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Wong vs. Carpio
*

G.R. No. 50264. October 21, 1991.

IGNACIO WONG, petitioner, vs. HON. LUCAS D.

CARPIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Davao del Sur, Branch V and MANUEL MERCADO,
respondents.
Civil Law Property Possession Case at bar The sale a retro
in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property
because there is an impedimentthe possession exercised by
private respondent.It should be stressed that possession is
acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a
right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by
the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right.
(Art. 531, Civil Code Rizal Cement Co., Inc. vs. Villareal, 135
SCRA 15 [1985]) and that the execution of a sale thru a public
instrument shall be equivalent to the
_______________
*

THIRD DIVISION.

US v. Felipe Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 743 with cited cases.

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Wong vs. Carpio

delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary x

x x. If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument,
the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of
the thing and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been
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effected. (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1989 Ed., p.
400). Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it
is clear that possession passed from vendor William Giger to
private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a
retro (Exhibit A), and accordingly, the later sale a retro (Exhibit
5) in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the
property because there is an impedimentthe possession
exercised by private respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different personalities except
in the cases of copossession. Should a question arise regarding
the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred if
there are two possessions, the one longer in possession, if the
dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title and
if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings. (Art. 538, Civil Code).
Same Same Same Forcible entry The act of entering the
property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is
necessary.The act of entering the property and excluding the
lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of
force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the
rule, entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally
as obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of the action is
really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person
who has entered without right. The words by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth include every situation or condition
under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property
and exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom. If a
trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes
of person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the
consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such
prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and
detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force
is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied
from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and
excluding the other party. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Ed., pp. 243244 Drilon vs. Gaurana,
149 SCRA 342 [1987]).
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Same Same Same Possession in good faith Possession in

good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made
known to the possessors, by extraneous evidence or by suit for
recovery of the property by the true owner.It should be noted that
possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character
except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show
that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully. (Art. 528, Civil Code). Possession in
good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made
known to the possessors, by extraneous evidence or by suit for
recovery of the property by the true owner. Whatever may be the
cause or the fact from which it can be deduced that the possessor
has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition, it
must be considered sufficient to show bad faith. (Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 226). Such interruption takes
place upon service of summons (Manotok Realty vs. Judge
Tecson, 164 SCRA 587 [1988] citing Mindanao Academy, Inc. v.
Yap (13 SCRA 190 [1965]).

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the then

Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Br. V. Carpio, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rodolfo B. Quiachon for petitioner.
Jose M. Ilagan for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, certified to this
Court by the Court of Appeals as it involves purely
question of law, seeking the annulment of the September
**
29, 1978 decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Davao del Sur, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 1258 which
reversed the February*** 20, 1978 decision of the Municipal
Court of Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur in an action for
Forcible Entry (Civil Case No. 13) ordering the dismissal of
the complaint as well as the counterclaim.
The undisputed facts of this case, as found by both the
trial court and the then Court of First Instance of Davao
del Sur, are as follows:
_______________
**

Presided by Hon. Judge Lucas D. Carpio.

***

Presided by Actg. Judge Rosalinda L. Montejo.

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Wong vs. Carpio

On the basis of the admission of parties in their respective
pleadings, the oral testimonies of all witnesses for both plaintiff
and defendants and the documentary evidence offered and
admitted this Court finds that plaintiff Manuel Mercado acquired
his rights to possess the land in litigation, particularly lot 3 (LRC)
Pcs295, (situated at Colonga, Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur) and
which is particularly described and embraced in Transfer
Certificate of title No. (T4244) T972 from William Giger by
virtue of a deed of sale with right to repurchase which was
executed in 1972 for a consideration of P3,500.00 (testimony of
plaintiff, T.S.N., p. 3, hearing of January 7, 1977). Then, in 1973,
William Giger again asked an additional amount of P2,500.00
from plaintiff and so he required William Giger to sign a new deed
of Pacto de Retro Sale (Exhibit A) on November 5, 1973 at
Davao City before Notary Public Gregorio C. Batiller (T.S.N., p. 5,
hearing of January 7, 1977). In 1972, plaintiff began harvesting
only the coconut fruits and he paid the taxes on the land (Exhibits
B to E) for Mr. Giger. He went periodically to the land to make
copra but he never placed any person on the land in litigation to
watch it. Neither did he reside on the land as he is a businessman
and storekeeper by occupation and resides at Lower Sta. Maria,
Davao del Sur while the land in litigation is at Colongan, Sta.
Maria. Neither did he put any sign or hut to show that he is in
actual possession (p. 8, T.S.N., p. 7, hearing of January 14, 1978).
He knew defendants laborers were in the land in suit as early as
August, 1976 and that they have a hut there but he did not do
anything to stop them. Instead plaintiff was happy that there
were people and a hut on the land in suit (p. 14, T.S.N., hearing of
January 14, 1978).
Before July, 1976, defendant Ignacio Wong went to the land in
litigation to find out if there were other people residing there or
claiming it besides the owner and he found none. So, in July,
1976, defendant Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of land in
litigation from William Giger and his wife Cecilia Valenzuela
(Exhibit 5). After the execution of Exhibit 5, defendant Ignacio
Wong asked for the delivery of the title to him and so he has in his
possession TCT No. (T4244) T974 (Exhibit 6) in the name of
William Giger. Mr. Wong declared the land in suit for taxation
purposes in his name (Exhibit 7). He tried to register the pacto de
retro sale with the Register of Deeds by paying the registration
fee (Exhibit 8) but due to some technicalities, the pacto de retro
sale could not be registered. The defendant Wong placed laborers
on the land in suit, built a small farm house after making some
clearings and fenced the boundaries. He also placed signboards
(T.S.N., pp. 1415, hearing of September 15, 1977). On September

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27, 1976, plaintiff Manuel Mercado again went to the land in suit
to make
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copras. That was the time the matter was brought to the attention
of the police of Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur and the incident entered
in the police blotter (Exhibit 11). Then on November 18, 1976,
defendant Wong ordered the hooking of the coconuts from the
land in litigation and nobody disturbed him. But on November 29,
1976, defendant received a copy of plaintiffs complaint for forcible
entry with summons to answer which is the case now before the
Court. During the pendency of this instant complaint for forcible
entry, spouses William Giger and Cecilia Valenzuela filed a case
for reformation of instrument with the Court of First Instance of
Digos, Davao del Sur against plaintiff Mercado (Exhibit 4). The
case pertains to Exhibit A of plaintiff. (pp. 13, CA Decision, pp.
8284, Rollo).

On the basis of the aforestated undisputed facts, the

Municipal Court of Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur in its
February 20, 1978 Decision found that herein petitioner
(defendant Ignacio Wong) had prior, actual and continuous
physical possession of the disputed property and dismissed
both the complaint and the counterclaim.
On appeal, the then Court of First Instance of Davao del
Sur, in its September 29, 1978 Decision drew a completely
different conclusion from the same set of facts and ruled in
favor of herein private respondent (plaintiff Manuel
Mercado). The decretal portion of the said decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the plaintiff to have taken
possession of the property earlier in point of time and defendant is
an intruder and must, as he is hereby ordered to return, the
possession of the land in question to the plaintiff, paying a
monthly rental of P400.00 from August, 1976, till the property is
returned with costs against the defendant. Judgment is reversed.

Petitioner filed the instant petition with the Court of

Appeals. But
the Court of Appeals, in its March 1, 1979
****
Resolution found that the only issue is a pure question of
lawthe correctness of the conclusion drawn from the
undisputed facts and certified the case to this Court.
In its April 4, 1979 Resolution, the Second Division of
this
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_______________
****

Penned by then Justice Hugo Gutierrez and concurred in by

Justices Lourdes San Diego and Serafin Cuevas.

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Wong vs. Carpio

Court docketed the case in this Court and considered it

submitted for decision.
Petitioner alleged two (2) errors committed by
respondent judge, to wit:
A) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY RESPONDENT
JUDGE THAT PETITIONER IS AN INTRUDER IS
WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR
PURPOSES OF A FORCIBLE ENTRY.
B) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY RESPONDENT
JUDGE THAT PETITIONER MUST PAY A
MONTHLY RENTAL OF P400.00 FROM AUGUST,
1976 TILL THE PROPERTY IS RETURNED HAS
NO LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner, in claiming that the private respondent has
not established prior possession, argues that private
respondents periodic visit to the lot to gather coconuts may
have been consented to and allowed or tolerated by the
owner thereof for the purposes of paying an obligation that
may be due to the person gathering said nuts and that a
person who enters a property to gather coconut fruits and
convert the same to copras may only be a hired laborer who
enters the premises every harvest season to comply with
the contract of labor with the true owner of the property.
The argument is untenable.
It should be stressed that possession is acquired by the
material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or
by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by
the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such
right. (Art. 531, Civil Code Rizal Cement Co., Inc. vs.
Villareal, 135 SCRA 15 [1985]) and that the execution of a
sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the
contrary x x x. If, however, notwithstanding the execution
of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use
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of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are

opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected.
(Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1989 Ed., p.
400).
Applying the above pronoucements on the instant case,
it is clear that possession passed from vendor William
Giger to
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Wong vs. Carpio

private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first

sale a retro (Exhibit A), and accordingly, the later sale a
retro (Exhibit 5) in favor of petitioner failed to pass the
possession of the property because there is an impediment
the possession exercised by private respondent.
Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time
in two different personalities except in the cases of co
possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be preferred if
there are two possessions, the one longer in possession, if
the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents
a title and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its
possession or ownership through proper proceedings (Art.
538, Civil Code).
As to petitioners query that Is the entry of petitioner to
the property characterized by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth in order to show that private
respondent has had possession so that the case is within
the jurisdiction of the inferior court? (p. 15, Petition p. 16,
Rollo). The same is answered in the affirmative.
The act of entering the property and excluding the
lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion
of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.
Under the rule, entering upon the premises by strategy or
stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by force. The
foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of
the original possessor by a person who has entered without
right. The words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth include every situation or condition under which
one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and
exclude another who has had prior possession therefrom. If
a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the
very eyes of person already clothed with lawful possession,
but without the consent of the latter, and there plants
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himself and excludes such prior possessor from the

property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can
unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is
used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily
implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the
ground and excluding the other party. (Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Ed., pp. 243244
Drilon vs. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342
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Wong vs. Carpio

[1987]).
Anent the award of rentals in favor of private
respondent, the same is in order. Petitioners argument
that there is no legal or factual basis for the payment of
monthly rentals because bad faith on the part of petitioner
was never proved deserves no merit.
It should be noted that possession acquired in good faith
does not lose this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not
unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully. (Art. 528, Civil Code).
Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects
in the title are made known to the possessors, by
extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property
by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact
from which it can be deduced that the possessor has
knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition,
it must be considered sufficient to show bad faith.
(Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 226).
Such interruption takes place upon service of summons
(Manotok Realty vs. Judge Tecson, 164 SCRA 587 [1988]
citing Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap (13 SCRA 190
[1965]). In the latter case, this Court held:
x x x Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the
other and hence as between themselves their rights would be as if
both of them had acted in good faith at the time of the
transaction, this legal fiction of Yaps good faith ceased when the
complaint against him was filed, and consequently the courts
declaration of liability for the rents thereafter is correct and
proper. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so
long as his posession is not legally interrupted, and such
interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons (Arts.
544 and 1123, Civil Code).
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A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner

received private respondents complaint for forcible entry
with summons on November 29, 1976 (Rollo, p. 46). His
good faith therefore ceased on November 29, 1976.
Accordingly, the computation of the payment of monthly
rental should start from December, 1976, instead of
August, 1976.
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the
computation of the monthly rental should start from
December, 1976 instead of
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Gatchalian vs. Delim

August, 1976, the September 29, 1978 decision of

respondent judge is Affirmed in all other respects, with
costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed with modification.
Note.Conveyance instruments are matters of evidence
and should be presented at the trial. (Ramos vs. Court of
Appeals, 163 SCRA 583.)
o0o

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