08-Rozman-Can Confucianism Survive in Universalism and Globalization

Can Confucianism Survive in an Age of Universalism and Globalization?
Author(s): Gilbert Rozman

Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Spring, 2002), pp. 11-37
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4127239
Accessed: 30-09-2016 10:31 UTC
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4127239?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to Pacific Affairs
This content downloaded from 115.145.25.109 on Fri, 30 Sep 2016 10:31:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Can Confucianism Survive
in an Age of Universalism
and Globalization?
Gilbert Rozman
Conventional wisdom sees the last quarter of the twentieth century as

the death knell of Confucianism.' What had been the dominant way
of thinking and social behaviour in China, Japan, and Korea for
centuries found new expression, but no lasting foundation, in each country,
as in Taiwan and Singapore.2 Each nation had championed its Confucian

identity, whether it was called that or not,3 but later drew back. While global
fascination rose over a cultural disposition seen as positive for meeting the
challenges of one era, it fell with doubts about any utility in the next. Now
globalization via WTO and democratization in South Korea and Taiwan are
eroding lingering ideals. It is tempting to simply forget about Confucianism
and fix our gaze on the requirements of a different era.
Recent discourse supports such an outlook. After the Asian financial crisis,
defenders of Confucianism are barely visible. In China the state has turned
to great power nationalism rather than Eastern values.4 The interlopers in
Southeast Asia who pretended that "Asian values" are synonymous with
1 I am grateful to the Department of Sociology ofYonsei University, chaired by Lew Seok-choon,

for giving me an opportunity to present a draft of this paper while I was a visiting professor in the fall
of 2000, and to Hahm Chaibong for stimulating my interest in Korean Confucianism and serving as
discussant for the paper. I also want to thank the Yonsei graduate students who assisted as language
instructors.
2 Countries have taken their turn as the favourite example for advocates of Confucian continuities.
First, Japan's distinct social relations took centre stage; Ronald Dore, ed., Aspects of Social Change in
Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). Next Taiwan was cited as the only "country
where Confucianism is officially worshipped;" Hung-chao Tai, ed., Confucianism and Economic Development:
An Oriental Alternative (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute Press, 1989), p. 4. Singapore then
claimed the mantle of most Confucian. Kishore Mahbubani, Can Asians Think? (Singapore: Times
Editions, 1998). Finally, after growing infatuation with the idea that Eastern civilization is on the rise,
Chinese cultural nationalism claimed to be its new standard-bearer. Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese
Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999). South Korea may have the best case of all, as discussed in this paper.
3 In Japan the term nihonjinron the "theory of being Japanese" combines elements of
Confucianism with nativist beliefs. In China the term dongfang wenming"Eastern civilization" embraces
Confucian traditions; even "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is used to convey these traditions.
Yet, in every corner of the region there is agreement on the term for Confucianism with the same
characters - rujiao, jukyo, yugyo.
4 Gilbert Rozman, "China's Quest for a Great Power Identity," Orbis, vol. 3, no. 3, (Summer
1999), pp. 383-402.
11
Pacific Affairs: Spring 2002
Confucianism have been exposed. Japanese have quieted about nihonjinron

(discussions about what is distinctive about being Japanese) which at root
was largely a variant of Confucianism.5 The battle against terrorism launched
by the U.S. in 2001 calls for a unified civilization, casting doubt on divisive
thinking. Critics are emboldened.' The Left, never comfortable with

explanations based on traditional values rather than class struggle and
opposition to neo-imperialism, discovered that Confucian values are just a
new form of "orientalism," seeing the "other" as different through

ethnocentric eyes.' Other academics jumped at the chance to discredit
Confucianism as the basis of political authoritarianism and the model of
crony capitalism in development; economists and political economists
welcomed this as confirmation that "fuzzy" cultural explanations lack any
scientific basis. Sociologists added that Confucianism is a system of belief
and social practices that sustains particularism or choosing people on the
basis of who they are rather than what they can do, making it incompatible
with the competitive pressures of our times when democratic, modernized

countries require universalism to compete. Is there more to be said about
what is seen as just another variety of nationalist bravado - one more fad of
recent intellectual discourse?
This paper argues that the battle is not over. Before we read its obituary, let
pause to consider one more time from a comparative perspective what
Confucianism was, why it declined, the reasons for its recent rise and fall, an
possibilities for its eventual resurgence. We should do this not in the manner
of boosters who champion the civilizing, moral qualities of Confucianism as a
reproof to modern excesses, but from a long-term perspective of t
compatibility of its practices with modernization and globalization and the valu
of its legacy for nations in a time of rising regionalism and changing global
environment. Whether confident from success in a new round of competition
or frustrated from failure, East Asian states singly and as a group are likely
take a fresh look at their traditions. Highlighting the case of South Korea mak
sense: It is the most Confucian country,s and it has seen the most intense deba
over the prospects for Confucianism.'
5 Harumi Befu, "Nationalism and Nihonjinron," in Harumi Befu, ed., Cultural Nationalism in
East Asia: Representation and Identity (Berkeley: Inst. of East Asian Studies, University of California
1993), pp. 107-35.
6 Jun Sang-in, "No (Logical) Place for Asian Values in East Asia's Economic Development
Development and Society, vol. 28, no. 2, (December 1999), pp. 191-204.
7 Chaibong Hahm, "How the East Was Won: Orientalism and the New Confucian Discourse
East Asia," (Seoul: unpublished ms., 2000).
8 Koh Byong-ik, "Confucianism in Contemporary Korea," in Tu Wei-Ming, ed., Confuci
Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mi
Dragons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 191.
9 The question of Confucianism's viability is being taken most seriously in Korea. While t
literature on Confucianism has faded elsewhere, Korean academics continue to give the subject clos
attention. See for example Hahm Chaibong, Yugyo chabonjuwi minjujuwi (Seoul: Chontong kwa hyond
2000), and the 1998-99 issues of thejournals of Chontong kwa hyondae and Tongasia munhwa wa sasan
12
Can Confucianism Survive?
What is Confucianism and Why Does It Matter?

Many have tried to answer the question of what we mean by this concept
that seems to be a cross between religion, way of life, system of belief about
society, and state ideology. In order to analyze its survival we must side with
those who find it embedded in social structure and individual attitudes as
well as in an embracing state-backed intellectual edifice. Confucianism

Qing dynasty China, Tokugawa Japan and Choson Korea served until
arrival of Western powers as the dominant way of interpreting the world

performing rituals related to state and society. After the loss of hegemony
a national orthodoxy, it did notjust disappear; remnants remain at the mic
level of family and community, the intermediate tier of the educational sys
and business enterprises, and the macro-level of the state and its guid
thought. Local elites had a vested stake in reinforcing Confucianism.'o
trace the presence of its elements we must be alert to its mult
manifestations, whether called Confucianism or obscured with other labels.
Often mentioned in a synopsis of core elements are: familyism focused
solidarity and social mobility, thirst for education centred on mastery of de
and social mobility, support of paternalism in return for benevolence
community, competition where the state (despite a guiding spirit) limits it
intervention in markets, a high moral cause aided by rituals and claim
serving society, and the hierarchy seen in bureaucratic authority and seniori
To trace change from era to era it is best to treat specific manifestations a
one time in history as if they are not indispensable for survival of the tradit
Confucianism in some sense collapsed throughout the region with
fall of the premodern order, but in other ways it survived to today. Its colla
is easily understood by social scientists. While it had, over a long hist

promoted elements of universalism rare in premodern times, the force
particularism had become so deeply entrenched that little structural reform
was occurring." With the failure of each national system under the n
circumstances after 1840, a natural reaction was to blame Confucianism.
Koreans blamed it for national weakness and intellectual blindness, allowing

Korea to fall under Japanese colonialism. Elsewhere it had also failed to
promote changes that had come only in the West, and then it had delayed
the necessary response to the increasingly assertive, but also appealingly
modem, Western states. Its visible symbols under strong attack, Confucianism
seemed to be disappearing. Everywhere newly risen elites looked elsewhere
10 Kim Kwang-ok, "The Reproduction of Confucian Culture in Contemporary Korea: An

Anthropological Study," in Tu Wei-Ming, ed., Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity, pp. 202-27.
11 T. R. Reid, Confucius Lives Next Door: What Living in the East Teaches Us about Living in the West
(New York: Random House, 1999).
12 Some changes continued. For instance, instead of seeing China as stagnant in the sixteenth to
eighteenth centuries, we would highlight the rise of both sub-elites imitating and competing with the
local gentry and merchant groups embracing Confucian ideals. They broadened the base of Confucian
social behaviour.
13
for a national identity befitting a world order of "modernize and militarize"
or perish. Capitalism, communism, and a variant of militarism promised

national strength and prosperity; Confucianism was rooted in bygone days
with no vision of the modern world. On the surface, formal institutions were
fading fast; beneath the surface a way of life, a system of beliefs, and a core
for national resurgence could not be easily dislodged.

In hindsight we observe that forces steeped in Confucianism survived,
acquiring new vitality. Civil codes recognized increased equality in the family,
but drew the line well short of what is commonplace in the West, making
renewed family solidarity a means to household entrepreneurship and longterm planning to counter anomie and disruptive mobility. Families led the
way in the prosperity of small-scale enterprises and, despite rapid changes,
preservation of social order. Even when large enterprises set the pace for development, family farming or shops became a bulwark of society. Especially South
Koreans retain confidence in the micro-level traditions shaping their lives.

After Confucian examination systems were cancelled in China and Korea,
these nations as well as Japan became obsessed with nation-wide exams
leading to higher education and prestigious careers. If the content of learning
largely duplicated that taught in the West, youngsters impressed the world
with mastery of the facts. Although self-criticism mounted about insufficient
creativity and discouraged dropouts, pride continues in the studious habits

and fundamental skills of the majority. However intense the debates on
reform, few expect to lose the benefits of the educational drive nurtured by
tradition.
New enterprises found ways of expressing paternalism - through extended
family ties or corporate loyalty training - aimed at creating a community

willing to sacrifice for business success. If the framework of modern business
organizations largely seems familiar, nowhere else have such diligent labour
patterns emerged and worked. Each East Asian state has sought to keep this
foundation even after recognizing that industriousness is not enough for
global competition and the satisfaction of younger generations.
As the successor states in the East Asian region gained confidence from
economic success, they articulated a national identity drawing heavily on
Confucian characteristics, even at times crediting this tradition. The resulting
national loyalties are deep and clearly focused on catching up, that is, more
accepting of sacrifice and state leadership than in the West. Elites do not
seem to be in a rush to forego these emotional ties to the state.
Critics deserve credit for not losing sight of the changes required in
advanced stages of modernization and newfound globalization, warning that
particularism could derail these same countries or lead to misleading ideals
of a different route to a world order."3 After all, defenders of the tradition
13 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1997), pp. 46-47.
14
have fiercely resisted such obvious forces of modernity as: equal

encouragement of education and careers for women; suitable rewards and
advancement for young workers and professionals based on their talent; or
openness to international firms or schools that challenge vested interests
and cater to individualism.
The term "Confucianization" helps us to trace changes for the three
countries of East Asia over one to two thousand years,14 while "de
Confucianization" was a process over the past century. Since the Confucia
tradition became a way of life, analyzing it does not take the form of asking
how many believers there are, but determining how widespread an
embedded its practices are. The degree of its presence can be visualized
along a rising and later a descending curve. Comparisons are easier if w
divide practices into: imperial or state, reform, elite, mass, and merchant or
enterprise Confucianism.'5
History reveals a continuous process of social integration, widening circles
of exchange and cooperation, and a deepening in the degree of interactio

over wider areas. This was true over several millennia prior to the start
modernization in East Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century
and it has accelerated in each subsequent stage of history.16 Social integration

takes many forms, three of which are marketing, migration and mobility."
Rules for coping with integration can be particularistic, favouring those with
desired background traits or ascriptive qualifications not germane to th

task at hand, or they can be universalistic. Competition is the means t
universalism through markets where goods are bought and sold, throug
exams and freedom to buy and sell property that favour mobility, and through
freedom of movement across ever larger territories. But plans for instan
removal of boundaries may cause disruptions that could be avoided by
gradual changes. They may actually lower levels of social integration or creat
a narrow type of administrative mobilization with reduced levels of trus
De-Confucianization must be seen through the lens of growing soci

integration, not campaigns from above.
In our new age the pressures for globalization and universalism ar
mounting and becoming closely intertwined. Some come from the "glob
14 Patricia Ebrey, JaHyun Kim Haboush, and Martin Collcutt took parallel approaches to th
history of Confucianization in Gilbert Rozman, ed., The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and I
Modern Adaptation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). See "The Chinese Family and Spre
of Confucian Values," pp. 45-83, "The Confucianization of Korean Society," pp. 84-110; and "T
Legacy of Confucianism in Japan," pp. 111-54.

15 Gilbert Rozman, "Comparisons of Modern Confucian Values in China andJapan," in Gilbe
Rozman, ed., The East Asian Region, pp. 157-203.
16 I proposed a framework for comparing premodern social integration in Gilbert Rozman, Urba
Networks in Ch 'ing China and TokugawaJapan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) and Urb
Networks in Russia, 1750-1800, and Premodern Periodization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976
17 For comparisons of these three types of social integration at different stages of modernization
see Cyril E. Black, et al., The Modernization of Japan and Russia (New York: The Free Press, 197
andGilbert Rozman, ed., The Modernization of China (NewYork: The Free Press, 1980).
15
community" centred in the West; domestic forces are playing a growing role
too.'s The most modernized sectors and those whose talents have not been
well utilized or rewarded because of discrimination lead the way. The

challenge for the Confucian backers is to accept enough of the currents of
globalization and universalism to enable essential practices to survive. The
primary force in their way may not be the advocates of Western-style
universalism, but the vested interests who cling to incompatible forms of
tradition and insist that they are defending the heritage. Below these groups
are labelled, respectively, globalizers and Confucianists. The discussion also

includes regionalizers, who press for more cooperation in East Asia.
Confucianization and De-Confucianization
On the basis of the writings of Confucius and his disciples, Ch
institutionalized for 2,000 years a system of particularistic social relat

punctuated by major elements of universalism. Premodern societies
overwhelmingly on particularism; the dearth of universalism did not
East Asia at a disadvantage nor was competition with states in the Wes
issue. Societies faced new challenges as the scale of administrative con
grew, marketing expanded, and greater social complexity required m
ways of dealing with people from afar with diverse backgrounds. In t
process of parallel evolution, Confucianism proved its advantage
facilitated the strengthening of family and lineage solidarity, an esse
foundation that, by entrusting families to control deviance and save face b
following ideal ethical standards, reduced much of the arbitrariness of

life."9 Its precepts aided in the growth of a national bureaucracy needed f
the administration of a large-scale territory, carrying important elements
universalism in the recruitment and deployment of officials. Stress
education for large numbers of males, linked to an examination system, w
perhaps the supreme premodern universalistic achievement.
It is no wonder that East Asian societies maintained unprecedented le
of social integration over many centuries. Nowhere else did administr
stability over large-scale states or reliance on a dispersed educated e
compare to the records of China, Korea andJapan. EvenJapanese samu
initially steeped in military prowess, under the influence of "
Confucianism" became a well-educated class with a strong sense of ho

that served to maintain social order.20 Unusual in assuming the goodne
18 Advocates of modernization theory long pressed the significance of increasing univer
from both international and domestic sources. See MarionJ. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Structu
Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

19 Marion J. Levy, The Family Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Unive
Press, 1947).
20 Eiko Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
16
human nature and extending the attitudes and rituals of civilization to the
population as a whole, all three had Confucianized to the extent that "mass
Confucianism" was deeply rooted by 1800. And, despite bias against

merchants shared by most premodern societies, China was the first country
to see periodic markets spread across the countryside, while Japan exceeded
China by 1800 in the intensity of its "merchant Confucianism" centred on
applying the principles of this worldview to commercial houses. Measures of
social integration such as urbanization indicate a long history of East Asian
precocity.21
What works for one stage of history may not be an advantage at another.
East Asian universalistic elements rested on a solid platform of particularism.
No new pattern of cross-national integration or social class opposition had

shaken this foundation. Except for Japan's impersonal forces overcoming
the formal rigidity of "centralized feudalism," internal forces of competition
brought few institutional adjustments. Reaching a peak, Confucianization

endured with no intellectual challenger: imperial Confucianism became
more rigid, reform lost its vigour, and merchant Confucianism remained
narrowly confined. Mass Confucianism's late diffusion in societies already
quite commercialized, urbanized and literate narrowed the options for
change. Tightened restrictions on youth and women, symbolized by footbinding in China and harsher patriarchy in Korea, slowed the shift from
familial to intermediate organizations. Universalism stalled in the region.22
One reason that Confucianization failed to give way to de-Confucianization
was the weakness of regional networks across East Asia that could have forced
competition.23 Integration limited to a national context allowed various types
of particularism to go unchallenged. Although the tradition had nurtured

important elements of universalism, they needed outside competition to
transform their scope of operation. Failing to achieve this gradually, East
Asian countries faced severe disruption when it was forced on them. Lacking
the competitive forces of China due in part to its great size and ofJapan due
to its feudal roots, Korea may have faced the hardest transition. Choson
Korea was the most thoroughly Confucianized.24 Despite the absence of
dogmatic moral certitude,25 full-scale Confucianization brought growing
21 Gilbert Rozman, "Urban Networks and Historical Stages," in Theodore K. Rabb and Robert I.
Rotberg, eds., Industrialization and Urbanization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp.
257-84.
22 John W. Hall's work on the Tokugawa era analyzes the spread of impersonal arrangements, on
which I elaborated in "Social Change," Marius B.Jansen, ed., The Cambridge History ofJapan, Vol. 5: The
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 499-568.
23 Gilbert Rozman, "East Asian Urbanization in the Nineteenth Century: Comparisons with
Europe," A. Van der Woude, et.al., eds., Urbanization in History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp.
61-73.
24 Tu Wei-Ming, "Confucius and Confucianism," in Walter H. Slote and George A. DeVos, eds.,
Confucianism and the Family (Albany: SUNY, Albany, 1998), p. 30.
25 F. W. Mote, Imperial China 900-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 959.
17
rigidity, especially in Korea, due to ritual formality or new methods of local
social control."26 Greater social engineering from the top and tighter elite
order than in China left less flexibility,2" and Korea was less commercialized
than China and Japan.28 From historical comparisons we may rank Japan,
China and Korea in that order as prepared for the challenges of de-
Confucianization.
From their forced opening until World War I, East Asian states scrambled
to save their sovereignty, adopting elements of universalism to surviv

Imperial Confucianism ended with the fall of dynasties in China and Kor
and its weaker form in Japan gave way quickly to a modern, centralized stat
After the abolition of the examination system, elite Confucianism fade

but aging degree holders retained prestige. Mass Confucianism fared bett
courtesy of the family system and the slow changes in rural society. Even in
modern ministries and commercial enterprises elements of the elite an

mass traditions survived. Societies steeped in Confucianism took a short
to modernization by drawing on familiar particularistic patterns, afte
essential breakthroughs in de-Confucianization.
Led by Japan, countries launched vast reforms. As latecomers t

modernization, this meant top-down, state-initiated change. Lacki
democratic traditions or a balancing role for civil society, officials exercised

great power. To ensure trustworthy colleagues and subordinates they invoke
particularistic associations. Thus, centralization drew on nepotism, region

ties and school ties. For decades the greatest dangers were political disord
or weak state capacity in pursuit of rapid reform.Japan's mix of particularis
and universalism worked fastest. China had trouble forging new means
universalism, having depended on those that did not survive and o
particularistic local connections. Korea had little time to reform before
faced Japan's mix of colonial particularism with elements of universalism. A
path of dismantling Confucianism with only slow advances in universali
was a formula for social disorder in China and social discontent in Korea.
The primary goal was to remove unequal treaties and be treated as f
members of the world community. The particularistic ways of Confucianism
embraced by forces resistant to these changes and weakening the mod
state, stood in the way. Ironically, nationalist successes in restoring the sta
wound up invoking a Confucian universalistic call for a benevolent stat

look after all the people as well as deep-seated particularistic methods
prop up authority. Imperial and mass Confucianism found new express
26 Haejoang Cho, "Male Dominance and Mother Power: The Two Sides of Confucian Patriarc
in Slote and DeVos, eds., Confucianism and the Family, pp. 195-96.
27 Martina Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideo
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 290-92.
28 James B. Palais, ed., Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions (Seattle: University of Washin
Press, 1996), pp. 966-84.
18
after egregious symbols - the ritual role of the emperor, blind marriages,
etc. - were gone.
It proved easier to build a strong state than a vibrant society. New regimes
looked for allies in centralization, more concerned about increased

integration within their own national boundaries than opening borders to
the outside world. This led to a more benevolent attitude toward Confucian
traditions. First, the sort of particularistic ties that Confucianism encouraged
could serve an authoritarian leadership able to reward local elites with jobs,
government contracts and recognition of their autonomous control. Second,
at this stage the masses were quite removed from initial modernization in
the cities and could be better quieted by reaffirming their traditions than
reversing them. Third, traditional elements supportive of centralization came
in handy. Leaders reasserted links between filial piety and loyalty, emphasized
the responsibility of the state to put the society in order, and capitalized on
suspicions toward intermediate organizations between the state and kinship
groups to question the legitimacy of potential rivals for power.
By the 1930s Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany and militaristJapan all combined
modernization of their economies with state mobilization and expansionism.
As a colony of Japan, Korea had no choice but to be part of this strategy.
Nationalist China emulated the organizational forms of administrative
centralization and state-led capitalism. In each case, nationalistic
emotionalism operated against international integration with the West. At

the same time, a favoured ideology glorified newfound programs for social
integration at the national level. Stalin's five-year plans showed the way to
expand mobility and migration, while diminishing local restraints to central
power. Japan relied more on the ie, the corporate household, as a strong
unit of solidarity as well as community integration through the village and
the neighbourhood association. In practice, a form of imperial Confucianism
was given new life, while mass Confucianism found the environment quite
unthreatening. Modernization proceeded without removing as much

particularism as in the West. Japan mixed attacks on Korea's Confucian
traditions with reliance on its legacy.29 Confucianists resisted forced Shintoism
or depravations against Korean culture, helping to retain the tradition's
prestige, while cooperating with authority more than Christians and
Buddhists.so
The interwar era with its world depression brought little globalization.
Strong states extending nationalism beyond their borders forced regional
integration on other peoples, but with high degrees of particularism,

rewarding loyalty and punishing resistance. Confucianism failed to acquire
29 NormanJacobs, The Korean Road to Modernization andDevelopment (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1985), p. 242.

Anthropological Study," pp. 214-16. 221-22.
19
an internationalist dimension. Educational expansion with a growing role

for stiff exam competition, bureaucratization and enterprise paternalism
did not become integral to global networks. State dominance left reform
Confucianism dormant and reduced elite Confucianism to the extent that
those who did not embrace nationalism turned primarily to foreign ideologies
such as socialism or liberalism. Modernization through mobilization before

1945 was working against globalization. This was fertile soil for the legacy of
imperial Confucianism to reassert itself and for the state to use mass
Confucianism against an individualism blamed on the West.
Japan set the pace for unbalanced modernization relying on state
benevolence, family solidarity and company paternalism. A new wave of

reforms would be needed to allow more scope to the individual and bottomup forces that were emerging, but they would not eliminate the hold of
Confucian forms of particularism. Korea and Taiwan experienced early
modernization as Japanese colonies, imbibing a mix of particularism and
newfound universalism. China's modernization had barely begun in most
areas; so communists could use Confucian ways even as they denounced
everything Confucian.
From the end of the 1940s East Asia divided into two. In China and North
Korea the mobilization of the previous era persisted. Given low levels of
development, there was ample room for extending this model, even if its
application invoked extreme levels of mobilization that left no room for
Confucian particularism. At times of radicalism, as in the Great Leap Forward

and the Cultural Revolution, attacks against Confucianism grew intense, but
communist control failed to produce stable universalism, degenerating into

political particularism, patron-client relations or "neo-traditionalism."3'
When radicalism subsided, Confucian elements had room for development
in the vacuum left by the state's overreaching power. At Mao Zedong's death,
China's patriarchal rural family was largely intact, although the extended
family system had been lost; the rural community was mostly self-reliant,
despite losing mobility as state policies operated against the market; and no
civil society limited the state, with its enduring moral superiority and top
down assertiveness. Denouncing Confucian particularism without replacing
it, socialism achieved very unbalanced modernization and created strong
barriers to globalization.
InJapan and Korea and, differently, Taiwan and Singapore, Confucianism
found new life in the economic and political model chosen for integration
into the Western bloc. This may be surprising because these four areas
experienced the fastest modernization in world history during the decades
of the 1950s to the 1980s. Indeed, it may be in part because of the speed of
the transition that particularistic elements played a large role even as
31 Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1986).
20
universalistic ones expanded rapidly. Also important was a decision in each

country to counteract Westernization and bolster authority by a new stress
on moral education. In Korea the 1968 presidential Charter of National
Education calling for diligence, thrift, loyalty and cooperation epitomized
this approach.32 Lacking the sweeping challenge to tradition and family
solidarity of Chinese communism or Japanese liberalism, Korea retained
more Confucian elements.33 South Koreans see their country not only as
closer to China than Japan, but in administrative culture and familyism more
Confucian than China.34 They overlook similarities in state-business relations
to Japan's zaibatsu (business conglomerates) rooted in the colonial era and
continuities in the modernization model chosen in the 1960s."5
Japan, of course, led the way, inheriting a prewar foundation for

modernization. Its state had been transformed by the American occupation
and a popular fascination with democracy, releasing new energies. A new
civil code guaranteed equality at variance with the hierarchical principles in
Confucian familyism. Zaibatsuwere split up. Yet, top-down occupation reforms
reinforced the role of the economic ministries and other state organs.Japan
steeped its new model of modernization in Confucianism: administrative

guidance from the state, enterprise paternalism with lifetime employment
and seniority wages, and family solidarity behind salarymen. Drawing on a
disciplined and increasingly educated workforce, this system generated
exports for the vast U.S. market and eventually other markets. It utilized
world economic integration, while restraining outside penetration. This
worked in an age of modernization through trade and national units,
although it was not well suited for the next stage of globalization or for a
higher level of modernization.
The Japanese postwar model embraced elements of particularism with
limiting effects on development. State-centred particularism meant selective
application of rules, transfer of retired personnel to key positions in nongovernment organizations and the private sector, a lack of checks and
balances and transparency, and dependency of local governments on

conditional largesse from the centre. As Japan grew richer, resources were
diverted to corruption, protection of weak sectors in the economy, and porkbarrel projects for favoured interest groups in return for campaign support.
32 Koh Byong-ik, "Confucianism in Contemporary Korea," p. 195.

33 Hahm Pyong Choon, Korean Jurisprudence Politics and Culture (Seoul: Yonsei Univeristy Press,
1986).
34 Gerald E. Caiden, "Introduction: Drawing Lessons from Korea's Experience," and Mahn Kee
Kim, "The Administrative Culture of Korea: A Comparison with China andJapan," in Gerald E. Caiden
and Bun Woong Kim, A Dragon's Progress: Developmental Administration in Korea (West Hartford, CN:
Kumarian Press, 1991), pp. xiv-xxii and 26-38.
35 Dennis L. McNamara, The Colonial Origins of Korean Enterprise, 1910-1945 (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 55-56; CarterJ. Eckert, Offspring ofEmpire: The Koch'angKims and
the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), p. 5.
21
Misinformation on economic efficiency led to huge waste in speculative

ventures and arrogant disregard for reform during the bubble economy.
South Korea repeated this pattern. Under a military government until 1987,
it tolerated more particularism than Japan. Regional favouritism,36 chaebol

(business conglomerates) personal authority, more centralization of power
with fewer checks, and broad acceptance of Confucian familial and lineage
ties in social networks left Korea behind in universalism. It also trailed in
globalization; foreign pressure to open up came late.

Korean postwar modernization started with a Confucian base rooted in
filial piety as well as loyalty and was affected by Japan's reinforcement of th
state. Modernization brought increasing individualist values, including

respect for human rights, equality and social welfare, as well as a growing
interest in enjoying one's life. Yet, even college students retained a stron
nucleus of traditional values in the midst of rapid change.37
East Asian nations took pride in the traditional roots of their economic
success, yet each had misgivings about its own brand of particularism. Reasons
for doubt largely came from within. The Japanese public chafed under
growing awareness that inequalities were widening, quality of life trailed far
behind the West, and initiative was stifled. They sensed that things were
unfair as corruption scandals exploded. With high modernization levels,
they wanted more universalism. Koreans had similar complaints, plus they
had a pent-up demand for democratization, unleashed but not satisfied wit
the end of military rule. Chinese associated particularism with Communis
party rule and its high level of corruption. The Taiwanese began to search
for a national identity to justify continued separation from China, and
distanced themselves from the Confucianism that was now more accepted
in China but twisted for nationalist ends and missing core public ethics
Even without a single crisis resulting from short-term factors, there wer
inborn limitations to a model for catching up, borrowing, and export-led
growth as the world kept moving ahead.
In 1997 the IMF became the scapegoat, especially in South Korea, for
resentment against globalization. The habit of severely limiting bot
universalism and globalization was unfair to domestic consumers and did

not meet international standards; wrenching adjustments are needed to
world order in which the WTO operates and the U.S. spurs technologica
innovation led by the information sector. Essential changes to the society
and its relationship to the state place Confucian claims at risk, but traditions
should not be dismissed as irrelevant to a new era after contributing muc

to recent success.
36 Choong Soon Kim, The Culture ofKorean Industry: An Ethnography ofPoongsan
University of Arizona Press, 1992), pp. 41-53.
37 Yang Jonghoe, "Confucian Institutional Change and Value Conflict in

Science Journal, no. 1 (1999), pp. 209-34.
22

What Is Left of Confucianism?
Four forces coalesced to bring about a comeback for Confucianism in

the 1980s-90s across East Asia: 1) newfound confidence in success combine
with a belief in its social roots; 2) a quest to reconsider and rename old
models of development - in Korea after sacrifices imposed from above in
quarter century of high-speed development; and in China after rejection o
the traditional socialist model; 3) the spread of democracy, leading to new
attention to national identity; and 4) a desire, especially in Taiwan throug
the early 1990s, to further China's reform and show it the way to leav
socialism. In Japan the heyday of nihonjinron came in the 1980s when
confidence was at its peak, so the other factors were secondary. In Korea
pride in Confucianism soared in 1994-97, when democracy arrived, fatigu
with the old model of development was most visible, and confidence wa
high.38 In China the principal factors may have been the vacuum caused b
the failure of the old model and the intention of reformers to heighten the
appeal power from successful neighbours. While the balance of these fou
forces varied, their impact occurred almost simultaneously. They added an
intellectual veneer to the structural reality of Confucian practices, while
obscuring the forces against traditions.
What is left of Confucian ways after successive periods of de-Confucianization
In economics, we find meritorious elites, chosen largely through exams, serving
as officials guiding the business sector, but the developmental state is on the
retreat. Instead of turning into a regulatory state in which the brightest and
least corrupt individuals rose to high office, as envisioned as far back a

Confucius's time, it grew into an albatross interfering with universalism and
globalization. We observe entrepreneurial households toiling hard in smal

family enterprises; yet even in China a larger scale of operations is becoming
essential. Instead of family firms drawing on a new wave of venture capit

and sparking the rise of new multi-national corporations, we see a barrie
that keeps small firms inefficiently relying on household labour under elderly
authority. Finally, Japan and Korea retain the paternalistic firm, despite an
end to lifetime employment and company loyalty as ideals.39 Globalization
threatens to send all of these forces further into retreat.
Merchant Confucianism has proven to be a strange mix of contradictory

elements. Korea is patrimonial, relying on the personal authority of the
chairman of the chaebol and pervasive state intervention. Japan is

communitarian, wanting cooperative group relations with some
administrative guidance but less state intervention. And Taiwan depends
more on kinship networks operating through smaller scale enterprises with
38 Cho Hae-Joang, "Constructing and Deconstructing 'Koreanness,'" in Dru Gladney, ed., Making
Majorities (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 73-91.
39 Gilbert Rozman, "The Confucian Faces of Capitalism," in Mark Borthwick, ed., Pacific Century
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 310-18.
23
a diminished role for the state. Clearly China's recent dynamism draws on
the same sort of social relations as Taiwan and Hong Kong, although local
and central governments politicize relations and leave little room for the
moral force of personal cultivation. In each case Confucian capitalism is
seen in the importance of reputation in network formation and the

elaboration of mechanisms for creating harmony. Social relations have been
harmonized with capitalism, keeping a common core despite varied
institutions.40
The company as community worked well in an age of catch-up

industrialization by holding down wages and national consumption,
maintaining labour harmony and sacrifice, and concentrating on quality
and cost control. This model is not suited to a time when national growth is
much slower, global innovation far quicker, national markets much less
protected, and workers newly emboldened by higher levels of modernization.
China's claims to paternalism often mask horrible sweatshop conditions.

Korean labour feels exploited because, just when firms were beginning to
compensate for decades of suppression of their demands and unions, they
were told that it is time to sacrifice again in order to switch to a new
development model.Japanese talk of dying from overwork and the younger
generation is losing trust in the corporate community. Nowhere do we see a
vision of the Confucian enterprise capable of inspiring responses to the
challenges ahead.
In politics and social relations, Confucianism is represented by

connections, gift giving, and a model of social exchange focused on favours,
not contractual principles.4 These practices protect vested interests even in

democratic settings. In the 1990s there has been much talk of political
changes in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Clearly, new forces are at work, but it is
too soon to say that the Confucian elements are markedly decreasing. It
may be that political Confucianism associated with the imperial Confucianism
of old will survive longer than economic practices linked to merchant

Confucianism. That may be the main problem. Two centuries ago it was
imperial Confucianism that left little room for reform Confucianism and
kept the commercial sector under tight restraint. Bolstered by modernization,
political systems of today give excessive power to the state, leaving the society
reliant on personal relations in order to win the right to operate, as it must.
Remnants of imperial Confucianism continue to be the principal problem

in the region.
40 Seok-choon Lew, "An Institutionalist Reinterpretation of 'Confucian Capitalism' in East Asia,"
Korean Social Science Journal, no. 2 (1999), pp. 117-34.
41 Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, Gifts, Favors & Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1994); Yasusuke Murakami and Thomas P. Rohlen, "Social Exchange Aspects
of theJapanese Political Economy: Culture, Efficiency, and Change," in Shumpei Kumon and Henry
Rosovsky, eds., The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. 3: Cultural and Social Dynamics (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1989), pp. 63-105; Kim Byung Kook, "The Politics of Reform in Confucian Korea:
Dilemma, Choice, & Crisis," Segye chiyok yongu nonsol, no. 11 (1997), pp. 87-122.
24
The revival of pride in Confucianism has concentrated on aspects of it

that retard globalization and universalism. Many still believe that the East
Asian state can lead the way to faster economic development than in the
West and societies can achieve a more harmonious model of capitalism.
Instead of promoting reforms that expand social networks suitable for an
open and inclusive society, recent periods of modernization have invigorated
social networks of a different sort.Just as China's reforms from 1978 boosted
guanxi (connections) and particularism centred on local governments, while

contributing to nationwide networks of corruption linked to a lack of political
modernization, Japanese politics also are at fault, as elections increasingly

lead to hereditary office-holding and networks of favouritism. While Korean
democratization seems to have made regionalism even more deeply embedded,
Japan's new electoral districts and claims of increased democratization since
1993 have not reduced the excess power of politicians representing

prefectures fearful of globalization. The greater the pride, the less openness.
So far, there is no sign of a strong moral force within the political system
or even among those who regard themselves as the intellectual elite of society
that could revive reform or elite Confucianism. In the early postwar years
when graduates of Tokyo University, Seoul National University, Taiwan
University and Beijing University were entering state service in droves and
finding great opportunities for upward mobility, there seemed to be a chance
that their idealism would transform official service. There might have been
a new elitism reminiscent of the ideals of Confucian scholar-officials. But at
least in ministries in charge of the redistribution of resources the
marginalizing effects of seniority rule and the corrupting effects of state authorit
became pronounced. There is no moral rebirth of the elite as part of a ne

civil service regime. Instead, the cultural and academic elite has produced
large numbers of righteous accusers on the left. Confucian elitism has bee
a mirage, failing to capture the moral high ground.
To many in the region the most negative side of Confucianism is the
residue of mass Confucianism seen in the treatment of women either in law
or through local traditions. One target has been marriage laws that restrict
individual choice. Until it was declared void by the Constitutional Court in
1997 Article 809 of the Civil Code of South Korea prohibited marriages
between people with the same surname and ancestral seat. Since some lineage
groups from one area comprise as many as 2 or 3 million people, estimates

range as high as 200,000 of couples that have defied this ban and suffered
discrimination in national health insurance, inheritance and even recognized
legitimacy of their offspring. Three years after the court action, the National
Assembly still had not amended the code due to the opposition of defenders
of Confucian values.42 In Japan and China, the local elite, especially from
42 Hahm Chaibong, "The Family v. the Individual: The Politics of Marriage Law in Korea," (Seoul:
unpublished manuscript, 2000).

25
less urbanized areas, also clings to family traditions due to their beliefs and
their desire to retain power. No less at fault in China is the cynical use of
nationalism by leaders, who first pervert cultural awareness of their own
traditions and those in the West and then bemoan the deterioration of social
ethics.
Of course, the structural impact of modernization and the spread of

foreign popular culture, especially among the youth, are undermining mass
Confucianism. It is their decisions that pose the most direct threat to existing
Confucian practices. Daughters raised in small nuclear families are delaying

marriage, going to college, choosing careers, seeking leisure and avoiding
marriage to sons of households that remain traditional by virtue of their
preference or profession (artisans, farmers, etc.). Entering the workforce,
men seek more leisure and are more prone to switch jobs than their fathers.
Popular culture has spread new values rapidly; traditional culture has lost its
appeal for young people. De-Confucianization at the mass level has

accelerated, as modernization theory predicted. In 1950 rural areas
dominated. Now urban residents prevail except in China.
The masses of East Asia are largely ignorant of the Confucian nature of
their behaviour. They see Confucianism is essentially gone. Aware of some
of its notorious associations, such as foot-binding and blind marriages, they
are glad to have it in the past. Given the huge generation gap in each country
of the region, some older people may be attached to practices steeped in

Confucianism, but younger people are apathetic at best.
People not only reject its presence at the mass level, they object to its use
by the state. Koreans, who accept Confucianism in daily life, interacting with
older relatives without rebelling, balk at it in national discourse, viewing the
political order suspiciously. They retain an image of Confucianism as a symbol
of national weakness held responsible for failing to resist Japanese

colonialism. Young people now gravitate to symbols of modernity, to which
Confucianism has failed to become attached.
Confucianism has lost its lustre for much the same reasons across East
Asia. The most powerful are: 1) a rise in nationalism that makes the areas o
the region more competitive with each other rather than seeking a common
heritage; 2) a growing appeal of globalization among young people
influenced by information technology (IT), popular culture and economic

integration; 3) increasing individualism due to the effects of modernization,
global ideology, and rapidly declining birth rates coupled with changing
childrearing practices and the rising status of women; and 4) the Asian
financial crisis and declining non-competitiveness. Of course, the relative
weight of these factors differs by country. Pride has diminished; the reality
of public opinion with little faith in traditions remains.
There remains a tendency to confuse what narrowly serves the interest

of political beneficiaries of the existing order with the essence of nationa
traditions. Chinese communists have draped themselves in the cloth of
26
defenders of Chinese civilization, while doing little to combat corruption

linked to particularism. Japanese politicians have lost most of the trust of
the Japanese people, but still have some success in keeping alive the idea
that they are defending Japanese tradition in their resistance to reforms
identified with the West. Korean democratization has disappointed the people
because of its failure to address the most blatant forms of unfairness. The
big challenges of reform to meet new needs of globalization lie ahead. N

having prepared nationally distinct approaches to reform, leaders are mo
likely to turn to time-tested Western models of the rule of law, the separati
of powers, and the impersonal handling of personnel. It is not clear ho

Confucian principles will enter into their calculations. Confucian claims t
moral integrity emanating from the top weaken pressure for institution
checks through the separation of power. Filling the vacuum are money
politics, regional voting blocs and other irregular mechanisms. Althoug
the ideal is to prevent cleavages, they inevitably occur. Thus Confucian
crusades by a new leader eager to prove his moral credentials soon fad
before a loss of credibility and a new cycle of rising opposition and th
appearance of another professed saviour. In Korea this pattern has been
enshrined in electoral politics of the 1990s without suggesting real hope for
a moral crusade that can restore credibility to Confucianism.43

Whereas Confucian values could have been used for many purposes,
priority was usually given to strengthening respect for authority. This serve
the growing dominance of imperial Confucianism in China. It was the
primary usage of the tradition in Tokugawa Japan.44And it lent itself to
view of politics as ethics that turned discussions away from policy alternativ
to overarchingjudgments on moral rectitude. Comparisons of the tradition
hold in contemporary times suggest its link to hierarchy rather than balance
of power, to authoritarian tendencies rather than civil society, and to keepin
foreign societies at arm's length rather than openness.45
At opposite poles at the peak of the discussion in Japan were books titled
Thinking about a Confucian Renaissance and The Poison of Confucianism.4
Throughout East Asia there was a love-hate relationship with Confucianism
especially when basic questions of democracy and human rights sharply
divided the society. To reach beyond this conflict requires a breakthrou
on these issues, which some optimists argue is compatible with Confucia
43 Kim Byung Kook, "The Politics of Reform in Confucian Korea: Dilemma, Choice and Crisis
pp. 87-122.
44 Marius B. Jansen, China in the Tokugawa World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1992), p. 68.
45 Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 55-89.
46 MizoguchiYuzo and Nakajima Mineo, eds.,Jukyo renessansu o kangaeru (Tokyo: Daisukan shoten,
1991); Muramatsu, Ei,Jukyo no doku (Tokyo: PHP kenkyujo, 1992).
27
thought,47 amidst doubts that the political system is able to overcome groups
favouring protectionism and nationalism over global integration.

What is clear is that change builds on what is left from the previous era of
development.Japanese export-oriented industrial firms, through production
chains at home and across Asia, continue to make large profits. Despite
excessive debts, some chaebol have boosted their exports, enabling South
Korea to bounce back from the severe economic downturn of 1997-98. China
has yet to reach a watershed, when its rate of growth drops to the world
average. Across a region that mastered the art of latecomer modernization,
social forces are in place to sustain past successes and the potential to facilitate
new ones if ways are found to accelerate integration across national
boundaries.
Our New Era of Globalization and Korea's Special Role
According to Francis Fukuyama's analysis, low-trust societies such as Chin
and Korea are limited in their development because individuals cannot

open to the outside and are likely not only to choose people on the basis
who they are but also to be corrupt, whereas high-trust societies suc
Japan have accepted more impersonal mechanisms of trust.48 In reali
Japanese also have trouble forging relations of trust, and China and Ko
are having some success in moving beyond earlier particularism. All th
societies must overcome limitations on trust associated with their reliance
on Confucianism. Lucian Pye carries the argument further in analyzing the

dearth of social integration beyond the personal level or what he calls a lack
of generalized bonding. He shows that convergence has been delayed,

limiting the degree of social capital at large due to state interference in the
development of institutions of civil society. Assertion of Asian values only

reinforced these barriers to impersonal civility, he concludes.49 It is this advice
in favour of openness and trust that should guide reforms in our new era.
One of the common refrains in each East Asian country is that because
traditions are different, the next stage of reforms must not listen much to
the advice of the West. In Korea in 1998, for instance, there was much talk
about using the tradition of a strong state to guide reforms toward a

synthesis."5 Usually the foundation for such defensiveness is more nationalist
pride than trust in one's own society's competitive potential.Japan's reforms
47 Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya and David Martin Jones, Towards Illiberal
Democracy in Pacific Asia (Oxford: St. Martin's Press, 1995);Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds.,
The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
48 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues & The Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free
Press, 1995), pp. 69-82, 127-45, 161-93.
49 Lucian W. Pye, "Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: Three Powerful Concepts for
Explaining Asia," Journal of Interdisciplinary History (Spring 1999), pp. 763-82.
50 Lew Seok-choon, "Yugyo chabonjuwi kwa IMF kaeip," Chontong kwa hyondae (Fall 1998), pp.
24-57.
28

have moved forward at a glacial pace. It is not clear which country will step
up and lead the way or how a shared vision may evolve. Eventually, a shared
Chinese identity is likely to draw parts of the region together and become
the driving force. It would be more authentic if it came gradually through
the popular will in defence of personal interests rather than being imposed
by the state in defence of vested interests.
Taking at face value statements by national leaders, we would be tempted
to say that Korea leads Taiwan followed byJapan, then Singapore and China,
and finally North Korea in readiness for the trust required by globalization.
It appears that the shock of the IMF has propelled Korea into the most
radical reforms and rhetoric, while the need to distant itself from China is
driving Taiwan. In both countries new leaders have come from the democratic
opposition to authoritarian rule. They may, however, not be representative
of their societies. President Kim Dae Jung was long obsessed with
transforming Korea into a more democratic society. His rejection of Asian

values may be but one of many factors that diminishes his support, worrying
those who have more vested interests in retaining much of the existing
economic model. Even among the many who associate excessive state
centralization and chaebol mismanagement with Confucian traditions, there
are quite a few who differ with Kim on the pace of change, believing that
Korea is not ready for the Anglo-American model even if it is desirable in
the long run. Lacking a firm political base, Kim has compromised with vested
interests in ways that cost him support also from those who favour more
rapid reform.
Likewise in Japan, despite the clamour for far-reaching changes since
1993 and the promise of a series of "big bang" reforms, powerful opponents
make fundamental change unlikely for the present. Restarting the economy
is the first priority, and pump-priming measures keep channelling huge
amounts of government funds into the hands of the beneficiaries of the old
economic order. As in Korea, there is a fear that universalism opens the way
to globalization, which damages national interests and even sovereignty. After
a century of associating modernization reforms with a strong state and
reinforced sovereignty, the preparation for global integration is inadequate.
While politicians hesitate, change is being driven by technology.

Traditional corporate culture places a high value on precedent, promotes
by seniority as the norm, and is very hierarchical in internal communications
as well as the distribution of power. For a long time the image of Western
organizations has contrasted with these traditions. It is one of performance-
based pay, innovative top management and lively communications both

horizontally and vertically. Across East Asia there is a move toward a new
organizational culture much closer to the Western ideal. In China it is linked
to the switch from the socialist mode of management in a planned economy.
In South Korea it was stimulated by democratization of society. And in Japan
the high level of modernization and diffusion of Western norms provided

29
an impetus that was accelerated with the economic stagnation from the early
1990s. Yet, perhaps most important is the introduction of information

technology. One study finds a remarkable shift from traditional management
in Japan in a mere three years from 1996 to 1999 through web-page access,
e-mail communications, and a host of other information changes that create
an open environment where the ideas of young employees and specialists

are highly valued.51 Simply introducing technology plays a dramatic role in
changing corporate culture and the larger Confucian social setting.

Korea is widely considered to be the most Confucian society. The reasons
for this are many. 1) There were stronger roots of particularism in relations
reaching beyond the community in late premodern times. In Japan

centralized feudalism placed a higher priority on impersonal competition
between local areas. In China the vast scale of the country and absence of
closed classes gave more scope to universalistic examinations and other ways
to counteract ascriptive ties. 2) The impact of Japanese colonialism may
have raised the role of political connections and state domination in an
atmosphere of nationalist resistance. 3) The more rapid pace of

modernization in Korea and greater reliance on top-down methods through
military authoritarianism created fertile ground for particularism. China
probably has more particularism than Korea, but much of it is linked to
communist control rather than Confucian traditions. 4) Even in the short
span of democracy, the nature of the political system combined with a large
amount of bureaucratic discretion reinforces some forms of particularism.

5) The Korean model of development has kept out foreign investment and
other forms of foreign penetration more than in any other East Asian country
or comparably modernized country. Whatever the explanation, Korean

particularism has distinctive features that deserve attention.
One question is whether the Korean people are abandoning their trust
in the state and reliance on a virtuous ruler in favour of insistence on checks
and balances and accountability. While such thinking rooted in Confucianism
is considered to be omnipresent in the region, Koreans are judged to be the

most influenced by it. Yet, each leader in the democratic era has lost the
confidence of the people, suggesting that people are raising their standards
for legitimate authority. Because of the system of presidential elections, the
will of the people can be more clearly reflected in Korea than in Japan and,
of course, China. Hahm Chaibong finds hope in this transition, suggesting
that traditional expectations for rectitude in government may even revive
Confucian ideals through democracy.52 His analysis combines a realistic
appraisal of de-Confucianization as a positive process, with optimism that
51 Akio Kunii, "Corporate Culture and the Introduction of Information Technology," Institutefor
International Policy Studies Policy Paper 257E (December 2000).
52 Hahm Chaibong, "The Confucian Tradition and Economic Reform," inJongryn Mo and Chongin Moon, Democracy and the Korean Economy (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), pp. 35-54.
30
moral aspects of the tradition can endure. But before that can happen the
universalism of elections must be supplemented by a host of other reforms
to achieve fairer government representing all of the people. One test will be
whether, in coming elections, extreme differences in voting by region will
be narrowed.53
A related test is whether Korea's corruption level will be lowered. Among

developed countries it may be the worst in the world; the latest ratings put
Korea in the bottom half with no sign of improvement.54 This is associated

with the difficulty of reducing the effects of regionalism, well documented
by Jon Byong-je.55 Even in the reforms of President Kim Young Sam the
embeddedness of practices associated with Confucianism proved very hard
to overcome, as explained by Kim Byong Kook.56
Along with the state, the chaebol are the primary barrier to universalism in
Korea. Chaebol heads were known for strict Confucian values: generational
order, hierarchy, patriarchy, subordination of women and stress on loyalty.57
Methods of labour recruitment and organizational control claimed to build

on traditionalism. Emphasis on chaebolin development thus helped to sustain
a feeling of tradition in the face of global industrial practices, but ruthless

exploitation of workers and arbitrary personal authority left an organizational
form much resented. When rampant financial mismanagement brought the

chaebol into disrepute, a wave of negativity helped turn the tide against
Confucianism too. Initial hopes in 1998 that financial pressure will force
them to change many of their practices proved overly optimistic. The first
generation of owner-managers relied heavily on trusted family members and
associates chosen through ascriptive ties. Newfound state resistance to chaebol
power and inefficiency offers hope for accelerated reform, particularly if
chaebol no longer have to cope with an arbitrary state and strategies of tax
evasion. Yet, recent economic troubles raise the profile of the chaebol as the
leading exporters and largest employers that keep the country from another
financial crisis.
Of course, Confucian traditions survive in the family, the community and
personal social relations, apart from the largest organizations in Korea. The
relentless pace of modernization and new forces of globalization such as
53 Chachi haengfong, no. 1 (1998). The results for
the people in Kwangju voted for Kim DaeJung, while
who nationwide received 41 percent of the vote. By
72.7 percent his opponent.
54 "Mountains and Molehills: Korea's Corruption
2000.
the presidential election show 97.3 percent of

only 1.7 percent supported his main opponent,
contrast, in Taegu 12.5 percent favoured Kim,
Index 2000," The Korea Herald, 23 September
55 Byong-je Jon, "Regionalism and Regional Conflict in Korea," in Kim Kyong-Dong and SuHoon Lee, eds., Asia in the 21st Century: Challenges and Prospects (Seoul: Pannum Book Co., 1990), pp.
182-95.
56 Kim Byong Kook, "The Politics of Reform in Confucian Korea: Dilemmas, Choice, and Crisis,"
pp. 87-122.
57 Eun Mee Kim, BigBusiness, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South Korean Development, 1960-
1990 (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), pp. 62-65.
31
popular culture threaten them. If Korea is about twenty years behindJapan

in social change, as one sometimes hears, then it can look forward to further
erosion in its traditions, but also resistance that seems to increase social
dissatisfaction more than smooth the way to more harmony. The attitudes
revealed in surveys suggest that Confucian thinking remains widely

accepted." Clearly, family practices keep it alive. Debates proceed over the
adequacy of institutional mechanisms for sustaining Confucian ideals and
practices in the midst of structural changes.59 Some thoughtful analysts
recognize the possibility of trust based on particularism still playing a positive
role in EastAsia."' After all, not only in domestic networks but also in networks
that are leading the way in the rise of East Asian regionalism, informal ties
are clearly prominent.6'

Perhaps the greatest role for Confucianism is as part of national identity.
With new tensions ahead between globalization and nationalism, we must
expect a strong reaction rhetorically regardless of the structural reality. If
some have viewed the revival of Confucianism as the construction of national
identity,62 we may overlook the growing gap between national identity and a
society's actual value system. No modernized society has a well-integrated

value system of the sort seen in premodern Confucianism. Public anxiety
over the diffusion of youth culture embraced by the entertainment industry
and the championing of what are perceived as American values naturally

leads to efforts to preserve values under threat. In Korea even those who are
strongly critical of the way Confucianism has been invoked to date predict
that it has some survival value in the preservation of individual and family
values different from those in the West.6" It remains to be specified what the
survival mechanisms are and how they can operate in a society that accepts
increased universalism and opens itself to increased globalization. Problems
of integration between South and North Korea and uncertainty about

regional cooperation in East Asia will complicate South Korea's struggle
over Confucianism. In the fight for democracy and workers' rights, Korean
students and younger intellectuals often turned to leftist theories of national
dependency.64 They made Confucianism a target of blame for blinding

58 Byong-ik Koh, "Confucianism in Contemporary Korea."

Anthropological Study," in Wei-ming Tu, ed., Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity, pp. 202-27;
Seok-choon Lew, "An Institutional Reinterpretation of 'Confucian Capitalism' in East Asia," pp. 117-34.
60 Won Bae Kim, "Family, Social Relations, and Asian Capitalism," Journal of International and
Area Studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (December 1998), pp. 65-79.
61 Dajin Peng, "The Changing Nature of East Asia as an Economic Region," Pacific Affairs, vol.
73, no. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 178-80.
62 Cho Hae-Joang, "Constructing and Deconstructing 'Koreanness.
63 YangJong Hoe, "Asian Values in Capitalist Development: A Critique," (Seoul: unpublished

ms., 2000).
64 Park Myoung-Kyu and Chang Kyung-Sup, "Sociology between Western Theory and Korean
Reality: Accommodation, Tension and a Search for Alternatives," International Sociology (June 1999),
pp. 148-51.
32
people to both domestic and international forces of oppression. Although

the coming of democracy and the Asian financial crisis dulled their message
for domestic struggle, a lingering sense of national weakness makes them a

force in debates. South Koreans could oppose the U.S. and Japan without
turning to Confucianism.
Our focus should not be limited to the psychology and rhetoric of nations
in competition but should also include the social institutions, domestic and
international, through which people interact. It is there that the real, rather
than reconstructed, future of Confucianism can be understood. There we
see at work the irrepressible forces of social integration. In the time of

Confucius, establishment of a national bureaucracy to lead in administrative
centralization over large populations advanced social integration. So too

did strengthened family solidarity, offering the individual household
opportunity and security in return for greater control over its members.
The bar for social integration has been raised many times. It now demands
a global approach to the movement of capital, goods and people. After 1950,
East Asian societies met the challenge of social integration at a time of lower
levels of modernization and globalization by incorporating particularistic

elements into their strategies of development in ways very different from
Western states. Now they must catch up again by boosting universalism.
Confucianism in Korea, socialism mixed with Eastern civilization in China,
and nihonjinron in Japan became linked to nationalist causes that divide the
countries of East Asia. In the mid-1990s, as South Korea became a more
democratic state and grew more confident of its relations with China and
Russia, writings on Japan became more assertive, adding to anxieties about
both the past and the future of that country. At about the same time, China's
leaders unleashed a nationalist campaign to bolster the legitimacy of the

Communist party, highlighting its role in the liberation of China from
Japanese occupation and the image ofJapanese conduct as evil. There were
signs of nationalism inJapan too, which reached a new height in 2001 when
textbooks appeared that claimed Japan legally annexed Korea, fought in
China and elsewhere to liberate Asian nations from Western imperialism,
and behaved normally during the war with no mention of "comfort women"
or the "rape of Nanjing." As long as the region's atmosphere fans nationalism,
we cannot expect serious interest in Confucianism as a unifying heritage.
South Korea can be expected to play a leading role in elevating

Confucianism into a force for regionalism. To the extent it focuses on
reunification with the North and seeks a supportive regional environment,
it will have a strong stake in bringing China and Japan together. As it seeks
funding for projects that can smooth the way to unification and a soft landing
for the North, the South will try to draw China and Japan into joint action.
While Chinese perceive Japan as imperialist aggressors whose people do not

reflect on the past and Japanese see China as communist brainwashers whose
people do not know the truth, Koreans respect Chinese Confucian history
33
and, more than Chinese, are indebted to Japanese modernization in ways

that may lead to forging ajoint image.
Some critics of Confucian explanations of Asian patterns of development
suggest that the differences across the region are too great to find a common
denominator and that it suffices to find historical paths of institutional change
to explain the outcomes.65 They underestimate the commonalities across

the region and allow details of recent history to obscure deeper features
evolving from earlier history. Some who respect Confucian traditions and
object to their misuse against human liberties and openness to the world see
human rights deeply embedded in the traditional thought of the region.66

Hesitant to blame the tradition and those who lately have distorted it, they
tend to miss the linkages between Confucian social traditions and structural
barriers to civil society. Advocates often take a nationalist position against
democratic and other ideals found in the West, not suggesting ways to
accelerate universalism or human rights.67
The U.S. has an advantage in globalization because of its wider application
of universalist practices in migration, marketing and mobility. It developed
as a melting pot society and increasingly, through its universities and hightech businesses, attracts the most talented young minds of our times. One
challenge of universalism in East Asian societies is to open their universities
and enterprises to the best talent in the world, an impossibility if recruitment
and promotion are narrowly defined in a national context emphasizing group
relations. Today financial and capital markets have become the liveliest arena
for advancing economic development. Again, the U.S., with its financial
openness and transparency, leads the way. In the 1990s Japan and Korea
have made major strides in selling shares in companies to foreigners and
this is becoming a force for their accelerated globalization, but the region
has a long way to go. American society has a much higher degree of
universalism in the recruitment and promotion of individuals according to
performance. Women have more opportunities. Fitting into the group is
less important. Young people can rise quickly or start their own companies
easily. As barriers fall in the new era, East Asian particularism that narrows
the range of migration, marketing and mobility can be expected to decline

from what remain rather high levels.
Will Confucianism Revive through Regionalism?

Is there life for Confucianism once universalism accelerates? Most social
scientists are likely to answer "no," since they are preoccupied with the
65 Marco Orru, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, and Gary G. Hamilton, The Economic Organization ofEast
Asian Capitalism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997).
66 Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming, eds., Confucianism and Human Rights (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1998).
67 Fang Litian and BiJundu, eds., Ruxue yu Zhongguo wenhua xiandaihua ((Beijing: Zhongguo
renmin daxue chubanshe, 1998).
34
narrowness of the tradition and today, as in the heyday of modernization

theory, seldom recognize the value of non-Western traditions for modern
development. Most defenders of Confucianism and Asian values would

answer "yes" on the assumption, which they hesitate to put to serious scrutiny,
that much of the particularism that they welcome will persist. There may be
only a few who would answer "yes" on the basis of a vision of a Confucian
legacy after much additional de-Confucianization and universalism. They
should be taken seriously for four reasons. 1) East Asian societies have the
foundation to be competitive if they grasp the trend of the times, since their
Confucian heritage leaves them with impressive advantages in education,

labour diligence, etc. 2) Intense global competition lies ahead with continued
efforts to build national and regional identities, giving East Asian states strong
reasons to reconstruct their separate and shared Confucian identities. 3)
We ought not to take for granted U.S. globalization and leadership in a
complex world or of the capacity to hold back great power rivalries in the
short term, causing a breakdown in international integration and a return
to more particularistic ways for a time and for some regions. 4) Individuals
of East Asian descent are proving very successful around the world in the
most competitive conditions, suggesting that the countries of the region
can tap a wealth of talent. The next decade or two will be crucial in the
transition, requiring intensified de-Confucianization but not necessarily
abandoning pride in the tradition.
We would be making a mistake to overlook the potential for the Confucian
legacy to give a boost to East Asian societies in the new era. The region's
educational drive can be harnessed to the IT revolution if state reforms are
not blocked. In an era when youth materialism and deviancy pose bi

challenges to national development, family solidarity has further promise if
nations change to embrace new family forms rather than standing in the
way. Idealists who speak of borderlessness are underestimating th
importance of the state. If East Asian states can expand democracy whi
focusing on overcoming vested interests and corruption, they may play
more positive role.68 In short, we must test American assumptions about the
superiority of creativity without rote learning, individualism without sustained
family pressure, and civic society without an active state. Now globalizatio
favours the Anglo-American model, but competition among nations as we
as firms and individuals is bound to continue, with East Asian actors fully in
the fray.
The struggle over Confucianism is at heart a battle over national identity.

In Japan, where nationalism was increasingly targeted at China in the 1990s,
Confucianism as a label serves no nationalist purpose. Instead, the right

wing looks to historical symbols that frighten Chinese and Koreans, such as
68 Hahm Chaibong, "The Confucian Political Discourse and the Politics of Reform in Korea,"
Korea Journal (Winter 1997), pp. 65-77.
35
that Japan was a normal country in the first half of the twentieth century
driven to war by the U.S. and intent on liberating Asia from Western
imperialism. If, in their rediscovery of the past,Japanese appeal to traditional
morality with streaks of Confucianism, they are unlikely to associate

nihonjinron with any regional significance.69 In China a sharp downswing in
feelings toward Japan in the mid-1990s accompanied a rise in great power

identity. Although Confucian discourse overlaps more with nationalism in
China as the home for the tradition, the nationalist tone of recent years
leaves it on the sidelines. South Korea's attachment to Confucianism is most
open, but the collapse of its development model has left little energy for
claims of superior values. Struggling to advance unification without it
occurring precipitously, the South seeks balance among the powers, not a
cultural label to widen the divide among them. The search for nationalist
identities is not likely to lead soon to Confucianism.
In the next decades Confucianism may again find broad acceptance in
the region if: 1) globalization is halting, provoking fear of global culture
and a new surge of nationalism; 2) regionalism makes progress, leading to a
search for commonalities to boost its prospects; 3) business organizations
and officials concerned with family stability decide to bolster new
organizational types with claims of superior social relations in dealing with

such problems as keeping welfare costs down in the face of an exploding
aging population and retaining the most talented labour through means
other than higher wages. These are just some of the many ways the tradition
can be sustained.
One scenario involves premature efforts to bolster Confucianism by th
intent on protecting their own authority and reversing the tide of s

change. Any effort to revive Confucianism soon is likely to come fro
forces against globalization to reduce integration with the outside. If Chin
leaders continue to promote regionalism, as they did in 2000 for the

time, we can expect an ideological tinge hostile to much of the cultu
globalization. If South Korea made a deal with the Kim Jung-il regim
gradual reunification without much outside pressure on the North, t
could also be a delay in globalization. IfJapan decided this was a good
to seek equidistance between staying in the West and re-entering As
could join to slow globalization. Rumblings of regionalism in 2000 hin
a premature agreement with vested political interests ready to slow the p
of reform. The kind of Confucianism that they might embrace mi

stimulate some regional integration, but probably not a lot. Whe
determine who the regionalizers are and the timetable, we will kno
globalizers will be in the ascendancy.
69 Moon Chung-in and Park Han-kyu, "Globalization and Regionalization," in Inoguchi T

and PurnendraJain, eds., Japanese Foreign Policy Today (New York: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 65-82.
36
Another scenario sees Confucianism returning more slowly and with less
rejection of globalization. In a decade or two after each country has adapted
more to the WTO and made more domestic political reform, we may see a
different kind of Confucianism rise to the fore, one more accepting of
international integration, yet still supportive of distinct regional traditions
and approaches. A revival may hearken back to reform Confucianism, the

oft-forgotten force in the tradition. The combined force of various countries
searching for regionalism could counterbalance each country's nationalist

tendencies.
Confucianism as it is expressed today in East Asia is largely a defence o

particularism not suited for the new era of globalization, but it is still
embedded in social practices and attitudes in ways that can enhanc

universalism. It not only defends those who cling to national protectionism,
male chauvinism, seniority over merit, and official fears of civil society.
also supports family mobility strategies, educational ambitions, sacrifice for
economic goals, and some limits on individualism seen as anarchy.70 Th
battle for reform in East Asian countries will be long and difficult, requiring
more interest groups to stand up to the vested interests with a narrow notion
of the tradition.
The struggle ahead is not new, although the pressure from globalization
far exceeds any previous outside forces. Confucianism in premodern times
played a constructive role in expanding universalism and incorporating
elements of particularism. In the modern era its legacy contributed to a
boost in universalism while sustaining an unusual degree of particularism. It
can still contribute positively, if protectionist forces do not treat universalism
as if it is Americanization, fearing competition.
The next decade is likely to be dominated by pressure from the U.S.: 1)

the impact of financial globalization under the rules of the WTO, eroding
particularism from the outside; and 2) the war against terrorism, placing
more demands for joint action. If tendencies toward U.S. unilateralism are
kept in check, convergence will be hastened. Patterns of universalism will be
spreading from within, too, as young people bring new attitudes and pressure
builds for reform. A premature Confucian revival might occur as a nationalist
reaction to world tensions and a counterattack by vested political interests.

If this were prevented, we may expect, after much particularism is eliminated
and prospects for regionalism are enhanced, another revival of Confucianism.
Modest in its appeals to tradition and nationalism, it would hold the best
chance of becoming a long-term force for local competitiveness and regional
vitality able to find new wind with globalization. Moderated by pressures for
regional consensus and global compliance, Confucianism has room for

survival as a synthesis of distinctive social practices and a competitive identity.
Princeton University, New Jersey, September 2001
70 Hahm Chaibong, "The Cultural Challenge to Individualism," Journal of Democracy, vol. 11, no.
1 (January 2000), pp. 127-34.
37

08-Rozman-Can Confucianism Survive in Universalism and Globalization

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

08-Rozman-Can Confucianism Survive in Universalism and Globalization

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Can Confucianism Survive in an Age of Universalism and Globalization?

Author(s): Gilbert Rozman

Can Confucianism Survive

Conventional wisdom sees the last quarter of the twentieth century as

as in Taiwan and Singapore.2 Each nation had championed its Confucian

1 I am grateful to the Department of Sociology ofYonsei University, chaired by Lew Seok-choon,

Pacific Affairs: Spring 2002

Confucianism have been exposed. Japanese have quieted about nihonjinron

thinking. Critics are emboldened.' The Left, never comfortable with

new form of "orientalism," seeing the "other" as different through

with the competitive pressures of our times when democratic, modernized

pause to consider one more time from a comparative perspective what

reproof to modern excesses, but from a long-term perspective of t

1993), pp. 107-35.

Can Confucianism Survive?

What is Confucianism and Why Does It Matter?

well as in an embracing state-backed intellectual edifice. Confucianism

arrival of Western powers as the dominant way of interpreting the world

trace the presence of its elements we must be alert to its mult

manifestations, whether called Confucianism or obscured with other labels.

Often mentioned in a synopsis of core elements are: familyism focused

solidarity and social mobility, thirst for education centred on mastery of de

and social mobility, support of paternalism in return for benevolence

community, competition where the state (despite a guiding spirit) limits it

intervention in markets, a high moral cause aided by rituals and claim

To trace change from era to era it is best to treat specific manifestations a

Confucianism in some sense collapsed throughout the region with

is easily understood by social scientists. While it had, over a long hist

particularism had become so deeply entrenched that little structural reform

Koreans blamed it for national weakness and intellectual blindness, allowing

seemed to be disappearing. Everywhere newly risen elites looked elsewhere

10 Kim Kwang-ok, "The Reproduction of Confucian Culture in Contemporary Korea: An

(New York: Random House, 1999).

Pacific Affairs: Spring 2002

for a national identity befitting a world order of "modernize and militarize"

or perish. Capitalism, communism, and a variant of militarism promised

for national resurgence could not be easily dislodged.

Koreans retain confidence in the micro-level traditions shaping their lives.

creativity and discouraged dropouts, pride continues in the studious habits

New enterprises found ways of expressing paternalism - through extended

family ties or corporate loyalty training - aimed at creating a community

Can Confucianism Survive?

have fiercely resisted such obvious forces of modernity as: equal

and cater to individualism.

The term "Confucianization" helps us to trace changes for the three

how many believers there are, but determining how widespread an

of exchange and cooperation, and a deepening in the degree of interactio

and it has accelerated in each subsequent stage of history.16 Social integration

desired background traits or ascriptive qualifications not germane to th

a narrow type of administrative mobilization with reduced levels of trus

De-Confucianization must be seen through the lens of growing soci

In our new age the pressures for globalization and universalism ar

Legacy of Confucianism in Japan," pp. 111-54.

Pacific Affairs: Spring 2002

well utilized or rewarded because of discrimination lead the way. The

are labelled, respectively, globalizers and Confucianists. The discussion also

On the basis of the writings of Confucius and his disciples, Ch

institutionalized for 2,000 years a system of particularistic social relat

process of parallel evolution, Confucianism proved its advantage

facilitated the strengthening of family and lineage solidarity, an esse

foundation that, by entrusting families to control deviance and save face b

following ideal ethical standards, reduced much of the arbitrariness of

initially steeped in military prowess, under the influence of "