Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179652

March 6, 2012

PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.), Petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and JANDELEON JUEZAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS : Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). for illegal deduction, nonpayment of service
incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of
benefits, delayed payment of wages and noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth. The
DOLE Regional Director found that private respondent was an employee of petitioner,
and was entitled to his money claims.
When the matter was brought before the CA, where petitioner (Bombo Radyo) claimed
that it had been denied due process, it was held that petitioner was accorded due
process as it had been given the opportunity to be heard, and that the DOLE Secretary
had jurisdiction over the matter.
In the Decision of this Court, the CA Decision was reversed and set aside, and the
complaint against petitioner was dismissed. The National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) was held to be the primary agency in determining the existence of an employeremployee relationship. This was the interpretation of the Court of the clause "in cases where
the relationship of employer-employee still exists" in Art. 128(b).
From this Decision, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification of
Decision (with Leave of Court). The PAO sought to clarify as to when the visitorial and
enforcement power of the DOLE be not considered as co-extensive with the power to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship
ISSUE: Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, it is clear and beyond
debate that an employer-employee relationship must exist for the exercise of the visitorial and

enforcement power of the DOLE. The question now arises, may the DOLE make a
determination of whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and if so, to what
extent?
HELD: The previous conclusion must be revisited. No limitation in the law was placed upon
the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary finding, that
the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE would first
seek the NLRCs determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, or
that should the existence of the employer-employee relationship be disputed, the DOLE
would refer the matter to the NLRC.
The DOLE, in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, has a
ready set of guidelines to follow, the same guide the courts themselves use. The
elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the selection
and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4)
the employers power to control the employees conduct.9 The use of this test is not
solely limited to the NLRC
Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to
make a determination as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship in the exercise
of its visitorial and enforcement power, subject to judicial review, not review by the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 179652 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that in the exercise of the DOLEs visitorial and enforcement power, the Labor
Secretary or the latters authorized representative shall have the power to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, to the exclusion of the NLRC.

Paul V. Santiago vs. CF Sharp Crew ManagementGR 162419 July 10, 2007Tinga, j.:

Facts: Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent)
for about five (5) years. He signed a new contract of employment with the duration of 9 months
on Feb 3 1998 and he was to be deployed 10days after. This contract was approved by POEA. A
week before the date of departure, the respondent received a phone

call from petitioners wife and some unknown callers asking not to send the latter off because if
allowed, he will jump ship in Canada like his brother Christopher Santiago, who jumped ship
from the C.S. Nexus in Kita-Kyushu, Japan last December, 1997.Because of the said
information, petitioner was told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore. This
prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent. The LA held the
latter responsible. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and respondent, hence, the
claims should be dismissed. The CA agreed with the NLRCs finding that since petitioner
had not departed from the Port
of Manila, no employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any claim for
damages against the so-called employer could have no leg to stand on.

Issue: When does the employer-employee relationship involving seafarers commence?

Held/Ratio: A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and
the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract,
which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and
respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions
therein. The commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would
have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before
the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the
employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may
give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is
the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
Respondents act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding "MSV
Seaspread"
constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioners cause of action. Respondent
unilaterally and unreasonably
reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages
he suffered.

PERT/CPM v. Vinuya, G.R. No. 197528, Sept. 5, 2012

FACTS: Respondents were contracted by the agency for deployment to work as aluminum
fabricator/installer in Modern Metal in Dubai, UAE. The contract was for 2 years, approved by
POEA, providing 9 working hours a day, a salary of 1,350 AED with overtime pay, food
allowance, free and suitable housing, free transportation, free laundry, free medical and dental
services. However, in Dubai, Modern Metals gave them appointment letters with terms different
from those they signed in the Philippines increasing their employment terms, reducing
salaries, allowances, and benefits. The working conditions were also not as promised. They
complained to their agency but to no avail. Due to unbearable living and working condition,
they resigned from their job and indicated personal/family problems as their reasons. (except
for Era who mentioned real reason). On March 15, 2008, respondents file a complaint for illegal
dismissal against PERT CPM. They agency alleged that they were not illegally dismissed
because they resigned voluntarily. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint finding that they
voluntarily resigned. Respondents appealed to NLRC which reversed the decision of Labor
Arbiter. NLRC pointed out that signing of different contract in Dubai is illegal. NLRC ordered
the payment of agency to pay the salary, placement fee, and exemplary damages to
respondents. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by NLRC, but
modified their judgment adjusting the awards, particularly their salaries, in light of courts
ruling in Serrano striking down the clause in Sec 10, par 5, RA 8042 which limits the
entitlement of illegally dismissed OFW. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and questioned the
applicability of Serrano ruling. This was denied. CA upheld NLRCs decision.

ISSUE: W/N RA 10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010, restoring the subject clause in
Sec 10 of RA 8042 being amendatory in nature can be applied retroactively

HELD: No. Amendment introduced by RA 10022 cant be given retroactive application because
it will result in an impairment of right that had accrued to the respondents by virtue of
Serrano ruling

Case Digest: Romero v. People

G.R. No. 171644: November 23, 2011
DELIA D. ROMERO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ROMULO
PADLAN and ARTURO SIAPNO,Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in September 2000 Romulo went to petitioner's stall to inquire about
securing a job in Israel. Convinced by petitioner's words of encouragement and
inspired by the potential salary of US$700.00 to US$1,200.00 a month, Romulo
asked petitioner the amount of money required in order for him to be able to go to
Israel. Petitioner informed him that as soon as he could give her US$3,600.00, his
papers would be immediately processed.
Petitioner contacted Jonney Erez Mokra who instructed Romulo to attend a briefing
at his (Jonney's) house in Dau,Mabalacat, Pampanga. Romulo was able to leave for
Israel on October 26, 2000 and was able to secure a job. Unfortunately, after two
and a half months, he was caught by Israel's immigration police, detained, and then
deported.
On the other hand, private respondent Arturo Siapno is petitioner's nephew. He
suffered the same fate as Romulos.
Arturo, after learning that his story was similar to Romulos checked with the DOLE
whether petitioner, Teresita D.Visperas and Jonney Erez Mokra had any license or
authority to recruit employees for overseas employment. Finding that petitioner and
the others were not authorized to recruit for overseas employment, Arturo and
Romulo filed a complaint before the NBI. Consequently, an Information was filed
against petitioner and Jonney Erez Mokra for the crime of Illegal Recruitment which
reads as follows:
Upon arraignment on, petitioner, with the assistance of her counsel pleaded not
guilty, whereas accused Jonney ErezMokra was and is still at-large.
The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of its decision
reads as follows:
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition after petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
by the CA. Petitioner enumerates the following assignment of errors:
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of the accused based merely on
a certification from the DOLE-Dagupan District Office without said certification being
properly identified and testified thereto,

(2) Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of the accused in interpreting
the gesture of good faith of the petitioner as referral in the guise of illegal
recruitment.
HELD: Petition denied
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, TWO ELEMENTS
The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1)
the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes
either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under
Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code.
CREATION OF POEA DID NOT DIVEST SECRETARY OF LABOR OF HIS
JURISDICTION OVER RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT ACTIVITIES
Petitioner claims that the prosecution committed a procedural lapse in not procuring
a certification from the agency primarily involved, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). The said argument, however, is flawed. A nonlicensee or non-holder of authority is any person, corporation or entity which has not
been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by
the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked
or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. Clearly, the creation of the POEA did not
divest the Secretary of Labor of his/her jurisdiction over recruitment and placement
of activities.
ACTS OF PETITIONER CONSTITUTE REFERRAL UNDER ART. 13 (B) OF THE
LABOR CODE
Petitioner insists that the CA was wrong in affirming the factual findings of the trial
court. According to her, the accommodation extended by the petitioner to the private
respondents is far from the referral as contemplated in Article 13 (b) of the Labor
Code. Nevertheless, the testimonies of the private respondents clearly establish the
fact that petitioner's conduct falls within the term recruitment as defined by law. As
testified by Romulo Padlan, petitioner convinced him and Arturo Siapno to give her
US$3,600.00 for the processing of their papers. Thus, it is apparent that petitioner
was able to convince the private respondents to apply for work in Israel after parting
with their money in exchange for the services she would render.
ABSENCE OF RECEIPTS, NOT FATAL
The Court has already ruled that the absence of receipts in a case for illegal
recruitment is not fatal, as long as the prosecution is able to establish through

credible testimonial evidence that accused-appellant has engaged in illegal

recruitment. Such case is made, not by the issuance or the signing of receipts for
placement fees, but by engagement in recruitment activities without the necessary
license or authority.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs Torres Case Digest

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D.
TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO,
as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]

FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic
helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order DOLE, through the POEA took
over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers.

The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly
licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment
for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and
to prohibit implementation.

ISSUES:
1.
whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their
rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
2.
whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are
unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3.
whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied with.
HELD: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities, to wit:

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate
the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of
Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules
and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.

SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is

constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society.

THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the
lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required
in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;

Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:

Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged
with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the
necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective
fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation;

and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:

Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three
(3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against
any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)

Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent
with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger
to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement
accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules

known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987).

Prohibition granted.

People v. Maceren (1977)

Doctrine:The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that
subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.

FACTS:
1. In 1969, Buenaventura et. al were caught electro fishing in the waters of barrio San Pablo Norte,
Sta. Cruz. They were charged with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
2. Municipal court quashed the complaint. CFI affirmed dismissal. Case came to SC on appeal by the
prosecution under RA 5440.
3. Said law penalizes: (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2)
unlawful fishing in deep-sea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of
sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6)
other violations.
4. As a defense, they argued that the law only contemplated the use of any obnoxious or poisonous
substance in fishing, and that use of an electric current was not punishable under it. (6) Other
violations, was construed by the SC to only be acts analogous to the five preceding it).
a. Fisheries Law does not expressly punish electro fishing. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources Fisheries promulgated AO 84, which expressly prohibited electro fishing
in all Philippine waters.
b. This provision was later amended by Fisheries AO 87, which limited the regulation to fresh
water fisheries. Buenaventura et. al. now contest the validity of said orders.
ISSUE: WON the Fisheries Administrative Order 84 was within authority of Secretary to promulgate
(NO)

RATIO:
NO, the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources cannot penalize
it. The AOs are devoid of legal basis.

The rule is that law-making bodies cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare
what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself, in consideration of the fact that the
legislature cannot be expected to contemplate all possible details and scenarios.
However, these rules cannot extend the law to include something it clearly does not contemplate.
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said

law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law
In RA 5440, electric fishing was not one of the penalized acts. In fact, an amendatory law PD 704
(promulgated 1975) would later include electric fishing as a punishable act. This was held to
demonstrate that RA 5440 was deficient in that it failed to contemplate that mode of fishing.
AO 84 in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the
category of other violations because the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to
the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, and is not the same as
the penalty for other violations of the law and regulations fixed in the Fisheries Law.
While there is no questioning the authority of the Secretary to promulgate the orders, since this is
clearly established in Sec. 4 of the Fisheries Law, it is apparent that he exceeded his authority in
promulgating FAO 84.
UST v. Board of Tax Appeals: The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
The case of State v Miles offers a similar situation where a person was charged with displaying
game (a deer), but the law only penalized taking game. The doctrine was that in a prosecution for
a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within
the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be
scrutinized with special care.
Since the Department Head exercise the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body,
it is a requisite that he should NOT transcend the bounds demarcated by the statute for the
exercise of such power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.

DISPOSITIVE: Case dismissed

Ramos et. al vs. Central Bank of the Philippines G.R. No.

L-29352, October 4, 1971
MARCH 16, 2014LEAVE A COMMENT

Central Bank, by promising to rehabilitate the bank, is estopped from

closing it down. The conduct of the Central Bank reveals a calculated
attempt to evade rehabilitating OBM despite its promises. Hence,
respondent Central Bank of the Philippines is directed to comply with it
obligations under the voting trust agreement, and to desist from
taking action in violation thereof.
Facts:

The Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) is a commercial banking

corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with
principal office at Rosario Street, Manila. Ramos et. al are the majority and

controlling stockholders of Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM). Pursuant to a

resolution from the Central Bank and the Monetary Board, the operation of for
various violations of the banking laws and implementing regulations. Because
the financial situation of the OBM had caused mounting concern in the Central
Bank, petitioner Ramos and the OBM management met with respondent Central
Bank on the necessity and urgency of rehabilitating the OBM through the
extension of necessary financial assistance.
In lieu thereof, the Monetary Board issued another resolution dated April, 1967
demanding the stockholders to mortgage their properties or assign the same to
the Central Bank and to execute a voting trust agreement whereby they will
pass the management to Philippine National Bank in order to stave of
liquidation. Hence, Ramos et. al executed the voting trust agreement prepared
by Central Bank with petitioners as cestuis que trust and Central Banks
Superintendent of Banks as the Trustee. Petitioners likewise conveyed by way of
mortgage to the Central Bank all their private properties and holdings to secure
the obligations of the OBM to the Central Bank. Accordingly, new directors and
officers were elected and installed and they took over the management and
control of the Overseas bank..
However, after 8 months, the Central Bank did not make any positive action to
reorganize and resume OBMs normal operations. Instead, Central Bank issued a
resolution excluding OBM from clearing with it and authorizing the nominee
board of directors to suspend operations. Worse, Central Bank Monetary Board
issued a resolution ordering the liquidation the bank. Hence this petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain respondent Central Bank of the Philippines
from enforcing and implementing the Monetary Board Resolutions. Petitioners
charged that the OBM became financially distressed because of this suspension
and the deprivation by the Central Bank of all the usual credit facilities and
accommodations accorded to the other banks. Central Bank contended that to
assail Resolution of the Monetary Board ordering the liquidation of the Overseas
Bank, an action must be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the Bank
itself, and not by petitioning stockholders

Issue:

Whether or not the CB had agreed to rehabilitate, normalize and

stabilize OBM and whether or not the Central Bank resolutions were adopted in
abuse of discretion.
Held:

If jurisdiction was already acquired ito delve into the validity of

Resolutions 1263 and 1290 (and this the Central Bank admits), there is no
cogent reason why, after such jurisdiction had been acquired, the Court should
be deprived thereof by the subsequent adoption of Resolution 1333, particularly
because the latter, in relation to the antecedent facts, appears to be no more
than a deliberate effort to evade the jurisdiction of this Court, and have the case
thrown back to the Court of First Instance. The Central Bank, by promising to
rehabilitate the bank, is estopped from closing it down. The conduct of the
Central Bank reveals a calculated attempt to evade rehabilitating OBM despite
its promises. Hence, respondent Central Bank of the Philippines is directed to
comply with it obligations under the voting trust agreement, and to desist from
taking action in violation thereof.
The Central Bank made express representations to petitioners herein that it
would support the OBM, and avoid its liquidation if the petitioners would execute
(a) the voting trust agreement turning over the management of OBM to the
Central Bank or its nominees, and (b) mortgage or assign their properties to the
Central Bank to cover the overdraft balance of OBM. The petitioners having
complied with these conditions and parted with value to the profit of the CB
(which thus acquired additional security for its own advances), the Central Bank
may not now renege on its representations and liquidate the OBM, to the
detriment of its stockholders, depositors and other creditors, under the rule of
promissory estoppel.

PLACEWELL INTERNATIONAL SERVICES CORP. vs. CAMOTE Case Digest

PLACEWELL INTERNATIONAL SERVICES CORP. vs. CAMOTE
G.R. No. 169973, June 26, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner Placewell International Services Corporation (PISC) deployed respondent Ireneo
B. Camote to work as building carpenter for SAAD Trading and Contracting Co. (SAAD) at the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) for a contract duration of two years, with a corresponding salary of
US$370.00 per month. At the job site, respondent was allegedly found incompetent by his foreign

employer; thus the latter decided to terminate his services. However, respondent pleaded for his
retention and consented to accept a lower salary of SR 800.00 per month. Thus, SAAD retained
respondent until his return to the Philippines two years after.
On November 27, 2001, respondent filed a sworn Complaint for monetary claims against petitioner
alleging that when he arrived at the job site, he and his fellow Filipino workers were required to sign
another employment contract written in Arabic under the constraints of losing their jobs if they
refused; that for the entire duration of the new contract, he received only SR 590.00 per month; that
he was not given his overtime pay despite rendering nine hours of work everyday; that he and his
co-workers sought assistance from the Philippine Embassy but they did not succeed in pursuing
their cause of action because of difficulties in communication.
ISSUE: Whether there is estoppel by laches
HELD: R.A. No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker,
of employment contracts already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the
period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE. The subsequently executed
side agreement of an overseas contract worker with her foreign employer which reduced her salary
below the amount approved by the POEA is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and
public policy. The said side agreement cannot supersede her standard employment contract
approved by the POEA.
Petitioners contention that respondent is guilty of laches is without basis. Laches has been defined
as the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or
declined to assert it. Thus, the doctrine of laches presumes that the party guilty of negligence had
the opportunity to do what should have been done, but failed to do so. Conversely, if the said party
did not have the occasion to assert the right, then, he can not be adjudged guilty of laches. Laches is
not concerned with the mere lapse of time; rather, the party must have been afforded an opportunity
to pursue his claim in order that the delay may sufficiently constitute laches.
In the instant case, respondent filed his claim within the three-year prescriptive period for the filing of
money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code from the time the cause of action accrued.
Thus, we find that the doctrine of laches finds no application in this case.

Seagull Maritime Corp. vs Balatongan, NLRC & POEA

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case
cited. Xie xie!
G.R. No. 82252 February 28, 1989 (PROHIBITED PRACTICES)
SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. AND PHILIMARE SHIPPING & EQUIPMENT SUPPLY, petitioners
vs.
NERRY D. BALATONGAN, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE

OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

Facts:
On November 2, 1982, a "crew Agreement" was entered into by private respondent Nerry D.
Balatongan and Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply (hereinafter called Philimare)
whereby the latter employed the former as able seaman on board its vessel "Santa Cruz"
(renamed "Turtle Bay") with a monthly salary of US $ 300.00. Said agreement was processed
and approved by the National Seaman's Board (NSB) on November 3, 1982.
While on board said vessel and parties entered into a supplementary contract of employment
on December 6, 1982 which provides among others: (1) The employer shall be obliged to insure
the employee during his engagement against death or permanent invalidity caused by accident
on board up to US $ 40,000 - for death caused by accident and US $ 50,000 - for permanent
total disability caused by accident.
On October 6, 1983 Balatongan met an accident in the Suez Canal, Egypt as a result of which
he was hospitalized at the Suez Canal Authority Hospital. Later, he was repatriated to the
Philippines and was hospitalized at the Makati Medical Center from October 23, 1983 to March
27, 1984. On August 19, 1985 the medical certificate was issued describing his disability as
"permanent in nature."
Balatongan demanded payment for his claim for total disability insurance in the amount of US
$ 50,000.00 as provided for in the contract of employment but his claim was denied for having
been submitted to the insurers beyond the designated period for doing so.
Thus, Balatongan filed on June 21, 1985 a complaint against Philimare and Seagull Maritime
Corporation in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for non-payment of
his claim for permanent total disability with damages and attorney's fees.
After the parties submitted their respective position papers with the corresponding
documentary evidence, the officer-in-charge of the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office
of the POEA rendered for respondents to pay complainant the amount of US $ 50,000.00
representing permanent total disability insurance and attorney's fees at 10% of the award.
Payment should be made in this Office within ten (10) days from receipt hereof at the prevailing
rate of exchange. This Office cannot however rule on damages, having no jurisdiction on the
matter.
Seagull and Philimare appealed said decision to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) on June 4, 1986. Hence, Seagull and Philimare filed this petition for certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

Issue:
W/N the supplementary contract of employment entered into between petitioners and
respondent is a prohibited practice to afford greater benefits to the employee
Held:
This Court is not a trier of facts and the findings of the public respondents are conclusive in
this proceeding. Public respondents found that petitioner Philimare and private respondent
entered into said supplementary contract of employment on December 6, 1982. Assuming for
the sake of argument that it was petitioners' principal which entered into said contract with
private respondent, nevertheless petitioner, as its manning agent in the Philippines, is jointly
responsible with its principal thereunder.
The Court finds that the respondent NLRC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners, motion for leave to file third-party complaint and substitution inclusion of
party respondent. Such motion is largely addressed to the discretion of the said Commission.
Inasmuch as the alleged transfer of interest took place only after the POEA had rendered its
decision, the denial of the motion so as to avoid further delay in the settlement of the claim of
private respondent was well-taken. At any rate, petitioners may pursue their claim against their
alleged successor-in-interest in a separate suit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on March 21, 1988 is hereby LIFTED. No costs. This
decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.