G.R. No.

118436 March 21, 1997

HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS (in substitution of
original petitioner), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, substituted by her heirs, 1 instituted this petition for review of the
Court of Appeals decision dated December 8, 1994 in "Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun
Management and Development Corporation," (CA G.R. CV No. 38328), alleging reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court when it affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite. The issue presented before us is whether or not private respondent Maguesun Corporation
committed actual fraud in obtaining a decree of registration over two unregistered parcels of land in
Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review a decree of registration.
The facts of the case are narrated below:
On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and Development Corporation
(Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered land
located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre)
with an area of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively. The original registration case was
docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, presided over
by Judge Julieto Tabiolo. In support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corporation
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor
and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property
from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half
months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication dated March 24, 1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis
of Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was
not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of the
proceedings. Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly. 2 After an
Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case. On
October 4, 1990, the Land Registration Authority reported, among other things, that the subject parcels of
land had previously been applied for registration in Land Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No.
55072 at the Court of First Instance of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision
has been rendered thereon. 3 Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court granted
Maguesun Corporation's application for registration (Land Registration Case No. TG-373) in a three-page
decision with the following dispositive portion: 4
WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the application for registration of said
lands described in plan As-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, one with an area of

3,641 and the other with an area of 10,674 square meters, as supported and shown
by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the records, in the
name of Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, with office address
at 521 Edsa, Quezon City, free from all liens and encumbrances and from any other
adverse claims of any kind and nature.
Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso facto becomes executory, upon which
eventuality the corresponding decree of registration may thus be issued.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on March 14,
1991, after the afore-mentioned Decision in LRC No. TG-373 became final 5 but not before it ordered,
on February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case No. 500 (GLRO Record No. 55072) applied for by Manuel
A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that petitioner
Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun
Corporation's name.
Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Regional Trial Court,
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that
Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the properties
she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas, who died on April 15, 1946 and
that her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject
property in the concept of owner for more than thirty years before they applied for its registration
under the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida
Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale
and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her claims, she also listed a number of
irregularities in the documents to prove actual fraud. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, she
claimed that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant,
occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the Land Registration
Authority such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As a result, an order of
general default was issued and Maguesun Corporation's application for registration was granted.
She charged Maguesun Corporation's with knowledge or authorship of the fraud owing to the fact
that the Maguesun Corporation's president, Manolita Guevarra Sunatay after whom the corporation
was named, was her niece. Manolita Suntay is the daughter of Lourdes Guevarra Suntay, a
deceased cousin of petitioner Vda. de Roxas who used to help with the lather's business affairs.
Manolita Suntay used to take care of the registration and insurance of the latter' s cars. 6
The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial court after the pre-trial, was whether or not Vda.
de Roxas' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication in favor of
Zenaida Melliza were forged. 7 Petitioner, who was then already 92 years of age, testified in open court
on February 11, 1992 that she has never met Zenaida Melliza, that she did not sell the subject lots and
that her signatures on the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were forged. 8 A document
examiner from the Philippine National Police (PNP) concluded that there was no forgery. 9 Upon
petitioner's motion, the signatures were re-examined by another expert from National Bureau of
Investigation. The latter testified that the signatures on the questioned and sample documents
were not written by the same person. 10 Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial

court dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration April 15, 1992. 11 Placing greater weight on
the findings and testimony of the PNP document examiner, it concluded that the questioned documents
were not forged and if they were, it was Zenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation, who was
responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud. The court further noted that
petitioner Mrs. Trinidad Roxas had not been paying taxes for several years, which fact "exhibited what
appeared to be unmistakeable signs of not actually owning (the lots) any more," and that her application
for registration was "previously dismissed and abandoned," thus indicating that "petitioner herself is aware
that she had already lost . . interest, if not actually her rights, over the property in question. 12

In a decision dated December 8, 1994, 13 respondent court denied the petition for review and affirmed
the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to and demonstrate that there
was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of
annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Additionally, respondent court stated that the
discrepancies or irregularities in the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed out by
petitioner are not patent or obvious, involve matters that are too trivial, requiring knowledge of the
intricacies of the law and are "not necessarily and exclusively indicia of extrinsic fraud and/or bad faith
especially when considered in the light of circumstances hereinafter discussed." The records also show,
according to the appellate court, that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court either the
existence of petitioner or any interest she may have had in the registration proceedings. Finally, the Court
of Appeals ruled that publication of the initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. 14
Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Maguesun Corporation had not commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the registration
decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's good faith. Petitioners
pray that the registration of the subject lots in the name of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that
said property be adjudicated in favor of petitioners and that respondent corporation pay moral
damages not less than P100,000.00, exemplary damages not less than P36,000.00 and attorney's
fees of P60,000.00.
We find the petition for review impressed with merit.
1. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which amended and codified laws relative to registration
of property. 15 Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the
decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court
after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party. 16 Absence,
minority or other disability of any person affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are
not considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a person deprived of land
or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is
recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening
and revising a decree of registration. 17 It is further required that a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree, that the petitioner has
a real and dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. 18
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional
deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact. 19 Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests

and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual design to
commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons. 20

Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent
acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were
or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from
having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a
fair submission of the controversy. 21 Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction
sued upon. 22
The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as
grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened and
reviewed. 23 In the oft-citedMacabingkil v. People's Homesite Housing Corporation case, the Court drew
from American jurisprudence stating that "relief has been granted on the ground that, by some fraud
practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, (and) that party has been
prevented from presenting all of his case to the court." 24 The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case
(Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional omission of fact required
by law. 25 For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon
which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. 26 Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the
original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration.
In Ramirez v. CA, 27 this Court adopted the Court of Appeals' ruling that the suppression of the fact that
the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield merely as antichretic creditors and the fraudulent
concealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any claim or interest in
the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and
intentional omission of applicants to disclose the facts of actual physical possession by another person
constitutes an allegation of actual fraud. 28 Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon
which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. 29
The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the
decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner.
Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted their name, or
that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject property. In the
corporation's application for registration filed with the trial court in LRC No. TG-373, the following
declaration appears:
6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of the
owners of all adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5
(mortgagors, encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the person shown on the plan
as claimants are as follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road
all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)

30

The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters of the
word "provincial" typed over correction fluid. Maguesun Corporation, however, annexed a
differently-worded application for the petition to review case (Civil Case No. TG-1183,
"Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation,
et al."). In the copy submitted to the trial court, the answer to the same number is as follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas. 31
The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word "Roxas" were indeed
erased and replaced with "Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)" in the original
application submitted in LRC No. TG-373 but the copy with the word "Roxas" was submitted
to the trial court in Civil Case No. TG-1183, it is reasonable to assume that the reason is to
mislead the court into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original application as an
adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the same application which formed
the basis for the Land Registration Authority in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section
15 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the full
names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known
and if not known, the extent of the search made to find them. Respondent corporation
likewise failed to comply with this requirement of law.
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property uninterruptedly through
their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. 32 Respondent Maguesun Corporation also declared in number 5 of the
same application that the subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family
caretaker resided in the subject property. Respondent corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge
of such possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the property,
knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas owned the property. It is reasonable to
expect her as a buyer to have inspected the property prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the
current possessors or occupants could have been made facilely. Respondent corporation's intentional
concealment and representation of petitioner's interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and
claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration. Through
such misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving their
property, thus effectively depriving them of their day in court.
2. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court
either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas or any interest she may have in the
registration proceedings for the records are replete with references by Maguesun Corporation itself
to petitioner. 33 Mention of the late President's name as well as that of petitioner was made principally in
the Formal Offer of Exhibits for respondent corporation, in a Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and 7239, tax
declarations and as predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what the law
requires to be stated in the application for registration. Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest,
occupation and possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for
registration, otherwise, the persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will,
therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or claims.
3. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official Gazette and in the Record
Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general circulation. The Court of Appeals held that
pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly states that "the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and

once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Provided, however, that the publication
in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. . . ."
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court,
publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement.
Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as
wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an adverse interest in the land subject of the
registration proceedings may be notified thereof. 34Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the
fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant in
assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.
4. The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in the documentary, as well as in the testimonial
evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial to this case, compelled the Court to undertake a
careful review of the facts of the case. 35 A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to
the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof
of respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution and preparation of the forged
instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the "innocent
purchaser for value" who merits the protection of the law.
In response to the questions fielded by the trial court and by counsel for petitioner, PNP Document
Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all the differences pointed out in the questioned
signatures and in the sample signatures as having been caused merely by "natural variation." 36 He
concluded that the questioned signatures were not forged. In contrast, Chief of the Questioned
Documents Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, Arcadio Ramos, testified with more specificity
as befits an expert that the questioned and sample signatures were not written by one and the same
person because of "(t)he manner of execution of strokes; the personalized proportional characteristics of
letters; the linking/connecting between letters; the structural pattern of letters and other minute
details . . . 37 Moreover, petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas categorically declared that she has
never met Zenaida Melliza and did not sell the subject property. 38 Petitioner, then over ninety years old,
has no motive to attest to a falsehood. Petitioner and her family also own several other pieces of property,
some of which are leased out as restaurants, e.g. Leo's Restaurant and Ma Mon Luk Restaurant. 39 This
is an indication that petitioner is not unaware of the value of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely that
indication that she would sell over thirteen thousand square meters of prime property in Tagaytay City to a
stranger for a measly P200,000.00 Finally, even to a layman's eye, the documents, as well as the
enlarged photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal forgery. The questioned signatures taken from the
Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in several
documents executed by petitioner. The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded and have none of
the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures characteristic of the penmanship of elderly
persons.
There are also added considerations reflective of the dubious character of the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication purportedly executed by petitioner. 40 In it she declares that she is a resident of 22 8th
Street, New Manila, Quezon City, when she actually lives in 2 Park Road, North Forbes Park, Makati. She
also states that she is the "sole heir of the late Manuel De Roxas who died sometime on the year 1944 at
Manila." Petitioner's husband is President Manuel A. Roxas and she refers to herself as Trinidad de
Leon vda. de Roxas. President Roxas was survived by petitioner and their two children, Ma. Rosario
Roxas and Gerardo Roxas (who predeceased petitioner). The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir
was known to the general public, as well as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while
delivering a speech at Clark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have
been ignored. If petitioner did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why she should state facts
other than the unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family.

Additionally, Zenaida Melliza's non-appearance raises doubt as to her existence. Her given address
was Matina, Davao City. How was she related to petitioner and what led her to purchase the
subject? Respondent corporation could very well have presented her to prove the legitimacy of their
transaction. If petitioner were selling said property, would she not have offered them first to
interested relatives such as Manolita G. Suntay? Would an ordinary person sell more than thirteen
thousand square meters of prime property for P170,000.00 when it was earlier purchased for
P200,000.00? These questions highlight several implausibilities in the alleged sale of the subject
property by herein petitioner. As Maguesun Corporation's President who is related to petitioner,
Manolita G. Suntay should have verified the sale of the subject property by Zenaida Melliza.
Manolita G. Suntay's closeness to petitioner Vda. de Roxas, as one who even registered the latter's
car, suggests acquaintance with the late petitioner's properties as well as the possibility that she took
advantage of such knowledge.
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack its possession to that of
petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza conveyed not title over the subject parcels of
land to Maguesun Corporation as she was not the owner thereof. 41 Maguesun Corporation is thus not
entitled to the registration decree which the trial court granted in its decision. Palpably, petitioner has not
been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession
in the concept of an owner over the subject lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She
therefore retains title proper and sufficient for original registration over the two parcels of land in question
pursuant to Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. 42
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management &
Development Corporation, et al.") promulgated on December 8, 1994 is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of land, described in Plan AS04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and 10,674 square meters, respectively,
as shown and supported by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the
Records of LRC No. TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas and
her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners. Upon finality of this Decision, the Land Registration
Authority is hereby directed to ISSUE with reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of
registration and certificate of title pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 100995 September 14, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELFINA S. DOLOR, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Leopoldo C. Nagera, Jr. for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 10 August 1988, private respondent Delfina S. Dolor filed an application before the Regional Trial
Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, for the confirmation and registration of her title to a 908-square
meter residential lot located at the interior of Dencio Cabanela Street, Poblacion, Daet, Camarines
Norte, described on Plan Ccn-05-000025 and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 005-0823.
On 25 November 1988, when the case was called for initial hearing, the Fiscal entered his
appearance on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Delfina S. Dolor moved
that an order of general default be issued against the whole world except petitioner which had filed
an opposition. On the same date, the trial court issued an order, stating:
When this case was called for initial hearing today, only the Fiscal in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines interposed an opposition to the application.
Applicant, thru counsel, prayed for the issuance of an order of general default against
the whole world with the exception of the Republic of the Philippines represented by
the Fiscal.
It appearing from the record that the jurisdictional requirements have been complied
with and there being no private oppositor to the application, the reception of evidence
is hereby delegated to the Branch Clerk of Court who is required to render a report
within twenty (20) days from the date of hearing which is hereby set on Dec. 20,
1988 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. 1
At the hearing on 20 December 1988, respondent Dolor's counsel marked as Exhibits "A" to "D,"
respectively, the Notice of Initial Hearing, the Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing

in the Official Gazette, the Affidavit of Publication of the Editor of the "Weekly Informer," and the
Certification or Return of Posting by the Deputy Sheriff.
Satisfied that respondent Dolor had a registerable title over subject property the trial court in its
decision of 17 August 1989 confirmed her title thereto and ordered its registration as her exclusive
property. 2
Petitioner assailed the trial court's decision before the Court of Appeals on a purely jurisdictional
ground. Petitioner argued that it was incumbent upon respondent Dolor to show proof that on or
before the date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988, there had been compliance with the
requirements specified by Sec. 23 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration
Decree, to wit:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days
from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from
the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the
time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall
cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; Provided, however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest
in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known,
and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all
persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to
show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted . .
..
The records show that while the trial court stated that the jurisdictional requirements were
complied with on 25 November 1988, they were yet to be presented on 20 December 1988
before its Branch Clerk, the designated Commissioner.
In its decision dated 16 July 1991, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. 3 It found
petitioner's submission not only too formalistic but also contrary to the facts and the law and in derogation
of substantial justice, rationalizing thus
We find that the requirements of Sec. 23 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 have been complied with in the instant case. The record shows that the
Notice of Initial Hearing set on November 25, 1988, issued by the Administrator,
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (Exh. "A") had been
published in the September 10, 1988 issue of the "Weekly Informer" (Exh. "C") and in
Volume 84, No. 42 of the Official Gazette issue of October 17, 1988 (Exh. "B"), and
posted in the prescribed conspicuous places in the subject parcel of land the

municipal building of Daet, Camarines Norte by the Sheriff (Exh. "D"). The
documents attesting to the compliance with Sec. 23 of PD 1529 were attached to the
record even before the date of the initial hearing of the instant Land Registration
Case No. N-678 . . . .
The appellant claims that while the presiding judge of the trial court stated that "the
jurisdictional requirements have been complied with" on November 25, 1988, the
jurisdictional requirements have yet to be presented on December 20, 1988 before
the Branch Clerk of Court, the designated Commissioner. Hence, appellant argues,
the Order of November 25, 1988 had no basis in fact and in law; there was no notice
to interested persons adjoining owners, and the whole world; and jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case has not yet been conferred with the court on November 25,
1988.
We cannot agree. The jurisdiction is not conferred by the marking of the relevant
documents as exhibits, but by the fact that all the requirements of Sec. 23, PD 1529
had been complied with as shown by those documents proving compliance
therewith, identified later as Exhibits "A" to "D," which were all attached to the
records of the case even before November 25, 1988. The trial court is not precluded
from taking cognizance of its own record. Although in actual practice, it is incumbent
upon the applicant's counsel to mark those documents as exhibits at the initial
hearing to prove the jurisdictional facts, the omission of such markings by applicant's
counsel who might have been as yet unfamiliar with such practice would not deprive
the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear and proceed with the trial of the case, for the
simple reason that the jurisdictional requirements have been complied with as shown
by the documents that were already attached to the record of the case and of which
the trial court can take judicial notice. The failure of the Fiscal as well as the
Presiding Judge to have called the attention of the counsel for the applicant to
proceed with the marking of the documents to prove the jurisdictional facts would not
have deprived the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Neither
would the marking of those documents later after the initial hearing deprive the trial
court of its jurisdiction. 4
In this petition, while petitioner concedes that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case is not
conferred by the marking of the relevant documents as exhibits but, rather, by the fact that all the
jurisdictional requirements of law had been carried out, yet, it takes exception to the factual finding
that there was compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. As borne out by the records, at the
scheduled date of initial hearing on 25 November 1988 and even during the actual hearing on 20
December 1988, the publication requirement in the Official Gazette was yet to be complied with.
Although the Notice of Initial Hearing was included for publication in the 17 October 1988 issue of
the Official Gazette, specifically Vol. 84, No. 42, thereof, the same was however released for
publication only on 31 January 1989, as shown by the Certification of Publication issued by the
Director of the National Printing Office. 5 In other words, the actual publication of the notice came out
sixty-seven (67) days after the scheduled initial hearing and/or forty-two (42) days after private
respondent had rested her case. Petitioner concludes that the late publication did not vest jurisdiction in
the trial court.
In petitioner's brief filed before respondent Court of Appeals, we note that the issue of late
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette was raised squarely. But for no

apparent reason, the issue was ignored in the questioned decision. Indeed, respondent court could
have easily resolved the issue in favor of petitioner supported as it was not only by competent
evidence but also by ample jurisprudence.
The primary legal principle against which the legality of all the proceedings conducted by the trial
court should be tested is jurisdiction. In order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction, the
provision of the law in point should be inquired into. 6 Section 23 of P.D. 1529 explicitly provides that
before the court can act on the application for land registration, the public shall be given notice of the
initial hearing thereof by means of publication, mailing, and posting. InDirector of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, 7 citing Caltex v. CIR, 8, this Court ruled that in all cases where the authority of the courts to
proceed
is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory it must be strictly
complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. So that where there is a defect of publication of
petition, such defect deprives the court of jurisdiction. 9 And when the court lacks jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a case, the same lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects. 10
In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, 11 an issue similar to the one presented in the
present petition was posed, that is, whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the
Official Gazette forty-seven (47) days afterthe hearing, instead of at least thirty (30) days prior to the date
of hearing, 12 was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the petition. We
answered in the negative since the purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution
in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is
minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for
hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the
case.
Regarding applications for land registration, the purpose of publication of the notice of initial hearing
is the same: to require all persons concerned who may have any rights or interests in the property
applied for to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the application should
not be granted. In particular, the notice in this case commanded all persons concerned:
. . . to appear before this Court at its session to be held at Branch XXXVIII,
Municipality of Daet, Province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, on the 25th day of
November, 1988, at 8:30 o'clock in the forenoon, then and there to present such
claims as you may have to said land or any portion thereof, and to submit evidence
in support of such claims, and unless you appear at said Court at the time and place
aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the land will be adjudicated
and determined in accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and
thereafter you will forever be barred from contesting said application (or petition) or
any decree entered thereon 13 (Emphasis supplied).
Section 23 of P.D. 1529 does not provide a period within which the notice should be published in the
Official Gazette but for reasons already obvious, the publication should precede the date of initial
hearing. While there is no dispute that the notice was included in Vol. 84, No. 42, 17 October 1988
issue of the Official Gazette, this particular issue was released for publication only on 31 January
1989 when the initial hearing was already a fait accompli. The point of reference in establishing lack
of jurisdiction of the trial court was 31 January 1989 because it was only on that date when the
notice was made known to the people in general. 14 Verily, the late publication of the notice defeated the
purpose for its existence thereby reducing it to a mere pro forma notice.

By reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the proceedings conducted by the trial court
which culminated in its decision granting the prayer of respondent Dolor are declared VOID and it
was error for respondent Court of Appeals to have sustained the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, is VACATED and
SET ASIDE, and the application of private respondent for the confirmation and registration of her title
over the property described therein is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168155

February 15, 2007

HEIRS OF MARINA C. REGALADO AND HEIRS OF ARNULFO C. REGALADO, REPRESENTED

BY AMADEO C. REGALADO, Petitioners,
vs.
EPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Marina Regalado (Marina) filed on July 14, 1987 an application for registration of a parcel of land
situated in Sitio Balubad, Barrio Nangka, Marikina, Metro Manila which was surveyed and recorded
as Psu-3907 (the property).1
The application, docketed as LRC Case No. 10916 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig,
was published on November 14, 1988 in the Official Gazette and on November 28, 1988 in Nueva
Era, a newspaper of general circulation.2
Marina subsequently filed on January 18, 1991 a motion to withdraw the application without
prejudice to the refiling of the same, citing as grounds
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. . . the discrepancies on the question of the survey and accession number corresponding to the
survey plan of the property, the question thereof not being indubitable and to allow the Bureau of
Lands time to examine its records; and for another compelling reason was the inevitable absence of
applicant from the country to arrange and assist in the intestate estate of her late widowed sister
whose children [were] all minors in London.3
The motion to withdraw the application was granted on February 28, 1991.
On March 17, 1992, Marina filed a petition to reinstate the earlier application which was withdrawn.
The court denied the petition on a technical ground.4
On May 6, 1992, Marina filed another application for land registration before the Pasig RTC.
Marina later filed on May 28, 1992 an "Amended Application for Registration" 5 alleging, inter alia, that
she had "by herself or through her predecessor-in-interest . . . been in open, continuous and

notorious possession and occupation of said land which is alienable and disposable of [sic] the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 or earlier"; 6 and that she acquired
the land "by virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated January 3, 1977 executed by the registered
claimant Tomas Antero as Assignor"7 in her favor.
The application was docketed as LRC Case No. R-4633, but was re-numbered as LRC No. N11237.8
To the Amended Application, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed an opposition on March 15,
1994, it claiming to be the owner of the property which it referred to as the "Balubad Nangka Project"
and which had been declared as an Area for Priority Development under Proclamation No. 1967
dated May 14, 1980.9
Acting on the Amended Application, a "Notice of Initial Hearing" 10 scheduled on June 26, 1995 was
published in the May 22, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette 11 and in the June 22, 1995 issue
of Taliba.12 Copies of the "Notice of Initial Hearing" were sent to all adjoining owners, the persons
named therein with known addresses, and government agencies and offices concerned. 13
During the pendency of her application or on November 29, 1995, Marina died, hence, her counsel
filed on February 21, 1996 a "Motion to Substitute Applicant," alleging that her surviving heirs
designated Arnulfo Regalado, her eldest son, as the applicant to pursue and litigate the land
registration case in their behalf.14Branch 155 of the Pasig RTC granted the motion on April 30,
1996.15
On August 20, 1996, Arnulfo Regalado executed a Waiver of the "area covered by the National
Housing Authority [sic] without prejudice to the other land subject of the . . . petition."16 In the same
Waiver, he ceded, transferred, and waived 30,239 square meters of the property to the NHA. 17
Finding that "the possession of the substitute-applicant is open, continuous, adverse, against the
whole world, in the concept of owner, and under a bona fide claim of ownership" 18 and that "[t]he
property is not part of any forest zone nor of any aerial, military or naval reservations of the
government and is classified to be alienable and disposable,"19 Branch 155 of the Pasig RTC, by
Decision of August 12, 1997, ordered the registration of the property, except the portion which was
waived in favor of the NHA, pro indiviso in the name of the heirs of Marina (Bernardita R. Carino,
Amadeo C. Regalado, Ernesto C. Regalado, Elizabeth R. Cabading, Alberto C. Regalado, Milagros
R. Escalante, and Arnulfo C. Regalado).20
The Republic of the Philippines (the Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Notice of Appeal of the RTC decision.21
By Decision22 of February 10, 2004, the Court of Appeals found for the Republic in this wise:
We sustain the first argument raised by the Republic as to the discrepancy in the lot size and
technical descriptionbetween the original as published vis--vis that stated in the petition even after
the waiver of 30,239 square meters in favor of the NHA. It is notable too that there are differences
among the original technical descriptionsmade for Tomas Antero [who allegedly assigned the
property to Marina] (Exh. "Z"), that duly approved by the Bureau of Lands (Exh. "AA"), and also that
published in the Taliba (Exh. "F"), from the final technical description of the subject land in the
assailed Decision. This is a serious defect for the technical description sets the extent and

boundaries of the land to be registered, and so should be precise for purposes of identification,
delineation, and distinction, and notice to the public.23 (Underscoring supplied)
The appellate court thus dismissed the application for registration.
Their Motion for Reconsideration24 having been denied,25 Marinas heirs filed the instant
Petition26 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, faulting the Court of Appeals to have erred
I. . . . IN ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL OF THE REPUBLIC DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT
WAS NOT PARTY IN THE CASE AS IT HAD NOT FILED ANY OPPOSITION OR ANSWER
AGAINST THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO;
II. . . . IN FINDING THAT THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
APPLICATION FOR DECREE OF REGISTRATION OVER THE INSTANT CASE
III. . . . IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE THEIR REGISTERABLE
RIGHTS OVER THE SUBJECT LAND IN THE CASE AT BAR.27 (Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the heirs of Marina designated Amadeo Regalado as their attorney-in-fact to
pursue the application.28
The petition is devoid of merit.
The failure of the Republic to file any opposition or answer to the application for registration, despite
receipt of notice thereof,29 did not deprive its right to appeal the RTC decision.30
Relative to the allegation that the Director of Lands or that the government did not oppose the
application of herein respondent, as in fact on December 26, 1969 an order of general default was
issued by the court against the whole world, suffice it to say that as stated by this Court in Luciano v.
Esterella, 34 SCRA 769, "it is a well known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its
government, is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents." And, in
an earlier case, Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 211, "there was an
enunciation of such a principle in this wise: Thus did the lower court, as pointed out by the then
Solicitor General, conclude that the government was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at
by the national treasurer and the auditor general. It would consider estoppel as applicable. That is
not the law. Estoppel does not lie."31 (Underscoring supplied)
Respecting the finding of the appellate court on the "discrepancy" in the lot size and technical
descriptionsmentioned in the earlier-quoted portion of its decision, the heirs contend that "[w]hat
appears, after a careful comparison of the approved survey plan (Exh. Z), and that republished [sic]
with Taliba (Exh. F) and the Official Gazette (Exhibit CC), were simple clerical errors and minor
discrepancies which do not substantially alter the technical description of the subject
property as published by the Land Registration Authority in theOfficial Gazette (Exh. CC) and
that by petitioner with the Taliba (Exh. F)."32
Petitioners conclude that any such discrepancy "was unsubstantial and did not in any way affect
the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court."

Petitioners contention fail in light of the following clear pronouncement of this Court in Fewkes v.
Vasquez,33 viz:
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act, an application for registration of land is required to
contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and
address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all
adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is
set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the
location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in the
Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is
considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases,
for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by
the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such
notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all persons concerned, who may have any
rights or interests in the property, to come forward and show to the court why the application for
registration thereof is not to be granted.
It must be remembered that the application in this case filed in the court below was for registration,
not of the big parcel of land (Lot No. 1383, Pls-764-D or Lot no. 21), but of certain portions thereof
designated by applicant-appellant as Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B. It is the technical description of
these 2 smaller lots, therefore, that must be published in order that the persons who may be
affected by their registration may be notified thereof. For, considering that the adjoining owners of
Lot No. 21 would not be the same as the owners of the properties adjoining Lots Nos. 21-A and 21B, the notification of the adjoining owners of the big lot would not be the notice to the adjoining
owners or occupants of the smaller lots required by law. In short, it is the publication of the specific
boundaries of Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B that would actually put the interested parties on notice of the
registration proceeding, and would confer authority on the land registration court to pass upon
the issue of the registerability of said lots in favor of the applicant.34 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Marinas heirs invoke Benin v. Tuason,35 synthesizing its ruling as follows, quoted verbatim:
"An slight increase in area registered over the area contained in the application is not fatal to the
decree of registration." "Registration Court has no jurisdiction only in so far as areas not covered by
original application are added." Also, "Amendment to application for registration need not be
published anew if merely excludes portions covered by the original application. 36 (Underscoring
supplied)
It is not the lot or property size alone, however, in which the appellate court found a discrepancy.
More importantly, it found discrepancy in the technical descriptions of the property appearing in the
different documents material to the resolution of the Amended Application for registration.
IN ANY EVENT, Marinas heirs as applicants in this land registration case "bear the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain."37 This they failed to discharge.
In another vein, while the heirs claim that Tomas Antero assigned the property to Marina by a Deed
of Assignment, no proof was presented that Tomas Antero had possessed the same in the concept

of an owner. That the property was surveyed for Tomas Antero38 does not prove his
ownership.39 Marinas heirs themselves admit, in their petition filed before this Court, the doubtful
nature of Tomas Anteros title to the property, thus:
It is worth pointing out that the very reason why the previous owner Tomas Antero of the subject lot
failed to secure the corresponding Tax Declaration was because of the apparent hesitation of then
Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila to issue the same, contending that it considered the same as
part of the public domain. That attitude of the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila could be readily
gleaned from the very Tax Declaration No. B-0069187 issued to petitioner Marina C. Regalado, the
specific portion thereof is quoted, to wit:
NOTE:
It is believed that the land covered by this declaration form [sic] part of the public domain and was
assessed upon the insistence of the declarant and upon compliance with Article 5-E of the
Assessment Regulation No. 3-75.40(Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)
Other than Marinas uncorroborated testimony given in a previous attempt to have the property
registered, there is no proof to sustain the trial courts finding that Marina, her uncle, aunt, and other
relatives have been residing in the property for more than 30 years and that she herself had been
residing there for 15 years when Tomas Antero executed the deed of assignment in her favor.41
Marinas admission that she does not know the name of the public road traversing the
property42 belies her claim that she resided therein for 15 years. At most, the evidence indicates that
Marina possessed and occupied a small portion of the property, while some 600 other parties
possessed and occupied the rest.43
As for the tax declaration in the name of Marina,44 it is not conclusive proof of ownership. While it is a
good indication of possession in the concept of owner,45 delayed declaration of property for tax
purposes negates
a claim of continuous, exclusive, and interrupted possession in the concept of an owner.46
In the case at bar, Marina claimed that the property was assigned to her as early as 1977, yet she
only declared it for tax purposes in 1988,47 following her first attempt to have the land registered on
July 14, 1987.48
And, there is no proof that Marina religiously paid taxes on the property. In fact, in her testimony, she
twice stated that she intended to pay taxes only if and when ordered to do so by the court. 49 The
photocopies of Tax Receipt Nos. 7436713 and 7436714 annexed to the motion for reconsideration
filed by Marinas heirs before the Court of Appeals cannot be appreciated in their favor. On top of
being mere photocopies, they were not offered in evidence before the trial court. To consider them at
the appeal stage would deny the other parties the right to rebut them. 50
In fine, the trial courts finding that Marina had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession in
the concept of owner and under a bona fide claim of ownership51 fails. The reversal by the appellate
court of the trial courts decision must thus be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

JOHN M. MILLER and EMILIO ESPINOSA, JR., applicants-appellees, v. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
ET AL., oppositors; ANSELMO IRENEA, ARTURO DE LA CRUZ, DOMINADOR MANGCAO, LUCAS
FRANCISCO, CIPRIANO SEQUILLO, PEDRO TAGALOG, PONCIANO GARCIA, RODOLFO DE DIOS, ET
AL., private oppositors-appellants.
A.P. Mayor & C.P. Mayor for private oppositors-appellants.
E. Espinosa, Jr. & J. Ma. Francisco for applicants-appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; REQUIREMENT OF VERIFYING OPPOSITION; WAIVED BY APPLICANTS

PROCEEDING WITH TRIAL WITHOUT OBJECTION. Where the applicants for registration of land proceeded
with the trial, presented evidence and rested their case, without objecting to the unverified oppositions, and
only after the first witness of the private oppositors had testified and applicants counsel had crossexamined him, was lack of verification brought up, it is held that the applicants had failed to invoke the
requirement of verification under Sec. 34 of Art 496 seasonably, and that by that time the applicants had
waived the said defect.
2. ID.; ID.; UNVERIFIED OPPOSITIONS SUFFICIENT TO CONFER STANDING IN COURT. Unverified
oppositions in land registration proceedings are sufficient to confer standing in court to oppositors, who may
be allowed to verify their oppositions, especially where said defect is deemed waived by the applicants
failure to invoke said requirement seasonably.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate which after survey, appeared to contain 411 hectares as per
plan PSU-143798 was applied for registration in the Court of First Instance of Masbate on June 18, 1956 by
John M. Miller and Emilio Espinosa, Jr.
After notice and publication, initial hearing was held on June 20, 1957. The Director of Lands and Bureau of
Public Highways filed written oppositions. Thirty-five individuals appeared and expressed verbal oppositions.
All persons, except the abovementioned oppositors, were declared in default on July 8, 1957.
On July 24, 1958 applicants started presenting evidence and the private oppositors were given five days to
file written opposition (Tsn., p. 5). Of the 35 oppositors 28 filed written but unverified opposition on July 29,
1958. On August 20, 1958 applicants finished adducing evidence and rested their case.
On August 27, 1958 the private oppositors presented their first witness. After his cross-examination, counsel
for applicants called the courts attention to the lack of verification in the opposition filed by the private
oppositors and moved to dismiss the same.
The private oppositors offered to verify their opposition. After parties had filed memoranda, the court issued
an order on January 13, 1959 dismissing the unverified opposition, without pronouncement as to costs (Rec.
on App., p. 26). Motion for reconsideration was denied by order dated November 18, 1959. The private
oppositors have appealed from both orders.
The requirement of verifying oppositions in land registration proceedings is based on Sec. 34 of Act 496
"Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file an answer on or
before the return day, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all
the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and
apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf."
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Applicants failed to invoke this provision seasonably. Without objecting to the unverified opposition, they
proceeded with the trial, presented evidence and rested their case. Only after the first witness of the private
oppositors had testified and applicants counsel had cross-examined him, was the defect of lack of
verification brought up. By that time, applicants had waived the defect
"An objection to A want of verification must be seasonably made. . . . The objection must be taken before
trial . . . The question cannot properly be raised by an objection to the introduction of evidence.
x

"Lack of, or defect in the verification of a pleading may be waived by the adverse partys failure to make a
proper and timely objection thereto . . . Where a party proceeds with the case as though his adversarys
pleading were verified, he waives the lack of verification of such pleading.
x

"The act of . . . proceeding to trial on the merits without objection, is generally a waiver of all uncertainties,
ambiguities, irregularities, formal defects, or faults or defects of any kind in the pleadings of the adverse
party.
x

"By . . . going to trial without objection, . . . a party may waive the right to urge that his adversarys
pleading is not subscribed or verified . . ." (46 G. J. S. 1120, 1129, 1133, 1137.)
Applicants contend that the defect could not be waived because it resulted in the private oppositors lack of
standing in the case from the start.
This Court has already held unverified oppositions sufficient to confer standing in court to oppositors. In
Malagum v. Pablo, 46 Phil. 19, a written opposition not made under oath was dismissed by the lower court.
When oppositors sought from this Court mandamus to have their opposition reinstated, this Court denied
the same for the reason that petitioners "had appeared in the case, had therefore standing in court, and the
order excluding their answer was in effect a final determination of their rights" so that appeal and not
mandamus was their proper remedy.
In Nicolas v. Director of Lands and Camungao, L-19147-8, December 28, 1963, the lower court dismissed a
petition for review of its judgment adjudicating the land to an applicant, filed by an oppositor who was not
notified of the hearing, for the reason that
"In the first place, the opposition filed by him was not a valid opposition because it was not sworn to as
required by the Land Registration Act. It was simply a written appearance. In other words, he failed to file
his answer in due form."
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On appeal this Court held

"The written appearance with opposition presented by petitioner herein, on November 7, 1951 (R.A.) was a
valid one, and sufficient to give him legal standing in court and would entitle him to notice, as a matter of
right. The lower court erred in choosing to ignore the written appearance with opposition, which was a
substantial compliance with the law, that requires a formal answer."
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For purposes of record, the private oppositors should be allowed, as they had requested, to verify their
opposition because, in any event, the supposed defect is deemed waived.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are set aside and the case is remanded to the court a quo for further
proceeding, without cots. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.