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22_QUESTIN

PEOPLE V. REBUCAN
G.R NO. 182551 JULY 27, 2011
Facts:
After having a drinking session with his friend, accused-appellant Rebucan went to the house of Felipe Lagera
for the purpose of confronting Felipe about the alleged sexual abuse of the formers wife. Felipe was carrying
Ranil, his 1-year old grandson, when Rebucan hacked him with a long bolo. According to Carmela Tagpis,
Felipe's granddaughter and an eyewitness to the incident, Rebucan came inside the house in a sudden manner.
No fight or altercation occurred between Felipe and Rebucan. After Felipe was hacked, Rebucan immediately
ran outside the house. The hacking wounds sustained by both Felipe and Ranil caused their deaths.
Charge: Double murder
RTC: Double murder (qualified by treachery); penalty: death
-MC: voluntary surrender
-AC: evident premeditation, dwelling, intoxication, abuse of superior strength, and minority (in so far as the
child victim Ranil)
CA: 2 counts of murder; penalty: reclusion perpetua for each count
Felipe:
-MC: voluntary surrender
-AC: evident premeditation
Ranil:
-MC: voluntary surrender
-AC: treachery
SC: affirmed CA
-MC: voluntary surrender
-AC: treachery (qualifying circumstance)
1. The evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of Felipe and Ranil were attended
by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.
2. In her testimony, Carmela categorically pointed to Rebucan as the persons who entered the house of
Felipe. She clearly stated that the attack was not preceded by any fight or altercation between Rebucan
and Felipe. Without any provocation, Rebucan suddenly delivered fatal hacking blows to Felipe. The
abruptness of the unexpected assault rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived him of any opportunity
to repel the attack or retaliate.
3. In the killing of Ranil, there was also treachery. The killing of a child is characterized by treachery even
if the manner of the assault is not shown.
Evident premeditation is not present because the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish any of its
elements.
Abuse of superior strength is appreciated because it was absorbed by treachery.
Dwelling, minority and intoxication cannot be appreciated as AC because they were not alleged in the
information.
Rebucans contention that he is entitled to the MC of intoxication and immediate vindication of a grave
offense is unmeritorious. He positively stated during cross-examination that he was only a bit tipsy but not
drunk when he proceeded to the house of Felipe. Thus, the MC of intoxication cannot be appreciated. Likewise,
the MC of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated. Rebucan testified that he learned of

the alleged sexual abuse on November 2, 2002. On November 6, he carried out the attack that led to the deaths
of Felipe and Ranil. The second element is absent because the period of four days was sufficient enough a time
within which he could have regained his composure and self-control.
Two separate counts of murder, not the complex crime of double murder. The evidence of the prosecution
failed to clearly establish the fact that Felipe and Ranil were killed by a single fatal hacking blow from Rebucan.
It was neither proven that the murder of Felipe was committed as a necessary means for committing and/or
facilitating the murder of Ranil and vice versa.

23_REONICO

PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN, G.R. NO. 197807, APRIL 16, 2012


FACTS
Prosecution
In 2002, witness Maniego was in front of her banana cue store in Manila. She was seated alongside her
mother, victim Sicor, inside the sidecar of a motorcycle.
Without warning, accused Lagman approached
Maniego and punched her face several times. Then accused Lagman grabbed victim Sicor and stabbed her in
the middle of her buttocks with a small knife. Maniego ran to the barangay hall for help. Upon finding that the
barangay chairman was not around, witness Maniego went to her common-law spouse, victim Santiago.
On her way, Maniego saw Lagman stab Santiago four times hitting his neck and trunk. Then Maniego
saw Lagman flee the scene of the crime carrying a knife. Maniego rushed Santiago to the hospital. Maniego also
saw Lagman being treated in the same hospital, after an angry crowd mauled her. Maniego informed the police
who was escorting Lagman that it was Lagman who had stabbed and killed Santiago. Hence, Lagman was
arrested and brought to the police headquarters.
Maniego testified that she had a close relationship with Lagman who got angry with her when she
eloped with Santiago. Sicor corroborated Maniegos testimony, and added that two sidecar boys brought her to
the hospital and she was released two hours after receiving treatment.
Witness PO3 Alateit testified that it was reported to him that a stabbing incident had taken place. He
headed towards the area where there was a commotion. Then he saw a woman running towards him whose
head was bloodied. He handcuffed the woman after he was informed that she had stabbed someone. During
her arrest, a sharp object fell from the womans waist. He confiscated the item and brought the woman to the
police station and to the hospital. He identified the woman as the accused Lagman. Witness PO3 Samson
testified and presented before the court the sharp object used in stabbing the victim.
Defense
Accused Lagman claimed that on the date of the stabbing incident, she confronted Maniego and asked if
it was true that she had been spreading the rumor that accused Lagman was insane. Maniego answered in the
affirmative so Lagman slapped Maniego and left. Leaving Maniego, Santiago and Sicor in pursuit. Santiago
then hit her with a lead pipe. Since she needed medical attention, she was brought to the hospital by her
mother and a barangay kagawad.
Lagman denied killing Santiago. She averred that nothing was found on her body when she was frisked;
claiming that the knife recovered by PO3 Alateit was not hers. She added that she had an argument only with
Maniego, not with Sicor or Santiago.
Dr. Lato testified that he treated Lagman who had a laceration on the head which was possibly cause by
a hard object such as a pipe, and that Lagman sustained a 2-cm laceration in her mid-pectoral area.
Accused Lagman was charged with Murder and Frustrated Murder. During the arraignment,
accused Lagman pleaded not guilty.
RTC of Manila: Convicted Lagman of Murder and Less Serious Physical Injuries.
But accused-appellant faulted the trial court for the following:
(1) not considering the inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of Maniego;
(2) Maniegos credibility was improperly appreciated and;
(3) the judge who heard the case was different from the one who rendered the decision.
CA: Affirmed the decision of RTC for Murder and Less Serious Physical Injuries.
Ruling that:
(1) The totality of the prosecutions evidence showed that Lagmans guilt was proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
(2) Lagman failed to show any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify
against her.
ISSUES

1. Whether or not Lagman was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
2. Whether or not the elements of less serious physical injuries are established.
RULING
APPEAL DENIED but modified the CA decision: Affirmed the conviction for Murder; but
modified Less Serious Physical Injuries to Slight Physical Injuries.
The Court ruled that the elements of Murder were established. The elements are the following:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him or her.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code.
4. That the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
The prosecution was able to clearly establish that Santiago was killed and that it was Lagman who killed
him as
there was an eyewitness to the crime. That Santiagos killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery as testified by Maniego (that Santiago was lighting a cigarette and was shocked when Lagman
stabbed the formers chest, back and neck). There was treachery since the victim was caught off guard when
appellant, without a warning, stabbed him four times successively leaving the victim no chance at all to evade
the knife thrusts and defend from appellants onslaught. These are the two elements of treachery:
1. At the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself
2. The accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of
attack employed by him.
The essence of treachery is that the attach is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected way,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no change to resist or escape. Finally, that the killing
of Santiago was neither parricide nor homicide.
The Court ruled that the elements of less serious physical injuries were not established. The other
charge was frustrated murder, which the RTC of Manila ruled to be only Less Serious Physical Injuries since
the stabbing was not in a vital part, and there was no intent to kill. However, the Court ruled that records do
not support a conviction for less serious physical injuries.
Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code provides any person who shall inflict upon another physical
injuries not described as serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor
for ten days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious
physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
In the case, nothing in the record supports that Sicor was incapacitated for labor for ten days or more or
that she required medical attention for the same period. In fact, she was released two hours after she was
admitted to the hospital. The Medico-Legal Report did not indicate how many days of medical treatment her
injury would need. However, Sicor testified that she lost two days of work on account of the injury she
sustained. Hence, the prosecution failed to establish that the injury falls under less serious physical injuries
absent the requirement that her injury required medical attention for ten days or incapacitated her for the
same period.
The Court can only convict Lagman of slight physical injuries under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that the penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor when the
offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine
days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period. Furthermore, there being no modifying
circumstances to be appreciated, and in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 64, Lagman should be meted a
penalty of imprisonment of arresto menor in its medium period which has a duration of eleven to twenty days
under Article 76 of the RPC.
Case Digest No. 24
24_ SANTOS

G.R. No. 188979


September 5, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO, Appellant.
FACTS:
At around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her two-year old nephew, BBB, on the floor of
her sisters room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and neck. AAA cried, but the appellant
covered her and BBB with a blanket. The appellant removed AAAs clothes, short pants, and underwear; he
then took off his short pants and briefs. The appellant went on top of AAA, and held her hands. AAA resisted,
but the appellant parted her legs using his own legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina. The
appellant stopped when AAAs cry got louder; AAA kicked the appellants upper thigh as the latter was about to
stand up. The appellant put his clothes back on, and threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to
anyone. Immediately after, the appellant left the room. AAA covered herself with a blanket and cried.
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape
The CA affirmed the RTC decision. It explained that a slight penetration of the labia by the male organ is
sufficient to constitute rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rape was consummated.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. We find that the prosecution failed to prove the appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape. We convict him instead of attempted rape, as the
evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime.
From the foregoing, we find it clear that the appellants penis did not penetrate, but merely touched
(i.e.,"naidikit"), AAAs private part. In fact, the victim confirmed on cross-examination that the appellant did
not succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina. Significantly, AAAs Sinumpaang Salaysay also disclosed that
the appellant was holding the victims hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This
circumstance coupled with the victims declaration that she was resisting the appellants attempt to insert his
penis into her vagina makes penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable. Significantly, nothing in
the records supports the CAs conclusion that the appellants penis penetrated, however slightly, the victims
female organ.
Simply put, "rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the
female organ." Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can
only be attempted rape [or] acts of lasciviousness.
, the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to establish the required penile
penetration. AAAs testimony did not establish that the appellants penis touched the labias or slid into her
private part. Aside from AAAs testimony, no other evidence on record, such as a medico-legal report, could
confirm whether there indeed had been penetration, however slight, of the victims labias. In the absence of
testimonial or physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the appellant cannot be convicted of
consummated rape.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an attempt when the offender commenced
the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico, we ruled that when
the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is
committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness.

In the present case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by the following overt acts: kissing AAAs
nape and neck; undressing her; removing his clothes and briefs; lying on top of her; holding her hands and
parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her vagina. The appellant, however, failed to perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance, i.e., the victim's loud cries and resistance. The totality of the appellants acts demonstrated the
unmistakable objective to insert his penis into the victims private parts.
"In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion, to the
end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion." We emphasize that a conviction
cannot be made to rest on possibilities; strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. In the
present case, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape.

25_TERRE
People v. Gutierrez

FACTS: The victim, AAA, was only 10 years old when she was raped by the accused, whom she called Uncle
Rod. In November 2005, she went home from school at around 12nn to have lunch. On the way home, she
passed by her Uncle Rods house, where the rape happened. She was brought inside the bedroom, the accused
raised her skirt, lowered her panties, and he brought out his penis and put it inside AAAs vagina. Afterwards,
he gave her 5 pesos. She came back to school at 2:10 pm. Her teacher asked her why she was late. After initially
declining to answer, the victim admitted she came from Uncle Rods house, where she usually gets money. The
teachers inspected her genitals and concluded she was sexually abused because her private parts were swollen.
They then brought her to the hospital where she was examined, and it was revealed that she suffered
penetrating trauma caused by sexual abuse. The next day, information was filed against accused Gutierrez for
statutory rape, to which he pleaded not guilty. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals convicted Gutierrez for
the said crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez was guilty of statutory rape.

HELD: YES. Statutory rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code is a different kind of rape, because
it does not have the other usual modes of rape. In statutory rape, it is enough that the victim is under 12 years
old and that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat, or
intimidation; or that the victim lost consciousness; or if there was fraud or grave abuse of authority. The
minority of the victim already presupposes incapacity to discern good from evil. In this case, the victim was
undisputedly 10 years old when the crime took place. She told the story of the incident clearly and categorically.
She could not have maliciously accused someonea known family acquaintance, at thatto have committed
such grave a crime as rape, and come before the court to do so. It does not matter that AAA did not cry for help
when she was raped. She was sexually abused by a man known to their family, who had abused his status to
have carnal knowledge of a minor. The penalty of reclusion perpetua, under Article 266-B, is accurately
imposed upon the accused.

26_Fabon
G.R. No. 196435
January 29, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
Vs.
JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR, Accused-Appellant
FACTS: At noon time of April 8, 1999, AAA, who was then 6 years of age, was playing with her playmates
whereupon she wandered by the house of the accused which was just below their house. AAA clarified during
her cross-examination that there was a vulcanizing shop owned by her father located in their house and where
accused was employed. While AAA was at the house of the accused, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks
were burned with a lighted cigarette by the said accused. She testified further that her clothes were taken off by
the same accused who also took his clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself on top of her, inserted
his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge of the then 6-year-old girl.
Dr. Emmanuel Reyes, the Medico-Legal Officer who examined AAA on the same day, testified that the victim
indeed had two (2) third degree burns in the perianal region. Dr. Reyes confirmed that it was possible that the
said burns were caused by a lighted cigarette stick being forced on the victims skin. Moreover, Dr. Reyes
confirmed that there was a loss of virginity on the part of the victim and that the same could have been done 24
hours from the time of his examination.
Thereafter, in three separate Informations, Crisostomo was charged with three counts of rape, all committed at
noon of April 8, 1999 on six-year-old AAA, as follows:
1. Rape by Sexual Assault
With the use of a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object, the accused inserted the same into the
genital orifice of AAA, thereby causing the labia majora of the vagina to suffer a third degree burn,
against AAAs will and consent.
2. Rape by Sexual Assault
With the use of a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object, the accused inserted the same into the
anal orifice of AAA, thereby causing the perianal region of the said anal orifice to suffer a third degree
burn, against AAAs will and consent.
3. Statutory Rape
The accused, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA; that on the same occasion the
accused raped said minor, the accused did then and there burn her buttocks by the use of a lighted
cigarette against her will and consent
The accused denied the allegation and said it was impossible for him to have raped "AAA" on the date and time
stated in the information as his night shift work schedule would not permit such rape to occur. Rogelio Oletin,
the brother-in-law of the accused, testified that the latter supposedly arrived from work at 10am, and slept until
5pm of the same day. According to Oletin that is the usual routine of the accused as the latter worked in the
night shift schedule as vulcanizer in the vulcanizing shop owned by AAAs father.
In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of AAAs body, the defense presented a supposed
playmate named Mary Pabuayan. According to Mary, she was then 7 years old when she and other playmates
together with AAA and Joel "Liit" the son of accused were playing, and Joel "Liit" supposedly lighted a straw
which inadvertently burned the anal portion of AAAs body. Marys exact words were to the effect that
"napatakan ang puwit ni AAA."
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC found Crisostomo guilty of three counts of rape.
a.) For the two counts of rape by sexual assault, RTC ruled that accused is to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused is ordered to pay P30,000 as civil indemnity, P30,000

for moral damages, and P15,000 as exemplary damages for each of the two counts of rape by sexual
assault.
b.) For the statutory rape, RTC ruled that accused is to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and is
ordered to pay the victim P75,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 for moral damages, and P30,000 as
exemplary damages with all costs of suit.
Appellant filed a brief before the CA, and claimed that the RTC erred in finding AAAs testimony credible
considering that she was unsure whether a match, rod or a cigarette stick was used in burning her private parts.
Appellant argued that AAA never showed signs of shock, distress, or anxiety despite her alleged traumatic
experience. Appellant concluded that these inconsistencies and contradictions are enough to set aside the
verdict of conviction imposed by the RTC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA dismissed the instant appeal of appellant, and affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC as to
the penalties.
a.) For the two counts of rape by sexual assault, CA modified the minimum of the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment into 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor.
b.) For the statutory rape, CA modified Crisostomos sentence into penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility of parole.
ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one
count of statutory rape and WON the trial court erred in the evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses.
HELD: The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly found appellant guilty of all three counts of rape. Article
266-A of the RPC provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above should be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is termed statutory rape as it departs
form the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12
years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took
place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender
years. In this case, the prosecution established all the elements of statutory rape.
The SC agrees with the CA that AAAs uncertainty on whether it was a match, rod or a cigarette stick that was
inserted into her private parts, did not lessen her credibility. Such uncertainty is inconsequential and does not
diminish the fact that an instrument or object was into her private parts. This is the essence of rape by sexual
assault. These inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of
rape. Further, it was held in People vs. Piosang that When the offended party is of tender age and immature,
courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
Regarding appellants argument that AAA did not manifest any stress or anxiety considering her traumatic
experience, it is settled that there is no standard behavioral response when one is confronted with a traumatic
experience. AAAs reaction does not diminish the fact that she was raped by appellant.

Appellants alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when weighted against AAAs positive identification of
him as the malefactor. Appellant failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene. In fact, he admitted that he lived just four houses away from the house of AAA.
SC affirmed with modification the decision of CA that the award of moral damages for the statutory rape is
increased to P75,000 and the award of exemplary damages in rape by sexual assault is increased to P30,000
for each count. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum.

27_DELA ROSA
G.R. No. 199268
February 12, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AURELIO JASTIVA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: On September 29, 2014, Jastiva, 49-year old was charged in the RTC with rape penalized under
Article 266-A in relation to Artive 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. In the evening of August 3, 2004, in
Zamboanga Del Norte, the accused allegedly raped AAA, a 67-year old and married by means of force and
intimidation with the use of a knife. A trial ensued and Jastiva pleaded not guilty.
According to the prosecution, AAA was asleep on their small barn or kamalig when around 11PM, while she was
fast asleep, Jastiva covered her mouth, threatened her with the knife, proceeded to have sexual intercourse
with her. He was unable to proceed with his lewd design because his penis was not yet erected. He then
resorted to foreplay by licking AAAs sexual organ and tried kissing her. Once done and after the accused
fulfilled his sexual desire, AAA stood and opened the door to let Jastiva out. As he was exiting the door, AAA
clearly recognized him as their neighhbor, with the aid of the illumination of the moon. The next day, she
reported the incident to her husband and together, they went to the barangay Hall. She was medically
examined by the Municipal Health Officer who issued a Medical Certificate stating that AAAs labia majora and
labia minora on both sides showed signs of irritation.
On the other hand, the defense maintained that Jastiva could not have committed the crime because he was
sleeping in their home at the date and time of the incident. Jastivas wife, Vilma and daughter, Merlyn,
corroborated with his story stating that their house possess one door only and it would be impossible to leave
without waking up the rest of the family.
RTCS RULING: Jastiva is guilty of the crime charged and was sentenced to a determinate penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay civil indemnity and moral damages.
CAS RULING: The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with a slight modification that Jastiva was further
required to pay interest on all damages awarded to AAA at a legal rate of 6% per annum.
Jastiva argued that the identity of the appellant was not established and the complainant failed to prove that
force and intimidation was used. The OSG, rebutted these stating that AAA no doubt positively identified the
appellant and that the act of holding a knife strongly suggests the use of force or intimidation. The CA held that
the elements of the crime of rape as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 266-A were established by the
prosecution.
ISSUE: WON the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant Jastiva beyond reasonable doubt
HELD: SC affirmed the CAs decision with modification awarding additional exemplary damages.
The court agrees in the finding that the crime of rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt because: 1) AAAs
credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the circumstances surrounding her rape; 2) AAAs
positive identification of Jastiva; 3) Physical evidence consistent with AAAs contention that she was raped; and
4) Absence of ill motive on the part of AAA in filing the complaint against Jastiva.
Also, it is the duty of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses. In rape cases, if the testimony of
the victim is accurate and credible, a conviction of rape may be issued based on her testimony. It is worthy to
remember the three guiding principles in rape prosecutions: 1) an accusation of rape is easy to make, difficult
to prove but more difficult to disprove; 2) Testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost care;
and 3) Evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall based on its own merits.
Lastly, the categorical and positive identification of Jastiva prevails over his alibi and denial. The defense of
alibi must prove that he was present at another place and time and it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime during its commission. This was not successfully established by the defense based on the
contradicting testimonies of the accuseds wife and child.
G.R. No. 183652
February 25, 2015

28_MENDOZA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, Petitioners
VS
COURT OF APPEALS, 21ST DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA,
JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
FACTS:
On March 25, 2004 around 8:00AM, AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony. At about
7PM she told his father that she would be attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together
with Lim, Oporto and Carampatana after eating went to Alsons place and were greeted by Montesvo, Alquizola
and Fiel. In the same place they went inside the bedroom and saw other people. Rudinas suggested that they
have a drinking session in which they agreed. They then started a drinking spree with their two bottles of
Emperador Brandy. At first AAA refused to drink but she eventually took a shoot. She consumed more or less
five glasses. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oportos lap. Oporto then started kissing
her head, at that time AAA was already sleepy but she was still forced to take another shot and fell asleep. They
woke her up again and insisted to drink directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda & Batoctoy were carrying her down stairs. When she regained
consciousness she saw that she was at the Alquizola Lodging House which she recognized. She would thereafter
fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top
of her kissing her different body parts and having intercourse with her. At one point, she woke up while
Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then
joined and started to kiss her. For the last time she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00AM of the next day. She was all along and helt heavy and
exhausted. She was wearing a shirt but without under garments. There were also red stains on her shirt. After
dressing up she reached their house and told her parents that she was raped, her mother started hitting her.
They immediately went to Lala Police Station for report and hospital for medication. The physician found an
old hymenal laceration and hyperemia.
On the other hand, the accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense, during the
drinking session, Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did not listen and still insisted. She rested on
Oportos lap, Roda then approached AAA to kiss her and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the same.
Meanwhile, Alquizola during the night after going to a drinking session with his cousins went to Alsons place
and there he saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other. Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to
resume drinking. After drinking, Batocoy offered to bring AAA home but she refused. Instead, AAA, Lim and
Carampatana went to the lodging house. Alquizola opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto and Carampatana
stayed. There, Carampatana removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give way. Oporto was
at the foot of the bed. Thereafter he removed AAAs pants. According to the defense, AAA lifted her buttocks to
make it easier for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto and AAA started kissing and Carampatana had
intercourse with her. Alquizola entered the room, when AAA saw him she said Come Kuya, embrace me
because I have a problem. Alquizola thus started kissing AAAs breast. Oporta and Alquizola then had sexual
intercourse with AAA then left to sleep. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more times. The morning
after, they went back to the lodge but AAA was already gone.
RTC Ruling: Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape. The three of them surrendered voluntarily to the authorities.
CA Ruling: The decision is reversed and set aside for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. They argued that
AAA consented to the sexual congress basing on the version of the defense. They also relied on the medical
report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration giving the impression that she has had carnal
knowledge with a man before. Also, they stressed that AAAs mothers unuseal reaction of hitting her when she
discovered what happened to her daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her
child just had premarital sex than one who was sexually assaulted.
AAA, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private counsel, primarily
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted private respondents. As the

aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal
prosecution.
ISSUE: A. Whether or not the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion
B.Whether or not the respondents are guilty beyond reasonable doubt on the crime of rape.
HELD and RATIO DECIDENDII:
A. YES. It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by
the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration of the facts
of the case was meticulously culled from the evidence of both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that
it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto,
Carampatana, and Alquizola, the accused-appellants in the case before it. The appellate court merely echoed
the private respondents testimonies, particularly those as to the specific events that transpired during the
crucial period - from the dinner at Gemenos house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House.
As a result, it presented the private respondents account and allegations as though these were the established
facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal. the CAs blatant disregard
of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of
discretion resulting in violation of petitioners right to due process
B. YES, they are guilty.
The appellate court swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made its own flimsy findings
to justify its decision of acquittal. First, the fact that AAA never showed any physical resistance, cried for help
or fought against the respondents bolsters the claim of the later that the sexual act was indeed consensual. But
the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault.
Also, under the provision of Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of rape are (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation
or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or when the victim is under 12 years of age.
Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced
her to drink even when she was already inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AA, but
the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time she was ravished.
In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be by itself sufficient to warrant a
judgment of conviction if found to be credible. The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her
accusation, she would not have open herself to the rough and tumble public trial. Also, it was observed that her
answers to the lengthy and humiliating questions were simple and straightforward negating the possibility of a
rehearsed testimony. The accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but unfortunately
failed to discharge the burden required of them. The CA continued, belabouring on the fact that the examining
physician found old hymenal laceration on AAAs private organ.The defense however, failed to show that AA
was sexually promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex orgies.
Lastly, the Trial Court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy becase his participation
in the crime was uncertain, citing People vsLobrigo. The Court finds that the RTC erred in ruling that
Alquizolas liability is not of a conspirator, but of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential
that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall
have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to
sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in
concert.
The Court also noted that although the prosecuting filed only a single information, it, however, actually
charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one
offense, otherwise the same is defective.
RULING:
Petition Granted. Decision of the Court of Appeals is Reversed and Set Aside.

29_Danny
People of the Philippines vs. Conrado Laog y Ramin
Facts: At around six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, AAA and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking
along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work. Suddenly, appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin, the uncle by affinity of
AAA, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly lead them to a grassy area. Without warning,
appellant struck AAA in the head with a lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and fall down. When Jennifer saw this, she
cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. He then stabbed her
several times with the ice pick and then covered her body with thick grass. Appellant then turned to AAA, hit her in the
head several times more with lead pipe, and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such defenseless state, appellant
raped her. When AAA regained consciousness she crawled until she reached her grandfathers farm at daybreak of June 8,
2000. When she saw him, she waved at him for help. She was then brought to the hospital. Appellant, on the other hand,
denied the charges against him and testified that he was at home with his children and nephew cooking dinner around the
time the crimes were committed.
The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes of murder and rape. Appellant appealed to
the CA but the latter affirmed with modification the trial courts judgment adding payment of actual damages to the heirs
of Jennifer and reducing the exemplary damages in each criminal case. Hence, this appeal.
Issues: (1) WON the inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA diminished her credibility
(2) WON appellant should be convicted of separate crimes of murder and rape
Held: Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed to the province of
the trial court because of its unique position of having observed the evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand
while testifying.
Appellant attempts to discredit AAAs accusation of rape by pointing out that while she testified on being very weak after
she was raped, she was able to crawl her way to her grandfathers farm wearing clothes when she was supposed to be
naked. But in AAAs account, appellant did not undress her completely her blouse and bra were merely lifted up while
her undergarments were just pulled down, which explains why she still had her clothes on when she crawled to her
grandfathers farm. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters not to the central facts of the
crime do not affect the credibility of witnesses declarations. For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a
witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime
charged.
Appellants defense cannot prevail over the credible testimony of AAA who positively identified him as the perpetrator of
the murder and rape. Positive identification, when categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the appellant whose testimony is not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. It is not enough to prove that the appellant has been somewhere else
during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere
within the vicinity of the crime scene. Appellant, during his cross-examination, admitted that his house was more or less
only 100 meters from the crime scene. Thus, his defense of alibi is not worthy of any credit.
While the Court concurs with the trial courts conclusion that appellant was the one who raped AAA and killed Jennifer,
the appellant should not have been convicted of the separate crimes of murder and rape. The facts alleged and proven
clearly show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex crime or composite crime
provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the RPC, as amended. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must
necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the sameprecisionthat would be necessary if they were made the
subject of separate complaints.
Article 266-B provides only a single penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the
occasion of the rape. The facts established showed that the elements of rape with homicide were consummated and it is
immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the woman victim of the rape.
APPEAL DISMISSED, JUDGMENT AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.

30_ACOSTA

PEOPLE V. EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO


G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012

FACTS:
The accused in this case is Edmundo Villaflores who was also known as Batman in their neighborhood and
was known to be a drug-addict. The victim is a four-year old girl named Marita. On July 2, 1999, Marita was
last seen by her mother Julia to be playing at the rear of their residence. When Julia noticed that Marita was
missing, she called her husband who rushed home to find Marita. After seeking the help of a manghuhula (out
of their desperation), at 6:00AM of July 3, 1999, they found Maritas lifeless body covered with blue and yellow
sack five houses away from their home. The result of the postmortem examination showed that the child was
raped and the cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation.Upon police investigation, two (2) witnesses who
were Aldrin Bautista and Jovy Stadium pointedVillaflores as the culprit. Both witnesses narrated that at about
10:00AM on July 2, 1999, they saw Villaflores leading Maria by the hand. At noon, the three used shabu for a
while, but the witnesses didnot see Marita in the vicinity of Villaflores house. It was only on 3:00PM that they
heard cries of achild. At about 7:00PM both witnesses saw Batman carrying a yellow sack which appears heavy,
thesame sack that he saw when they are still inside the house of Batman. The wife of the accused also gave a
supporting testimony that on the night of July 2, 1999 she saw his husband place some sacks under their house
and then went closer and saw a protruding elbow inside the sack, when sheconfronted his husband who was on
drugs, Villaflores said it was nothing. Based from these circumstances, the RTC convicted Villaflores of a rape
with homicide holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but that his guilt was shown
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the conviction. The accused appealed and argued
that both RTC and CA erred in convicting him of a composite crimeof Rape with homicide through
circumstantial evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can be convicted of a composite crime of rape with homicide through
circumstantial evidence.

HELD:
YES. In order to convict Villaflores for the composite crime of rape with homicide, the State must thus prove
the concurrence of the following facts, namely: (a) that Villaflores had carnal knowledge of Marita; (b) that he
consummated the carnal knowledge without the consent of Marita; and (c) that hekilled Marita by reason of
the rape.Under the RPC as amended, rape is always committed when the accused has carnal knowledge of a
female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called statutory rape, because a female of thatage is
deemed incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge. Maritas Certificate of Live Birth disclosed that
she was born on October 29, 1994, indicating her age to be only four years and eightmonths at the time of the
commission of the crime on July 2, 1999. As such, carnal knowledge of herby Villaflores would constitute
statutory rape. The crime becomes a composite crime of rape with homicide when it was made on the occasion
of the rape, which refers to a killing that occursimmediately before or after, or during the commission itself of
the attempted or consummated rape,for as long as the killing is lined to rape. Although the best evidence to
prove rape is the testimony of the victim herself, the rule held that the Rules of Court allows circumstantial
evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as theidentity of the culprit when the rape victim is
herself killed; provided however, that such circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction.

A circumstantial evidence is sufficient when:


1-there is more than one circumstance
2-the facts from which the inferences derived are proven
3-the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt

With the circumstances provided by the testimonies of different ewitnesse, the RTC and the CA appreciated the
circumstances together and were seen as strands which create a pattern and formed an unbroken chain that led
to a reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of others, was guilty of rape with homicide.

31_Barrieta
People vs. Jojie Suansing
G. R. No. 189822
September 2, 2013
FACTS
Carnal knowledge of a woman suffering from mental retardation is rape since she is incapable of giving consent
to a sexual act. Under these circumstances, all that needs to be proved for a successful prosecution are the facts of sexual
congress between the rapist and his victim, and the latters mental retardation.
"AAA" was born on July 6, 1975. She is She used to live in Tangub City with her grandparents because her mother
suffered from and later died of tuberculosis. When "AAA" was 15 years old, she became a mother to a baby boy who was
born on September 29, 1990. Nobody admitted responsibility for her pregnancy. To receive better guidance and
supervision, "AAA" was transferred to the residence of "EEE" who raised her as a daughter. Sometime before April 8,
2001, "GGG" requested "FFF" to get from appellants boarding house an electric fan and a transformer. "FFF" together
with her brother and "AAA" went to the boarding house of appellant. After giving the requested items, appellant ordered
"FFF" and her brother to leave "AAA" behind. "FFF" brought the items to "GGG" who, upon learning that "AAA" was still
with appellant, requested "FFF" to return to appellants boarding house to fetch "AAA." Upon arriving at the boarding
house, "FFF" noticed that the door was closed. She called out to "AAA" to go home to avoid being scolded by "EEE." "AAA"
opened the door and came out fixing her short pants. "FFF" then asked "AAA" if anything happened. "AAA" replied that
after "FFF" and her brother left the boarding house, appellant pulled her inside the room, removed her shoes and panty,
told her to lie down on the floor, and inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent. "AAA" requested "FFF" not to
tell anyone that she was raped by appellant. On August 3, 2001, "EEE" learned about the rape and confronted "AAA."
"EEE" then reported the incident to police authorities. Hence this case.
ISSUE
Whether or not defendant is guilty of the crime of rape.
HELD
DEFENSE: Denial
RTC: Defendant guilty of simple rape. However, since "AAAs" mental retardation was not specifically alleged in the
Amended Information, it cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance that would warrant the imposition of the
death penalty.
CA: affirmed the findings of the RTC with respect to the assessment of the testimony of "AAA." It also affirmed the RTCs
ruling not to consider the mental retardation of "AAA" as a qualifying circumstance that would result in the imposition of
the death penalty since it was not specifically alleged in the Amended Information.
SC: The appeal is unmeritorious.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 8353, states that:
Art. 226-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;


d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman, (2) through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was
under 12 years of age or was demented. From these requisites, it can thus be deduced that rape is committed the moment
the offender has sexual intercourse with a person suffering from mental retardation. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is
a mental retardate is rape. A mental condition of retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a
bestial assault on her chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually weak to
the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already constitutes rape, without requiring proof that
the accused used force and intimidation in committing the act. Only the facts of sexual congress between the accused and
the victim and the latters mental retardation need to be proved. In this case, the evidence presented by the prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt the sexual congress between appellant and "AAA" and the latters mental
retardation. "AAA" positively identified appellant as her rapist.
The appellants knowledge of "AAAs" mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime qualifies the
crime of rape. Appellant is therefore guilty of the crime of qualified rape. The supreme penalty of death should have been
imposed on the appellant due to the special qualifying circumstance of knowledge at the time of the rape that "AAA" was
mentally disabled. However, the enactment of RA 9346 prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. In lieu thereof, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed in accordance with Section 2 of RA 9346. In addition, as provided under Section
3 thereof, appellant shall not be eligible for parole.

33_CARILLO
G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. JERRY OBOGNE, AccusedAppellant.
Appellant Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of rape to which the latter pleaded not guilty. RTC Catanduanes
rendered decision finding the appellant guilty of simple rape but did not consider AAAs mental retardation as a
qualifying circumstance considering that the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of AAAs mental disability.
CA affirmed.
FACTS:
On or about July 2002, in the afternoon, in barangay Ogbong, municipality of Viga, province of Catanduanes, the said
accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA, a 12year old mentally retarded person.
During the continuation of AAAs testimony, she was able to recall what [appellant] did to her.
AAA recalled that while she was playing, [appellant] saw her and asked her to go with him because he would give her a
sugar cane. [Appellant] brought AAA to his house and while inside, he removed her panty, and then inserted his penis
into her vagina and he got the knife and then he took a sugar cane and then he gave it to her and then she went home.
The trial court did not consider AAAs mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance considering that the Information
failed to allege that appellant knew of AAAs mental disability.
Hence, this appeal by private complainant.
Appellant on the other hand argues that the testimony of AAA deserves no credence because she was incapable of
intelligently making known her perception to others by reason of her mental disability. Appellant also attempted to show
that he was at barangay Ananong at the time of the rape incident. However, as found by the trial court, the distance
between barangay Ananong andbarangay Ogbong is only four kilometers and could be traversed in one hour or even
less.
ISSUES:
1/ W/N a mental retard can be a considered a credible witness and 2) W/N the trial court is correct in not considering the
mental retardation of AAA as qualifying circumstance
HELD:
Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide that all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.

In this case, AAA is totally qualified to take the witness stand notwithstanding her mental condition. This Court finds
AAA a very credible witness, even in her mental condition. Contrary to defense counsels objection that AAA was not
capable of intelligently making known her perception to others, AAA managed to recount the ordeal she had gone
through in the hands of the accused, though in a soft voice and halting manner x x x. AAAs simple account of her ordeal
clearly reflects sincerity and truthfulness.
Finally, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of simple rape and properly imposed
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266B, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court
correctly ruled that AAAs mental disability could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance because the
Information failed to allege that appellant knew of such mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime. As
held in People v. Limio:
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not call for the imposition of the death
penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such mental disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the
prosecution.
For the AntiRape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) expressly provides that
the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with the qualifying circumstance of (10) when
the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time
of the commission of the crime. Said knowledge x x x qualifies rape as a heinous offense. Absent said circumstance,
which must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction of appellant for qualified rape under

Art. 266B (10), RPC, could not be sustained, although the offender may be held liable for simple rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
As such this circumstance must be formally alleged in the information and duly proved by the prosecution.
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be alleged
with specificity in the information. x x x But in the absence of a specific or particular allegation in the information that
the appellant knew of her mental disability or retardation, as well as lack of adequate proof that appellant knew of this
fact, Article 266B (10), RPC, could not be properly applied.
Hence, the appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, as defined under Article 266A of the [Revised] Penal Code, for
which the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the decision of CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant is not eligible for parole.

34_CASTRO
People v. Joson
G.R. 206393, January 21, 2015
FACTS:
AAA lives with her brother Joson, and his wife. In the morning of May 14 2009, while Josons wife was away, AAA
was awakened by appellant undressing her. AAA tried to struggle but the latter was tightly holding her arms. After
undressing her, appellant kissed and mounted her. He was able to insert his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, he went
back to sleep leaving AAA crying. In the morning, he left AAA with a letter apologizing for what happened and begging her
not to tell on his wife. On the same date, AAA related the incident to appellants wife and on June 2009, AAA,
accompanied by her father, reported the incident to the police.

The prosecution presented a provisional medico-legal report on the examination conducted on AAA, which states
that there is no evident injury on AAA at the time of the examination. The birth certificate of AAA was also submitted to
prove that she was still a minor at the time the rape was committed.

Appellant admitted that AAA is his sister but he proffered the defense of alibi and claimed that he was staying in
Cavite at the time of the incident and only went back to his house in Dasmarias on May 26 2009. Appellant denied the
accusation against him and speculated that AAA resented him because he was strict with his sister. Appellant also denied
writing the apology letter and presented his specimen handwriting in court. The trial court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial courts decision.

Joson maintains that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of rape as defined under Article 266-A of the
RPC, particularly the elements of force, threat or intimidation. He argues that AAA did not allege that he threatened her
with the use of any firearm or any bladed weapon nor did he say anything to threaten or intimidate her. With respect to
moral ascendancy, he contends that the Court in a recent case did not consider a brother as one of those close kin who has
moral ascendancy over a victim that would substitute for force and intimidation. He further points out that there was no
showing of any resistance on the part of AAA to his alleged sexual advances.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Joson should be convicted of the crime of rape.

RULING:
Yes. For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when
she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.

First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively identified her own brother as the assailant. She
was likewise unwavering in her narration that appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, appellant employed
threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. The force or violence required in rape cases is relative; it need not be
overpowering or irresistible. That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The parties relative age,
size and strength should be considered in proving the element of force. The degree of force that may not suffice when the

victim is an adult may be more than enough if employed against a person of tender age.

Jason employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate the rape. AAA was only 14 years old at that time.
Considering the tender years of the offended party as compared to Joson, his act of pinning the arms of AAA to avoid any
form of resistance from her suffices. Force or intimidation is not limited to physical force. As long as it is present and
brings the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is unnecessary. Further, the failure of
the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is not tantamount to consent. Physical resistance
need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her
attackers because of fear. Resistance is not an element of rape and its absence does not denigrate AAAs claim that Joson
consummated his bestial act.

Anent appellants argument that as a brother he lacks moral ascendancy over her sister, which could substitute for
force and intimidation, the Court held in People vs. Villaruel that the older brother definitely had moral ascendancy over
his sister. Being the eldest, he had definitely moral ascendancy over her. He, being the eldest among the children since
both of their parents were dead, the accused stood as guardian of the siblings. The moral ascendancy and influence the
accused has over the complainant sufficiently substitutes for the force and intimidation required in rape.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua was also proper. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, however, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

35_Del Rosario

People vs Candellada
GR No. 189293

July 10, 2013

Facts:
An Information was filed against respondent Vicente Candellada before the RTC charging him of
attempted rape of his 14 year old daughter AAA where it not for AAAs shouting for help, Candellada had
successfully consummated the crime of Rape. He was likewise charged with 8 counts of consummated rape
committed on May 30; June 2 and 12; July 10; August 13; Nov. 5; Dec. 15 and 25, all in year 2004. The nine
Information were tried jointly.
According to the prosecution, AAA was born on Davao as the second of the 3 daughters of the accused.
In Davao accused had impregnated AAA and later on brought her to Lanao Del Norte. They live with an
acquaintance of the accused named Gemina in which he introduce to the latter that AAA is his wife. While in
Lanao, Candellada had intercourse with AAA many times but AAA could only remember the 8 aforementioned
dates. AAA gave birth to a baby boy who later died after 4 days of birth. Germina testified that she saw that the
accused had frequently mauled his wife and that on Dec. 28, 2004 the accused hit AAA with a woodthis was
corroborated by the medical examination conducted by Dr. Magtagad to AAA. He observed hematoma,
contusions, and abrasions on the different part of AAAs body which were caused by a blunt object, possibly a
wood. Meanwhile, accused Candellada denied the allegations saying that AAA was impregnated by someone
else and this prompted him to bring her to Lanao and that it was impossible for him to make an attempt to rape
AAA on Dec. 28, 2004 because he was already in jail on Dec. 23, 2004 after he struck AAA. Also, he tried to
discredit AAAs testimony saying that they were coached, rehearse, and contrived because AAA could not
vividly described how she was molested; AAA merely repeated that on all 8 occasions, accused had intercourse
with her by inserting his penis to her vagina.
RTC ruled that Candellada is guilty of 8 counts of consummated rape but acquitted with the charged of
attempted rape committed on Dec. 28, 2004 because there was no enough evidence to prove his guilt since the
overt acts committed by the accused resulted only to AAAs physical injuries. RTC sentenced him with death
penalty. The records of the 8 rape cases were then forwarded to CA. CA affirmed judgement of conviction with
modification on the sentence (now reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole) and award of damages.
Issue: whether or not accused is guilty of 8 counts of rape
Decision: Yes, he is guilty; his appeal lacks merit.
For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of (1)
sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent, (4) the victim is under 18 years old at the
time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim).
The 4th and 5th elements, minority and relationship, were admitted by the accused during the pre-trial
conference. While the first 3 element were established by AAAs testimony.
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the
victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, as in
this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when a
woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed and, where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis
thereof. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount of psychological
depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his
remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts
are inclined to give credit to the straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal
prosecutions for rape.

The uniform way by which AAA described the eight rape incidents does not necessarily mean that her
testimony was coached, rehearsed, and contrived. Also, AAAs failure to mention that accused-appellant
removed their undergarments prior to the rape does not destroy the credibility of AAAs entire testimony. Rape
victims do not cherish keeping in their memory an accurate account of the manner in which they were sexually
violated. Thus, errorless recollection of a harrowing experience cannot be expected of a witness, especially
when she is recounting details from an experience so humiliating and painful as rape. In addition, bearing in
mind that AAA had been repeatedly raped by accused-appellant for a period of time (beginning in Davao,
which resulted in AAAs pregnancy), it is not surprising for AAA to recall each incident in much the same way.
Note:
In rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of
her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy
takes the place of violence or intimidation.

36_DIZON
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIAL
G.R. No. 191362

October 9, 2013

FACTS:
"AAA" is one of the six (6) children born to "BBB" and "CCC." After "CCC" died, "BBB" cohabited with appellant Marciano
Cial (also known as "Onot"). Appellant and "BBB" have two (2) children.
In 2002, "AAA", then thirteen (13) years old, was a Grade I pupil and was residing with her family and appellant in x x x
Quezon Province. "AAA" calls appellant "Papa."
Sometime in December 2002, appellant called "AAA" and told her to go to the bedroom inside their house. Once inside,
appellant took off "AAAs" shorts and panty and spread her legs. Appellant pulled his pants down to his thighs and
inserted his penis into the little girls vagina. "AAA" felt intense pain but she did not try to struggle because appellant had a
bolo on his waist. After satiating his lust, appellant threatened to kill "AAA" and her family if she reported the incident to
anyone. At that time, "AAAs" maternal grandmother was in the house but was unaware that "AAA" was being ravished.
Unable to endure the torment, "AAA" confided her ordeal to her mother. But "AAAs" mother did not believe her. "AAA"
ran away from home and went to her maternal uncles house. There, she disclosed her harrowing experience to her
mothers siblings. Her uncle appeared to be angered by appellants wrong doing. But nonetheless, her uncle allowed
appellant to bring her home when appellant fetched her.
For fear that she might be raped again, "AAA" ran away and went to the house of her aunt. Her aunt helped her file the
complaint against her stepfather.
"AAA" was brought to Doa Marta Memorial District Hospital in Atimonan, Quezon where she was physically examined
by Dr. Arnulfo Imperial. Dr. Imperial issued a Medico-Legal Report which essentially states that:
1) she was negative to pubic hair; there was a negative physical injury at the pubic area, with normal external
genitalia;
2) the hymen has an old laceration on the 12 oclock and 5oclock positions, introitus admits one examining finger
with ease; and
3) spermatozoa determination result was negative for examination of spermatozoa.
According to Dr. Imperial, the negative result for pubic hair as indicated in his report means that the victim has not yet
fully developed her secondary characteristics which usually manifests during puberty. Dr. Imperial explained that the easy
insertion of one finger into her vagina means that the child was no longer a virgin and that it would be difficult to insert
even the tip of the little finger into the private part of a virgin as she would have suffered pain.
On April 7, 2003, "AAA" and her aunt sought the assistance of the Crisis Center for Women at Gumaca, Quezon. "AAA"
was admitted to the said center and still continued to reside therein at the time of her testimony. 7
Appellant denied the charge. He alleged that he treated "AAA" as his own daughter. He also claimed that "AAAs" aunt
fabricated the charge because appellant called her a thief.
RTC: The RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of qualified rape.

CA: The appellate court affirmed the RTC


The CA disregarded appellants contention that he could not have raped "AAA" in the presence of "AAAs" grandmother as
"lust is no respecter of time and place." Moreover, the appellate court found that the prosecution satisfactorily established
"AAAs" minority as well as the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant being the common-law husband of
"AAAs" mother.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the relationship and minority of the AAA has been proven in this case.
RULING:
No. Both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting appellant of the crime of qualified rape. According to both courts,
the twin qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship attended the commission of the crime.
In its Formal Offer of Evidence, 18 the prosecution mentioned "AAAs" Certificate of Live Birth. Also attached to the Folder
of Exhibits marked as Exhibit "B" is "AAAs" Certificate of Live Birth showing that "AAA" was born on October 31, 1991.
However, upon closer scrutiny, we note that the said Certificate of Live Birth was never presented or offered during the
trial of the case. Up until the prosecution rested its case, nobody was presented to testify on "AAAs" Certificate of Live
Birth. Records show that the prosecution presented only "AAA" and Dr. Imperial as its witnesses. Dr. Imperial never
testified on "AAAs" age. On the other hand, "AAA" even testified on the witness stand that she does not know her age the
time the crime was committed.
Clearly, the prosecution failed to prove the minority of "AAA".
The same is true with respect to the other qualifying circumstance of relationship. The prosecution likewise miserably
failed to establish "AAAs" relationship with the appellant. Although the Information alleged that appellant is the
common-law husband of "AAAs" mother, "AAA" referred to appellant as her step-father during the trial.
Even the RTC interchangeably referred to appellant as the common-law husband of "AAAs" mother as well as the stepfather of "AAA". Moreover, the RTC failed to cite any basis for its reference to appellant as such. In fact, the RTC Decision
is bereft of any discussion as to how it reached its conclusion that appellant is the common-law husband of "AAAs"
mother or that "AAA" is his step-daughter.
The CA committed the same error. Notwithstanding appellant's claim that he is married to "AAA's" mother, it went on to
declare, without any explanation or justification, that appellant is the common-law husband of "AAA's" mother.
Given that Marciano and AAA's mother were not legally married, the qualifying circumstance that the accused is the
common-law husband of the victim's mother may be properly appreciated.
The tems "common-law husband" and "step-father" have different legal connotations. For appellant to be a step-father to
"AAA," he must be legally married to "AAA's" mother.26
Suffice it to state that qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like the crime itself. In this
case, the prosecution utterly failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship. As such, appellant should only be convicted of the crime of simple rape, the penalty for which is reclusion
perpetua.

37_DONA
PEOPLE v. LUCENA, G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014
FACTS:
On appeal is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of RTC Paraaque City, Branch finding
appellant Manolito Lucena alias Machete guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape as
defined and penalized under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266A, in relation to Article 266B, of the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines, as amended, thereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count
On 28 April 2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old, was walking and chatting with
her friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio, Paraaque City, when two (2) barangay tanods, one of
whom is the appellant, approached and informed them that they were being apprehended AAA for violating the
curfew ordinance of their barangay. AAAs companions, however, managed to escape, thus, she alone was
apprehended. AAA was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the tricycle.
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San Dionisio Barangay Hall.
The appellant told the other tanod that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to her house. The appellant
brought her instead to Kabuboy Bridge. The appellant then took out the backseat of the tricycle and positioned
it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her
clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina despite
the latters plea not to rape her. Three (3) penetrations happened one after another at an interval of five (5)
minutes, wherein the appellant would take a rest after satiating his lust and after regaining his strength would
again rape AAA. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered AAA to dress up. The
appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about what happened between
them. He then brought AAA in front of a school in Paraaque City and allowed AAA to get off.
In his defense, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation attended
the commission of rape. Records revealed that AAA did not even attempt to resist his alleged sexual advances
over her person. The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The
intervening period of five (5) minutes between each penetration does not necessarily prove that he decided to
commit three separate acts of rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not force or intimidation attended the crime.


HELD:
ART. 266A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed.
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;


b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

xxxx

ART. 266B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis supplied).

Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances constitutes rape: (1) when
force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and (3)
when she is under twelve (12) years of age.

The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible when
applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such character as
could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose which the accused had in mind. Further, it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the
victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such
degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces
fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death.

In the case at bench, the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at her while she was
ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life and personal
safety. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone
about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the former was still
inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge. It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and
intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved
desires.

While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he inserted his
penis into AAAs vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of sexual intercourse, the same
does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had already been instilled in the
mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was still within appellants reach, therefore, he
could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any resistance to his evil desires.
AAAs lack of physical resistance, therefore, is understandable and would not in any way discredit her
testimony.

When a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to think and act coherently. Physical
resistance is not an essential element of rape and need not be established when intimidation is exercised upon
the victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists embrace because of fear for her life
and personal safety. The victims failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her
submission to the criminal acts of her aggressor. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress
are unpredictable; people react differently.
As to the number of rapes committed. The Court quotes the observations of the trial court as approved by
CA: The three (3) penetrations which occurred one after the other at intervals clearly infer that when appellant
decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a
single impulse, but rather by several criminal intent. This Court holds that indeed the three insertions into
AAA were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellants
conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that
[w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua
to death. As it was properly alleged and proved that the appellant used a gun in order to consummate
his evil desires, thus, both lower courts correctly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count of rape.

38_DUQUILLA
PEOPLE V JUMAWAN
G.R. No. 187495
(2014)
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is the husband of private complainant KKK. He was charged with two
counts of rape, in violation of R.A. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
On October 16, 1998 after the accused-appellant, KKK and their children went about their nightly routine, the
accused and his wife went to their conjugal bedroom. Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she refused to lie thereon with the accused and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her
behaviour angered the accused who ordered her to transfer to the bed. She refused, reasoning that she wasnt feeling well,
so accused lifted the cot and threw it against the wall. Terrified, KKK transferred to the bed wherein accused expressed his
desire to copulate by tapping his fingers on her lap. She resisted his yearning, reiterating that she wasnt feeling well. She
held on to her panties but accused pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. He raised her daster, stretched
her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. He carried out his carnal desires while KKK continued to protest. MMM,
one of the couples children heard her mothers cries so she went to her parents room, knocked on the door and inquired
about KKK. She helped her mother to get up in order to bring her to the girls bedroom. The accused tried to prevent KKK
from leaving but MMM leaned against the door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out. In their
bedroom, KKK told her children about what accused-appellant did. KKK decided to spend the next night in the childrens
bedroom but an infuriated accused-appellant ordered her to go to the conjugal room. She refused so accused lifted her
from the bed and attempted to carry her out. Accused grabbed KKKs short pants causing them to tear apart. The presence
of their children did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled that even in front of them, he can have sex with their
mother because hes the head of the family. He ordered his daughters to leave the room while he succeeded in pursuing his
carnal desires with KKK even if she refused because she wasnt feeling well. The children in the staircase heard the pleas of
their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed. When the commotion ceased, the children scurried to their room
where they found their mother crouched on the bed, crying. She then told her children what their father did. The accusedappellant denied raping his wife on both nights, claiming that he was in another town, working.
The RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution and convicted the accused of the two
separate charges of rape. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling.
ISSUE:
WON accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is guilty of the charges of rape.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts finding of guilt and convicted the accusedappellant of the two charges.
The concept of rape in marriage goes deep into history and is traced to two ancient English practices of bride
capture whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and stealing an heiress whereby a man abducted a woman and
married her. Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified under three
ideologies: (1) chattel theory, where a woman was the property of her father until she marries to become the property of

her husband; (2) doctrine of coverture, where a woman lost her identity upon marriage therefore a husband had the right
to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved; and (3) marital unity theory, where the woman becomes one with her
husband upon marriage. These gave rise to the marital exemption rule as conceived by Chief Justice Hale of England when
he stated that the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife has given herself up in the kind unto her husband. Such irrevocable implied
consent theory was observed in common law countries, giving legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his
wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a woman not his wife. This was challenged by womens movements
until the Court of Appeals of New York declared the same unconstitutional for lack of rational basis in distinguishing
between marital rape and non-marital rape.
In the Philippines, the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hales irrevocable implied
consent theory. As a result of its commitment to the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women (UN-CEDAW), however, the Legislature enacted R.A. 8353 which eradicated the stereotype concept of
rape. The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. It
recognizes the reality of marital rape and criminalizes its perpetration. The crime of rape is penalized without regard to
the rapists legal relationship with his victim. The definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. 8353 pertains to rape, as
traditionally known, sexual assault and marital rape. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the
law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. The elements and
quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal
relationship between the accused and his accuser.
In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution was based on credible witnesses who gave equally credible
testimonies to establish the elements and proof required for a judgment of conviction. The accused-appellant forced his
wife when he knowingly overpowered her in order to facilitate he consummation of his much-desired non-consensual
sexual intercourse. He employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK when he imposed his distorted sense of moral
authority over her. He exercised dominance over his wife as husband which cowed KKK into submission. No consent can
be deduced from KKKs act of going to the conjugal bedroom with the accused because at that juncture there were no
indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. Resistance is not an element of rape and need not be proved by
the victim; at any rate, however, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused to recognize
that she seriously did not assent to the sexual congress. Moreover, it is not the presence or absence of blood on the victims
underwear that determines the fact of rape inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary
to prove rape. Lastly, the accused-appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse when he raised the
irrevocable implied consent theory; therefore, his defense of alibi should be rejected.

39_EISMA

RICHARD RICALDE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 211002

January 21, 2015

FACTS:
On January 30, 2002, XXX (then a 10 years old boy) requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonalds Bel-Air, Sta.
Rosa at past 8:00 p.m. Ricalde, then 31 years old, is a distant relative and textmate of XXX. After dinner, XXXs mother
told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor.

It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something inserted in his
anus." He saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis." When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mothers room to
tell her what happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ. XXXs mother armed herself
with a knife for self-defense when she confronted Ricalde about the incident, but he remained silent. She asked him to
leave.

XXXs mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to report the incident to the Sta.
Rosa police station. The police referred them to the municipal health center for medical examination. The result yielded a
negative result for spermatozoa and found no signs of recent trauma in his anal orifice.

A criminal complaint filed against Ricalde but he denied the accusations of alleged rape through sexual assault.

Regional Trial Court found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault.

Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with the modification of lowering the amounts of damages awarded.

Petitioner Ricalde filed a petition praying for his acquittal. Among the issues he raised were:

1.

The existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. There was no physical evidence to support the allegation since the
medico-legal tested negative.

2. XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object
being inserted into his anal orifice. XXX was also able to immediately push him away. Thus, no push and pull
movement happened that would explain XXXs alleged stomach ache. Petitioner submits that the alleged stomach
ache was an attempt to aggravate the charge against him.
3. XXX testified that after he had pushed petitioner away, he saw that petitioner was wearing pants with the zipper
open. Petitioner submits that performing anal coitus while wearing pants with an open zipper poses a challenge
the risk of injuring the sexual organ or having pubic hair entangled in the zipper.

Therefore, petitioner contends that the incident only amounts to acts of lasciviousness.

Courts ruling
The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 classified rape as a crime against persons and amended the Revised Penal Code to include
Article 266-A on rape through sexual assault:

Article 266A. Rape; When and How Committed.Rape is Committed


1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object rape," "gender-free rape," or
"homosexual rape." The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is "the insertion of the penis into another persons
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another persons genital or anal orifice.

Likewise, the Court found it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object
that was inserted into her genital. To require the rape victim would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.

Second, petitioners reliance on the medico-legals finding lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXXs anal orifice
does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration.

The positive testimony of XXX should be given weight. The variance doctrine as argued by the petitioner was not given
credit by the Court because no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during trial. The
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.

Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.

Fallo:

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that for rape through sexual assault
under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, accused-appellant Richard Ricalde is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six
(6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in
the amount ofP30,000.00 and moral damages likewise in the amount of P30,000.00, both with interest at the legal rate
of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

40_Fajardo
Jovit Garingarao v People of the Philippines
Topic: Republic Act 7610 (Anti-Child Abuse Law)
Facts:
Petitioner, Jovit Garingarao, is charged of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610.
Prosecution: AAA, a 16 year old girl, was brought to the hospital by her parents BBB and CCC due to fever and
abdominal pain. She was confined for further observation. At the day when the incident happened, she was left alone
because BBB have to fix AAAs medicare and CCC need to attend to their store. When the time BBB came back to the
hospital, AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. At their house AAA told her parents that she was sexually abused by
Garingarao. According to AAA, that morning, when she was left alone, someone came to her room in white uniform and
ask her if she had taken her medicines and if she is still feeling some pain. After her reply, Garingarao then lifted her bra
and touched her breast, AAA inquire as to what he was doing but he said that he is just conducting some examination.
Afterwards, Garingarao left the room but eventually returned with a stethoscope. He lifted AAAs shirt and pressed the
stethoscope to her stomach and touch her two nipples. Garingaro then lifted her pajama and underwear then pressed the
lower part of her abdomen then slid his finger inside AAAs private part. AAA crossed her legs and informed him that it is
her monthly period; however Garingarao continued but only stopped when he saw that AAA really had her monthly
period. He then went inside the bathroom, clean his hands and left.
Defense:
Garingarao denied the accusations and presented a new version of the story. He alleged that on the day of
the incident, when he went to AAAs room to administer her medicine and check her vital signs he was accompanied by his
nursing aide Tamayo. And while on the room, BBB was there and even accused him of not administering medicines
properly and on time, then a heated argument ensued between them. And that, the accusation was just made and
fabricated by BBB to get even with him. This story was further corroborated by the nursing aide, Tamayo.
Ruling:
RTC The trial court gave credence to the positive identification of AAA and ruled that Garingaraos argument is
baseless as it was illogical for BBB to convince his daughter to fabricate a story just to get even over a heated argument. He
was convicted of the crime charged.
CA
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification as regards the penalty and damages awarded. It
further stated that while Garingarao was charged for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610, he should be convicted
under RA 7610 because AAA was 16 years old when the crime was committed. Under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the offender
shall be charged with rape or lascivious conduct under the Revised Penal Code only if the victim is below 12 years old,
otherwise the provision of RA 7610 shall prevail.
SC
Garingarao still alleged that it was impossible for him to commit the crime because there are so many patients and
employees in the hospital. He further alleged that assuming the charge was correct he shall only be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610. According to him a single incident would not suffice to hold him liable
under said law.
The Court was not persuaded. It affirmed the findings of the trial court and the appellate court which gave
credence to the testimony of AAA. It is a settled rule that denial is a weak defense as against the positive identification of
the victim.

With regards to Garingaraos contention that he should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610, the Court cited
the pertinent provision of RA 7610 particularly Section 5 of Article III:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit,
or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period, x x x

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;


2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610, lascivious conduct is
defined as follows:
The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

The Court ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation
which subdues the free exercise of the offended partys free will. In the case, the act of Garingarao of touching AAAs breast
and putting his finger to her vagina is achieved by coercing AAA into submitting to this lascivious acts by pretending that
he was examining her. The court further explains that it is inconsequential that the abuse under RA 7610 occurred only
once because under Section 3(b) of the said law, abuse may be habitual or not.

With the foregoing, the Court holds Jovit Garingarao guilty of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act
7610, imposing the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals.

41_Ferrer
People of the Philippines vs Dina Dulay
(G.R. No. 193854; September 24, 2012)
Case filed: Rape as Principal by Indispensable Cooperation (Art 266-A, RPC)
Decision: RTC: Guilty of Rape
CA: Guilty of Rape, modified Damages
Supreme Court: Guilty of Child Prostitution, a violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the
Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act
Facts:
The victim AAA was 12 years old during the crime. AAA's sister introduced Dina Dulay to AAA as someone who is nice.
Thereafter, Dulay convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Before going to the said
wake, they went to a casino to look for Dulay's boyfriend, but since he was not there, they went to Sto. Nio at Don Galo
but he was also not there. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish, they saw
Dulay's boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, Dulay and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the
Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, Dulay suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by
the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to appellant and heard "Speed" tell appellant to look for a
younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for Dulay's
help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but she did not do so. After the rape,
"Speed" and Dulay told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her.

AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and the latter informed their
mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at Barangay San Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay officials
of San Dionisio referred the complaint to the police station. The Paraaque City Police Office (Women's and Children
Concern Desk) asked the assistance of the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, upon which the latter
assigned the case to Dr. Merle Tan. Consequently, with the consent of AAA and her mother, and in the presence of a social
worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Dr. Tan conducted the requisite interview and
physical examination on AAA. Later on, Dr. Tan issued a Medico-Legal Report stating that there was no evident injury in
the body of AAA, but medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual abuse. During her testimony, Dr. Tan explained that such
impression or conclusion pertains to the ano-genital examination and also stated that she found multiple abrasions on the
back portion of the body of AAA.

Version of Defense (Sole Testimony of Dulay):


Dulay met AAA a few days before June 2005 when the latter was introduced to her by her cousin Eglay Akmad during
the wake of a relative of AAA at Palanyag. The cousin of appellant was AAA's neighbor at Palanyag. Around 1 o'clock in the
morning of July 3, 2005, Dulay claimed that she was at La Huerta, at the Bulungan Fish Port in Paraaque City with her
cousin Eglay and stayed there for about thirty (30) minutes. They then proceeded to the house of Dulay's cousin in
Palanyag. In the said house, Dulay saw "Speed" and two (2) other male persons. She also saw AAA who was engaged in a
conversation with "Speed" and his two (2) companions. She asked AAA what she was doing there and the latter said that it
was none of her business ("wala kang pakialam sa akin"). Because of the response of AAA, appellant left the house and
went home to General Trias, Cavite.
Issues:
1. W/N there was actual conspiracy between Speed and Dulay that warrants Dulays conviction as Principal by
Indispensable Cooperation in the crime of Rape
2. W/N the crime committed by Dulay is Rape (Art 266-A, RPC) or Child Prostitution (Sec 5(a), RA 7610)
3. W/N all elements of Child Prostitution in Sec 5(a) of the Anti-Child Abuse Law are present
Held:
The crime of the accused is actually that of acting as a procurer for Child Prostitution. Under the Revised Penal Code, to
be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in
criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not
have been accomplished. The prosecutions evidence did not show that the acts committed by Dulay are indispensable in
the commission of the crime of Rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time Dulay convinced AAA to go with her
until Dulay received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of Rape. Anyone
could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped.
Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus,
this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the
Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was
raped by Speed.

However, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which states that:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other
similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in
prostitution.
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other
similar means;
c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such
child in prostitution;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It means the child is abused
primarily for profit. As alleged in the Information and proven through the testimony of AAA, Dulay facilitated child
prostitution. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. Thus, the act of Dulay in convincing AAA, who was 12 years old at that
time, to go with her and thereafter, offer her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable under the abovementioned law.

The penalty prescribed for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 is Reclusion Temporal in its
Medium period to Reclusion Perpetua. Therefore, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
proper imposable penalty is Reclusion Temporal in its Maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by the law.
Notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 is a special law, Dulay may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Since
the penalty provided in R.A. 7610 is taken from the range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first
clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Thus, appellant is entitled to a maximum term which should be

within the range of the proper imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4
months and 1 day to 20 years) and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period (ranging from 8
years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months).

42_GABA
DE CASTRO VS PEOPLE
GR 169533 March 20, 2013
FACTS:
George was charged for violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act 7610 when he allegedly hit Jayson, a 12-year old sixth
grader, with his palms hitting Jayson at his back, and slapping him, at the same time uttering derogatory remarks, which
acts according to the Information filed against him, are prejudicial to the childs development and which demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of Jayson as a human being. In his defense, Geogre denied haveig physically abused or
maltreated Jayson. He explained that he merely confronted Jayson after Mary Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters,
had told him about Jayson and Roldans throwing stones and them and Jaysons burning of Cherrylyns hair. Mary Rose
corroborated his fathers testimony, describing his father as a loving father.
RTC RULING:
RTC convicted him as charged and sentenced him to six years and one to eight years of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
CA RULING:
The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and 1 day of prision mayor as the
maximum term.
Jayson filed a petition for certiorari to reverse his conviction for child abuse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not George is guilty of child abuse.

HELD:
The Supreme Court granted Georges appeal, even though he adopted the wrong remedy:
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is Section 10 (a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the Childs
Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms.
xxxx
(b)Child Abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the
back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse
within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying
of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of Jayson as a human being, or that he
had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been
done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the
personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss
of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner
as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor.
Considering that Jaysons physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner was liable for
slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor
from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.
xxxx
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of imprisonment. In
imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under
Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the
exercise of his will power. Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the
accused. It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and
intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and
that Jayson had burned Cherrlyns hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto
menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that
offset the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to
the penalty imposed not exceeding one year, the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.

43_HADLOC
ROSALDES V. PEOPLE
Facts:
On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary
School, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina
Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Gonzales to apologize to her;
however, Gonzales just proceeded to his seat. This prompted petitioner to go to Gonzales and pinch him on his thigh.
Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Gonzaless body hit a desk. As a result, he lost
consciousness. Petitioner nonetheless picked him up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor, causing
the boy to cry. After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Gonzales, accompanied by
two of his classmates, went home crying and told his mother about the incident. Per advice of the Barangay Captain,
Gonzales was brought by his aunt and a Barangay Councilman to a hospital where he was examined and assessed with
physical injuries secondary to maltreatment. The petitioner was charged with child abuse in the RTC. For her part,
petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by Gonzales to maltreat or malign
him in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as an act of
discipline that she, as a school teacher, could reasonably do towards the development of the child. She justifies her act as
under the doctrine of loco parentis.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of laying of hands by petitioner on the victim was intended by the accused to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being; and thus, constitutes the crime of child
abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the RPC.
Ruling:
The facts laid constitute child abuse, a violation of R.A. No. 7610.
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Gonzales as her pupil, her infliction of the
physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her
hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him.
Section 3, R.A. No. 7610:
(b) Child abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
XXXX
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a
child as a human being;

XXXX
To constitute the foregoing, the act need not be habitual. The petitioner went overboard in disciplining Gonzales.
Further, the physical pain inflicted had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school
altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust
again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by
deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Gonzales as a human being. It is worth noting too
that the present maltreatment was neither her first nor only maltreatment of a child. She was then convicted by the RTC in
Iloilo City, for maltreatment of another child. Such shows petitioners propensity for violence.
In fine, the child abuse committed by the petitioner was aggravated by her being a public school teacher.

44_LEANO

DEL SOCORRO VS VAN WILSEM


G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
Ponente: Justice Peralta
FACTS
On September 25, 1990, Del Socorro and Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland and were blessed with a
son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Their marriage ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, petitioner and her 18 months old son come home in the Philippines. According
to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount 250 Guildene (which is
equivalent to Php17, 500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a
business known as Paree Catering. Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City against respondent for violation of Sec. 5, para. E (2) of R.A. No. 9262 or Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. RTC- dismissed the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondents obligation to support
their child under Article 195 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which
equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligors
nationality.On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling.
ISSUES
1.Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
2.Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support
his minor child.

HELD
The case should be filed first with the CA (hierarchy of courts) however, dismissing the instant
petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts.
1. YES. The petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a
foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect
to family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, the Court agrees with the
RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to
his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged
to support petitioners son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of procession presumption shall govern. Though the national law of respondent states that parents have no
obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability because when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Hence, it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
However, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife due to the divorce decree.
2. YES. The deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against women and
children under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 which provides:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following
acts:c
hanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
financial support legally due her or her family .
(i) denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to
the woman's child/children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, the criminal law of the Philippines
applies to him under Territoriality Principle in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code. The alleged continuing acts of
respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein
are residents of the Province of Cebu City. Therefore, the Philippine courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent
Finally, the Court do not agree with respondents argument that granting, that there is a legal basis for charging
violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of
crime under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that the acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in
ten (10) years. The act of denying support to a child is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at
present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
SC- GRANTED the petition. Orders of RTC-Cebu are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.