RULINGS/PRINCIPLES IN THE CASES

OF LOCAL POLICE POWER

ACEBEDO OPTICAL v. COURT OF APPEALS, March 31, 2000; 329 SCRA 314
The delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare
clause of the Local Government Code. Police power as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people. The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of
police power to local government units, as agencies of the State, in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
This delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of
the Local Government Code.
The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to
encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order,
morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is
essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or
grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not
revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.
As aptly discussed by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the power to
issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke,
withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to revoke or cancel, likewise
includes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions.
Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do
business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a
particular profession. The first is usually granted by the local authorities
and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the
particular profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or
otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A
professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural
person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City
Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical
shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice
of optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in
its employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by
the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
In the present case, the objective of the imposition of subject conditions on
petitioners business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists
in petitioners employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as
optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit
is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City
Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the
practice of a profession, like that of optometry. Such a function is
within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically
empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional
Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

Unless prohibited by statutes, a corporation has all the contractual

rights that an individual has and it does not become the practice of
medicine or optometry because of the presence of a physician or
optometrist. The manufacturing, selling, trading and bartering of
eyeglasses and spectacles as articles of merchandise do not constitute the
practice of optometry.
In analogy, it is noteworthy that private hospitals are maintained by
corporations incorporated for the purpose of furnishing medical and surgical
treatment. In the course of providing such treatments, these corporations
employ physicians, surgeons and medical practitioners, in the same way that
in the course of manufacturing and selling eyeglasses, eye frames and optical
lenses, optical shops hire licensed optometrists to examine, prescribe and
dispense ophthalmic lenses. No one has ever charged that these corporations
are engaged in the practice of medicine. There is indeed no valid basis
for treating corporations engaged in the business of running optical
shops differently.
It had occasion to rule that a license or permit is not in the nature of a
contract but a special privilege. "xxx a license or a permit is not a
contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permitee, and
is not a property in the constitutional sense, as to which the
constitutional proscription against impairment of the obligation of
contracts may extend. A license is rather in the nature of a special
privilege, of a permission or authority to do what is within its terms.
It is not in any way vested, permanent or absolute." It is therefore decisively
clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that petitioner
acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in
subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the
said imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of authority
of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly
beyond the scope of ones authority are null and void and cannot be
given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to
an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra vires.
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging subject business permit as
having been issued by respondent City Mayor in the performance of
proprietary functions of Iligan City. As hereinabove elaborated upon, the
issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is
essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon
local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is
essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the
contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local
Government Code.

ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, JULY 25, 1991;

199 SCRA 595
Section 16 of Ordinance No. 147 should not be interpreted as
authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming building by
the municipal government. Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot
and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority

(Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on

public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an
impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset
building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity
for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the
Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating
summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its
property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for
prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as
opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli
prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial order being a
prejudicial issue.
The enforcement and administration of the provisions of the
Ordinance resides with the Zoning Administrator. Moreover, the
enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Ordinance resides
with the Zoning Administrator (Article VII, Secs. 1 and 2, Ordinance No. 147).
It is said official who may call upon the City Fiscal to institute the necessary
legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance (id., Sec. 2,
Ibid.). And any person aggrieved by the decision of the Zoning Administrator
regarding the enforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board of
Zoning Appeals.
Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal
Mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local
Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted
judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances".
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial
proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which affects
the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated
under the undefined law of necessity. The storage of copra in the quonset
building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be
injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it
be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its
summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of
a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when
demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property was
not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a
tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did
constitute a nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for
precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the
Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating
summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its
property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for
prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as
opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli
prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial order being a
prejudicial issue.

LIM v. COURT OF APPEALS, August 12, 2002; 387 SCRA 149

The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond
question. The law expressly provides for such authority. Section 11 (l), Article
II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, reads: Sec. 11. General
duties and powers of the mayor. The general duties and powers of the
mayor shall be: x x x. (l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or
permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the
conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or
municipal ordinances are being committed under the protection of such
licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have
been granted is carried on, or for any other reason of general interest.
(Emphasis supplied) On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local
Government Code provides: Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties
and Compensation: xxx. (b) For efficient, effective and economical
governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the City and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the City Mayor shall: (3) x x
x. (iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for
any violation of the condition upon which said licenses or permits
had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
While the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits
necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even
refuse to issue the same, he must observe, however due process in
exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the
applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. From the
language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue
business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to
suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to
suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the
violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws specifically
refer to the violation of the condition(s) on which the licenses and permits
were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and permits
is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such
licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising
these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or
licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private
commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of
their licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power to
order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of
inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments. Lim
acted beyond his authority when he directed policemen to raid the New
Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated
Ordinance No. 7716 which expressly prohibits police raids and inspections, to
wit: Section 1.
No member of the Western Police District shall conduct
inspection of food and other business establishments for the purpose of
enforcing sanitary rules and regulations, inspecting licenses and permits,
and/or enforcing internal revenue and customs laws and regulations. This
responsibility should be properly exercised by Local Government Authorities

and other concerned agencies. (Emphasis supplied) These local government

officials include the City Health Officer or his representative, pursuant to the
Revised City Ordinances of the City of Manila, [19] and the City Treasurer
pursuant to Section 470 of the Local Government Code.
Lim has no authority to close down Bistros business or any business
establishment in Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take
refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local
Government Code. There is no provision in these laws expressly or
impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private
commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if
there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the
Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to
rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and
permits. The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must
always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the
rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such
power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the
instant case, we find that Lims exercise of this power violated Bistros
property rights that are protected under the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Lims zeal in his campaign against prostitution is commendable. The
presumption is that he acted in good faith and was motivated by his concern
for his constituents when he implemented his campaign against prostitution
in the Ermita-Malate area. However, there is no excusing Lim for
arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the business
operations of Bistro. For this reason, the trial court properly
restrained the acts of Lim.

ROBLE ARRASTRE, INC., v. HON.VILLAFLOR, August 22, 2006; 499 SCRA

434
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the
delegated police power to local governments. Local government
units exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies. Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that
the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and
suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which
said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. On
this matter, petitioner maintains that under the Local Government Code of
1991, a suspension or revocation of permits shall be premised on a finding of
violation of the conditions upon which the permits were issued pursuant to a
law or ordinance, which is independent of the Code itself.
On petitioners assertion that the power to issue license should be pursuant
to law other than the Local Government Code of 1991, we so hold that the
language of the law did not find the need to distinguish between
other laws and that of the Local Government Code of 1991 itself.
When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Hence, even the Local
Government Code of 1991, specifically Section 16 thereof, can be utilized to

determine the bounds of the exercise of the municipal mayor in issuing

licenses and permits.
While we agree with petitioner that there is no ordinance conferring upon the
respondent mayor the power to refuse the issuance of the permit for the
operation of an arrastre service, we are, as yet, unprepared to declare
that the power of the municipal mayor as enunciated under Section
444(b)(3)(iv) is ministerial. What can be deduced from the aforesaid
section is that the limits in the exercise of the power of a municipal mayor to
issue licenses, and permits and suspend or revoke the same can be contained
in a law or an ordinance. Otherwise stated, a law or an ordinance can provide
the conditions upon which the power of the municipal mayor under Section
444(b)(3)(iv) can be exercised. Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 takes its cue from Section 16 thereof, which is largely an
exercise of delegated police power. We said: The general welfare clause is the
delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs. Through
this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property
of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Accordingly, we have upheld enactments providing,
for instance, the regulation of gambling, the occupation of rig drivers, the
installation and operation of pinball machines, the maintenance and
operation of cockpits, the exhumation and transfer of corpses from public
burial grounds, and the operation of hotels, motels, and lodging houses as
valid exercises by local legislatures of the police power under the general
welfare clause.
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991,
whereby the power of the respondent mayor to issue license and
permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police
power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof
cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is
validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari,
but certainly, not of mandamus.
It may be true, as argued by petitioner, that Resolution No. 93-27, which was
enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos, is not an ordinance but
merely a resolution. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted
differently - a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not
for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.
The fact that Resolution No. 93-27 is a "mere" resolution can do nil to support
petitioners cause. As stated earlier, the proper action is certiorari to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion had been committed
on the part of respondent mayor in the refusal to grant petitioners
application. Petitioners petition for mandamus is incompetent
against respondent mayors discretionary power. Thus: "Discretion,"
when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon
them by law or acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by
the judgment or conscience of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in

contradiction to a discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal performs

in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither
the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. HON. ATIENZA, JR., February 13, 2008:
545 SCRA 92
Nowhere in the judges discussion can we see that, in addition to a
showing of a clear legal right of Chevron and Shell to the remedy
sought, he was convinced that they had made out a case of
unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome the
presumption of validity of the ordinance. Statutes and ordinances are
presumed valid unless and until the courts declare the contrary in clear and
unequivocal terms. The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be
unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its
enforcement enjoined. The presumption is all in favor of validity.
Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears that it is
unconstitutional. There is no such showing here. Therefore, the injunctive
writs issued in the Manila RTCs May 19, 2003 order had no leg to stand on.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not
be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in
the exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in
the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema
lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).While police power
rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be
delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause,
encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments.
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly
exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be

subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives
of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the
interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall
arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals,
safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.
The oil companies aver that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because
they have invested billions of pesos in the depot. Its forced closure will result
in huge losses in income and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities.
Their contention has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there
is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote
public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation
is necessary only when the states power of eminent domain is exercised.
In eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied to some
public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police
power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or
forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. The
restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is
not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which
interferes with paramount rights of the public.
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements
for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not
be limited to existing conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They
allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate.
However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights,
the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The
reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or
LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals right to
property, the former should prevail.
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the provisions in the
two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the
latter act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one. The second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the
earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the
earlier law.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a certain
area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No.
8119 can be considered a general law as it covers the entire city of Manila.
Mandamus Lies To Compel Respondent Mayor To Enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative [or
executive departments] of the government in the legitimate exercise of its
powers, except to enforce mere ministerial acts required by law to be
performed by some officer thereof.

A party need not go first to the DILG in order to compel the enforcement of
an ordinance.
REQUISITES:
1 Ordinance No. 8027 Is Constitutional And Valid. The City of Manila Has
The Power To Enact Ordinance No. 8027. Specifically, the Sanggunian
has the power to reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city. The
Enactment Of Ordinance No. 8027 Is A Legitimate Exercise Of Police
Power
2 Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Unfair, Oppressive Or Confiscatory Which
Amounts To Taking Without Compensation. The oil companies are not
prohibited from doing business in other appropriate zones in Manila.
The City of Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the
businesses and industries in the zones it established. In the regulation
of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the use or interest
therein, hence there is no compensable taking.[140] In this case, the
properties of the oil companies and other businesses situated in the
affected area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they
can be applied to other profitable uses permitted in the commercial
zone.
3 Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Partial And Discriminatory: We reiterate that
what the ordinance seeks to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that
will result from a terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding
community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by
fire or explosion occurring in those areas would be nothing compared
to the damage caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself.
Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The enactment of the
ordinance which provides for the cessation of the operations of these
terminals removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the
purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not limited to the
conditions existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future
conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all businesses
and industries in the area it delineated.
4 The DOE Cannot Exercise The Power Of Control Over LGUs: Thus, the
President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot
interfere with the activities of local governments, so long as they act
within the scope of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot
substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the
sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local
officials must prevail as long as they are acting within the parameters
of the Constitution and the law.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA, January 20, 2009; 576

SCRA 416
The general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the
overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in
the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.
THIRD-PARTY STANDING: American jurisprudence is replete with examples
where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or
invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of

other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In

Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court held that
physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would
penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional
protections available to their patients.
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE: In overbreadth analysis, challengers to
government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third
parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech,
the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even
constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim that the
Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients.
We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance
suffers from overbreadth. We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right
to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their
establishments for a wash-rate time frame.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions
including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not
be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as
the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity
of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police
power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate
the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution,
drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our
emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of
Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and,
sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.
The purpose of due process guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals.
Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Substantive due
process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It
inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a
person of life, liberty, or property.
JUDICIAL REVIEW: STRICT SCRUTINY, RATIONAL BASIS, INTERMEDIATE
REVIEW: Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established:

strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the
political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic
legislation. A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate
scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating
classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,[55] after the Court declined to
do so in Reed v. Reed.[56] While the test may have first been articulated in
equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all
substantive due process cases as well. We ourselves have often applied the
rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.[57] Using
the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.[58] Under intermediate
review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of
less restrictive measures is considered.[59] Applying strict scrutiny, the focus
is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest. In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny
refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of
governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental
freedoms.[60] Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing
with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental
rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The
United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to
protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,[62] judicial access[63] and
interstate travel.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons
of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.
It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of
the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the
guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall
be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe
v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life,
liberty or property is affected.[73] However, this is not in any way meant to
take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys
the presumption of validity.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the ErmitaMalate area, its longtime home, and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict
our capital city the Pearl of the Orient as a modern-day Sodom or
Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams
of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving
big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities

such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the

modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such
perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from
offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by
offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting
the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to
Manila. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws.
Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and
drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.
Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in
illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the
rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must
be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary
and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their
patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their
patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly
equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. The
promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves
the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not
trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. The notion that the promotion of
public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle. The
advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not delegitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on
which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with
relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long
as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate
accommodation of different interests.
Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more
extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our
recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is
innate, and protected by the State.
Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

CABRERA v. COURT OF APPEALS, March 18, 1991; 195 SCRA 314

The closure of city streets is within the powers of the city council;
The closure of provincial roads is within the powers of the provincial

board. In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, the power of the City
Council of Baguio City to close city streets and withdraw them from public use
was also assailed. This Court said: 5. So it is, that appellant may not
challenge the city council's act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at
its dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an
alley. These are acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street.
The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority competent to determine
whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. Such
power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion
will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts,
absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the
public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be
served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance. While it is
true that the above cases dealt with city councils and not the
provincial board, there is no reason for not applying the doctrine
announced therein to the provincial board in connection with the
closure of provincial roads. The provincial board has, after all, the
duty of maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of
the inhabitants of the province. Moreover, this authority is inferable from
the grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province of
Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads.

One whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street has no
right to compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he still has
reasonable access to the general system of streets. On this issue, the
governing principle was laid down in Favis thus:. . . The general rule is that
one whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street has no
right to compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he still has
reasonable access to the general system of streets. The circumstances in
some cases may be such as to give a right to damages to a property owner,
even though his property does not abut on the closed section. But to
warrant recovery in any such case the property owner must show
that the situation is such that he has sustained special damages
differing in kind, and not merely in degree, from those sustained by
the public generally. This rule was based on the following observations
made in Richmond v. City of Hinton 6 which were quoted with approval by this
Court: The Constitution does not undertake to guarantee to a property owner
the public maintenance of the most convenient route to his door. The law will
not permit him to be cut off from the public thoroughfares, but he must
content himself with such route for outlet as the regularly constituted public
authority may deem most compatible with the public welfare. When he
acquires city property, he does so in tacit recognition of these principles. If,
subsequent to his acquisition, the city authorities abandon a portion of the
street to which his property is not immediately adjacent, he may suffer loss
because of the inconvenience imposed, but the public treasury cannot be
required to recompense him. Such case is damnum absque injuria.

Following the above doctrine, we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to
damages because the injury he has incurred, such as it is, is the price he and
others like him must pay for the welfare of the entire community. This is not

a case where his property has been expropriated and he is entitled

to just compensation. The construction of the new road was
undertaken under the general welfare clause. As the trial judge acutely
observed, whatever inconvenience the petitioner has suffered "pales in
significance compared to the greater convenience the new road, which is
wide and concrete, straight to the veterans fountain and down to the pier,
has been giving to the public, plus the fact that the new road adds beauty
and color not only to the town of Virac but also to the whole province of
Catanduanes." For the enjoyment of those benefits, every individual in the
province, including the petitioner, must be prepared to give his share.

MACASIANO v. DIOKNO, August 10, 1992; 212 SCRA 464

Properties of the Local Government which are devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of
Congress. Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia
Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public service and are
therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties
of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed
public and are under the absolute control of Congress (Province of
Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22
SCRA 1334). Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to
control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is
vested upon them by Congress.
However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local
government units to close roads and other similar public places should be
read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established
by law. These basic principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the
province, city or municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article
424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of
public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the
public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be
disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private
persons. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be
complied with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for
the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public
use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or
necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn
from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of
the local government unit concerned (Article 422, Civil Code; Cebu
Oxygen, etc. et al. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66
SCRA 481). It is only then that the respondent municipality can "use or
convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the
local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance with
the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local
Government Code.
However, those roads and streets which are available to the public in general
and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property

devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power
to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private
persons.
The general public have a legal right to demand the demolition of
the illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the
officials of respondent municipality have the corresponding duty
arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them
to their specific public purpose.
The instant case as well as the Dacanay case, involves an ordinance which is
void and illegal for lack of basis and authority in laws applicable during its
time. However, at this point, We find it worthy to note that Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, known as Local Government Lode, has already been repealed by
Republic Act No. 7160 known as Local Government Code of 1991 which took
effect on January 1, 1992. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that
rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new
Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation
involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original
terms and conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the
time such rights were vested.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED