STRONG V.

REPIDE
G.R. No. L-7154
February 21, 1912
EN BANC
MORELAND, J.:

On July, 1909, Repide returned the 800 shares of stock to Mrs.

Strong and in turn, Mrs. Strong paid P14,159.29. Said satisfaction was
effected by means of a stipulation or agreement entered into between the
attorneys for the plaintiff and the defendant, in which the satisfaction of the
judgment was acknowledged by both parties.

FACTS
Prior to October 10, 1903, Eleanor Erica Strong was the owner of
800 shares of the capital stock of the Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Company, Limited.

On October 10, 1903 Francisco Gutierrez Repide allegedly obtained

these shares of stocks, where Eleanor Strong contested this sale by
instituting in the CFI nullification of the sale due to fraud. On April 29, 1904,
the CFI of Manila found the purchase of the shares of stock was fraudulent
and void. (Sale was made without the authority of Strong, that she never ratified the

From the 10th day of October, 1903, the date of the said fraudulent
purchase by the defendant, until the 27th day of July, 1909, Repide retained
said shares in his possession or under his control and after the rendition of
said judgment of April 29, 1904, collected the dividends earned by said
shares for the years 1905, 1906, 1907, and 1908 at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum, amounting to a total of P19,200, which sum the defendant retained
and refused to pay over to the plaintiff. After demand upon and refusal by the
defendant, Mrs. Strong began this action for the recovery of said sum.
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff for the said sum of P19,200, with interest thereon at the
rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint.

sale but repudiated it as soon as she learned of it, that this sale was induced by fraud
on the part of the defendant)

ISSUE
WON Petitioner can sue return of dividends even if it was not
included in the cause of action in the complaint
This judgment fixed the value of the shares at P138,352.71,
awarding judgment in this amount to Mrs. Strong, while directing that the said
judgment might be satisfied by delivery of the said shares by Repide to Mrs.
Strong, in which event Mrs. Strong should pay to Repide P14,159.29.

HELD
YES.
As a general rule no, by reason of Rule 9, sec. 1. HOWEVER,
this case is an exception to the rule.
RATIO

This judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippine

Islands, thereat, judgement was reversed, Thereupon Mrs. Strong raised an
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which court on May, 1909,
rendered its judgment, reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands and affirming the judgment of the trial court.

(Effect muna kapag di na-plead.).

The plaintiff in suing for the recovery of shares illegally taken
from her by the defendant had the right to demand their return and
with them whatever damages she had sustained by reason of their
retention, which would be in this case the dividends which had been
collected on them by the defendant while they were in his possession.
That is, strictly speaking, what the plaintiff should have demanded in
her complaint. Generally speaking, it is not permitted that a plaintiff

sue for the recovery of property which is illegally detained by another,

and, after recovering that property, sue in a separate action for the
damages sustained by that illegal detention. The law seeks to prevent
multiplicity of actions, and it is the duty of every person suing to join in
one action every cause of action which he has against the defendant,
to the end that all questions between the parties be litigated in one
suit and multiplicity of actions and resulting expenses prevented. This
is a question, however, which could have been raised in the court
below by the defendant. He did not do so. Neither has he raised the
question in this court directly. We, therefore, do not pass upon it or
base any finding upon it. The purpose which we have in referring to it
at all is to indicate that the real question arising from the controversy
between the parties relative to this particular assignment of error
really resolves itself into one of multiplicity of actions, that is, of the
duty of the plaintiff to join all her causes of action against the
defendant in one complaint, and not the one presented by the

appellant in his argument relative to the reach which should be given

to the document of satisfaction.
(Eto na yung peculiarity ng case na to.)
It is true that plaintiff could have included in her action and
recovered at the most only those dividends which were due at the
time judgment in her favor was entered. It happens in this case that
most of the dividends became payable after the plaintiff had secured
her judgment. That being so, they could not have been included by
her in the original complaint, not could they have been incorporated
within the judgment in that action. This, then, furnishes another
reason why the contention of the appellant in this regard cannot be
sustained. Under such circumstances a plea of multiplicity, even if
made, would not have been available as to those dividends which
became payable after the judgment was entered in that action.