G.R. No.

175602, February 13, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ AND EDWIN
VALDEZ
FACTS:
Brothers, Edwin Valdez (Edwin) and PO2Eduardo Valdez (PO2 Valdez) shot
and killed threeunarmed persons, Moises, Jonathan Rubio, and Joselito in a jai
alai betting station. On January 20, 2005, the RTC convicted them for three counts
of murder. On appeal, the Court of appeals affirmed the conviction with modifications as
to the damages. The two accused appealed to this Court on final appeal but on
October 10, 2007 Edwin withdrew his appeal. On January 18, 2012, the Court granted
PO2
Valdez appeal and found him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of
murder on grounds that the information did not sufficiently allege the
attendance of treachery. On March 12, 2012, Edwin wrote to the Court
Administrator pleading that the granted appeal of PO2 Valdez be applied to him
also citing Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not they may be convicted of Murder even though it is not alleged in
the information
HELD:
No, the requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform
the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to
enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of
innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with.
To have the facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime
of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly
accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice.
The allegations in the information are controlling in the ultimate
analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged
included in the offense proved. In that regard, an offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter;
an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the

essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those

constituting the latter.

People v. Tabongbanua
GR. No. 171271
FACTS:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998.
The latter worked as the managing partner of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, a law firm
operated as a sole proprietorship, and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis
St.,Greenhills, San Juan, M.M. On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 oclock in the
evening, the accused drove Atty. Sua Kho to her condominium unit at1702
Platinum 2000, Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Jun M.M. After handing his employers bag
to Marissa Hiso, the housemaid, accused proceeded to the kitchen where he
drank a glass of water.
Shortly thereafter, Marrisa heard her employer screaming, and she saw
the accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife which eventually led to the
death of Atty. Sua-Kho. The accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of selfdefense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he testified, didnt want her husband to know that she
had been taking tripswith a company guest, a certain Phillip Robinson, to
Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in Tanay
The Court of Appeals disregarded appellants claim of self-defense for lack
of evidence and for being incredible considering the number and location of
wounds sustained by the victim and his flight from the crime scene. As
regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex
and age of the victim, the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were
included as amendments to the information after the presentation by
the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not be allowed because
it will prejudice the rights of the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in ruling that such amendment should not be
allowed
HELD:
Yes, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, provides that an
amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form,

provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not prejudicial to

the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the
accused had already been arraigned. A substantial amendment consists of the
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The insertion
of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the
respect due torank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial,
amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another
offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original
information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect
any substantial right of appellant. Besides, appellant never objected to the
presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling
and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of
rank, age or sex. Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed
waived.

Bernardo vs People
GR No. 182210

FACTS:
To secure the payment of a promissory note, Paz issued to Carmencita
five postdated checks, which were all dishonored upon presentment for
payment for reason Account Closed. Despite demand for payment and to
honor the checks, Paz failed to do so, hence Carmencita filed cases for
violation of BP 22 against Paz.
After the prosecution rested its case, Paz took the witness stand, and
testified that she could not be held liable for violation of BP 22 because the
checks were presented after the 90-day period provided under the law;
neither did she receive any notice of dishonour. She maintained that the
checks were never meant to be presented for payment as she always paid
her loans in cash, while Carmencita never bothered to issue receipts to her.
After her cross-examination, her re-direct examination and to present other
evidence was waived by the trial court after her counsel failed to appear for
several times. After trial, the RTC convicted her as charged, and sentenced
her to o one (1) year imprisonment for each count of the offense charged
and ordered her to indemnify Bumanglag the amount of P460,000.00, plus
12% interest and 5% penalty charges, from December 1, 1991, until full
payment.
Paz appealed to the CA, which however affirmed the ruling, modifying
it by deleting the penalty of imprisonment, instead imposing a fine of
P460,000.00 and retained the P460,000.00 civil indemnity. The CA did not
believe Pazs assertion that she was denied due process when her right to
present other evidence was waived by the trial court. It also brushed aside
her contention that the check was not presented for payment within 90 days
as the same is not an element of the crime. Paz appealed to the Supreme
Court. During the pendency of her appeal, Paz died, hence, her counsel
informed the Court of the the development. By a Resolution dated March 7,
2012, the Court required Pazs heirs to appear as substitutes for the
deceased Paz for purposes of civil liability. The heirs moved to reconsider,
arguing that Pazs civil liability was extinguished upon her death, but the
Court denied the motion, holding that her civil liability survived because it
was based on a contract. It also observed that it would be costly,
burdensome, and time-consuming to dismiss the present case and require
the Bumanglags to file a separate civil action.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Bernardos civil liability was extinguished upon her death
HELD:
No, as a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes
her criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability based solely on the
offense (delict). The death amounts to an acquittal of the accused based on
the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in her favor, which
can be overcome only by a finding of guilt something that death prevents
the court from making. In a sense, death absolves the accused from any
earthly responsibility arising from the offense a divine act that no human
court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard. The intervention of death of
the accused in any case is an injunction by fate itself so that no criminal
liability and the corresponding civil liability arising from the offense should be
imposed on him.
The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an action for
recovery therefore may be generally pursued but only by filing a separate
civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced against
the estate of the accused.
Thus, the death of Bernardo did not automatically extinguish the action. The
independent civil liability based on contract, which was deemed instituted in
the criminal action for B.P. 22, may still be enforced against her estate in the
present case. We thus rule on the present action to determine Bumanglags
civil liability.

Larranaga vs CA
G.R. No. 130644; March 13, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and
was detained without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of
arrest. The petitioner alleged that he must be released and be subject to a
preliminary
investigation.
However,
pending the resolution of the Court for the petition for certiorari, prohibitiona
nd mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
filed by the petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest directed to the
petitioner.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation
2. Whether or not petitioner should be released from detention pending the
investigation
HELD:
1. Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been
arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the right to preliminary
investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at
the
time
of
entering
aplea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively andcon
sistently demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before
hewas charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during t
hearraignment because there was a pending case in this Court
regarding
hisright to avail of a regular preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts
of petitioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary
investigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot be waived
unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed.

2. No. The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that
detention
or
at
least
deny him the right to be released because of such defect.The originalw
arrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless,
the
Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26,
1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rapeslay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.

Leviste v. CA
G.R. NO. 189122; March 17, 2010
FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for
the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years
and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal,
he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his
advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or
possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked
the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion
to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial
court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent,
bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean
that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances

mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of

Court?
HELD:
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission
to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary.
A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the
court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice. Choice
occurs where, between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number
(of options), there is more than one possible outcome, with the selection of
the outcome left to the decision maker. On the other hand, the
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of
discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts discretion and
relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail
pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court
on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory
effectively renders nugatory the provision that upon conviction by the
Regional
Trial
Court of
an
offense
not
punishable
by
death, reclusion perpetua,
or
life
imprisonment, admission
to
bail
is discretionary.
Hence, after conviction by the trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail
ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the
risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons.

G.R. No. 148193 January 16, 2003

People vs Consing
FACTS:
Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr.
and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI)
that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square meter lot
situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
687599 in the name of Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented that they
acquired said lot, which was previously covered by TCT No. 191408 from
Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of
respondent and his mother, PBI purchased the questioned lot. In April 1999,
PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a valid
title over the subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and
Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent and his mother and
that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is not on file
with the Register of Deeds. In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the
possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu.
Despite
written
and verbal demands,
respondent and
his mother refused to return the amount of P13,369,641.79 alleged to
have been initially paid by PBI.
On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 68, an action for "Injunctive Relief" docketed as Civil Case No.
SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires,
Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other John Does.
Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his mother,
Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to
the other defendants on the various transactions involving TCT No.
687599.On October 13, 1999, PBI fi led against respondent and his
mother a complaint for "Damages and Attachment, " docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-95381, with Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and
pendency of Civil Case No. SCA 1759.
On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of
public document was filed against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his
mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 9995381, for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial
question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for
Estafa through falsification of public document, filed against the respondent

HELD:
No, a prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and
Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and
his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.

Cruz vs Arreola
AM RTJ 01-1642

FACTS:
On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending
the filing of an Information for Estafa as defined and penalized under Art.
315, par.1(b) of the Revised Penal Code against Marilyn Carreon, an
employee of the Land Transportation Office based on the complaint filed by
herein complainants. Upon the filing of the Information, the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-99-80446 and was raffled to Branch 85.
On January 19, 1999, accused Marilyn Carreon filed with the trial court an
Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation. In his Order dated January 25, 1999, the
respondent Judge considered the said motion a mere scrap of paper for noncompliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the same date, a Warrant of Arrest was issued by the
respondent Judge and released by respondent Branch Clerk of Court.
On February 10, 1999, respondent Judge issued another Order deferring
the implementation of the Warrant of Arrest against the accused pending the
resolution of her Motion for Reinvestigation. On June 16, 1999, respondent
Judge granted Carreons Motion for Reconsideration and directed the Branch
Trial Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.
The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution finding no cogent
reason to reverse, modify, or alter the resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman and recommended that the case be set for trial.
On September 20, 1999, Carreon filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest as she intended to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
of the Reinvestigation or a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice.
In his Order dated September 27, 1999, respondent Judge granted Carreon's
motion and suspended further proceedings in the said case.

On the basis of the foregoing Orders issued by the respondent Judge,

complainants filed the instant complaint charging both respondent Judge and
his Branch Clerk of Court with ignorance of the law.
In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge manifests that the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function of a judge as he is mandated to
determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant.
Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand, claims that it is a
ministerial duty on her part to release duly signed orders, resolutions and
decisions of the presiding judge of her branch.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge erred in withholding the issuance of a
warrant of arrest considering that the Office of the City Prosecutor already
made a finding that there exists probable cause to indict the accused
HELD:
No, the determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it
is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. Hence, the judge cannot
rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify
the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
It appears from the records that the challenged Orders issued by the
respondent Judge were not at all baseless. The respondent Judge merely
exercised his sound discretion in not immediately issuing the warrant of
arrest and in suspending further proceedings pending reinvestigation of the
case. On her part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be faulted for
performing a ministerial function, that is, releasing Orders duly signed by the
respondent Judge.

Alimpoos vs Court of Appeals

GR No. L-27331

FACTS:
The Accused was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan, Agusan, by virtue of a Warrant
of Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge in the Criminal Case, which was a prosecution for
Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries. The place allegedly robbed belonged to the
Offended Parties. Contending that the Warrant was issued without the observance of the
legal requirements for the issuance thereof, the Accused, then detained, and his wife
instituted the Habeas Corpus case before the Trial Court. Named as defendants in the
original complaint were the Offended parties and the Witnesses (as witnesses for the
prosecution) all of whom are residents of Agusan. In an amended complaint, the two
arresting policemen, the Chief of Police, and the Municipal Judge were added as codefendants.
anad

The Complaint of the Accused was premised on the alleged violation of Article
32 (4), (8), (15), (16), (17) and (19) of the Civil Code, and Article 269 of the Revised
Penal Code, by defendants therein who were said to have been instrumental in causing the
detention and arrest of the Accused. It prayed for the Accuseds release from detention, as
well as for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Offended Parties
and the Witnesses, and the Municipal Judge and/or their representatives, from proceeding
with the Criminal Case. Actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs
were also prayed for.
cranad

cranad

cranad

cranad

cranad

cranad

After due hearing in the Habeas Corpus case, respondent Trial Judge issued the appealed
Order (the ORDER, for short), dated March 26, 1966, declaring the detention of the
Accused illegal and granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus as well as the Preliminary Injunction
prayed for upon the filing of the required bond.
cranad

The Acting Provincial Fiscal of Agusan received copy of said ORDER on March 31, 1966, and
on April 1, 1966, moved for extension of time within which to appeal, but eventually
desisted from doing so. Thereafter, the offended parties filed an appeal and mandamus but
were subsequently denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioners appeal was,
therefore, filed out of time and the judgment has become final.
HELD:
Yes, it is apparent then that both respondent Trial Judge and the Appellate Tribunal
committed error in holding that the Offended Parties appeal was interposed beyond the
reglementary period. Service on the Offended Party, Eliseo Alimpoos, on March 31, 1966
cannot be deemed as notice in law to his counsel. Under the circumstances, therefore,
reliance may be placed on the assertion of counsel that the Offended Party, Eliseo Alimpoos,
had given him a copy of the ORDER only on April 4, 1966, which must be deemed as the

date of notice to said counsel of the ORDER. Counsel lost no time in mailing his Notice of
Appeal on the same day, April 4, 1966 from Cebu. Procedurally, the appeal was seasonably
filed.
However, although the Appellate Tribunal had committed error in its appreciation of the date
when the lawyers of the Offended Parties were served notice of the ORDER, we believe it
would not be justifiable to reverse and to direct respondent Trial Judge to allow the
Offended Parties to appeal. Instead, we are opting to render a practical judgment.
People vs Chi Chan Liu
GR No. 189272
FACTS:
At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani Yuzon, the officers-on-duty
at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, Looc, Occidental Mindoro, received a radio message from the
Barangay Captain of Ambil Island, Looc, Maximo Torreliza, that a suspicious looking boat was seen
somewhere within the vicinity of said island. Immediately thereafter, the police officers headed towards the
specified location wherein they spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side, one of which resembled a
fishing boat and the other, a speedboat. They noticed one (1) person on board the fishing boat and two (2)
on board the speed boat who were transferring cargo from the former to the latter. As they moved closer to
the area, the fishing boat hurriedly sped away. Due to the strong waves, the police officers were prevented
from chasing the same and instead, went towards the speed boat, which seemed to be experiencing engine
trouble. On board the speed boat, the officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. Chan Que and Hui
Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with several transparent plastic bags containing a white, crystalline
substance they instantly suspected to be the regulated drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
known as shabu. They requested the appellants to show their identification papers but appellants failed to
do so. Thus, the police officers directed appellants to transfer to their service boat and thereafter towed
appellants speed boat to the shore behind the Municipal Hall of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. On their way, the
police officers testified that appellant Chi Chan Liu repeatedly offered them big, big amount of money
which they ignored.