BELICENA V SECRETARY OF FINANCE

FACTS
Belicena was appointed Acting Undersecretary in the Department of Finance and
forthwith assumed office. While acting as such, the President designated him as Acting
Secretary of Finance while the Secretary of Finance was in Hongkong on official
business for the government. Belicena took his oath of office and Acting Executive
Secretary Liwanag confirmed the designation. The President extended his service as
Acting Undersecretary of Finance and in anticipation of his impending compulsory
retirement, Belicena filed an application for termination leave. His application was not
acted upon by the Secretary. When a new Secretary of Finance assumed office, he
approved the application. The voucher for his pay was not signed because in
computation of Belicenas terminal leave pay, it was alleged that his one day salary as
Acting Secretary of Finance should not be considered as his last month salary.
ISSUE
Whether the monetary value of Belicenas terminal leave credits should be computed
based on his 1-day salary as Acting Secretary of Finance?
HELD
YES. When the President designated Belicena as acting secretary, he did so under a well
considered opinion that absence of then Secretary Ocampo was of such extent that he
would be unable to perform his duties and by reason of that opinion the President
extended to Belicena a temporary designation. Since the 1-day salary received by
Belicena as Acting Secretary of Finance by virtue of a valid designation by the President
is his highest monthly salary, the monetary value of his terminal leave should be
computed on such basis as provided for by law.

BITONIO VS COA

Facts: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr.

was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor
Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. As
representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA
Board, he was receiving a per diem for every board
meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.

After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement

transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per
diems to Mr. Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling
declaring unconstitutional the holding of other offices by
the cabinet members, their deputies and assistants in
addition to their primary office and the receipt of
compensation therefore, and, to COA Memorandum No.
97-038 dated September 19, 1997, implementing Senate
Committee Reports No. 509.
In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he
contended that the Supreme Court modified its earlier
ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the
prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and
their Assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a
Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and
other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant
Secretary are not covered by the prohibition.
He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916),
enacted four years after the Civil Liberties Union case
became final, authorized the payment of per diems; in
expressly authorizing per diems, Congress should be
conclusively presumed to have been aware of the
parameters of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted
in the Civil Liberties Union case.
COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems

received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA
Board of Directors meetings as representative of the
Secretary of Labor.
Held: The assailed decision of the COA is affirmed.
The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem
for his board meetings sitting as representative of the
Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA.
The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is
solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the
Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is
prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional
office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to
the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the
Secretary of Labor. The Supreme Court cannot allow the
petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of
Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his
principal.
Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment
must not be repugnant to the Constitution. No law can
render it nugatory because the Constitution is more
superior to a statute. The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must
have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why
the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such
defect. The option of designating representative to the
Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted.
Likewise, the paragraph as to payment of per diems to the

members of the Board of Directors was also deleted,

considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with
the proscription set by the Constitution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS,
accused-appellant.
Facts:
The victim of rape in this case was a minor below twelve (12) years of age, who herself
narrated the shameful details of the dastardly act against her virtue. The victim was peddled
for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father. Because the
complainantwas a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several acts of
lasciviousness on distinctlyseparate occasions..The accused was then CongressmanRomeo
Jalosjoswho, inspite of his having been charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory
rape, was stillre-elected to his congressional office. On December 16, 1996, two (2)
informations for the crime ofstatutory rape and twelve (12) for acts of lasciviousness, were
filed against accused-appellant
The victim, Maria Rosilyn, grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care
of SimplicioDelantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old
homosexual whose ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and
accepting boarders at his house.He, however, was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.
Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of one of their boarders. They went tothe
Pasay City Police where she executed a sworn statement against SimplicioDelantar. Rosilynwas
thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD).The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which
eventually led to thefiling of criminal charges against accused-appellant He was also
convicted on six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.
Issue/s
1.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT,
CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANT INDICIA OF INCONSISTENCIES AND UNTRUTHS.

2.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.

3.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE

SIGNIFICANCEOF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

4.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PRIVATECOMPLAINANT WAS A MINOR LESS THAN TWELVE YEARS OF AGE WHEN THECLAIMED
INCIDENTS ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE.

5.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RAPE
WASCOMMITTED AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC Makati with modification of penalty.

1.

TESTIMONY OF VICTIM; DOCTRINE OFFALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS; APPLICATION

THEREOF NOT AN ABSOLUTERULE OF LAW; CASE AT BAR. The contention is without
merit. Falsus in unofalsus inomnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely
applied in modernjurisprudence.Trier of facts are notbound to believe all that any witness
has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and reject other portions,
according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to be thetruth . . .
Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars,the jury are not required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony,
but may credit suchportions as they deem worthy of belief.

2.

CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED BY SOMEAMBIGUOUS ANSWERS ON WITNESS

STAND, WHICH REFERS TO MINOR ANDPERIPHERAL DETAILS; CASE AT BARA reading of the
pertinent transcript ofstenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in fact firm and consistent
on the fact of rape andlascivious conduct committed on her by accused-appellant. She
answered in clear, simple andnatural words customary of children of her age.

3.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED; DEFECT IN OUT-OF-COURT

IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED CAN BE CURED BY AN IDENTIFICATIONSUBSEQUENTLY MADE IN
COURT; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR.Contrary to thecontentions of accused-appellant, the
records reveal that Rosilyn positively and unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the
courtroom. Such identification during the trial cannot be
diminished by the fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accused-appellant as
her abuser based on the name she heard from the person to whom she was introduced and on
the name she saw and read in accused-appellant's office.

4.

AGE OF THE VICTIM IN RAPE CASES MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE; PRESENT INCASE AT BAR. It
is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be provedby the
presentation of her birth certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends that the
birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court because said
birthcertificate has already been ordered cancelled and expunged from the records by the
Regional TrialCourt of Manila, Branch 38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April 11,
1997. Even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there is sufficient and ample
proof of the complainant's age in the records. Rosilyn's Baptismal Certificate can likewise
serve as proofof her age. In People v. Liban, we ruled that the birth certificate, or in lieu
thereof.

5.

WHEN CONSUMMATED; SUFFICIENTLYESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. True, in People v.

Campuhan, we explained that thephrase, "the mere touching of the external genitalia by the
penis capable of consummating thesexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge.Theinevitable contact between accused-appellant's penis, and at the very least,

the labia of the pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt pain inside her vagina
when the "idiniin" part ofaccused-appellant's sex ritual was performed.
6.

STATUTORY RAPE; ELEMENTS; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. At the time of commission of

the crimes complained of herein in 1996, statutory rape was penalizedunder Section 11 of
R.A. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:When and how rape
is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a womanunder any of the
following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman isdeprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented

SSS Employees Association v Court of Appeals

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON
MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO
AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH
98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of
SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees
from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to
return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the
defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual
employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the
same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly
committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right
to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as
"government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.
69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

Cena v CSC
Facts:
Gaudencio Cena worked for 7 years as a Legal Officer of the Law Dept of Caloocan City. He was then
transferred to the Office of the Congressman where he worked as a Supervising Staff Officer for 3
months. He was then appointed as Registrar of the RD (Register of Deeds) in Malabon. In total, he has
rendered govt service for 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his 65 th bday, he requested the
LRA Administrator that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to
enable him to retire with full benefits of old age pension.
The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the CSC. The CSC denied the extension but Cena filed a
motion for reconsideration. This time around, CSC granted a 1-yr extension to him. Cena still filed a case
against CSC for grave abuse of discretion when it granted an extension of only 1 yr. He contends that the
law(Sec 11, PD 1146 also known as Revised Govt Insurance Act) does not limit or specify the maximum
number of years the retiree may avail of to complete the 15-year service. Thus, the CSC has no authority
to limit through a memorandum the number of years.
In defense, CSC said that since it is the central personnel agency of the govt, it is vested with power to
grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement age.
Issue:
Whether or not Cena is allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement?
Held:
Yes. An administrative circular, such as a memorandum of the CSC cannot limit PD 1146, on extension of
service of employees who reach 65. While it is true that CSC is given the authority to take appropriate
action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service, it cannot extend to matters
not covered. The CSCs authority is limited only to carrying into effect what PD 1146 says. It cannot go
beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
The CSC Memorandum, being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the
principle that a regulation must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. CSC has no power to supply or add perceived
omissions in PD 1146.

Petitioner: SALVACION A. MONSANTO

Respondent: FULGENCIO S., JR.
FACTS:
In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was accused of the
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment and to
indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded
and to pay the costs proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant, she also asked for the backpay for the entire period of her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a
new appointment

 The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is
the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries,
benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can
reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that
she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court.
There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city
treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited.
The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after
conviction, for the result would still be the same
ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled
to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and
when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all
his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. But
unless expressly grounded on the persons innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief
for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to
make reparation for what has been suffered.
(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she
must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

National Transmission Corporation v. Hamoy,- where again, it was categorically stated that the CES
covers only presidential appointees: