CASE DIGEST 1

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING

and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Carmen Quimiguing and Felix Icao had a close and confidential relations.
Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Quimiguing
several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent. As a result she
became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao. Quimiguing had to
stop studying. Hence, she claimed for support and damages. Icao moved to dismiss
for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been
born. The trial judge sustained Icaos motion and dismissed the complaint.
Quimiguing moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl. But the court, sustaining Icao's
objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable.
ISSUE: WON Quimiguing can claim for damages.
RULING: YES.
A married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a
clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for
the damage caused.
Article 21 of the NCC states that Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. This rule is supported by Article
2219 of the same Code which provides Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21 , 26, 27, 28 . . ."
Thus, independently of the right to support of the child she was carrying,
Quimiguing had a cause of action for damages.

CASE DIGEST 2
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. Defendant is a
married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory.
Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative
of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name,
defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their
family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext
that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in
love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan
but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. The rumors about
their love affair reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime in 1955, and since
then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing
Lolita. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared. Plaintiffs found a note inside
Lolita's aparador stating that the two will meet.
Plaintiffs brought an action for damages. Defendant, set up a defense that
the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
The trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that
they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's
affection.
ISSUE: WON plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages.
RULING: YES.
The present action is based on Article 21 of NCC which provides "Any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection
cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious
scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of having illicit relations with

her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is immeasurable considering the
fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
CASE DIGEST 3

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ,

defendant-appellant.
FACTS: In 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez arranged their
marriage to be held on September 4 of the same year. The bride-to-be has
been devoted with all the preparations for their wedding. However, two days
before their marriage, Paking left a note that they must postpone the
marriage for his mother was against it. A day before their wedding, Paking
wrote again that the wedding shall push through. Worse, Paking did not show
up on their wedding day causing Wassmer to be publicly humiliated.
The breach of promise to marry made by Velez prompted Wassmer to
file a civil suit against the former. Velez never filed an answer, thus, awarding
moral and exemplary damages to Wassmer.
Velez appealed on the court and stated that he failed to attend the
wedding day because of fortuitous events. He also insisted that he cannot
be civilly liable for there is no law that acts upon the breach of promise to
marry. He also contested the award of moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral or exemplary damages may be awarded in a
breach of promise to marry suit.
HELD:
A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
However, Wassmer has already made preparations for the wedding. Velezs
failure to appear on the wedding day is contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy which is embodied on Article 21 of the Civil Code. Under the
law, the injured party is entitled to moral damages as well as to exemplary
damages because Velezs acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner
(Article 2232) in breaching his promise to marry Wassmer.
Moral Exemplary Damages may be Awarded in an actionable breach of
promise suit. When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Art. 21
of the civil code, moral damages may be awarded under art. 2219 (10) of the
said code. Exemplary Damages may also be awarded under Art. 2232 of said
code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner.

CASE DIGEST 4
JOSE C. ZULUETA, vs. NICANOR NICOLAS
FACTS: Plaintiff instituted the present action on May 19, 1954 against the defendant
provincial fiscal of Rizal to recover moral pecuniary damages in the sum of P10,000.
The complaint in substance alleges on May 6, 1954, the defendant fiscal conducted an
investigation of a complaint for libel filed by herein plaintiff against the provincial
governor of Rizal and the staff members of the Philippine Free Press;
After said investigation, the fiscal "rendered an opinion" that there was no prima
facie case; that the alleged libelous statements were made in good faith and for the sole
purpose of serving the best interest of the public; and that in consequence the fiscal
absolved the said governor and the Free Press staff from the crime of libel.
Issue: whether or not plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action.
Held: NO. The present action is based on article 27 of the new Civil Code, which
provides that "any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter." PROVIDED, that such refusal or
neglect is without just cause.
Refusal of the fiscal to prosecute when after the investigation he finds no sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case is not a refusal, without just cause, to perform
an official duty. The fiscal has for sure the legal duty to prosecute crimes where there is
no evidence to justify such action. But it is equally his duty not to prosecute when after
the investigation he has become convinved that the evidence available is not enough to
establish a prima facie case.
Having legal cause to refrain from filing an information against the person whom the
herein plaintiff wants him to charge with libel, the defendant fiscal cannot be said to
have refused or neglected without just cause to perform his official duty. On the
contrary, it would appear that he performed it.

CASE DIGEST 5
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, vs. DALMACIO CATIPON
Facts: The parties stipulatethat Defendant affixed his signature on the Trust
Receipt, because of his strong desire to get the onions purchased by him from J. V.
Ramirez & Co., Inc., and which were duly paid for to the latter and not
toPlaintiff Bank.
Defendant contends that he is only a customer of J. V. Ramirez & Co., Inc and that
he only signed the trust receipt when a son of J. V. Ramirez came to him and
explained that it`s the only way to get onions which he bought.
When Ramirez became insolvent, Plaintiff PNB filed a claim against J. V. Ramirez in
the Insolvency Proceedings of J. V. Ramirez & Co., Inc. and did not realize any cent
out of its claim filed in the insolvency proceedings.
Since the trust receipt was in the nameDefendant Catipon, PNB charged him with
estafa for having misappropriated, misapplied and converted the merchandise
covered by the trust receipt; but after due trial was acquitted from the charge
because his guilt was not satisfactorily established.
c

The bank commenced the present action to recover the value of the goods.
Defendant Catipon filed his appeal and one of the grounds is that his acquittal in the
estafa case is a bar to the Banks institution of the present civil action, because the
Bank did not reserve in the criminal case its right to separately enforce his civil
liability.
Issue: Whether or not defendant is civilly liable.
Held:
Yes. Appellants case has no merit. The decision acquitting Appellant Catipon of the
charge of estafa does not preclude or bar the filing of this action to enforce his
liability as one of the signers of the trust receipt.
Acquittal being equivalent to one on reasonable doubt, does not preclude a suit to
enforce the civil liability for the same act or omission, under Article 29 of the new
Civil Code.
The declaration in the decision of acquittal to the effect that if any responsibility
was incurred by the accused that is civil in nature and not criminal amounts to a
reservation of the civil action in favor of the offended party.
If the Appellant executed the trust receipt (that the present action seeks to enforce),
he is liable ex contractu for its breach, whether he did or he did not

misappropriate, misapply or convert the said merchandise as charged in the

information filed in the criminal case.
It appearing from the stipulation that the merchandise (onions) covered by the trust
receipt were delivered by Ramirez to the Appellant herein, who disposed thereof, it
is but right that he should be the one to answer for their value. Appellants
payments to Ramirez cannot diminish the rights of the Bank, since the trust receipt
expressly obligated herein Appellant to pay the Bank and not to his co-signer.

CASE DIGEST 6
National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union of the Phil. v. San Miguel
Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. L-18170, [August 31, 1963], 118 PHIL 806-815
FACTS:
Appellant National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union of the Philippines is the
bargaining representative of all regular workers paid on the daily basis and of route helpers
of San Miguel Brewery, Inc.
October 2, 1959 - The said Union signed a collective bargaining agreement with the
company, which provided among other things, that
"The COMPANY will deduct the UNION agency fee from the wages of workers who are not
members of the UNION, provided the aforesaid workers authorizes the Company to make
such deductions in writing or if no such authorization is given, if a competent court direct the
COMPANY to make such deduction." (Art. II, Sec. 4)
November 17, 1960 - union brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
collection of union agency fees under the bargaining contract.
Allegation: it had obtained benefits for all workers in the company and that "defendant
Independent S.M.B. Workers' Association refused and still refuses to pay UNION AGENCY
FEE to the plaintiff UNION and defendant COMPANY also refuses and still refuses to deduct
the UNION AGENCY FEE from the wages of workers who are not members of the plaintiff
UNION and remit the same to the latter,"
RTC RULING: Dismissed the complaint and held that there was nothing in the Industrial
Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875) which would authorize the collection of agency fees and
that neither may such collection be justified under the rules of quasi contract because the
workers had not neglected their business so as to warrant the intervention of an officious
manager.
The Court also held the rules of agency inapplicable because there was no agreement
between the union and the workers belonging to the other union as to the payment of fee
nor was there, said the court, any allegation in the complaint that the amount of P4.00,
which the union sought to collect from each employee, was the expense incurred by the
union in representing him.

The Union filed an M.R but was denied thus this appeal.
Unions Argument: 1. non-members are "free riders" who should be made to pay for
benefits received by them. They should be made to pay on the principle of quasi contract.
The union invokes Article 2142 of the Civil Code which provides that
"Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasicontract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another." (Italics ours)
2. it is contended that the collection of agency fee may be justified on the principle of
agency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not non members of the union should be made to pay for benefits received by
them?
HELD:
No. It is true, as the union claims, that whatever benefits the majority union obtains from
the employer accrue to its members as well as to non-members. But this alone does not
justify the collection of agency fee from non-members. For the benefits of a collective
bargaining agreement are extended to all employees regardless of their membership in the
union because to withhold the same from the non- members would be to discriminate
against them.
The benefits that accrue to non-members by reason of a collective bargaining agreement
can hardly be termed "unjust enrichment" because, as already pointed out, the same are
extended to them precisely to avoid discrimination among employees.
Moreover, when a union bids to be the bargaining agent, it voluntarily assumes the
responsibility of representing all the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. That is
why Section 12 of the law states that "The labor organization designated or selected for the
purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such
unit for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment."
When a union acts as the bargaining agent, it assumes the responsibility imposed upon it by
law to represent not only its members but all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit
of which it is the agent. The Civil Code states that agency is presumed to be for
compensation unless there is proof to the contrary. (Art. 1875). There can be no better
proof that the agency created by law between the bargaining representative and the
employees in the unit is without compensation than the fact that these employees in the
minority voted against the appellant union.
WHEREFORE, the orders dated December 6, 1960 and December 20, 1960 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila are hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

CASE DIGEST 7
PALSA v. Jimenez, G.R. No. L-26622, L-26774, [May 31, 1974]
FACTS:
The two cases at bar take their root from one and the same case filed on September 7, 1964 in the
Manila court of first instance by respondents Attys. Jimenez and Ampil and PALEA primarily directed
against PAL employees who were not rank and file employees and belonged to a union of supervisors
known as PALSA (Philippine Air Lines Supervisors' Association) and all other employees of
PAL not otherwise members of any labor union and squarely raising in issue their right to demand
payment from said PALSA members and non-union members the same 25% charge for attorneys' fees
and union fee.
Claiming that it was only fair and just that said non-PALEA employees of PAL (PALSA and
non-union employees) as beneficiaries of the PALEA suit on the applicability of Republic Act
1880 imposing a 40-hour week to PAL as a government-controlled corporation "on the
cardinal principle of law that no one shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the
expense of another" should pay them the same attorneys' fees and union due totalling 25%
and unable to collect, said respondents filed the suit below against the petitioners in the
cases at bar.
RTC- Dismissed the complaint.
Findings: "the two counsels for the PALEA, had an agreement with the PALEA for the
payment to them of 20% of whatever sums the union would be able to obtain and in
addition, the expenses of litigation were incurred by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs now seek to compel the Defendant union known as the PALSA to also pay the PALEA counsel
20% of their overtime pay and to shoulder the proportionate part of the expenses of litigation. It
is admitted that plaintiff attorneys had no prior contract of employment within Defendant PALSA; it is
further admitted that there are several labor unions with the PAL, each with its own collective
bargaining agreement with the PAL; it is further admitted that the PALSA is a union of supervisors
who are not eligible for membership in the PALEA; it is further admitted that the PALEA and
the PALSA have been at odds on many occasions and that the PALSA has its own legal
counsel.
So that the sole issue in this case must be based on quasi-contract 'no one shall unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another'. Counsel for Plaintiffs has gratuitously mentioned in his
memorandum that this Court has held that in this case the relations between the parties is one of
quasi-contract for precisely this Court has consistently ruled that the entire basis of Plaintiffs' action
must be one on quasi-contract which Plaintiffs must prove.

COURT OF APPEALS- Disagreed with the trial court. Reversed the RTCs judgment of dismissal and
entering another "declaring defendant members of the PALSA and the other defendant non-union
employees of the PAL liable to Attys. Enrique Jimenez and Mariano Ampil, Jr. for their attorneys' fees
in an amount equivalent to 15% and 5%, respectively, of the said defendants' total back wages,"
farther "declaring said defendants liable to Atty. Jimenez for expenses of litigation equivalent to 1% of
the former's total back wages" and ordering PAL to pay the said attorneys the equivalent of said
percentages "to be charged against and to be deducted from the backwages respectively due to each
of (them)," with costs against the members of the PALSA and other non-union employees of PAL.
Both PALSA and PAL filed with this Court the separate petitions at bar for review on certiorari of the
appellate court's adverse decision on appeal, which are now jointly herein decided.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents attorneys and PALEA by virtue of the favorable judgment obtained by
them on June 30, 1964 in PALEA vs. PAL, declaring Republic Act No. 1880 to be applicable to PAL
government-controlled corporation and resulting in the payment of Saturday backwages to all PAL
employees regardless of their union or non-union affiliation may be held all the other non-PALEA
employees of PAL equally liable for the payment of the 20% attorney's fees and 5% union fee claimed
by them from PALEA members on the principle of quasi-contract?

HELD:
It is thus clear that the favorable declaratory judgment that respondents obtained in 1964 in the
PALEA suit on Republic Act No. 1880 in which they allegedly spent much time, money and effort,
was simply in the nature of a judicial recognition that PAL was at the time a government-controlled
corporation and that the provisions of Republic Act No. 1880 were applicable to all its employees.
The resulting payment to PAL employees of Saturday backwages which accrued since the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 1880 was a mere incident of said declaration and may not be viewed in the same
category as awards for special benefits secured from the employer as a consequence of a hard-fought
battle obtained after the exertion of special efforts and protracted proceedings occasioned by the
employer's refusal.
On the contrary, the favorable declaratory judgment obtained by respondents in the case could not in
any way be deemed mainly responsible if not indispensable for the extension of the 40-hour a week
benefits prescribed under Republic Act No. 1880 to non-PALEA employees of PAL.
There being no special showing that respondents attorneys and PALEA did more than just secure a
judicial declaration of the applicability of Republic Act No. 1880 to PAL employees, their claims for 25%
attorneys' fees and union fee or expenses of litigation sought to be collected from non-PALEA
members, must fail, since whatever benefits were extended to all PAL employees were actually
generated by the legislative mandate of Republic Act No. 1880, as judicially affirmed in the PALEA
case.
And save that of securing judicial recognition that PAL is a government-controlled corporation and
therefore covered by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1880, there was no special service
given nor special effort exerted on the part of respondents attorneys and PALEA to secure
benefits in addition to what Republic Act No. 1880 ordained, so as to entitle them to
attorneys' fees and/or contribution from non-PALEA members.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and in lieu thereof
judgment is hereby rendered affirming the trial court's judgment of dismissal of respondents
complaint. With costs in all instances jointly and severally against respondents. SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST 8

CASE DIGEST 9

CASE DIGEST 10

DE LA RAMA STEAMSHIP VS TAN

An agreement was entered into on 1949 between the De la Rama
Steamship Co. Inc. and the National Development Company (NDC) whereby
De la Rama undertook the management of the three vessels known as Dona
Aurora, Dona Nati and Dona Alicia which had been purchased by the
Philippine Government from Japan with the advise and technical supervision
of De la rama. In the management contract, it was provided that De la Rama
had the option to buy the vessels at the 5 th year of the purchase and delivery
of each of the vessels at a price which is to consist of the cost price of each
vessel, plus such expenses as De la Rama may have incurred in connection
with the construction, outfitting, provisioning and operation thereof; but
should De la Rama fail to exercise the right of option it should be reimbursed
of the expenses incurred in manning, equipping, fueling, overhauling and
reparing the vessels, and the payment of loading commission discharging
commission, overriding commisiion sub-agents commission, etc.
The NDC cancel the general agency that it had granted to De la Rama
upon one years notice. This was opposed by de la Rama, which alleged that
it had been granted the option to purchase the vessels. The Court however
upheld the right of the NDC to cancel the management contract and the
option of De la Rama to purchase the vessels was rendered ineffective.
ISSUE: WON De la Rama can demand NDC to refrain from using the names
of the three vessels.
RULING:
Yes. To permit NDC to continue using the names would be to countenance
the unlawful appropriation of the benefit of a goodwill which De la Rama has
acquired as a result of the continued usage and large expenses; it would be
tantamount to permitting NDC to grab the reputation or goodwill of the
business of another.

CASE DIGEST 11
ROBERT JANDA vs. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY
The late Walter C. Wurdeman has shares of stocks of the Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company. Robert Janda, the deceased ancillary administrator sold 2500 shares of it and asked the
Company that such transaction be registered in their books but was refused by the latter despite of
the certificate shown by the administrator and the court order of the probate proceedings.
The defendant admitted such refusal but reasoned that the plaintiff needs to follow license
requirement provided by the Central Bank in transaction involving a non-resident citizen which was
not complied with by the plaintiff; that the transfer demanded by the plaintiff was penalized by the
Central Bank regulationsand that the amount of damages the plaintiff claimed to have suffered, as
stated in his second cause of action, was caused not by the defendant but by the plaintiff himself for
refusing to secure the license required by the regulations of the Central Bank which could have been
easily obtained from any of the authorized security dealers at no expense to the estate of the late
Walter C. Wurdeman.
The Court rendered a judgment declaring that the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff as the
Central Bank regulation provided that license is important in such transaction.
A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the defendant is liable for damages.
RULING:
The court ruled that the defendant cannot be held answerable for damages, because it only
complied with the regulations of the Central Bank and it was not within its competence to interpret but
to comply with such regulations. And the defendant is directed to transfer and register the 2,500

shares of its stock sold by the plaintiff in his capacity as ancillary administrator of the estate of the late
Walter C. Wurdeman to the brokerage firm Hall, Picornell, Ortigas& Company without the license
required by the Central Bank.
Also in this case it explained what a Foreign exchange is. As defined, it is the conversion of
an amount of money or currency of one country into an equivalent amount of money or currency of
another country. A sale of charges of stock of a domestic corporation belonging to a non-resident to a
resident for the purpose of paying taxes due the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities and expenses incurred in the administration of the estate of a deceased is not a
transaction in foreign exchanges. By the sale of said shares, dividends declared from time to time by
the corporation, accruing and payable to the non- resident before the sale, part of which could only be
remitted to him, as provided for in the regulations of the Central Bank, will no longer accrue and be
payable to the non-resident but to the resident purchaser. In that case, the need or reason for
remitting part of the dividends to the non-resident disappears because they are due and payable to
the resident purchaser. The probability of remittance abroad of the proceeds of the sale does not
make the sale a transaction in foreign exchange. It is no transaction at all. When such remittance is to
be made the Central Bank steps in, as no remittance of funds abroad may be effected without the
approval or license of the Central Bank.

CASE DIGEST 12
ISIDRO SABAvs. CA
(Emil L. Ong, Emil L. Ong Chuan, & Jose Ong Chuan, private respondents)
FACTS
1934 - Pedrode la Cruz was a grantee of a lease of land in Laoang, Northern Samar
awarded to him by the Bureau of Lands.
1939 - Gregoria Nalazon, wife of Pedro, died and the estate became the subject of an
intestate proceedings. The leasehold was included, wherein 50% was adjudicated proindivisoto Pedro while the other 50% was adjudicated pro-indiviso to their8 children. The
improvements introduced by Pedro consisted of rock fillings and 3 warehouses.
1953 - Jose Ongchuan leased the warehouse from Pedro de la Cruz.
1959 or so -7of the children sold their leasehold rights to Emil Ong
1961 - The warehouse leased by Jose Ongchuan was burned to the ground. After the fire,
Emil Ong constructed a new building on the same.
March 1966Lourdes (one of the children)sold her leasehold right IsidroSaba.Later,
Lourdes sent a letter to private respondents notifying them of the sale of her 1/8 share to
Saba and requested that payment of rentals be given to the new owner instead of her.
Private respondents did not heed the request. Saba was also ignored.
Saba was forced to file a case for collection of rentals in the Municipal Court of Laoang but
was dismissed for improper venue. Saba appealed to the CFI but the prior decision was
affirmed.

August 6, 1974- Saba filed this case on for collection of rentals over the 1/8 share of
Lourdes C. Agbayani in the amount of P8,271.12 plus interest from August, 1966 until full
payment.
LLjur

Private respondents prayed for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
They contended that the complaint is baseless and intended to harass them and because of
this complaint their reputations were tarnished and was exposed to ridicule.
May 30, 1984 -The trial court rendered judgment against petitionerdismissing the
complaint and ordering Saba to pay to defendants jointly and severally, P40,000 as moral
damages; P30,000 as exemplary damages and P15,000 as attorney's feees.CA affirmed in
toto the trial court's decision

ISSUE/S
WoN (1) petitioner has a cause of action against private respondents and (2) the award of
damages is proper.
HELD
No. The Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce set the maximum period of his lease at fifteen
(15) years. Therefore up to 1949 only. There is no evidence on record of renewal of the term
of the lease. When Lourdes sold her "leasehold right" Saba in 1966, there was no longer a
leasehold right that she conveyed. Corollarily, Saba did not acquire any right from her that
can be enforced against the private respondents or anybody for that matter. In this regard,
the affirmance of the dismissal of the complaint was correct.
With respect to the award of damages, both the trial court and the respondent court erred.
Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. It is however not
enough that such injuries have arisen; it is essential that they have sprung from
a wrongful act or omission, fraud, malice, or bad faith which was the proximate cause
thereof. The adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful
and subject the actor to make payment of damages, for the law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. One who exercises his rights does
no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum facit. If damage results from a person's
exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
Saba was in good faith when he filed the collection suit. He thought that by virtue of the sale
of the leasehold right to him, Lourdes right to 1/8 of the property has already been
transferred to him, which includes the right to collect rentals. The failure by private
respondents to pay the rentals prompted Saba to file a complaint against them. A person
may have erred but error alone is not a ground for moral damages. And although
cases were previously filed one after another by petitioner against private respondents, no
evidence was adduced that these cases were baseless and intended merely to harass
private respondents. The acts performed by petitioner cannot be said to have disparaged
the reputation of private respondents. Lastly, whatever worries, anxieties and expenses
private respondents may have suffered were only such as are usually caused to a party
haled into court as a defendant in a litigation. Clearly, there is no sufficient justification for
the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is concerned is
DELETED.

CASE DIGEST 13
YSMAEL MARITIME CORPORATION vs. HON. CELSO AVELINO and
SPS. FELIX C. LIM and CONSTANCIA GEVEIA
FACTS
Rolando G. Lim, single, a licensed 2nd mate, was on board the M/S Rajah, owned by
petitionerYsmael Maritime Corporation (YMC), when the same sank Rolando perished
because of that incident.Claiming that Rolando's untimely death at the age of 25 was due to
the negligence of YMC, his parents, Felix Lim and Consorcia Geveia, sued YMC for
damages.
YMC alleged [1] that the complaint stated no cause of action; [2] that respondent-plaintiffs
had received P4,160 from YMC and had signed release papers discharging YMC from any
liability arising from the death of their son, and [3] that the respondents had already been
compensated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission for the same incident, for which
reason they are now precluded from seeking other remedies against the same employer
under the Civil Code.
YMC sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.Judge Avelino (CFI Cebu) upheld the
spouses vigorous opposition and denied YMC's motion to dismiss for being unmeritorious.
YMC filed the instant special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction, contending that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he refused to dismiss the complaint for damages on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE
WoN the suit for damages filled by the spouses is meritorius. / WoN the spouses Lim may
recover damages from YMC in the suit filled.
HELD
No. YMC invokes Robles vs. Yap Wing, to support its contention that all claims for death or
injuries by employees against employers are exclusively cognizable by the Workmens
Compensation Act regardless of the causes of said death or injuries. That case no longer
controls.
WCA, Sec. 5 Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to
an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents
or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said
injury,

In Floresca vs. Philex Mining Company, involving a complaint for damages for the death of
five miners in a cave-in, this Court was confronted with three divergent opinions on the
exclusivity rule as presented by several amici curiae.
1stview is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an action to
recover damages [not compensation under the WCA] with the regular courts on the basis of
negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil Code.

2nd view (Robles case) is that the remedy of an employee for work-connected injury or
accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the WCA.
3rd view is that the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a choice of
availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular
courts under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of
his negligence. But once the election has been exercised, the employee or his
heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. In other words, the employee
cannot pursue both actions simultaneously.
This latter view was adopted by the majority in the Floresca case. In so doing, the Court
rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by the WCA as laid
down in the Robles case. Unless and until the Floresca ruling is modified or superseded, it is
deemed to be the controlling jurisprudence.
Thus respondent Lim spouses cannot be allowed to maintain their present action to recover
additional damages against petitioner under the Civil Code. The spouses admitted in open
court that they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the WCC and had
received the compensation payable to them under the WCA. It is therefore clear that
respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid.
At the very least, a sense of fair play would demand that if a person entitled to a choice
of remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no
longer be allowed to exercise the second option."Having staked his fortunes on a
particular remedy, [he] is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the
prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission."

CASE DIGEST 14
Virata v. Ochoa
Facts:
On September 24, 1975, Arsenio Virata died after he was bumped by a passenger jeepney
driven by Maximo Borilla, and registered in the name of Victorio Ochoa, who is the employer of
Borilla. An action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted against Borilla in the
CFI of Rizal. The private prosecutor made a reservation to file a separate civil action for
damages against the driver on his criminal liability, but later on withdrew such reservation. The
heirs of Virata then reserved their right to institute a separate civil action, then commenced a civil
case for damages at the CFI of Cavite based on quasi-delict against Borilla and Ochoa.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of the pendency of the
criminal case between the same parties and the same cause. The CFI of Rizal acquitted Borilla on

the ground that the event was a mere accident. The CFI of Cavite later on granted the motion of
respondents and dismissed the civil case.
Issue: WON the heirs of Virata can pursue an action for damages based on quasi-delict against
Borilla and Ochoa
Held:
Yes.
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action
under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover
twice for the same negligent act.
Under the Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery.
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before the criminal
case was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil
action for damages based on quasi-delict. The acquittal of the driver Borilla, of the crime charged
in the criminal case is not a bar to the prosecution of the civil case for damages based on quasidelict The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is quasi-delict, not an
act or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.

CASE DIGEST 15
German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC
Facts:
Facts:
On 17 October 1994, Froilan de Lara (private respondent) was hired by German Marine
(petitioners) to work as a radio officer on board its vessel. Sometime in June, 1995, while the
vessel was docked at the port of New Zealand, private respondent was taken ill. His worsening
health condition was brought by his crewmates to the attention of the master of the vessel.
However, instead of disembarking private respondent so that he may receive immediate medical
attention at a hospital in New Zealand, the master of the vessel proceeded to Manila, a voyage of
ten days, during which time the health of private respondent rapidly deteriorated. Upon arrival in
Manila, private respondent was not immediately disembarked but was made to wait for several
hours until a vacant slot in the Manila pier was available for the vessel to dock. Private
respondent was confined in the Manila Doctors Hospital, wherein he was treated by a team of

medical specialists.
After private respondent was discharged from the hospital, he demanded from petitioners the
payment of his disability benefits and the unpaid balance of his sickness wages, pursuant to the
Standard Employment Contract of the parties. Having been assured by petitioners that all his
benefits would be paid in time, private respondent waited for almost a year, to no avail.
Eventually, petitioners told private respondent that, aside from the sickness wages that he had
already received, no other compensation or benefit was forthcoming. Private respondent filed a
complaint with the NLRC for payment of disability benefits and the balance of his sickness
wages. On 31 July 1997, the labor arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay
respondent disability benefits and the sickness wages balance.
On 29 July 1998, the NLRCi affirmed the labor arbiters decision in toto and declared that the
latters findings and conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. The CA affirmed the
decision of the NLRC.
Issues:WON respondent is entitled to disability benefits, the sickness wage balance, and damages
Held: YES
1. Disability Benefits
Petitioners contention that the existence and grade of a seamans disability must be
pronounced by a physician accredited by the POEA does not find any support in the abovecited
provision, nor in any other portion of the Standard Employment Contract. In order to claim
disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the company-designated
physician who must proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent disability, whether total or
partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latters employment.
On the strength of the medical certificate from Manila Doctors hospital which stated that
private respondent can be classified under partial permanent disability and is not fit to go back to
his previous work due to his mental state, such shall be upheld.
2. Sickness wages and other damages
Petitioners are guilty of negligence in failing to provide immediate medical attention to
private respondent. It has been sufficiently established that, while the vessel was docked at the
port of New Zealand, private respondent was taken ill, causing him to lose his memory and
rendering him incapable of performing his work as radio officer of the vessel. The crew
immediately notified the master of the vessel of private respondents worsening condition.
However, instead of disembarking private respondent so that he may receive immediate medical
attention at a hospital in New Zealand or at a nearby port, the master of the vessel proceeded
with the voyage, in total disregard of the urgency of private respondents condition. Private
respondent was kept on board without any medical attention whatsoever for the entire duration of
the trip from New Zealand to the Philippines, a voyage of ten days. To make matters worse,

when the vessel finally arrived in Manila, petitioners failed to directly disembark private
respondent for immediate hospitalization. Private respondent was made to suffer a wait of
several more hours until a vacant slot was available at the pier for the vessel to dock. It was only
upon the insistence of private respondents relatives that petitioners were compelled to disembark
private respondent and finally commit him to a hospital There is no doubt that the failure of
petitioners to provide private respondent with the necessary medical care caused the rapid
deterioration and inevitable worsening of the latters condition, which eventually resulted in his
sustaining a permanent disability.

CASE DIGEST 16: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BONIFACIO SAN

AGUSTIN Y ROSLIN
FACTS:
San Agustin was accused of raping his minor daughter Jessebelle who was 13
years old. According to the victim, the first incident happened on July 1,
1997, which was the birthdate of her cousin, and every night thereafter. The
same thing happened during August of 1997, but on September, she was
raped only during weekends when her father would come home from working
at a construction site in Imus, Cavite which was 5 hours away from their
home. A physical exam of the victim, at the request of the police, showed
that there was a healed hymenal laceration at the four oclock position which
had been caused when a hard object such as an erect male organ had been
inserted in the victims vagina.
Accused raised the defense of denial and alibi, stating that he couldnt have
raped his daughter because he was working on the dates mentioned by the
victim. He presented his sister as witness, who declared that her brother was
indeed working on those dates and that the victim erred in stating that she
was raped on the night of her cousins birthday last July 1 because, as the

cousins mother, she knows for a fact that the real birthday of her daughter
was on March 5 and that on September 15, another date when the daughter
alleged that her father raped her, the victim was sleeping over at their house
for the night. Accused also stressed out that the victim said she was raped
only on Saturdays and Sundays but July 1 and September 15 is a Tuesday
and Monday respectively.
RTC:
Accused was charged with two counts of rape, sentencing him to suffer
death penalty.
With capital punishment being imposed, the cases were elevated to the SC
for automatic review.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not complainants testimony is credible and sufficient to sustain

appellants conviction
2. Whether or not appellants defense of denial and alibi is worthy of credence

HELD:

1. YES. The accused specifically points out the time and dates provided by the
victim as to when she was raped was erroneous but the SC held that exact
time and date of the commission of the crime are not decisive in a
prosecution for rape. First, the precise time of the commission of the rape is
not an element of the crime. Second, the precise time and date of the rape
has nonbearing on the commission. Hence the inconsistencies with the time
and date of the rape are details of minor significance, and what is more
important is the consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive
identification of the assailant.
2. NO. For alibi to prosper as a defense, one must not only prove that he was
somewhere else whe the crime was committed but must also show that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the locus criminis. In the
present cases, both requisites are wanting. Accused failed to prove that he
was actually in Imus on July and September 15 when the rape happened, and
he cant rely on his sisters testimony since she didnt personally see him on
both dates. Also, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be in their
Laguna house by the alleged time of the rape since he gets off work at 5pm,
and it only takes him 5 hours from Imus to Laguna, thus, he can be home at
10pm in Laguna. Complainant did testify that the rape usually happened
around 11pm.
Furthermore, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and
unequivocal identification of appellant by private complainant as her rapist.
Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of illmotive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over
the appellants defense of denial and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving and undeserving of
any weight in law.

The SC posits that the imposition of the death penalty in rape cases becomes
mandatory when the offended party is under 18 years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim. The qualifying circumstances of age and
relationship of the victim to the offender must be specifically alleged and
proved. In the present case, however, the victims age has not been proven
adequately, and that bars appellants conviction for rape in its qualified form.
He is guilty of two counts of rape, and the proper penalty is not death but
reclusion perpetua.

CASE DIGEST 17: COCA COLA BOTTLERS, HENSON and AQUINO vs

JOSE S. ROQUE
FACTS:
Respondent Roque started as a route helper with Coke Bottler and was then
promoted to acting salesman. However, due to unremitted collections which
Roque denied, his former manager Henson, reassigned him to his old
position. Henson then started an administrative investigation on the said
matter, without giving Roque the chance to be heard. As a result of said
investigation, Coke Bottlers ordered a summary dismissal for Roque in
October 1982. In March 1983, Henson filed a criminal case for estafa against

Roque. The RTC rendered a decision on September 1988, acquitting Roque of

the said crime for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In June 1989, Roque filed with the RTC a complaint for damages on the
ground that during the seven years that the estafa case was being tried, he
and his entire family suffered tremendously and miserably, forcing them to
the brink of proverty, and causing them embarrassment and humiliation.
RTC:
Ruled in favor of Roque and awarded him actual or compensatory damages
representing his salary for the 4 years plaintiff was deprived due to his illegal
dismissal, mora and exemplary damages plus cost of suit.
CA:
Affirmed the lower courts decision but with modifications (lowered amount
of damages). Both parties submitted a Motion for Recon but were denied.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case considering that the
complaint is in the nature of a claim for damages arising from and by virtue
of an ER-EE relationship
2. Whether or not petitioners were denied their right to due process of law
3. Whether or not lower court erred in awarding damages for malicious
prosecution
4. Whether or not the lower court erred in awarding actual damages considering
the same has no legal or evidentiary basis
5. Whether or not the lower court erred in granting respondents motion of
execution pending appeal

RULING:

1. YES. According to petitioners, all claims for damages arising from ER-EE
relationship are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, but the
SC held that not every claim of an EE against an ER is cognizable by the
former. In the instant case, aside from claiming his unpaid salary and other
benefits, Roque also claimed damages on the sufferings, humiliation and
embarrassment that he and his family experienced during the pendency of
the estafa case. Resolving this issue calls for the application of civil laws, the
case is properly cognizable by the regular courts.
2. NO. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side , but
chose to ignore them. They repeatedly failed to appear both in the pre-trial
hearings and the trial itself without justifiable reasons. Since they also filed a
Motion for Recon, the filing of such, cures any defect.
3. NO. Both RTC and CA ruled that petitioners were liable, not because of
malicious prosecution, but for non-observance of conduct required of every
individual in human relations. The trial court found petitioners to have acted
in wanton and gross bad faith and injustice in manipulating the dismissal of
Roque, and later on instigating a baseless criminal action against him, thus
subjecting him and his family to penury.The award of damages to respondent
by the lower and appellate courts were even based on Articles 19, 21 and

2180 of the Civil Code. The finding of petitioners in bad faith in dealing with
respondent entitles Roque to moral and exemplary damages.
4. YES. There is no basis for the awarding of actual and compensatory damages.
According to the law, to justify the awarding of actual an compensatory
damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the
injured party, the actual amount of loss.
5. NO. The CA has noted that the grant of execution pending appeal was
properly raised, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal.

CASE DIGEST 20
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE CORPORATION and LOUIE
CABALIT, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LOLITA SIPE
ESCARA, respondents.

FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner's

for the delay in the delivery of the remittance sent to her by her sister-in-law
through petitioner PT & T Corporation.
-On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but deleted
the award of actual damages.
-The appellate court, however, sustained the award of moral and exemplary
damages in favor of private respondent.
- In the instant appeal, petitioners would strongly urge that the appellate court be
reversed in awarding moral and exemplary damages to respondent Lolita Escara
with the latter's failure to present evidence that she had suffered wounded feelings,
serious anxiety, and mental anguish or that the act she had ascribed to petitioners
was done in bad faith, or in wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Private respondent, however, would insist that the clearly established culpable
conduct of petitioners warranted the award of both moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Won respondent Lolita may be awarded to both moral and exemplary
damages
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals was correct in deleting
the award of actual damages for lack of proof of pecuniary loss.
Moral damages cannot also be awarded in the case at bar considering that the
delay of less than two months in the remittance to private respondent of the
amounts due her could hardly be said as being constitutive of bad faith or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith.
Neither can exemplary damages be awarded. Exemplary damages are not
recoverable as a matter of right. Although such damages need not be proved,
plaintiff must first show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory
damages before a court can favorably consider an award of exemplary damages.
Temperate or moderate damages cannot likewise be awarded because private
respondent failed to establish that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
The Supreme Court awarded nominal damages in favor of private respondent.
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or recognized and not
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. In the
instant case, for the violation of the right of private respondent to receive timely
delivery of the money transmitted through petitioner corporation an award of
nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00 against petitioner corporation is
appropriate.
CASE DIGEST 21 LEOPOLDO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. BANK OF
AMERICA, respondent.

FACTS:
LeopoldoAraneta, the petitioner herein, was a local merchant engaged in the import
and export business. On June 30, 1961 he issued a check for $500 payable to cash
and drawn against the San Francisco main office of the Bank of America, where he
had been maintaining a dollar current account since 1948. At that time he had a
credit balance of $523.81 in his account, confirmed by the bank's assistant cashier
in a letter to Araneta dated September 7, 1961. However, when the check was
received by the bank on September 8, 1961, a day after the date of the letter, it
was dishonored and stamped with the notation "Account Closed."
"Upon inquiry by Araneta as to why his check had been dishonored, the Bank of
America acknowledged that it was an error, explaining that for some reason the
check had been encoded with wrong account number, and promising that "we shall
make every effort to see that this does not reoccur." The bank sent a letter of
apology to the payee of the check, a Mr. Harry Gregory of Hongkong, stating that
"the check was returned through an error on our part and should not reflect
adversely upon Mr.Araneta." In all probability the matter would have been
considered closed, but another incident of a similar nature occurred later.
On May 25, and 31, 1962 Araneta issued Check No. 110 for $500 and Check No. 111
for $150, respectively, both payable to cash and drawn against the Bank of
America. These two checks were received by the bank on June 3, 1962. The first
check appeared to have come into the hands of RufinaSaldaa, who deposited it to
her account with the First National City Bank of New York, which in turn cleared it
through the Federal Reserve Bank. The second check appeared to have been
cleared through the Wells Fargo Bank. Despite the sufficiency of Araneta's deposit
balance to cover both checks, they were again stamped with the notation "Account
Closed" and returned to the respective clearing banks.
In the particular case of Check No. 110, it was actually paid by the Bank of America
to the First National City Bank. Subsequently, however, the Bank of America,
claiming that the payment had been inadvertently made, returned the check to the
First National City Bank with the request that the amount thereof be credited back
to the Bank of America. In turn, the First National City Bank wrote to the depositor of
the check, RufinaSaldaa, informing her about its return with the notation "Account
Closed" and asking her consent to the deduction of its amount from her deposit.
However, before Mrs.Saldaa's reply could be received, the Bank of America
recalled the check from the First National City Bank and honored it.
In view of the foregoing incidents, Araneta, through counsel, sent a letter to the
Bank of America demanding damages in the sum of $20,000. While admitting
responsibility for the inconvenience caused to Araneta, the bank claimed that the
amount demanded was excessive, and offered to pay the sum of P2,000.00. The
offer was rejected.
On December 11, 1962 Araneta filed the complaint in this case against the Bank of
America for the recovery of the following:
1. Actual or compensatory damages P30,000.00
2. Moral damages 20,000.00
3. Temperate damages 50.000.00

4. Exemplary damages 10,000.00

5. Attorney's fees 10,000.00
___________
T O T A L P120,000.00
The judgment of the trial court awarded all the items prayed for, but on appeal by
the defendant the Court of Appeals eliminated the award of compensatory and
temperate damages and reduced the moral damages to P8,000.00, the exemplary
damages to P1,000.00 and the attorney's fees to P1,000.00.
Not satisfied with the decision of the appellate court, the plaintiff filed the instant
petition for review, alleging two reasons why it should be allowed, as follows:
"(1) The Court of Appeals erred in holding that temperate damages
cannot be awarded without proof of actual pecuniary loss. There is
absolutely no legal basis for this ruling; worse yet, it runs counter to the
very provisions of ART. 2216 of the New Civil Code and to the
established jurisprudence on the matter;
"(2) The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that moral damages may be
recovered as an item separate and distinct from the damages recoverable for injury
to business standing and commercial credit. This involves the application of
paragraph (2) of Art. 2205 of the New Civil Code which up to now has not yet
received an authoritative interpretation from the Supreme Court
ISSUE:
WON LEOPOLDO (PETITIONER) CAN CLAIM FOR TEMPERATE
DAMAGES
HELD:
The Code Commission, in explaining the concept of temperate damages under
Article 2224, makes the following comment: "In some States of the American Union,
temperate damages are allowed. There are cases where from the nature of the
case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is
convinced that there has been such loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial
credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show with certainty in
terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge should be
empowered to calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the
plaintiff should suffer, without redress from the defendant's wrongful act."
The petitioner, as found by the Court of Appeals, is a merchant of long standing and
good reputation in the Philippines. Some of his record is cited in the decision
appealed from. We are of the opinion that his claim for temperate damages is
legally justified. Considering all the circumstances, including the rather small size of
the petitioner's account with the respondent, the amounts of the checks which were
wrongfully dishonored, and the fact that the respondent tried to rectify the error
soon after it was discovered, although the rectification came after the damage had
been caused, we believe that an award of P5,000 by way of temperate damages is
sufficient.

Under the second error assigned by the petitioner, he contends that moral damages
should have been granted for the injury to his business standing or commercial
credit, separately from his wounded feelings and mental anguish. It is true that
under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. "besmirched reputation" is a ground upon
which moral damages may be claimed, but the Court of Appeals did take this
element into consideration in adjudging the sum of P8,000 in his favor. We quote
from the decision:
". . . the damages to his reputation as an established and
well known international trader entitled him to recover moral
damages."
xxxxxxxxx
". . . It was likewise established that when plaintiff learned
that his checks were not honored by the drawee Bank, his
wounded feelings and the mental anguish suffered by him
caused his blood pressure to rise beyond normal limits, thereby
necessitating medical attendance for an extended period."
The trial court awarded attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000. This was reduced
by the Court of Appeals to only P1,000. Considering the nature and extent of the
services rendered by the petitioner's counsel both in the trial and appellate courts,
the amount should be increased to P4,000. This may be done motuproprio by this
Court under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, which provides that attorney's fees may
be recovered in the instances therein enumerated and "in any other case where the
Court deems, it first and equitable that attorney's fees . . . should be recovered,"
provided the amount thereof be reasonable in all cases.

CASE DIGEST 22 Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. vs

Court of Appeals
FACTS:
In February 1963, Ilagan was driving a bus owned by Batangas Laguna Tayaban
Bus Company along Manila South Super Highway. He sped pass a big cargo
truck thereby taking the opposite lane and he hit the car driven by a certain de
los Reyes which resulted to the latters death and the latters nieces death and
causing serious injuries to the other car passengers. Ilagan was sued for
homicide through reckless imprudence and while the case was pending in the
CA the victims sued Ilagan and BLTB for damages via an independent civil action
based on Article 2180. BLTB assailed the suit as it invoked the opinion penned
by Justice Capistrano in Corpus vs Pajewhich states that under Article 33 of the
Civil Code it excludes criminal negligence as one of those which an independent
civil action can be filed, hence homicide through reckless imprudence or
criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the
defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same
criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his right to institute
a separate civil action; and based on this, BLTB wanted the dismissal of the civil
suits pending the criminal suit in the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil suit can be filed independently of the criminal negligence
case pending before the CA.
HELD:
Yes. The opinion of Justice Capistrano in Corpus vs Paje is not controlling
because it is not doctrinal this is because the majority of the court did not
agree with it. Also, the Corpus case was different because the damages claimed

there were based on the same criminal negligence. But in the case at bar, the
damages sought to be recovered were based on quasi-delict or Article 2176 &
2180 of the Civil Code which is an independent civil action.

CASE DIGEST 23
CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. L-12191 OCTOBER 14,
1918
FACTS:
On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad
Company where he was an employee. As the train drew near to his
destination, he arose from his seat. When he was about to alight from the
train, Cangco accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed
to notice because it was already 7:00pm and it was dim when it happened.
As a result, he slipped and fell violently on the platform. His right arm was
badly crushed and lacerated which was eventually amputated.
Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its
employees placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving
them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting
from the companys trains.
The companys defense was that granting that its employees were negligent
in placing an obstruction upon the platform, the direct and proximate cause
of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributing negligence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the
plaintiff.

HELD:
In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such
act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly
the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances
necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.
The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to
get on and off the train at the station. There could, therefore, be no
uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he
was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting.
The Supreme Courts conclusion was that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of
contributory negligence.

CASE DIGEST 24
|||

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Esguerra,

G.R. No. L-31420, October 23, 1982
203 PHIL 107-112
FACTS: Respondent Patrocinio Esguerra, a paying passenger in a bus of
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., was seriously injured when said vehicles and a
freight truck of Transport Contractors, Inc. sideswiped each other in the middle of
the road. Esguerra filed an action for damages against the owners of said
vehicles and their respective drivers.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the award of Moral Damages is Proper
TRIAL COURT RULING: The trial court dismissed the complaint against
Transport Contractors, Inc. and Modesto Joaquin but ordered Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. and Nicasio de los Reyes to pay solidarily the plaintiff P25,085.40

as compensatory damages, P5,000.00 as moral damages, P 2,000.00 as

attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal,
CA RULING:Court of Appeals modified the compensatory damages to.
P20,085.40 and ordered all four defendants to pay solidarily said amounts to the
plaintiff. On certiorari, petitioners Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Nicasio de
los Reyes contend that the award of P 5,000.00 moral damages is contrary to law
and jurisprudence; and that the award of P2,000.00 attorney's fees is without
factual and legal basis.
SC RULING:Supreme Court held that the instant case falls under the
jurisprudential rule that moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract of transportation in view of the
provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code; but that with respect
to the attorney's fee of P2,000.00, the same need not be proved and is allowed in
the discretion of the court after considering several factors which are discernible
from the facts brought out during trial, such as its present in the instant case
where respondent Esguerra as plaintiff in the lower court was compelled to
litigate and incur expenses in order to protect his interest.

SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES GENERALLY NOT COVERABLE
IN ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES BASED ON BREACH OF CONTRACT OF
CARRIAGE. This Court has repeatedly held that moral damages are not
recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of the contract of
transportation, as in the instant case, in view of the provisions of Articles 2219
and 2220 of the New Civil Code.
2. EXCEPTION. The exceptions are (I) where the mishap results in the death
of a passenger, and (2) where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or
bad faith, even if death does not result. (Rex Taxicab Co., Inc. vs. Jose Bautista,
et at., G.R. No. L-15392, Sept. 30, 1960).
3. GENERAL RULE APPLIES TO CASE AT BAR. The Court of Appeals
found that the two vehicles sideswiped each other at the middle of the road. In

other words, both vehicles were in their respective lanes and that they did not
invade the lane of the other. It cannot be said therefore that there was fraud or
bad faith on the part of the carrier's driver. This being the case, no moral
damages are recoverable.
4. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY'S FEES; RECOVERABLE WHERE PLAINTIFF
IS COMPELLED TO LITIGATE AND INCUR EXPENSES IN ORDER TO
PROTECT HIS INTEREST; CASE AT BAR. With respect to attorney's fee of
P2,000.00, the same need not be proved as herein petitioners contended. The
same is allowed in the discretion of the court after considering several factors
which are discernible from the facts brought out during the trial. In this case,
plaintiff was compelled to litigate and incur expenses in order to protect his
interest.

CASE DIGEST 25. Calalas vs. CA Eliza Sunga

Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Sunga is a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the
Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Calalas. At the
time the jeepney was filled to a capacity of about 24 passengers, and Sunga was given by the

conductor an extension seat. Which is a wooden stool and is placed at the back of the door at
the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As
Sunga was seated at the rear end of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger.
Just as she was doing so, a truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the rear portion of the jeepney. As a result Sunga was injured which resulted to her
confinement and her being remain on cast and crutches for a period of 3 months.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas alleging violation of contract of carriage, for
failing to exercise the diligence required of a common carrier. Calalas also filed a third party
complaint against Francisco Salva (owner of the truck which bumped the jeepney)
Ruling of the RTC: The lower court rendered judgement against Salva and absolved Calalas of
Liability.
Ruling of the CA: The CA reversed the ruling of the lower court on the ground that Sungas action
was based on a contract of carriage and not a quasi delict, and that the Common Carrier failed to
exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code.
Calalas contended that:
1. The negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident, which negates his
liability.
2. That to rule otherwise would make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its
passengers.
3. That the bumping of the jeepney was a caso fortuito (fortuitous event)
Issue:
WON Calalas is liable?
Ruling:
First Issue: WON Sunga is bound by the ruling of the lower court, absolving Calalas of
liability?
No. The principle of res judicata does not apply. First, because she (Eliza Sunga) was never a party
to the case. Second, the issues in the present case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage, while the issue in the other case is whether Salva and his driver Verena
are liable for quasi delict.

Second Issue: WON Calalas is liable?

YES

In Quasi-delict the negligence or fault should be established because it is the basis of the action. In
Breach of Contract, the action can be prosecuted by merely proving 1.) The existence of the
contract and 2.) The fact that the obligor, in case of a common carrier, failed to transport his
passengers safely to his destination.
Likewise under Art 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or negligent, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence.
In this case it is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the truck
driver.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, and not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person
where there is no relation between him and another party. Unlike in this case
there
is a contractual relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent.
Under the Civil Code:
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard
for all the circumstances.

Art. 1756. In Case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence.
In the case at hand, upon the happening of the accident, the petitioner-Calalas is presumed
negligent and it became his duty to prove that he had exercised extraordinary diligence in the care of
his passengers
Sub-issue: Now, did Calalas exercise extraordinary diligence?
No.
First,he is in violation of the land transportation and traffic code. Which provides that no person
shall xxx while discharging xxx or unloading, obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the
highway.In this case the jeepney was improperly parked, its rear portion being exposed at two
meters from the broad shoulders of the highway and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal
angle.
Second, under the same code, the petitioner took more passengers than the allowed seating
capacity (Which is 24). Code provides that, no person operating any motor vehicle shall allow more
passengers or freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
Third, the fact that Sunga was seated in an extension seat, placer her in a greater peril than that
which other passengers are exposed. Therefore, petitioner was not only unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence, but evidence shows that he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers.

Sub-issue: WON the jeepney being bumped constitutes a caso fortuito?

No. A Caso Fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable. Which requires the following requisites:
a. The cause of the breach is independent on the debtors will
b. The event is unforeseeable or unavoidable
c. The event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner
d. The debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.
In this case, Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body
protruding two meters in the highway. (2nd requisite IGO! Nag-ali daw ang iyang jeep sa dalan, ga
danghag lang)

Decision: Ruling the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

CASE DIGEST 26

Equitable Leasing Corp vs. Lucita Suyom, Marissa Enano, Myrna Tamayo, Felix
Oledan
Facts:
A Fuso Road Tractor rammed into the house of Myrna Tamayo. A portion of the house
was destroyed. Pinned to death were respondent Myrna Tamayos son and Respondent
Felix Oledans daughter. Injured were the respondents themselves and two sons of
Lucita Suyom.
Tutor the driver was charged and was later on convicted. It was found under the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) that the registered owner of the tractor was Equitable
Leasing Corp (petitioner) which it leased to Edwin lim.
A complaint for damages was filed. RTC rendered its decision ordering petitioner to pay
damages. That the deed of sale in favor of Ecatine, was not registered with the LTO,
therefore the legal owner, equitable, is liable to the respondents,
The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the ruling of the lower court. That even if the
deed of sale was issued in favor of Ecatine, the certificate of registration on file, still
remained in the petitioners name.
Issue:
WON Petitioner is liable?
Ruling:
Yes
The petitioner is liable for the deaths and injuries, because it was the registered owner
of the tractor at the time of the accident.
The court ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered
owner is the lawful operator in so far as the public is concerned. Consequently, it
is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation.
In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the
actual operator and employer is being considered merely as its agent. The same
principle applies even if the registered owner of the vehicle does not use it for public
service.
In this case, since Equitable remained the registered owner of the vehicle, it
could not escape its primary liability for the death and injuries arising from the
negligence of the driver.

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so thatif any accident
happens or any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle, responsibility can be fixed on
a definite individual, the registered owner.