Agapay vs Palang

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan

on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the
wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950.
The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel
attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for
good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone
in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with
19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier,
they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at
Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was
likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina
executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named
Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon
Carlinas complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and
her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to
get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan
allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with
petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA
reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot
should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.

HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of
Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because
of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties
acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution
shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective
contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution.
If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in
the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store.
However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually
contributed money to but the subjected riceland. When the
land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old
compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a
pensioner of the US Government.
Considering his
youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the
P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify
the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the

Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal

partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to
donate their conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation
of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment
when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was
not specifically for separation of property and should not be so
inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public
who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property
revealed the falshood of Erlindas claim that she bought such
property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer
testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price
and directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a
donation and which was clearly void and inexistent by express
provision of the law because it was made between persons
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.
Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides
that the prohibition against donation between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better
than those in legal union.

MALLILIN JR. V CASTILLO

FACTS:
Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective
marriage still subsisted. During their union, they set up
Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business
flourished and the couple acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely in Castillo's name. Due
to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed
a complaint for partition and/or payment of Co-ownership
share, accounting and damages against Castillo. Castillo, in
her answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between
them because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules
on co-ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man
and a woman living together as husband and wife but not
married, they are not capacitated to marry each other because
of their valid subsisting marriage. She claimed to be the
exclusive owner of all real and personal properties involved in
Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that they were
acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely
in her name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

Facts:
RULING:
Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even
though they are incapacitated to marry each other. Article 144
of the Civil Code does not cover parties living in an adulterous
relationship. Their property regime falls under Article 148 of the
Family Code where co-ownership is limited, properties
acquired by them through their joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof
to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.

Spo4 santiago cario married susan nicdao in 1969 without

marriage license. They had two children. He then married
susan yee on november 10 1992, with whom he had no
children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back
in 1982.
He passed away on november 23 1992. The two susans filed
with the rtc of quezon city the claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various

Both parties were already married when they

cohabited together. During the relationship
they established a business enterprise and
by
reason
thereof
acquired
several
properties. The properties however, were all
registered in the name of Castillo. When they
decided to end the relationship, Mallilin
demanded for his share in the properties
they acquired during the cohabitation.
Castillo countered that Article 144 of the Civil
Code cannot be applied as the same covers
only properties acquired by a man and a
woman living together as husband and wife
but not married or under a void marriage. In
their case, their union suffered the legal
impediment of a prior subsisting marriage.
SC: Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides
for a limited co-ownership in cases where the
parties in union are incapacitated to marry
each other. - It applies as all but one property
were acquired after the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the
property acquired under the regime of the
New Civil Code, then it should be excluded.
The legal relation of the parties is already
specifically covered by Article 148 of the
Family Code under which all properties
acquired out of their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall
constitute a co-ownership. -Co-ownership is a
form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee
for the other. -A trust relation already inheres
in a co-ownership.

government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of p146,000

while yee received a total of p21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money
acquired by nicdao, collectively denominated as "death
benefits." yee admitted that her marriage with the spo4 took
place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage between nicdao and
the spo4. She however claimed that she became aware of the
previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of yee. Nicdao appealed to
the ca, which the ca affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not yee can claim half the amount acquired by
nicdao.
Ruling:
No. Sc held that the marriage between yee and cario falls
under the article 148 of the family code, which refers to the
property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages,
adulterous or concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the spo4 as a police
officer as her marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy.
She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the
deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.

NICDAO CARIO VS YEE CARIO

Hence, they are not owned in common by yee and the

deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and yee has no

right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession,

the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal
heirs. And, yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between nicdao
and spo4 is null and void due to absence of a valid marriage
license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased
even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-

capacitated and not barred by any

impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless is void for other
reasons, like the absence of marriage
license. Conformably, even if the deceased
alone as a government employee earned the
disputed death benefits, Article 147
creates a co-ownership in respect thereto
entitling Nicdao to share one-half thereof as
there is no allegation of bad faith.

ownership in respect thereto, entitling nicdao to share one-half

of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first
marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits
and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by

ACINTO SAGUID vs. CA, RTC,

BRANCH
94,
BOAC,
MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY

intestate succession.

The marriage between yee and spo4 is likewise null and void
for the same has been solemnized without the judicial
declaration of the nullity of the marriage between nicdao and
spo4. Under article 40, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain
first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before
he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the

Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but

separated de facto from her husband, when she met and
cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the
couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year
cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for
Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she
be declared the sole owner of these personal properties
and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their house, be
reimbursed to her.

second marriage would be void. However, for purposes other

than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of
nullity is necessary.

February 2, 2001 - The nullity of the

marriage between Nicdao (the first wife) and
the deceased does not validate the second
marriage of Yee and the deceased Santiago
without the prior judicial declaration of nullity
of the previous marriage. - Considering that
the marriage between Yee and the deceased
is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of
previous marriage then presumed to be
valid, the application of Article 148 is
therefore in order. - As to the property
regime of Nicdao and the deceased, Article
147 of the Family Code governs. This Article
applies to unions of parties who are legally

ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the

parties

HELD:
it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not
capacitated to marry each other because the former was
validly married to another man at the time of her
cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime
therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code,
which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, and multiple alliances of the same
married man. Under this regime, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions Proof of actual contribution
is required.

Even if cohabitation commenced before family code,

article 148 applies because this provision was intended
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the
name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not
sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house
and personal properties of the parties. Private
respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed
P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However,
nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of
her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts
in her name for the purchase of construction materials.
While there is no question that both parties contributed
in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no
sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective
shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family
Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties
respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to
be equal.

June 10, 2003 -Under the property

regime governed by Art. 148 x x x x
only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective
contributions x x x x. Proof of actual
contribution is required. - In the case at
bar, nowhere in Ginas testimony did she
specify the extent of her contribution.
What appears in the record are receipts
in her name for the purchase of
construction materials on 11/17/95 and
12/23/95 in the amount of P11,413.00.
With respect to the disputed personal
properties both claimed that the money
used in the purchase thereof came partly
from their joint account. There is
however, no sufficient proof of the exact
amount of their respective shares in the
said account.

And pursuant to Article 148 of the Family

Code, in the absence of proof of extent of
the parties respective contribution, their
share shall be presumed to be equal.
Here, the disputed properties were
valued at P111,375.00, the existence and
value of which were not questioned by
Jacinto, hence, their share therein is
equivalent to , P55,687.50 each. And
on the basis of the evidence established,
the extent of Ginas co-ownership over
the disputed house is only up to the
amount of P11,413.00 her proven
contribution in the construction thereof.
-In Adriano vs. CA, the SC ruled that the
fact that the controverted property was
titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient
proof of co-ownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of
the property.

LUPO ATIENZA vs. YOLANDA DE

CASTRO
Lupo, married and the president and
general manager of 2 corporations, hired
the services of Yolanda as accountant
thereof. The 2 became intimate and
eventually lived together and had 2
children. The relationship turned sour
and they parted ways. Lupo then filed a
petition for judicial partition involving a
parcel of land with improvements located
in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City. He
alleged that the property was acquired
during their union and hence, the
property is co-owned by them. He
claimed that the funds used in the
acquisition of the said property were his
exclusive funds and that the title was

transferred to Yolandas name alone was

done without his knowledge and consent.
And since the property was acquired in
1987, therefore Article 144 of the Civil
Code should be applied. That he is not
burdened to prove that he contributed to
the acquisition thereof because with or
without contribution by either partner, he
is deemed a co-owner of the subject
property. He added that Article 484 of the
Civil Code states that as long as the
property was acquired by either or both
of them during their extramarital union,
such property would be legally owned by
them in common and governed by the
rules on co-ownership, which shall apply
in default of contracts or special
provisions. SC: Here although the
adulterous relationship commenced in
1983, Article 148 of the Family Code
applies because this provision is intended
to fill up the hiatus/gap in Article 144 of
the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the
FC was enacted, there was no provision
governing property property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage.
Hence,
even
if
the
cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the FC took
effect, Article 148 of the FC governs.
Rather than presenting proof of his actual
contribution to the purchase used as
consideration for the property, Lupo
diverted the burden upon him to Yolanda
as a shrewd and scheming woman
without capacity to purchase any
property. Petitioners claim of ownership
is without basis because not only did he
fail to substantiate his allege contribution
but likewise the very trail of documents
pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary
proof redounds to the benefit of
respondent. In contrast, aside from his
mere say so and voluminous bank

records, which sadly finds no relevance in

this case, the petitioner failed to
overcome
his
burden
of
proof.
Respondent had sufficiently established
that she derived funds used to purchase
the property from her earnings, not only
as an accountant but also as a
businesswoman engaged in foreign
currency trading, money lending and
jewelry retail. She presented clientele
and
promissory
notes
evincing
substantial dealings with her clients, her
bank account statements and bank
transactions.

BORROMEO vs. DESCALLAR

Austrian Jambrich met and fell in love with
Descallar, a married but separated woman,
who was working as waitress at a local hotel
in Cebu City. She was earning P1,000.00 per
month and another P1,000.00 in the form of
tips. Subsequently, they bought 3 parcels of
land with a house constructed thereon. The
deed of sale originally included Jambrich as
buyer but because of the refusal of the
Register of Deeds to register the property in
Jambrichs name on the ground that a
foreigner could not acquire alienable lands of
public domain they erased his name but not
his signatures appearing in all pages of the
document. Jambrich and Descallar however,
separated. Subsequently, Jambrich incurred
debts and to pay the obligation, he sold his
rights and interest in the property that is now
registered in Descallars name in favor of his
creditor. Is the sale made by Jambrich valid?
SC: The transfer of land from Agro-Macro
Development Corporation to Jambrich could
have been declared invalid if challenged, had
not Jambrich conveyed the property to
Borromeo. Citing United Church of Christ vs.
Sebastian,
the
Court
reiterated
the
consistent ruling that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a

Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is

considered cured and the title of the
transferee is considered valid.

FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent
Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love and live
together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute
Deed of Sale was issued in their names. However, when
the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for
registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich
was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the
public domain. Consequently, his name was erased but
his signature remained and the property was issued on
the name of the Respondent alone. However their
relationship did not last long and they found new love.

Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in

business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum of
money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his
properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when
the Petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment
it found out that said land was registered in the name of
Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent for recovery of real property.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties

in question and may not transfer and assign any rights
and interest in favor of the petitioner?
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the
name of respondents make his the owner thereof.

RULINGS:

1. The evidence clearly shows that as between

respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the
properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the
properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to

purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the

house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in
question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of
Absolute
Sale because of
legal constraints.
Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale
where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all
authority to transfer all his rights, interest and
participation over the subject properties to petitioner by
virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that
the disputed properties were acquired during the couples
cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of
co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to
marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar,
respondent was still legally married to another when she
and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous
relationship and no co-ownership exists between the
parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove
his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.

2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of

acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the
existence with notice to the world at large. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner
of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has
the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner.

LAVADIA VS HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA

Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married
Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot seven children,
including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty.
Luna and his wife agreed to live separately as husband
and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation
and Property Settlement whereby they agreed to live
separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On
January 2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of
his marriage with Eugenia from the Dominican Republic.
On the same day, he married Soledad.
In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several
other lawyers. The new law office thru Atty. Luna
obtained a condominium unit which they bought on an
installment basis. After full payment, the condominium
title was registered in the names of the lawyers with proindivisio shares. When the law office was dissolved, the
condominium title was still registered in the names of the
owners, with Atty. Lunas share fixed at 25/100. Atty.

Luna established a new law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz.

After Atty. Lunas death in 1997, his share in the
condominium unit, his law books and furniture were
taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage. His
25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to
Atty. Dela Cruz.
Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint against
the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him, the properties
were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their
marriage, and because they had no children, 3/4 of the
property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net
estate, and the other half bequeathed to her in a last will
and testament of Atty. Luna.
The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties
to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage, except
for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned
over to her.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by awarding all
the properties, including the law books to the heirs of
Atty. Luna from the first marriage.
In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida
alleged that the CA erred in holding that the Agreement
For Separation and Property Settlement between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia (the first wife) is ineffectual, hence the
conjugal property was not dissolved.

In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered it by

way of determining whether the divorce decree between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who
among the contending parties were entitled to the
properties left behind by Atty. Luna.
The Supreme Court:
The divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void:
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing
abroad.Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have been the void and the
voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration
of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the
marriage.
No judicial approval of the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement:
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains governed
their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil
Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage,
did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the
event that they had not entered into any marriage
settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article
119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community
of property, or upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad was bigamous, and
void from the very beginning, hence, their property
relations is governed by the rules on co-ownership:
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the
Civil Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a

second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.[23] A
bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being
bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership,
conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership
carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To
establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative
for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions
in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of coownership, without sufficient and competent evidence,
would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court
explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of coownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to
the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis
because they failed to substantiate their allegation that
they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed
properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled
that the fact that the controverted property was titled in
the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is
not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence of
ownership of the properties subject of the case, the
subject properties were awarded in favour of the heirs of
Atty. Luna from the first marriage.