G.R. No.

93828 December 11, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SANTIAGO EVARISTO and NOLI CARILLO, accused-appellants.

PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires, Cavite, * in Criminal
Case No. NC-267, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo," finding
the accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
accordingly sentencing them to the penalty of life imprisonment.
The information indicting the accused-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the appellants) reads:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses SANTIAGO EVARISTO AND
NOLI CARILLO of the crime of VIOLATION of P.D. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd. day of August 1988, in the Municipality of Mendez,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused being private persons not authorized by law did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously manufacture, repair and kept (sic) in their
possession, custody and control one (1) caliber 38 revolver (paltik) with two live
ammunition and one (1) empty shell of said caliber, two (2) 12 gauge home made
shot guns, one (1) caliber 22 revolver (sumpak) and two (2) vise grips and one (1)
plier use (sic) in the manufacture and repair of said firearms without any permit or
license from competent (sic) authority.
CONTRATRY (sic) TO LAW.
Cavite City, August 30, 1988. 1
Appellants having entered a plead of not guilty, trial thereupon commenced, with the prosecution and
the defense presenting their respective witnesses and evidence to support their divergent versions
of the events leading to the arrest of the appellants.
A careful review of the records and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, Sgt. Eladio
Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of the Philippine Constabulary, indicates that on the day in
question, a contingent composed of Romeroso and Vallarta, together with a Sgt. Daniel Maligaya,
also of the Philippine Constabulary, and two (2) members of the Integrated National Police, were on
routine patrol duty in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At or about 5:50 in the afternoon, successive
bursts of gunfire were heard in the vicinity. Proceeding to the approximate source of the same, they
came upon one Barequiel Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air.

Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo prompting the lawmen to
pursue him. Upon approaching the immediate perimeter of the house, specifically a cement
pavement or porch leading to the same, the patrol chanced upon the slightly inebriated appellants,
Evaristo and Carillo. Inquiring as to the whereabouts of Rosillo, the police patrol members were told
that he had already escaped through a window of the house. Sgt. Vallarta immediately observed a
noticeable bulge around the waist of Carillo who, upon being frisked, admitted the same to be a .38
revolver. After ascertaining that Carillo was neither a member of the military nor had a valid license
to possess the said firearm, the gun was confiscated and Carillo invited for questioning.
As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo's permission to scour
through the house, which was granted. In the sala, he found, not Rosillo, but a number of firearms
and paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and manufacture of firearms, all of which,
thereafter, became the basis for the present indictment against Evaristo.
For their part, the appellants dispute the above narration of the events in question, alleging that they
were forcibly taken into custody by the police officers and even subjected to physical and mental
indignities. They denied ownership or knowledge of any of the firearms presented in evidence,
contending that these were purposely planted in their possession by the prosecution witnesses and
other police authorities.
After evaluation of all the evidence, the trial court rendered the now-assailed decision dated 18 April
1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, for having possessed firearms in violation of P.D. No. 1866, accused
Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo are hereby sentenced to serve the penalty
provided for under Sec. 1 thereof. The full period of their preventive imprisonment
shall be deducted from the aforementioned penalty.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. 2
Hence, this petition, assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. The lower court gravely erred in admitting Exhibits "B" to "F" in evidence
considering that those are illegally seized evidence;
2. The lower court gravely erred in finding that said illegally seized evidence are
firearms as contemplated in Presidential Decree No. 1866; and
3. The lower court gravely erred in giving credence to the arresting officer's
testimonies which are patently contradictory and half truths (sic) testimonies. 3
First, on the issue of illegal search. The pertinent rule on the matter is Article III of the Constitution,
the relevant portion of which provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) . . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
It is to be noted that what the above constitutional provisions prohibit are unreasonable searches
and seizures. For a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search
warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must
be supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has
recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among
these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view, adopted by this jurisdiction from the
pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Harris vs. U.S. 4 and Coolidge vs. New
Hampshire. 5 Thus, it is recognized that objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced in
evidence. 6
The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo
to enter his house. The officer's purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge
therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the
house, thereby rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent and even accidental.
With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains the validly of the
firearm's seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on authorized warrantless arrests.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

For purposes of the present case, the second circumstance by which a warrantless arrest may be
undertaken is applicable. For, as disclosed by the records, the peace officers, while on patrol, heard
bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to investigate the matter. This incident may well be within the
"offense" envisioned by par. 5 (b) of Rule 113, Rules of Court. As the Court held in People of the
Philippines v. Sucro, 7 "an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at
a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE
SCENE THEREOF." 8
The next inquiry is addressed to the existence of personal knowledge on the part of the peace officer
of facts pointing to the person to be arrested as the perpetrator of the offense. Again, reference to
the records resolves said query. Giving chase to Rosillo, the peace officers came upon the two (2)
appellants who were then asked concerning Rosillo's whereabouts. At that point, Sgt. Vallarta
discerned the bulge on the waist of Carillo. This visual observation along with the earlier report of
gunfire, as well as the peace officer's professional instincts, are more than sufficient to pass the test
of the Rules. Consequently, under the facts, the firearm taken from Carillo can be said to have been
seized incidental to a lawful and valid arrest.
The next area to be addressed is the allegation of the appellants that the statute's coverage does not
extend to firearms that are not functional or serviceable. The Court does not agree.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 penalizes "any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, orpossess any firearms, PART OF FIREARM, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." 9 It is clear that the law
makes no distinction as to serviceable or functional firearms. Indeed, the possession of even a part of a
firearm is sufficient to come within the prohibitive ambit of the statute. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus.
Lastly, the appellants challenge the veracity of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
maintaining that these were inconsistent with each other, thereby giving rise to the conclusion that
the entire incident was a contrivance on their part. Specifically, they point to the apparent conflict in
the statement of the prosecution witnesses that there were only three (3) individuals in the vicinity
(aside from the peace officers) as opposed to the testimony of another peace officer, testifying as a
hostile witness, that aside from the appellants, and Rosillo, there were also other people in the
vicinity, such as Evaristo's mother, brother and other farmers.
The Court sees no such conflict. A recourse to the trial court proceedings easily shows that the two
(2) prosecution witnesses, Sgt. Romerosa and CIC Vallarta, testified in a straightforward and candid
manner, categorically identifying the appellants as the two (2) individuals they had apprehended and
clearly narrating the circumstances of such apprehension. The defense has given no possible
reason or motivation for these peace officers to make false accusations against the appellants.
Absent the presentation of such defense evidence, the testimony of the peace officers should
deserve full credence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court of Trece Martires, Cavite in Criminal Case No. NC-267
finding the accused Santiago Evaristo and Noel Carillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Illegal
Possession of Firearms as defined in Presidential Decree No. 1866, is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and other incidental paraphernalia found in the
possession of the appellants, in favor of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to be disposed of in
accordance with law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S
RIGHTS (ULAP),petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
COMMAND, respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional
and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner
Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association
whose members are all members of the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the
purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing
an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the
benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at
dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan,

was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint
along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner
Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was
stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to
make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has
been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military
indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other
rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's
Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege
that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. 5
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without
a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure,
is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right
against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings
in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all
of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions

which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is howeverreasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a
review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints
was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police
Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 86218. September 18, 1992.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELSIE BAGISTA y BANGCO, AccusedAppellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE;
RULE. The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be
subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a
search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Art. III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in
violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
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2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE, AN EXCEPTION. The constitutional proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a
lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of
evidence in plain view. With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground
that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle
is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as
long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search
that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had
probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the
confidential information they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same
appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have
probable cause to search accused-appellants belongings since she fits the description given by the NARCOM
informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during

the course of said search is admissible againstAccused-Appellant.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE; RULE AND
EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt.
Parajas, that the bag containing the dried marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellants possession.
She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was actually taken from the luggage carrier
above the passenger seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what actually
happened at the checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-appellants
apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the defense. In situations like this, the matter of assigning
values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because, unlike appellate courts,
they can weigh such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the
trial. The exception is when the trial court has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result, which We do not find in the instant case.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR DISCREPANCIES; CASE AT BAR. As to the alleged
discrepancies in the prosecutions case, such as the color of the stripes of the bag which contained the
marijuana and whether the items seized from accused-appellant were marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit
tops, these are minor in character and do not detract from the prosecutions case since it was shown by the
Receipt of Property Seized, which was signed by accused-appellant, that these were the very items taken
from her at the time of her arrest.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

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1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE;
RULE; SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLE AS AN EXCEPTION; REQUIRES PROBABLE CAUSE; NOT PRESENT IN
CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the accused on the basis alone
of an information they received that a woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and 52" or 53" in
height would be transporting marijuana. The extensive search was indiscriminately made on all the
baggages of all passengers of the bus where the accused was riding, whether male or female, and whether
or not their physical appearance answered the description of the suspect as described in the alleged
information. If there really was such an information, as claimed by the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing
thought why they had to search the baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags of those who appeared
to answer the description of the woman suspected of carrying marijuana. Moreover, the accused was not at
all acting suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched her bag, where they allegedly found the
marijuana. From the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the NARCOM agents were only
fishing for evidence when they searched the baggages of all the passengers, including that of the accused.
They had no probable cause to reasonably believe that the accused was the woman carrying marijuana
alluded to in the information they allegedly received. Thus, the warrantless search made on the personal
effects of herein accused on the basis of mere information, without more, is to my mind bereft of probable
cause and therefore, null and void. It follows that the marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless
search was inadmissible in evidence.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

Appeal by accused-appellant Elsie Bagista from the decision dated September 26, 1988 of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P20,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 oclock in the morning, the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio City, received
information from one of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly
hair, and with a height of 52" or 53", would be transporting marijuana from up north. 1 Acting upon this
piece of information, Sgt. Oscar Parajas testified that he, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a civilian NARCOM agent
proceeded to Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet. Upon arriving at said location at around 11:00 oclock that
same morning, they established a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both private and public, coming

from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana leaves on board. 2
After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and
body number 428, which came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and
thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to the passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they were
going to search their baggages. Sgt. Parajas then proceeded to the rear of the bus while Sgt. Fider began
inspecting the bags in the front. 3
While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right side (as one is facing the
driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt.
Parajas inspected the bag and discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by assorted
clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought
to the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was booked and investigated. The woman was then identified
as Accused-Appellant. 5 The confiscated bundles were subjected to laboratory examination, and found
positive for marijuana. 6
Accused-appellants defense rests solely on denial. She claimed that she was engaged in the buying and
selling of vegetables, particularly cabbages. On the day in question, she boarded the Dangwa Tranco bus at
Abatan, Benguet, bringing with her ten (10) sacks of cabbages which she intended to sell to a certain Maria
Opino in Baguio City. While inside the bus, she approached the conductor for her ticket to cover the fare for
her sacks of cabbages, but was told by the latter that he would attend to her later.
When the bus reached Tublay, Benguet, it was stopped by the NARCOM agents who boarded the same and
began inspecting the baggages of the passengers. Accused-appellant claimed that the bag containing the
marijuana was taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger seats. When nobody admitted owning
the bag, the NARCOM agent approached her, took the shoulder bag on her lap, and asked her to come with
them for investigation as she fits the description of the would-be transporter of the marijuana given by the
NARCOM informer. She denied having anything to do with the marijuana found on the bus.
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To corroborate her story, Accused-appellant presented the conductor of the Dangwa Tranco bus, Nestor
Yangkin. He testified that when the NARCOM agents boarded the bus at Tublay, Benguet, one of them got a
bag from the luggage carrier, opened it, and smelled the contents. The agent then asked the passengers
who among them owned the bag; when nobody answered, he walked to the back of the bus, all the time
looking at the faces of the passengers. When the agent approached accused-appellant, who was seated at
the rear of the bus, the former talked to her, then escorted her out of the bus. 7
During Yangkins cross-examination, it came out that the 10 sacks of vegetables that were loaded at Abatan
were brought by a man who told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival at the Dangwa
Station in Baguio City but that the owner of the sacks would be riding in the bus. And yet, Yangkin did not
seek out the alleged owner of the sacks. The witness also testified that none of the passengers approached
him and offered to pay for the fare of the sacks, 8 contrary to accused-appellants testimony.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court found the testimony of Sgt. Parajas credible. Said the court a
quo:
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". . . The testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas was direct and straightforward as he gave all the requisite details
of the entrapment operation they conducted based on an information provided by a coordinating individual.
His testimony reveals that the bag containing the marijuana leaves was found on the lap of the accused.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that Sgt. Parajas was moved by any motive than simply the
carrying out of his official mission or duty. Where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the
principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not
so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit (People v. Francia, L-69253, September 30,
1987, 154 SCRA 495)." 9
The trial court brushed aside the defenses observation that there were discrepancies between the testimony
of Sgt. Parajas and the evidence presented, such as the color of the bag allegedly taken from accusedappellant and the kind of marijuana taken from the bag, as immaterial. Similarly brushed aside was the
defenses contention that the evidence against accused-appellant, such as the Receipt of Property Seized 10
and her signature thereon, 11 and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report 12 and her signature thereon, 13
were inadmissible due to the absence of counsel, since these were not confessions or extra-judicial
statements.

Finally, the trial court did not give credence to the testimonies of accused-appellant and her witness Nestor
Yangkin, in view of the testimony of Sgt. Parajas that he took the bag containing the marijuana from
accused-appellants lap. Moreover, the court a quo observed that there was a discrepancy between the
testimonies of accused-appellant and Yangkin on the matter of the 10 sacks of cabbage, which led the court
to conclude that the former was in the act of transporting marijuana at the time of her arrest.
Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the marijuana leaves found in the bag
taken from her was inadmissible in evidence as it was the product of a warrantless search, which motion
was denied by the trial court for lack of merit on November 22, 1988.
chanroble s.com:cralaw:red

Aggrieved, Accused-appellant filed the instant appeal, alleging that the court a quo erred (1) in not finding
the warrantless search conducted by the NARCOM agents as illegal and unconstitutional, and (2) in
admitting the illegally obtained evidences and convicting her on the basis of said evidences.
Accused-appellant is in error.
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected
to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search
warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 14 The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right
shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside
from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle,
15 and the seizure of evidence in plain view. 16
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. 17
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality
or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. 18
The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the
north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular
informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing
marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to search accused-appellants belongings since
she fits the description given by the NARCOM informant.
Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the course
of said search is admissible against Accused-Appellant.
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-appellant in the court below on the inadmissibility of the
evidence against her on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. This amounts to a
waiver of the objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained
therefrom. 19 Amid a waiver, the court is duty bound to admit the evidence. 20
Reviewing the evidence, We find the same sufficient to prove accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag containing

the dried marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellants possession.

She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was actually taken from the luggage carrier
above the passenger seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have two opposing versions of what actually
happened at the checkpoint in Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-appellants
apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the defense. In situations like this, the matter of assigning
values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts because, unlike appellate courts,
they can weigh such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the
trial. 21 The exception is when the trial court has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result, 22 which We do not find in the instant case.
Moreover, Accused-appellants defense was weakened by the fact that her witness Nestor Yangkin
contradicted her on the matter of the 10 sacks of vegetables appellant claims to have brought with her at
the time of her arrest. Appellant claims she loaded the sacks of vegetables on the bus and tried to pay for its
fare, but that conductor Yangkin, put her off. Yangkin claims otherwise: the sacks of vegetables were loaded
by a man who told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival in Baguio City, and that no one
on the bus offered to pay for the same.
cralawnad

In weighing contrary declarations and statements, greater weight must generally be given to the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than the denials of the Accused-Appellant. 23
Given the discrepancy on this point, the trial court correctly disregarded the corroborative testimony of
Nestor Yangkin. The matter of the ownership of the 10 sacks of vegetables is material since appellants
reason for being on the bus was to deliver these sacks to Baguio City. If the sacks of vegetables are not
hers, then the only conclusion that can be drawn is that she was on her way to Baguio City to sell the
marijuana found in her possession.
As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecutions case, such as the color of the stripes of the bag which
contained the marijuana and whether the items seized from accused-appellant were marijuana leaves or
marijuana fruit tops, these are minor in character and do not detract from the prosecutions case since it
was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized, 24 which was signed by accused-appellant, that these were
the very items taken from her at the time of her arrest.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested,
tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was
high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2Later, the information was
amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and
likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a
motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers
absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against
the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25,
1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to
him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of
what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she
conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator
hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still
handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have
been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock
room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to
have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo
for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin
testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of
his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other,
although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not
even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who
had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their
credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face
and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal
record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accusedappellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a
medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been
set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his
release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he
was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this
point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest
of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that
they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the
time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a
third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting
team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the
coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we
have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June
25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the
coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days
before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the
activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of
Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of
information, maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the
person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel
Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo
with marijuana was received by you many days before you received
the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days
before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that
minnudin was coming?

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was

coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the
information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his
activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act
of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was
mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23,
1984, you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel
Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search
of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield
positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you
do not need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the
PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws
and not of men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant
as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses,
it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest
and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team,
had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of
what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from
the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to

return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights
guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional
presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as
the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution
must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial
court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree,
to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because
there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed
by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual
in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accusedappellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding
the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing her to serve the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P 20,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the accused alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without
being lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly
transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the
purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)
The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's
evidence as follows:
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following document and
testimonial evidence as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of
suspected marijuana dried leaves weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25,
1981; "B" plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana contained in the plastic container; "B-1a"another plastic container; "C"Chemistry Report No. D-668-81;"C-1" Findings:
Positive for marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs of
accused with Pat. Daniel Obia and Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"
Victory Liner Ticket No. 84977;"G"Sworn Statement of Pat. Daniel Obia, "H"
Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V.
Galindo;"H-1"date of of the request; "L"Certificate of Field Test dated July 22,
1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional Wrapping paper; and the testimonies of witnesses
of the prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obio, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco,
Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.
Theresa Ann Bugayong22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a resident of
1150 Sampaloc, Metro Manila testified that she received a request from the Task
Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City, dated July 25, 1981, on specimen marijuana
submitted for examination. The specimen consisted of 900 grams of suspected dried
marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a
marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").
The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. After her
examination, she prepared Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981
(Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She conducted three eliminations; microscopic examination,
the duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory examination of thin layer

chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo
Santiago, a representative of the CANU, Olongapo City.
The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obia, 37 years old, married,
policeman and residing at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obia
testified that he has been a member of the INP, since 1970 up to the present. He was
assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative. His job then was
among other things to follow up reports in their office, recover stolen items and
apprehend suspects. On July 21,1981, he was on Detached Service with the ANTINARCOTICS Unit; and that on that date, he came from Baguio City and arrived in
Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30
o'clock in the morning. He took the Victory Liner in going back to Olongapo City. His
family lives in Baguio City. On board the Victory Liner, he was seated on the second
seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same
bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the
back of the seat of Obia. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven
buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables. The act of the accused putting
her bag behind Pat. Obia's seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic)
nervous. With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the
woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to
go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of
the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain
camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He
could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the
ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that
there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached
Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline
Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina
intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as a policeman and told her
he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana
inside said bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at
home." However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right
hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the
police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the
presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obia, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio
Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana
weighing about one kilo. Witness stated that he could detect marijuana even before
the application of chemicals because of one year and a half assignment with the
CANU. After the marijuana was taken from the bag of the accused, photographs
were taken of the accused and the marijuana confiscated from her possession with
Pat. Obia and that of Investigator Tiongco, accused and himself Identified
photographs shown to him in open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness
was likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana contained in a plastic container (Exhs.
"B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as the one confiscated from the accused and

pointed to his initials on the newspaper wrapping which also shows the date and
time, although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be soiled already. The
marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated.
To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio
City to Olongapo City, witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was
confiscated from the accused and for Identification purposes, the witness presented
the body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the ticket which is "309" (Exhs.
"F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not pay his fare from Baguio City because
as a policeman, he used his badge and a free ride.
On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15,1981
and underwent treatment of his heart while he was there. He was given a furlough for
medical treatment. He stayed in Baguio City for about five days and returned to
Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21, 1981, witness never knew the
accused, and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when she boarded the same
Victory Liner he took. When the accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic
bag placed the bag right behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside
her seat. Witness Obia became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when
they reached San Fernando, Pampanga, after he checked the buri bag. The bus
stopped at said town to load some gasoline. Witness inserted one of his fingers
inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He confirmed his testimony on
direct that when witness confronted accused he was invited to go with her in order to
settle the matter to which he refused. Accused further testified that from the time the
accused placed her bag behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt so nervous and had
to take his medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was only after having taken his medicine
that his apprehension was contained and thus was able to insert his right hand inside
the buri bag in San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom of the
bag. He Identified his sworn statement regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981
which is Exhibit "G." Witness likewise Identified accused Anita Claudio in open court.
Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St., East Bajac
Bajac, Olongapo City, testified that as a policeman on the afternoon of July 21, 1981,
he was inside the Investigation Division of the Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty
Investigator, between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Pat.
Daniel Obia arrived at the Police Station with a woman and Identified her in the
courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat. Obia reported to him that he apprehended Anita
Claudio inside the Victory Liner bus for possession of marijuana dried leaves. The
marijuana leaves were contained in a buri bag with some vegetables such as camote
tops, bananas and some other vegetables. The marijuana was placed in a plastic
wrapper with the name National Book Store colored black and white. Witness
Identified the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained the markings of Pat. Obia
which are his initials, (Exhs. "B-2-a"), and numbers 210781 representing the date
which was placed by Pat. Obia after Cpl. Tiongco examined the suspected
marijuana.

After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables, he
interviewed apprehending officer Obia and reduced his statements in writing. Cpl.
Tiongco Identifled the sworn statement of Obia (Exh. "G"). He also interviewed
accused Anita Claudio who was all the while inside the Investigation room seated on
a chair. After appraising her of her constitutional rights, he asked the accused
whether she was willing to give her written statements to which the accused refused.
Hence, no statements were taken of her. However, pictures were taken inside the
investigation room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series which were already previously Identified
by Pat. Obia, Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures as that of Pat.
Obia and the accused and also of himself. Thereafter, the marijuana contained in
the plastic bag were turned over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio was detained.
Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba Street, East
Tapinac, Olongapo City, testified he was since March 1972 a policeman and was
stationed at Police Station 21, Olongapo City, Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he
was already assigned to the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On July 22,
1981, he reported for work at the CANU and received from Lt. Galindo more than a
kilo of suspected marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt. Galindo he conducted
a field test on this marijuana which he received from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a
request signed by him dated July 22,1981 (Exh. "H").
In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen, he prepared a
Certificate of Fleld Test dated July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test
indicated the presence of tetra-hydrocannabinol (THC), an active substance that can
be only be found in marijuana, a prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello Identified a plastic bag
of marijuana received from Lt. Galindo which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago,
the Evidence Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime
Laboratory.
The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years old, married,
residing at No. 27 Jones St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, a policeman of Olongapo
City, assigned with Police Station "21." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to
the present. In July, 1981, he was then assigned at the Patrol Division and his duty
was to patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.
He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was at the Caltex Gasoline Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City
along Rizal Avenue. He was then on duty patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at
the said place, he saw Pat. Obia alighted from the Victory Liner bus ordering
somebody to alight from the same bus. When he heard Pat. Obia he approached
him and asked him what was happening. Pat. Obia told him he apprehended a
certain woman possessing dried marijuana. The woman was still then inside the bus.
Pat. Obia then brought the woman to the police department who was bringing with
her a buri bag. They boarded a tricycle, the woman riding inside the tricycle while
Pat. Obia sat behind the driver. He then followed in his motorcycle the said tricycle
to police station. He went inside the Investigation Section of the Police Station and

he was there when Pat. Obia reported to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of the
woman possessing marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first time inside the
Investigation Section placed in a buri bag covered with newspaper. He witnessed the
taking out of the marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. Obia in the presence of Cpl.
Tiongco and the woman or the accused in this case, and himself. Policeman Bagang
Identified the accused in open Court. When asked about the nature of the marijuana
when it was brought out from the bag, he said that the marijuana was dried but not
well dried. Aside from the marijuana inside the buri bag, there were vegetables and
bananas, Witness Identified in open Court, the marijuana he saw found in the buri
bag of the accused. His means of Identification was the signature of Pat. Obia,
(Exh. "B-1"). He likewise Identified a newspaper wrapping which was already torn.
While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the accused's answer to
Cpl. Tiongco's questions that she was going to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He,
however, did not linger long at the investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana
and heard the answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongcos question the place of delivery
of the marijuana, he left the police station. Witness likewise Identified an initial DO21-07-81 already marked as Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial, and not a signature,
stands for Daniel Obia. After the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the prosecution
rested its case. (Rollo, pp. 42-47)
Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:
I
CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE
OR SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.
II
CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IF
THE ALLEGED BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.
III
APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS
WRONG BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT
CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT. (Rollo, p. 91)
The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep.
Act No. 6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.
The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs.The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty

thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug
involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs.
Therefore, she may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only
delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution and transportation of
probihited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not
err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.
The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the possessor is
unknown.
This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1 kilos of
marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259,
267) "the possession of such considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and
seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except
the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said marijuana.
The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as unlawful.
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:
.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (12a)
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obia did not need a
warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being

an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there
was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does not deny having
had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of
possession. In a complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence
against her were mere fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only
planted.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's
findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of
policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records
why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a
serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in
Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obia for no reason at all.
In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused
herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).
Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De
La Cruz,supra).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to
as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch
10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual
background of the case is as follows:

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of
the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a
late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country,
scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and
Plate number AVC 902.
1

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province,
for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs.
2

The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set
up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider
and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that
they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the
front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was
seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging
on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same
bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing
tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to
contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in
each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which
did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and
they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found
among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for
chemical analysis.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug
which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue
of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but
were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed
that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more
seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of
the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck
containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn
handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he
charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture
was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to
accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his
failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the
Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by
the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his
lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish
in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
3

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic
Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at
Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV
of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused
argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search
warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.
5

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
7

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.
8

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
10

11

12

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his
possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same
morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused,
that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the police authorities conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga,
against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some
informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was
apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
13

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made.
It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has
nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do
so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs
in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together
as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which
justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other
words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in
opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain
hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed
inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his
passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to
act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would
be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring and dissenting:
The ancient tradition that a man's home is his castle, safe from intrusion even by the king, has not
only found its niche in all our charters, from 1935 to the present; it has also received unvarying
recognition and acceptance in our case law. The present Constitution declares that
1

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

It further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of said right, among others, "shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
3

The rule is that no person may be subjected by the police or other government authority to a search
of his body, or his personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search
warrant or on the occasion of a legitimate arrest.
4

An arrest is legitimate, of course, if effected by virtue of a warrant of arrest. Even without a warrant,
an arrest may also be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person:
5

(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
In any of these instances of a lawful arrest, the person arrested "may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant." And it has been held that the search may extend to the area "within his immediate
control," i.e., the area from which said person arrested might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.
6

Apart from "search incidental to an arrest," a warrantless search has also been held to be proper in
cases of "search of a moving vehicle, and "seizure of evidence in plain view." This was the
pronouncement in Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267, 276, which drew attention
to Moreno v. Ago Chi; Alvero v. Dizon, Papa v. Mago, and an American precedent, Harris v. U.S.
8

10

11

12

13

If, on the other, a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those
justifying an arrest without warrant in accordance with law, supra, merely on suspicion that he is
engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it
is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof, as being "the fruit
of the poisonous tree. In that event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion,
is inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." But the right against an unreasonable search
and seizure may be waived by the person arrested, provided he knew of such right and knowingly
decided not to invoke it.
14

15

16

There is unanimity among the members of the Court upon the continuing validity of these
established principles. However, the Court is divided as regards the ultimate conclusions which may
properly be derived from the proven facts and consequently, the manner in which the principles just
cited should apply thereto.
The proofs of the prosecution and those of the defense are diametrically at odds. What is certain,
however, is that the soldiers had no warrant of arrest when they conducted a search of Malmstedt's

person and the things in his possession at the time. Indeed, the Court a quo acknowledged that the
soldiers could "not be expected to be armed with a warrant or arrest nor a search warrant everytime
they establish a temporary checkpoint . . . (and) no judge would issue them one considering that
searching questions have to be asked before a warrant could be issued." Equally plain is that prior to
the search, a warrantless arrest of Malmstedt could not validly have been in accordance with the
norms of the law. For Malmstedt had not committed, nor was he actually committing or attempting to
commit a crime, in the soldiers' presence, nor did said soldiers have personal and competent
knowledge that Malmstedt had in fact just committed a crime. All they had was a suspicion that
Malmstedt might have some prohibited drug on him or in his bags; all they had was, in the words of
the Trial Court, "the hope of intercepting any dangerous drug being transported," or, as the Office of
the Solicitor General asserts, "information that most of the buses coming . . . (from the Cordillera)
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs."
This case, is remarkably similar to Peo. v. Aminnudin, decided on July 6, 1988 also by the First
Division. There, Aminnudin was arrested without a warrant by PC officers as he was disembarking
from an inter-island vessel. The officers were waiting for him because he was, according to an
informer's report, then transporting marijuana. The search of Aminnudin's bag confirmed the
informer's report; the bag indeed contained marijuana. The Court nevertheless held that since the
PC officers had failed to procure a search warrant although they had sufficient time (two days) to do
so and therefore, the case presented no such urgency as to justify a warrantless search, the search
of Aminnudin's person and bag, the seizure of the marijuana and his subsequent arrest were illegal;
and the marijuana was inadmissible in evidence in the criminal action subsequently instituted against
Aminnudin for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
17

There are, on the other hand, other cases adjudicated by this Court in which apparently different
conclusions were reached. It is needful to devote a few words to them so that the relevant
constitutional and legal propositions are not misunderstood.
In People v. Claudio (decision promulgated on April 15, 1988), the accused boarded a "Victory
Liner" passenger bus going to Olongapo from Baguio City. She placed the plastic bag she was
carrying at the back of the seat then occupied by Obia, an INP member "on Detached Service with
the Anti-Narcotics Unit." This avowedly aroused Obia's suspicion, and at the first opportunity, and
without Claudio's knowledge, he surreptitiously looked into the plastic bag and noted that it
contained camote tops as well as a package, and that there emanated from the package the smell of
marijuana with which he had become familiar on account of his work. So when the bus stopped at
Sta. Rita, and Claudio alighted, Obia accosted her, showed her his ID, identified himself as a
policeman, and announced his intention to search her bag which he said contained marijuana
because of the distinctive odor detected by him. Ignoring her plea "Please go with me, let us
settle this at home" he brought her to the police headquarters., where examination of the package
in Claudio's bag confirmed his suspicion that it indeed contained marijuana. The Court held the
warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful, the search justified, and the evidence thus
discovered admissible in evidence against the accused.
18

In People v. Tangliben (decision promulgated on April 6, 1990), two police officers and a barangay
tanod were conducting a "surveillance mission" at the Victory Liner Terminal at San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, "aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors . . . (there)
but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information
supplied by informers; . . . they noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag . . who was acting
suspiciously;" they asked him to open the bag; the person did so only after they identified
themselves as peace officers; found in the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic weighing
one kilogram, more or less; the person was then taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando,
Pampanga, where he was investigated; and an information was thereafter filed against that person,
19

Tangliben, charging him with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425), as
amended. Upon these facts it was ruled, citing Claudio, supra, that there was a valid warrantless
arrest and a proper warrantless search incident thereto.
The facts in Tangliben were pronounced to be different from those in People v. Aminnudin, supra. "In
contrast" toAminnudin where the Court perceived no urgency as to preclude the application for and
obtention of a search warrant, it was declared that the Tangliben case
. . . presented urgency. . . (The evidence revealed) that there was an informer who pointed to
the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana . . . Faced with such on-the-spot information,
the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant .
. . To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal
possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robber, etc.
would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these
persons are associated.
In Tangliben, therefore, there was in the Court's view sufficient evidence on hand to enable the PC
officers to secure a search warrant, had there been time. But because there was actually no time to
get the warrant, and there were "on-the-spot" indications that Tangliben was then actually committing
a crime, the search of his person and his effects was considered valid.
Two other decisions presented substantially similar circumstance instances: Posadas v. C.A., et al.,
decided on August 2, 1990, and People v. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., decided on August 20, 1990.
20

21

In the first case, Posadas was seen to be acting suspiciously by two members of the INP, Davao
Metrodiscom, and when he was accosted by the two, who identified themselves as police officers, he
suddenly fled. He was pursued, overtaken and, notwithstanding his resistance, placed in custody.
The buri bag Posadas was then carrying was found to contain a revolver, for which he could produce
no license or authority to possess, four rounds of live ammunition, and a tear gas grenade. He was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and convicted after trial. This Court
affirmed Posadas' conviction, holding that there was, in the premises, probable cause for a search
without warrant, i.e., the appellant was acting suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag he
had with him at the time. The Court cited with approval the ruling of the U.S. Federal Supreme Court
in John W. Terry v. State of Ohio, a 1968 case, which the Solicitor General had invoked to justify the
search.
22

In the case of Maspil, et al., a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional Unit
of the Narcotics Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles
on the highway going towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report by
informers that Maspil and another person, Bagking, would be transporting a large quantity of
marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with the policemen manning the checkpoint. As
expected, at about 2 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney approached the
checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped the vehicle and saw
that on it were loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When opened, the sacks
and cans were seen to contain what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon
placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific
examination, were verified to be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus
conducted, as being incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest, and declared that, as in Tangliben,
supra, Maspil and Bagking had been caught in flagrante delicto transporting prohibited drugs at the
time of their arrest. Again, the Court took occasion to distinguish the case from Aminnudin in which,
as aforestated, it appeared that the police officers were aware of Aminnudin's identity, his projected
criminal enterprise and the vessel on which he would be arriving, and, equally as importantly, had
23

24

sufficient time and opportunity to obtain a search warrant. In the case of Maspil and Bagking, the
Court found that the officers concerned had no exact description of the vehicle the former would be
using to transport marijuana, and no inkling of the definite time of the suspects' arrival, and pointed
out that a jeepney on the road is not the same as a passenger boat on the high seas whose route
and time of arrival are more or less certain, and which ordinarily cannot deviate from or otherwise
alter its course, or select another destination.
25

The most recent decision treating of warrantless search and seizure appears to be People v. Lo Ho
Wing; et al., G.R. No. 88017, decided on January 21, 1991 (per Gancayco, J.). In that case, an
undercover or "deep penetration" agent, Tia, managed somehow to gain acceptance into a group of
suspected drug smugglers, which included Peter Lo and Lim Ching Huat. Tia accompanied Peter Lo
to Guangzhou, China, where he saw him and other person empty the contents of six (6) tins of tea
and replace them with white powder. On their return to Manila with the cans of substituted "tea," they
were met at the airport by Lim. As they were leaving the airport in separate vehicles, they were
intercepted by officers and operatives of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM), who had earlier been
tipped off by Tia, and placed under arrest. As search of the luggage brought in by Tia and Peter Lo,
loaded on the group's vehicles, quickly disclosed the six (6) tin cans containing fifty-six (56) bags of
white crystalline powder which, upon analysis, was identified as metamphetamine. Tia, Lo and Lim
were indicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Tia was discharged as state witness.
Lo and Lim were subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the questions
raised by them in this Court on appeal was whether the warrantless search of their vehicles and
personal effects was legal. The Court, citingManipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267
(1986), held legal the search of the appellants' moving vehicles and the seizure therefrom of the
dangerous drug, considering that there was intelligence information, including clandestine reports by
a planted spy actually participating in the activity, that the appellants were bringing prohibited drugs
into the country; that the requirement of obtaining a search warrant "borders on the impossible in the
case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one
place to another with impunity," and "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
26

27

In all five cases, Claudio, Tangliben, Posadas, Maspil, and Lo Ho Wing, facts existed which were
found by the Court as justifying warantless arrests. In Claudio, the arresting officer had secretly
ascertained that the woman he was arresting was in fact in possession of marijuana; he had
personally seen that her bag contained not only vegetables but also a package emitting the odor of
marijuana. In Tangliben, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, and had been
positively pointed to as carrying marijuana. And in both cases, the accused were about to board
passenger buses, making it urgent for the police officers concerned to take quick and decisive
action. In Posadas, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, too, and when
accosted had attempted to flee from the police officers. And in Maspil and Lo Ho Wing, there was
definite information of the precise identity of the persons engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at
a particular time and place.
Now, as regards the precise issue at hand, whether or not the facts in the case at bar make out a
legitimate instance of a warrantless search and seizure, there is, as earlier pointed out, a regrettable
divergence of views among the members of the Court.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that the appellant should be absolved
on reasonable doubt. There was in this case no confidential report from, or positive identification by
an informer; no attempt to flee; no bag or package emitting tell-tale odors; no other reasonably
persuasive indications that Malmstedt was at the time in process of perpetrating the offense for
which he was subsequently prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched Malmstedt's pouch and
the bags in his possession, they were simply "fishing" for evidence. It matters not that the search

disclosed that the bags contained prohibited substances, confirming their initial information and
suspicion. The search was not made by virtue of a warrant or as an incident of a lawful warrantless
arrest, i.e., under circumstances sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that some crime was
being or about to be committed, or adjust been committed. There was no intelligent and intentional
waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure. The search was therefore illegal,
since the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest of an individual before a search of his body
and his belongings may licitly be made. The process cannot be reversed, i.e., a search be first
undertaken, and then an arrest effected, on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search. An
arrest made in that case would be unlawful, and the search undertaken as an incident of such an
unlawful arrest, also unlawful.
The fact that when investigated at the headquarters of the Narcotic Command at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Malmstedt had, it is said, willingly admitted that there were was hashish inside the "teddy
bears" in the luggage found in his possession an admission subsequently confirmed by laboratory
examination does not help the cause of the prosecution one bit. Nothing in the record even
remotely suggests that Malmstedt was accorded the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all
persons under custodial investigation. He was not informed, prior to being interrogated, that he had
the "right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice," and that if he could not afford the services of counsel, he would be provided with one; not
does it appear at all that he waived those rights "in writing and in the presence of counsel." The
soldiers and the police officers simply went ahead with the investigation of Malmstedt, without
counsel. The admissions elicited from Malmstedt under these circumstances, as the Constitution
clearly states, are "inadmissible in evidence against him.
28

29

The prohibited drugs supposedly discovered in Malmstedt's bags, having been taken in violation of
the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are inadmissible against him
"for any purpose in any proceeding." Also pronounced as incompetent evidence against him are the
admissions supposedly made by him without his first being accorded the constitutional rights of
persons under custodial investigation. Without such object evidence and admissions, nothing
remains of the case against Malmstedt.
It may be conceded that, as the Trial Court points out, the evidence presented by Malmstedt in his
defense is feeble, unworthy of credence. This is beside the point; for conformably to the familiar
axiom, the State must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
The unfortunate fact is that although the existence of the hashish is an objective physical reality that
cannot but be conceded, there is in law no evidence to demonstrate with any degree of persuasion,
much less beyond reasonable doubt, that Malmstedt was engaged in a criminal activity. This is the
paradox created by the disregard of the applicable constitutional safeguards. The tangible benefit is
that the hashish in question has been correctly confiscated and thus effectively withdrawn from
private use.
What is here said should not by any means be taken as a disapproval or a disparagement of the
efforts of the police and military authorities to deter and detect offenses, whether they be possession
of and traffic in prohibited drugs, or some other. Those efforts obviously merit the support and
commendation of the Courts and indeed of every responsible citizen. But those efforts must take
account of the basic rights granted by the Constitution and the law to persons who may fall under
suspicion of engaging in criminal acts. Disregard of those rights may not be justified by the objective
of ferreting out and punishing crime, no matter how eminently desirable attainment of that objective
might be. Disregard of those rights, as this Court has earlier stressed, may result in the escape of
the guilty, and all because the "constable has blundered," rendering the evidence inadmissible even
if truthful or otherwise credible.
30

I therefore vote to reverse the Trial Court's judgment of October 12, 1989 and to acquit the appellant
on reasonable doubt.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his dissent, which I believe represents the correct application
to the facts of this case of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court on searches and
seizures. It is consistent with my ponencia in People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, and also with Alih
v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, the latter being a unanimous decision of the Court en banc, and my
dissents in Umil v. Ramos (on warrantless arrests, 187 SCRA 311, Valmonte v. De Villa (on
checkpoints), 178, SCRA 211, 185 SCRA 665, and Guazon v. De Villa (on "zonas"), 181 SCRA 623.
I write this separate opinion merely to remark on an observation made during the deliberation on this
case that some members of the Court seem to be coddling criminals instead of extending its
protection to society, which deserves our higher concern. The inference is that because of our wrong
priorities, criminals are being imprudently let free, to violate our laws again; and it is all our fault.
Believing myself to be among those alluded to, I will say without apology that I do not consider a
person a criminal, until he is convicted by final judgment after a fair trial by a competent and impartial
court. Until then, the Constitution bids us to presume him innocent. He may seem boorish or speak
crudely or sport tattoos or dress weirdly or otherwise fall short of our own standards of propriety and
decorum. None of these makes him a criminal although he may look like a criminal.
It is so easy to condemn a person on the basis of his appearance but it is also so wrong.
On the question before us, it seems to be the inclination of some judges to wink at an illegal search
and seizure as long as the suspect has been actually found in possession of a prohibited article That
fact will retroactively validate the violation of the Bill of Rights for after all, as they would rationalize,
the suspect is a criminal. What matters to them is the fact of illegal possession, not the fact of illegal
search and seizure.
This kind of thinking takes us back to the intolerant days of Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1,
which was discredited in Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, even before it was definitely rejected by
an express provision in the 1973 Constitution. That provision, which has been retained in the present
Constitution, again explicitly declares that any evidence illegally obtained "shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding."
The fruit of the poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison our system of criminal justice. In the
case at bar, the search was made at a checkpoint established for the preposterous reason that the
route was being used by marijuana dealers and on an individual who had something bulging at his
waist that excited the soldier's suspicion. Was that probable cause? The ponencia notes that the
military had advance information that a Caucasian was coming from the Sagada with prohibited
drugs in his possession. This is what the military says now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless
search. It is so easy to make such a claim, and I am surprised that the majority should readily accept
it.
1wphi1

The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced by the subsequent
discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's

suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of illegal possession that retroactively established the
probable cause that validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree
that washed clean the tree itself.
In Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, Justice Holmes said sixty-four years ago:
. . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available
evidence should be used. It is also desirable that the government should not itself foster and
pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it
pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay
them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of
disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that in the future it will pay for
the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.
1avvphi1

If by deterring the government from playing "an ignoble part," I am "coddling criminals," I welcome
the accusation and take pride in it. I would rather err in favor of the accused who is impaled with
outlawed evidence than exalt order at the price of liberty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SAGVAMAIJTE (at large), Accused, HECTOR
MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

As against a bustling city life, Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and
his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a country home not any near the
metropolis of Manila or its environs, but in the rugged and mountainous terrain of Tuba, Benguet.
Perhaps they thought they were in a veritable paradise, beyond the reach of worldly distractions and
trouble when in the early morning of 27 August 91, in the, sanctity of their own home, Horace was
brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Sufficient
prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victimsformer houseboy, as one of the
perpetrators of the That illusion was shattered ghastly crime.
As to Rene's co-conspirator, the, prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in the
information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries 1 filed on 19 November 1991 with
Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet at La Trinidad, Benguet.
Only Richard Malig was arrested On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of Richard Malig, the
prosecution filed a motion to amend the information 2 to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda
alias Putol because the evaluation Of the evidence subsequently submitted established his complicity in
the crime, and at the hearing of the motion the following day, the Prosecutor further asked that accused
Richard Malig be dropped from the information because further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no
sufficient evidence against him. 3

The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and
Maqueda were issued. Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992, and on 9 April 1992,
he filed an application for bail. 4 He categorically stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a
State witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this
case."
On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Informations 5 with only Salvamante and Maqueda
as the accused. Its accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 27th Of August, 1991, at Tagadi; Upper Tadiangan Municipality
of Tuba, Province Of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the, above-named accused, Conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, armed with lead pipes, and with intent of gain and
against the will and consent of the owners thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of Spouses TERESITA and WILLIAM
HORACE BARKER and with violence against and intimidation of the persons therein
ransack the place and take and carry away the following articles, to ,it:
[An enumeration and description of the articles follow]
all having a total value of TWO HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (P204.250.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to, the said Teresita
and William Horace Barker; that on the occasion and by reason of the said robbery;
both accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly strike Teresita Barker
and William Horace Barker with lead pipes on the different Parts of their body,
leading to the death of William Horace Barker and inflicting various physical injuries
on the former which required medical attendance for a period of more than thirty (30)
days and have likewise incapacitated her from the performance of her, customary
labor for the same period of time.
Contrary to Law.
Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial proceeded
entered a plea of not guilty on 22 April 1992. 6
In its decision 7 Promulgated on 31 August 1993, the trial Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical Injuries and sentenced him to Suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim, Teresita M, Barker in the amount of P50,000.00 for the
death of William Horace Barker, court found accused Hector P41,681,00 representing actual expenses,
P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs."
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie Dacara
and Julieta Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje, prosecutor
Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod
in its evidence in chief and Fredesminda Castrence and SP03 Armando Molleno on rebuttal.
Accused Hector Maqueda took the witness stand and presented SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his
evidence in chief and Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sour-rebuttal witness.

The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and meticulous summary
thereof, is as follows:
Between 10:30 and 11:00 pm. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and Teresita
Mendoza Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked, as washer wont, the main
doors of their house to see if they had been locked and bolted.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers
who shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the
door to the garage, went to the lavatory to wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she
opened the door of the toilet and switched. on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew
Salvamante very well because he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps of the Barkers
whom she and Julieta Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her on her
chores.
Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she Was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face
and she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she
identified at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the
garage and shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the house.
Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening
the door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with 'his right hand
brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters in front of her. At the trial, She pointed to, accused
Maqueda as the man she saw then. (She got scared and immediately closed the door. Since the
door knob turned as if someone was forcing his way into the room, she held on to it and shouted for
help.
The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of the room,
leaving behind her husband who was still asleep; She went down the Stairs and proceeded t, the
dining room. She saw Salvamante and a companion who was a complete stranger to her. Suddenly
the two rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipes. Despite her pleas to get what they want
and not to hurt her, they continued to beat her up until she lost consciousness. At the trial, she
pointed to accused Maqueda as Salvamante's companion.
Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at theback of her right hand. She fell
to the concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to-the garage and hid under the car. After
a few seconds, ,he went near the door of the garage and because she could not open it, she called
Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the door. When they saw
that the door knob was being turned, they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone
from entering. While locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr.
Barker: "That's enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and Julieta
heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs.
At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27 August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a
waiting shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from
the house of the Barkers. They saw two men approaching them from a curve. When the two men

reached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand and a
right hand with a missing thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right
shoulder
Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following
would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger
jeepney bound for Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed.
The two men bearded it, Mike again noticed that the taller man had the defects above mentioned
because the latter used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as
he bearded it. In the Investigation conducted by the Tuba Police, he identified through a picture the
shorter man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man.
At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered bough courage to leave the room where
they had earlier barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the gate of the
garage. In the dining room, they saw the Barkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and Julieta rushed
out of the house and ran to the place of Janet Albon to seek help. After requesting Janet to call the
police, they returned to the Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what they had seen earlier.
They just stayed near the road.
Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF) arrived. A team from the Baguio
City Police Station, headed by Police Officer Policarpio Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto
Micu of the City Health Department, also arrived. The team conducted an initial investigation only
because it found out that the scene of the crime was within the jurisdiction of the Tuba Police
Station, which, however, was difficult to get in touch with at that time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the
body of Mr. Barker inside the Barker house and Cambod prepared a sketch (Exhibit "JJ") showing its
location.' They went around the house and found a lead pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a black Tshirt (Exhibit "CC"), and a green hand towel (Exhibit "DD"). He also discovered another lead pipe
(Exhibit "BB") at the back of the door of the house. He then interviewed the two househelps who
provided him with descriptions of the assailants. The team then left, leaving behind BCF Security
Officer Glen Enriquez and a security guard. Cambod prepared a report of his initial investigation
(Exhibit "KK").
Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master's bedroom, he saw several pieces of
jewelry scattered on the floor and an empty inner cabinet. He noticed footprints at the back of the
house, particularly at the riprap wall, and observed that the grass below it was parted as if someone
had passed through and created a trail amidst the grass down toward the Asin road of Tuba,
Benguet. Upon his request, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent to the Barker house
to secure the premises. Enriquez then left after Dalit's arrival.
At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba Police Station arrived at theBarker house to
conduct their investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime was called by Dalit, returned to the
Barker house.
The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from the Barker house by the
Baguio City Police were first brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet, and then to the court.

The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian Road,
Baguio City, where it was examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje, MunicipalHealth Officer of Tuba,
Benguet. H, found in it twenty-seven injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt instrument,
determined the cause of death as hemorrhagic shock, and then issued a death certificate (Exhibits
"P," "O," and "R").
The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center
where she was treated and confined for eight days. The attending physician, Dr. Francisco L.
Hernandez, Jr., first saw her at around 11:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a comatose state.
Dr. Hernandez found that she sustained multiple lacerations primarily an the left side of the occipital
area, bleeding in the left ear, and bruises on the arm. One of the muscles adjoining her eyes was
paralyzed. She regained consciousness only after two days. Dr. Hernandez opined that Mrs.
Barker's injuries were caused by a blunt instrument, like a lead pipe, and concluded that if her
injuries had been left unattended, she would have died by noontime of 27 August 1991 due to
bleeding or hemorrhagic shock.
On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station, Benguet, came to the hospital
bed of Mrs. Barker, showed her pictures of several persons, and asked her to identify the persons
who had assaulted her. She pointed to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed
of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of the team that it was improper for them to
conduct it without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness.
Moreover, her eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and she had double
vision.
On 3 September 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated. Mrs. Barker was then discharged
from the hospital and upon getting home, tried to determine the items lost during the robbery. She
requested Glen Enriquez to get back the pieces of jewelry taken by the Tuba PNP (Exhibit "U"). The
Tuba PNP gave them to Enriquez (Exhibit "V"). Mrs. Barker discovered that her Canon camera, radio
cassette recorder (Exhibit "W-3"), and some pieces of jewelry (Exhibit "W-2") were missing. The
aggregate value of the missing items was P204,250.00. She then executed an affidavit on these
missing items (Exhibit "X.).
Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. It was revealed that she
sustained a damaged artery on her left eye which could cause blindness. she then sought treatment
at the St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital in New York (Exhibit "L") where she underwent an unsuccessful
operation. She likewise received treatment at the New York Medical Center (Exhibit "M").
On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the BCF, ordered Glen
Enriquez to go to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police in determining the,
whereabouts of accused Rene Salvamante. In Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to obtain information
from the barangay captain, Basilio Requeron, that he saw Salvamante together with a certain "Putol"
in September 1991; however, they already left the place.
On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, Melanie Mendoza, and three others went back to Guinyangan to
find out whether Salvamante and "Putol" had returned. Upon being informed by Barangay Captain

Requeron that the two had not, Enriquez requested Requeron to notify him immediately once
Salvamante or "Putol" returned to Guinyangan,
On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that Putol," who is none
other than accused Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo
Anagaran, Chief of the Tuba Police Station, together with another policeman, Proceeded to
Guinyangan. The Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then
brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail.
Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the. headquarters of the
235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj.
Virgilio F. Rendon, directed SP03 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and
according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter
signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at
the Barker house on 27 August 1991.
On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "GG6"). He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteeringto be a State witness in the above entitled
case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then
had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the company of
Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an affirmative
answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he,
Maqueda, was the only accused on trial (Exhibit "II").
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained
permission from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony.
Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a
peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at
the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his zeal purpose in going to Baguio City was
to rob the Barkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in the
kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with a
lead pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with
the lead pipe providedhim by Salvamante, After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in
beating up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. the Barkers were already unconscious
on the' floor, Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio
cassette and some pieces of jewelry.
Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then changed clothes, went out of the house, walked
toward the road where they Saw two persons from whom they asked directions, and when a
passenger jeepney stopped and they were informed by the two Persons that it was bound for Baguio
City, he and Salvamante bearded it. They alighted somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio City
and walked until they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they boarded a bus for
Manila. 8
Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. Hi, testimony is summarized by the
trial court in this wise:

Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the crime. He stated
that O" August 27, 1991 he was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense
located at Lot 1, Block 21 Posadas Bayview Subdivision, Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. He was employed as a caretaker Since July 5, 1991 and he worked
continuously there up to August 27, 1991, It was his sister, Myrna Katindig, who
found him the job as caretaker. A, caretaker, it was his duty to supervise the
employees in the factory and whenever his employer was not around, he was in
charge of the sales. He and his 8 co-employees all Sleep inside the factory.
On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not recall what he did
that day. He slept inside the factory that night and on August 27, 1991, he was
teaching the new employees how to make the seasoning for the polvoron.
On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan, Quezon Province as
it was his vacation time from his job at the polvoron factory. He was to be back at
work after New Year's Day in 1992. Upon alighting from the bus at Guinyangan,
Quezon, he saw accused Rene Salvamante. He knows accused Salvamante as they
were childhood playmates, having gone to the same elementary school. He had no
chance to talk to him that day when he saw him and so they just waved to each
other. He again saw accused Salvamante after Christmas day on the road beside
their (Salvamante) house. Salvamante invited him to go to Calauag, Quezon
Province and roam around. He agreed to go as he also wanted to visit his brother,
Jose Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos, Calauag, Quezon. When the two accused
were at Calauag, Salvamante asked Maqueda to accompany him /Salvamante) in
selling a cassette recorder which he said came from Baguio City. Accused Maqueda
knew that Salvamante worked in Baguio as the latter's mother told him about it. They
were able to sell the cassette recorder to Salvamante's aunt. They had their meal
and then went to visit accused Maqueda's brother. After that occasion, he never saw
accused Salvamante again. After his Christmas vacation, he went back to work a the
polvoron factory until February 29, 1992. One of his co-workers Roselyn Merca, who
was a townmate of his asked him to accompany her home as she was hard up in her
work at the factory. Hence, he accompanied Rosely home to Guinyangan, Quezon.
He was supposed to report back for work on March 2, 1992 but he was not able to as
he was arrested by members of the CAGFU at the house of Roselyn Merca when he
brought her home. He was then brought to the Guinyangan municipal jail, then to the
Tuba Police Station, Tuba, Benguet. There he was told to cooperate with the police in
arresting Salvamante so he would not stay long in the Province of Benguet. He was
also told that if he would point to accused Salvamante, he would be freed and he
could also become a state witness: He told them that he could attest to the fact that
he accompanied accused Salvamante in selling the cassette recorder.
On March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad,
Benguet where he has remained under detention up to the present. 9
The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castience
and SP03 Armando Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory where Maqueda worked,

testified that she started her business only on 30 August 1991 and thus it was impossible for her to
have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991. SP03 Molleno declared that he informed Maqueda of his
constitutional rights before Maqueda was investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and freely gave
his Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL"). 10
Although the trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses
Teresita Mendoza Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus disregarded their
testimonies on this matter, it decreed a conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus
delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence. It stated thus:
Since we have discarded the positive identification theory of the prosecution
pinpointing accused Maqueda as the culprit, can we still secure a conviction based
on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti as well as on circumstantial
evidence?
In order to establish the guilt of the accused through circumstantia1 evidence, the
following requisites must be present: 1) there must be more than One circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and 3) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
(People vs. Pajarit, G.R. No. 82770, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 678). There must
be an unbroken chain of circamstances which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the defendant to the exclusion of all Others, as the author of
the crime (People vs. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569).
The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tend to show the guilt of the
accused are:
1. A physical demonstration to which the accused and his counsel did not offer any
objection shows that despite his being handicapped, accused Maqueda could well
and easily grip a lead pipe and strike a cement post with such force that it produced
a resounding vibration. It is not farfetched then to conclude that accused Maqueda
could have easily beat Mr. Barker to death.
2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right after the incident in the
company of accused Salvamante was testified to by Mike Tabayan, the only
prosecution witness who noticed the defective hands of the accused. As they had to
ask for directions from the witness in the Tagalog dialect shows that they were
strangers to the place
3. Accused Maqueda knows or is familiar with accused Rene Salvamante as they
from the same town. By his own testimony, accused Maqueda has established that
he Salvamante are close friends to the point that they went out together during the
Christmas vacation in 1991 and he even accompanied Salvamante in selling the
black radio cassette recorder.

4. His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains this statement that he is willing
and volunteering to be State witness in the above-entitled case, it the accused in
appearing that he is the least guilty along This in effect, supports his extrajudicial
confession trade to the police at Although he claims that he did not his signature
would lean his as he was just told that release from detention, this is a flimsy excuse
which cannot Had he not understood what the motion meant, he could have easily
asked his sister and brother-in-law what it meant seeing that their signatures up
already affixed on the motion.
5. This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker house that
fateful morning and his even more damaging admission to Ray Dean Salvosa as to
what he actually did can be considered as another circumstance to already bloster
the increasing circumstances against the accused.
6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long Line of cases, alibi is at best a
weak defense and easy of fabrication (People vs. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020,
October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 712). For alibi to be given credence, it must not only
appear that the accused interposing the same was at some other place but also that
it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission (People vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992, 215 SCRA 247).
This defense easily crumbles down as Tayaban placed accused Maqueda at vicinity
of the crime scene.
The combination of all these circumstances plus extrajudicial confession produce the
needed proof beyond reasonable doubt that indeed accused Maqueda is guilty of the
crime. 11
The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit: "LL") of Maqueda
taken by SP02 Molleno immediately after Maqueda was arrested.
Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In his 14-page brief, he pleads that we acquit
him because the trial court committed this lone error:
. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 12
Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted to his arguments which are anchored
on his alibi that at the time the crime Was committed he was not in Benguet but in Sukat,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, ad the failure of the star witnesses for the Prosecution to identify him. He
alleges that Mrs. Barker, when investigated at the hospital, Pointed to Richard Malig as the
companion of Rene Salvamante, and that when initially investigated, the two housemaids gave a
description of Salvamante's companion that fitted Richard Malig.
We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi is unconvincing.

The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the
househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had ruled
that Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and the two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva,
were not able to positively identify Magueda, The trial court based his conviction on his extrajudicial
confession and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence. He should have
focused his attention and arguments on these.
From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession
the Sinumpaang Salaysay and an extrajudicial admission the, verbal admissions to Prosecutor
Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is
an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between. the
former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which
read as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in
criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment
of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 13 Wharton
distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case,
of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused,
direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof
of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than
a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in
itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the
ultimate fact of guilt. 14
And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient
for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken
without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already
benefited in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the
court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial investigation. Hence,
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
is not applicable, 15 i.e., the police investigation was " no longer within the ambit of a custodial
investigation." It heavily relied on People vs. Ayson 16 where this Court elucidated on the rights of a person
under custodial investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in court. The trial court went
on to state:
At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He
no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse
to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such
refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in
court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so. 17
The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested
under the aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its
execution. Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise, which
he failed to do and, hence, theSinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court
admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the
truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. It said:
In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth
but the tenor of the statement or the fact that such statement was made, it is not
hearsay (People vs. Fule, G.R. No. 83027, February 28, 1992, 206 SCRA 652). 18
While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or information
had been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filing an accused
"no longer Has] the right to remain silent End to counsel but he [has] the right to refuge to be a
witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were so, then
there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view
would not only give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said
accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution,
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense." The direct and primary source of this Section 12(1) is the second
paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .
The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right against self-incrimination
reading:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The incorporation of the second
paragraph of Section 20 in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 constitution was an acceptance of the
landmark doctrine laid down by the united States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona. 19 In that
case, the Court explicitly stated that the holding therein "is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is
an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings." It went on to state its ruling:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but
briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural
safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform
accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes
to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if
the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some question or volunteered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to a questioned. 20
It may be pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph of the aforementioned
Section 20, the word custudial, which was used in Miranda with reference to the investigation, was
excluded. In view thereof, inGalman vs. Pamaran, 21 this Court aptly observed:
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term
"custodial" by having it inserted between the words "under" and "investigation," as in
fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person" goes to prove that they did not
adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine.

Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application of Miranda by
making it applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person and in
custody. 22 Accordingly, as so formulated, the second paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule adopted
in People vs. Jose 23 that the rights of the accused only begin upon arraignment, Applying the second
paragraph of Section 20, this Court laid down this rule in Morales vs, Enrile: 24
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on
his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of
the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Note that the first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of the
reason for the arrest and show him "the warrant of arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply
means that a case had been filed against him in a court of either preliminary or original jurisdiction
and that the court had issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that
the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under the second paragraph of
Section 20 are available to a person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated for
the commission of an offense. This paragraph was incorporated into Section 12(1), Article III of the
present Constitution with the following additional safeguards: (a) the counsel must be competent and
independent, preferably of his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such counsel,
he must be provided with one, and (c) the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include the right to counsel. 25 Thus,
Section 12(2), Article III of the present Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In People vs. Holgado, 26 this Court emphatically
declared:
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no
person shall be-held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law",
and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but

because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not
enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
the court should assign one de officio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant
him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is
strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a
criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his right to
remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then police authorities and
other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from
accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage
the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and
to counsel.
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by
virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the
arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, 27 and since the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer Or law
enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is
charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such' investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in
palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a
reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section.
The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang
Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution
which reads:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa
stand on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of
Rights.. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an
investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the
other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily
limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be
taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect; 28or restriction on the power
of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle
that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited. 29 They are the
fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, 30 or state tyranny and abuse of authority.

In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution
did not govern the relationships between individuals. 31

Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in
evidence against the former Under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs;
People, 32 this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the
offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a
witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he
heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he
gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions.
To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he
explicitly .stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it
appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a
state witness, Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established
beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not
only at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his participation
therein. Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt
was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. The
following circumstances were duly proved in this case:
(1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour
after the crime in question was committed there;
(2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker,
Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the
crime;
(3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;
(4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left
the place sometime in September 1991;
(5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and
(6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least
guilty."
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can
be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person, i.e. the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilty. 33 We do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court are present in this case.
This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial
court correctly rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 34 Through
the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was
positively established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the
waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It
was not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the time
the crime was committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started
working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his, testimony that he
started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991.
WHEREFORE, in of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision Of
Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court Of Benguet in Criminal Case, No.91-CR-1206 is AFFIRMED in
toto.
Costs against accused-appellant HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL.
SO ORDERED,
NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY BOARD, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Adolfo N. Feliciano for respondents Anti-Usury Board.
No appearance for other respondent.
IMPERIAL, J.:
The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain

accounting books, documents and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta,
Province of Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury
Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in
question be returned to him.
On the date above-mentioned, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner
kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used
by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in
violation of the law. In his oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that
his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear
to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received
by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the
warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at
nay time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the
immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said warrant,
several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock
on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal
revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order
books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four
stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one
bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of
correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and
other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits,
promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. The
search for and a seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of the petitioner who stated
his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the
documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search
warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion on June 8, 1936, praying that the agent
Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the
office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed
the order of the court. On said date the court issued an order directing Emilio L. Siongco to deposit
all the articles seized within twenty-four hours from the receipt of notice thereof and giving him a
period of five (5) days within which to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of
court. On June 10th, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion
praying that the order of the 8th of said month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be
authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for the necessary investigation.
The attorney for the petitioner, on June 20th, filed another motion alleging that, notwithstanding the
order of the 8th of said month, the officials of the Anti-Usury Board had failed to deposit the articles
seized by them and praying that a search warrant be issued, that the sheriff be ordered to take all
the articles into his custody and deposit of the Anti-Usury Board be punished for contempt of court.
Said attorney, on June 24th, filed an ex parte petition alleging that while agent Emilio L. Siongco had
deposited some documents and papers in the office of the clerk of court, he had so far failed to file
an inventory duly verified by oath of all the documents seized by him, to return the search warrant
together with the affidavit it presented in support thereof, or to present the report of the proceedings

taken by him; and prayed that said agent be directed to filed the documents in question immediately.
On the 25th of said month the court issued an order requiring agent Emilio L. Siongco forthwith to file
the search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the proceedings taken by him, and to
present an inventory duly verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2d of said year, the
attorney for the petitioner filed another petition alleging that the search warrant issue was illegal and
that it had nit yet been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in connection therewith,
and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return of all the
articles seized to the petitioner, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of
court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority. On September 10, 1936, the court
issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in accordance with the
law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled, and that agent
Emilio L. Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and
ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show case, if any, within the unextendible
period of two (2) days from the date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in
the inventory, Exhibit 1, should not be returned to the petitioner. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury
Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the
articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the violation of
the Anti-Usury Law committed by the petitioner. In view of the opposition of the attorney for the
petitioner, the court, on September 25th, issued an order requiring the Anti-Usury Board to specify
the time needed by it to examine the documents and papers seized and which of them should be
retained, granting it a period of five (5) days for said purpose. On the 30th of said month the
assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board filed a motion praying that he be granted ten (10) days to
comply with the order of September 25th and that the clerk of court be ordered to return to him all
the documents and papers together with the inventory thereof. The court, in an order of October 2d
of said year, granted him the additional period of ten(10) days and ordered the clerk of court to send
him a copy of the inventory. On October 10th, said official again filed another motion alleging that he
needed sixty (60) days to examine the documents and papers seized, which are designated on
pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 1016, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42,
43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said period of sixty (60) days. In an order of October 16th,
the court granted him the period of sixty (60) days to investigate said nineteen (19) documents. The
petitioner alleges, and it is not denied by the respondents, that these nineteen (19)documents
continue in the possession of the court, the rest having been returned to said petitioner.
I. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine
Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court (section 95,
General Orders. No. 58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a
citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the
right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and
papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railways Commission, 32
Fed., 241; Interstate Commerce Commission vs Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U. S.,
29 Law. ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to search and
seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basis principles of government
(People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).

II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the
highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a
liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them(State vs. Custer
County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the
proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and
seizure or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189;
Leonardvs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So.,
613).
III. The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has
been based upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he
had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of
the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a
person whom he considered reliable. To the question "What are your reason for applying for
this search warrant", appearing in the affidavit, the agent answered: "It has been reported to
me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said premises,
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as a money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law" and
in attesting the truth of his statements contained in the affidavit, the said agent states that he
found them to be correct and true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights, provides
that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place top be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of
General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable
cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized." It will be noted that both provisions require
that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the
search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant ands
the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of
attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act
faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined asan outward pledge given by the person
taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God (Bouvier's Law Dictionary; State vs. Jackson, 137 N. W., 1034; In
re Sage, 24 Oh. Cir. Ct. [N. S.], 7; Pumphery vs.State, 122 N. W., 19; Priest vs. State, 6 N.
W., 468; State vs. Jones, 154 Pac., 378; Atwood vs. State, 111 So., 865). The oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause (U. S. vs. Tureaud, 20 Fed., 621; U. S. vs. Michalski, 265 Fed., 8349; U.
S. vs. Pitotto, 267 Fed., 603; U. S.vs. Lai Chew, 298 Fed., 652). The true test of sufficiency
of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a

manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused
(State vs. Roosevelt Country 20th Jud. Dis. Ct., 244 Pac., 280; State vs.Quartier, 236 Pac.,
746).
It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizure. Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace
against which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable
search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is
said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been
defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful
ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in
any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence or
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law.
ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S.
70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs.Bateman, 278 Fed., 231;
Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).
In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit,
which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective
by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that
the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and
other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner
was subjected.
IV. Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be declared
illegal and cancelled is that it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by
the applicant. In other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot be issued unless
it be supported by affidavits made by the applicant and the witnesses to be presented
necessity by him. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or justice must, before issuing
the warrant, examine under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and
take their depositions in writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at
least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued
the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano
G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither
the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take
the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to
the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is
nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense
with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was
insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the

duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant.
When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his
personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable
cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or
more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude,
therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit
of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
V. The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of the illegality of the search
warrant and the cancellation thereof, the fact that it authorized its execution at night. Section
101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is
positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered
to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued
exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and
that the search could not legally be made at night.
VI. One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his contention that the warrant
was issued illegally is the lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be
seized. Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97 of General
Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for
determining whether probable cause exist and whether the warrant should be issued, must
contain a particular description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with (Munch vs. U. S.,
24 Fed. [2d], 518; U. S. vs. Boyd, 1 Fed. [2d], 1019; U. S. vs. Carlson, 292 Fed., 463; U.
S. vs. Borkowski, 268 Fed., 408; In re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co., 253 Fed., 605;
People vs. Mayen, 188 Cal., 237; People vs. Kahn, 256 Ill. App., 4125); but where, by the
nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather generally, it is not required
that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue
(People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284; People vs. Kahn, supra). The only description of the articles
given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said
premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection
with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the
law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other
more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is
difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made
substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed
the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he
did.
VII. The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his claim that the search warrant
was obtained illegally, is that the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board
might provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases which might
be filed against him for violation of the Anti-usury Law. At the hearing of the incidents of the
case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really
been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or

some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that
may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search
warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in
whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant
unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the
compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs.Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886;
Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs.Madden, 297
Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it
appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of
using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for
violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the
documents should be returned to him.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of
the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has
waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200
for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there
was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise
and, second, because if there was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of criminal
proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the
respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in
question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated
his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.
Said board alleges as another defense that the remedy sought by the petitioner does not lie because
he can appeal from the orders which prejudiced him and are the subject matter of his petition.
Section 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure in fact provides that mandamus will not issue when there
is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. We are of the opinion,
however, that an appeal from said orders would have to lapse before he recovers possession of the
documents and before the rights, of which he has been unlawfully deprived, are restored to him
(Fajardo vs. Llorente, 6 Phil., 426; Manotoc vs. McMicking and Trinidad, 10 Phil., 119; Cruz Herrera
de Lukban vs. McMicking, 14 Phil., 641; Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456).
Summarizing the foregoing conclusions, we hold:
1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No. 58, relative to search and
seizure, should be given a liberal construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain
the constitutional guaranties whole and in their full force;
2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and fundamentally restrict
the enjoyment of the ownership, possession and use of the personal property of the
individual, they should be strictly construed;
3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the
warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge
of the facts of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose

of seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be
instituted against the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury Law;
4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear positively in
the affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place
indicated, neither could the search and seizure be made at night;
5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the
applicant or a complainant in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts,
when the applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty
of the judge to require affidavits of other witnesses so that he may determine whether
probable cause exists;
6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be
seized is necessary, but whereby, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description
must be rather general, but is not required that a technical description be given, as this
would mean that no warrant could issue;
7. That the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of compromise
or settlement attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the
search and seizure; and
8. That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if taken by him, would not be
an effective, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and, consequently,
the petition for mandamusfiled by him, lies.
For the foregoing considerations, the search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the orders
of the respondent court authorizing the relation of the books and documents, are declared illegal and
are set aside, and it is ordered that the judge presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
direct the immediate return to the petitioner of the nineteen (19) documents designated on pages 1
to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25,26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and
45, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to
as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners
filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted
to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of
Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid
and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were
cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of
the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear
that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have
been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights
of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not
been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment,
when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of
the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the
personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the

authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.
1wph1.t

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen,
in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even
if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should
not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other
laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and

their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this
Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that
the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to
federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in
violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed
dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state
or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an
essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the
right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,

and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given
crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause,
and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee
under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents
of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power
they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but,
understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners,
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of
the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either

inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners
herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being
best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with
the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE HERRERA, as Judge, City Court of Manila, NBI Agent CELSO J. ZOLETA, JR. and
MANUEL CUARESMA, respondents.
Astraquillo, Laquio, Brillantes and Associates, Taada, Carmon and Taada and Alidio, Elegir,
Anchete and Catipon petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for respondent
Celso J. Zoleta, Jr.
Antonio Barredo for respondent Manuel Cuaresma.

ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City
Court of Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers,
receipts and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.

On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso
Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in
connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax
evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg.,
Rizal Avenue, Manila. The search warrant is couched in the following language:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath NBI
Agent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr. and his witness Manuel Cuaresma that there are good and
sufficient reasons to believe that Mr. William Li Yao or his employees has/have in
his/their control in premises No. 2nd Floor Republic Supermarket Building, in Rizal
Avenue district of Sta. Cruz, Manila, property (Subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the ----- of
the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report
including subrogation receipt and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts,
including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, check vouchers,
income tax returns, and other papers connected therewith ... for the years 1961 to
1964 to be dealt with as the law directs.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI
entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon
Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman
of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2)
carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it was issued in contravention of the
explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 1, of Art. III of the
1935 Constitution, now Section 3, of Art. IV of the new Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, hereunder quoted for convenience of reference, viz:
Sec. 3 The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnessed he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons, or
things to be seized." (Art. IV, Section 3, New Constitution)
Sec. 3 Requisites for issuing search warrant A search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by
the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126,
Rules of Court)
Sec. 5 Issuance and form of search warrant If the judge or justice of the peace
is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based,
or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant in
the form prescribed by these rules. (Sec. 5, Rule 126)
Sec. 8 Time of making search The warrant must direct that it be served in the
day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at
any time of the night or day. (Sec. 8, Rule 126)
Sec. 10 Receipt for property seized. The officer seizing property under the warrant
must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose
possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at
least one witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
(Sec. 10, Rule 126) .
"Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and
happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs,
books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. 1 While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government (People v. Elias, 147 N.E. 472)."
I.
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1)
estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit
command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense." The aforequoted provision, which is found in the last paragraph of the
same section, is something new. "There is no precedent on this amendment prohibition against
the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense either in the American books
on Criminal procedure or in American decisions." 2 It was applied in the celebrated case of Harry S.
Stonehill v. Secretary of Justice 3 where this Court said:
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place
the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at
the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision abovequoted to outlaw the
so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen in times of
keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the

disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend section 3 of Rule
122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised
Rules of Court, that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than
one specific offense.
II.
Petitioner likewise contests the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it authorized the
search and seizures of personal properties so vaguely described and not particularized, thereby
infringing the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. It also assails the noncompliance with the above-requirement as
likewise openly violative of Section 2 of Rule 126 which provides:
SEC. 2. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following
personal property:
(a) Property subject of the offense;
(b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
(c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The search warrant herein involved reads in part: "... property (Subject of the offense, stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned." The claim of respondents
that by not cancelling the description of one or two of the classes of property contained in the form
when not applicable to the properties sought to be seized, the respondent judge intended the search
to apply to all the three classes of property. This is a patent impossibility because the description of
the property to be searched and seized, viz: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report,
including subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts including cash
receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc. and the offenses alleged to have been
committed by the corporation to wit: estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud, render it
impossible for Us to see how the above-described property can simultaneously be contraband
goods, stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of one and the same offense. What is plain
and clear is the fact that the respondent Judge made no attempt to determine whether the property
he authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to any one of the three classes of
personal property that may be searched and seized under a search warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2
of the Rules. The respondent Judge simply authorized search and seizure under an omnibus
description of the personal properties to be seized. Because of this all embracing description which
includes all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which if seized (as it was really seized in
the case at bar), could possibly paralyze its business, 4 petitioner in several motions, filed for early
resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their
business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its

numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the
general public. 5 And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was issued, We have
before Us the infamous general warrants of old. In the case of Uy Kheytin, et al., v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 896,
cited with approval in the Bache case, supra, We had occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement
that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:

"... Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically
require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to
limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the
search warrant to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they shall seize, to the end that "unreasonable searches and seizures" may
not be made. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is
borne out by American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant
issued in this case.
III.
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule
126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. Going over the receipts
(Annexes "B", "B-1", B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one
bordereau of reinsurance, 8 fire registers, 1 marine register, four annual statements, folders
described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big carton folders; folders of various sizes,
etc., without stating therein the nature and kind of documents contained in the folders of which there
were about a thousand of them that were seized. In the seizure of two carloads of documents and
other papers, the possibility that the respondents took away private papers of the petitioner, in
violation of his constitutional rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day with the
broad and unlimited search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their passport.
IV.
The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule 126. 6 Annex "A" of the
Petition which is the search warrant in question left blank the "time" for making search, while actual
search was conducted in the evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m., until the wee hours of the
morning of October 28, 1965, thus causing untold inconveniences to petitioners herein. Authorities 7 are of
the view that where a search is to be made during the night time, the authority for executing the same at
that time should appear in the directive on the face of the warrant.
In their Memorandum 8 respondents, relying on the case of Moncado v. Peoples Court (80 Phil. 1),
argued:
Even assuming that the search warrant in question is null and void, the illegality
thereof would not render the incriminating documents inadmissible in evidence.

This Court has reverted to the old rule and abandoned the Moncado ruling (Stonehill case, supra).
Most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus the Supreme Court of the United
States declared: 9
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense the protection of the 4th Amendment,
declaring his right to be secured against such searches and seizures is of no value,
and so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praise-worthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted
in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
Moreover, the criminal charges filed by the NBI have all been dismissed and/or dropped by the Court
or by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila in 1968, as manifested in the petition filed by petitioner
dated October 24, 1972, for early resolution of this case.
V.
It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place from 1961 to 1964, and the
application for search warrant was made on October 27, 1965. The time of the application is so far
remote in time as to make the probable cause of doubtful veracity and the warrant vitally defective.
Thus Mr. Joseph Varon, an eminent authority on Searches, Seizures and Immunities, has this to say
on this point:
From the examination of the several cases touching upon this subject, the following
general rules are said to apply to affidavits for search warrants:
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and
definite and must not be too remote from the time of the making of the affidavit and
issuance of the search warrant.
(3) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of observation of the
offense is too remote from the time when the affidavit is made or the search warrant
issued, but, generally speaking, a lapse of time of more than three weeks will be held
not to invalidate the search warrant while a lapse of four weeks will be held to be so.
A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time given in the
affidavit as to the date of the alleged offense, and the time of making the affidavit is
thus expressed: The nearer the time at which the observation of the offense is
alleged to have been made, the more reasonable the conclusion of establishment of
probable cause. [Emphasis Ours]

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is
nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents,
papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON.
ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City:
HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN.
FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS ALTUNA, respondents.
Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for
petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be briefly
stated. The three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILARROQUE and TOLENTINO.
1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was
one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary
Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The
stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose
that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.
3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents.
In their COMMENT, however, respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the
same day"; that is late on august 6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search
Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in
Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased
residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the
premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long
wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:

(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila
Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE).
Judge Panos Court was Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt.
Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao.
(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined
under oath by Judge Pao but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter
deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records,
documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including support
money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion. 1
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching
party presumably without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable
typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. 3
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the
search was made in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2)
Barangay Tanods. No mention was made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and
documents attached to the Return was signed by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were
charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by
the CSG against petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion/Subversion."
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33
(Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent
Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that
AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on
November 16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT
CASE praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles,
in connection with cases that are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon
City Fiscal's Office and the court. 5

(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended
Return, which AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any
evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Pao admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized
documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS
CASE, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that
the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on
January 7, 1985 on the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently not aware of the Order of Judge Pao of December
13th issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search
Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Pao; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and
granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying
petitioners' Motion to Suppress.
This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents
or their duly authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search
Warrant.
The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant
since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure,
and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions
propounded to the applicant's witness. The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General,
contend otherwise, adding that the questions raised cannot be entertained in this present petition
without petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed Search Warrant with the issuing
Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the
Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as
Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible

supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to

the public, and support money from foreign or local sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties
vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to
be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to
what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what
articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is
thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of
similar description were considered null and void for being too general. Thus:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote
the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for
Free Philippines. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement. 6
The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were
described as 'subversive documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing
paraphernalia and all other subversive materials Such description hardly provided a
definite guideline to the search team as to what articles might be lawfully seized
thereunder. Said description is no different from if not worse than, the description
found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. the Chief of Staff"which this Court
declared null and void for being too general. 7
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the
seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for
publication, newspaper dummies subversive documents, articles, etc., and even
typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines.
Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records
and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The
search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is
constitutionally objectionable. 8
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the
applicant for Search Warrant.
Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed
by Lt. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to know if you
affirm the truth of your answer in this deposition?
(The deposition instead)
A Yes, sir,

Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?

A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the
application for search warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were
so many suspicious persons with documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New
People's Army.
Q What else?
A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National
Democratic Front, Organization of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ...
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings,
Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters,
subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available
to the public and support money from foreign and local sources. 9
The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are
not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the
issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious
man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th
pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the
description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers
from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely
repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue. 11

Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a Search Warrant
is with the Court that issued it instead of this original, independent action to quash. The records
show, however, that petitioners did raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their
Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In fact, they already questioned the admissibility of the evidence
obtained under the Search Warrant, even during the inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And
in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress on December 12, 1984
claiming that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Substantially, therefore,
while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the legality of the Search
Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly
administration of justice. It should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by
one Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result
of the service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with
the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search
Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on
petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles
seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the
case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section
12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged with an
offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant,
of a person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the
place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this
latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and
circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some
confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be
searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's
interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals." 13
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against
public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time;
that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling
was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No.
239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results
in the interest of public order.

Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as
evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to
ask Special Military Commission No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive
Judge Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondent from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the
Subversive Documents case hereby made permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by
the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-11, pending before Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila AguilarRoque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant
documents and articles.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-69803 January 30, l987
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON.
ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City;
HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN.
FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS ALTUNA, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For resolution are petitioners' and public respondents' respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration
of this Court's Decision of October 8, 1985, which decreed that:
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by
respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Pano is hereby annulled and set aside, and
the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from introducing evidence
obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents Case hereby
made permanent, the personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary
Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC1-1,
pending before Special Military Commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner
Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return
to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles. (Rollo, p. 154; 139 SCRA 165).
In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration, public respondents maintain that the subject Search
Warrant meets the standards for validity and that it should be considered in the context of the
criminal offense of Rebellion for which the Warrant was issued, the documents to establish which are
less susceptible of particularization since the offense does not involve an isolated act or transaction.

In their own Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioners assail that portion of the Decision holding
that, in so far as petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque is concerned, the search made in her premises was
incident to her arrest and could be made without a search warrant. Petitioners submit that a
warrantless search can be justified only if it is an incident to a lawful arrest and that since Mila
Aguilar was not lawfully arrested a search without warrant could not be made.
On April 10, 1986, we required the parties to MOVE in the premises considering the supervening
events, including the change of administration that have transpired, and pursuant to the provisions of
Section 18 of Rule 3 in so far as the public respondents are concerned (which requires the
successor official to state whether or not he maintains the action and position taken by his
predecessor-in-office).
In their Compliance, petitioners maintain that the arrest of petitioners and the search of their
premises thereafter are both illegal and that the personalties seized should be ordered returned to
their owners.
The Solicitor General on behalf of public respondents, "in deference to the dissenting opinion of then
Supreme Court Justice (now Chief Justice) Claudio Teehankee," now offer no further objection to a
declaration that the subject search is illegal and to the return of the seized items to the petitioners.
Respondents state, however, that they cannot agree to having the arrest of petitioners declared
illegal.
The pertinent portion of the dissenting opinion referred to reads:
... The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the
Court's decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional
mandate that 'the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects aqainst unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall not be violated' (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the
absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in
violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding"
(Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has
proved by historical experience to be the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all
evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and
police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the
Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or modify.
All the articles thus seized fag under the exclusionary
rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three petitioners,
as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 7120809, August 30, 1985). ...
ACCORDINGLY, considering the respective positions now taken by the parties, petitioners' Motion
for Partial Reconsideration of this Court's Decision of October 8, 1985 is GRANTED, and the
dispositive portion thereof is hereby revised to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge
Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
respondents from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive
Documents Case hereby made permanent. The personalities seized by virtue of the illegal Search
Warrant are hereby ordered returned to petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104879, 6 May 1994, 232
SCRA 249.
G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994
ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City;
HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

REGALADO, J.:
Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another primae
impressionis case through the present petition wherein the parties have
formulated and now pose for resolution the following issue: Whether or not a
court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in
connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and,
thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the
court's supposed territorial jurisdiction. 1
The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken
from the findings of respondent Court of Appeals 2 on which there does not
appear to be any dispute, to wit:
From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can be
gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM
Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was
sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St.,

corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23, 1990, respondent
RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same
day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject
search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a
labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research
(EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of
Property Seized," firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents,
among others, were seized and taken during the search. And all the sixtyone (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp
Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the
exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicated for
violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge
Tirso D.C. Velasco.
On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal
of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence"
before the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for
Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally
Obtained.
On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the
challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the
quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant
was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and
Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules
and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court
(National Capital Judicial Region);. . .
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge,
having been denied by the assailed Order of October 5, 1990, petitioners
have come to this Court via the instant petition, raising the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION
FOR A SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A
WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect affirming that of
the trial court, by denying due course to the petition for certiorari and lifting
the temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in

connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now impugned in

and sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us.
We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in
support of their submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretative
theories contrary to the letter and intent of the rules on search warrants and
which could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area of
law enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they do not
convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1) the court
which has the competence to issue a search warrant under a given set of
facts, and (2) the permissible jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such
search warrant vis-a-vis the court's territorial jurisdiction. These issues while
effectively cognate are essentially discrete since the resolution of one does
not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoid
compounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall be
discussedseriatim.
I
Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions
to invalidate the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and
ammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to
be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case against petitioners for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter
court. The application for the search warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly
filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminal actions
involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for
having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for
and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of
a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a
special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as
equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific
courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites,
procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant,
merely constitutes process. 4 A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction
as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search
for personal property and bring it before the court. 5 A search warrant is in
the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and

peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a

public necessity. 6
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and
provisions on search warrants, 7 such warrant is definitively considered
merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its
ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court
pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of
both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities
herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or
other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of
accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, 8 or all writs, warrants,
summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. 9 It is likewise
held to include a writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to
acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or
enforce the judgment, 10 or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other process
issuing from a court of justice. 11
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process
designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one
has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter
contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance
to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may
eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet
been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other
than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located.
This is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in
different venues under the rules for delitos continuados or in those instances
where different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the
same criminal offense.
In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible
position may create, we need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions and which we
quote:
Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the
offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took
place.

(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any

other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal
action may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory
where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including
the place of departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its
voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of
the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the
vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted
principles of international law.
(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein
under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper
court in which the charge is first filed. (14a)
It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or
the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply
for a search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the
ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if
compliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of said
warrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain the same
from what may later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of the
aforequoted Section 15.
Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and,
for that matter, the Judiciary Act of 1948 12 or the recent Judiciary
Reorganization Act, 13 have never required the jurisdictional strictures that
the petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from the silence
of the reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that said
statutory omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean
that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and even Congress itself, did not
consider it proper or correct, on considerations of national policy and the
pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those who would
ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now impose such conditions or
restrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation, may instead be
reasonably construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would be
tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that has
been omitted but which someone believes ought to have been embraced
therein. 14
Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a
criminal case has already been filed in a particular court and a search
warrant is needed to secure evidence to be presented therein. Obviously, the
court trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant, upon proper

application and due compliance with the requisites therefor, since such
application would only be an incident in that case and which it can resolve in
the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are within
its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no further complications.
The jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, where such articles are
outside its territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will be addressed hereafter.
3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after
discoursing on the respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional
Trial Courts which correspond to the thirteen judicial regions, 15invite our
attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority granted by
law, 16 has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional
Trial Court 17 over which the particular branch concerned shall exercise its
authority. 18 From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional
Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant
an application for and issue a warrant to search that place." Support for such
position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is, Circular
No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No. 19 on August
4, 1987.
We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not
intended to be of general application to all instances involving search
warrants and in all courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as
part of the Rules of Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to meet
a particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on applications for
search warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other
courts with multiple salas and only with respect to violations of the AntiSubversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code,
illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the court's
jurisdiction to issue search warrants would not apply tosinglesala courts and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to
be adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure
which would be vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.
For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that
Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of
the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts," was the source of
thesubject matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this administrative order was
issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
the pertinent portion of which states:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The
Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional

Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all writs, proceedings or actions, whether civil or
criminal, . . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, not by a procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or
circular. The jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and
their judges is basically regional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides
that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall
be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court
to any branch or city or municipality within the same region as public
interest may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an
assignment to another station . . ." which, otherwise, would necessitate a
new appointment for the judge.
In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and
19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its
branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts.
The administrative order merely defines the limits of
the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its
authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The circulars only allocated to the three executive judges the administrative
areas for which they may respectively issue search warrants under the
special circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise pursuant to
the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg, 129.
Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion
that the grant of power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and
issue search warrants where the place to be searched is within their
territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from exercising
the same power. It will readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basically
intended to provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its
predecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of requirements,
principally a raffle of the applications for search warrants, if they had been
filed with the executive judge, among the judges within his administrative
area. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle and
ordered instead that such applications should immediately be "taken
cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose
jurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or by their substitutes
enumerated therein.
Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to
confer exclusive jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact,

however, that they were themselves directed to personally act on the

applications, instead of farming out the same among the other judges as
was the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical to require them
to so act only on applications involving search of places located within their
respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was, therefore,
in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications among them,
in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and not a mandate for
the exclusion of all other courts. In truth, Administrative Circular No. 13
even specifically envisaged and anticipated the non-exclusionary nature of
that provision, thus:
4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized
thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be
distributed conformably with Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of
this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to whom it has
been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued the search
warrant. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction
over the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the
consequence of petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with
jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the
same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case
is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof,
has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such
criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful
substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19
shall have primary jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction
does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant
therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and
justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place.
Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has
jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive
judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular
No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented
outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.
This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible
jurisdictional range of enforcement of search warrants.
II
As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch
of a regional trial court has the authority to issue a warrant for the search of

a place outside its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the

query in the negative. We hold otherwise.
1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule imposes such a
limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is
provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the
American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of
arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the
enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the
delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be
made to the issuing judge, 19 said warrant does not become functus
officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled.
On the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in
our Rules at ten days 20 but there is no provision as to the extent of the
territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and
within the premises specifically described therein which may or may not be
within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.
We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that
when the law or rules would provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions,
they so state. Absent specific mention thereof, and the same not being
inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are
presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers, a
contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be countenanced.
A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional
rule heretofore was that writs and processes of the so-called inferior courts
could be enforced outside the province only with the approval of the former
court of first instance. 21 Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the
enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval of the
regional trial court. 22 On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and
processes of the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughout
the Philippines, 23 under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines,
certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable
only within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is
necessary that said provision be set out in full:
3. Writs and processes.
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of
the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court
may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases,

without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court. (Emphasis

ours.)
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or
enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and
processes which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only
within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other
writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search
warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision,
statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or
territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the abovequoted provision of the interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement
anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in
paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the
processes contemplated in
paragraph (b).
2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and
purpose of a search warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is
extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information
regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited
articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the
requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such
illicit items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposing
further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through
decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a
search warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial
jurisdiction. In the landmark case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno,et al., 24 the
searches in the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of
therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants issued by
the Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
and by the Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City, 25 but the same were
never challenged on jurisdictional grounds although they were subsequently
nullified for being general warrants.
3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by
petitioners, dubiously invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal
searches and seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a search
warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place
to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we
swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities
may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an
application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled
that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the

constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards

in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a
search warrant, 26 and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever
court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search
warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the
warrant 27 would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not
only because of the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the
danger involved, unless there are really compelling reasons for the
authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such constitutional
protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are
enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only
property and privacy, but persons and liberty.
On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities
have to contend now and then with local and national criminal syndicates of
considerable power and influence, political or financial in nature, and so
pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in
the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact
that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to
and their examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and
expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of
experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as quoted
by respondent court:
This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information
which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant is secured
(against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does not hold court
sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where the place to be
searched is located. 28
The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into
account in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in the absence of
statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the county may
issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the county and
made returnable before the justice of still another district or another court
having jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved. 29 In the present state
of our law on the matter, we find no such statutory restrictions both with
respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the enforcement
thereof anywhere in the Philippines.
III
Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more
accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending
in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the

seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal

case. This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our
jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was
anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited scenario
contemplated therein.
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following
policy guidelines:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary
jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said
case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court
only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must
prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due
course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered
for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the
same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice
to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party
aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections
then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or
subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall
be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by
the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the
criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal
property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved
in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to
suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to
prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed
by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The
resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to
any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to
quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding
thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be
transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the
necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.

5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal

offense is charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or
more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action.
Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved,
such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on
applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and
the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J.,

The majority opinion enunciates these two principles:
1. Before the criminal action is filed with the appropriate court, a court which
has no territorial jurisdiction over the crime may validly entertain an
application for and thereafter issue a search warrant in connection with the
commission of such crime; and
2. After the filing of the criminal action, the court with which it was filed has
primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for
purposes of said case; however, under extreme and compelling
circumstances, another court may issue a search warrant in connection with
said case.
I am unable to agree with the first and with the exception to the second.
A.. By the very definition of a search warrant which the majority opinion
adopts, it is clear to me that only a court having territorial jurisdiction over
the crime committed can validly entertain an application for and issue a
search warrant in connection with said crime. The majority opinion says:

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant,

merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as
an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed
by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the
nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of a public
necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and
provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely
as a process generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant
to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues
as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or
other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of
accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants,
summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise
held to include a writ, summons, or order in a judicial proceeding to acquire
jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce
judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other processes issuing from a
court of justice.
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process
designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one
has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. . . ." (citations
omitted)
What are to be underscored in the foregoing definition or disquisition on the
concept of a search warrant are the following: (a) it is "in the nature of a
criminal process akin to a writ of discovery," (b) it is generally issued by a
court "in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction," and (c) it is "designed by
the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case . . . or in
anticipation thereof." All of these are premised on the assumption that the
court entertaining the application for and issuing the search warrant has
jurisdiction over the main case, meaning, of course, the crime in connection
with whose commission the warrant was issued.
The writ of discovery is the discovery in federal criminal cases governed by
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 thereof provides:
Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment
or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to
permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books,

papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the

defendant or obtained from others by seizure or process, upon a showing
that the items sought may be material to the presentation of his defense and
that the request is reasonable. (4 Federal Practice and Procedure with
Forms, Rules Edition, 1951 ed., 124).
Note that the required motion is filed after the filing of the indictment or
information.
"Ancillary," in reference to jurisdiction can only mean in aid of or incidental
to an original jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction is defined as follows:
Ancillary jurisdiction. Power of court to adjudicate and determine matters
incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction of an action.
Under "ancillary jurisdiction doctrine" federal district court acquires
jurisdiction of case or controversy as an entirety and may, as incident to
disposition of matter properly before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other
matters raised by case, though district court could not have taken
cognizance of them if they had been independently presented.
. . ."Ancillary jurisdiction" of federal court generally involves either
proceedings which are concerned with pleadings, processes, records or
judgments of court in principal case or proceedings which affect property
already in court's custody. . . . (Black's Law Dictionary 79 [5th ed., 1979]).
"Incident in the main case" also presupposes a main case which, perforce,
must be within the court's jurisdiction.Incident is defined thus:
Incident. Used both substantively and adjectively of a thing which, either
usually or naturally and inseparably, depends upon, appertains to, or follows
another that is more worthy. Used as a noun, it denotes anything which
inseparably belongs to, or is connected with, or inherent in, another thing,
called the "principal". Also, less strictly, it denotes anything which is usually
connected with another, or connected for some purposes, though not
inseparably. . . . (Id., at 686)
Reliance upon Section 3 of the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 which reads:
3. Writs and processes. (a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court
may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court
may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases,
without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.

is misplaced for the reason that said section refers to writs or processes
issued by a court in a case pending before it and not to a case yet to be filed
with it or pending in another court.
The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a court from
issuing a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its
territorial jurisdiction should not be construed as a grant of blanket authority
to any court of justice in the country to issue a search warrant in connection
with a crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majority view
suggests or implies that a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, or
Batanes can validly entertain an application for a search warrant and issue
one in connection with a crime committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all
courts in the Philippines, including the municipal trial courts, can validly
issue a search warrant in connection with a crime committed anywhere in
the Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the Philippines have, for
purposes of issuing a search warrant, jurisdiction over the entire
archipelago.
I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search warrant is
but an incident to a main case and involves the exercise of an ancillary
jurisdiction therefore, the authority to issue it must necessarily be coextensive with the court's territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be
to add an exception to the statutory provisions defining the territorial
jurisdiction of the various courts of the country, which would amount to
judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdiction of the courts is determined by
law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 discloses that the territorial
jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial
courts and municipal circuit trial courts are confined to specific territories. In
the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses that would result
in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the infliction upon him of
undue and unwarranted burdens and inconvenience as when, for instance,
an accused who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to
quash a search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in
connection with an offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat, Batanes.
Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative confirmation
of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to issue search warrants
in connection with crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. While
it may be true that the forty-two search warrants involved therein were
issued by several Judges specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the City
Court of Manila, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c)
Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City
Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig
Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez of the City Court of Quezon City (Footnote
2, page 387) there is no definite showing that the forty-two search

warrants were for the searches and seizures of properties outside the
territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were issued
against the petitioners and corporations of which they were officers and
some of the corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 have addresses in Manila
and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which includes Makati) and Quezon City
both belonged to the Seventh Judicial District. That nobody challenged on
jurisdictional ground the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in
favor of the unlimited power of a court to issue search warrants.
B. I have serious misgivings on the exception to the second principle where
another court may, because of extreme and compelling circumstances, issue
a search warrant in connection with a criminal case pending in an
appropriate court. To illustrate this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of
Argao, Cebu, may validly issue a warrant for the search of a house in Davao
City and the seizure of any property therein that may have been used in
committing an offense in Manila already the subject of an information filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I submit that the exception
violates the settled principle that even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the
first court which acquires jurisdiction over the case acquires it to the
exclusion of the other. (People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]).
This being so, it is with more reason that a court which does not have
concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance of the case
does not also have the authority to issue writs or processes, including search
warrants, in connection with the pending case. Moreover, since the issuance
of a search warrant is an incident to a main case or is an exercise of the
ancillary jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has
exclusive jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in the issuance of all
writs and processes in connection therewith. Furthermore, instead of serving
the ends of justice, the exception may provide room for unwarranted abuse
of the judicial process, wreak judicial havoc and procedural complexities
which effective law enforcement apparently cannot justify. I cannot conceive
of any extreme and compelling circumstance which the court that first
acquired jurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meet within its broad
powers and authority.
In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examining my original view in this
case, I respectfully submit that:
1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed may
validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection
with said crime. However, in the National Capital Judicial Region,
Administrative Circulars No. 13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August
1987 must be observed.

2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the appropriate

court, search warrants in connection with the crime charged may only be
issued by said court.

# Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The majority opinion enunciates these two principles:

1. Before the criminal action is filed with the appropriate court, a court which
has no territorial jurisdiction over the crime may validly entertain an
application for and thereafter issue a search warrant in connection with the
commission of such crime; and
2. After the filing of the criminal action, the court with which it was filed has
primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for
purposes of said case; however, under extreme and compelling
circumstances, another court may issue a search warrant in connection with
said case.
I am unable to agree with the first and with the exception to the second.
A.. By the very definition of a search warrant which the majority opinion
adopts, it is clear to me that only a court having territorial jurisdiction over
the crime committed can validly entertain an application for and issue a
search warrant in connection with said crime. The majority opinion says:
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant,
merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as
an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed
by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the
nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of a public
necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and
provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely
as a process generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant
to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues
as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.

Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or

other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of
accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants,
summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise
held to include a writ, summons, or order in a judicial proceeding to acquire
jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce
judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other processes issuing from a
court of justice.
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process
designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one
has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. . . (citations omitted)
What are to be underscored in the foregoing definition or disquisition on the
concept of a search warrant are the following: (a) it is "in the nature of a
criminal process akin to a writ of discovery," (b) it is generally issued by a
court "in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction," and (c) it is "designed by
the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case... or in anticipation
thereof." All of these are premised on the assumption that the court
entertaining the application for and issuing the search warrant has
jurisdiction over the main case, meaning, of course, the crime in connection
with whose commission the warrant was issued.
The writ of discovery is the discovery in federal criminal cases governed by
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 thereof provides:
Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment
or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to
permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books,
papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the
defendant or obtained from others by seizure or process, upon a showing
that the items sought may be material to the presentation of his defense and
that the request is reasonable. (4 Federal Practice and Procedure with
Forms, Rules Edition, 1951 ed., 124).
Note that the required motion is filed after the filing of the indictment or
information.
"Ancillary," in reference to jurisdiction can only mean in aid of or incidental
to an original jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction is defined as follows:
Ancillary jurisdiction. Power of court to adjudicate and determine matters
incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction of an action.
Under "ancillary jurisdiction doctrine" federal district court acquires
jurisdiction of case or controversy as an entirety and may, as incident to

disposition of matter property before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other

matters raised by case, though district court could not have taken
cognizance of them if they had been independently presented. . . . "Ancillary
jurisdiction" of federal court generally involves either proceedings which are
concerned with pleadings, processes, records or judgments of court in
principal case or proceedings which affect property already in court's
custody. . . . (Black's Law Dictionary 79 [5th ed., 1979]).
"Incident in the main case" also presupposes a main case which, perforce,
must be within the court's jurisdiction.Incident is defined thus:
Incident. Used both substantively and adjectively of a thing which, either
usually or naturally and inseparably, depends upon, appertains to, or follows
another that is more worthy. Used as a noun, it denotes anything which
inseparably belongs to, or is connected with, or inherent in, another thing,
called the 'principal'. Also, less strictly, it denotes anything which is usually
connected with another, or connected for some purposes, though not
inseparably. . . . (Id., at 686)
Reliance upon Section 3 of the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 which reads:
3. Writs and processes. (a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court
may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court
may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases,
without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.
is misplaced for the reason that said section refers to writs or processes
issued by a court in a case pending before it and not to a case yet to be filed
with it or pending in another court.
The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a court from
issuing a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its
territorial jurisdiction should not be construed as a grant of blanket authority
to any court of justice in the country to issue a search warrant in connection
with a crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majority view
suggests or implies that a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, or
Batanes can validly entertain an application for a search warrant and issue
one in connection with a crime committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all
courts in the Philippines, including the municipal trial courts, can validly
issue a search warrant in connection with a crime committed anywhere in
the Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the Philippines have, for

purposes of issuing a search warrant, jurisdiction over the entire

archipelago.
I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search warrant is
but an incident to a main case and involves the exercise of an ancillary
jurisdiction therefore, the authority to issue it must necessarily be coextensive with the court's territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be
to add an exception to the statutory provisions defining the territorial
jurisdiction of the various courts of the country, which would amount to
judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdiction of the courts is determined by
law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 discloses that the territorial
jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial
courts and municipal circuit trial courts are confined to specific territories. In
the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses that would result
in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the infliction upon him of
undue and unwarranted burdens and inconvenience as when, for instance,
an accused who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to
quash a search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in
connection with an offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat, Batanes.
Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative confirmation
of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to issue search warrants
in connection with crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. While
it may be true that the forty-two search warrants involved therein were
issued by several Judges specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the City
Court of Manila, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c)
Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City
Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig
Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez of the City Court of Quezon City (Footnote
2, page 387) there is no definite showing that the forty-two search
warrants were for the searches and seizures of properties outside the
territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were issued
against the petitioners and corporations of which they were officers and
some of the corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 have addresses in Manila
and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which includes Makati) and Quezon City
both belonged to the Seventh Judicial District. That nobody challenged on
jurisdictional ground the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in
favor of the unlimited power of a court to issue search warrants.
B. I have serious misgivings on the exception to the second principle where
another court may, because of extreme and compelling circumstances, issue
a search warrant in connection with a criminal case pending in an
appropriate court. To illustrate this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of
Argao, Cebu, may validly issue a warrant for the search of a house in Davao
City and the seizure of any property therein that may have been used in

committing an offense in Manila already the subject of an information filed

with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I submit that the exception
violates the settled principle that even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the
first court which acquires jurisdiction over the case acquires it to the
exclusion of the other. (People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]).
This being so, it is with more reason that a court which does not have
concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance of the case
does not also have the authority to issue writs or processes, including search
warrants, in connection with the pending case. Moreover, since the issuance
of a search warrant is an incident to a main case or is an exercise of the
ancillary jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has
exclusive jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in the issuance of all
writs and processes in connection therewith. Furthermore, instead of serving
the ends of justice, the exception may provide room for unwarranted abuse
of the judicial process, wreak judicial havoc and procedural complexities
which effective law enforcement apparently cannot justify. I cannot conceive
of any extreme and compelling circumstance which the court that first
acquired jurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meet within its broad
powers and authority.
In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examining my original view in this
case, I respectfully submit that:
1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed may
validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection
with said crime. However, in the National Capital Judicial Region,
Administrative Circulars No. 13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August
1987 must be observed.
2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the appropriate
court, search warrants in connection with the crime charged may only be
issued by said court.
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as
Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and
MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of
First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Juan T. David for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by
Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis,
Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police
Department, against Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment of the order issued by respondent
Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of March 7, 1967,
which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners
in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by
respondent Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any
manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the determination of this case this Court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Judge from executing, enforcing
and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said
case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a
certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the
following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders
of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of
Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1
at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went
after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks
consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of
Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau
of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their
cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
67496, alleging, among others, that Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having
purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that she hired the
trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657
Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police
Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo
Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods
contained therein be not examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally
assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the control and
supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming them to have been
misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and
Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge
that they were imported illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police
Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and
that unless restrained their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer
irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a
restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or their

agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of
the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their
favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex
parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No. 67496 now petitioners in the instant case
before this Court from opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of
the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order
was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the
Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city
fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case
No. 67496, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila
and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed,
on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks
and of their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court of
First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case,
the petition stated no cause of action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the
administrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs
had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties and charges thereon had not been
paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department had the power to make the seizure; that the
seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and
Customs Code could effect search, seizures and arrests in inland places in connection with the
enforcement of the said Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein
petitioners averred in the court below that the writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios
Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that the release of the goods, which were
subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of
Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa would not
suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of the restraining
order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and for the dismissal of the
case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the conformity of the parties,
ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the
representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center
of the Manila Police Department. On December 13, 1966, the above-named persons filed a
"Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to
release the goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of
prohibited importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her
posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their
opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the release of the goods

in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most of the goods, as
shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental
opposition was filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967
seizure proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila, and the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January
30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges
due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios
Mago filed an urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the
goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein
respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March
13, 1967, said respondent filed the corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the
Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to
hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they
had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the
present action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their
petition petitioners alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in
ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for the following reasons:
(1) the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over the
case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking
judicial intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its
agent in not collecting the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release
of the goods was grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in
this case. In their answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of
the lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue
the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long
before seizure, and identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were
instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could no longer go after the goods in
question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the
customs premises and were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that
respondent Remedios Mago was purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those
goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods
was affected by members of the Manila Police Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Customs and affected without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and
detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued by the Collector of
Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers

have no authority to seize the goods in question because they are not articles of prohibited
importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the present action because they had agreed
before the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any objection to the release of the goods
under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still be liable; and (8) that
the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with
jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess
and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and
penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and
other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question
were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the
payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port
of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties,
taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject
of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of
Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a
comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in
the bales upon examination and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared,
presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and
receipts of duties collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H
(the inventory contained in the "compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens
and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were
assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch
bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320
dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief
were declared, but in Annex H it appears that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2,
120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and another 200
dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to
forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
And this Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is
subject to forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 8
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the
customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said
goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police
Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been

formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained
jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon
the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties,
taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same
according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the
Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was
filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of
Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and
detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been
issued by the Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L24037, decided by this Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De
Joya case, it appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of
Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported
and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an
inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to leave the customs premises in Manila, on
October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them for further verification, and upon examination the
goods were found to be different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel.
Francindy Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the release of the
goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith of those goods; that a local purchaser was
involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods came
from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964, Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector
of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had
no jurisdiction over the goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was
not liable for duties and taxes because the transaction was not an original importation; that the
goods were not in the hands of the importer nor subject to importer's control, nor were the goods
imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and that the importation had
been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a warrant of
seizure and identification against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs
and the Collector of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending
seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The Court of First Instance held resolution on the motion to
dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First
Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy
Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of
Customs sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the resolution of their
motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered
them to comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy
Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon filed with this
Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. In
resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:

This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to
seize the goods and institute forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of
First Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition for mandamus to compel the Customs
authorities to release the goods?
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of first Instance
was filed (on October 26, 1964) ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure
and forfeiture (on November 12, 1964),the Customs bureau should yield the jurisdiction of
the said court.
The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on
October 6, 1964, i.e., before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the
seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were
paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23, 1964, Customs released 22 bales
thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu Port
(Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs
custody, these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code
(RA 1957).
The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues
from imported articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on
customs; and to enforce tariff and customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they
be found to have been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are
subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses
therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act
1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in
cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the
Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax
Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v.
Averia,supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such
law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are later enactments, the
Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods
are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously
been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In
the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4,

1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts.
Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in
question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January
12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was
only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when
the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction.
Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila
had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police
Department, could not seize the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot
be sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized
in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests,11 and it was his duty to make seizure,
among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to
forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and
examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause
to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law;
and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of
holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner
Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods
in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer
to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This
was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search
and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle.
He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure
without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not
require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under
Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine
any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said
"dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the
peace. . . ."17 It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling
house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799,
wherein the court, considering a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and
Customs Code, said as follows:

Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first
Congress, and in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the
necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a
dwelling house of similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a
movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a search warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it
was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search vessels within their own
and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on
which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty, or
had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the
person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods,
wares, or merchandise thereon, which they had probably cause to believe had been so
unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast
as well, for trial and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap.
100), for a year and expired. The Act of February 28, 1865, revived 2 of the Act of 1815,
above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The substance of this section was re-enacted
in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and was thereafter
embodied in the Revised Statutes as 3061, Comp. Stat. 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed.
p. 1161. Neither 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as
unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated as operative by this court in
Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not
have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition,
and amended petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege
that there was a search. 18All that they complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search
warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they were
detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would
be needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure
in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship,
motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190
N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question
raised by defendant's counsel was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched

without search warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence
in a trial for violation of the prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the negative,
urging the constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure
without a warrant, as is sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is
forbidden. . . .
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the
Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure
is or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has
multiplied by quantity production and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the
slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as
covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed
rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of
silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The
question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is
a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum
running," which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private
ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways.
Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law
especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they
are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of
common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper
administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon
a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final
analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which
it is made.
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the
goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had
acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff
laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal
and decisive issue in the present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the purposes of this
decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;
(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent
Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila;

(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967
restraining respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7,
1967 in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any
manner in said case;
(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
and

1wph1.t

(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
It is so ordered.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO

SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y
Ko guilty of violation of 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing
him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on
December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use
11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without
the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:

That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

[4]

When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,

whereupon he was tried.

Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico,

forensic chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics
Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10,
Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence established the
following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant [5] in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accusedappellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He
presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer,
he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took
place in accused-appellants room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by
accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a
search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along
with one civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the
warrant.[6]
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened
it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives
then forced the door open and entered the house. [7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his
group started searching the house.[8] They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing
a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be

marijuana wrapped in newsprint[9] having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams.

[10]
A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to
sign it.[11]
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station
10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. [12]
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. [13] The
white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a
small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves,
one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana. [14]
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was
corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were
about to leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their
house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed
over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof. [15]
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper
inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his
glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it. [16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house
while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag
containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods. [17]
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting
handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA,
Quezon City, where accused-appellant was detained. [18]
Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his
testimony. Arcano testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food,
and took away canned goods and other valuables. [19]

After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto
mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional;
and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of
marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to
law. The evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances
over to the National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH
WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT FOR VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2)

BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN
USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the
admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against
him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the
admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant
pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force by
the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure [21] provides that a
search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of
the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity
can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.
[22]
Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites
are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160
For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR.
INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA,
PNP that there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his
possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown
in Annex A, the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of
the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the abovestated properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the
law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite,
Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that
there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search
warrant was issued for more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be
searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause

The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride orshabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that
the search warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing the
existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be
seized by the trial court.[23]

The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence
officer who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance
of a search warrant on anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q - Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you remember
if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
A - Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San
Jose, Quezon City, sir.
Q - Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A - Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - Are you familiar with that place?
A - Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established contract
with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to the former.
Q - In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A - When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir.
Q - Were you able to buy at that time?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A - I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q - Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the stuff
(shabu) were being kept?
A - Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q - How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?

A - When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I saw that
the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q - Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A - Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is
genuine shabu?
A - After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and
reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12 grams of shabu I
bought from the subject.Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central
Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result for
shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95
dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q - Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A - Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy
bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q - Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A - Yes, sir.[24]

However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for
the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search
warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact
seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant
issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the
seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its
existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly described two
obscene books but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it
was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain
articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because
the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the
warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books, which

formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of
these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning
other articles. . . . In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a
warrant will be treated as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger
that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to
minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might
be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld
as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could
not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable
cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be
invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not
supported by the evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search
warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellants house for an undetermined
quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for
drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged

Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one
specific offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and
possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A.
No. 6425.[27] It will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of
this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection
with Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it
is clearly recited in the text thereof that There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo
Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo
City, has in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics
preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although the specific
section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable
cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the

particularity of the description to be made of the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. [28]
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for Violation of R.A.
6425, without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized
the search and seizure of dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic). This Court, however, upheld the validity of
the warrant:
Appellants contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1)
offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is
unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal
possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In
short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants,
one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and
the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous
drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and
penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same
class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for
the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30]
Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of
P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). The validity of the warrant was
questioned on the ground that it was issued without reference to any particular
provision in P.D. No. 1866, which punished several offenses. We held, however, that
while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal
possession of explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the decree is a codification of
the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which
offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of
firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the
violations under the various provisions of the said law.
Particularity of the Place

Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to
be searched with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon
City, the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No.
160 contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to
wit: 1) the application for search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched
was located in between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2)
the deposition of witness which described the premises as a house without a number
located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the
location of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who raided
appellants house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar
could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood
in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilars place is at the end of appellants
place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilars team is undeniably
appellants house and it was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even
first ascertained through their informant that appellant was inside his residence before
they actually started their operation.[32]
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended
to be searched.[33] For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment
Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it
turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the
ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each
floor. However, the description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit
supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the accused Morris
Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass. [34] In this case, the location of accusedappellants house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that
the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellants
residence, Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded
on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the

deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to
be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being
justified on the ground that the drug was seized within the plain view of the searching
party. This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented in evidence.[35] For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior
justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent
illegality of the evidence before the police. [36] The question is whether these requisites
were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence

Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to
the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of
the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the
plain view doctrine can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items
subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. [37]
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct
of a search pursuant to accused-appellants lawful arrest for possession
of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the

one arrested and the premises within his immediate control. [38] The rationale for
permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to
commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was
found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the
warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-appellants person or in an area within
his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted
after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in
his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence

The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality
to justify their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared
inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs
were contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents. We
explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of
the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the
bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police
officers eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the
inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their plain view, what may be said to be the object in their plain
view was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the
contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said
object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether
by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are
obvious to an observer.[40]
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process
when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.
[41]
In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant
was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent

container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible
as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were
discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the
marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the plain view
doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accusedappellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed
by the searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure [42] provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to
the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his
house to gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported
by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested
persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by accusedappellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duanos claim that they had to use some force in order to
gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accusedappellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked
on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of
the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching partys
forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of
their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y
Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term
ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and

two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of
11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accusedappellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the
confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila, Branch 33 and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Francisco SB Acejas III, Oscar S. Atencio, Rodolfo M. Capocyan, Ernesto P. Fernandez, Romulo B.
Macalintal, Rodrigo H. Melchor, Rudegelio D. Tacorda Virgilio L. Valle and Luciano D. Valencia for
petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated 9 March
1988 which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order
dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.
It appears that on 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special
Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals. an application1 for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH
WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled
"People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente, Defendant." In his application for search
warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw alleged, among others, as follows:
1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that
NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, Anonas St. Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or
possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and ammunition which are illegally

possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense which the

said NEMESIO PRUDENTE is keeping and concealing at the following premises of
the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, to wit:
a. Offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the
ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor;
b. Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second
Floor and other rooms at the second floor;
2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact, and
therefore, believes that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the
undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable
Court the following described properties:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and handgrenades; and,
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
In support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, OIC of the
Intelligence Section of (ISAD) executed a "Deposition of Witness" dated 31 October 1987,
subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge. In his deposition, P/Lt. Florenio Angeles
declared, inter alia, as follows:
Q: Do you know P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, the applicant for a
Search Warrant?
A: Yes, sir, he is the Chief, Intelligence and Special Action Division,
Western Police District.
Q: Do you know the premises of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila
A: Yes, sir, the said place has been the subject of our surveillance
and observation during the past few days.
Q: Do you have personal knowledge that in the said premises is kept
the following properties subject of the offense of violation of PD No.
1866 or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;

b. .38 and 45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

c. explosives and handgrenades; and d. Assorted weapons with ammunitions?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Do you know who is or who are the person or persons who has or
have control of the above-described premises?
A: Yes sir, it is Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines.
Q: How do you know that said property is subject of the offense of
violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 or intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense?
A: Sir, as a result of our continuous surveillance conducted for
several days, we gathered information from verified sources that the
holder of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren't
licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the
premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not
students who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and
ammunition.
On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 87-14, 3 the
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath
applicant ALLADIN M. DIMAGMALIW and his witness FLORENIO C. ANGELES that
there are good and sufficient reasons to believe (probable cause) that NEMESIO
PRUDENTE has in his control in the premises of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, properties which are subject
of the above offense or intended to be used as the means of committing the said
offense.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day or
night of the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly
(a) offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and
other rooms at the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at
PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith seize and take
possession of the following personal properties, to wit:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

c. explosives and hand grenades; and

d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
and bring the above described properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the
law directs.
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some 200
WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo
Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching team,
alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging
brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old
newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1) pc.M33 Fragmentation hand grenade
(live); (b) one (11) pc.M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.PRB423
Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the
complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts which
formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was
not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant,
for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge
one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the
Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search
warrant on a Saturday was urgent. 5
The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate and Legal Affairs Division,
WPD, opposed the motion. 6 After petitioner had filed his reply 7 to the opposition, he filed a
supplemental motion to quash. 8
Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge issued an order, 9denying the petitioner's motion and
supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 10 was likewise denied in the
order 11 dated 20 April 1988.
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent Judge has decided a question of
substance in a manner not in accord with law or applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, or that
the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing
the disputed orders.
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined
personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. 12 The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense 13 and the
judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. 14

The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched." 15 This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant
or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. 16
Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it was issued on the
basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal knowledge of the applicant and
his witness but based on hearsay evidence. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin
Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and
possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and
found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles
declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days, they "gathered
informations from verified sources" that the holders of the said fire arms and explosives are not
licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned search
warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons.
While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated
that he verified the information he had earlier received that petitioner had in his possession and
custody the t there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified
the earlier information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such information to
be a fact. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and answers, but
there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not, visa-vis the said applicant.
What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the only support to P/Major
Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay. For, it avers that they
(presumably, the police authorities) had conducted continuous surveillance for several days of the
suspected premises and, as a result thereof, they "gathered information from verified sources" that
the holders of the subject firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 17 this Court laid the following test in determining whether the
allegations in an application for search warrant or in a supporting deposition, are based on personal
knowledge or not
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged
thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath required must
refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant for
search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person
whom one considers to be reliable.
Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in his deposition, do not
come up to the level of facts of his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable
for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant.

In the same Alvarez case, 18 the applicant stated that his purpose for applying for a search warrant was
that: "It had been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are being kept in
said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as a money lender, challenging usurious rate of interests, in violation of law." The Court held that
this was insufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.
In People vs. Sy Juco, 19 where the affidavit contained an allegation that there had been a report to the
affiant by a person whom lie considered reliable that in said premises were "fraudulent books,
correspondence and records," this was likewise held as not sufficient for the purpose of issuing a search
warrant. Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the
declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid
search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case:
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
Besides, respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by the Rules of
Court. As held in Roan v. Gonzales, 20 "(m)ere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus
not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record."
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short.
Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers." On the
contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held
in Quintero vs. NBI," 21 the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's
witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the
deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would
not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant."
Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence of probable cause to justify
the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also notes post facto that the search in question
yielded, no armalites, handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated in the
application for search warrant, the supporting deposition, and the search warrant the supporting
hand grenades were itself Only three (3) live fragmentation found in the searched premises of the
PUP, according to the affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for determination of "probable
cause" in the valid issuance of a search warrant, as enunciated in earlier cases. True, these
requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual
against unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.
Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to particularly
describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms at the ground floor and
the second floor of the PUP.

The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended . 22 In the case at bar, the application
for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of
the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more
particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the
Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor.
The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a
search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at
the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.
Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the ground that it was issued in
violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in connection with one specific offense.
The search warrant issued by respondent judge, according to petitioner, was issued without any
reference to any particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated when allegedly P.D. No. 1866
punishes several offenses.
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 23 Where the warrants involved were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," the Court held that no specific offense
had been alleged in the applications for a search warrant, and that it would be a legal hearsay of the
highest order to convict anybody of a "Violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code" without reference to any determinate provision of said laws and
codes.
In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of PD
No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) While the said decree punishes several offenses, the
alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As
explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other
words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score. Besides,
while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal
possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said
decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or
belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms,
etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As observed by respondent Judge: 24
The grammatical syntax of the phraseology comparative with the title of PD 1866 can
only mean that illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, have
been codified under Section 1 of said Presidential Decree so much so that the
second and third are forthrightly species of illegal possession of firearms under
Section (1) thereof It has long been a practice in the investigative and prosecution
arm of the government, to designate the crime of illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives as 'illegal possession of firearms, etc.' The Constitution
as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not recognize the issuance of one
search warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of

ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of explosives. Neither is the filing of
three different informations for each of the above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of
Court. The usual practice adopted by the courts is to file a single information for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. This practice is considered to be in
accordance with Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides that: 'A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except
only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses. Describably, the servers did not search for articles other than firearms,
ammunitions and explosives. The issuance of Search Warrant No. 87-14 is deemed
profoundly consistent with said rule and is therefore valid and enforceable.
(Emphasis supplied)
Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the applicant to state, under
oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the search warrant, his application having been filed on a
Saturday, rendered the questioned warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular No. 19,
dated 14 August 1987, which reads:
3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays shall
likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the court having
jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify
and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that the issuance is
urgent.
it would suffice to state that the above section of the circular merely provides for a guideline,
departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an otherwise valid search warrant.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders dated
9 March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search Warrant No. 87-14 are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.
The three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades which, according to Ricardo Y. Abando, a member of
the searching team, were seized in the washroom of petitioner's office at the PUP, are ordered
delivered to the Chief, Philippine Constabulary for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO
M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ARTURO
LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR ALCORDO,
JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN DOE, Respondents.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin, for Petitioners.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V . Bautista, Solicitor Pedro
A. Ramirez and Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for Respondents.

DECISION

VILLAMOR, J.:

This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its President, Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to
declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge on February 25, 1970; to
order respondents to desist from enforcing the same and/or keeping the documents, papers and effects
seized by virtue thereof, as well as from enforcing the tax assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by
petitioners to have been made on the basis of the said documents, papers and effects, and to order the
return of the latter to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition but did not issue the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for therein.
The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as follows:

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On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against
petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue
Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file the application for search warrant
which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent
Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers:
respondent Veras aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still
unsigned by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De
Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not
yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had
adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer,
upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge
asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and
without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leons
application for search warrant and respondent Logronios deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then
sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search warrant
petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners lawyers
protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the
warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of documents.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search
warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be
issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay
petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorneys fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru
the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent
Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the
meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on petitioner
corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized.
Petitioners came to this Court.
The petition should be granted for the following reasons:

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1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court are:

jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable

searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)
"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him."
(Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3,
of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be conducted by
the judge himself and not by others. The phrase "which shall be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce," appearing in the said
constitutional provision, was introduced by Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft submitted by
the Sub-Committee of Seven. The following discussion in the Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings
of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is enlightening:
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"SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compaero los piropos y vamos al grano.

En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para que no se frusten los fines de la justicia
mediante el registro inmediato y la incautacion del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su Seoria que causaria cierta
demora el procedimiento apuntado en su enmienda en tal forma que podria frustrar los fines de la justicia o
si Su Seoria encuentra un remedio para esto casos con el fin de compaginar los fines de la justicia con los
derechos del individuo en su persona, bienes etcetera, etcetera.
"SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la practica el caso hipottico que Su Seoria pregunta por la siguiente
razon: el que solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y ese escrito no aparecer en
la Mesa del Juez sin que alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese escrito o peticion de sucuestro. Esa persona
que presenta el registro puede ser el mismo denunciante o alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento
de registro. Ahora toda la enmienda en esos casos consiste en que haya peticion de registro y el juez no se
atendra solamente a sea peticion sino que el juez examiner a ese denunciante y si tiene testigos tambin
examiner a los testigos.
"SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Seoria que el tomar le declaracion de ese denunciante por escrito siempre
requeriria algun tiempo?.
"SR. FRANCISCO. Seria cuestio de un par de horas, pero por otro lado minimizamos en todo lo posible las
vejaciones injustas con la expedicion arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro. Creo que entre dos males
debemos escoger. el menor.
x

"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are incorporating in our
constitution something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge could issue a search warrant, he
must be under the obligation to examine personally under oath the complainant and if he has any witness,
the witnesses that he may produce . . ."
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The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for it
requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to "personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce . . ."
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Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to
determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the

Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of
warrants except "upon probable cause." The determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls
for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in
the absence of any rule to the contrary.
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant
(respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the complainants
application for search warrant and the witness printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before
respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly
be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the
participants seem to have attached so little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before
respondent Judge were not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the salient facts. The
transcript of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of
this case in the court below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V. Gonzales,
Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his witness, and that
stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge was at the sala
hearing a case. After respondent Judge was through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer
Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness Logronio went to respondent Judges chamber and informed the
Judge that they had finished the depositions. Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to
him her stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as follows:
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"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or instructed them,
requested Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will be found to be false and
without legal basis, he can be charged criminally for perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio whether
he affirms the facts contained in his deposition and the affidavit executed before Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.
"Q And thereafter?
"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.
"Q Who is this he?
"A The Honorable Judge.
"Q The deposition or the affidavit?
"A The affidavit, Your Honor."

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Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.

The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of her notes, to a few words of warning
against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This
cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his
witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the
rules require a personal examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of the intention of the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be consumed by the judge in
examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings quoted
above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance
with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and followup questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These
were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was
probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code
in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209." The question
is: Was the said search warrant issued "in connection with one specific offense," as required by Sec. 3, Rule
126?

To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code referred to
above. Thus we find the following:
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Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.

Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.
Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false and fraudulent
returns.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the information
required under the Tax Code.
Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures any article
subject to a specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids or abets in the conduct
of illicit distilling, rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any article subject to specific tax . . .,"
and provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership, or association, the official and/or employee who
caused the violation shall be responsible.
Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of output
removed, or to pay the tax due thereon.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is
the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated.
The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of
Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to
make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due
thereon). Even in their classification the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two different titles:
Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under Title V
(Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383), is not
applicable, because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued for violation
of only one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code. The distinction more apparent than real, because
it was precisely on account of the Stonehill incident, which occurred sometime before the present Rules of
Court took effect on January 1, 1964, that this Court amended the former rule by inserting therein the
phrase "in connection with one specific offense," and adding the sentence "No search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill:
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"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense."
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this
manner:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements
books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts,
promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and
business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."
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The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, said:

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"The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
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Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions
of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned
the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly
described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants."
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While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said warrant
nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general
warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of petitioner
corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the
purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized, to wit:
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". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search
warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made,
that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is
borne out by American authorities."
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The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued in
this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is
as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised
Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles
desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and
seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained
in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other
pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts,
promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals,
records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of respondent Judges order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In the first
place, when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and
passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can
be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo, etc., Et. Al. v. Ago, Et Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the
second place, the rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ
of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the circumstances.
(Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of the essence in view of the tax
assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against
petitioner corporation, On account of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary. (Matute
v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the
deprivation of petitioners fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court
below not only with irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., supra.)

It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against unreasonable
search and seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which is
charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the
exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such corporation, we
do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the 4th
Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of
individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it
waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without
compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected, under the 14th
Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)
"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule applied to
a corporation, the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a
corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have been
achieved in a lawful way." (Silverthorne Lumber Company, Et. Al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385,
64 L. ed. 319.)
In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to
object against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:
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"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations,
whatever, the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners
herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity . . ."
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In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and
effects were searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the corporation to whom the
seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score,
petitioner corporation here stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill.
The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely as claimed by petitioners at
least partly as in effect admitted by respondents based on the documents seized by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were made some one and one-half months
after the search and seizure on February 25, 1970, is a strong indication that the documents thus seized
served as basis for the assessments. Those assessments should therefore not be enforced.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by
respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing the said
search warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized thereunder are ordered to be returned to
petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau of Internal Revenue and their representatives are
permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in Annex "G" of the present petition, as
well as other assessments based on the documents, papers and effects seized under the search warrant
herein nullified, and from using the same against petitioners in any criminal or other proceeding. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs with Mr. Justice Barredo.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.