was required to verify
preparation
and
they
Ownership, and no witness was presented to prove
voluntarily executed their affidavits; whether they
that he signed said Affidavits. We quote with approval
understood the contents of their affidavits; and,
the findings of the Sandiganbayan on this matter:
ascertain
from
the
affiants
whether
and/or
execution
of
the Affidavits
of
Interestingly,
the
accused
maintains
then took advantage of his position as
that his signatures appearing in the

thirteen Affidavits of Ownership were
forged. The Court cannot accept the
claim of the accused that he has no
knowledge of the Affidavit of Ownership.
Besides, his signatures appearing in the
thirteen Joint-Affidavits appear to be the
same
as
those
of
his
signatures
appearing in the Affidavit of Ownership.

But what the accused cannot deny,
however, is that while he maintains that
he has no knowledge that his three (3)
children
had
been
included
as
applicants for the issuance of a tax

declaration,
the
Certification,
(Exh.
"TT"), shows that it was signed by him

(accused), declaring that his children,
municipal mayor. 28
Petitioner
singles
out
the Affidavit
of
Ownership pertaining to Dolores Joy Madarang and

capitalizes on the absence of his signature therein to
get
an
acquittal.
It
must
be
pointed
out
that
this Affidavit of Ownership is inextricably connected

with
the
rest
of
the
documents i.e., the Joint
Affidavit, the otherAffidavits of Ownership purportedly

executed on the same date and Mayor's Certification
of 30-year occupancy, all of which were intended to
enable the purported affiants to obtain the Tax
Declarations over Lot No. 5504. There is no other
logical conclusion but that petitioner was also the
author
of
the
supposed Affidavit of
Ownership of
Dolores Joy Madarang or that he caused its preparation

albeit unsigned by him.
actual
Petitioner belatedly, at this stage of the case, pointed
occupants of the subject land. Clearly,
out the prosecution's failure to present the original of
therefore,
Madarang
the Mayor's Certification, 29 and complained in his
appears to be only a subordinate to the
petition that only a certified xerox copy of the xerox
herein accused who was undeniably the
copy on file was submitted in the proceedings a quo. It
municipal mayor when he signed the
must be stressed that the Mayor's Certification was not
documents as subscribing officer, he
even the subject of any of the criminal cases against
among
others,
as
Mr.
were
the
Romulo
petitioner. It is only one among equally damning
the
evidence presented by the prosecution.
petitioner, i.e., from administering the oath of the
Although petitioner contested the authenticity of his

signature in the Mayor's Certification as well as those
appearing
in
nonetheless
the Affidavits
admitted
of
having
Ownership, he
signed
the Joint
Affidavits and upon comparison of the signatures

thereon, the Sandiganbayan found that they were
made by one and the same person. We find no reason
to
deviate
from
this
factual
finding
of
the
Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan,
all
the
acts
of
herein
alleged affiants, which included the petitioner's minor

children, in the questioned documents to his act of
issuing a Mayor's Cetification attesting to the fact that
the applicants, which again included the petitioner's
minor children, for tax declaration have been in
possession of the lot for more than thirty years, prove
beyond cavil that he was the one who falsified the
documents and would benefit therefrom. HDATSI
Petitioner contends that the subject lot remains public
To overcome the presumption that the person who

stood to benefit by the falsification of the documents is
and that no damage resulted from the issuance of the

tax declaration.
the material author of the falsifications, petitioner

points out that it was Madarang, not him, who was
authorized to sell and receive the proceeds of the sale
of the land. Thus, he would not have benefited from
the issuance of the Tax Declaration.
Jurisprudence 30 has
already
settled
that
in
the
falsification of public or official documents, whether by

public officials or by private persons, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or
True, Madarang was the one designated as attorney-in-
intent to injure a third person. This notwithstanding, it
fact in the Special Power of Attorney, but it is a fact
cannot be denied that petitioner consummated his act
that Madarang was petitioner's Assistant Municipal
in falsifying the documents, and which documents
Treasurer.
have
petitioner used in successfully obtaining the tax
allowed the falsification of these documents if he
declaration in the names of the alleged applicants
would not benefit from them. As aptly pointed out by
causing prejudice to the real occupant, Efren Tayag.
Undeniably,
petitioner
would
not
Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to
combination of evidence which in the
insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to
ordinary and natural course of things,
setting felons free. 31 The standard that should be
leaves no room for reasonable doubt as
observed by the courts in appreciating circumstantial
to his guilt. Stated in another way,
evidence was extensively discussed in the case
where
of People of the Philippines v. Modesto, et al. 32thus:
circumstances are capable of two or
the
quantity
of
inculpatory
facts
and
more explanations, one of which is
. . . No general rule can be laid down as

to
the
consistent with innocence and the other
circumstantial
with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill
evidence which in any case will suffice.
the test of moral certainty and is not
All the circumstances proved must be
sufficient to convict the accused.
consistent with each other, consistent

with the hypothesis that the accused is
The evidence presented by the prosecution, albeit
guilty,
mostly
and
at
the
same
time
circumstantial,
is
sufficient
to
warrant
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he
petitioner's conviction. The following requisites for
is
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction were
innocent,
and
with
every
other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

It
has
been
said,
and
we
met, to wit:
believe
correctly, that the circumstances proved

should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty
person.
circumstances,
From
there
all
should
the
be
(a) There
is
more
than
one
circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and
(c) The
combination
circumstances
produce
of
is
all
such
conviction
reasonable doubt. 33
the
as
to
beyond
All told, the Court finds no reason to disagree with the
SY TIONG SHIOU, JUANITA TAN SY,
Sandiganbayan's judgment of conviction. With the
JOLIE
overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution
CHARLIE TAN, and JESSIE JAMES
and applying Sec. 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of
TAN, petitioners, vs.
Court, there are more than enough bases to sustain
FELICIDAD CHAN SY, respondents.
the
findings
of
the
Sandiganbayan
that
counts
of
Falsification
under
TAN,
ROMER
SY
CHIM
TAN,
and
herein
petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten

(10)
ROSS
Article
[G.R. No. 179438. March 30, 2009.]
171,
particularly paragraph 2, "causing it to appear that
SY
persons have participated in an act or proceeding
SY, petitioners, vs. SY TIONG SHIOU
when in fact and in truth, they did not participate in
and JUANITA TAN, respondents.
CHIM
and
FELICIDAD
CHAN
the act or proceeding."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
DECISION
Decision dated July 25, 2003 and Resolution dated

September
24,
2003
of
the
Sandiganbayan
are
hereby AFFIRMED.
ORDERED. DcICEa
||| (Lonzanida v. People, G.R. Nos. 160243-52, [July 20,
2009], 610 PHIL 687-708)
TINGA, J p:
These
consolidated
petitions
involving
the
same
parties, although related, dwell on different issues.

G.R. No. 174168.
This is a petition for review 1 assailing the decision
SECOND DIVISION
and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May

2006 and 8 August 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP
[G.R. No. 174168. March 30, 2009.]
No. 91416. 2
On 30 May 2003, four criminal complaints were filed
despite the fact that they had not executed any
by Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy (Spouses Sy)
conveyance of their shares. 7 CIHTac
against Sy Tiong Shiou, Juanita Tan Sy, Jolie Ross Tan,

Romer Tan, Charlie Tan and Jessie James Tan (Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al.) before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Manila. The cases were later consolidated. Two of the
complaints,
I.S.
Nos.
03E-15285
and
03E-
15286, 3 were for alleged violation of Section 74 in

relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code. In
these complaints, the Spouses Sy averred that they
are stockholders and directors of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc.
(the corporation) who asked Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.,
officers of the corporation, to allow them to inspect the
books and records of the business on three occasions
to no avail. In a letter 4 dated 21 May 2003, Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al. denied the request, citing civil and intracorporate cases pending in court. 5
Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argued before the prosecutor

that the issues involved in the civil case for accounting
and damages pending before the RTC of Manila were
intimately related to the two criminal complaints filed
by the Spouses Sy against them, and thus constituted
a
prejudicial
question
that
should
require
the
suspension of the criminal complaints. They also

argued that the Spouses Sy's request for inspection
was premature as the latter's concern may be properly
addressed once an answer is filed in the civil case. Sy
Tiong Shiou, on the other hand, denied the accusations
against him, alleging that before the 2003 GIS was
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the same was shown to respondents, who at
that time were the President/Chairman of the Board
In the two other complaints, I.S. No. 03E-15287 and
and Assistant Treasurer of the corporation, and that
03E-15288, 6 Sy
with
they did not object to the entries in the GIS. Sy Tiong
falsification under Article 172, in relation to Article 171
Shiou also argued that the issues raised in the pending
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and perjury under
civil case for accounting presented a prejudicial
Article 183 of the RPC. According to the Spouses Sy, Sy
question that necessitated the suspension of criminal
Tiong Shiou executed under oath the 2003 General
proceedings.
Tiong
Shiou
was
charged
Information Sheet (GIS) wherein he falsely stated that

the shareholdings of the Spouses Sy had decreased
On 29 December 2003, the investigating prosecutor
criminal action for violation of Section 74 in relation to
issued a resolution recommending the suspension of
Section 144 of the Corporation Code since a finding in
the criminal complaints for violation of the Corporation
the
Code and the dismissal of the criminal complaints for
misappropriated the funds would not be determinative
falsification and perjury against Sy Tiong Shiou. 8 The
of their guilt or innocence in the criminal complaint. In
reviewing prosecutor approved the resolution. The
the
Spouses Sy moved for the reconsideration of the
falsification and/or perjury should not have been
resolution, but their motion was denied on 14 June
dismissed on the ground of prejudicial question
2004. 9 The Spouses Sy thereupon filed a petition for
because the accounting case is unrelated and not
review with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which the
necessarily determinative of the success or failure of
latter denied in a resolution issued on 02 September
the falsification or perjury charges. Furthermore, the
2004. 10 Their subsequent motion for reconsideration
Court of Appeals held that there was probable cause
was likewise denied in the resolution of 20 July
that Sy Tiong Shiou had committed falsification and
2005. 11 IHDCcT
that the City of Manila where the 2003 GIS was
The Spouses Sy elevated the DOJ's resolutions to the

Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari,
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
DOJ. The appellate court granted the petition 12 and
civil
case
same
that
manner,
respondents
the
criminal
mishandled
complaints
or
for
executed is the proper venue for the institution of the

perjury
charges.
Sy
Tiong
Shiou, et
al. sought
reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but

their motion was denied. 13
directed the City Prosecutor's Office to file the
On 2 April 2008, the Court ordered the consolidation of
appropriate informations against Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.
G.R. No. 179438 with G.R. No. 174168. 14
for violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 144 of

the Corporation Code and of Articles 172 and 183 of
the RPC. The appellate court ruled that the civil case
for accounting and damages cannot be deemed
prejudicial to the maintenance or prosecution of a
Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argue that findings of the DOJ in

affirming, modifying or reversing the recommendations
of the public prosecutor cannot be the subject
of certiorari or review of the Court of Appeals because
the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body within the purview
the appointed independent auditor. Hence, the DOJ did
of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in affirming
rely on the separate opinion of former Chief Justice
the
Andres
of
Manila. 18 They further argue that adherence to the
Appeals, 15 wherein he wrote that this Court should
Court of Appeals' ruling that the accounting case is
not be called upon to determine the existence of
unrelated to, and not necessarily determinative of the
probable cause, as there is no provision of law
success of, the criminal complaint for falsification
authorizing an aggrieved party to petition for such a
and/or perjury would unnecessarily indict petitioner Sy
determination. 16 In any event, they argue, assuming
Tiong Shiou for the said offenses he may not have
without admitting that the findings of the DOJ may be
committed
subject to judicial review under Section 1, Rule 65 of
unfavorable to him in the civil action. 19 AEIDTc
R.
Narvasa
in Roberts,
Jr.
v.
Court
the Rules of Court, the DOJ has not committed any

grave abuse of discretion in affirming the findings of
the City Prosecutor of Manila. They claim that the
Spouses Sy's request for inspection was not made in
good faith and that their motives were tainted with the
intention to harass and to intimidate Sy Tiong Shiou, et
al. from pursuing the criminal and civil cases pending
before the prosecutor's office and the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 46. Thus, to accede to
the Spouses Sy's request would pose serious threats to
the existence of the corporation. 17 Sy Tiong Shiou, et
al. aver that the RTC had already denied the motion for
production
and
inspection
and
instead
ordered
petitioners to make the corporate records available to
recommendation
but
of
only
the
City
because
Prosecutor
of
an
of
outcome
Indeed, a preliminary proceeding is not a quasi-judicial

function and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency
exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the
findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence
of probable cause. 20 Moreover, it is settled that the
preliminary investigation proper,i.e., the determination
of whether there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should
be
subjected
to
embarrassment
of
the
trial,
expense,
is
the
rigors
function
of
and
the
prosecution. 21 This Court has adopted a policy of

non-interference
investigations
in
and
the
conduct
leaves
to
of
the
preliminary
investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence
the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
as will establish probable cause for the filing of
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
information against the supposed offender. 22
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
As in every rule, however, there are settled exceptions.
not the criminal action may proceed. 24
Hence, the principle of non-interference does not apply
The civil action and the criminal cases do not involve
when there is grave abuse of discretion which would
any prejudicial question. DHEACI
authorize the aggrieved person to file a petition

for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. 23
The civil action for accounting and damages, Civil Case

No. 03-106456 pending before the RTC Manila, Branch
46, seeks the issuance of an order compelling the
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ
Spouses Sy to render a full, complete and true
gravely abused its discretion when it suspended the
accounting of all the amounts, proceeds and fund paid
hearing of the charges for violation of the Corporation
to, received and earned by the corporation since 1993
Code on the ground of prejudicial question and when it
and to restitute it such amounts, proceeds and funds
dismissed the criminal complaints.
which the Spouses Sy have misappropriated. The
A prejudicial question comes into play generally in a

situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending and there exists in the former an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed since howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case. The reason behind
the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a)
criminal cases, on the other hand, charge that the

Spouses Sy were illegally prevented from getting
inside
company
premises
and
from
inspecting
company records, and that Sy Tiong Shiou falsified the

entries in the GIS, specifically the Spouses Sy's shares
in the corporation. Surely, the civil case presents no
prejudicial question to the criminal cases since a
finding that the Spouses Sy mishandled the funds will
have no effect on the determination of guilt in the
complaint for violation of Section 74 in relation to
Section 144 of the Corporation Code; the civil case
on the principle that every crime is defined by its
concerns the validity of Sy Tiong Shiou's refusal to
elements, without which there should be at the
allow
most no criminal offense. 26
inspection
of
the
records,
while
in
the
falsification and perjury cases, what is material is the

veracity of the entries made by Sy Tiong Shiou in the
Section 74 of the Corporation Code reads in part:

xxx xxx xxx
sworn GIS.
The records of all business transactions

Anent the issue of probable cause, the Court also finds
that there is enough probable cause to warrant the
institution of the criminal cases.
of the corporation and the minutes of

any meeting shall be open to inspection
by any director, trustee, stockholder or
member
of
the
corporation
at
The term probable cause does not mean 'actual and
reasonable hours on business days and
positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It
he may demand, in writing, for a copy of
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus
excerpts from said records or minutes,
a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
at his expense.
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a

conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of
evidence
of
the
prosecution
in
support
of
the
charge. 25
Any officer or agent of the corporation

who shall refuse to allow any director,
trustee, stockholder or member of the
corporation
to
examine
and
copy
excerpts from its records or minutes, in

accordance with the provisions of this
In order that probable cause to file a criminal case may
Code, shall be liable to such director,
be arrived at, or in order to engender the well-founded
trustee,
belief that a crime has been committed, the elements
damages, and in addition, shall be guilty
of the crime charged should be present. This is based
of an offense which shall be punishable
stockholder
or
member
for
under
Section
this
punished by a fine of not less than one
Code: Provided, That if such refusal is
thousand (P1,000.00) pesos but not
made pursuant to a resolution or order
more than ten thousand (P10,000.00)
of the Board of Directors or Trustees, the
pesos or by imprisonment for not less
liability under this section for such
than thirty (30) days but not more than
action
five (5) years, or both, in the discretion
shall
be
144
of
imposed
upon
the
directors or trustees who voted for such
of
refusal: and Provided, further, That it
committed by a corporation, the same
shall be a defense to any action under
may,
this section that the person demanding
dissolved in appropriate proceedings
to examine and copy excerpts from the
before the Securities and Exchange
corporation's records and minutes has
Commission:
improperly
dissolution
used
any
information
the
court.
after
If
notice
the
violation
and
hearing,
Provided,
shall
not
That
preclude
is
be
such
the
secured through any prior examination
institution of appropriate action against
of the records or minutes of such
the director, trustee or officer of the
corporation or of any other corporation,
corporation
or was not acting in good faith or for a
violation: Provided, further, That nothing
legitimate
in this section shall be construed to
purpose
in
making
his
demand. DTcHaA
Meanwhile, Section 144 of the same Code provides:
Sec. 144. Violations of the Code.
Violations of any of the provisions of this
Code or its amendments not otherwise
specifically penalized therein shall be
responsible
for
said
repeal the other causes for dissolution

of a corporation provided in this Code.
In the recent case of Ang-Abaya, et al. v. Ang, et
al., 27 the Court had the occasion to enumerate the
requisites before the penal provision under Section
144 of the Corporation Code may be applied in a case
of violation of a stockholder or member's right to
inspect the corporate books/records as provided for
information secured through any prior
under Section 74 of the Corporation Code. The
examination of the records or minutes
elements of the offense, as laid down in the case, are:
of such corporation or of any other
First. A director, trustee, stockholder or

member has made a prior demand in
writing for a copy of excerpts from the
corporation's records or minutes;
Second. Any officer or agent of the
concerned corporation shall refuse to
allow
the
stockholder
said
or
director,
member
trustee,
of
the
corporation to examine and copy said

excerpts;
corporation, or was not acting in good

faith or for a legitimate purpose in
making his demand, the contrary must
be shown or proved. 28
Thus, in a criminal complaint for violation of Section 74
of the Corporation Code, the defense of improper use
or motive is in the nature of a justifying circumstance
that would exonerate those who raise and are able to
prove the same. Accordingly, where the corporation
denies inspection on the ground of improper motive or
purpose, the burden of proof is taken from the
Third. If such refusal is made pursuant
shareholder
to a resolution or order of the board of
corporation. 29 However, where no such improper
directors or trustees, the liability under
motive or purpose is alleged, and even though so
this section for such action shall be
alleged, it is not proved by the corporation, then there
imposed upon the directors or trustees
is no valid reason to deny the requested inspection.
who voted for such refusal; and, THEcAS
and
placed
on
the
In the instant case, however, the Court finds that the
Fourth. Where the officer or agent of the
denial of inspection was predicated on the pending
corporation sets up the defense that the
civil case against the Spouses Sy. This is evident from
person demanding to examine and copy
the 21 May 2003 letter of Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.'s
excerpts from the corporation's records
counsel 30 to the Spouses Sy, 31 which reads:
and minutes has improperly used any
Gentlemen:
Even
We write in behalf of our clients, SY SIY

HO, INC. (Guan Yiac Hardware); SY
TIONG SHIOU, JUANITA TAN SY; JOLIE
ROSS TAN; CHARLIE TAN; ROMER TAN;
and JESSE JAMES TAN, relative to your
letter dated 16 May 2003. Please be
informed that a case for Accounting and
Damages had already been filed against
your clients, Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan
Sy before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 46, denominated as Civil
Case No. 03-106456.
in
their
Joint
Counter-Affidavit
dated
23
September 2003, 33 Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. did not

make any allegation that "the person demanding to
examine and copy excerpts from the corporation's
records
and
minutes
has
improperly
used
any
information secured through any prior examination of

the records or minutes of such corporation or of any
other corporation, or was not acting in good faith or for
a legitimate purpose in making his demand." Instead,
they merely reiterated the pendency of the civil case.
There being no allegation of improper motive, and it
being undisputed that Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. denied Sy
Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy's request for inspection,
the Court rules and so holds that the DOJ erred in
We fully understand your desire for our
dismissing the criminal charge for violation of Section
clients to respond to your demands,
74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code.
however,
circumstance
under
this
the
would
prevailing
not
be
advisable. The concerns that you raised
Now on the existence of probable cause for the

falsification and/or perjury charges.
in your letter can later on be addressed
The Spouses Sy charge Sy Tiong Shiou with the offense
after your clients shall have filed their
of falsification of public documents under Article 171,
responsive pleading in the abovesaid
paragraph 4; and/or perjury under Article 183 of the
case.EcSCHD
Revised Penal Code (RPC). The elements of falsification
We trust that this response will at the

moment be enough. 32
of public documents through an untruthful narration of

facts are: (a) the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the
executing the document under oath, he, in effect,
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
attested
the facts narrated; 34 (c) the facts narrated by the
Spouses Sy claim that the entries in the GIS pertaining
offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of
to them do not reflect the true number of shares that
truth in the narration of facts was made with the
they own in the company. They attached to their
wrongful intent to injure a third person. 35 On the
complaint the 2002 GIS of the company, also executed
other hand, the elements of perjury are: (a) that the
by
accused made a statement under oath or executed an
therein vis-a-vis the ones in the 2003 GIS. The Spouses
affidavit
the
Sy noted the marked decrease in their shareholdings,
statement or affidavit was made before a competent
averring that at no time after the execution of the
officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c)
2002 GIS, up to the time of the filing of their criminal
that in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a
complaints did they execute or authorize the execution
willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d)
of any document or deed transferring, conveying or
that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the
disposing their shares or any portion thereof; and thus
falsity is required by law or made for a legal
there is absolutely no basis for the figures reflected in
purpose. HSIaAT
the 2003 GIS. 39 The Spouses Sy claim that the false
upon
material
matter;
(b)
that
A General Information Sheet (GIS) is required to be

filed within thirty (30) days following the date of the
annual or a special meeting, and must be certified and
sworn to by the corporate secretary, or by the
Sy
to
the
Tiong
veracity 38 of
Shiou,
and
its
contents.
compared
the
The
entries
statements were made by Sy Tiong Shiou with the

wrongful intent of injuring them. All the elements of
both offenses are sufficiently averred in the complaintaffidavits.
president, or any duly authorized officer of the

corporation. 36 From
the
records,
the
2003
GIS
submitted to the SEC on 8 April 2003 was executed

under oath by Sy Tiong Shiou in Manila, in his capacity
as
Vice
President
and
General
Manager. 37By
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals' holding,

citing the case of Fabia v. Court of Appeals, that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction no longer precludes the
simultaneous filing of the criminal case with the
On 3 February 2003, Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer
corporate/civil case. 40 Moreover, the Court finds that
of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation), a family
the City of Manila is the proper venue for the perjury
corporation doing business under the name and style
charges, the GIS having been subscribed and sworn to
Guan Yiac Hardware, submitted a letter 46 to the
in the said place. Under Section 10 (a), Rule 110 of the
corporation's Board of Directors (Board) stating that
Revised Rules of Court, the criminal action shall be
the control, supervision and administration of all
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
corporate funds were exercised by Sy Chim and
territory where the offense was committed or where
Felicidad Chan Sy (Spouses Sy), corporate president
any
and assistant treasurer, respectively. In the same
of
its
essential
occurred. 41 In Villanueva
v.
ingredients
Secretary
of
letter, Juanita Tan disclosed that Felicidad Chan Sy did
the
felony
is
not make cash deposits to any of the corporation's
statement
is
banks from 1 November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus
made. 43 Thus in this case, it was alleged that the
the total bank remittances for the past years were less
perjury
Shiou
than reflected in the corporate financial statements,
subscribed and sworn * to the GIS in the City of Manila,
accounting books and records. Finally, Juanita Tan
thus, following Section 10 (a), Rule 110 of the Revised
sought to be free from any responsibility over all
Rules of Court, the City of Manila is the proper venue
corporate funds. The Board granted Juanita Tan's
for the offense.
request and authorized the employment of an external
Justice, 42 the
Court
held
that
consummated
when
the
false
was
committed
when
Sy
Tiong
auditor to render a complete audit of all the corporate
G.R. No. 179438.

This
petition
assails
the
decision 44 and
resolution 45 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 May

2004 and 29 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 81897. cDHAaT
accounting books and records. 47 Consequently, the

Board hired the accounting firm Banaria, Banaria &
Company. In its Report 48 dated 5 April 2003, the
accounting
firm
P67,117,230.30
attributed
as
to
the
unaccounted
disbursements from 1994 to 2002. 49
Spouses
receipts
Sy
and
A demand letter 50 was subsequently served on the
before the RTC Manila, praying for a complete and true
Spouses Sy on 15 April 2003. On the same date, the
accounting of all the amounts paid to, received and
children of the Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the
earned by the company since 1993 and for the
corporation
other
restitution of the said amount. 56 The complaint also
important documents. After the incident, the Spouses
prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and or
Sy
preliminary injunction to restrain Sy Chim from calling
cash,
allegedly
reporting
postdated
transferred
to
the
checks
residence
corporation.
and
and
ceased
Thereupon,
the
corporation filed a criminal complaint for robbery

against the Spouses Sy before the City Prosecutor's
Office
of
Manila. 51 A
search
warrant
was
subsequently issued by the Regional Trial Court. 52
a stockholders' meeting on the ground of lack of

authority.
By way of Answer, 57 the Spouses Sy averred that Sy
Chim was a mere figurehead and Felicidad Chan Sy
merely performed clerical functions, as it was Sy Tiong
On 26 April 2003, Sy Tiong Shiou, corporate Vice
Shiou and his spouse, Juanita Tan, who have been
President and General Manager, called a special
authorized by the corporation's by-laws to supervise,
meeting to be held on 6 May 2003 to fill up the
control and administer corporate funds, and as such
positions vacated by the Spouses Sy. Sy Tiong Shiou
were the ones responsible for the unaccounted funds.
was subsequently elected as the new president and his
They assailed the meetings called by Sy Tiong Shiou
wife, Juanita Tan, the new Vice President. 53Despite
on the grounds that the same were held without notice
these developments, Sy Chim still caused the issuance
to them and without their participation, in violation of
of a Notice of Stockholders meeting dated 11 June
the by-laws. The Spouses Sy also pursued their
2003
counter-claim for moral and exemplary damages and
in
his
capacity
as
the
alleged
corporate
president. 54
attorney's fees.
Meanwhile, on 1 July 2003, the corporation, through
On
Romer
their Motion
S.
Tan,
filed
its Amended
Complaint
for
Accounting and Damages 55 against the Spouses Sy
September
for
2003,
the
Leave
to
Spouses
File
Sy
filed
Third-Party
Complaint, 58 praying that their attached Third Party
Complaint 59 be allowed and admitted against Sy
allowed pleadings under Section 2, Rule 2 thereof.
Tiong Shiou and his spouse. In the said third-party
Moreover, even if such a pleading were allowed, the
complaint, the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong Shiou and
admission of the third-party complaint against Sy
Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporation's claim
Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan still would have no basis
for misappropriating corporate funds.
from the facts or the law and jurisprudence.62 The
On 8 October 2003, the trial court granted the motion

for
leave
to
file
the
third-party
complaint,
and
forthwith directed the issuance of summons against Sy

Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan. 60 On 16 January 2004,
their counsel allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou
and Juanita Tan were not furnished with the copies of
several pleadings, as well as a court order, which
resulted in their having been declared in default for
failure to file their answer to the third-party complaint;
thus,
they
opted
not
to
file
motion
for
reconsideration anymore and instead filed a petition

for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
In its Decision dated 26 May 2004, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan. 61 The appellate court declared that a
third-party complaint is not allowed under the Interim
Rules
of
Procedure
Governing
Court of Appeals also ruled that the respondent judge

committed a manifest error amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in admitting the third-party complaint and
in summarily declaring Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan
in default for failure to file their answer within the
purported reglementary period. The Court of Appeals
set aside the trial court's 8 October 2003 Order
admitting the third-party complaint, as well as the 19
December 2003 Order, declaring Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan in default for failure to file their answer.
The trial court was further ordered to dismiss the thirdparty complaint without prejudice to any action that
the corporation may separately file against Sy Tiong
Shiou and Juanita Tan. 63 aHcDEC
The Spouses Sy filed a motion for reconsideration, but
their motion was denied on 29 August 2007. 64
Intra-Corporate
Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy argue before this Court
Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules), it
that a third-party complaint is not excluded or
not being included in the exclusive enumeration of
prohibited by the Interim Rules, and that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that their third-party complaint
(5) Motion for postponement and
is not actionable because their action is not in respect
other motions of similar intent,
of
the
except those filed due to clearly
disallowance of the third-party complaint will result in
compelling reasons. Such motion
multiplicity of suits.
must be verified and under oath.
the
corporation's
claims.
They
add
that
The third-party complaint should be allowed.
Rule 2, Sec. 2. Pleadings allowed. The

only pleadings allowed to be filed under
The conflicting provisions of the Interim Rules of
these Rules are the complaint, answer,
Procedure for Inter-Corporate Controversies read:
compulsory
counterclaims
or
cross-
Rule 1, Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings.
claims pleaded in the answer, and the
The following pleadings are prohibited:
answer to the counterclaims or crossclaims. 65 TAIaHE
(1) Motion to dismiss;

(2) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(3) Motion for new trial, or for
reconsideration of judgment or
order, or for re-opening of trial;
There is a conflict, for while a third-party complaint is

not included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it
among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this conflict
may be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule
in statutory construction, that every part of the statute
(4) Motion for extension of time
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.,
to file pleadings, affidavits or any
that every part of the statute must be considered
other paper, except those filed
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
due
the
to
clearly
compelling
general
intent
of
the
whole
reasons. Such motion must be
enactment. 66 Statutes, including rules, should be
verified and under oath; and
construed in the light of the object to be achieved and

the evil or mischief to be suppressed and they should
be given such construction as will advance the object,
determination
suppress
proceeding. 69
the
mischief
and
secure
the
benefits
intended. A statute should therefore be read with

reference to its leading idea, and its general purpose
and intention should be gathered from the whole act,
and this predominant purpose will prevail over the
literal import of particular terms or clauses, if plainly
apparent, operating as a limitation upon some and as
a reason for expanding the signification of others, so
that the interpretation may accord with the spirit of
the entire act, and so that the policy and object of the
statute as a whole may be made effectual and
operative to the widest possible extent. 67 Otherwise
stated, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law
determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in the
rules in this case, must be read according to its spirit
and intent. 68
1 of the Interim Rules, which reads:

Sec. 3. Construction. These Rules
shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a
just, summary, speedy and inexpensive
every
action
or
Now, a third-party complaint is a claim that a

defending party may, with leave of court, file against a
person not a party to the action, called the third-party
defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. It is
actually a complaint independent of, and separate and
distinct from the plaintiff's complaint. In fact, were it
not for Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such
third-party
complaint
independently
and
would
have
separately
from
to
be
the
filed
original
complaint by the defendant against the third-party

defendant. Jurisprudence is consistent in declaring that
the purpose of a third-party complaint is to avoid
circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law
suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all
the
This spirit and intent can be gleaned from Sec. 3, Rule
of
matters
arising
from
one
particular
set
of
facts. 70 DTCAES
It thus appears that the summary nature of the
proceedings governed by the Interim Rules, and the
allowance of the filing of third-party complaints is
premised
on
one
objective
the
expeditious
disposition of cases. Moreover, following the rule of
liberal interpretation found in the Interim Rules, and
defendant: (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter
taking into consideration the suppletory application of
to
the Rules of Court under Rule 1, Sec. 2 71 of the
subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of
Interim Rules, the Court finds that a third-party
direct liability of the third-party defendant to the
complaint is not, and should not be prohibited in
plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant
controversies governed by the Interim Rules. The logic
to both the plaintiff and the defendant. 72
and justness of this conclusion are rendered beyond

question when it is considered that Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan are not complete strangers to the litigation
as in fact they are the moving spirit behind the filing of
the principal complaint for accounting and damages
against the Spouses Sy.
the
defendant
for
contribution,
indemnity,
In determining the sufficiency of the third-party

complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and
the third-party complaint must be examined. A thirdparty
complaint
facie show
that
must
the
allege
facts
defendant
is
which prima
entitled
to
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief
The Court also rules that the third-party complaint of

the Spouses Sy should be admitted.
from the third-party defendant. 73

The complaint alleges that the Spouses Sy, as officers
A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that
of the corporation, have acted illegally in raiding its
some substantive basis for a third-party claim be found
corporate funds, hence they are duty bound to render
to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity,
a full, complete and true accounting of all the
subrogation, contribution or other substantive right.
amounts, proceeds and funds paid to, received and
The bringing of a third-party defendant is proper if he
earned by the corporation since 1993 and to restitute
would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant or
to the corporation all such amounts, proceeds, and
both for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the
funds which they took and misappropriated for their
original
third-party
own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
defendant's liability arises out of another transaction.
the plaintiff and its stockholders. 74 On the other
The defendant may implead another as third-party
hand, in the third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy
defendant,
although
the
claim that it is Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan who had
claims, 75 and thus the allowance of the third-party
full and complete control of the day-to-day operations
complaint is warranted.
and complete control and custody of the funds of the

corporation, and hence they are the ones liable for any
shortfall or unaccounted difference of the corporation's
WHEREFORE, these cases are resolved as follows:

G.R. No. 174168
cash account. Thus, Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan
The petition for review is DENIED. The Decision and
should render a full, complete and true accounting of
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May 2006
all the amounts, proceeds, funds paid to, received and
and 8 August 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
earned by the corporation since 1993, including the
91416 are AFFIRMED. aCITEH
amount attributed to the Spouses Sy in the complaint

for accounting and damages. In their prayer, the
Spouses Sy moved that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan
Costs against the petitioners.

G.R. No. 179438
be declared as directly and solely liable in respect of
The petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution
the corporation's claim for accounting and damages,
of the Court of Appeals dated 26 May 2004 and 29
and that in the event that they, the Spouses Sy, are
August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 81897 are
adjudged liable to the corporation, Sy Tiong Shiou and
SET ASIDE and the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Juanita Tan be ordered to pay all amounts necessary to
Manila Branch 46 dated 8 October 2003 and 19
discharge their liability to the corporation by way of
December 2003 are REINSTATED.
indemnity or reimbursement. CAaDSI

The allegations in the third-party complaint impute
direct liability on the part of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita
SO ORDERED.
||| (Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim, G.R. No. 174168,
179438, [March 30, 2009], 601 PHIL 510-538)
Tan to the corporation for the very same claims which

the corporation interposed against the Spouses Sy. It is
clear therefore that the Spouses Sy's third-party
complaint is in respect of the plaintiff corporation's
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127327. February 13, 2009.]
defined and penalized in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315

of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), meted upon co-
LIBERATA AMBITO, BASILIO AMBITO,
petitioners Liberata and Basilio Ambito; and two
and
CRISANTO
charges of Falsification of Commercial Document, as
AMBITO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF
defined and penalized under Articles 171 and 172 of
THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF
the RPC, meted upon co-petitioner Crisanto Ambito in
APPEALS,respondents.
the Decision 2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 26, dated November 29,
1990, in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to
DECISION
14587.
The facts of this case, as summarized in the assailed
CA decision, are as follows:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
Before
this
Court
is
Petition
for
Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil

Procedure of the Decision 1 of respondent Court of
Appeals (CA), dated March 29, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No.
12727, entitled People of the Philippines v. Liberata
Ambito, et al., filed by petitioners Liberata Ambito,
Basilio Ambito and Crisanto Ambito. The assailed CA
decision
affirmed
the
judgment of
conviction
of
multiple charges of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.

22(B.P. Blg. 22) meted upon co-petitioner Basilio
Ambito; multiple charges of the complex offense of
Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents,
Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito were

the principal owners of two rural banks
in the province of Iloilo namely, the
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc., in
the municipality of Leon, and the Rural
Bank of Banate, Inc. in the municipality
of Banate. In addition, the spouses
Ambito were the owners of Casette
[Kajzette]
Enterprises,
establishment
in
Jaro,
commercial
Iloilo
City
engaged in procuring farm implements

intended for the use of the agricultural
loan borrowers of the said banks. The
payment by the drawee bank, the same
spouses Ambito obtained their supply of
were dishonored for insufficiency of
farm implements and spare parts from
funds. These are Check No. 79173946
the Iloilo City branch of Pacific Star, Inc.
dated June 20, 1979 in the amount of
which was then engaged in selling
P39,168.75 (Exh. 'A', CC No. 14556);
'Yanmar'
Check No. 79173948 dated June 15,
machineries
and
spare
parts. TIEHSA
On
several
1979 in the amount of P75,595.00 (Exh.

occasions
in
1979,
the
spouses Basilio Ambito and Liberata

Ambito transacted business with Pacific
Star,
Inc.
whereby
they
purchased
Yanmar machineries and spare parts

from the said company allegedly for the
use of the loan borrowers of their banks.
In
these
transactions,
the
spouses
Ambito made down payments in their

purchases either in cash, in checks or in
certificates of time deposit issued by
the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc.
However,
when
the
Manila
Banking
by Basilio Ambito as down payment of

purchases
were
presented
dated June 30, 1979 in the amount of

P45,957.00 (Exh. 'A', CC No. 14558);
Check No. 79182639 dated October 18,
'A', CC No. 14559); Check No. 79182638
dated
September
27,
1979
in
the
amount of P1,957.60 (Exh. 'A', CC No.

14560); Check No. 79182637 dated
September 18, 1979 in the amount of
P2,425.50 (Exh. 'A', CC No. 14561) and
Check No. 79175930 dated August 9,
'A', CC No. 14562).
Corporation (Manila Bank) checks issued

their
'A', CC 14557); Check No. 79173947
for
At the time the spouses Basilio Ambito

and Liberata Ambito made purchases of
farm implements from the Pacific Star,
Inc. in 1979, the general manager of the
Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. was Liberata
follow Liberata Ambito, Marilyn Traje
Ambito herself and the cashier, Marilyn
signed and gave the blank certificates
Traje, while the general manager of the
of time deposit to her without receiving
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. was
any consideration therefor. HcaDIA
Crisanto
Ambito,
Ambito,
and
brother
the
cashier,
of
Basilio
Reynaldo
Baron.
The same thing happened to Reynaldo

Baron, the cashier of the Community
Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. who was asked
On three separate occasions, Liberata
by the spouses Ambito as well as the
Ambito forced the cashier of the Rural
manager of the bank, Crisanto Ambito,
Bank of Banate, Marilyn Traje, to sign
to sign and give blank certificates of
several
time
time deposit to them. Reynaldo Baron
deposit and to give the same to her
was at first hesitant to accommodate
alleging
said
the request of the Ambitos but due to
certificates in connection with some
their persistence and considering that
transactions involving the bank. Marilyn
they were his superiors and owners of
Traje at first refused to give Liberata
the bank, Baron signed the certificates
Ambito the said certificates but the
of time deposit in blank and gave the
latter scolded her, at the same time
same to the Ambitos. When Baron asked
assuring
for
blank
that
her
certificates
she
that
needed
she
of
the
would
be
the
duplicate
copies
of
the
responsible to anybody for the issuance
certificates, he was told that they were
of said certificates including personnel
still negotiating with Pacific Star, Inc.
and investigators of the Central Bank
Later, the Ambitos told Baron that the
tasked with the examination of the
transaction was cancelled and that he
accounts of the bank. Afraid that she
should just cause the printing of similar
would lose her job if she would not
blank certificates by the Apostol Printing
Press in Iloilo City. Baron got scared and
1. Certificate of Time Deposit No.
objected to the idea vouched to him by
079, due date May 7, 1979,
the Ambitos until finally he resigned
in the amount of P7,276.50
from his job because he could no longer
(Exh. 'A', Crim. Case No.
withstand the pressure exerted on him
14563) as down payment
involving transactions he believed were
of the articles covered by
anomalous. Baron worked as cashier of
Sales
the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc.
dated November 9, 1978 of
from August to December 1979. When
Pacific Star, Inc. (Exh. 'A-1',
the Central Bank investigators came
Crim. Case No. 14563);
and
conducted
examination
of
the
records and transactions of the bank,

Baron reported the anomalies to them.
Invoice
No.
3002
2. Certificate of Time Deposit Nos.

083 and 085 both with due
date May 14, 1979 in the
The blank certificates of time deposit of
amounts of P17,283.00 and
the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. obtained
P3,132.00,
by the spouses Basilio and Liberata
(Exhs. 'A' and 'A-1', Crim.
Ambito from Marilyn Traje were filled up
Case No. 14564) as down
with the amounts of deposit and the
payment.
name
as
Nos. 3003, 3004 and 3005
depositor and used by the spouses as
(Exhs. 'A-1', 'A-2' and 'A-3',
down payments of the purchase price of
Crim.
the
14564); cDTACE
of
the
Pacific
machineries
and
Star,
Inc.
spare
parts
purchased from the Pacific Star, Inc.

These certificates of time deposit are as
follows:
respectively
Sales
Case
Invoice
No.

086, due date May 21,
1979, in the amount of
payment,
P11,896.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
Nos. 3009 and 3010 both
date December 1, 1978
payment, Sales Invoice No.
(Exhs. 'A-1' and 'A-2', Crim.
3006
Case No. 14567);
(Exh.
'A-1',
Crim.
Case No. 14565);
Sales
Invoices
095, due date June 20,
1979 in
1979 (Exh. 'A', Crim. Case
P24,062.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
No. 14566) in the amount
of
down
payment in Sales Invoice
payment, Sales Invoice No.
Nos. 3031 dated December
3007 dated November 27,
11, 1978 (Exh. 'A-1', Crim.
1978 and Sales Invoice No.
Case No. 14568);
P7,945.00
as
3008 dated November 28,

1978 in the total amount of
P7,945.00 (Exhs. 'A-1' and
'A-2',
Crim.
Case
No.
14566);
the
amount of

P17,090.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
No. 3035 (Exh. 'A-1', Crim.
Case No. 14567);
P17,090.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.


P5,827.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
No. 3097 dated January 23,
1979
Case No. 14572);
Nos. 3066 and 3067 both

dated
January
3,
1979
(Exhs. 'A-1' and 'A-2', Crim.

Case No. 14570); acIHDA
(Exh.
'A-1',
Crim.
11. Certificate of Time Deposit

No. 100, due date July 25,
P9,380.00 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
P8,365.00 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
1979
Case No. 14573);

Nos. 3081 dated January
10, 1979 and Sales Invoice
1979 (Exhs. 'A-1' and 'A-2',
P27,226.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
Case No. 14572 as down
(Exh.
'A-1',
Crim.

1979 in
the
amount of
P3,132.50 (Exh. 'A'; Crim.

No. 3106 (Exh. 'A-1', Crim.
Case No. 14574); CITSAc
No. 102, due date August
15, 1979 in the amount of
P21,420.00 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
P58,712.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
Case
in
payment of Sales Invoice
No. 3120 dated February 8,
No. 3134 dated February
1979,
Sales
Invoice
17, 1977 (Exh. 'A-1', Crim.
3121
dated
February
No.
14575)
No.
8,
1979 and Sales Invoice No.

3126 dated February 12,
1979, (Exhs. 'A-1', 'A-2' and
'A-3',
Crim
Case
No.
14575);
Case No. 14577); TDcHCa

21, 1979, in the amount of
P16,205.00 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
Case
No.
14578)
and
Certificate of Time Deposit
No.
104,
September 18, 1979, in the
P25,375.00 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
amount of P2,730.00 (Exh.
'A-1',
14578) as down payment
No. 3129 dated February
in Sales Invoice No. 3137
15, 1979 (Exh. 'A-1', Crim.
dated February 22, 1979
Case No. 14576);
and Sales Invoice No. 3178
Crim.
due
Case
date
No.
dated March 22, 1979;


No. 108, due date October
P78,277.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
'A-1' and 'A-2', Crim. Case
No. 145810);

Nos. 3215, 3216 and 3217
all dated April 18, 1979,
(Exhs. 'A-1', 'A-2' and 'A-3',

P7,218.75 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
No. 3409 dated May 2,
1979
P8,557.50 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
Case No. 14582);

No. 3221 dated April 19,
1979
(Exh.
'A-1',
Crim.
Case No. 14580); AEIHaS
(Exh.
'A-1',
Crim.
21. Certificates of Time Deposit

Nos. 112, 113, 114, 115,
116, 117 and 118 all dated
November 1, 1979 in the
amounts
of
P57,750.00,
P93,933.00,
P21,393.75,
P12,285.00,
P13,860.00,
P20,002.50
P38,529.75 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
P156,555.00
(Exhs. 'A', 'A-1', 'A-2', 'A-3',
'A-4',
No. 3240 and 3241 both
dated April 25, 1979 (Exhs.
'A-5',
and
respectively
'A-6',
Crim.
Nos.
3423
to
3429,
have been falsified are (1) Certificate of
inclusive (Exhs. 'A-7' to 'A-
Time
13', inclusive, Crim. Case
February 4, 1980 in the amount of
No. 14583); EScIAa
P32,555.25 (Exh. 'A', Crim. Case No.

No.
119,
due
date
December 18, 1979, in the

amount of P5,892.25 (Exh.
Deposit
No.
039,
due
14586) and (2) Certificate
date
of Time
Deposit No. 040, due date February 14,

'A', Crim. Case No. 14587).
'A', Crim. Case No. 14584)
The said certificates of time deposit
as down payment in Sales
supposedly issued by the Rural Bank of
Invoice
dated
the Banate, Inc. and the Community
June 21, 1979 (Exh. 'A-1',
Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. were unfunded
and not covered by any deposit so that
No.
3505

No. 134, due date January
P3,984.00 (Exh. 'A', Crim.
No. 3272 dated July 27,
1979
(Exh.
'A-1',
Crim.
Case No. 14585);

The certificates of time deposit of the
Community Rural Bank of Leon found to
when
presented
the (sic) Pacific
for
Star,
redemption
Inc.,
the
by
same
were not honored. As a consequence,

Pacific
Star,
Inc.
suffered
actual
damages in the amounts representing

the total value of the machineries and
spare parts sold and delivered by the
complainant to the Ambitos and the
latter failed and refused to pay the
same despite demands on them. HISAET
In view of the anomalous transactions
the name of Pacific Star, Inc. were
entered into by the Ambitos, both the
actually issued in the name of Paciencia
Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the
Cantara
Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc.
Francisco
became insolvent and so sometime in
1979 and
May 7, 1980, the Central Bank of the
P1,000.00 and P3,000.00, respectively
Philippines placed both banks under
(Exh. 'B', Crim. Cases Nos. 14586 and
receivership and liquidation. Maria Luz
14587).
Preires, bank examiner of the Central

Bank, was appointed deputy receiver
and
later
deputy
liquidator
of
the
Community Rural Bank of Leon. The

Central Bank took over the affairs and
records of the banks including their
deposits, assets and liabilities. Records
showed no certificate of time deposit in
on
October
Alinsao
17,
on
1979
and
November
only in the
amounts
19,
of
Subsequently, on complaint of Pacific

Star, Inc., the Ambitos were charged of
violations of B.P. Blg. 22, Falsification
and
Estafa
through
Falsification
Commercial
Document
Informations
filed
in
under
the
of
the
aforecited
cases.
the name of Pacific Star, Inc. properly
After due proceedings, the Court a quo,
funded and covered by any deposit.
promulgated
Anomalous issuances of certificates of
November
time deposit were uncovered as, for
portion of which reads as follows:
instance,
Community
Rural
Bank
of
a
29,
Decision,
1990,
the
dated
decretal
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Cases
Leon, Inc. Certificates of Time Deposit
Nos.
Nos. 039 (Exh. 'A', Crim. Case No. 14586
14559, 14560, 14561 and 14562,
and 040 (Exh. 'A', Crim. Case No.
the
14587) which were supposed to be in
accused, Basilio Ambito, guilty
14556,
Court
14557,
hereby
14558,
finds
the
beyond reasonable doubt of the
and penalized in Articles 48, 171,
offense
the
172 and 315 of the Revised Penal
provisions of Section 1 of Batas
Code and hereby sentences the
Pambansa
hereby
said accused to suffer in each
sentences the said accused to
case, an indeterminate sentence
suffer in each of the seven cases,
ranging from TWO (2) YEARS,
the penalty of imprisonment of
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
DAY
and to indemnify the offended
minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS,
party, Pacific Star, Inc. the total
NINE (9) MONTHS and ELEVEN
sum of P173,480.55, with interest
(11)
thereon at the legal rate of 12%
correccional as
per annum from the date of filing
pay a fine of P3,000.00 and to
of the Informations on May 10,
indemnify
1982,
without
Pacific Star, Inc. the total sum of
subsidiary imprisonment in case
P18,287.00 with interests thereon
of insolvency, and to pay the
at the legal rate of 12% per
costs. caIEAD
annum from the date of the filing
of
violation
Blg.
until
22 and
paid,
of
In Criminal Cases Nos. 14574 and

14585, the Court hereby finds the
accused,
Basilio
Ambito
and
Liberata Ambito, guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the complex
offense of Estafa thru Falsification
of Commercial Document, defined
of prision
correccional as
DAYS
the
of prision
maximum,
offended
and
party,
of the Informations on May 10,

1982
until
paid,
without

of insolvency, together with the
accessory penalties provided for
by law, and to pay the costs.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 14563,
per annum from the date of the
14570, 14580, 14582 and 14584,
filing of the Informations on May
the
Court
finds
the
10,
Ambito
and
crime of Estafa thru Falsification
by
costs. CcAESI
accused,
hereby
Basilio

said accused to suffer, in each of
these cases, an indeterminate
prison
sentence
ranging
from
TWO (2) YEARS, ELEVEN (11)

MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS
of prision
correccional as
minimum,
to
SIX
(6)
YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and TWENTY

ONE
(21)
DAYS
mayor as
maximum,
indemnify
the
of prision
and
offended
to
party,
Pacific Star, Inc., the total sum of

P83,095.00,
with
interests
1982
law,
until
and
paid,
to
without
pay
the

14569, 14571 and 14573, the
Court hereby finds the accused,
Basilio
Ambito
and
Liberata
Ambito, guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the complex offense of
Estafa
thru
Falsification
of
Commercial Document, defined

prison
sentence
FOUR
(4)
ranging
YEARS,
MONTHS
correccional as
TWO
from
(2)
of prision
minimum,
to
EIGHT
(8)
YEARS
mayor as
maximum,
indemnify
the
of prision
and
offended
to
prison
sentence
FOUR
(4)
ranging
YEARS,
TWO
(2)
(1)
DAY
party,
MONTHS
of prision
P103,900.00
minimum, to ELEVEN (11) YEARS
with
interests
and
from
ONE
correccional as
of prision
party, Pacific Star, Inc., the total
10,
without
sum of P116,530.00 with interests
by law and to pay costs.
10,
1982
until
paid,

accused,
Basilio
Ambito
and
mayor as
1982
until
maximum,
paid,
without

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14565, the
offense of Estafa thru Falsification
Basilio
doubt of the complex offense of
Estafa
Ambito
thru
and
Liberata
Falsification
of
doubt of the offense of Estafa
thru Falsification of Commercial
Document, defined and penalized
prison
from
in Articles 48, 171, 172 and 315
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
of the Revised Penal Code and
MONTHS
hereby
sentences
the
correccional as minimum, to NINE
accused
each,
suffer
(9)
indeterminate
sentence
ranging
of prision
YEARS
of prision
mayor as
to
prison
said
an
sentence
maximum, and to indemnify the
ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and
offended party, Pacific Star, Inc.,
TWO
the
with
correccional as minimum, to TEN
interests thereon at the legal rate
(10) YEARS of prision mayor as
of 12% per annum from the date
maximum, and to indemnify the
of the filing of the Informations on
offended party, Pacific Star, Inc.,
May 10, 1982 until paid, without
the
interests thereon at the legal rate
of 12% per annum from the date
of the filing of the Informations on
by law and to pay costs. cITaCS
May 10, 1982 until paid, without
sum
of
P35,190.00
(2)
sum
MONTHS
of
ofprision
P50,555.00
with

In Criminal Cases Nos. 14567, the
Basilio
Ambito
and
Liberata
accused,
Basilio
Ambito
and

reasonable doubt of the offense
of
Estafa
thru
Falsification
of

prison
sentence
FOUR
(4)
MONTHS
ranging
YEARS,
and
of prision
from
TWO
(2)
(1)
DAY
ONE
correccional as
minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS

of prision
mayor as
maximum,

party, Pacific Star, Inc., the sum
of
P134,375.00
with
interests

10,
1982
until
paid,
without
by law and to pay costs. IDScTE

14576
and
14581,
the
Court
hereby finds the accused, Basilio

Ambito
and
Liberata
Ambito,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the offense of Estafa thru
Falsification
of
Commercial

hereby
sentences
the
said
accused to suffer, in each of

prison sentence ranging from SIX
(6)
YEARS
and
ONE
(1)
DAY
of prision mayor as minimum, to

THIRTEEN (13) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to
indemnify
the
offended
party,

P235,170.00
with
interests
temporal as maximum, and to
indemnify
10,
P1,110,500.00
1982
until
paid,
without
the
offended
with
party,
interests
10,

14579
and
14583,
the
Court
hereby finds the accused, Basilio

Ambito
and
Liberata
Ambito,
1982
until
paid,
without

guilty beyond reasonable doubt
The foregoing penalties imposed
of the complex offense of Estafa
upon the accused are, however,
thru Falsification of Commercial
subject to the threefold rule as
provided for in Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code so that the
maximum
hereby
said
accused's imprisonment shall not
accused to suffer, in each of
be more than three times the
most severe of the penalties the
prison sentence ranging from TEN
total
(10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
exceed Forty (40) years.
sentences
the
of prision mayor as minimum, to

TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
period
duration
of
which
of
not
the
to
charged in these Criminal Cases
Nos. 14586 and 14587. AHacIS
accused, Crisanto Ambito, guilty
On
beyond reasonable doubt of the

offense
of
Falsification
of
Reynaldo
Baron,
of
the
Traje
and
are
hereby
the
offense
against them and the bail bonds
posted for their provisional liberty

cases,
Marilyn
doubt,
charged in all the criminal cases
and 172 of the Revised Penal
two
accused
ACQUITTED
and penalized under Articles 171
these
reasonable
are hereby ordered cancelled. 3
an
sentence
After they were convicted by the RTC, petitioners
ranging from ONE (1) YEAR and
appealed their case to respondent CA which, in turn,
ONE
denied their appeal via the assailed CA Decision, the
indeterminate
prison
(1)
DAY
correccional as
FOUR
(4)
of prision
minimum,
YEARS,
TWO
MONTHS
to
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
(2)
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
of prision
correccional as
maximum,
the
and
the
accessory
Decision
is
hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the
pay a fine of P2,000.00, together

with
assailed
Appellants.
penalties
SO ORDERED. 4
provided for by law, and to pay

the costs. For insufficiency of
Petitioners
evidence,
Reconsideration of the adverse CA Decision but this
Liberata
Basilio
Ambito
ACQUITTED
of
Ambito
are
the
and
hereby
offenses
was
promptly
succinctly
Resolution 5dated
interposed
rejected
by
November
a
the
8,
Motion
CA
1996,
in
for
its
hence,
petitioners'
recourse
to
this
Court
for
review
on certiorari.
even resorted to imposing a fine on petitioners'

counsel for his repeated non-compliance as stated by
This Court initially denied said Petition for Review

on Certiorari 6 through a Resolution 7 dated January
29, 1997 on the ground that the said petition raised
factual issues. Undaunted, petitioners filed a Motion
our Resolution 15 dated March 8, 2006 but to no avail.

Thus, in a Resolution 16 dated June 20, 2007, this
Court
resolved
to
dispense
with
the
filing
of
petitioners' memorandum.
for Reconsideration 8 dated February 25, 1997 seeking
In their Petition, 17 petitioners raised the following
to persuade this Court to give due course to their
grounds:
petition
which
this
Court
granted
in
Resolution 9 dated April 28, 1997, thereby reinstating

the
petition.
Respondents
were
required
to
file
comment on the petition as ordered in the same

Resolution. Respondents filed their Comment 10 on
September 9, 1997, while petitioners filed a delayed
Reply 11 on September 4, 1998. In turn, respondents
filed a Rejoinder 12 on January 18, 1999. TADaES
On
January
17,
2005,
this
Court
A. THE
APPEALS
RESPONDENT
COMMITTED
COURT
A
OF
REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS

GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES IMPUTED TO
THEM, THERE BEING UNCONTROVERTED
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT FROM THE
NATURE OF THE TRANSACTIONS AND
DEALINGS BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS
issued
AND PSI FOR A LONG PERIOD OF 14
Resolution 13 directing both parties to submit their
YEARS,
respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from
PETITIONERS, IF ANY, IS ONLY CIVIL IN
notice.
NATURE, AND NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Respondents
submitted
their
Memorandum 14 on March 18, 2005 but petitioners

failed to submit theirs despite the fact that this Court
had already granted numerous extensions of time to
file as requested by petitioners' counsel. This Court
THE
LIABILITY
OF
THE
ATTACHES TO THEM.
B. THE
RESPONDENT
APPEALS
COMMITTED
COURT
A
OF
REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED A
OF ALL THE OFFENSES IMPUTED TO
REVERSIBLE
THEM,
PETITIONER
THE
FACTS
OF
THE
CASE
ERROR
IN
BASILIO
AMBITO
SHOWING THAT THE VALUE OF THE
GUILTY
SUBJECT CHECKS AND CCTDS [CREDIT
OF BP22 DESPITE
CERTIFICATES OF TIME DEPOSIT] HAVE
SUBJECT
ALREADY BEEN FULLY PAID PRIOR TO
PRESENTED FOR PAYMENT WITHIN
THE INSTITUTION OF THE CRIMINAL
90
CASES BELOW.
CHECK. HTCESI
C. ANENT
CRIMINAL
THAT
CHECKS
DAYS
THE
WERE
FROM
NOT
DATE
14556 TO 14562, THE RESPONDENT
14556
AND
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THE
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
PETITIONER
IN
BEYOND
DOUBT
OF
VIOLATION
THE
AMBITO
REASONABLE
OFFENSE
OF BP22 DESPITE
OF
THE
FINDING
CASE
OF
CRIMINAL
BASILIO
NOS.
VIOLATION
E. ANENT
GUILTY
CASE
OF
FINDING
14557,
PETITIONER
THE
BASILIO
AMBITO GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE

OF
VIOLATION
OF BP22 DESPITE
THAT THERE WAS IN EACH CASE NO
LACK OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
PROPER
PRIOR NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND
PROVE THE CRIME CHARGED.
DEMAND
FOR
ALLEGED
PAYMENT
DISHONORED
OF
THE
CHECKS
GIVEN BY PSI TO PETITIONERS.

D. ANENT
14556,
CRIMINAL
14557
AND
NOS.
F. ANENT
EVIDENCE
CRIMINAL
OFFERED
CASE
TO
NOS.

CASE
NOS.
14558,
THE

PETITIONERS
GUILTY
BEYOND
REASONABLE
DOUBT
OFFENSE
ESTAFA
OF
PRETENSES
OF
BY
THE
TO RESOLVE THE ASSIGNED ERROR
FALSE
COMPLEXED
OF
DOUBLE
PAYMENT
OF
WITH
INDEMNITY OR CIVIL LIABILITY ON
FALSIFICATION OF A COMMERCIAL
THE MERITS THEREOF, IT BEING IN A
DOCUMENT,
POSITION TO DO SO, AND DESPITE
THERE
BEING
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE TENDING
TIMELY
TO
INSTITUTION OF THE CIVIL CASE
SHOW
THE
LACK
OF
THE
ELEMENT OF DECEIT.
G. ANENT
CRIMINAL
NOTICE
INVOLVING
CASE
OF
THE
THE
PRIOR
SAME
TRANSACTIONS AS IN THE CASES AT
NOS.
BAR. 18 SHDAEC

In essence, petitioners' recourse to this Court is hinged
on their belief that their conviction in the lower court
PETITIONERS
BEYOND
was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt and
REASONABLE DOUBT OF ESTAFA BY
that the respondent CA failed to perform its duty to
FALSE
PRETENSES
fully ascertain whether the prosecution's evidence was
WITH
FALSIFICATION
GUILTY
COMPLEXED
OF
sufficient enough to warrant a finding that would
COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT, IT BEING
support their conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and
CLEAR FROM THE FACE OF THE
for
SUBJECT CCTDS THEMSELVES THAT
Documents.
Estafa
through
Falsification
of
Commercial
THERE THEREIN EXISTS NO FALSE

NARRATION OF FACTS.
H. THE
RESPONDENT
COURT
OF
We hold the petition to be meritorious in part.
Anent the issue of whether or not co-petitioner Basilio
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING
Ambito's conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to
APPEALS
COMMITTED
14562 for the seven (7) counts of violation ofB.P. Blg.
22 was in accordance with law, petitioners argue that
Pacific Star, Inc. (PSI) filed with Branch 2 of the RTC of
he cannot be convicted of the same since the
Manila
prosecution allegedly failed to prove the dispensable
petitioners, or more than three (3) years before the
elements of prior notice of dishonor and demand for
thirty-two (32) Informations for violations of B.P. Blg.
payment of the checks at issue. 19 Furthermore, they
22 and for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
insist that there
is no violation ofB.P. Blg. 22,
Documents were filed against petitioners on May 10,
particularly in Criminal Case Nos. 14556, 14557 and
1982. Within that three-year span of time, the OSG
14558 as the subject checks therein were presented
points out, co-petitioner Basilio Ambito failed to pay
for payment more than ninety (90) days from date. 20
the value of the checks despite having been notified of
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
civil
complaint
for
collection
against
their dishonor. 21
asserts that petitioners' claim of necessary and
As to petitioners' contention that the prosecution was
indispensable elements of notice of dishonor and
not able to prove the indispensable element that the
demand to pay cannot be found in the statute defining
drawer had knowledge that the checks were not
the essential elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The
backed up by sufficient funds since the checks subject
OSG further insists that, from among the said essential
of Criminal Case Nos. 14556, 14557 and 14558 were
elements, there is no particular manner prescribed in
presented for payment more than ninety (90) days
which the person who made and issued the dishonored
from date, the OSG claims that the said element had
checks
been clearly established by the petitioners' testimony
should
be
notified
of
the
fact
of
dishonor. HSTCcD
Be that as it may, the OSG avers that as far as the
checks subject of the charges of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 in these criminal cases are concerned, co-petitioner
Basilio Ambito had been more than sufficiently notified
of the fact of dishonor because on December 28, 1979,
in the lower court where petitioners contend that the

subject checks were issued only as mere guarantee
and, as such, were not supposed to be deposited as
previously agreed by PSI and petitioners. 22 In any
case, the OSG argues that under Section 2 of B.P. Blg.
22, the maker's knowledge of the insufficiency of funds
is legally presumed from the dishonor of the check for
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions,
insufficiency of funds. 23
the making of worthless checks and putting them in
After
carefully
submissions
of
reviewing
the
the
parties,
records
we
find
and
the
that
the
prosecution's evidence was inadequate to prove copetitioner Basilio Ambito's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1)
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply
on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment. 24
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg.
22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the

public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order. 25 Thus,
the mere act of issuing a worthless check whether
as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of
pre-existing debt is malum prohibitum. 26 TIEHSA
In light of the foregoing, petitioners' contention in the
lower court that the subject checks were only issued
as mere guarantee and were not intended for deposit
as per agreement with PSI is not tenable. Co-petitioner
Basilio Ambito would be liable under B.P. Blg. 22 by the
mere fact that he issued the subject checks, provided
that the other elements of the crime are properly
proved.
With regard to the second element, we note that the
law provides for a prima facie rule of evidence. A
disputable presumption of knowledge of insufficiency
of funds in or credit with the bank is assumed from the
act of making, drawing, and issuing a check, payment
of
which
is
refused
by
the
drawee
bank
for
insufficiency of funds when presented within 90 days
from the date of issue. However, such presumption
process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be
does not arise when the maker or drawer pays or
actually sent to and received by the accused. The
makes
the
accused has a right to demand and the basic
receiving
postulates of fairness require that the notice of
notice that such check had been dishonored. In order
dishonor be actually sent to and received by the same
for the maker or drawer to pay the value thereof or
to afford him/her the opportunity to avert prosecution
make arrangements for its payment within the period
under B.P. Blg. 22. 28
arrangements
check within
five
for
banking
the
payment
days
after
of
prescribed by law, it is therefore necessary and

indispensable for the maker or drawer to be notified of
the dishonor of the check.
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records that

would indicate that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito was
given any notice of dishonor by PSI or by Manila Bank,
Under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must prove not only
the drawee bank, when the subject checks were
that the accused issued a check that was subsequently
dishonored for insufficiency of funds upon presentment
dishonored. It must also establish that the accused
for payment. In fact, all that the OSG can aver
was actually notified that the check was dishonored,
regarding this matter is that co-petitioner Basilio
and that he or she failed, within five (5) banking days
Ambito had been notified of the fact of dishonor since
from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the
PSI filed a collection case against petitioners more
check
than three (3) years before the same filed the criminal
the
amount
due
thereon
or
to
make
arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the

accused received such notice, a prosecution for
violation
of
the Bouncing
Checks
Law cannot
prosper. 27 TCAScE
cases before this Court. 29

Likewise, respondent CA merely cited, in its assailed
Decision, co-petitioner Basilio Ambito's July 17, 1989
trial court testimony as basis for concluding that he
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily
was properly informed of the dishonor of the subject
deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a
checks, viz.:
criminal
prosecution.
Accordingly,
procedural
due
Appellant Basilio's claim that he was
to replace the same with cash or make
never notified of the dishonor of the
arrangements
checks he issued in partial payments of
payments
the purchases Kazette Enterprises made
checks. 30
from PSI is belied by his own admission

made when he testified in the Court a
quo thus:
the
PSI,
amounts
for
of
the
the
Verily, the aforementioned circumstances are not in

accord with the manner or form by which a notice of
dishonor should be made under the law and existing
xxx xxx xxx

Q Inspite
of
with
of
you
jurisprudence.
agreement
they
The notice of dishonor of a check may be sent to the
deposited and when presented
drawer or maker by the drawee bank, the holder of the
they bounce?
check, or the offended party either by personal

delivery or by registered mail. The notice of dishonor
A That was in the receipts.
to the maker of a check must be in writing. 31
Q So you admit you have presented

these checks already marked as
Exhibit 'A' for the prosecution for
criminal cases Nos. 14556 to
14562,
inclusive,
were
all
returned for insufficiency of funds

by the depository bank? ETHSAI
A Yes, sir. (t.s.n., Ambito, page 35, July
17, 1989)
While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state

that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in
conjunction, however with Section 3 of the law,i.e.,
"that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit
with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be
explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a
mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be
insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court has
previously held that both the spirit and letter of
the
the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to
dishonor of the checks, Appellant failed
be punished thereunder not only that the accused
Notwithstanding
his
notice
of
issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the
dishonored
accused has actually been notified in writing of the
cases, 33 we have held that an acquittal based on
fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal
reasonable doubt does not preclude the award of civil
statutes have to be construed strictly against the State
damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
and liberally in favor of the accused. 32
liability of the accused for damages only when it
There being no proof that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito

was given any written notice either by PSI or by Manila
Bank informing him of the fact that his checks were
dishonored and giving him five (5) banking days within
which to make arrangements for payment of the said
checks, the rebuttable presumption that he had
knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds has no
application in the present case. TCAHES
checks.
In
number
of
similar
includes a declaration that the facts from which the

civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, in the case
at bar, the trial court's directive for Basilio Ambito to
indemnify PSI the total sum of P173,480.55, with
interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% per annum
from the date of filing of the Informations on May 10,
1982, until paid, and to pay the costs is affirmed.
Anent the question of whether or not petitioner
spouses Liberata and Basilio Ambito's conviction for
the
offense
of
Estafa
through
Falsification
of
Due to the failure of prosecution in this case to prove
Commercial Document was proven beyond reasonable
that
the
doubt, the petitioners interposed the defense that they
requisite notice of dishonor and the opportunity to
cannot be properly convicted of the same as there was
make arrangements for payment as provided for under
no finding of false narration of facts and of deceit.
co-petitioner
Basilio
Ambito
was
given
the law, We cannot with moral certainty convict him of

violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioners assert that PSI was not deceived by the

issuance of the subject credit certificates of time
However, Basilio Ambito's acquittal for his violations
deposit (CCTDs), which did not contain a false
of B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove all
narration of facts, for the reasons that: (i) said CCTDs,
elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt did
which were undated as to their respective dates of
not entail the extinguishment of his civil liability for the
issuance, did not state that funds had already been
certificates of time deposit but "CREDIT Certificates of
deposited by PSI; (ii) during the course of their alleged
Time Deposit" because the term "credit" indicates a
fourteen-year long business relationship, PSI, which
"deferred or delayed nature of the payment", thus,
had been accepting said CCTDs, knew that they were
signifying a promise to pay at a future date; 39 (viii)
unfunded as said certificates of time deposit were
PSI was not defrauded as it gave discounts in its sales
issued to serve as "promissory notes" to guarantee
invoices if petitioners paid in full the value of the
payment for the balance of the invoice price of the
certificates "on or before 180 days" from delivery. By
machineries; 34 (iii) petitioners did not represent to
giving discounts for early payment, it was thus aware
PSI that "the money was already deposited" because
of the possibility that said certificates might not be
the subject CCTDs were "even postdated"; 35 (iv) the
funded when they fell due; 40 (ix) the sales invoices
amounts
not
issued by PSI gave it the right to institute civil actions
"downpayments" but "CREDIT extended to petitioner
only and not criminal actions; 41 and (x) petitioners
Basilio
the
had already performed their obligations to PSI by way
petitioners'
of the payment of the amount of P300,000.00 and the
obligation is civil in nature because current and
return of one unit Kubota machinery valued at
savings deposits constitute loans to a bank and, thus,
P28,000.00. 42 aSTHDc
stated
Ambito
sales/purchases
in
payable
were
the
six
CCTDs
months
made; 36 (v)
were
after
a CCTD is an evidence of a simple loan; 37 (vi) the

essential element of fraud was absent because PSI
knew that the CCTDs issued to it by petitioners were
not covered by funds because it knew that the
deposits were yet to be made when the farmers, to
whom Basilio Ambito resold on credit the machineries,
shall have deposited in the rural banks their payments
We are not persuaded. We find no reason to disturb

the identical findings of the CA and the RTC regarding
the
particular
circumstances
surrounding
the
petitioners' conviction of Estafa through Falsification of

Commercial
Documents
because
the
same
are
adequately supported by the evidence on record.
for those machineries; 38 (vii) the subject certificates
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh
of time deposit issued to PSI were not ordinary
evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that
the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of
commission of the fraud, it being essential that such
support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute
false statement or representation constitutes the very
palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. 43
cause or the only motive which induces the offended
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether

committed by false pretenses or concealment, are the
following (a) that there must be a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (b) That such false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be
party to part with his money. In the absence of such

requisite, any subsequent act of the accused, however
fraudulent and suspicious it might appear, cannot
serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under the said
provision. 46 ACaTIc
made or executed prior to or simultaneous with the
In the case at bar, the records would show that PSI was
commission of the fraud. (c) That the offended party
given assurance by petitioners that they will pay the
must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act
unpaid balance of their purchases from PSI when the
or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part
CCTDs with petitioners' banks, the Rural Bank of
with his money or property because of the false
Banate, Inc. (RBBI) and/or the Rural Bank of Leon, Inc.
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (d) That
(RBLI), and issued under the name of PSI, would be
as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
presented for payment to RBBI and RBLI which, in turn,
damage. 44
will pay the amount of deposit stated thereon. The
In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315,

paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC, 45 it is indispensable that
the
element
of
deceit,
consisting
in
the
false
statement or fraudulent representation of the accused,

be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the
delivery of the thing by the complainant.
The
false
committed
pretense
or
fraudulent
prior
or
simultaneously
to
act
amounts stated in the CCTDs correspond to the

purchase cost of the machineries and equipment that
co-petitioner Basilio
Ambito
bought
from
PSI
as
evidenced by the Sales Invoices presented during the

trial. It is uncontroverted that PSI did not apply for and
secure loans from RBBI and RBLI. In fine, PSI and copetitioner Basilio Ambito were engaged in a vendor-
must
be
with
the
purchaser
business
relationship
while
PSI
and
RBBI/RBLI were connected as depositor-depository. It is
likewise established that petitioners employed deceit
confirming the lower courts' finding that petitioners
when they were able to persuade PSI to allow them to
are guilty of the complex crime of Estafa through
pay the aforementioned machineries and equipment
Falsification of Commercial Documents.
through down payments paid either in cash or in the

form of checks or through the CCTDs with RBBI and
RBLI issued in PSI's name with interest thereon. It was
later found out that petitioners never made any
deposits in the said Banks under the name of PSI. In
fact, the issuance of CCTDs to PSI was not recorded in
the books of RBBI and RBLI and the Deputy Liquidator
appointed by the Central Bank of the Philippines even
corroborated
this
finding
of
anomalous
bank
As borne by the records and the pleadings, it is

that
petitioners'
representations
were
outright distortions of the truth perpetrated by them

for the sole purpose of inducing PSI to sell and deliver
to
co-petitioner
Basilio
Ambito
machineries
complex crime had been committed by petitioners is

proper because, whenever a person carries out on a
public, official or commercial document any of the acts
of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
RPC 48 as a necessary means to perpetrate another
crime, like Estafa, Theft, or Malversation, a complex
crime is formed by the two crimes.
Under Article 48 of the RPC, 49 a complex crime refers
transactions in her testimony during the trial. 47
indubitable
The pronouncement by the appeals court that a
and
equipments. Petitioners knew that no deposits were

ever made with RBBI and RBLI under the name of PSI,
as represented by the subject CCTDs, since they did
to (1) the commission of at least two grave or less

grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a
single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary
means for committing the other (or others). Negatively
put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more
crimes are committed, but not by a single act; or (2)
committing one crime is not a necessary means for
committing the other (or others).50
not intend to deposit any amount to pay for the
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial
machineries. PSI was an innocent victim of deceit,
document may be a means of committing Estafa,
machinations and chicanery committed by petitioners
because before the falsified document is actually
which resulted in its pecuniary damage and, thus,
utilized to defraud another, the crime of Falsification
has already been consummated, damage or intent to
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC, 54 the
cause damage not being an element of the crime of
elements of falsification of public documents through
falsification of public, official or commercial document.
an untruthful narration of facts are: (1) the offender
In other words, the crime of falsification has already
makes in a document untruthful statements in a
existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or
narration of facts; (2) the offender has a legal
commercial document to defraud another is estafa.
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;
But the damage is caused by the commission of
(3) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely
Estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
false; and (4) the perversion of truth in the narration of
Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or
facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a
commercial document is only a necessary means to
third person. 55
commit the estafa.51
As earlier discussed, the issuance of the falsified
In the case before us, the issuance by petitioners of
CCTDs for the sole purpose of obtaining or purchasing
CCTDs which reflected amounts that were never
various machinery and equipment from PSI amounts to
deposited as such in either RBBI or RBLI is Falsification
the criminal offense of Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a)
under Articles 171 52 and 172 53 of the RPC. The
of the RPC. 56 The petitioners falsified the subject
particular
of
CCTDs, which are commercial documents, to defraud
petitioners, taking advantage of their position as
PSI. Since the falsification of the CCTDs was the
owners
necessary means for the commission of Estafa, the
criminal
of
RBBI
undertaking
and
statements/representations
RBLI,
with
consisted
making
the
assailed judgment of the appeals court convicting
existence of time deposits in favor of PSI by issuing the
petitioners of the complex crime of Estafa through
subject CCTDs without putting up the corresponding
Falsification of Commercial Documents is correct.
deposits in said banks. DaHcAS
regard
untruthful
to
Quite
apart
from
the
prosecution's
successful
discharge of its burden of proof, we find that the

accused failed to discharge their burden to prove their
defense. To begin with, there appears to be no proof on
petitioner Crisanto Ambito's conviction for Falsification
record of the alleged 14-year financial arrangement
of Commercial Documents (in Criminal Case Nos.
between
14586 and 14587). However, the aforesaid Decision is
accused
and
PSI
or
the
purported
"consignment only" agreement between them other
REVERSED
than the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of
Ambito's conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (in
the accused. Moreover, we uphold the findings of the
Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to 14562), who is hereby
CA
proper
ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt has not been
characterization of the CCTDs and the lack of credible,
established beyond reasonable doubt. However, the
independent evidence of the alleged payment of the
portion of the said Decision insofar as it directs Basilio
accused's obligations to PSI.
Ambito to indemnify Pacific Star, Inc. the total sum of
and
the
court a
quo as
to
the
Finally, with respect to co-petitioner Crisanto Ambito,

we find no reason to disturb the trial court's ruling that
he is liable for only the crime of Falsification of
Commercial Documents in connection with CCTD Nos.
039 and 040 of RBLI, there being no showing that the
with
respect
to
co-petitioner
Basilio
P173,480.55, with interest thereon at the legal rate of

12% per annum from the date of filing of the
Informations on May 10, 1982, until paid, and to pay
the costs (also in Criminal Case Nos. 14556 to 14562)
is AFFIRMED.
said CCTDs were used to purchase farm implements
SO ORDERED.
from PSI. 57 THacES
||| (Ambito v. People, G.R. No. 127327, [February 13,

2009], 598 PHIL 546-580)
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated March 29, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED with respect to petitioner spouses Basilio
THIRD DIVISION
and Liberata Ambito's conviction for Estafa through

Falsification of Commercial Documents (in Criminal
Case Nos. 14563 to 14585) and with respect to co-
[G.R. No. 186101. October 12, 2009.]
GINA
A.
DOMINGO, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
branch. Petitioner, on the other hand, is a dentist who

had a clinic in Remedios' compound.
Being the wife of the best friend of Remedios' son,
petitioner had a close relationship with Remedios and
her family.
DECISION
On June 15, 1995, Remedios accompanied petitioner to

BPI because the latter wanted to open an account
VELASCO, JR., J p:
therein. Remedios then introduced petitioner to the

bank's staff and officers. Soon thereafter, petitioner
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated November
24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
frequented
Remedios'
office
and
volunteered
to
deposit her checks in her bank account at BPI.
No. 31158 entitled People of the Philippines v. Gina A.
Sometime in October 1996, Remedios wanted to buy a
Domingo, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated May 21,
car thinking that she already had a substantial amount
2007 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-75971-87 of the
in her account. Thus, she went to BPI to withdraw two
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 in Quezon City.
hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000). To her surprise,
The
however, she found out that her money had already
RTC
convicted
petitioner
Gina
Domingo
(petitioner) of 17 counts of Estafa through Falsification
been
of Commercial Document.
through 18 encashment slips bearing her forged
The Facts
withdrawn.
The
withdrawals
were
effected
signatures reaching the amount of eight hundred

thirty-eight thousand pesos (PhP838,000). She denied
Private complainant, Remedios D. Perez (Remedios), is
having affixed her signatures on the encashment slips
a businesswoman and a valued depositor of the Bank
used. DISHEA
of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Aurora Boulevard
Testimonies
showed
that
on
several
occasions
beginning September 18, 1995 until October 18, 1996,
Mayof24, 1996
petitioner presented a number of encashment slips
50,000.00
50,000.00
none
various amounts to BPI, and by virtue of which sheJune

was7, 1996
able to withdraw huge amounts of money fromJune
the26, 1996
July 5, 1996
checking account of the complainant. She deposited
40,000.00
45,000.00
25,000.00
40,000.00
45,000.00
25,000.00
none
none
none
17, 1996
the bigger portion of these amounts to her July
own
40,000.00
40,000.00
none
account and pocketed some of them, while also paying

Aug. 5, 1996
the rest to Skycable. The transactions were processed
Sept. 17, 1996
by four tellers of BPI, namely: Regina Ramos, Oct.
Mary4, 1996
Oct. 18, 1996
Antonette Pozon, Sheila Ferranco, and Kim Rillo who
50,000.00
35,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00
48,550.00
35,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00
1,450.00 (PS)
none
none
none
Mary Antonette
Pozon
Shiela Ferranco
Shiela Ferranco
Mary Antonette
Pozon
Mary Antonette
Pozon
Shiela Ferranco
Shiela Ferranco
Kim P. Rillo
Kim P. Rillo
verified the signatures of the complainant on the

After having been apprised of the illegal transactions
questioned encashment slips.

As synthesized by the trial court, the transactions are
as follows:
Date of
encashment
slip
Amount
withdrawn
via
encashment
slip
Amount
deposited
to
accused's
account
Sept. 8, 1995
Sept. 18, 1995
Feb. 12, 1996
Feb. 15, 1996
P10,000.00
30,000.00
30,000.00
20,000.00
P8,000.00
20,000.00
28,550.00
20,000.00
March 21, 1996

April 8, 1996
April 10, 1996
April 29, 1996
May 13, 1996
40,000.00
40,000.00
30,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00
30,000.00
35,000.00
30,000.00
34,500.00
38,550.00
of petitioner on complainant's account, the latter

complained to the bank for allowing the withdrawal of
the money with the use of falsified encashment slips

Amount paid Name of Teller
and demanded that the amount illegally withdrawn be
to Skycable
who processed
returned. She was required by BPI to submit checks
(PS)
the transaction
or Pocketed
bearing her genuine signature for examination by the
(Po)
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. After
by the accused
P2,000.00 (Po) Regina Ramos
examination, Josefina dela Cruz of the PNP Crime
10,000.00 (Po)
Laboratory came up with a finding that complainant's
1,450.00 (PS)
Shiela Ferranco
signatures on the questioned encashment slips had
none
Mary Antonette
Pozon
been forged. Only then did the bank agree to pay her
10,000.00 (Po) Shiela Ferranco
the amount of PhP645,000 representing a portion of
5,000.00 (Po)
Regina Ramos
none
Shiela Ferranco
the amount illegally withdrawn with the use of the
5,500.00 (Po)
Regina Ramos
forged encashment slips. DASEac
1,450.00 (PS)
Shiela Ferranco
In her defense, petitioner testified that she is a dentist,
practicing her profession in her house at No. 21,
October
Alvarez Street, Cubao, Quezon City. She further stated
Philippines, the above-named accused,
that she knew Remedios as the owner of the house
a private individual, by means of false
that she and her husband were renting at No. 3 New
pretenses
Jersey Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She declared
executed prior to or simultaneously with
that she never used "Perez" as an alias or nickname
the commission of the fraud and by
and that the signatures appearing on the questioned
means of falsification of commercial
encashment slips were not hers.
document did, then and there willfully,
Petitioner, however, admitted that she was once a

depositor of BPI Aurora Boulevard branch, having
opened an account in said bank sometime in June
1995. She had been maintaining said account until she
was arrested in 1998. She used to frequent the bank
three times a week or as the need arose for her bank
transactions, for which reason, she and the bank
tellers had become familiar with each other. She knows
that, like her, Remedios was also a depositor of BPI
Aurora Boulevard branch, but there was no occasion
that they met each other in the bank.
1996,
unlawfully
in
and/or
and
Quezon
City,
fraudulent
feloniously
acts
defraud
Remedios D. Perez and/or the Bank of

the Philippine Islands represented in the
following manner, to wit: said accused
falsified or caused to be falsified an
encashment
slip
of
Bank
of
the
Philippine Islands dated October 18,

1996
for
P40,000.00,
Philippine
Currency, by then and there filling up

said encashment slip and signing the
name of one Remedios D. Perez, a
depositor of said bank under Account
Remedios and BPI filed a complaint before the
No. 3155-0572-61, thereby making it
prosecutor's office.
appear, as it did appear that said
The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971
encashment
reads as follows:
respect, when in truth and in fact said
slip
is
genuine
in
all
accused well knew that Remedios D.

Perez never signed the said encashment
slip; that once said encashment slip was
forged and falsified in the manner set
forth, accused pretending to be the said
Remedios D. Perez used it to withdraw
the aforesaid sum of P40,000.00 from
the
latter's
account,
and
once,
in
possession of the said amount of money

misappropriated,
misapplied
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
July 17, 1996

July 5, 1996
June 26, 1996
June 7, 1996
May 24, 1996
May 13, 1996
April 29, 1996
April 10, 1996
April 8, 1996
March 21, 1996
February 15, 1996
February 12, 1996
September 18, 1995
40,000.00
25,000.00
45,000.00
40,000.00
50,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00
30,000.00
40,000.00
40,000.00
20,000.00
30,000.00
30,000.00 4
and
Upon motion by the prosecution, the 17 cases were
converted the same to her own personal
consolidated and tried jointly by the trial court. When
use and benefit, to the damage and
arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the
prejudice of the offended party.
crimes charged in the 17 Informations. Trial on the
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
merits ensued with the prosecution presenting seven
The allegations in the Information in Criminal Case

Nos. Q-98-75972-87 are all substantially the same as
those in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971, except for the
dates of the commission of the crime or dates of the
BPI encashment slips and the amounts involved, to
wit: CSAcTa
1.
2.
3.
Q-98-75975
Q-98-75976
Q-98-75977
Q-98-75978
Q-98-75979
Q-98-75980
Q-98-75981
Q-98-75982
Q-98-75983
Q-98-75984
Q-98-75985
Q-98-75986
Q-98-75987
Criminal Case No. Date of the commission

of the crime/
encashment slip
Q-98-75972
October 4, 1996
Q-98-75973
September 4, 1996
Q-98-75974
August 5, 1996
witnesses, namely: Remedios; Arturo Amores, General

Manager of BPI, Aurora Blvd. Branch; Regina Ramos,
Mary Antonette Pozon, Sheila Ferranco, and Kim P.
Rillo, all bank tellers of BPI, Aurora Blvd. Branch; and
Josefina Dela Cruz, a Document Examiner III of the PNP
Crime Laboratory. On the part of the defense, it
presented petitioner herself and Carmelita Tanajora,
Amount Involved
P40,000.00
35,000.00
50,000.00
petitioner's house helper.

Ruling of the Trial Court
On May 21, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision, the
2.In
dispositive portion of which reads:
beyond
No.
Q-98-
Eleven (11) Months and
judgment is hereby rendered finding the

GUILTY
Case
75972 Two (2) Years,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, joint

accused
Criminal
reasonable
(11)
Days
of [prision]
correccional to
Seven (7) Years and Twenty
doubt of the crimes charged in Criminal
One (21) Days of prision
[Case] Nos. Q-98-75971; Q-98-75972;
mayor;
Q-98-75973; Q-98-75974; Q-98-75975;

Q-98-75976; Q-98-75977; Q-98-75978;
Eleven
3.In
Criminal
Case
No.
Q-98-
Q-98-75979; Q-98-75980; Q-98-75981;
Q-98-75982; Q-98-75983; Q-98-75984;
Q-98-75985;
Eleven
(11)
75987. Accordingly, and applying the
of [prision]
correccional to
Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment, as follows:
mayor; ADCETI
1.In
Q-98-75986
Criminal
Case
and
No.
Q-98-
Q-98-

Eleven
(11)
of [prision]
correccional to
Days

mayor;
Days
4.In
Criminal
Case
No.
Q-98-

Eleven
(11)
Days
of [prision]
correccional to
Eight (8) Years and Twenty
5.In
6.In
7.In
mayor;
mayor;
Criminal
Case
No.
Q-98-
8.In
Criminal
Case
No.
Q-98-
Eleven
(11)
Eleven
(11)
of [prision]
correccional to
of [prision]
correccional to
Days
Days
mayor;
mayor;
Criminal
Case
No.
Q-98-
9.In
Criminal
Case
No.
Q-98-
Eleven
(11)
Eleven
(11)
of [prision]
correccional to
of [prision]
correccional to
Days
Days
Six (6) Years and Twenty
mayor;
mayor;
Criminal
Case
No.
Q-98-
10.In Criminal Case No. Q-98-
Eleven
(11)
Eleven
(11)
of [prision]
correccional to
of [prision]
correccional to
Days
Days
mayor;
mayor;
Eleven
(11)
Eleven
(11)
of [prision]
correccional to
of [prision]
correccional to
Days
Days
mayor;
mayor;
Eleven
(11)
Eleven
(11)
of [prision]
correccional to
of [prision]
correccional to
Days
Days
mayor;
mayor; aDATHC
Eleven
(11)
Eleven
(11)
of [prision]
correccional to
of [prision]
correccional to
Days
Days
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
mayor;
Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
17.In Criminal Case No. Q-987598[7] Two (2) Years,

Eleven
(11)
Days
of [prision]
correccional to

mayor;
Further, the accused is hereby ordered
to pay BPI and/or Remedios Perez the
total sum of Six Hundred Thirty Five
Thousand Pesos (P635,000.00), as civil
indemnity, plus six percent (6%) interest
per annum from the time of the filing of
these cases, until fully paid.
challenged Joint Decision of the Court a

quo is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 6
The CA held that petitioner was the one who authored
the crimes of which she was convicted reasoning that
she was the only person who stood to be benefited by
the falsification of the document in question; thus, the
presumption that she is the material author of the
falsification is present.
Moreover,
petitioner's
theory
that
the
crimes
committed were perpetrated by the bank tellers or is

an inside job cannot be sustained because of the lack
of any evidence showing that the tellers harbored any
ill motive against her. The CA emphasized that the
defense of denial, unsubstantiated by clear and
The bond posted by the accused for her
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving and
provisional liberty is hereby canceled.
merits no weight in law; it cannot be given greater
SO ORDERED. 5
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated November 24,
2008, disposed of the case as follows:
evidentiary value than the testimony of credible

witnesses who testified on affirmative matter.
On March 4, 2009, petitioner filed a timely appeal
before this Court.
The Issues
Petitioner
interposes
in
the
Elements of Falsification of Commercial
present
appeal
Documents are Present
the
following assignment of errors:
Petitioner contends that the decision of the lower court

is not supported by the evidence on record and that
this evidence cannot sustain in law the requirements
ERROR IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE
of proof beyond reasonable doubt for the crime for
EVIDENCE,
DOCUMENTARY
which she was charged.
TESTIMONIAL,
WERE
THE
LOWER
AND
COMMITTED
COURT
IN
BY
THE
PROMULGATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE

SUBJECT DECISION; STcEaI
Specifically, petitioner claims that, as a matter of

policy, the bank personnel verified the signature cards
of
private
complainant
Remedios
before
any
encashment can be drawn against the account of
II
Remedios.
Thus,
petitioner
contends
that
the
ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
signatures in the encashment slips are genuine as
LAW, SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL,
found by the staff and manager of BPI and that the
WERE
cases filed against her are the products of inside jobs.
COMMITTED
PROMULGATION
OF
IN
THE
THE
SUBJECT
Further,
she
argues
that
the
results
of
the
examinations conducted by Josefina dela Cruz of the
DECISION.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Substantially, the issues raised boil down to the
question of whether or not the evidence adduced by
the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
PNP Crime Laboratory lack evidentiary value, since the

report
only
stated
that
the
signatures
on
the
Encashment/Withdrawal Slips were different from the

genuine signatures of Remedios based on the checks,
which contained the genuine signatures of Remedios,
but did not state that the signatures belong to
petitioner.
The contentions are flawed.
they
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes
did
not
in
fact
participate;
any private individual who commits any of the acts of
3.Attributing to persons who have
falsification enumerated in Art. 171 of the Code in any
participated in an act or
public or official document or letter of exchange or any
proceeding
other kind of commercial document. The acts of
other than those in fact
falsification enumerated in Art. 171 are:
made by them; cDTACE
Art. 171.Falsification by public officer,

employee
minister.
or
notary
The
or
penalty
ecclesiastic
of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000

statements
4.Making untruthful statements in

a narration of facts;
5.Altering true dates;
6.Making
any
alteration
or
officer, employee or notary who, taking
intercalation in a genuine
document which changes
its meaning;
the following acts:
7.Issuing
1.Counterfeiting or imitating any
form
in
an
authenticated
document
handwriting, signature, or
purporting to be a copy of
rubric;
an original document when
2.Causing it to appear that

persons
have
participated in any act

or
proceeding
when
no such original exists, or

including in such copy a
statement contrary to, or
different from, that of the
genuine original; or
8.Intercalating any instrument or

note
relative
her
testimony,
Remedios
categorically
denied
the
having filled out and signed any of the subject
encashment slips on the dates indicated on them. Her
protocol, registry or official
testimony is further strengthened by the testimonies
book.
of the bank manager and the bank tellers, who
issuance
to
In
thereof
in
(Emphasis
and
underscoring supplied.)
facilitated the banking transactions carried out by
Essentially, the elements of the crime of Falsification of

Commercial Document under Art. 172 are: (1) that the
offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification; and (3) that
the act of falsification is committed in a commercial
document.
As borne by the records, all the elements of the crime
are present in the instant case. Petitioner is a private
individual who presented to the tellers of BPI 17 forged
encashment slips on different dates and of various
petitioner with their branch. Their testimonies were

coherent and consistent in narrating that it was indeed
petitioner
who
presented
the
encashment
received the proceeds of the transactions, and/or

caused the transfer of the money to her own bank
account.
Moreover, the testimony of Josefina dela Cruz (dela
Cruz) bolsters the findings of the trial court that the
alleged signatures of Remedios in the encashment
slips are forged, to wit:
amounts. The questioned encashment slips were
Q:Using the method you employed in
falsified by petitioner by filling out the same and
the examination of questioned
signing the name of the private complainant, thereby
and
making
Remedios Perez, will you please
it
appear
that
Remedios
signed
the
encashment slips and that they are genuine in all

respects, when in fact petitioner knew very well that
Remedios never signed the subject encashment slips.
slips,
standard
signatures
of
elaborate the study you made?

A:After conducting the examination, I
reduced
my
examination
to
writing and my findings are as
strokes are smooth. In the capital
follows:
'R' in the questioned signature,
'Scientific comparative examination and

analysis
of
the
questioned
documents
and
the
submitted
standard
signature
reveals
significant
divergences
handwriting
structure
movement,
and
other
in
stroke
individual
handwriting characteristics.'
Q:You
mentioned
divergences
there
is
presence
of
re-trace
strokes while in the standard

signature, there is no re-trace
strokes. In the downward portion
of the letter 'R' in the questioned
signature,
the
direction
is
downward while in the standard it

is horizontal. Now the angular
strokes following the capital 'R' is
in
traced in the middle part of the
handwriting movement, will you
letter 'R', the downward portion
please point to this Honorable
while in the standard, it is found
Court this significant divergences
in the last stroke of capital 'R'. In
of differences in the strokes of
the middle name letter 'D', the
handwriting?
shape is more rounded on the
A:First of all the manner of execution.
questioned signature but in the
The manner of execution is slow
standard it is more elongated. In
while in the execution of the
the loop of the family name, it is
standard, it is moderate. The line
more
quality
questioned
signature[;] while in the standard,
signature, there is presence of
it is more elongated. With that, I
tremors in the strokes while in the
was able to conclude that the
standard
questioned signatures Remedios
in
the
signatures,
all
the
rounded
in
questioned
D. Perez marked 'Q-1' to 'Q-36'
truth that the questioned encashment slips had been
standard signatures of Remedios
falsified by petitioner and that they were presented to
Perez
the bank in order to defraud the bank or holder of the
marked
'S-1'
to
'S-27'
inclusive were not written by one

and the same person. 7
account.
Additionally, the Court has held that in gauging the
relative
Typically, such inconspicuous divergences noted by

dela Cruz on the questioned signatures could not be
weight
handwriting
to
be
experts,
given
the
to
following
the
opinion
standards
adhered to:
easily detected by untrained eyes or by one who had
We have held that the value of the
no formal training in handwriting examination; thus,
opinion of a handwriting expert depends
resort to the opinion of an expert is imperative. This
not
explains why the bank tellers who processed the illegal
whether a writing is genuine or false,
transactions entered into by the petitioner on the
but upon the assistance he may afford
account of Remedios failed to notice the forgery or
in pointing out distinguishing marks,
falsification. As a result, they allowed the encashment
characteristics and discrepancies in and
by petitioner. The training or skill, if any, of the tellers
between genuine and false specimens
in detecting forgeries is usually minimal or inadequate
of writing which would ordinarily escape
and their opinion is generally unreliable. It was,
notice or detection from an unpracticed
therefore, prudent on the part of the bank to seek the
observer. The test of genuineness ought
opinion of an expert to determine the genuineness of
to
the signatures in the encashment slips. DEAaIS
formation
As found by the trial court, the totality of the

testimonies of Remedios, dela Cruz, the handwriting
expert, and the bank tellers bears the earmarks of
upon
be
his
the
of
mere
statements
resemblance,
letters
in
not
some
of
the
other
specimens but to the general character

of writing, which is impressed on it as
the involuntary and unconscious result
of
are
of
constitution,
habit
or
other
and signature appears thereon to encash a check and
permanent course, and is, therefore
withdraw the amount indicated therein.
itself permanent. 8
Even more, petitioner would have this Court believe
Moreover, it cannot be said that since none of the
that
prosecution witnesses saw the falsification actually
document did not exist because Remedios and BPI did
done by petitioner, she cannot be held liable. The bank
not suffer any damage. Such argument is specious. It
tellers who processed the illegal transactions of
has been ruled that damage or intent to cause damage
petitioner involving the account of Remedios were
is not an element in falsification of a commercial
consistent in their testimonies that it was petitioner
document, because what the law seeks to repress is
herself who presented the encashment slips and
the
received the proceeds of the slips. In such a situation,
documents. 11
the applicable rule is that if a person has in his

possession a falsified document and he made use of it,
taking advantage of it and profiting from it, the
presumption is that he is the material author of the
falsification. 9 In the instant case, petitioner has failed
Furthermore, contrary to petitioner's assertions, the

encashment
slips
are
commercial
documents. Commercial documents are, in general,

documents
or
instruments
crime
prejudice
of
to
falsification
the
public
of
commercial
confidence
in
such
Therefore, the acts of petitioner clearly satisfy all the

essential elements of the crime of Falsification of
Commercial Document.
Crime of Falsification was a Necessary Means
to Commit Estafa
to overthrow the presumption.
questioned
the
which
are
used
by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate

trade. 10 An encashment slip necessarily facilitates
bank transactions for it allows the person whose name
It has been held that whenever a person carries out on

a public, official, or commercial document any of the
acts enumerated in Art. 171 of the RPC as a necessary
means to perpetrate another crime, such as estafa or
malversation, a complex crime is formed by the two
crimes. 12 CAIaDT
Under Art. 48 of the RPC, a complex crime refers to:
the offended party or third person. Deceit is the false
(1) the commission of at least two grave or less grave
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or
felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a single
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by
act; or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for
concealment
committing the other (or others).
disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial

document may be a means of committing estafa,
of
that
which
should
have
been
deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his

legal injury.
because before the falsified document is actually
In the case before us, all the elements of estafa are
utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification
present. Once petitioner acquired the possession of
has already been consummated, damage or intent to
the amounts she encashed by means of deceit, she
cause damage not being an element of the crime of
misappropriated, misapplied, and converted the same
falsification of public, official, or commercial document.
to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage
In other words, the crime of falsification has already
and prejudice of the private complainant and BPI.
existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official,

or commercial document to defraud another is estafa.
But the damage is caused by the commission of
estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
Therefore, the falsification of the public, official, or
commercial document is only a necessary means to
commit estafa. 13
In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the
accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence
or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to
Without a doubt, the falsification of the encashment

slips was a necessary means to commit estafa. At that
time, the offense of falsification is already considered
consummated even before the falsified document is
used to defraud another.
Therefore, the trial court aptly convicted petitioner for
the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of
Defense of Denial Is Untenable
It is a hornbook doctrine that the defense of denial,
judicial dictum that the findings of fact of the trial
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
court are not disturbed on appeal, except when it
negative and self-serving, and merits no weight in law
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts
and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than
or circumstances of weight and substance that would
the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on
have materially affected the outcome of the case. We
affirmative matters. 14
find that the trial court did not err in convicting
In the instant case, petitioner's defense of denial

crumbles in the face of the positive identification made
by
the
prosecution
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for failure to
enunciated by this Court, "[p]ositive identification
sufficiently show reversible error in the assailed
where categorical and consistent and not attended by
decision. The Decision dated November 24, 2008 of
any
the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 31158 is AFFIRMED.
of
ill
motive
on
during
the
trial.
As
showing
witnesses
petitioner of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of
part
of
the
eyewitnesses on the matter prevails over alibi and

denial". 15 The defense has miserably failed to show
No costs.
any evidence of ill motive on the part of the
SO ORDERED.
prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against
||| (Domingo v. People, G.R. No. 186101, [October 12,

2009], 618 PHIL 499-519)
her. aEDCAH
Thus, between the categorical statements of the
prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and bare
denials of the accused, on the other hand, the former
must, perforce, prevail. 16
We accord the trial court's findings the probative
weight it deserves in the absence of any compelling
reason to discredit its findings. It is a fundamental
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144692. January 31, 2005.]
CELSA
P.
ACUA, petitioner, vs.
Pedro
Pascua
("respondent
ACNTS'
Officer-In-Charge
PEDRO PASCUA and RONNIE TURLA,
("respondent Turla") was a member of its faculty. 2
City
National
Trade
School), respondents.
respondent
was
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON,

(Angeles
while
Pascua")
Ronnie
Turla
On 13 July 1998, a certain Erlinda Yabut ("Yabut"),

another ACNTS teacher, together with other school
personnel, requested a dialogue with respondent
DECISION
Pascua
on
some
unspecified
matter.
Respondent
Pascua agreed to the request and the meeting took

place on 16 July 1998. Respondent Turla attended the
meeting
CARPIO, J p:
Petitioner,
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari 1 of the Resolution
dated 4 April 2000 and the Order dated 19 June 2000
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The 4 April 2000
Resolution dismissed for lack of probable cause the
complaint for perjury of petitioner Celsa P. Acua
against respondents Pedro Pascua and Ronnie Turla.
The 19 June 2000 Order denied the motion for
reconsideration.
upon
respondent
whom
Yabut
Pascua's
apparently
directive.
invited,
also
attended the meeting.

As an offshoot to an incident during the 16 July 1998
meeting, petitioner charged respondent Pascua with
misconduct ("OMB-ADM-1-99-0387") and with violation
of Article 131 3 of the Revised Penal Code ("OMB 1-99903")
before
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman
("Ombudsman"). 4 In his sworn counter-affidavit in

OMB-ADM-1-99-0387,
respondent
Pascua
alleged,
among others, that: (1) OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is a

The Facts
Petitioner Celsa P. Acua ("petitioner") is a former

teacher of the Angeles City National Trade School
("ACNTS") in Angeles City, Pampanga. Respondent
"rehash and a duplication with a slight deviation of

fact" of an administrative case pending with the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS")
which petitioner and Yabut earlier filed against him and
(2) Yabut had no authority to invite to the 16 July 1998
Public respondent dismissed petitioner's complaint in
meeting a non-employee of ACNTS like petitioner
his 4 April 2000 Resolution, 9 thus:
considering that he (respondent Pascua) was the one

who called the meeting. 5 Respondent Pascua also
submitted a sworn statement of respondent Turla
confirming that respondent Pascua and not Yabut
Upon careful evaluation of the case

record, we find no evidence to indict
respondents for perjury.
xxx xxx xxx
called the 16 July 1998 meeting. 6

The Ombudsman dismissed OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and
It could not be established by the
OMB 1-99-0903.
evidence on record that it was Erlinda
Contending
that
private
respondents
perjured
themselves in their sworn statements in OMB-ADM-199-0387, petitioner charged private respondents with
perjury ("OMB 1-99-2467") before the office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ("public respondent").
Petitioner alleged that private respondents were liable
for perjury because: (1) the complaint she and Yabut
Yabut who called the meeting on July 16,

1998 and invited complainant. Annex
"B-1" . . . of the complaint is the letter of
Erlinda Yabut to Dr. Pedro Pascua, dated
July 13, 1998, which shows that Ms.
Yabut was requesting respondent to
have a dialogue (sic). The letter states:
filed against respondent Pascua before the Civil
"We, the undersigned would like
Service Commission, later endorsed to the DECS, was
to request your good office to
not "the same" as her complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-
allow us to have a dialogue on
0387 and (2) it was Yabut and not respondent Pascua
Thursday, July 1[6], to once and
who called the 16 July 1998 meeting. 7
for
Private respondents denied the charge against them

and sought the dismissal of the complaint. 8
The Ruling of the Public Respondent
all
ventilate
our
complaints/observations and also

listen to the rebuttal of the other
side.
It is the desire of everybody who
called by the undersigned
attended the meeting last time
on said date but a dialogue
that whatever is the outcome of
among
this
the
Angeles City National Trade
basis of the next appropriate
School which I previously
step.
headed. Mrs. Acu[]a at
confrontation
will
be
We would like to request the

incoming
Administrator
or
somebody from the DECS to act

as moderator."
Pursuant
respondent
to
that
the
time
teachers
was
not
of
teacher to attend the said

dialogue,
thus
stated
openly on said occasion

that I will not start the
such
Pascua
circumstance,
stated,
among
meeting
if
there
are
outsiders, and Mr. ROGELIO
others, in his counter-affidavit in OMB-
GUTIERREZ
ADM-1-99-0387 that:
Complainant to step out of
"5. Be
that
as
it
vehemently
charge
may,
deny
the room so we could start

the dialogue, . . . ;
6. I also deny the charge that she
Complainant Celsa Acu[]a
was invited by Mrs. Erlinda
from testifying against Mrs.
Yabut,
co-complainant
Amelia Yambao on July 16,
hers
in
1998
Administrative
the
the
herein
prevented
matter
that
asked
truth
case,
because I was the one who
or
called for that dialogue and
investigation conducted or
not Mrs. Yabut, thus I never
no
that
the
DECS
there
was
being
of
the
of
hearing
gave
any
authority
Hence, petitioner filed this petition. Petitioner contends
any
that public respondent committed grave abuse of
anyone
to
person
who
was
not
of
the
school
member
faculty
or
invite
to
an
discretion in dismissing her complaint for lack of

probable cause. 11
employee
Public respondent, in his Comment, maintains that he
thereof."
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Clearly, the letter of Ms. Yabut and the

aforequoted
respondent
counter-affidavit
Pascua
petitioner's complaint in OMB 1-99-2467. 12
of
belie
In their Comment, private respondents claim that
the
petitioner filed this petition out of time. Hence, this
commission of perjury since there was
petition should be dismissed outright. On the merits,
no deliberate assertion of falsehood on
private respondents submit that public respondent
a material matter.
Respondent
likewise
charged.
be
correctly
Ronnie
indicted
Since
it
Turla
for
was
could
the
not
dismissed
crime
Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 65"). 14

The Issues
deliberate assertion of falsehood on the
The petition raises these issues:
part of respondent Ronnie Turla. 10

but
1. Whether petitioner filed the petition

public
respondent denied her motion in the 19 June 2000

Order.
against
her petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
way. There was also no willful and
reconsideration
charge
In her Reply, petitioner counters that she timely filed
respondent
it would be truthful of him to state that
sought
perjury
them. 13
Pascua who called him to that meeting,
Petitioner
the
on time; and
2. Whether
public
committed
grave
respondent
abuse
of
discretion
in
dismissing
the
The contention has no merit. Section 27 is no longer in
complaint in OMB 1-99-2467 for
force
lack of probable cause.
Desierto 16 declared it unconstitutional for expanding
this
Court
in Fabian
of Article
The petition, while filed on time, has no merit.
VI,
Section
30
of
the
Constitution.
Furthermore, Section 27 relates only to appeals from

rulings
The Petition was Filed on Time

Private respondents contend that petitioner filed this
petition beyond the ten-day period provided in Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770. 15 Section 27 states in
part:
Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.
...
of
the
Ombudsman
in
administrative
disciplinary cases. It does not apply to appeals from

the Ombudsman's rulings in criminal cases such as the
present case. 17
The
remedy
of
an
aggrieved
party
in
criminal
complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with this

Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, we
held in Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario: 18
In all administrative disciplinary cases,

orders, directives, or decisions of the
of
the
Ombudsman
may
be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing

a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice
of the order, directive or decision or
denial of the motion for reconsideration
in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
v.
the Court's jurisdiction without its consent in violation
The Ruling of the Court
Office
because
The Ombudsman Act specifically deals

with the remedy of an aggrieved party
from orders, directives and decisions of
the
Ombudsman
disciplinary
in Fabian,
cases.
the
in
administrative
As
aggrieved
we
ruled
party
[in
administrative cases] is given the right

to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such
right of appeal is not granted to parties
aggrieved by orders and decisions of
the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like
The Public Respondent did not Gravely Abuse
finding probable cause to indict accused
His Discretion in Dismissing OMB 1-99-2467
persons.
We reiterate this Court's policy of non-interference
However, an aggrieved party is not
with the Ombudsman's exercise of his constitutionally
without recourse where the finding of
mandated prosecutory powers. 19 We explained the
the Ombudsman . . . is tainted with
reason
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
Ombudsman: 20
lack
[or]
excess
of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997

of
Civil
such
policy
in Ocampo,
IV
jurisdiction. An
aggrieved party may file a petition for

Rules
for
Procedure.
(Emphasis
supplied)
The rule is based not only upon respect

for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to
the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
Petitioner precisely availed of such remedy when she
practicality
filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging
functions of the courts will be grievously
that public respondent gravely abused his discretion in
hampered
dismissing her complaint against private respondents.
assailing the dismissal of investigatory
Under Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, petitioner
proceedings conducted by the Office of
had 60 days from her receipt of the 19 June 2000
the
Order within which to file this petition. Petitioner
complaints filed before it, in much the
received a copy of the 19 June 2000 Order on 13 July
same way that the courts would be
2000. Thus, petitioner had until 11 September 2000
extremely swamped if they could be
within which to file this petition. Petitioner did so on 11
compelled to review the exercise of
August 2000. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on
discretion on the part of the fiscals or
time.
prosecuting attorneys each time they
as
by
well.
Otherwise,
innumerable
Ombudsman
with
the
petitions
regard
to
v.
decide to file an information in court or
deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and,
dismiss
(d) that the sworn statement or affidavit
complaint
by
private
complainant.
containing the falsity is required by law

or
The Court, in the present case, finds no reason to
made
for
legal
purpose.23 (Emphasis supplied)
deviate from this long-standing policy.

Petitioner contends that public respondent committed
Public respondent correctly ruled that the first and
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint
third elements are absent here in that private
for perjury for lack of probable cause. The contention
respondents' statements in their counter-affidavits
is untenable. Probable cause, as used in preliminary
in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were not material to that
investigations, is defined as the "existence of such
case nor do they constitute willful and deliberate
facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
assertion of falsehood.
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
On the Element of Materiality
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is
was
the "main fact which was the subject of the inquiry, or
guilty
of
the
crime
for
which
he
was
prosecuted." 21 The elements of perjury under Article
any
183 22 of the Revised Penal Code are:
fact . . . ." 24 To hold private respondents liable, there
(a) that the accused made a statement
circumstance
which
tends
to
prove
that
must be evidence that their assailed statements in
an
OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 were the subject of inquiry in
affidavit upon a material matter; (b)
that case. Petitioner has presented no such evidence.
that the statement or affidavit was
The records are hardly helpful, as petitioner did not
made
furnish the Court a copy of her complaint in OMB-ADM-
under
oath
before
or
executed
competent
officer,
authorized to receive and administer
1-99-0387.
oath; (c) that in that statement or
What is before the Court is a portion of respondent
affidavit, the accused made a willful and
Pascua's counter-affidavit in that case as quoted by
public respondent in his 4 April 2000 Resolution.
and
Admittedly, some inference is possible from this
requested a dialogue with respondent Pascua, it was
quoted material, namely, that the basis of petitioner's
respondent Pascua's consent to their request which led
complaint in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is that respondent
to the holding of the meeting. Thus, respondent
Pascua prevented her from taking part in the 16 July
Pascua's statement in question is not false much less
1998 meeting. However, it would be improper for the
malicious. It is a good faith interpretation of events
Court to rely on such inference because the element of
leading to the holding of the meeting.
materiality must be established by evidence and not

left to inference. 25
some
Regarding
unidentified
respondent
counter-affidavit
in
Pascua's
personnel
allegation
in
OMB-ADM-1-99-0387
duplication with a slight deviation of fact" of the DECS
that OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 is significantly the same as
administrative case petitioner and Yabut filed against
petitioner's
complaint
respondent Pascua, petitioner has not shown why this
against respondent Pascua before the DECS is
is false. Petitioner again did not furnish the Court a
immaterial to the inferred issue.
copy of her and Yabut's complaint with the DECS.
On
the
Element
of
Deliberate
Assertion
of Falsehood
mere
"rehash
that
not prosper because respondent Pascua's statement

administrative
his
petitioner's
Yabut's
was
who
At any rate, petitioner's complaint for perjury will still
and
complaint
ACNTS
and
Respondent Turla's statement in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387

that respondent Pascua called the 16 July 1998
The third element of perjury requires that the accused
meeting was a mere reiteration of what respondent
willfully and deliberately assert a falsehood. Good faith
Pascua told him. Consequently, it was correct for
or lack of malice is a valid defense. 26Here, the Court
public respondent to hold that since respondent Turla
finds that respondent Pascua's statement in his
merely repeated what he heard from respondent
counter-affidavit in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 that he called
Pascua, he could not be held liable for making a false
the 16 July 1998 meeting does not constitute a
and malicious statement. IEHTaA
deliberate assertion of falsehood. While it was Yabut
There is grave abuse of discretion where power is
EJERCITO
ESTRADA
and
THE
exercised in arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF
passion or hostility. The abuse must be so patent and
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to

a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
DECISION
contemplation of law. 27 No such conduct can be

imputed on public respondent. Public respondent
disposed of petitioner's complaint consistent with
applicable law.
BRION, J p:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. The Resolution
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this
dated 4 April 2000 and the Order dated 19 June 2000
Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 to seek the reversal
of respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon are
of the Sandiganbayan's Joint Resolution dated July 12,
AFFIRMED.
2004,
granting
respondent
Joseph
Ejercito
Estrada's (Estrada) demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case
SO ORDERED.
No. 26565. 2
||| (Acua v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon , G.R. No.

144692, [January 31, 2005], 490 PHIL 640-653)
THE FACTS
On
April
4,
2001,
an
Information
for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558)

was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent
EN BANC
Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information
[G.R. Nos. 164368-69. April 2, 2009.]

PEOPLE
OF
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
THE
JOSEPH
for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No.

26565,
Amended
was
likewise
Information
reads: HTaIAC
filed
in
against
Crim.
Estrada.
Case
No.
The
26565
That on or about 04 February 2000, or
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently
sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
consolidated for joint trial. Still another Information,
in the City of Manila, Philippines and
this time for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No.
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Court, the above-named accused, being
Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim.
then President of the Republic of the
Cases No. 26558 and 26565.
Philippines, without having been duly

authorized,
judicially
or
administratively, taking advantage of
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a

warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued.
his position and committing the offense
On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a
in relation to office, i.e., in order to
Special Division in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and
CONCEAL
HE
decide the charges of plunder and related cases
ACQUIRED during his tenure and his
(illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent
true identity as THE President of the
Estrada. 3
Republic of the Philippines, did then and
At the trial, the People presented testimonial and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
documentary evidence to prove the allegations of the
REPRESENT HIMSELF AS 'JOSE VELARDE'
Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and
IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use
perjury. The People's evidence for the illegal alias
and
charge, as
THE
employ
ill-gotten
the
SAID
wealth
alias
"Jose
Velarde" which IS neither his registered

name at birth nor his baptismal name,
in signing documents with Equitable PCI
Bank and/or other corporate entities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
summarized
by
the
Sandiganbayan,
of
Philippine
and
Industrial
consisted of: EcHTCD

A. The
testimonies
Commercial
Bank (PCIB) officers
Clarissa
Ocampo (Ocampo) and

Manuel
G.
Atty.
Curato(Curato) who
commonly
declared
that
on
b. 8
February 4, 2000, Estrada opened

a numbered trust account (Trust
Account
C-163) with
PCIB
and
c. 22
Aprodicio
Lacquian
and
d. 24
e. 25
B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills

who declared that a certain Baby
times
with
her;
that
Ortaliza deposited several checks

in
PCIB
Savings
Account
No.
0160-62502-5 under the account

name
"Jose
Velarde"
on
the
following dates (as evidenced by
(Exh.
November
1999
(Exh.
November
1999
(Exh.
December
1999
(Exh.
1999
(Exh.
1999
(Exh.
"QQQQQ")
g. 21
December
"RRRRR")
Ortaliza (Ortaliza) transacted

several
1999
"PPPPP")
f. 20
Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan,
November
"OOOOO")
Fernando Chua were present on

that occasion;
(Exh.
"NNNNN")
Ocampo and Curato also testified

that
1999
"LLLLL")
signed as "Jose Velarde" in the

account opening documents; both
November
h. 29
December
"SSSSS")
i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. "TTTTT")

j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. "UUUUU")
k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. "VVVVV")
deposit receipts duly marked in

l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. "WWWWW")
evidence):
a. 20
October
"MMMMM")
1999
(Exh.
(2) Documents
duly
identified
by
witnesses showing that Lucena

Ortaliza was employed in the
Office of the Vice President and,
evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias)
later on, in the Office of the
was anchored on the following grounds: 11
President when Estrada occupied

these
positions
and
1. Of
when
Savings
Account
thirty-five
presented
deposits were made to the Jose

Velarde
the
only
No.
by
two
(35)
the
(2)
witnesses
prosecution,
witnesses,
Ms.
Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel
0160-62502-5.
Curato,
testified
that
on
one
The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the
occasion (4 February 2000), they
consolidated
saw movant use the name "Jose
cases,
which
the
Sandiganbayan
admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated October

13,
2003. 4 The
reconsider
the
accused
separately
Sandiganbayan
moved
to
Resolution; 5 the
People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated

Comment/Opposition
to
the
motions. 6 The
Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution

dated November 17, 2003. 7
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense
moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in
these cases. 8 In its Joint Resolution dated March 10,
2004, 9 the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense
leave to file demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565
(illegal use of alias) and 26905 (perjury).
Velarde"; cCSDaI
2. The use of numbered accounts and
the
like
was
legal
and
was
prohibited only in late 2001 as

can
be
gleaned
from
Bangko
Sentral Circular No. 302, series of

2001, dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and
habitual
use
documents
prosecution
documents
of
alias
offered
are
which,
as
by
the
the
banking
by
their
nature,
are
confidential
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim.
cannot
be
Case Nos. 26565 and 26905. 10 His demurrer to
following proper procedures; and
revealed
and
without
4. The use of alias is absorbed in
regard
plunder.
The
People
to
convict
movant
for
illegal use of alias; and
opposed
the
demurrers
through
4. Contrary
to
the
submission
of
Consolidated Opposition that presented the following
movant, the instant case of illegal
arguments: 12
use of alias is not absorbed in
1. That the use of fictitious names in

bank
transaction
was
not
expressly prohibited until BSP No.

302 is of no moment considering
that as early asCommonwealth
Act No. 142, the use of alias was
already
being
prohibited.
prosecuted
of C.A.
No.
Movant
for
142 and
is
violation
not
BSP
Circular No. 302;
plunder.
Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through
a Consolidated Reply Opposition.
THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYAN'S RULING
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the
Resolution now assailed in this petition. The salient
points of the assailed resolution are:
First the coverage of Estrada's indictment. The
Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant evidence
2. Movant's reliance on Ursua vs. Court

of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996])
is misplaced;
for the indictment are those relating to what is

described in the Information i.e., the testimonies
and documents on the opening of Trust Account C-163
on February 4, 2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out
3. Assuming arguendo that C.A.
No.
that the use of the disjunctive "or" between "on or
requires
about 04 February 2000" and "sometime prior or
publication of the alias and the
subsequent thereto" means that the act/s allegedly
habitual
the
committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually
prosecution has presented more
taken place prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of
142,
as
amended,
use
thereof,
than sufficient evidence in this
the
conjunctive
was
simply
the
prosecution's
the alias was used in connection with the opening of a
procedural tool to guard against any variance between
numbered trust account made during the effectivity
the date stated in the Information and that proved
of R.A. No. 1405, as amended, 14 and prior to the
during the trial in a situation in which time was not a
enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160. 15
material ingredient of the offense; it does not mean

and cannot be read as a roving commission that
Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde":
and
a. Estrada's use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his
distinct from those that took place on the single date
dealings with Dichavez and Ortaliza after February 4,
"on or about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or
2000 is not relevant in light of the conclusion that the
subsequent thereto". The Sandiganbayan ruled that
acts imputed to Estrada under the Information were
the use of the disjunctive "or" prevented it from
the act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only.
interpreting the Information any other way. IcCEDA
Additionally, the phrase, "Estrada did . . . represent
includes
acts
and/or
eventsseparate
Second the People's failure to present evidence

that proved Estrada's commission of the offense. The
Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to present
evidence that Estrada committed the crime punished
under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142),as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals. 13 It
ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the
context
of CA
142 only
is public and habitual.
if
In
the
use
Estrada's
of
the
alias
case,
the
Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the principles

was not as simple because of the complications
resulting from the nature of the transaction involved
himself as 'Jose Velarde' in several transactions",

standing alone, violates Estrada's right to be informed
of the nature and the cause of the accusation, because
it is very general and vague. This phrase is qualified
and explained by the succeeding phrase "and use
and employ the said alias 'Jose Velarde'" which "is
neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal
name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank
and/or
other
representations
corporate
before
entities".
persons
Thus,
other
Estrada's
than
those
mentioned in the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza

and Dichavez do not fall within the "Equitable PCI Bank
and/or other corporate entities" specified in the
Information. Estrada's representations with Ortaliza
to secrecy by the same law cannot be
and Dichavez are not therefore covered by the
considered as 'public' as to fall within
indictment.
the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On

account of the absolute confidentiality
of the transaction, it cannot be said that
b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the
movant intended to be known by this
principle in the law of libel that mere communication
name
to a third person is publicity; it reasoned out that that
name. Confidentiality
the definition of publicity is not limited to the way it is
negate publicity. Ursua instructs:
defined under the law on libel; additionally, the

application of the libel law definition is onerous to the
accused
and
is
precluded
by
the
ruling
in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be

construed strictly against the State and favorably for
the accused. It ruled that the definition under the law
on libel, even if it applies, considers a communication
to
third
person
covered
by
the
privileged
communication rule to be non-actionable. Estrada's

use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one
such privileged communication under R.A. No. 1405,
as amended. The Sandiganbayan said:
Movant's act of signing "Jose Velarde" in
bank
documents
being
absolutely
confidential, the witnessing thereof by

bank officers who were likewise sworn
in
addition
to
his
and
real
secrecy
Hence, the use of a fictitious

name
or
different
name
belonging to another person in a

single instance without any sign
or
indication
that
the
user intends to be known by

this name in addition to his real
name from that day forth does
not fall within the prohibition
in C.A.
No.
142 as
amended. IESAac
c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention
not to be publicly known by the name "Jose Velarde" is
shown by the nature of a numbered account a
perfectly valid banking transaction at the time Trust
Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No.
numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan further
142, as interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily be
ruled, did not impose on Estrada the obligation to
harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No. 1405and
disclose his real identity the obligation R.A. No.
R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute
6713 imposes is to file under oath a statement of
should be construed in a way that will harmonize it
assets and liabilities. 16 Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No.
with
1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had the
Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to the
absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the
present case, led it to conclude that the use of an alias
amount of his bank deposits, but he was under no
within the context of a bank transaction (specifically,
obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the
the opening of a numbered account made before bank
bank account (such as the name he used to open it).
officers) is protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A.
Third the effect of the enactment of R.A. No.

9160. 17 The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute
existing
laws.
reasonable
scrutiny,
the
No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No.

142 until the passage into law of R.A. No. 9160.
prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of
THE PETITION
anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names,
The People filed this petition raising the following
and
issues:
all
other
similar
accounts,
is
legislative
acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed

in our laws that allowed depositors to hide their true
identities.
The
Sandiganbayan
prohibition
was
lifted
from
noted
Bangko
that
the
Sentral
ng
Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000

another confirmation that the opening of a numbered
trust account was perfectly legal when it was opened
on February 4, 2000.
1. Whether
the
court a
quo gravely
erred and abused its discretion in

dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565
and in holding that the use by
respondent Joseph Estrada of his
alias
"Jose
Velarde"
was
not
public despite the presence of

Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and
Fernando Chua on 4 February
1405 and Commonwealth Act No.
2000;
142 were proper; HIAESC
2. Whether
the
court a
quo gravely
5. Whether
the
court a
quo gravely
limiting
and in holding that the use by
amended
respondent Joseph Estrada of his
Case No. 26565 to the use of the
alias "Jose Velarde" was allowable
alias
under banking rules, despite the
respondent
clear
February 4, 2000;
prohibition
underCommonwealth
Act
No.
142;
6. Whether
the
coverage
Information
"Jose
the
of
in
the
Crim.
Velarde"
Joseph
court a
Estrada
by
on
quo gravely
3. Whether
the
court a
quo gravely
departing from its earlier final
finding on the non-applicability
ofUrsua v. Court of Appeals and
and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as
forcing
an exception to the illegal use of
instant case.
alias
punishable
under Commonwealth
Act
No.
142;
4. Whether the alleged harmonization
and
application
court a
made
quo of R.A.
by
the
No.
its
application
to
the
THE COURT'S RULING

The petition has no merit.
The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua
Ruling
Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:
Section
1. Except
pseudonym
proceedings like those legally provided
solely for literary, cinema, television,
to obtain judicial authority for a change
radio or other entertainment purposes
of name and no person shall be allowed
and in athletic events where the use of
to secure such judicial authority for
pseudonym
more than one alias. The petition for an
is
as
normally
accepted
practice, no person shall use any name
alias
different from the one with which he
baptismal and family name and the
was registered at birth in the office of
name recorded in the civil registry, if
the local civil registry or with which he
different, his immigrant's name, if an
was baptized for the first time, or in
alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such
case of an alien, with which he was
names other than his original or real
registered in the bureau of immigration
name, specifying the reason or reasons
upon entry; or such substitute name as
for
may
authority for the use of alias, the
have
competent
been
court:
authorized
Provided,
by
That
shall
the
Christian
set
desired
name
forth
alias.
the
person's
The
and
judicial
the
alien
persons whose births have not been
immigrant's name shall be recorded in
registered in any local civil registry and
the proper local civil registry, and no
who have not been baptized, have one
person shall use any name or names
year from the approval of this act within
other than his original or real name
which to register their names in the civil
unless the same is or are duly recorded
registry of their residence. The name
in the proper local civil registry.
shall comprise the patronymic name

and one or two surnames.
How this law is violated has been answered by

the Ursua definition of an alias "a name or names
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an
used by a person or intended to be used by
alias shall apply for authority therefor in
himpublicly and habitually usually
in
business
transactions in addition to his real name by which he
names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the
is registered at birth or baptized the first time or
act of using an alias name, unless such
substitute
alias was duly authorized by proper
name
authorized
authority". There
must
by
be,
in
competent
the
words
of Ursua, a "sign or indication that the user intends to

be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his
real name from that day forth . . . [for the use of alias
to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No.
142 as amended". 18
judicial proceedings and recorded in the

civil register. 19
Following the doctrine of stare decisis, 20 we are
guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime punished
under CA No. 142 may be committed. Close adherence
to this ruling, in other words, is unavoidable in the
Ursua further relates the historical background and
application of and the determination of criminal
rationale that led to the enactment of CA No. 142, as
liability under CA No. 142.
follows: cDCSET
The
Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid
enactment
142 was
the application of the Ursua ruling proceeds from
made primarily to curb the common
Estrada's position in the government; at the time of
practice among the Chinese of adopting
the commission of the offense, he was the President of
scores of different names and aliases
the Republic who is required by law to disclose his true
which created tremendous confusion in
name. We do not find this argument sufficient to justify
the field of trade. Such a practice
a distinction between a man on the street, on one
almost bordered on the crime of using
hand, and the President of the Republic, on the other,
fictitious
obvious
for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first place,
successfully
the law does not make any distinction, expressly or
reasons
names
could
of C.A.
No.
which
not
be
for
maintained against the Chinese who,
impliedly,
rightly
they
treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to Estrada, in fact
one
allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph
or
possessed
wrongly,
a
claimed
thousand
and
that
would
justify
differential
Estrada, which name he has used even when he was
means "otherwise known as" (Webster
already the President of the Philippines. Even the
Third New International Dictionary, 1993
petitioner has acquiesced to the use of the screen
ed., p. 53). The charge of using an
name of the accused, as shown by the title of the
"alias" logically implies that another
present petition. Additionally, any distinction we make
name
based on the People's claim unduly prejudices Estrada;
habitually. Otherwise, he will not be
this is proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142,
known by such name. In any case, the
as a penal statute, should be construed strictly against
amended
the State and in favor of the accused. 21 The mode of
"several transactions" and signing of
violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever
documents with the Equitable PCI Bank
the accused may be.
and/or other corporate entities where
The People also calls our attention to an earlier

Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated February 6,
2002)
denying
Estrada's
motion
to
quash
the
the
has
been
used
information
above-mentioned
publicly
and
adverts
to
alias
was
allegedly employed by the accused.

The facts alleged in the information are
Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected
distinctly
different
from
facts
the application of Ursua under the following tenor:
established in the Ursua case where

another name was used by the accused
in a single instance without any sign or
The use of the term "alias" in the
indication that that [sic] he intended to
Amended Information in itself serves to
be known from that day by this name in
bring this case outside the ambit of the
addition to his real name. 22
ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of

Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]),
on
which the accused heavily relies in his

motion
to
quash.
The
term
"alias"
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely

abused its discretion in
applying Ursua notwithstanding this
earlier final ruling on its non-applicability a ruling
The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415
that binds the parties in the present case. The
having resolved only an interlocutory
People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to
matter,
the point of gravely abusing its discretion when it
judicata cannot
resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in
case. There
the reversal of its earlier final ruling. SDEHCc
judicata where the previous order
the
principle
be
of res
applied
can
in
be
this
no res
two
in question was not an order or
reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a
judgment determinative of an issue
mere interlocutory order a ruling denying a motion
of fact pending before the court but
to quash 23 that cannot be given the attributes of
was
finality and immutability that are generally accorded to
because it required the parties to
judgments or orders that finally dispose of the whole,
perform
of
case. 24 The
adjudication. In this case, the lifting of
Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order
the restraining order paved the way for
because its effects would only be provisional in
the possession of the fishpond on the
character, and would still require the issuing court to
part
undertake substantial proceedings in order to put the
representatives pending the resolution
controversy to rest. 25 It is basic remedial law that an
of the main action for injunction. In
interlocutory order is always under the control of the
other words, the main issue of whether
court
or
We
find
or
no
merit
particular
and
may
be
in
this
matters
modified
argument
in,
or
for
rescinded
upon
only
of
not
an
interlocutory
certain
acts
petitioners
private
for
and/or
respondent
order
final
their
may
be
sufficient grounds shown at any time before final
considered a sublessee or a transferee
judgment. 26 Perez v. Court of Appeals, 27 albeit a
of the lease entitled to possess the
civil case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory
fishpond under the circumstances of the
order carries no res adjudicata effects. SaysPerez:
case had yet to be resolved when the

restraining order was lifted. 28
Second, in
the
earlier
the
was designed to cause and did cause "confusion and
Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the
fraud in business transactions" which the anti-alias law
Information to determine the sufficiency of these
and its related statutes seek to prevent. The People
allegations
any
also argues that the evidence it presented more than
evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present
satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as amended,
demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a
and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that
fuller view of the prosecution's case, and was faced
Estrada's use of the alias was public.
and
motion
did
not
to
quash,
consider
with the issue of whether the prosecution's evidence

was
sufficient
Information.
to
Under
prove
these
the
allegations
differing
of
the
views,
the
Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on

the application of Ursua, the leading case in the
application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is
not per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That
there is no error of law is strengthened by our
consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the
application of Ursua.
In an exercise of caution given Ursua's jurisprudential
binding effect, the People also argues in its petition
that Estrada's case is different from Ursua's for the
following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used and
intended to continually use the alias "Jose Velarde" in
addition to the name "Joseph Estrada"; (2) Estrada's
use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single
transaction; and (3) the use of the alias "Jose Velarde"
In light of our above conclusions and based on the

parties'
expressed
examine within
the
positions,
Ursua
we
shall
framework the
now
assailed
Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to

evidence. The prosecution has the burden of proof to
show
that
the
Sandiganbayan
evidence
satisfied
it
presented
with
the
the Ursua requirements,
particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality

in the use of an alias. TAECaD
What is the coverage of the indictment?
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely
erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage
of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565
to Estrada's use of the alias "Jose Velarde" on February
4, 2000. It posits that there was a main transaction
one that took place on February 4, 2000 but there
were other transactions covered by the phrase "prior
to or subsequent thereto; the Information specifically
complaint or information the precise date the offense
referred to "several transactions" . . . "with Equitable
was committed except when it is a material ingredient
PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities". To the
of the crime. This liberality allegedly shaped the time-
People, the restrictive finding that the phrase "prior
tested rule that when the "time" given in the complaint
to or subsequent thereto" is absorbed by the phrase
is not of the essence of the offense, the time of the
"on or about 04 February 2000" drastically amends
commission of the offense does not need to be proven
the succeeding main allegations on the constitutive
as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if
criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the
the proof shows that the offense was committed at any
transactions involved and the documents signed with
time within the period of the statute of limitations and
various entities; there is the undeniable essential
before the commencement of the action (citing People
relationship between the allegations of the multiplicity
v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US
of transactions, on one hand, and the additional
v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of
antecedent of "prior to or subsequent thereto", on the
the commission of an offense are liberally interpreted,
other. It argues that the Sandiganbayan reduced the
the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely
phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto" into a useless
abused its discretion in disregarding the additional
appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and
clause "prior to or subsequent thereto"; under the
totally unwarranted escape route.
liberality
The People further argues that the allegation of time is

the least exacting in satisfying the constitutional
requirement that the accused has to be informed of
the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation
of the approximate date of the commission of the
offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule
provides that it is not necessary to state in the
principle,
the
allegations
of
the
acts
constitutive of the offense finally determine the

sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People thus
claims that no surprise could have taken place that
would
prevent
Estrada
from
properly
defending
himself; the information fully notified him that he was

being accused of using the alias Jose Velarde in more
than just one instance.
We see no merit in these arguments.
At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature the
on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
right of Estrada to be informed of the nature and cause
commission. 31
of the accusation against him. Under the provisions of

the Rules of Court implementing this constitutional
right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense in the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense
was
committed. 29 As
to
the
cause
of
accusation, the acts or omissions complained of as

constituting
the
offense
and
the
qualifying
and
The
information must at
all
times embody
the
essential elements of the crime charged by setting

forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the
culpability and liability of the accused so that he can
properly prepare for and undertake his defense. 32 In
short, the allegations in the complaint or information,
as written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused
the primary reader of and the party directly affected
by the complaint or information of the charge/s
laid. HEIcDT
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary

and concise language and not necessarily in the
The heretofore cited Information states that ". . . on
language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient
or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or
to enable a person of common understanding to
subsequent
know the offense charged and the qualifying and
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
aggravating circumstances, and for the court to
Honorable
pronounce
[did] . . . willfully, unlawfully and criminally
judgment. 30 The
date
of
the
thereto,
Court,
in
the
the
City
of
above-named
Manila,
accused
commission of the offense need not be precisely
REPRESENT
stated in the complaint or information except when the
SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ
precise date is a material ingredient of the offense.
the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither
The offense may be alleged to have been committed
his registered name at birth nor his baptismal
HIMSELF
AS
'JOSE
VELARDE'
IN
name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI
approximate dates, so that the phrase "sometime prior
Bank and/or other corporate entities."
or
We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayan's

reading of the Information, as this was how the
accused might have similarly read and understood the
allegations in the Information and, on this basis,
prepared his defense. Broken down into its component
parts, the allegation of time in the Information plainly
states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before
February
4,
2000;
(3) OR sometime
prior
or
subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila,

Estrada represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in
several
transactions
in
signing
documents
with
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
subsequent
thereto"
would
effectively
be
surplusage that has no meaning separately from the

"on or about" already expressed. This consequent
uselessness of the "prior or subsequent thereto"
phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and
necessary consequence of the use of the "OR"
between the two phrases and the "THERETO" that
referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second
phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very
different (and would have been clearly in accord with
the
People's
Information
present
simply
interpretation)
used "AND" instead
had
the
of "OR" to
separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various

transactions occurring on various dates and occasions
Under this analysis, the several transactions involving
all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be
the signing of documents with Equitable PCI Bank
disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision
and/or other corporate entities all had their reference
in the use of "OR" is the reality the case has to live
to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or
with. To act contrary to this reality would violate
about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly
Estrada's right to be informed of the nature and cause
implying that all these transactions took place only on
of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on
February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime
several separate days that the People claims would
before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the
result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to
Information could have simply said "on or about
prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the
February 4, 2000" to capture all the alternative
single day mentioned in the Information.
Separately from the constitutional dimension of the
documents as "Jose Velarde" amounted to a "public"
allegation of time in the Information, another issue
use of an alias that violates CA No. 142.
that the allegation of time and our above conclusion

raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a
violation of the offense charged, were actually alleged
in the Information.
On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues

that to premise the validity of Estrada's prosecution for
violation of CA No. 142 on a mere banking practice is
gravely erroneous, improper, and constitutes grave
The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on
abuse of discretion; no banking law provision allowing
the People's case, as it deals a fatal blow on the
the use of aliases in the opening of bank accounts
People's claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose
existed; at most, it was allowed by mere convention or
Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of an
industry practice, but not by a statute enacted by the
alias within a single day cannot be deemed "habitual",
legislature. Additionally, that Estrada's prosecution
as it does not amount to a customary practice or use.
was supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated
This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition
October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada
under CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua.
stands charged with violation of CA No. 142, penalized
The issues of publicity, numbered accounts,

and
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.
We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.
since 1936, and not with a violation of a mere BSP

Circular. That the use of alias in bank transactions prior
to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is inconsequential
because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an alias
(except for certain purposes which do not include
banking) was already prohibited. Nothing in CA No.
The People claims that even on the assumption that
142 exempted
the
use
of
aliases
in
banking
Ocampo and Curato are bank officers sworn to secrecy
transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit
under the law, the presence of two other persons who
its application; it was therefore grave error for the
are not bank officers Aprodicio Laquian and
Sandiganbayan to have done so. Lastly on this point,
Fernando Chua when Estrada's signed the bank
bank regulations being mere issuances cannot amend,
modify or prevail over the effective, subsisting and
loans). A trust account, according to the People, may
enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
not be considered a deposit because it does not create
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and

its relationship with CA No. 142, that since nothing
in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it
ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA No.
142's coverage. Harmonization of laws, the People
posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to be
harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at
the juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust and

deposit operations are treated separately and are
different in legal contemplation; trust operation is
separate and distinct from banking and requires a
grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not
covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as
amended). CDScaT
least related with one another. The three laws which
The People further argues that the Sandiganbayan's
the
not
conclusion that the transaction or communication was
remotely related to one another; they each deal with a
privileged in nature was erroneous a congruent
different subject matter, prohibits a different act,
interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows
governs a different conduct, and covers a different
that a person who signs in a public or private
class of persons, 33 and there was no need to force
transaction a name or alias, other than his original
their application to one another. Harmonization of
name or the alias he is authorized to use, shall be held
laws, the People adds, presupposes the existence of
liable for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank
conflict or incongruence between or among the
employees are bound by the confidentiality of bank
provisions of various laws, a situation not obtaining in
transactions except in the circumstances enumerated
the present case. HEDSIc
in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the
Sandiganbayan
tried
to
harmonize
are
The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not
apply to trust transactions, such as Trust Account No.
C-163, as it applies only to traditional deposits (simple
prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank employees

and officers only, and not Estrada; the law does not
prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his
use of an alias to other people, including Ocampo and
Curato, as he did when he made a public exhibit and
tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias
use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.
is more than mere communication to a third person;
Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan

ruling that the use of an alias before bank officers does
not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages the
commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of illgotten wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an
anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to
silence bank officials and employees from reporting
the commission of crimes. The People contends that
the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be

made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to
cause it to become generally known. In order to be
held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the
alias must have held himself out as a person who shall
publicly be known under that other name. In other
words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be
manifest.
the law R.A. No. 1405 was not intended by the
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when
Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage
Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust
for the commission of crimes and cannot be so
Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his
interpreted;
interpreted,
intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose
understood and applied so that right and justice would
Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua
prevail.
were not part of the public who had no access to
the
law
can
only
be
Estrada's privacy and to the confidential matters that
We see no merit in these arguments.
transpired in Malacaan where he sat as President;
We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the
Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared
Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel
matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while
that mere communication to a third person is
Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office
publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142.
and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy
Our
the
and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be
requirement that there be intention by the user to be
said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be
culpable and the historical reasons we cited above
for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian
close
reading
of Ursua
particularly,
and Chua were also inside the room at that time. The
used therein is to be understood broadly
same holds true for Estrada's alleged representations
and not limited only to accounts which
with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for
give
these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada's
relationship between the depositor and
representations to these people were made in privacy
the bank.
and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
rise
to
creditor-debtor
The policy behind the law is laid down in

Section 1:
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the
SEC. 1. It is hereby declared to be
indictment
the policy of the Government to
rests,
affords
Estrada
reasonable
expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act
give
related to the opening of a trust account a
people to deposit their money in
transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely
banking
confidential
in
rejected,
discourage private hoarding so
in Ejercito
v.
People's
that the same may be properly
nitpicking
nature. 34 We
previously
Sandiganbayan, 35 the
argument
on
the
alleged
dichotomy
encouragement
utilized
to
institutions
by banks in
the
and to
authorized
between bank deposits and trust transactions, when
loans to assist in the economic
we said: EHSADc
development
of
the
country.
(Underscoring supplied)
The contention that trust accounts are

not covered by the term "deposits", as
If
the
money
deposited
under
an
used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that
account may be used by bank for
they do not entail a creditor-debtor
authorized loans to third persons, then
relationship between the trustor and the
such account, regardless of whether it
bank, does not lie. An examination of
creates a creditor-debtor relationship
the law shows that the term "deposits"
between the depositor and the bank,
falls under the category of accounts
SEC.
which the law precisely seeks to protect
whatever nature with bank or
for
banking
the
purpose
of
boosting
the
economic development of the country.
one such account. The Trust Agreement

between petitioner and Urban Bank
provides that the trust account covers
"deposit, placement or investment of
funds" by Urban Bank for and in behalf
petitioner.
The
money
deposited
under Trust Account No. 858, was,

therefore,
intended
not
merely
to
remain with the bank but to be invested

by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of
account
is
not
protected
byR.A.
1405 would encourage private hoarding

of
funds
that
could
otherwise
be
invested by bank in other ventures,

contrary to the policy behind the law.
in
political
was
understood broadly:
intended
to
the
by
the
subdivisions
are
and
its
hereby
considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not
be examined, inquired or looked
into by any person, government
official,
bureau
office, except upon
or
written
permission of the depositor, or in

cases of impeachment, or upon
order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials, or in
cases where
the
money deposited or invested is

litigation.
"deposits"
the
issued
instrumentalities,
more
that
in
Government of the Philippines, its
the
shows
institutions
bonds
Section 2 of the same law in fact even

clearly
deposits of
Philippines including investments
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt,
of
2. All
term
be
subject
matter
(Emphasis
underscoring supplied)
of
the
and
The
phrase
"of
whatever
nature"
imposed by R.A. No. 1405 on the bank officers; what is
proscribes any restrictive interpretation
essentially significant is the privacy situation that is
of "deposits". Moreover, it is clear from
necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions. This
the immediately quoted provision that,
statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively
generally, the law applies not only to
negate a conclusion that the transaction was done
money which is deposited but also to
publicly or with the intent to use the alias publicly.
those which are invested. This further

shows that the law was not intended to
apply only to "deposits" in the strict
sense of the word. Otherwise, there
would have been no need to add the
phrase "or invested. cSICHD
We
The enactment of R.A. No. 9160, on the other hand, is

a significant development only because it clearly
manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered
accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted
banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law
or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad
indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent
enough to cover Trust Account No.
law
858. 36
constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use
have
consistently
ruled
that
bank
deposits
cannot
be
maintained
without violating
the
of ex post facto laws. 38
under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
We hasten to add that this holistic application and
Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of
interpretation of these various laws is not an attempt
privacy. 37 Given the private nature of Estrada's act of
to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of
signing the documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the
the
opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim
necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for
that there was already a public use of alias when
culpability,
Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need
of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estrada's
not even consider here the impact of the obligations
use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that the
offense
as
punished
amplified
under CA
No.
in Ursua. The
142 must
application
law considers private or, at the very least, where the
requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as
law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to
they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that
the parties to the transactions; it is at this point
we so declare. We do so now in this review and
that R.A. No.
accordingly find no reversible error of law in the
1405tangentially interfaces with
an
indictment under CA 142. In this light, there is no

actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No.
1405 that
requires
harmonization.
Each
operates
within its own sphere, but must necessarily be read
assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.

WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
we DENY the
petition for lack of merit.
together when these spheres interface with one
SO ORDERED. cEaTHD
another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent
||| (People v. Estrada, G.R. Nos. 164368-69, [April 2,

2009], 602 PHIL 226-254)
vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada,

cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his
indictment.
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we
simply looked at the totality of the circumstances
obtaining
in
Estrada's
use
of
the
Velarde"vis--vis the Ursua requisites.
alias
We
do
SECOND DIVISION
"Jose
not
[G.R. No. 186030. March 21, 2012.]
decide here whether Estrada's use of an alias when he

occupied the highest executive position in the land
NORMA DELOS REYES VDA. DEL
was valid and legal; we simply determined, as the
PRADO, EULOGIA R. DEL PRADO,
Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable
NORMITA R. DEL PRADO and
for the offense charged based on the evidence the
RODELIA R. DEL
People presented. As with any other accused, his guilt
PRADO, petitioners,vs. PEOPLE OF
must be based on the evidence and proof beyond
reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal liability
DECISION
This petition stems from an Information for falsification

under Article 172, in relation to Article 171 (4), of
the Revised Penal Code filed against herein petitioners
REYES, J p:
Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado (Norma), Normita
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to assail and
set aside the following issuances of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in the case docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
Del Prado (Normita), Eulogia Del Prado (Eulogia) and

Rodelia 3 Del Prado (Rodelia) with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, allegedly
committed as follows:
31225 and entitled "Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del
That on or about the 19th day of July,
Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado, Normita R. Del Prado and
1991, in the [M]unicipality of Lingayen,
Rodelia R. Del Prado v. People of the
[P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines,
Philippines": SDITAC
and within the jurisdiction of this
1)the Decision 1 dated September 15,

2008 affirming with modification
the decision and order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
38, Lingayen, Pangasinan in
Criminal Case No. L-8015; and
2)the Resolution 2 dated January 6,
Honorable Court, the above-named

accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then
and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsified, execute[d] and
cause[d] the preparation of the DEED
OF SUCCESSION, by stating and making
it appear in said document that they
2009 denying the motion for
were the only heirs of the late Rafael del
reconsideration of the Decision of
Prado, when in truth and in fact, all the
September 15, 2008.
accused well knew, that Ma. Corazon
The Factual Antecedents
Del Prado-Lim is also an heir who is

entitled to inherit from the late Rafael
Del Prado, and all the accused
Del Prado" to cover the distribution of several
deliberately used the DEED OF
properties owned by the late Rafael, including the
SUCCESSION to claim ownership and
parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title
possession of the land mentioned in the
(OCT) No. P-22848, measuring 17,624 square meters,
DEED OF SUCCESSION to the exclusion
more or less, and situated at Libsong, Lingayen,
of the complainant Ma. Corazon Del
Pangasinan.
Prado-Lim to her damage and prejudice.
Per agreement of the heirs, Corazon was to get a
Contrary to Art. 172 in relation to Art.
3,000-square meter portion of the land covered by
171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code. 4
OCT No. P-22848. This right of Corazon was also
Upon arraignment, the accused therein entered their

plea of "not guilty". After pre-trial conference, trial on
the merits ensued.
The prosecution claimed that Ma. Corazon Del PradoLim (Corazon), private complainant in the criminal
case, was the daughter of the late Rafael Del Prado
(Rafael) by his marriage to Daisy Cragin (Daisy). After
Daisy died in 1956, the late Rafael married Norma with
whom he had five children, namely: Rafael, Jr., Antonio,
Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia.
The late Rafael died on July 12, 1978. On October 29,
1979, Corazon, as a daughter of the late Rafael, and
Norma, as the late Rafael's surviving spouse and
representative of their five minor children, executed a
"Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of Rafael
affirmed in the Deed of Exchange dated October 15,

1982 and Confirmation of Subdivision which she
executed with Norma. acAIES
Corazon, however, later discovered that her right over
the subject parcel of land was never registered by
Norma, contrary to the latter's undertaking. The
petitioners instead executed on July 19, 1991 a Deed
of Succession wherein they, together with Rafael, Jr.
and Antonio, partitioned and adjudicated unto
themselves the property covered by OCT No. P-22848,
to the exclusion of Corazon. The deed was notarized
by Loreto L. Fernando (Loreto), and provides in part:
WHEREAS, on the 12[th] day of July
1978, RAFAEL DEL PRADO[,] SR., died
intestate in the City of Dagupan, leaving
certain parcel of land, and more
name, is the surviving spouse and the
particularly described and bounded to
rest are the children of the decedent;
wit:
xxx xxx xxx

ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. P-22848
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in

consideration of the premises and
"A certain parcel of land (Lot No.
invoking the provisions of Rule 74, Sec.
5518, Cad-373-D) Lingayen
1 of the Rules of Court, the parties
Cadastre, situated in Poblacion,
hereto do by these presents, agree to
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Island of
divide and partition the entire estate
Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by
above[-]described and accordingly
Lots Nos. 5522, 5515; and 6287;
adjudicate, as they do hereby
on the SE., by Lots Nos. 5516,
adjudicate the same among themselves,
5517, 55 and Road; on the SW.,
herein below specified to wit:
by Road, and Lots Nos. 5521,

5510, and 5520; and on the NW.,
xxx xxx xxx 5
by Road; . . . containing an area
By virtue of the said Deed of Succession, OCT No. P-
of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX
22848 was cancelled and several new titles were
HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR
issued under the names of Corazon's co-heirs. When
(17,624) Square Meters, more or
Corazon discovered this, she filed a criminal complaint
less. Covered by Psd-307996
against now petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and
(LRC), consisting of two lots. Lot
Rodelia. Antonio and Rafael, Jr. had both died before
No. 5510-A and Lot 5518-B."
the filing of said complaint.
WHEREAS, the parties hereto are the
Among the witnesses presented during the trial was
only heirs of the decedent, the first
Loreto, who confirmed that upon the request of Norma
and Antonio, he prepared and notarized the deed of
months and one day of prision correccional as
succession. He claimed that the petitioners appeared
maximum. They were also ordered to pay a fine of
and signed the document before him. DEacIT
P5,000.00 each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
For their defense, the petitioners denied having signed
of non-payment of fine.
the Deed of Succession, or having appeared before
Considering the minority of Rodelia at the time of the
notary public Loreto. They also claimed that Corazon
commission of the crime, she was sentenced to suffer
was not a daughter, but a niece, of the late Rafael.
the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, plus
Norma claimed that she only later knew that a deed of
payment of fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary
succession was prepared by her son Antonio, although
imprisonment in case of non-payment.
she admitted having executed a deed of real estate

mortgage in favor of mortgagee Prudential Bank over
portions of the subject parcel of land already covered
by the new titles.
The Ruling of the MTC
All the petitioners were ordered to indemnify Corazon

in the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to
pay the costs of suit.
Unsatisfied with the MTC's ruling, the petitioners filed a
motion for new trial on the grounds of alleged gross
The MTC rejected for being unsubstantiated the
error of law, irregularities during the trial, and new and
petitioners' denial of any participation in the execution
material evidence. To prove that they did not intend to
of the deed of succession, further noting that they
exclude Corazon from the estate of the late Rafael, the
benefited from the property after its transfer in their
petitioners cited their recognition of Corazon's right to
names. Thus, on August 9, 2006, the court rendered its
the estate in the deed of extra-judicial partition,
decision 6 finding petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita
confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange, joint
and Rodelia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
affidavit and petition for guardianship of minors Rafael,
crime charged, sentencing them to suffer an
Jr., Eulogia, Antonio and Normita, which they had
indeterminate penalty of four months and one day
earlier executed. 7 Again, the petitioners denied
of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and four
having signed the deed of succession, and instead
A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
insisted that their signatures in the deed were forged.
merit by the RTC via its resolution 11 dated October
The motion was denied by the MTC via a

resolution 8 dated December 21, 2006, prompting the
filing of an appeal with the RTC.
The Ruling of the RTC
On August 10, 2007, the RTC rendered its
decision 9 affirming the MTC's decision, with
modification in that the case against Rodelia was
dismissed in view of her minority at the time of the
31, 2007. Hence, Norma, Eulogia and Normita filed a

petition for review with the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On September 15, 2008, the CA rendered its
decision 12 dismissing the petition and affirming the
RTC's ruling, with modification as to the imposable
penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
commission of the crime. The decretal portion of the
decision reads: HIaTDS
appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed

appealed Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan dated
August 9, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED, but
modified as to accused Rodelia R. Del
Prado as the case against her is hereby
DISMISSED on account of her minority
at the time of the commission of the
offense.
SO ORDERED. 10
Decision dated August 10, 2007 and

Order dated October 31, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
Pangasinan, in Crim. Case No. L-8015
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION th
at appellants Norma delos Reyes Vda.
Del Prado, Eulogia R. Del Prado and
Normita R. Del Prado are hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year and one (1)
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision
EXECUTED BY THE PETITIONERS
correccional, as maximum.
WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF
SO ORDERED. 13
COMPLAINANT MS. CORAZON DEL

PRADO-LIM, SHE WAS
The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners
SPECIFICALLY NAMED AS AN HEIR
was denied by the CA in its resolution 14 dated
WITH CORRESPONDING
January 6, 2009. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners
SHARES/INHERITANCE IN THE
appealed from the decision and resolution of the CA to
ESTATE OF THE LATE RAFAEL DEL
this Court, through a petition for review
PRADO. CcTHaD
on certiorari 15 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Present Petition
C.WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER

COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN
The petitioners present the following assignment of
FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE
errors to support their petition:
GOOD FAITH OF THE PETITIONERS
A.WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER

FINDING THAT COMPLAINANT MA.
CORAZON DEL PRADO-LIM WAS
WHICH NEGATES THE

COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF
FALSIFICATION ON THEIR PART.
D.WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER
EXCLUDED AS AN HEIR OF THE
LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO.
CONVICTING THE PETITIONERS
B.WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER

COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT IN
SEVERAL
DOCUMENTS/INSTRUMENTS
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND

LEGAL BASIS, THE PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE OF THE
PETITIONERS NOT HAVING BEEN
OVERCOME BY THE
exclude private complainant Corazon from the estate
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.
of the late Rafael.
E.WITH DUE RESPECT [THE LOWER

COURT ERRED] IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE CASE IS PURELY CIVIL
ONE[,] NOT CRIMINAL. 16
To support their assigned errors, the petitioners invoke
the existence and contents of the several documents
which they had presented before the MTC, including
the deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Rafael Del Prado dated October 29, 1979, confirmation
of subdivision, deed of exchange and petition in the
guardianship proceedings for the minor Del Prado
children filed by Norma, in which documents they
claim to have indicated and confirmed that Corazon is
also an heir of the late Rafael. Given these documents,
the petitioners insist that they cannot be charged with
falsification for having excluded Corazon as an heir of
their decedent.
This Court's Ruling

The petition is bound to fail.
Only questions of law may be raised
in petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
First, the questions being raised by the petitioners
refer to factual matters that are not proper subjects of
a petition for review under Rule 45. Settled is the rule
that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only
questions of law may be raised. It is not this Court's
function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence
already considered in the proceedings below, our
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of
law that may have been committed by the lower court.
The resolution of factual issues is the function of the
lower courts, whose findings on these matters are
received with respect. A question of law which we may
In sum, the issue for this Court's resolution is whether
pass upon must not involve an examination of the
or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioners'
probative value of the evidence presented by the
conviction for falsification, notwithstanding the said
litigants. 17 This is clear under Section 1, Rule 45 of
petitioners' defense that they never intended to
the Rules of Court, as amended, which

provides: ITHADC
Section 1.Filing of petition with
the other hand, there is a question of fact when the
Supreme Court. A party desiring to
doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged
appeal by certiorari from a judgment,
facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration
final order or resolution of the Court of
of the whole evidence, considering mainly the
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of
of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court
specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to
or other courts, whenever authorized by
one another and to the whole, and the probabilities of
law, may file with the Supreme Court a
the situation. 18
verified petition for review

on certiorari. The petition may include
an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or other provisional remedies
and shall raise only questions of
law, which must be distinctly set
forth. The petitioner may seek the
same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or
proceeding at any time during its
pendency. (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction between a question of law and a
question of fact is settled. There is a question of law
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts. Such a question does not
involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. On
Contrary to these rules, the petitioners ask us to

review the lower courts' factual finding on Corazon's
exclusion in the subject deed of succession, to
reconsider its contents and those of the other
documentary evidence which they have submitted
with the court a quo, all of which involve questions of
fact rather than questions of law. In their assignment
of errors, petitioners even fully question the factual
basis for the courts' finding of their guilt. However, as
we have explained in Medina v. Asistio, Jr.: 19
Petitioners' allegation that the Court of
Appeals "grossly disregarded" their
Exhibits "A", "B", "C", "D" and "E", in
effect, asks us to re-examine all the
[evidence] already presented and
evaluated as well as the findings of
fact made by the Court of Appeals.
misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact
Thus, in Sotto v. Teves (86 SCRA 154
are conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA
[1978]), [w]e held that the appreciation
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
of evidence is within the domain of the
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
Court of Appeals because its findings of
the appellee, (7) when the CA's findings are contrary
fact are not reviewable by this Court
to those by the trial court, (8) when the findings are
(Manlapaz v. CA, 147 SCRA 236
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
[1987]; Knecht v. CA, 158 SCRA 80
which they are based, (9) when the acts set forth in
[1988] and a long line of cases).
the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
It is not the function of this Court to

analyze or weigh such evidence all over
again. Our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing errors of law that may have
been committed by the lower court.
(Nicolas[,] et al. v. CA, 154 SCRA 635
[1987]; Tiongco v. de la Merced, 58
SCRA 89 [1974]).
There are recognized exceptions to this rule on
questions of law as subjects of petitions for review, to
wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, (10)

when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. 20 After a consideration of the
petitioners' arguments, this Court holds that the
present appeal does not fall under any of these
exceptions.
There can be no good faith on the
part of the petitioners since they
knew of the untruthful character
of statements contained in their
deed of succession.
Even granting that the present petition may be
officer, employee, or notary who, taking
admitted, we find no cogent reason to reverse the CA
decision appealed from, considering that the elements
of the crime of falsification under Art. 171, par. 4 of
the following acts:
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 172 thereof,

were duly proved during the proceedings below. Said
elements are as follows: EAIaHD
(a)The offender makes in a public
document untruthful statements
in a narration of facts;
(b)The offender has a legal obligation to
xxx xxx xxx

4.Making untruthful statements in
narration of facts;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 172.Falsification by private
individual and use of falsified
disclose the truth of the facts
documents. The penalty of prision
narrated by him; and
correccional in its medium and
(c)The facts narrated by the offender

are absolutely false. 21
These elements are based on the provisions of Art.
172, in relation to Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads:
maximum periods and a fine of not

more than P5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
1.Any private individual who shall
commit any of the
falsifications enumerated
Art. 171.Falsification by public officer,
in the next preceding
employee or notary or ecclesiastical
article in any public or
minister. The penalty of prision
official document or letter
mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000
of exchange or any other
kind of commercial
anchor their defense, such as the deed of extrajudicial
document; and
partition dated October 29, 1979, the parties'
2.Any person who, to the damage

of a third party, or with the
intent to cause such
damage, shall in any
private document commit
confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and

Norma's petition for guardianship of her then minor
children. Specifically mentioned in these documents is
the fact that Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir,
of the late Rafael.
any of the acts of
The obligation of the petitioners to speak only the
falsification enumerated in
truth in their deed of succession is clear, taking into
the next preceding article.
account the very nature of the document falsified. The
xxx xxx xxx
deed, which was transformed into a public document

upon acknowledgement before a notary public,
The material document claimed to be falsified in this
required only truthful statements from the petitioners.
case is the Deed of Succession dated July 19, 1991,
It was a legal requirement to effect the cancellation of
the presentation of which before the Register of Deeds
the original certificate of title and the issuance of new
and other government agencies allowed the
titles by the Register of Deeds. The false statement
cancellation of OCT No. P-22848, and the issuance of
made in the deed greatly affected the indefeasibility
several new titles in its stead. The first and third
normally accorded to titles over properties brought
elements were committed by the inclusion in the
under the coverage of land registration, to the injury of
subject deed of the clause that states, "(w)hereas, the
Corazon who was deprived of her right as a landowner,
parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the
and the clear prejudice of third persons who would rely
first name, is the surviving spouse and the rest are the
on the land titles issued on the basis of the
children of the decedent." 22 The untruthfulness of
deed. cEAIHa
said statement is clear from the several other

documents upon which, ironically, the petitioners
We cannot subscribe to the petitioners' claim of good
THIRD DIVISION
faith because several documents prove that they knew

of the untruthful character of their statement in the
[G.R. No. 183132. February 8, 2012.]
deed of succession. The petitioners' alleged good faith

is disputed by their prior confirmation and recognition
RICHARD
CHUA, petitioner, vs.
of Corazon's right as an heir, because despite
PEOPLE
knowledge of said fact, they included in the deed a
OF
THE
statement to the contrary. The wrongful intent to injure

Corazon is clear from their execution of the deed,
DECISION
showing a desire to appropriate only unto themselves

the subject parcel of land. Corazon was unduly
deprived of what was due her not only under the
provisions of the law on succession, but also under
MENDOZA, J p:
contracts that she had previously executed with the
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
petitioners.
seeks to annul and set aside the February 21, 2008
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for
Decision 1 and June 2, 2008 Resolution 2 of the Court
review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 29051, modifying
dated September 15, 2008 and Resolution dated
the October 6, 2004 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
January 6, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
Court, Branch 132, Makati City (RTC) in Criminal Case
No. 31225 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No. 21499 entitled People of the Philippines v. Richard
SO ORDERED.
||| (Vda. del Prado v. People, G.R. No. 186030, [March
21, 2012])
Chua, for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial

Document.
The Facts:
In 1982, Allied Banking Corporation (the bank) hired
"Kindly
Richard Chua as a general clerk in its International
immediately SA# 1000-209312 of
Banking Division which processed the opening of
R. CHUA representing proceeds
domestic and international letters of credit, domestic
of remittance by order of Amado
and international remittances as well as importation
Roque under TT ref. BKT/1752/25
and exportation. Specifically, Chua was tasked to
dated 10-26-84."
process trust receipts, accept trust receipt payments

and
issue
the
corresponding
receipts
for
these
payments. 4
credit
&
advi[s]e
2.Inward Foreign Remittance Advice of

Credit dated 6 August 1984 in the
amount of P16,024.70:
In response to a complaint of a bank client regarding

the non-application of his payments, an internal audit
was conducted. In the course of the audit, twenty-nine
(29) fictitious payments backed by equally bogus
foreign remittances were discovered. The audit led to a
finding that these remittances were not supported by
the necessary authenticated advice from the foreign
bank concerned. Two of these remittances were with
"Please
credit
&
advi[s]e
immediately SA# 1000-209312 of

R. Chua representing proceeds of
remittance from San Francisco by
order
of
US$899.75
Linda
@
Castro
17.822
for
less
charges." 5 HDATSI
instructions to credit specified amounts to Savings
Meanwhile, the accounts payable
Account No. 1000-209312 which turned out to be
payments made by two clients of the Bank, ATL Plastic
under Chua's name.
Manufacturing Industries and Unidex Garments, were
1.Inward Foreign Remittance Advice of

Credit dated 29 October 1984 in
the amount of P16,729.96:
or the
excess
used to cover up the discrepancy created as a result of

the crediting of the foregoing amounts to Chua's
account. It was made to appear that the said amounts
were refunded to the same clients although they were
not. Debit Tickets were even accomplished to justify
the act of crediting the subject amounts to Chua's
Manufacturing Industries, the respective
account. Afterwards, when the same had been credited
sums of P16,024.70 and P16,729.96 for
to his account, Chua withdrew them on different
the purpose of applying the same to the
dates. 6
payment of the excess indebtedness of
On December 17, 1985, Chua was charged with Estafa

through Falsification of Commercial Documents before
the RTC. The Information reads:
said clients with the complainant bank

but the accused instead made it appear
that said amounts were to be credited
to the current account of the client by
That on or about May 18, 1984 and
executing an advice of credit which the
October 24, 1984 and for sometime
said accused, however, did not forward
prior to and subsequent thereto, in the
to
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
complainant and, instead, he prepared a
fictitious
this Honorable Court, the above-named
advice of credit by falsely making it
accused, by means of deceit and false
appear therein that there existed dollar
pretenses
or
remittances of a certain Linda Castro
simultaneous with the commission of
and Amado Roque in the U.S. dollar
the fraud, did then and there willfully,
equivalent of said amounts which the
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Allied
accused
Banking Corporation in the following
account with the bank; and the accused,
manner, to wit: the said accused, as
once in possession of said funds, did
General Clerk of the said complainant
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
and taking advantage of his position as
feloniously appropriate and convert the
such, received from clients of the bank,
same to his own personal use and
Unidex
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
executed
Garments
and
prior
ATL
to
Plastics
the
Cash
Department
inward
credited
foreign
to
his
of
the
remittance
personal
the
complainant,
Allied
Banking
On appeal, the CA modified the RTC's judgment of
Corporation, in the total amount of
conviction by holding Chua liable for falsification of
P32,754.66. 7 IDSEAH
commercial documents only. The CA reasoned out that
Records show that the case was ordered archived on

March 31, 1986 when Chua evaded arrest after the
court's issuance of an arrest warrant. He was finally
arrested on September 10, 1999, after 13 years, but
was
released
on
bail
the
following
day.
When
arraigned, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. 8
Chua, being a mere general clerk of the bank, did not

acquire both material and juridical possession of the
subject amounts. He was likened to a bank teller
"whose possession over the money received by him is
possession by the bank itself." 11 Be that as it may,
the CA, still under the same indictment/information
and pursuant to this Court's ruling in Gonzaludo v.
For his defense, Chua denied that he prepared the
People, 12 held
subject Debit Tickets. He insisted on their regularity as
commercial documents as defined in Articles 172 and
these were duly signed and approved by two of his
171 of the Revised Penal Code. 13
immediate supervisors. Chua likewise denied having

prepared the Advice of Credit documents that covered
Chua
liable
for falsification
The CA wrote:
the questioned foreign remittances. He pointed out
In the case at bench, the prosecution
that these documents were likewise approved for final
was able to prove that the subject
processing by his supervisors. Finally, he denied
Inward Foreign Remittance Advices of
having prepared the withdrawal slips, much more, the
Credit which were used to transfer the
cash
excess payments made by ATL Plastic
withdrawals
corresponding
to
the
subject
amounts. 9
In the assailed decision dated October 6, 2004, the
RTC found Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents and was sentenced accordingly. 10
Manufacturing Industries and Unidex

Garments to the appellant's account in
the guise of remittances, were fictitious
since there were really no Linda Castro
or Amado Roque who sent the same. It
of
adduced
two
documents, i.e.,
the
Thus, the CA gave no value to his defense. The
Advices of Credit and the Debit Tickets,
dispositive portion of its February 21, 2008 Decision
which were merely used to cover up the
reads:
fictitious remittances. It is true that

there is no direct proof that appellant
was the author of the falsification.
However, since he benefited from the
fictitious transactions in question, the
inevitable conclusion is that he falsified
them. It is an established rule that when
it is proved that a person has in his
possession a falsified document and
makes
use
of
the
same,
the
presumption or inference is justified that

such person is the forger. On this score,
the
prosecution
convincingly
demonstrated that appellant withdrew

the
subject
amounts
on
different
dates. 14
Chua's defense of forgery failed to impress the CA. As
it was his burden to establish his defense, it was not
enough for him to submit just any specimen of his
WHEREFORE,
the
Decision
dated
October 2004 of the Regional Trial

Court,
Makati
City,
Branch
132,
is
MODIFIED. Appellant RICHARD CHUA is

hereby
ACQUITTED
of
the
complex
crime of Estafa through Falsification of

Commercial Documents. However, he is
adjudged
GUILTY
of
the
crime
of
Falsification of Commercial Documents

and
is
SENTENCED
to
suffer
an
indeterminate penalty of 4 months and

1 day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
2
years
and
months
of prision
correccional, as maximum. Likewise, he

is
ORDERED
to
PAY
fine
of
P5,000.00. ADTCaI
No Costs.
SO ORDERED. 15
signature. The NBI requested him to submit additional
Chua sought partial reconsideration but his motion was
documents containing his signatures for the years
denied by the CA on June 2, 2008. Still not satisfied,
1983 and 1984 but he failed to meet its requirements.
Chua now comes to this Court raising the following
ISSUES:
Chua claims that the CA's statement, "It is true that

there is no direct proof that appellant was the author
I
Whether
or
not
of the falsification," 17 absolves him from criminal

the
Honorable
liability even for the lesser offense of falsification of
Court of Appeals erred in finding
commercial documents. According to Chua, the CA was
the petitioner guilty of the crime of
merely speculating when it held that he was the
Falsification
Commercial
author of the falsified commercial documents because
Documents considering that it has
he allegedly benefited from them. He further argues
categorically ADMITTED that there
that the prosecution "failed to show other facts and
is no direct proof that petitioner
circumstances from which it may be reasonably and
was the author of the falsification
logically inferred that he committed the crime of
in the case at bar.
falsification." 18
of
II
Whether
Court
of
or
not
Appeals
applying
the
Chua is obviously clutching at straws when he argues

the
Honorable
that the CA's judgment of conviction was based merely
not
on speculation. He apparently misread the CA decision.
paramount
First of all, the CA never abandoned or set aside the
erred
in
of
factual findings of the RTC when it ordered the
innocence in favor of the petitioner
modification of the judgment of conviction. The
in view of its explicit admission
modification was merely on the RTC's conclusion as to
that there is no direct proof that
the crime actually committed. In its appealed decision,
the petitioner was the author of the
the CA pointed out that an essential element in the
falsification. 16
complex
constitutional
presumption
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
crime
of estafa
through
falsification
commercial documents was lacking, thus:
of
Evidently,
in
appellant
did
bench,
subject amount to him; (e) his own admission on cross
juridical
examination that the subject amounts were indeed
possession over the subject payments
credited to his savings account with the bank; and (f)
which were made by two of Allied
his admission that after the subject incident with the
Bank's clients, i.e.,
bank, he filed a notice of leave and never came
and
ATL
the
case
not
at
acquire
Unidex Garments
Plastic
Manufacturing
Industries. It must be borne in mind that

appellant is a mere general clerk of
Allied Bank. As part of his duties, he
received payments from clients. His
position therefor may be likened to the
position
of
bank
teller
whose
possession over the money received by
The CA never disturbed, categorically or otherwise, the

RTC's factual findings with regard to (a) the discovery
fictitious
payments
purportedly
from
The absence of a direct proof that Chua was the author

of the falsification is of no moment for the rule remains
that whenever someone has in his possession falsified
documents and "uttered" or used the same for his
advantage and benefit, the presumption that he
authored it arises.
. . . . This is especially true if the use or
him is possession by the bank itself. 19
of
back. 20
equally
fictitious foreign remittances; (b) the fictitious debit or

refund to the bank's clients although in truth there
were none as indicated in the bank's History of Daily
Transactions, and was instead credited to the account
of Chua; (c) authenticity of his signature in the
uttering of the forged documents was so

closely connected in time with the
forgery that the user or possessor may
be proven to have the capacity of
committing the forgery, or to have close
connection
therefore,
with
had
the
forgers,
complicity
in
and
the
forgery. ACETSa
withdrawal slips as testified to by the bank's signature
In
the
absence
verifier; (d) his denial that he ever knew the two
explanation,
persons named above who allegedly remitted the
possession of a forged document and
one
of
who
satisfactory
is
found
in
who used or uttered it is presumed to
his own account, 23 squarely falling under paragraph
be the forger. 21
Certainly, the channeling of the subject payments via

false
remittances
to
his
savings
account,
his
subsequent withdrawals of said amount as well as his

unexplained flight at the height of the bank's inquiry
into the matter more than sufficiently establish Chua's
involvement in the falsification.
of
Article
171
of
the
Revised
Code; 24 and (iii) the falsification was committed in

two commercial documents, namely, "inward foreign
remittance
advice
of
credit"
and
the
bases relied upon by the CA when it instead found

Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt offalsification of
tickets." 25 Without doubt, his subsequent conviction

to a lesser crime was not unfounded.
complex or a more serious crime is nothing new. The

CA was merely following the Court's lead in the case
of Gonzaludo v. People, 26 where it was held: TSIDEa
commercial documents. The facts are the same. The
The lack of criminal liability for estafa,
elements of the crime as found in paragraph 1, Article
however, will not necessarily absolve
172 of the RPC, are: "1) the offender is a private
petitioner from criminal liability arising
individual or a public officer or employee who did not
from the charge of falsification of public
take advantage of his official position; 2) the offender
document under the same Information
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated
charging the complex crime of estafa
in Article 171; and 3) the falsification was committed
through falsification of public document.
in a public or official or commercial document." 22
It is settled doctrine that
Applying this to the present case, all three elements
"When a complex crime has been
are
individual; (ii) he
present
used
(i) Chua
fictitious
"debit
A conviction coming from the heels of an acquittal in a
The evidentiary bases of the RTC were the very same
undeniably
Penal
is
private
charged in an information and the
"inward
foreign
evidence
fails
to
support
the
remittance advice of credit" to cause the funneling or
charge on one of the component
transfer of the two named bank clients' payments into
offenses, can defendant still be
separately convicted of the other
accused
offense? The question has long
charge." 28 (previous
been answered in the affirmative.
omitted)
In United States v. Lahoylahoy

and Madanlog, 27 the Court has
ruled to be legally feasible the
conviction of an accused on one
of the offenses included in a
complex
crime
charged,
when
properly established, despite the

failure of evidence to hold the
of
the
other
citations
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February

21, 2008 Decision and June 2, 2008 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29051 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Chua v. People, G.R. No. 183132, [February 8,
2012], 681 PHIL 476-485)

First Division: IGMIDIO MADRIGAL, Petitioner, vs. People OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

First Division: IGMIDIO MADRIGAL, Petitioner, vs. People OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

FIRST DIVISION

jurisdiction of this [honorable] [c]ourt,

the said accused during and within the

MADRIGAL, petitioner, vs.

10, 1998 did then and there willfully,

caliber .38 Smith & Wesson [r]evolver

ammunition, without first securing from

For possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver

of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93 with two separate

That on or about March 31, 1998, in the

crimes: (1) violation of P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A.

Municipality of San Pedro, Province of

8294 1 and (2) violation of the Omnibus Election Code,

jurisdiction of this [honorable] [c]ourt,

information in Criminal Case No. 1025-SPL read:

the said accused, without the required

custody and control a caliber .38 Smith

twenty (20) days of prision

ammunition and a split [(sic)] shell

without any number.

and to pay a fine of Fifteen

on the merits, the RTC ruled:

beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of [v]iolation

crime of [v]iolation of the

from one year as minimum

from two (2) years, eleven

(11) months and ten (10)

provided for by law.

reasonable doubt of the

Madrigal y Macaraig guilty

1. In Criminal Case No. 1026-SPL,

1025-SPL, finding accused

Petitioner pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial

Petitioner appealed the RTC decision. The CA affirmed

petitioner's conviction in both offenses but reduced the

to [f]ive (5) years, [f]our

penalty imposed on him in Criminal Case No. 1026-SPL

convicted for illegal possession of firearm if another

(illegal possession of firearm). 3

crime was committed:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner seeks

SEC. 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree

his acquittal from the charges against him. He

No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further

questions the findings of the RTC, as upheld by the CA,

amended to read as follows:

of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of

finding of the RTC, as upheld by the CA, that petitioner

Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or

Ammunition or Instruments Used

At the outset, we see no reason to disturb the factual

We partially grant the petition.

maximum period and a fine of not

unlawfully . . . possess any low

ammunition, or machinery, tool or

8294 expressly provides that a person may not be

be used in the manufacture of

ammunition: Provided, That no

SET ASIDE insofar as petitioner was found guilty of

illegal possession of firearm. Criminal Case No. 1026-

committed. (emphasis supplied)