George S. Claghorn - Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Timaeus (1954)

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S 'TIMAEUS'
TO MY FATHER AND MOTHER
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM
OF PLATO'S 'TIMAEUS'
BY
GEORGES.CLAGHORN
THE HAGUE
MARTINUS NljHOFF
1954
ISBN-13: 978-94-011-8190-7
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-011-8839-5
e-ISBN-13: 978-94-011-8839-5
Copyright I954 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It has indeed been a privilege for me to receive, throughout
the preparation of this study, the sound criticism and sagacious
counsel of Professor Glenn R. Morrow, of the University of
Pennsylvania. The attainment of his high standards is the goal
for which I have striven; if in any respects I have fallen short,
the responsibility is fully mine. Dr. Morrow's kindness has been
unfailing. His clear insight into the subtleties of Greek thought
has been a continuing challenge and inspiration. To him, therefore,
I offer my deepest appreciation.
Professor Francis P. Clarke and Professor Paul Schrecker, also
of the Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania,
carefully perused the manuscript and made many helpful
suggestions. Others - professors, students, and friends - have
generously shared in this work, by stimulating my thinking and
by lending practical assistance. With cheerful efficiency, Mrs.
Bernard Liedman typed the manuscript, Jack Lottey checked
the proofs, and Anthony J. Mattes prepared the indexes. To one
and all, I extend my sincere gratitude.
The following publishers have kindly granted permission to
quote from their books: Harvard University Press (from The
Loeb Classical Library: Plato, Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon,
Menexenus, Epistles, tr. by R. G. Bury; Diogenes Laertius,
Lives and Opinions 0/ the Philosophers, tr. by R. D. Hicks).
Oxford University Press, Inc. (from The Works 0/ Aristotle
Translated into English, ed. by W. D. Ross; and The Works 0/
Plato, tr. by Benjamin Jowett). Random House, Inc. (from The
Complete Greek Drama, ed. by Oates and O'Neill). Whenever a
quotation is made in the present work, the source is given.
This study is sent forth in the hope that it may contribute to a
better understanding of both the natural science and the general
thought of Plato and Aristotle.
St. Davids, Pa., U. S. A.

May IS, 1954
G.S.C.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION
The Problem . . . . . . . .
The Importance of the Timaeus
Modern scholarship and the relation of Aristotle to
Plato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chronology to be used . . . . . . . . . .
Sources and method of examining them. . .
II.
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE RECEPTACLE
Plato's 'Receptacle'; Aristotle's 'matter' . .

Identification of the two by means of the gold analogy
Other similarities between the two
Both are Non-being . . .
Both are unintelligible. .
Both are full of potencies
Both are infinite . . . .
Both are Great and Small.
Both are extended
Not empty space (the void)
Space as contained and container
Summary of the chapter . . . .
III.
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE SIMPLE BODIES.
History of the term 'Element'

Plato's view of the simple bodies.
The four earthly bodies. . .
Construction of plane-figures .
Meaning of plane-figures . . .
Aristotle's view of the elements
Plato and Aristotle on the meaning and value of
mathematical analysis
..........
Aristotle's criticisms of planes and plane-figures .
Summary of the chapter . . . . . . . . . . .
I
I
I
3
4
5
5
7
9
9
10
I I
II
12
13
14
15
18
20
20
22
22
23
26
27
28
31
36
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IV. ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF QUALITIES
Definition of 'quality'
. .
Plato's treatment of qualities
Aristotle's treatment of qualities.
General criticisms of Plato's views
The problem of w e i g h t .
Aristotle's doctrine (natural places, absolute directions, weight).
.
Plato's doctrine (natural places, relative directions,
weight).
Aristotle's criticisms of weight.
.
Summary of the chapter
.
V. ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF MOTION
Motions and their causes (Plato)
Motions and their causes (Aristotle)
The motion of the earth in the Timaeus
c:LMO!J.SV'Y)V and its support.
tMO!J.SV'Y)V and its support
.
.
The position of the earth, a related question
Possible interpretations
The earth at rest
.
The earth in motion (kinds)
VI. ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF TIME
'Time' in the Timaeus
'Time' in Aristotle
Aristotle's criticisms
Similarities between the two views
The problem of whether Time began
VII. ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF SOUL
The intermediate character of myth
Mythical nature of the Timaeus
Value of myth
The problem of soul.
Plato's general view of soul
Living Creature and World-soul
Human soul
39
39
39
45
47
50
50
51
52
58
60
60
65
71
71
73
78
79
79
79
82
84
84
86
88
90
92
97
99
99
100
100
101
101
102
105
TABLE OF CONTENTS
VIII.
Xl
Aristotle's general view of soul . .

Aristotle's criticisms of soul
World-soul and the Unmoved Mover
World-soul and God
God as Demiurge . . . . . . . . .
God as Cause . . . . . . . . . .
II2
II4
II7
II8
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF 'NATURE' .
121
'Nature' to the Pre-Socratics

'Nature' to Plato . . . . .
'Nature' to Aristotle
Teleology in Plato's doctrine
In Aristotle's . . . . . .
Plato, Aristotle, and their predecessors
Plato and Aristotle compared on doctrines
Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHY
121
122
125
127
129
II3
133
135
137
INDEX OF PASSAGES IN ARISTOTLE AND PLATO.

GENERAL INDEX
106
loB
141
146
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to determine Aristotle's attitude
toward the content and method of Plato's natural science.
Plato and Aristotle have often been regarded as on opposite
sides of a philosophic 'Great Divide'. On the other hand, those
who have found that the two men were in agreement have
sometimes mentioned only scattered instances of that agreement.
There is need for a new comparison of the two philosophers one which is limited in scope, based on the primary texts, and
which is systematic and thorough in method. If successful, such a
comparison would bring into sharp focus one phase of Aristotle's
comments on Plato. Our attempt to meet this need is Aristotle's
Criticism of Plato's TIMAEUS. In pursuing this study, it has been
necessary to reject a number of uncritically-accepted interpretations of the Timaeus. Contrary to the view of many, we have
concluded that Aristotle largely agreed with Plato, both in the
principles and presuppositions of his natural science.
A number of implications stem from this study. There is, for
example, the oft-questioned manner in which Aristotle treated
Plato's philosophy. In the great majority of instances, Aristotle
stands forth as a reliable reporter and a skilled critic. Moreover,
the study sheds light on that ancient riddle: whether Plato and
Aristotle are basically akin or at odds in their general philosophies.
Finally, it is hoped that this study may provide useful suggestions
for the evaluation of commentaries on the Timaeus, and for the
appraisal of the various schools of interpretation which they
represent.
The Timaeus is a significant dialogue to use as a basis for comparing viewpoints. It is the only dialogue of Plato completely
devoted to what we call 'natural science'. And it is the Platonic
dialogue to which Aristotle refers more often than any other.
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS
Moreover, the place of the Timaeus is secure in the mainstream of

Western thought. Throughout antiquity, it was regarded on all
sides as a key dialogue for the understanding of Plato's philosophy. Chalcidius, in the fourth century A. D., and Proclus, in the
fifth, wrote commentaries on the Timaeus. The references in
Proc1us are sufficient to show that the dialogue had been expounded, in whole or in part, by interpreters of every age, from
that of Crantor to that of Proclus himself, including all the
Neo-Platonic luminaries 1.
During the middle ages, the influence of the Timaeus became
even more pervasive. The dialogue had been made available
chiefly through the works of Chalcidius, Boethius' Consolations,
and Macrobius' exposition of Cicero's Somnium Scipionis 2. But
the Greek Fathers, imbued with its spirit and phrases, lent it
further prestige. For many centuries, it was not only the chief
source of Platonism, but of philosophy itself 3. It was easily one
of the most widely read and circulated books of the medieval
era 4. With the publication of the Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi,
now under way, the influence of the Timaeus on medieval philosophy will become increasingly more evident.
Fre~~. enthusiasm for the work was generated by the revolt
against Aristotle. The high regard in which it was held by Renaissance spirits is symbolized in Raphael's great fresco, 'The School
of Athens', where Plato is shown with a copy of the Timaeus in
his hand. A book of such importance deserves the most careful
consideration.
The history of scholarship has been checkered with those who
thought that Plato or Aristotle, as the case might be, had the
deeper philosophic insight. But seldom have the two men been
put in more radical, systematic opposition to each other than
by a group of nineteenth century Germa.n critics 5. Some took
the position that Aristotle willfully caricatured Plato's thought.
Others more charitably, perhaps, regarded him as simply ignorant
of its true intent. It is difficult to believe that either Plato or
1
Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford, 1928), pp. 1-2.
Ibid., p.
2.
Shorey, 'The Interpretation of the Timaeus', in A. J. P.; IX, 4; 407.

Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages
(London, 1939),PP. 14,27-8, 30-1,33-4.
Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore, 1944), I, ix, x.
INTRODUCTION
Aristotle has benefited from these attempts to magnify their

differences. Indeed, they run counter to the very old tradition
that the theories of Plato and Aristotle are in harmony 6.
Beyond all the contradictions and conflicts attributed to
Plato a generation ago, Paul Shorey rediscovered the basic
unity of his thought. The relationship of Aristotle to Plato needs
to be re-examined in the same way. Too often in the past,
contradictions have been sought where they did not really exist.
What is needed now is recourse to the texts themselves to find
out what is actually meant. In following such a procedure in
this study, a large measure of harmony was found to exist between
the two philosophers. Where they appear to differ, this is often
due to the mode of investigation or exposition, rather than to an
actual difference of conclusions. Findings of this work, therefore,
are at variance with some of the critical theories.
The works of Aristotle are usually divided into three main
groups, corresponding to the stages of his career. The first was
when he was in the Academy during the old age of Plato, the
second was his period of wandering (347-335) to Assos, Mitylene,
and Macedonia, and the third was his time of greatest activity
and maturity during his second sojourn in Athens. Many principles have been employed in assigning dates to the treatises, e.g.,
that Aristotle originally agreed with Plato, but eventually became estranged to his teacher's doctrines. One which has attracted
wide interest in our day is that of F. J. Nuyens, who finds a development in Aristotle's psychological theory. According to
this view, Aristotle had first a dualistic, Platonistic view of soul
and body; then a more biological concept of the soul; and finally,
while regarding it as the entelechy of the body, he came to the
belief that Nous was imperishable 7.
On the basis of Nuyens' principle, the following treatises are
classified as early: The Categories, ToPics, On Philosophy, Protrepticus, all of the physical writings (De Caeto, De Generatione et
Corruptione, Physics - except Book VIII), the Meteorologies, and
Metaphysics (Books A, B, K, M - 9, and ro - ro86azI to end,
and N) 8. To the second period belong: De Interpretatione,
Klibansky, op. cit., p. 40.
Nuyens, L'Evolutian de la Psychologie d'Aristote (Louvain, 1948) pp. 57-9.
Ibid., pp. 107, II6-8, 123, 100, 172, 175, 194.
1
Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, History of Animals, Parts of

Animals, De Incessu, De Motu, some of the Parva Naturalia (De
Juventate et Senectute, Vita et Morte, De Respiratione), the Eudemian Ethics, and the Nicomachean Ethics 9. The last period
includes: De Anima, De Longitudinae et Brevitate Vitae, the first
five treatises of the Parva Naturalia, De Generatione Animalium,
and the Metaphysics (Books M - I , to line I086a2o of 9, E, Z, H,
0, A) 10. Though other commentators differ with this chronology on
some points - notably on the placing of De Anima, Book Lambda of the Metaphysics, and the Eudemian Ethics - many of them
agree with much of it 11. Without pronouncing on his psychological views, therefore, we accept Nuyens' chronology as a plausible
one. We shall follow it throughout the present study.
The plan to be employed is primarily inductive, dealing with
the refences of Aristotle to the Timaeus which are listed in Bonitz'
Index Aristotelicus 12. However, references solely of aphysiological and biological nature will not be introduced, except as they
bear on the larger philosophical issues. After determining the
meaning of Aristotle's criticism in the light of its context, we
must see if he correctly reports the teaching of the Timaeus in the
given case. Next, we must ask whether it is a valid criticism, and
why. On the basis of this survey, we shall endeavor to draw
conclusions as to whether Aristotle properly understood Plato,
and the purpose toward which his criticisms led.
Ibid., pp. IIO-II3, 148, 167, 170-171, 189-93, 197.

,. Ibid., pp. 16, 170, 171, 172-3, 175 f., 182-4.
11 Cf. Jaeger, Aristotle (Oxford, 1948), pp. 369, 125, 307 n., 299, 306, 204, 208-10,
197
12 Berlin, 1870, 596a 60-bI9.
CHAPTER II

One of the most bewildering - and fascinating - doctrines of
Plato is his teaching concerning the Receptacle. Exactly what is
this mysterious entity? It is everywhere and nowhere; it is seen
in all things, but is not fully contained in anything. It is indispensable for constituting the universe, yet of itself unable to bring
into existence the smallest part of it. Flashes of fire, traces of
liquid, and various other qualities constantly come and go,
leaving the Receptacle unaltered in any respect. It may well be
described as the scene of tumultuous, disorderly flux (Tim. sobc,
szde). Aristotle declares that it is like a substrate, free from
form or shape, and thus best for modelling (De Caelo 306bI7-19;
d. Tim. SIa) 1. In short, the Receptacle would scarcely seem to
be a promising candidate for the basic material from which all
things are made.
Yet this Receptacle is one of the three fundamental factors by
which Plato in the Timaeus accounts for the physical world. It is
that in which the model realizes its image (sza-d), the medium in
which things come to be, as distinguished both from true realities
(ideas) and things themselves (copies). (socd, SIa.) Since this
Receptacle 2 is capable of receiving the nature of anything in
order to engender offspring, it is properly designated the matrix
or nurse of all Becoming, the mother of all it contains 3. Other
terms used to describe it are 'place' (-r61CO<;, sza), 'space' (XWPot,
sza), 'seat' (~~pot, szb), and 'recipient' ({)1CO~OX~, 49a). It is referred
1 All quotations of Aristotle in English translation will be from the Oxford editions;
those of Plato, from the Loeb editions. References to the Greek text of both men will
be that of the Loeb editions, unless otherwise noted.
All other references throughout the study which do not cite the name of some work
refer to the Timaeus.
7j 8&xo(l.&v1), ij 8E~a.(l.&v1) 50b , 52d, 53a; TO 8&X6(l.EVOV, 50d; 8exEa6lXt, 50a.
(l.7rt"Pa., matrix, womb, 50d, 5Ia; Tt6TjVl], nurse, 52d, 49a.
to otherwise by Aristotle as l'e't'cxA1)1t't'n(6v or l'e6ex't'tx6v terms

never employed by Plato, but which nevertheless fairly render
his meaning (Phys. 209b 12-14, 35-2IOa2) '.
Aristotle's doctrine of matter should also be kept in mind by
one who wishes to examine his criticisms of the Receptacle.
Aristotle held that change was always between two contraries
(Phys. I88b22-3). The Pre-Socratics were right in recognizing
contraries, though they did not understand their proper basis
(phys. I88aI9-26, b33-I89a2). Actually, there is a basis which
underlies and is inseparable from these contraries and out of
which they come into being, just as the bronze is the basis both
of the shapeless mass and of the finished statue (De Gen. et Corr.
329a30-3; Phys. I90az5-6, bI5-I7; I9Ia6-IZ). Though a thing
will come to be, prime matter does not come-to-be; for, as the
potentiality for receiving forms, it must be eternal (Phys. I9zaz69). When the form is not realized we have a state of privation
(cr't'ep1Jcrtt;); when it is realized, we have the object as known to us
(Phys. 19za 3-],26-34). Since the material is relative to the form,
it should be plain that each object has its own substrate. In the
case of perceptible objects, it is never found apart from them in a
separate existence of its own. (Cf. Phys. 194b9; I92b32-34; De
Gen. et Corr. 329a24-7.) Aristotle summarizes his own view as
follows:
For my definition of matter is just this - the primary substratum of each thing from which it comes to be without qualifica)
tion, and which persists in the result.
(Phys. I92a32-3
Now it soon becomes apparent that Aristotle thought tha~
Plato's view of matter was the same as his own. He speaks 0
'the Nurse (i.e. the primary matter), (De Gen. et Corr. 329a23)'
and states twice that matter is mentioned in the Timaeus (Phys'
2IoaI-2, 209bII-2). But Aristotle's term for matter (()A1J) is not
used even once by Plato in that sense. To Plato it had only
the more common meaning of wood, earth, or specific type of
stuff 5. While these statements of Aristotle do not conform to the
letter of the Platonic texts, it will be interesting to plumb deeper
Ross, Aristotle's Physics (Oxford, 1936), pp. 565-6.
6 Zeller, Plato (London, 1888), p. 296 n. 9; cf. Ast, Lexicon Platonicum, III, 432-3,
and Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London, 1937), p. 181. Conversely, of Aristotle, see
Rivaud, Le probleme du devenir ... (Paris, 1906), p. 306.
to determine whether they are valid in spirit and basic intention.

One of the well-known sections of the Timaeus is the gold
analogy, in which Plato explains something of the nature of the
Receptacle (49d-soc). Suppose, he says, that a man was molding
figures out of gold, and that he continually took each of them and
remolded it into another figure, and so on. One could scarcely
point to one figure and say with finality what it 'is', for it differs
both from what it just was and from what it is soon to be. That
is, unless one wants to say that it is 'gold', which would be the
safe course. In the same way, Plato concludes, one must apply
the term 'this' only to the Receptacle. While the figures change,
it forever retains the same character.
This is somewhat of a paradox, because the Receptacle is
subject to perpetual modification. But this is its very nature: to
be that in which the new is brought forth and the old is abolished,
to be the unlimited source of change, and yet to be free from any
quality that appears in it (sode). One may truly say of the Receptacle, 'The more it changes, the more it remains the same' 6.
In addition to describing the character of the Receptacle,
Plato explains its relation to specific things. Six times he repeats
that things are made in it (4ge, soc-e, S2ab). The implication is
that the Receptacle is more comprehensive than any given thing
or any aggregation of them. (Cf. sobc.) Plato makes clear that it is
not to be identified with any body or constituent of them. It is
separate from the 'elements' (SIa), from the heavens (S2d), and
from specific characteristics (soe). Strictly speaking, the forms
are never in it; only copies of them are (soc-e, SIe-S2a).
Plato wanted to avoid the impression, no doubt, that particular
bodies were made 'out of' the Receptacle as a pitcher is made out
of a lump of clay. He probably wanted to avoid identifying it
with the a.PlOC( of the Pre-Socratic philosophers, as much as with
any physical body or tangible quality of his own choosing. Yet he
could not avoid using the term 'out of' in the gold analogy
(ex lpUGOU, soa). He immediately qualifies this by stating that in
the Receptacle itself, the figures, which turn out to be bodies,
'enter and depart' (Soc). Although no analogy can be expected to
walk on all fours, Plato may well have permitted this, to convey
Cf. 50bc: /;)( ya.p T'ijt; ~or,uT'ijt; ,,0 mxpcbtor,v OU)(
,, ya.p &.:1. Ta. 1tcXVTor,. x." .A.
t~(Tt'or,,,or,~
3uvcX(.Lrot; 3e)("or,(
the impression that the Receptacle is in things, just as they are

in it. That is, when a figure is made out of gold, it possesses the
quality of that gold, just as the gold in question has for the moment
the shape of the figure. In the same way, while the Receptacle
contains all things, one may think of a given thing being made out
of it - in the sense that it incorporates the quality of the Receptacle, namely, ability to change. The fact is that all things have
this quality, by virtue of being part of the Receptacle. Yet they
must in the final analysis be dissociated from it.
This passage, brief as it is, conceals many a pitfall for the unwary exegete, and therefore may serve as a reliable index of
Aristotle's powers as an interpreter. His comments regarding the
gold analogy are found in De Generatione et Corruptione (329aI324). At the outset, one may note the correctness of his report that
Plato specifies each of the figures in the analogy as 'gold', and that
it is impossible for the Nurse to be identical with the planes. Also,
Aristotle recognizes the distinction between primary bodies and
planes, and calls the former 'so-called elements' (329aI7, 22-4;
d. Tim. 48bc).
The first definite criticism he offers is that what Plato has written in the Timaeus is not based on any precisely-articulated
conception (De Gen. et Corr. 329aI4). This is a very mild reproach
to which Plato himself seems to assent 7. The nature of the subjectmatter makes it so.
A more important criticism is that Plato does not state clearly
whether the Receptacle exists in separation from the element
(De Gen. et Corr. 329aI4-S). Plato seems quite explicit in some
instances, as noted above, that the various bodies are separate
from the Receptacle. But he discusses them separately (48e-S3c;
S3C-6IC), and does not treat in any complete way of their relation
to each other. The result is that his meaning must be inferred
from the gold analogy. By stating in this simile that figures are
in gold, does Plato mean that bodies are always in the Receptacle?
Or that the Receptacle only exists in bodies - as figures of one
kind or another are formed out of the gold? But the offspring
could scarcely be coeval with that which is called (sod) the mother.
Nevertheless, Plato says that they were co-eternal, existing
even before the world began (S2d-S3b). To go back to the original
7
Tim. 29cd, 4Scd, 5lab (&'1t"OPWTIXTIX, 8ucrIXAWT6TIXTOV), 52ac.
statement, when Plato held that bodies were separate from the
Receptacle, he no doubt referred to nature rather than location.
Further clarification of the relation of the Receptacle to bodies
must await our study of the relation of space to the Receptacle.
Meanwhile, Aristotle's report appears entirely right, that Plato
was not clear on this subject.
A third criticism found in the De Generatione passage is that
Plato does not make any use of the Receptacle (De Gen. et Corr.
329aIS). Aristotle's objection becomes all the more difficult in the
light of his very next sentence:
He says, indeed, that it is a substratum prior to the so-called
'elements' - underlying them, as gold underlies the things
that are fashioned of gold.
(329aI5-7)
Plato says no such thing, although one could take the gold
analogy to imply that intention. The term 'molding stuff'
(eY!Lcxyxei:ov, Soc) 8 would definitely tend to support such a view,
especially since the gold is used only in an analogical sense (sob; d.
Phys. 19Ia8-I2). The visibility of the gold is unrelated to the
main point of the analogy.
With respect to the criticism itself, some will protest that
Plato does make use of the Receptacle - copies of the forms
appear in it (Slab). While this is so, it is equally true that he does
not state how this happens. The function, moreover, appears
only incidentally in the course of his description of the Receptacle's nature. Plato discusses the Receptacle, the triangles and their
arrangement, and the primary bodies and their compounds, all
in separate treatments. The Timaeus describes no practical relationship between them; that is left for the reader to supply.
Once again, Aristotle has scored a valid criticism, though he
points to an incompleteness rather than to an error in Plato's
work. Therefore, although Aristotle makes some minor observations of a puzzling nature, these do not shake his main contentions
in this passage, which appear well-founded.
Aristotle's attempt to link the Receptacle with his own concept of prime matter was not based on whimsy, nor the desire to
borrow prestige, but on definite points of likeness between the
two. One of these is that both the Receptacle and prime matter
Meaning, 'that in which, or on which, an impression is made',
10
are Non-being. Aristotle teaches that that out of which things

come-to-be possesses no being without qualification, while in
another sense things always come-to-be out of that which is.
Coming-to-be implies that a thing potentially 'is' but actually
'is not'. Whatever comes to be must emerge from Non-being
(De Gen. et Corr. 317b16-8, 319a26-8).
The same view was expressed earlier in the Timaeus. The
Receptacle cannot be identified either with forms or with things.
In itself, it is devoid of all of them, just as a perfume base is
completely free of all odor. Consequently, it cannot be said to
'be' anything (sod-S1a). But to say that it is 'not-anything' is a
far cry from saying that it is 'nothing'. It existed before the
heavens were made (S2d), and it will always exist and possess the
same character (49d-sob).
To Aristotle, the difference between matter and privation was
that matter was Non-being only with respect to a given attribute,
while privation in its own nature was Non-being. Matter existed,
and could have the potentiality of a given state, while privation
was the utter lack of it. This was where Plato failed, Aristotle
thought; he believed in matter but overlooked privation (Phys.
192a3-13, 2S-31) 9. But instead of berating his teacher Aristotle
significantly passes this off as a natural mistake, due probably to
intense study of the privative aspect. For as he says, 'the negative
part of the contrariety may seem, if you concentrate your attention on it ... not to exist at all'.
Another resemblance of prime matter to the Receptacle is
that both are unintelligible. The Receptacle certainly could not
be associated with ideas (soe), which are the objects of knowledge
(S2a). The Receptacle is knowable, but only by a 'bastard reasoning' (S2b). It must, therefore, be neither Being, which is the
object of knowledge (YVWO'LC;), nor absolute Non-being - Aristotle's 'privation' - which is the object of ignorance (&yvow).
(Rep. 477-8). Fortunately, these two are not the sole possibilities
to which one is restricted. To say that anything is 'Non-being'
does not necessarily mean that it is non-existent, in an absolute
9 Bonitz omits Phys. 19Ib3S-192a34 among his references to the Timaeus, but it
should unmistakably be listed (d. Phys. 192aI3-4 with Tim. sod). Note Zeller's
acceptance of Aristotle's testimony in this section in Zeller, op. cit., pp. 305-7. Plato
did not give privation a detailed treatment, but he definitely recognized it. He thought
that it was the absence of actuality or of proper function (Rep. I.353b-e).
II
sense. It may simply be 'other than Being' as Being is defined, i.e.,

it may have a different type of existence (Soph. 2S7-8).
Plato finds that ideas are accessible to the reason, and bodies
to the senses, but that trying to know the Receptacle is quite a
different matter. One may describe its appearance; but strictly
speaking appearances are in it and are not the nature of the
Receptacle itself. While it does have a definite nature, this cannot
be known any more than Kant's 'Noumenon'. Plato says that it
is 'invisible' and 'unshaped' (SIa), 'baffling' and 'obscure' (4ga),
and barely an object of belief (S2b). Similarly, Aristotle thought
matter was itself unknowable, apart from its perceptible and intelligible aspects as expressed in things (Phys. I9Ia8f.). We are
shortly to see that it was an infinite, and that, by definition, is
unknowable (Phys. I87b7-9).
The Receptacle and prime matter have still another feature in
common: both are filled with potencies. Plato says that although
the Receptacle never departs from its own character, it is laid
down by nature as a molding stuff for everything (sobc). 'Its own
character' is doubtless the capability of bringing forth things of
every variety and description. Such a conclusion would be reinforced by his statement that the Receptacle is fitted to receive
'over its whole extent the copies of all things intelligible and eternal'10. It not only is able to receive these appearances, but it does
exhibit them and their affections. The Receptacle is indeed filled
with potencies (aUVcXfLewv fL1tbtAIXcr6IXL, S2de).
Aristotle, too, held to something underlying the primary bodies,
which is itself the same (De Gen. et Corr. 3I9b3-4). But its potencies are different; that is, the same matter may contain contrary
potencies, though both cannot be realized at the same time (De
Gen. I, 3; 329a 24-33). Matter is the substrate 'receptive of' (a
Platonic expression) coming-to-be and passing-away (De Gen.
et Corr. 320a3-4)' meaning that it has the ability to make these
states possible in things. In fact, potencies are the guarantee of
its very existence (Phys. I92a2S-3I, De Gen. et Corr. 317bz3-S).
There is another likeness between the 'Receptacle' of Plato
and the 'prime matter' of Aristotle - both are infinite. The
Receptacle is capable of receiving all things (sobc, Slab, 5zab), and
the number of 'all things' would certainly exceed finite experience
10
51a; italics mine.
12
or comprehension. Moreover, approximately the same place may

be delimited by different types of plane-figures. For this reason,
a given volume may bring forth an infinite variety, qualitatively
as well as quantitatively.
Prime matter, in Aristotle's estimation, is infinite, too. An
infinite in magnitude, however, could not possibly exist in actuality (Phys. 206a8, IS). Parmenides, who believed in a limited
universe, must therefore have spoken more truly than Melissus,
who held that it was unlimited (Phys. 207aIs-zI, Phys. 204b2932). The infinite in Aristotle's system is something else, namely,
an infinity of finite possibilities which may be realized at different
times. (Cf. Phys. 206a27-g.) This is the reason that matter is
called 'infinite' - because it has an infinite number of potentialities.
The 'Great and Small' is a still different description which
Aristotle links to Plato's Receptacle. The indeterminate dyad of
Great and Small, nowhere mentioned in Plato's extant works, is
often attributed to him 11. Others, presumably the Platonists,
believed in only one potentiality, derived from a unitary matter
which was Non-being (Phys. IgIb3S-Ig2az). This would exclude
coming-to-be. But Plato believed in two infinites, the dyad of
Great and Small, although he failed to make the distinction that
they were one in definition, not in number (Phys. 203aIS-6,
Meta. Io87b9-I 4) 12.
Time after time, Aristotle associates his 'matter' with the
Great and Small of Plato (Phys. 209b3S-2IOaz, Phys. I87aI7-8,
Meta. g87bIg-23). This at once poses a problem. If prime matter
11 Robin, La Theorie Platonicienne des idees et des nombres (Paris, 1908), note 261,
pp. 635-60, contains an exhaustive analysis of the Aristotelian texts which designate
'the great and small', 'dyad', 'the unequal', 'unequal dyad', 'indefinite dyad', 'the
infinite', 'multiplicity', 'the much and the little', and 'the other' as being the material
principle of Plato or the Platonists. He concludes that Plato took for the material the
Great and Small, frequently considered as a pair or dyad, that he insisted on the relative indeterminate (or 'infinite') nature of this principle, and that he probably was the
first to use the 'indefinite dyad', which both Speusippus and Xenocrates inherited
from him. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford, 1924), II, 434-5, evidently favors
this view.
However, the dyad is not mentioned by Plato in this sense, and the case is based on
the testimony of Aristotle and the later commentators. At any rate, there is no
mention of it in the Timaeus. We shall mention certain Aristotelian texts regarding
the Great and Small, however, which relate directly to the Timaeus or to topics it
immediately involves.
12 Phys. 192aII-Z; cf. Ross, Aristotle's Physics (Oxford, 1936), p. 497.
13
is one, how can it be the same as the Great and Small, which
Plato thought was two? Aristotle explains that the Great and
Small are attributes, which refer to extension and division (Meta.
1088a1s-bz, Phys. z06bz7-30). They are two aspects by which
the Receptacle is expressed 13. But the Receptacle is better known
through explanation than it is through sense (Phys. 189aS-9)'
and when so understood, it stands as one self-subsistent entity
(Phys. Z03~-6) 14.
The final point of likeness between the Receptacle and prime
matter is that both were thought of as extended. Plato specifically calls the Receptacle 'ever-existing Space', 15 and everything
that exists must be in some place and occupy some space (szab,
d). Space, or 'room', as it is sometimes translated, must be greater
than any single body or sum of them, but each of them must
share a portion of it. This characteristic was certainly true of
prime matter in Aristotle's philosophy.
It was to place ('t'67to~) and spatial magnitudes (!Le:ye6"y)), rather
than to space (xwpoc), that Aristotle devoted most of his attention 16. His distinctions as to what place is, and is not, are made
with the utmost care and precision (Physics IV, 1-S). 'Place'
is the position of a body, defined by the inner limit of the body
which surrounds it. It is to be confused, therefore, neither with
form, matter, nor the inner content of body itself (Phys. ZIOb3S.. As Wicksteed interprets in his translation (Phys. 203a16, Loeb ed.). Cf. Tredennick, Meta. 1087b13 n.; I, xxii f. (Loeb ed.).
U
Aristotle has often been taken to task for 'attributing matter to the forms'. One
of the references sometimes cited is Meta. 988a12-I4, but this speaks of matter being
predicated of forms in the case of sensible things.
However, in the Physics (Phys. 203a8-9) he does unequivocally state that Plato
does posit the infinite in the forms, as well as in objects of sense. This is perhaps an
anticipation of his own doctrine of intelligible matter for ideas-as-known, as well as
an effort to find in Plato a parallel to his view of the immanence of forms.
Plato contended that everything which exists must exist on earth or in the heavens,
and that which is not in place is nothing (S2b). Aristotle recognizes this in his statement that there is no body outside of the universe, and that not being outside, they
must be nowhere (Phys. 203a8-9, cf. Tim. 32C-33a). But Plato still maintained that
they neither receive nor pass over into anything perceptible to sense (Sle-S2a).
The passage is a difficult one, but Aristotle's point is valid in the sense that matter
IS always found together with the forms in the only manner in which the forms exist
for us.
15 Throughout the discussion of 'place' and 'space', the Loeb translation of the
Timaeus will not be followed. Instead, to keep the distinction clear, )(Wpot will be
uniformly rendered 'space;' and 'l'61toC;, 'place'.
18 Ross, Aristotle (London, 1945), pp. 85-7.
14
2IIa7, 28-34, 212a3-8). Place, evidently, is the position or location of the volume of a body 17.
Such a view of place is harmonious both with Aristotle's
statement that forms and numbers are not in place, according
to Plato, and with Plato's dissociation of the forms from the
tangible world (phys. 209b34-2IOa2; Tim. S1a). There is a place
for every individual thing, but at present they do not all occupy
those places (Phys. 212 b3-7), for reasons which will be explained
in Chapter Four (infra). While each part of the universe has a
place, there is no place for the whole universe, since it is finite
and unbounded (Phys. 2I2b8-IO, cf. 2I2a32-S).
The possibility of a void at once arises with this conception of
place. True enough, Aristotle defined place in relation to body.
The paradox is that he also holds it to be separable from body,
unlike the matter of the body (Phys. 2I2aI-3, 208bI-S). One
may speak with equal accuracy of a body's actual place or proper
place. Either the actual or proper place may contain the body,
which would be absent in turn from the other. But never for a
moment did Aristotle believe that a given place was totally
empty (Phys. 2I2aI2-4). A void the universe did not have; it
was a plenum. No sooner did one body retire from a place, than
another replaced it, without any break in continuity (Phys.
2IIbI8-2S)
Those who adhere to the view that there is a void hold that it is
a place where some thing, or kind of body, is absent (Physics IV,
6, 7); this one might call 'tri-dimensional vacuity'. It would be
easy to go on and point out that, for Plato, the Receptacle is not
to be identified with either qualities or things. The Receptacle
is empty, and on this ground he might be thought vulnerable to
the charge of having a void. But Aristotle never pursues this
line of attack.
The Timaeus was quite blunt that there was no void (s8a, 8oc).
If Aristotle were as willing to ridicule and differ with Plato as
some say he is, he might be expected to construe this to refer
solely to the universe and things, and to mean that there is a
void beyond. Once again, he is silent. As a matter of fact he
17 If a stone were falling through water, its place, according to this definition, would
be not the whole body of water, but 'the aqueous surface immediately enveloping it'
at any given moment (Wicksteed, Aristotle's Physics, Loeb ed., I, 269).
IS
definitely states that Plato denies a void, and makes no place for
it in coming-to-be and passing-away (De Gen. et Corr. 3ZSbz4-33).
Aristotle even uses an argument that has overtones of the Timaeus. The fact of movement, and particularly the movement of
a projectile, he says, make necessary the belief that there is no
void (Phys. zI4bzg-2IsaI, I4-z3; d. Tim. 7gb) 18.
As Aristotle sees Plato's world from the standpoint of its
particles, their diverse shape and varying size never permit
them to fit completely into each other. Plato, then, has a void
in spite of himself (De Caelo 306b3-9)! But Plato thought that
the smaller primary bodies squeezed into the interstices of the
larger ones, and, since there was an unlimited variety of sizes, no
void was left (s8a, 60c). If one protests that the figure of drifting
planes suggests a space between primary bodies, these could not
possibly be visible if the primary bodies themselves were too
fine to be perceptible. Moreover, the Receptacle exists both where
bodies are and where they are not but may come-to-be, so that its
existence is continuous, everywhere the same, and nowhere a void.
Concerning his predecessor's teaching along these lines, Aristotle first reports that Plato, in the Timaeus, said that matter
and space are the same (phys. ZOgbIZ-3). We have already found
that Plato never used the term 'matter' in the sense Aristotle did.
This report cannot be verbally true, therefore, but it should be
given further scrutiny. Perhaps Aristotle was accurate in spirit,
that is, in the sense that his view of matter corresponded to the
intent of Plato's Receptacle.
Aristotle thought that place was the innermost limit of a
containing body, but that space was that which was contained,
qua magnitude. If all attributes are taken away, nothing but
this matter remains (Phys. ZOgbI-II). Such a doctrine would not
be difficult for Plato to accept. He saw bodies coming to be in the
Receptacle. Certainly, if bodies were in the Receptacle, and the
Receptacle was space, it would be in them. The identification of
the Receptacle and space has led many interpreters down a
false trail. In many cases they not only regard it as extension 19,
18 J. L. Stocks, De Caela, 309a21n. (Oxford tr.), thinks 309a18-28 contains reference to the Timaeus. If so, it is an additional supporting text.
19 Robin (Platon, pp. 234-Sn.) likens the Platonic X6lpot to Descartes' extension.
Other interesting comparisons between the two are to be found in Milhaud, Philosophes
-Geometres de la Grece (Paris, 1900), p. 297 ff.
16
but often as that alone 20, which puts them in the position of
saying that things are, or come to be from, pure nothingness. It
would seem a much sounder approach to say that space is not a
void, but where things are, at least potentially 21.
Another comment along this line is that 'the participant' (the
Receptacle) is 'place'. The participant in this case is defined as the
Great and Small or the matter, as Plato 'called it in writing the
Timaeus'. (Phys. 209 b33-2IoaI). A person might make the natural mistake of claiming they were identical, for they do appear to
be the same (Phys. 2IIb30-37). As a matter of fact the outer
limits of matter and the inner limits of surrounding bodies
(i.e., place) coincide, just as the same points on a rounded surface
are in a concave arrangement when seen from one direction, and
in a convex when viewed from the other.
From the statement that xwpoc is matter, and the one that
't'67toc; is matter, it is but a short step to Aristotle's third observation, that xwpoc and 't'67toc; are the same, according to Plato
(Phys. 209bI5-6). But how can this be, if xwpoc and 't'67toc; are
as different as Aristotle, in this study so far, seems to claim they
are? Or is this meant to show that Plato was muddled, if not
entirely wrong, in his conceptions?
A number of obvious differences have been pointed out between
Aristotle's views of place and of space. Place stresses displacement; space emphasizes volume. Place is that which surrounds,
while space is what is surrounded. There is no place of the whole,
20 Baeumker goes to the extreme. Cf. Das Problem der Materie in der Griechischen
Philosophie (Muenster, 1890), Pt. 2, Ch. 4C, pp. 177-87, which is headed, 'Die platonische Materie ist der leere Raume, d.h. die blosse Ausdehnung'. Burnet (Greek
PhilosoPhy, Part I (London, 1924), p. 344) is also rather extravagant: 'That 'primary
matter' of Timaeus is space of three dimensions and nothing else is really quite certain
.... ' (Italics mine.)
21 Cf. Cornford, op. cit., p. 200: 'Space is not a void .... Space is to Plato the 'room'
(xwpcx) or place where things are, not intervals or stretches of vacancy where things
are not. ... " See also, p. 42 (ibid.).
Ritter (The Essence of Plato's Philosophy (New York, 1933), pp. 266-7) uses as
proof the fact that the concrete objects change, while the parts of space do not. This
is Kantian in flavor, but true. Ritter also notes that some mistakenly say that elements
come into being by delimitation of empty space; there is more to objects than this.
Although Taylor (op. cit., p. 402) does not agree that the xwpcx of Timaeus and the
npwTI) (\A"l) of Aristotle are the same, he does acknowledge that there is 'a certain
analogy' between them. Both 'are meant to provide a permanent background for
change'.
ARISTOTLE'S CRITI CISM OF THE RECEPTACLE
17
but there is a space of the whole. A place describes an existing

thing, but cannot bring it about. A space is more than the thing
existing in it at the moment; it has the ability to bring forth a
new body where the old ceases to be.
On the other hand, there are many ways in which place and
space are like each other. Negatively, both are different from
body (Phys. 208bS-8), and the surface of both do not in turn
have space and place (Phys. 2oga8-12). Positively, as noted, the
boundary of each - in reference to an individual thing - is the
same. And as the whole of space contains all delimitations of it,
space contains all places. This is confirmed by the teaching that
there cannot be a place of the whole, and that places are necessarily within it. What is true in act will be, a fortiori, true in
respect to potency. Space in general will have the potentiality
of not only all spaces but of all places as well.
These are important considerations. On the basis of them, it
now appears that place and space are two aspects of one and the
same thing, namely, matter, Some will still protest that Plato's
Receptacle is not to be identified with the Aristotelian matter.
Things, they will insist, are made in the Receptacle, but out 01
matter. Where can the twain meet? But Aristotle says that each
thing is made in matter in the sense that matter is a necessary
constituent of surrounding bodies, which made place possible.
Place is an expression of matter in the surroundings, then, just as
a particular space is an expression of matter within the individual
thing. Furthermore, in the case of Plato, the Recipient is demarcated to make a body possible. It may properly be said to be
'carved out' within the Receptacle. The terms 'out of' and 'in',
consequently, may be applied with equal Validity to either
Aristotle's matter or Plato's Receptacle, if, at the same time, the
proper connotation be kept clearly in mind.
Corroboration of Aristotle's testimony is to be found in the
Timaeus Locrus. This ancient dialogue dates back, it is estimated,
to the first century, A.D. Taylor suggests that it represents
perhaps an earlier exegetical view, and even possible access to
more reliable texts, since it is considerably older than any
existing commentary or manuscripts of the dialogue. In spite of
the misconceptions which have been entertained with respect
to the Timaeus Locrus, therefore, it remains an important docu2
18
ment. And significantly enough, in it we are told that Plato

'calls' prime matter 'place' (X&lpat or 't'67tO~) 22.
Aristotle felt that the distinction between place and space was
a difficult one to make (Phys. 209bI8-2I). This may be one reason
that he does not chide or ridicule Plato in this section. The whole
tone of it is complimentary; everyone said something about place,
but Plato alone tried to say what it is (Phys. 209bI6-J)! While
it is true that Aristotle did make the distinction between space
and place (Phys. 209bII-3I), it is also true that he often used
the two terms synonymously 23. Plato, too, was consistent,
Aristotle tells us, in identifying place and space in the Timaeus
and the Unwritten Teachings, despite other differences between
them (Phys. 209bII-J) 24. Aristotle made the same identification,
except that he developed in more detail the implications of each.
Space is the volume-aspect of matter, place the extent-aspect.
He regards space as the unfolding scene of all things that come
to be, which is certainly in complete consonance with the Platonic
description of the Receptacle.
Our examination of the texts has led to the conclusion that the
Receptacle in many ways seems to correspond with Aristotle's
prime matter. It is Non-being, not in a privative sense of being
94a, cited in Taylor, op. cit., pp. 657-8. Other similarities to the Timaeus are the
three-fold division of the universe into tatoc, \lAO(, and O(tathl'!6v, and his rejection of
a literal creation (idem; cf. chapter six, infra). Taylor's defense of the dialogue is
worth noting (op. cit., pp. 6SS-64), for he attaches value to it, even though it runs
counter to some of those Pythagorean views for which he has such a penchant.
os Wicks teed, op. cit., I, 271-3, d. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus (Berlin, 1870), p. 859 .
The intriguing question of the existence and dependability of the unwritten
teachings of Plato has been subjected to fresh and careful study in our own day.
Cherniss, in The Riddle of the Early Academy (Berkeley, 1945), takes the position
that Plato did not teach, the so-called later theory of ideas or idea-numbers at all, the
bulk of proof being the silence of the dialogues on the question.
A searching rejoinder to this book is given by Glenn R. Morrow ('Review: The
Riddle of the Early Academy (H. Cherniss),' in The Philosophical Review, March
1946, pp. 190-9}. It is pointed out here that supplementary sources assure us of the
reality of the unwritten teachings (d. Taylor, op. cit., p. 29), that Aristotle would have
had to exercise a reasonable care in writing of Plato, and that the abrupt dismissal of
the unwritten doctrines cuts us off from information we would not have elsewhere
and which does not conflict with the dialogues. Many more objections are listed
which will have to be answered before the Riddle thesis can be considered acceptable.
Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Early Academy (Baltimore, 1944), p.
121, uses the argument: why trust Aristotle on the unwritten doctrines if he twice
misstates Plato on the written ones (of the Tim.) ? But the latter is a matter of interpretation, and at any rate is a non sequitur to the issue at hand.
At any rate, the controversy does not affect us here (see text). Vs. Rivaud, op. cit.,
pp. 306-7, whose unsupported position is held neither by Ross, Aristotle's Physics
(Oxford, 1936), p. 566, nor Taylor, op. cit., P.402 (n. S8b4).
19
unable to exist, but in the sense of not being completely realized

at anyone time, and as not being wholly associated with any
existing thing. It is unintelligible in itself, a chaotic mass until
expressed in individual existent things. It is filled with potencies,
which can only be realized through objects; every part of it has
a store of these, never all exhibited at any given moment. It is
infinite in the sense of the physical multiplication of bodies and in
their divisibility. It is the Great and Small. It is that which both
expresses space and place. and which makes their existence
possible. And finally, there is no object in which it is not found.
In this re-appraisal, Aristotle has not appeared unfriendly in
his comments concerning Plato, nor does his view of prime matter
differ basically from that of Plato. The jibes and misunderstandings, of which Aristotle has often been accused, have been conspicuously absent. Plato uses the term 'out of' only once in connection with the Receptacle, and then he does not identify it
with any specific type of body. But that does not interfere with
its likeness to matter. It rather confirms the fact that the Receptacle was something more basic than any visible body, and was
that which made them all possible. By avoiding the term 'out of',
Plato may thus have been emphasizing his divergence from the
physical philosophers who made one or more of the elements the
source of all the world. This tentative answer will be tested in
connection with other parts of the study, but it appears to be a
reasonable explanation.
Meanwhile, the chief inferences still stand. On seven major
counts, Aristotle's 'prime matter' may rightfully be said to resemble Plato's 'Receptacle'. The differences cannot be denied;
but they are not insuperable, and can be accounted for. The two
entities must surely be the same. Our conclusion is, therefore,
that Aristotle did understand his master's view of the Receptacle,
and that he adopted it and developed it in his own view of prime
matter.
CHAPTER III
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE

SIMPLE BODIES
Plato was the first to apply the term 'element' to the basic
constituents of all things. So Diels tells us in his interesting
history, Elementum 1. Element (G't"OLXELOV) had been a common
word in Greek to denote letters of the alphabet, corresponding to
our 'ABC's'. But it was put to philosophic use first in the Theaetetus (zoIe). Socrates says that he remembers in a dream having
heard someone say that things were built up out of prior things,
just as the alphabet arises from letters 2. (See z03a f., Rep. 40za f.)
One need not accept Diels at all points. For example, his statement is rather extreme that the theory of elements never belonged
to the heart of Plato's philosophy, but was a late, Pythagorean
development. Nor need one accept his puzzling interpretation
that the term 'element', applied first to geometrical figure, was
used later by Plato to describe the one and infinite two. And the
eventual demonological meaning of the term lies beyond the
scope of the present study 3.
After Plato spoke of the simple bodies as 'elements', the simile
remained alive throughhout all antiquity. Aristotle hinted at it
when he spoke of GUG't"OLXLIX as designating things of the same category. In the Roman world, Diels found the Latin equivalent for
GTOLXELOV, 'elementum', to be of foreign derivation; it did not
occur in writings of the pre-Ciceronian era. Once again, this term
which denotes 'a letter of the alphabet' did not originally mean
'a basic constituent of the world;' instead, the opposite is true, as
in the case of the Greek counterpart 4.
H. Diels, Elementum (Leipzig, 1899).
, Ibid., p. 58. Diels thinks that Plato got the usage from the Atomists; Taylor
differs (Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford, 1928), p. 307.
3 Diels, op. cit., pp. 21-2, 57-8.
Ibid., pp. 58, 81-2.
1
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE SIMPLE BODIES
21
Most of the Pre-Socratics had one or a small number of material

bodies from which they thought the universe orginated. These
bodies were called G't'OLXeLoc or &pXOCL (sing., &pX~), according to
Aristotle (Meta. 983b7-II). Plato never used this term in the
sense his predecessors did, except to reject it decisively. He did
use it to mean 'beginning' or 'origin', 'leader' or 'ruler', and
'principle', in a non-material sense 0. But the previous usage was
incorrect, he thought, because no single body was truly fundamental in the constitution of the universe (48b-d). Hence, if the
universe was not constituted of them, it could scarcely be explained
by them (46c-e).
Plato said that the so-called first principles (&pXOCL, i.e., material
bodies) are presumed to be elements of the universe (G't'OLXeLoc),
although one who has 'a grain of sense' (~pOCXu rppovouv't'o<;) would
not even liken them to the class of syllables (48bc). Plato's
application of the term 'element' to a solid body cannot be denied
(S6b). Yet, with this single exception, his usage of the term
'element' is unmistakably in reference to primary, intangible
constituents - specifically, triangles. (Cf. S4b, SSd, S7c, and 6m.)
The point of 48bc is that simple bodies cannot be called even
the syllables of things, let alone the ABC's. They are two steps
away from tangible reality; the faces of figures correspond to
syllables, while the two ultimate types of triangle, of which both
faces and figures have been composed, correspond to the ABC's
(G't'oLxeLoc) 6.
Aristotle also uses the term G't'OLXeLov to mean both tangible and
intangible constitutents. For example, he refers to the simple
bodies as 'elements' in De Caelo, 302ar6-2o, and the Metaphysics,
rOI4a3O-S. Yet chapter one of De Generatione et Corruptione,
Book II, is devoted to proving that the true elements are not
the four simple bodies, but primary matter and certain contrarieties (enumerated in II, 2, as the hot and the cold, the moist and
the dry). Aristotle calls material bodies 'elements' only in the
relative sense that they are the ingredients which go into a
compound. He is at pains to make clear that the sole entities of
As beginning: Prot. 3l8a, Phaedr. 237b, d, 262d, Parm. l37d, l53C, Rep. 2.377a,
Laws 6.753e, 768d, 77se, 2.67Ia, 672C, Gorg. 466b, Tim. 48b. As leader, ruler: Prot.
344C. As non-material principle: Phaedr. 245cd, Phaedo lOle, Rep. 6.510b, 5IIbc.
Taylor, op. cit., p. 393, cf. De Gen. et Corr. 325b28-9 and Tim. 53d.
22
which this designation holds true, literally, and absolutely, are

those underlying intangibles. Aristotle either avoids the use of
the Pre-Socratic term 'first principle', or qualifies it in such a way
as to clarify his special intention 7.
The basic facts of Plato's theory are undisputed: there are a
specific number of types of material body, each of which has
definite qualities and a prescribed shape. The simple bodies or
'kinds' (ye:v1j) are four in number, corresponding to the fire, earth,
air, and water of common experience 8. The world's body contains
the whole of these (32c-33b). A fifth kind, mentioned in very
obscure fashion, evidently has no reference to this world (Ssc).
Mathematical necessity gives the reasons for the four elements.
First, the world must be visible and tangible, but nothing can be
visible without fire or tangible without earth (3Ib). But since
these are two separate things, there must be a bond between
them, in fact two bonds, because they are solids, not planes. So
air and water become the links between earth and fire 9, with the
resulting proportion that, as fire is to air, so is air to water, and
as air is to water, so is water to earth (3Ib-32C) 10. Some have
identified the fifth element with ether, both for historical and
logical reasons 11. However, ether is designated plainly in the
Timaeus as a variety of air and not a separate element (S8d). What
7 Cf. his use of &px.~ in the references listed in Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus {Berlin,
1870),1IIa28-II3b26.
8 Under no circumstances should the fire, earth, air, and water we know be confused
with the kinds mentioned by Plato, for he identifies them by nature rather than by
our experience of them. Cf. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London, 1937), pp. 188-91
and Tim. 50b.
Cf. De Gen. et Corr. 330b34-331a3. Aristotle has the same intermediates.
10 With 'square' numbers, only one mean is required in the proportion, but in
'solid' or cubic numbers, two mean terms are required, as: x': x'y::x'y: xy2:: xy':
y3. Cf. Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics (Oxford, 1921), I, 89, 297.
11 Zeller, Plato (London, 1888), pp. 372-3n. Philolaos connected the fifth element
with ether as did Xenocrates, who (apud Simp!. Phys. 205b Scho!' in Aris. 427a) attributes this view to Plato. Zeller disagrees, but cites Martin, II1,140 sq., as concurring.
Burnet's demonstration that the fragments of Philolaos are probably apocryphal
makes dependence on them a risky business. {Plato, Timee-Critias (Paris, 1949), Vo!.
X of Bude ed., tr., ed., and intro. by A. Rivaud, pp. 24, 24n, 81-82, citing Burnet,
Early Greek PhilosOPhy, ed. 3, pp. 277, 284-303.)
As is well known, Aristotle's fifth element was ether {see Zeller, Aristotle (London,
1897), pp. 476-7). Although one can speculate that the alacrity with which Plato's
followers accepted 'ether' as the fifth element might show that it arose in the Academy
and was put forth before Plato's death (Jaeger, Aristotle (Oxford, 1948), pp. 300-1 and
300n.), thereis'no real proof that this was Plato's view. Rivaud (Timee-Critias, Bude,
p. 84) thinks in contrast to the above that Plato's followers considered ether a variety
of fire.
23
Plato says regarding ether should prevail, Though the doctrine of

the four 'kinds' (or 'roots') stems from the sixth or fifth century, 12
the construction of five regular bodies is now dated from Plato's
own time 13.
Each of the primary bodies has a definite shape. Fire, the most
mobile and penetrating of all, is made up of regular tetrahedrons
or pyramids. Air is in the shape of an octahedron; water, an
icosahedron. Earth is a cube, hence lacking in mobility. The fifth
body is a dodecahedron, which is very close to being a sphere
(S4d-S6c) 14. These simple bodies, at least the terrestrial ones, all
may be perceived in experience (46d, 6IC). The important qualification must be added, however, that it is the collective mass of
a simple body that is seen, never an isolated particle of it (S6bc),
and that we conceive rather than perceive its rational nature.
Since the size of the constituting triangles varies greatly, there
are an infinite number of varieties within each class of body
(S7cd). For instance, there are two kinds of fire (S8cd), three
kinds of air (S8d), two of water - metals (s8e-S9c) and liquids
(S8d, S9d-6ob) - and four main types of earth (6ob-6Ia). In
addition, he states the relation of air and fire to the other kinds,
admitting that he does not cover all. Compounds are formed of
earth and water (6 Ia-C , also S6c-S7d).
Plato gives detailed information as to how the figures of the
simple bodies are formed. The basic materials employed are the
rectangular isosceles triangle, and the half-equilateral, from which
all other triangles can be built up (S3d, S4ab). Six half-equilateral
triangles are used in the formation of one equilateral. Four of
these constitute the sides of the first solid figure (the pyramid),
which is fire. The same basic feature, the equilateral, is incorporated into the next two bodies, air having eight (octahedron),
and water twenty (icosahedron). Isosceles triangles are put
Rivaud, TimeeCritias (Bude ed.), pp. II7, 81-2.
Sachs, Die juenj platonischen Koerper (Berlin, 1917), pp. 186, 105. Cf. Burnet, op.
cit. (ed. 4), pp. 283-4, 293, rejecting the hypothesis that the Pythagoreans introduced
them.
" Cf. Phaedo 1 lob, where it is said that the true earth, if seen from above, is manycolored, like the balls made of twelve pieces of leather. Robin, Greek Thought (London,
1928), p. 227, suggests that the number of pentagonal surfaces in this element remind
one of the twelve signs of the zodiac, which are like an adornment for the sky. It may,
therefore, be the body in which the stars move, namely, the ether. (Cf. Rep. 7.529bc,
Epi. 981C.) Rivaud, op. cit., p. 84, is inclined to take this position.
U
18
24
together in sets of four to form a quadrangular equilateral plane.

Six such planes compose the cube, which is earth (S4d-SSC).15
Though the initial account in the Timaeus presents the Demiurge
working with materials which are always present (3Ib-32b), the
treatment in the latter section makes clear that these structures
do not occur by chance, but by a figure assigned to them by
God, before whose creative act they were without reason and
measure (S3ab).
At first sight, this seems to be the construction of a physical
product from mathematical constituents. This impression might
even be strengthened by the description in S4b-d and ssa-c of
particles dissolving into triangles, drifting around, and then
being reconstituted into other particles. However, Plato is emphatic that he is describing physical reality, for he says:
In the first place, then, it is plain I presume to everyone that
fire and earth and water and air are solid bodies; and the form
of a body, in every case, possesses depth also. Further, it is
absolutely necessary that depth should be bounded by a plane
surface; and the rectilinear plane is composed of triangles. (S3c)
Elsewhere he tells us that the universe has depth and is solid
(32ab), as are the simple bodies (S6b).
In addition to the explicit statements of Plato, there are other
factors which would preclude the literal construction of solids
from planes alone. For example, any geometer worthy of the
name would know that no triangle or aggregation of them can be
'visible' or 'tangible'. These are terms Plato used to describe
what has come to be (3Ib, 36e, 46d). The graphic description of
materials violently interacting with one another in 56c-57e and
60e-62b could not possibly apply to anything other than solids.
While the plane-figures may be legitimately interpreted as delimitations of pure space, Plato did not think they were restricted
to this alone. It is true that he implies that bodies are made from
planes (54b-55c), but this is not his literal meaning 16. The
plane-figures were associated with definite material bodies.
1. Euclid gives details regarding the construction of the five basic solids in his
Elements, XIII, I3-I8 and addendum. Cf. Heath, op. cit., I, 4I5-9.
16 As may be confirmed by reasons already given as well as by the apology with
which he prefaces the passage cited. His method, Plato says, is 'technical' and 'most
unusual' (53bc).
25
Plato had a definite purpose in devoting so much attention to

the planes and plane-figures. As stated above, he did not regard
them as constitutive of body. But he did consider them descriptive. The presupposition of all bodies is the Receptacle, in whose
fertile expanses all things come to be and pass away. It is an
indeterminate mobility which becomes determinate by something
outside the Receptacle, namely, the Ideas. These Ideas maintain
their own character forever, ingenerable, indestructible, and imperceptible to the senses but knowable by reason (S1e-S2a). The
universe is a copy of this rational world, made as nearly like it as
possible (29ab, 3ge-4oa, socd). The mark of things of sense and
motion is that they are generated and destroyed, while the rational world always is (37e-38a).
With the Ideal theory in mind, the meaning of the figures of
simple bodies is brought into sharp focus. The figures are the
objects of a rational and mathematical determination (S3b) 17.
Their constituent planes, the two types of which are the real
'elements', are invisible, and the most beautiful and perfect
imaginable (S6bc). Certainly these are the marks of the Ideal order.
However, the figures can only be constructed in a tri-dimensional
space, which means that they could not exist, except in thought,
apart from the Receptacle in which sensible reality appears.
In Chapter Two (supra), the Receptacle was said to be an
'infinite'. But any simple or compound body is a definite limitation - quantitatively and qualitatively - within this infinite.
The Receptacle is truly infinite. (I) It is infinite in existence,
even being before Time 'began', hence independent of it (szd). (2)
Its magnitudes are capable of infinite division, even though the
basic triangles within it can be only divided in thought. (3) It is
infinite in its ability to bring forth material things (SIa, S3e-S4b).
Plato usually speaks of things coming-to-be from the forms; in
this sense, they, too, could properly be called infinite (socd). (4)
It is infinite because it is not limited through itself but through
something else. At least these four reasons for belief in the infinite, given by Aristotle, are exemplified in the Receptacle
(Phys. 203b1S-20).
17 Some think this the starting point of Plato's later theory of the derivation of the
world from square and cubic numbers. E.g., Stenzel, Zahl und Gestalt bei Platon und
Aristoteles (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 88-9, 70-1.
26
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OP PLATO'S TIMA.EUS
A geometrical figure, Plato observes in the Meno, is that in

which a solid ends. It is the limit, or extremity, of a solid (Meno
7sa-76a). Perhaps more light will be thrown on Plato's intention
when this reference is compared with Aristotle's doctrine of
place. According to Aristotle, place was a limit, when considered
as that which contains. Or, one could think of it in terms of that
which it contained. The first would be form, the second, matter
(Phys. 209bI-IO) 18. 'Place', as seen in the second chapter (supra),
would strictly speaking be neither, although it would coincide
at all points with the form. Aristotle says that that which contains
or limits 19 is form, and that which is limited is matter (De
Caelo 293bI3-6). Plato says that the planes enclose bodies and
thereby delimit the Receptacle. Their basic meaning is the same.
When the plane-figures are so employed, they describe the shape,
displacement, and relative location of the simple body.
The primary function of the planes and plane-figures, however,
is not descriptive, but explanatory. First of all, they would
explain the uniform nature of the types of simple bodies. The same
principles describe a given simple body whenever it appears, and
these principles relate to the definite way in which the body is
shaped, and to the plan of its construction. Secondly, the planes
and plane-figures insure the uniform nature of generation and
alteration. Certain changes in geometrical structure will bring
about certain specific results. Thirdly, Plato, by means of the
triangles and figures, is indicating that the qualities have regular
causes.
Plato found a teleology in every part of the universe, and in the
whole of it. He thought that rationality did not only lay in the
purposes for which the universe strives; its very nature is rational.
This may be seen in things which are in space, things which have
as their cause a rational, order-producing mind. There is a unified
agent, the God who geometrizes and introduces harmony
wherever possible 20.
But it was no mere visionary goal that Plato sought. His objecAristotle even follows Plato in the use of t7tbtEl)o~ in this passage.
7tepOl:~ or ISpo~. The word ISpQ~, which occurs frequently in the Prior
Analytics, is found more rarely in the Posterior Analytics. This was taken by Solmsen
to be the last link in Aristotle's gradual development from a Platonic view of form to
something purely logical in implication. (Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics
(Oxford, 1949), p. 16). This conforms to the chronological view adopted in this study .
Shorey, in American Journal ot Philology, IX, 4; 416.
18
19
27
tives were in harmony with the highest ideals of science. He was

showing that scientific explanation was possible. Such an explanation would be possible only if the universe was constructed according to regular principles, and if these could be understood. This
was the plan of things to Plato. The same given causes would
always produce the same results (all things being equal), and
specific materials will always and everywhere, under given conditions, exhibit the same behavior. This is often called the principle of 'the uniformity of nature', and is presupposed in all
prediction and experimentation. Plato was also defending the
view that the world could be explained in terms of a limited
number of principles. This is known today as the principle of
'parsimony'. The brunt of the Timaeus argument is directly
against the Atomist view of a capricious, utterly unpredictable
universe. In these respects, Plato was contending for principles
that today are considered basic to science.
Much of Aristotle's theory of elements is stated in De Generatione et Corruptione II, 1-8, and in De Caelo III, 3-6, and IV, 4-5.
There is, he says, a limit to the number of elements. They are
more than one, and finite in number (De Caelo 303az-304bz3). No
single one of these simple bodies is fundamental. Apparently
they are generated out of each other, but this is actually due
to the basic substrate (De Gen. et Corr. 33za5-z7, b6-333aI5,
3zoa3-6). Since the simple bodies cannot come to be out of
each other in the sense that they include each other (as a wall
comes to be out of bricks), none of them can be called 'eternal'
(De Gen. et Corr. 334az3-b8, De Caelo 304bz6--8).
The four simple bodies found on earth are each differentiated
by a contrariety of tangible qualities (De Gen. et Corr. 3z9bII-3,
330a3o-b3). Basically, the qualities are also four in number hot and cold (power to act), and dry and moist (power to be
acted upon). All other qualities are derived from these (De Gen.
et Corr. 3z9bz3-6, 33-330az9). The elements are arranged in
descending series as follows:
Fire . .
Dry and Hot
Air . .
Hot and Wet
Water.
Wet and Cold
Cold and Dry 21
Earth.
U
See arrangement in Oxford tr., Physics, 212b32 n., as listed by R. P. Hardie.
28
It is thus possible for the elements to change into one another

by dropping one 'contrary' and realizing another, by the more
difficult process of changing both at once, or by two elements
each dropping one 'contrary' and merging to form a third. From
these four bodies, all compounds are derived (De Gen. et Corr. II,
2, 8). 'Matter' in Aristotle can, therefore, mean either the substrate or the particular simple body out of which a compound or
thing is made. In the former sense, it is commonly called 'primary
matter' ; in the latter, 'secondary matter'.
Since Plato's simple bodies are described in geometrical terms,
it will be well to compare his view of the meaning and value of
mathematical analysis with that of Aristotle. As is well known,
Plato was no novice in mathematics, and required students in the
Academy to have a through grounding in the subject. Geometry,
he thought, was not knowledge in the final sense, because it was
seeking to know through symbols. True knowledge dispensed
with symbols. But intermediate between opinion (M~ot) and
knowledge (e7tL(J't'~fL'YJ) was a third level, that of understanding
(aLOCVOLot). Understanding does not refer to first principles to
validate belief, and it mistakes hypotheses for principles (Rep.
6.5IIc, 7.533c-e). This is true of geometry.
Plato did not intend the intermediate position in the scale of
knowledge to be a reproach to geometry. Indeed, he held that
science in highest esteem. The objects with which it dealt had a
beauty of form superior to that found in animals or pictures. The
geometrical figures were eternally and absolutely beautiful
(Philebus 5lCd). The highest science was dialectic, by means of
which one could behold intelligible reality without the aid of intermediaries. But geometry led toward the same high ideals by a
different approach (Rep. 6.5roc-5IIb, 7.532 f.).
To the Greeks, the good life was like a work of art, which
reflected balance and symmetry. The motto on the Delphic
oracle epitomized this spirit in its famous words, 'Nothing too
much' (fL'YJOE:V &yotv). This conception was rooted in Plato's thought,
too. Measure was needed - for the good life, for art, and for
knowledge (Phileb. 66a-c, 56e, States. 284a, Rep. ro.602d-6o3a).
These were not arithmetical measures (Phileb. 56e-57a), crudely
imposed from without. They were measures of the ideal order, of
intelligence.
29
Plato did not despise the mathematical sciences; to him, they

played a most important role. Astronomy in its highest sense
could lead one beyond the stars to the abstract movements they
represent. Harmonics could lift one from the realm of musical
chords to that of the knowledge of mathematical ratios. Geometry
could direct the inner vision away from things seen and temporal,
to the unseen ideals of beauty and virtue. Mathematics was not
simply for the purposes of navigation, music, and the construction of figures. It was that by which one could understand the
world in rational terms, and at the same time, improve his soul 22.
Aristotle also had much to say concerning the function and
value of mathematics. Metaphysics, on the one hand, only
considered objects insofar as they were Being. Physics, on the
other, studied things, not qua Being, but qua sharing in movement.
Between these two disciplines lay mathematics, which dealt
with things, but only insofar as they were quantitative and
continuous. To this end, it stripped off all sensible qualities, and
considered bodies only as abstractions (Meta. I061az6-b33).
According to Aristotle, the objects of geometry possessed a
certain matter, namely, pure extension. It was an intelligible
rather than a sensible, physical, or movable matter, and was not
to be confused with wood, bronze, or any perceptible type of
material (Meta. 1036 aZ-13, b3Z-I037aS). While it is true that
the mathematician deals with aspects of material things, he does
so only in terms of aspects which are separable in thought (e.g.,
the numbers in a rule, or the lines and volume of an object). But
Aristotle was clear that the mathematician does not err in this
procedure, for the objects of mathematics can be thought of as
separable. This is why the geometer is said to investigate physical
lines, but not qua physical (phys. 193b31-6, 194a10-1).
The physical thing, Aristotle thought, was 'in place'. But the
mathematical object was separable in thought from that which
it described, and could not, therefore, properly be said to be
'in place' (Meta. I09za17-z1, Phys. z08bz2-S). It did describe
the relative position of a thing (Meta. I06Iaz8-b4), and, as previously stated, its extension. On the basis of many different
factors - abstract character, separability in thought, and co Rep. 7, esp. 524b-531C. Cf. Heath, op. cit., I, 284-7, Burnet, Greek Philosophy,
Part I (London, 1924), pp. 224-8.
30
extension with the volume of a thing - therefore, the objects of

geometry would seem to possess the same characteristics as
Aristotle's 'places'. Even his statement that the mathematician
treats of surfaces, but not as the limits of a physical body (Phys.
I93b3I-2), is valid of 'place', although the outer limits of body
and the inner limits of the immediate container are mathematically the same.
Aristotle placed a high value on mathematics, just as his
teacher had done. Physics did deal with elements of which the
mathematician could not take account, he held; but what is true
in mathematics relative to body is true, although the converse is
not 23. The sciences which are in touch with physical reality which for Aristotle was the world of material things - dealt
primarily with what happened rather than why it happened;
with phenomena more than with the ultimate underlying reasons;
with the 15"t'L above the aL6,t'L (Post. Anal. 76a9-I3, 78b34, 79aIO;
I, 3I). Mathematics would certainly qualify as an abstract science,
though admittedly not to the degree that metaphysics would. By
comparison with mathematics, the other sciences could be called
'sciences' only by courtesy 24.
To sum up the attitude of the two men toward mathematics,
we find that both accord it an honored place. Neither one thinks
it supreme, however. Plato says that dialectics deals with things
in themselves qua Being, and Aristotle says that 'first philosophy' 25 fulfills that mission. It is important to note that Aristotle
particularly does not disparage the mathematical enterprise,
when properly conducted. Also, Aristotle's concept of the nature
of geometrical figures is not at variance with Plato's view of them.
To Aristotle they were abstract (i.e., non-material), separable in
thought from real things but related to them, and possessed of an
intelligible matter.
There are additional similarities between Aristotle's understanding of 'place' and his view of geometrical figures, which also
may be identified with the Platonic conception of planes and
23 Mansion, Introduction a la Physique Aristotilicienne (Louvain, I946), p. 225,
citing 299aII-7.
24 Ross, op. cit., p. I4. The doctrine applies to his whole work, not just to an early
'Platonic period'. Cf. the chronology in Chapter One, supra, and Mansion, op. cit., pp.
I92-3
25 Called 'metaphysics' by later gneraetions.
3I
plane-figures. Geometrical figures, like place, describe relative

position, and though related to the object, may be thought of as
separate from it. Geometrical figures, furthermore, are not in
place. The term 'in place' is used by Aristotle to describe either
the thing or the material of which it is made. In the same fashion
Plato distinguishes the planes from both the particles and the
Receptacle (d. De Gen. et Carr. 329a22-4).
A rough and arbitrary distinction has sometimes been made
between Plato and Aristotle. According to the distinction, Plato
is extremely mathematical, and Aristotle is anti-mathematical.
This cannot now stand. Neither can the old misconception that
Aristotle has a qualitative basis for the universe, while Plato
gives it a quantitative basis. Aristotle does differentiate the simple
bodies on the principle of perceivable qualities, while Plato uses
geometrical means to distinguish them. But Aristotle treats of
them as they appear, and Plato is giving a rational explanation
of the way in which they are constructed. However, both men
believe that qualities arise from the material factor, so that the
qualitative always requires (in experience) a quantitative
basis. But Aristotle does not relate plane-figures to the simple
bodies. The purpose of the remainder of this chapter will be to
determine why he does not relate them to the simple bodies, as
Plato did.
Aristotle's first general criticism which seems to relate to the
Timaeus is that a solid cannot be composed of planes. There are
some, he says, who explain the generation of all bodies by the
composition and separation of planes. However, to compose
every body of planes is a clear contradiction to mathematics
(De Caeta 2g8b33-299a4). This is due to the abstract nature of
mathematics, and to the fact that it is based on the existence of
bodies; bodies are not based on it. Plato would agree, for the
planes are primarily explanatory, and under no circumstances do
they constitute reality by themselves. They mark the bounds of
a body, and delimit an area within the Receptacle where something has come to be.
Aristotle pursues this subject further. If the plane-body is
divisible, he says, then those who give fire a special shape will
have to say that part of fire is not fire because a pyramid is not
composed of pyramids. Also, not every body is either an element
32
or composed of elements, since part of fire will not be fire (De

Gaelo 304 b2-7). With respect to the first statement, it is entirely
correct. A pyramid is not composed of pyramids (i.e., a planefigure is composed of planes), and a constituent part of fire in
abstracto is not fire. The latter statement is equally in keeping with
Platonic doctrine. No body is an element (the planes are), and no
body is composed solely of elements (since they also possess
solidity and qualities).
There are some places where Plato apparently makes the planes
solid, as for example in 54d-55c, where solids are constructed
from planes. Or take 57a, where he says that fire cuts due to the
acuteness of its angles and the line of its sides 26. We can find an
example of this in common use today in the statement that a
knife cuts because it is sharp. (Cf. 6re.) We do not disbelieve in
the steel because we mention only the sharpness of angle! To
emphasize structure 27 is not to rule out ingredient. As a matter
of fact, Aristotle believed it to be Platonic doctrine that, given
the proper conditions and concomitants, the composition of planes
would produce bodies (De Gaeta 306bz6-7; De Gen. et Carr. 3r6a34)
Moreover, if the simple bodies are composed of planes alone,
some strange consequences might ensue. They might unite end
to end, thus forming a great bi-dimensional sheet. Or they might
come together piled one atop another, allowing no room for volume, instead of joining edge to edge in regular figures. Or a third
possibility might be that they would form unorthodox figures,
thus making more than four simple earthly bodies (De Caeto
Z99bz4-3 r ).
These criticisms are, for the most part, directed against those
who considered only the mathematicals, to the exclusion of the
Receptacle. Those who hold such doctrines would neglect volume,
solidity, and the possibilities of the Receptacle which would be
realized in simple bodies. The last criticism is a shaft at those
who believe that chance is supreme. Plato had left the door open
for the union of triangles in various figures, but he stated bluntly
that simple bodies could not be formed except from the four
Plato in s6ab makes the pyramids cut, but he does not mean by virtue of their
geometrical nature only (Cornford, op. cit., p. 222).
27 E.g., 'Sandpaper scratches because it is rough'.
33
basic figures. Now Aristotle attacks those who only posit the
planes, and who think that these can unite by accident, in figures
of any sort. Aristotle, like Plato, is making a plea for reason and
order.
The second general criticism related to this subject is that
the theory which composes bodies of planes, composes planes of
lines, and lines of points, which Aristotle held to be an impossibility (De Caelo Z99a6-<), further expanded in Physics VI, I}. The
previous criticism appeared to be against those who constructed
bodies out of planes-and-pure-space, instead of against Plato.
This criticism also has 'the mathematicians' as its target, rather
than Plato himself.
The Platonists, Aristotle tells us, believe in atomic magnitudes.
If they did not, the triangle would be more than one (De Gen. et
Carr. 316arr-z). For the meaning of this, Joachim refers us to
the arguments in De Lineis I nsecabilibus 28. There we read that
the id~al Line, the ideal Square, the ideal Triangle, and all the
other ideal figures and solids must be without parts, otherwise
there will be elements prior to each of them. That is, they cannot
have parts qua ideal, for parts are always prior to the whole
(968a3-I4). The De Lineis, as is well known, eventually turns on
this view, demolishing it along with the concept of indivisible
lines (points) out of which other lines are constructed (De Lineis
Insec. 97Ia17-<)7za13, z8-<); d. Aristotle Minor Works, Loeb ed.,
P41 5).
More light will be thrown on this criticism if we recall that it
was a characteristic feature of Pythagoreanism that surfaces
were composed of lines and lines of points. Members of that
school held that the point had one dimension; the line, two; the
surface, three; and the solid, four. Out of such elements they
could construct the world (Meta. 1036b1Z passim). Aristotle,
>. Joachim in his edition of Aristotle On Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Oxford,
1922), p. 76, referring to his notes in Oxford tr. to 968a9-12.
Aristotle is probably not the genuine author of De Lineis Insecabilibus. Ross,
Aristotle (London, 1945), p. 13, finds it primarily directed against Xenocrates, and to
resemble in its doctrine Theophrastus, to whom Simplicius ascribed it; Strato has also
been suggested as its author.
W.S. Rett in Aristotle Minor Works (Loeb ed.), p. 415, says only that this 'most
interesting" and 'extremely difficult' work was written by some author of the Peripatetic School.
At any rate, it is in conformity with Aristotle's position in his recognized works.
3
34
according to Burnet, was himself very decided that the Pythagoreans thought that points had magnitude 29, Plato rejected this
Pythagorean view, for which we have Aristotle's own word (Meta.
9923.20-4). He says that Plato calls the point the principle of the
line (<XPx~ YPIX(l.(l.ljC;). Yet (f't"OLXe'i:OV is far different from <XPX~, as
Aristotle himself realizes 30. Cherniss thinks it entirely possible,
on the basis of the texts, that the view Aristotle had under fire
was actually that of Speusippus 31.
Whatever uncertainties cloud the identity of those who sought
to develop bodies from points, this much is sure: Aristotle did
not think that Plato held such views. The oft-quoted text
applies again, that Plato carried his analysis of the elements
back to planes (De Gen. et Corr. 329a22-3). Aristotle plainly
says that Plato makes the planes the primary reals (1tPW't'1X
U1tclpxov't'lX) in the Timaeus, and these are considered indivisible
magnitudes (De Gen. et Corr. 315b28-33).
Aristotle has subsidiary arguments of his own to the effect
that planes are not divisible. He regarded mathematical figures as
indivisible, insofar as they were thoughts (430b6-14). This is from
a late work, De Anima, and might indicate that Aristotle came
to realize this in old age. But in view of the other references, it is
more likely that he believed it all along. Concerning the indivisibility of form itself, apart from matter, there are many statements
in the Metaphysics 32. The fact that Plato makes the planes
indivisible may well be a mark of their likeness to form.
A third criticism is Aristotle's objection to the alteration of
simple bodies. The Timaeus had emphasized that all the simple
bodies can be transformed into each other except earth (54b-d).
Aristotle correctly reports this distinction, though he disagrees with
it (De Gen. et Corr. 33zaz8-30, De Caeta 306aI-6). He says that if
this were true, earth alone would be entitled to the name, 'element' .
Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (ed. 4; London, 1948), pp. 290-1. He notes that
Zeller differs. Cf. Meta. M, 6, I080b18 f. and De Caeto, 300a16.
3. Milhaud, Les Philosophes-Geometres de la Grece (Paris, 1900), p. 341. Cf. Meta.,
Delta.
31 Cherniss, op. cit., I, pp. 131-2. See Meta. 10g1b30-5, I028bz1-4, and I085b27-34.
Cf. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford, 1924), II, p. 457 n. 32.
32 I016b1-6, 23; I034a8 tin.; 1044a4-9; 1045b23; I052a29-36; I088bI4-16, 25-8.
Also, De Anima, 41Zb6-9, 430b14-20, 27-31. This does not affect, of course, his
general attack on the divisibility of solids, to be found in De Gen. et Corr., 325b253z6b7.
35
It alone would be indestructible, and would not be alterable into

anything but itself. It would also be indissoluble and elementary.
All of this should lead one to ask why Plato made earth to be
constructed according to different triangles from those of the
other three simple bodies. It was not that earth did not appear
to change into the other bodies (49cd) 33. Perhaps it was a means
of protest against those of his predecessors who reduced. everything
to a single element of visible material. The case is that the earthplanes delimit the same Receptacle that is delimited by the
planes of other bodies.
Aristotle, on his side, would concur in both respects. (I) He is
against making anyone material body supreme (De Cada, III, 5).
(2) He also holds that from the same underlying potentiality
(prime matter, corresponding to Plato's Receptacle), earth and
the other simple bodies are alike derived. He differs from Plato
because earth in Plato's scheme is wholly different from the other
simple bodies; in Aristotle's view, it is related to the others in the
series of contraries.
A corollary of this criticism is that not all of the triangles will
necessarily be used up when one body changes into another,
hence, not all of the body changes into another body (De Cada
306a21-b3). This would not only seem to be perfectly true, but
in keeping with the spirit of Aristotle's own doctrine. A body
drops a contrary, according to Aristotle, when it is transformed
into another body. His comment, in this same section, that the
figure of drifting planes is unsatisfactory is true if one takes
these as literal plates of corporeal matter 34, or if one stresses
only the planes to the exclusion of the Receptacle. Fortunately,
one is not restricted to these choices. Plato is thinking of pure
geometrical triangles. It is no doubt just a picturesque depiction
of the truth that the four kinds are prior in perception but not in
Being; and that while they change into each other, with the
exception of earth, this change can only be understood in terms
of rational elements common to all. It should also be remembered
that Aristotle's bodies did not come from each other primarily,
but from the substrate, so that he is again drawing the parallel
between his doctrine and that of Plato.
aa Vs. Cherniss, op. cit., I, ISO .
< As Martin did, d. Cornford,
op. cit., p.
229.
36
A fourth criticism is that Plato neglected compounds. He

discussed the generation of elements, Aristotle acknowledges,
but did not discuss all coming-to-be (De Gen. et C01'1'. 3ISaZ9-3I).
At first glance this seems a rather peculiar statement, for S9d-6Id,
while not exhaustive, indicates that the simple bodies can unite
and gives some of the compounds. More proof of Aristotle's
erring ways could be based on his statement that Plato did not
deal with the generation of flesh and bone, which is in direct
contradiction to the Timaeus (De Gen. et Corr. 3ISa31-3; d.
Tim. 73d-74d). But before any such drastic conclusions are
formed, it would be well to understand what Aristotle means.
It is generally agreed that Plato treats in detail of the generation of the elements, and that he gives much specific information
regarding them. He does not, however, discuss compounds in the
same, detailed, analytical manner. Rather, he gives a sketchy,
phenomenalistic type of summary of them. Plato describes the
conditions in which they are made, not the nature or method of
their structure. As compared with his treatment of the simple
bodies, Aristotle is correct that he seems not even to deal with
compounds, and this includes flesh and bone.
Plato, Aristotle rightly complains, does not adequately describe
the nature of compounds. Is a continuous body like flesh or bone
to be produced from the collocation of discrete atoms (De
Cado 306b22-S)? How else can one conceive them, if no compound
is described which bridges the particles and unites them in a
higher unity? It is as hopeless as that other impossibility, of constructing a line out of points. Continua cannot be made out of
aggregations.
From a comparison of these two views of simple body, and
from Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's view, some definite conclusions can be stated. The regular geometric figures of Plato refer
to solid, simple bodies, though the figure may be theoretically
detached from the simple body. Figures always appear within
the Receptacle, and therefore are surrounded. Aristotle's doctrine
of 'place' exhibits many of the same characteristics - it is full, it
may be detached, and it cannot exist without something surrounding it. Aristotle does not employ the planes, and in his
view, 'place' includes an object rather than a particle alone. But
otherwise, it seems to be a direct adaptation of Plato's view of
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICIS M OF THE SIMPLE BODIES
37
plane-figures, and to represent the same thing, though described

in different terms.
A companion conclusion is that the plane-figures represent
that which has come to be, qua delimited in space and rationally
understood. They are a finite limitation of the infinite. It has
also become clear that the plane-figures are not Ideas. True, they
have definite functions. Ontologically, they delimit an existing
body, and epistemologically, they are the means by which uniform nature and behavior are understood. These could be linked
with the function of form. But the plane-figures are found in
objects, and there are many of the same kind. Plato, on the other
hand, would believe in the transcendence and uniqueness of
Ideas.
Furthermore, the figure of drifting planes is not just a flight
of fancy or a device showing Plato's inability to deal with them.
It has definite significance. (a) It indicates that there are a
definite number of common principles for explaining basic
phenomena, a goal science has always sought. Thus, Plato contends not only for the possibility of scientific explanation, but for
principles which in their own way reflect the best ideals of science
(uniformity and parsimony). It also has other meanings. (b)
That which bounds is greater than that which is bounded, since
there is room for drifting planes; and Aristotle agrees that matter
is greater than any particular body. (c) Though not all extension
is bounded, we can only sense, and rationally explain, that which
is bounded. (d) Within the Receptacle is the possibility of rational
determination.
There is also good reason to conclude that Aristotle is fully
aware of the meaning of Plato's Receptacle, and is restating this
in his own doctrine. He does it, first, in his view of primary
matter, as regards it contents and possibilities 35. The second way
in which he does it is through 'secondary matter', with respect
8. There is a striking parallel between the rigid field convention of modern quantum
physics and the Receptacle of Plato. Both are delimited in order for solid bodies to
appear. Solid bodies of any type can appear anywhere, subject only to the delimiting
factors involved (object-particles in the case of modern physics, planes in the case
of Plato) and other bodies in the field. Both are 'nothing' until delimited, but potentially everything.
This was first brought to the writer's attention by Dr. Nels Lindenblad of Princeton,
N.J. Cf. Eddington, Fundamental Theory (Cambridge, I946), pp. 22-5.
38
to the place it occupies, its actualities, and its location in a particular body.
A four-fold agreement exists between Plato and Aristotle on
the major points involved. Both agree that a mathematical
construction is not a material construction. There is a difference
of viewpoint on the relation of the simple bodies (Aristotle linking earth closer to the other bodies, while Plato separates it),
but they are agreed on the deeper issue that no one simple body is
basic (vs. the Ionians). Aristotle further recognizes and accepts
the Platonic distinction between the Receptacle and plane-figures
Finally, both agree that an object can only result from a finite
limitation of the infinite. The criticisms Aristotle offers are
constructive, rather than destructive.
They both hold an equally high view of mathematics, and its
function. When Aristotle challenges the mathematical construction, therefore, he is probably attacking those who ignore other
aspects of Platonic doctrine and who attempt to construct solids
from plane-figures and the void. It cannot be done. Thus he
begins with the standpoint of experience, and attempts to validate the essential Platonic doctrines, with arguments and terminology of his own. He does not employ geometrical constructions because they have been misused, possibly by some of
Plato's avowed followers. As Plato found it necessary to attack
the Physicists, Aristotle now seeks to put to rout the Pythagoreans. But the evidence is overwhelming that Aristotle, at the
same time, was consciously defending the doctrine he had received
from Plato.
CHAPTER IV
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF QUALITIES

There is a widely-quoted line from Goethe's Faust, 'In the beginning is the act'l. By that is meant that the fuU development
of anything is largely determined in its inaugural stages. (Cf.
Rep. 377a.) The same is true of Plato's view of qualities. Their
character is fixed at the outset by the nature of the primary
bodies which originate them, and which, in turn, they express.
The term 'quality' can be used to represent the intelligible
aspect of anything, what might be called the basic 'essence'. In
this sense one could speak of the qualitative perfection of the
Ideas in Plato, or point out the rational, purposive structure of
the universe and its constituents 2. Other chapters of this study
deal with quality from that standpoint. The special concern of
this chapter, however, will be with quality in another sense,
that of sensations, or qualities in experience (otLa61J't"&.).
Plato deals at length in the Timaeus both with qualities and
their causes (6Id-68d). His lively account describes the changes
that take place in the world, in the body as a whole, and in sense
organs in particular. It should be borne in mind that Plato is
not interested in the properties of things in themselves, so much
as he is with the reactions that they can and do produce in sentient beings 3. So throughout the Timaeus, Plato stresses two
factors. On the one hand, he emphasizes the physical reality
which acts; on the other, the resultant subjective change 4.
Goethe, Faust, Part I, Scene iii (tr. Bayard Taylor; Boston, 1870; T, 51).
As, e.g., Milhaud, Les PhilosophesGeometres de la Grece, pp. 348-9, and Field,
The Philosophy of Plato, p. 140.
'The affections so far as perceptible', hoc 7t1X6l)(.L1X1:1X /)O'IX a:ta67)1:txoc), 61C.
This is brought out by the terms employed in each case. The former is spoken of as
a doer (3pNV) 6zb; cause (lXhllX) 63e (twice), 64a, 6Sb, 67b, c, e; and agent (1:0 7totl)alXv)
64b. The effect or affection (passive sense) is called 7toc6o<; (6zb, 64b, c, d, 6Sb,66b,
68a) or 7toc67)(.L1X (61C, d - second mention, 6za, 63e - first mention, 64a - first
mention, 6Sb, 66b, c, 67b, e). 7toc6o<; in 61e is used in an active sense; 7toc67)(J.1X appears
1
40
It will be worth our while to see how these principles are spelled
out in detail in Plato's analysis of qualities. To that analysis,
therefore, we now tum our attention.
Plato first takes notice of certain general qualities. 'Heat', for
example, is an affection due to the cutting property of fire
particles (6rd-6za). A more complex explanation is required for
'cold'. He decribes cold as due to liquids with larger particles
surrounding a body, entering into it, and driving out smaller
particles. Because the larger particles are unable to pass into
the smaller ones, they compress the moisture within the body.
Their uniformity and compression brings about an immobility
and density rather than a non-uniformity and motion. The result
is that the parts so contracted, contrary to their nature, struggle
in an opposite direction. This fighting and shaking is none other
than 'trembling' and 'shivering'. The affection as a whole is termed
'cold' (6zab).
'Hard' is applied to the things to which our flesh gives way;
'soft' is applied to those things which give way to our flesh. There
is also a physical reason for the sensation of softness; the constituent particles of the given thing have small bases. Contrarywise, when particles are constituted of quadrangular bases,
firmly established, they are most inelastic. Masses of such
particles are of very dense composition, hence most rigid and
hard (6zbc). Since Plato's view of the 'heavy' and the 'light' is
too important to be summarily dealt with, we leave it for later
consideration. The next quality is that of 'roughness', caused by
hardness combined with irregUlarity. Its opposite is 'smoothness',
a feeling which results from regularity combined with density.
There are other qualities, likewise the product of external
causes, which 'we feel' because they are related to our whole
organism. Pleasure and pain come under this category. An affection which is violent and opposed to nature possesses a painful
intensity. The 'return to normalcy' is pleasant. The theory is the
same as the one propounded in the Philebus, that deviation from
a harmonious state brings pain, while return to it brings pleasure
(Phileb. 3rd-3zb).
to be used in an external, active sense in 6Id - first mention, 64a - second mention,
and 64d.
Note Plato's purpose at the opening of the discussion on qualities: ' ... to elucidate
the Causes which account for ... affective qualities'. (6IC)
4I
We should scarcely say that vision is pleasurable or painful,

because it takes place with ease. Nor are we aware of the concomitant pain when the emptying is gradual, and the replenishing
intense and abundant. (The pleasure of smelling perfume is a
case in point.) But when all those parts which undergo violent
alterations are restored gradually and with difficulty to their
original condition, results of a very different kind are produced,
Dislocations and upsets in the physical order, such as those caused
by the burning and cutting of the body, would suffice to bring
about such a state (64c-6Sb).
Qualities arising through specific organs of sense are the next
ones to be considered. Once again, the affections themselves and
the agents which produce them are both important (6Sb).
The first group of such qUalities are flavors. The tongue, which
is the organ involved in this case, is particularly sensitive to
conditions of smoothness and hardness. Flavors, therefore, are
largely responsible for the contractions and dilations which are
its affections.
Plato conceived of the tongue as having fine veins, capable of
receiving substances. These veins are not to be confused with
blood vessels. They were unusually sensitive and passed their
reactions along to the heart; in tum, that organ made the individual conscious of the reactions (6scd). While this explanation
may not have the refinement of modem theories of the nervous
system, it is nevertheless a valiant attempt to explain the physiological basis of sensibility. Once again, by his orderly, consistent
recourse to physical causes, Plato is scientific in the best sense of
the word.
Another example is to be found when one tastes earthly particles. These particles, according to Plato, strike the moist, soft
parts of the tongue and are melted down, a process which in tum
contracts and dries the small veins. If they are rougher, we label
them 'astringent;' if less rough, simply 'harsh'. Or in the case of
detergents, the particles may have such a powerful effect that
they wash out part of the tongue's surface, as in the case of
alkalies. A substance like this is called 'bitter'. A property less
strong than alkaline, detergent to a moderate degree, and consequently more agreeable, is known as 'saline' (6sde).
There are other particles which share in the heat of the mout h
42
and are made smooth by it. When they are inflamed, they burn
and cut the part that heated them (the tongue), and fly upward
because of their lightness, burning, and cutting. Whatever substance possesses these properties is said to be 'pungent' (6se-66a).
Particles that have been refined already by putrefaction enter
the narrow veins and cause a circulating movement. Fermentation takes place, and the mass seethes with air bubbles. Substance
with these properties is known as 'acid' 5. Whenever, by contrast,
the moist particles enter the tongue, they oil its roughened parts.
The tongue then relaxes and returns to the natural state. If
parts of the tongue are unnaturally dilated, they contract; and
those that are contracted dilate. Tastes such as these are most
pleasant to everyone; they are the affection called 'sweet' (66a-c).
Plato lists odors as the second set of qualities known through
the sense organs. There are no fixed varieties here as there were
in the case of flavors. Smells must be classified as a half-formed
state, the reason being that our veins in these organs are of too
narrow a construction to admit the primary bodies, earth and
water; and too broad to detect those of fire and air. No primary
body, therefore, can have an odor. An odor can only arise in the
intermediate state of being moistened or putrified, melted or
vaporized. One such intermediate is mist, which is air passing
into water. Another is smoke, water passing into air. It is not
difficult to make the deduction that smells refer to things thinner
than water and thicker than air. A sudden, deep breath makes it
impossible to smell. All that can be said of smells is that those
which are rough and irritate the bodily cavity between the head
and the navel are' painful', while those which mollify it and restore
it to its natural condition are 'pleasant' (66d-67a).
The third set of special qualities are sounds. In general, Plato
reports, a sound is a stroke transmitted through the ears by the
action of the air upon the brain and the blood, finally reaching
the soul. We today would not agree with him that the final seat
of hearing is the liver, but much of his preliminary analysis of
5 Although chemistry as a science did not come into existence until many centuries
after Plato, he is in this case giving an explanation which is in chemical terms. It is
properly said that in this he shows a conception far in advance not only of his predecessors, but of Aristotle as well (Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from
Alcmaeon to Aristotle; Oxford, I906; pp. I72-3).
43
the relation of concussion and sound is acceptable. For instance,

we do say that a very rapid motion produces a 'shrill' sound that
every slower motion produces a 'deep' sound, although we describe the agent, rather than the 'sound wave', in those terms.
A uniform motion is responsible for an 'even' and smooth sound;
the opposite kind of motion produces a 'harsh' sound. A great
motion causes a 'loud' sound, whereas a motion of the opposite
kind results in a 'soft' sound (67a-c).
The fourth set of qualities which Plato names are detected by
the eye, and known as 'colors'. He conceives of the eye as giving
forth a stream of light, just as the object does. The character of
these streams, and the way they meet and mingle, determines
how things appear to an observer. For example. the particles
flying forth from the object can be smaller, larger, or equal in
size to the particles of his visual stream. If they are equal, the
particles are imperceptible; the object then is described as 'transparent'. Just as sweet and bitter objects react on the tongue, so
particles larger or smaller than those of the visual stream react
on the eye. The smaller particles dilate the stream to give the
sensation of 'white'; while those that are larger contract it and
give the impression of 'black' (67c-e).
There is also a definite reason that the eye waters when it is
confronted with a dazzling white. This reaction is quite in keeping
with the character of white. It is a species of fire, and dissolves
some of the passages of the eye when it penetrates it. The sparkle
of colors felt when the eye waters is again consonant with the
whole process, for tears are partly fire which, as it goes out,
meets fire coming in, with a resulting diffusion of brilliance.
Flashes of red often seen at such a time are caused by the fire's
ray, as seen through moisture. 'Bright color' blended with white
becomes 'yellow'. The other colors and blends follow in order
(67e-68d).
This manner of acquiring sensation, surprisingly enough, has
many similarities to that advanced by the relativist in the Theaetetus. The latter theory of quality is found in the midst of the
discussion of sense-perception as knowledge (Theae. ISSd-IS7c). A
natural impulse might lead the reader to think that Plato is
returning to a Protagorean view of knowledge. For if each individual acquires knowledge by his separate interaction with a
44
given stimulus, the eannarks of a relativistic epistemology begin

to appear.
There are a number of reasons for believing that the Theaetetus
discussion in some sense really does express Plato's view. In the
first place, the same position is set forth seriously in the Timaeus,
both in references already given in this chapter, and in others
(43b-d, 4Sb-d, 46a-c). Secondly, the Theaetetus version is quite
obscure in stating who is the author of the doctrine. It is variously ascribed to Protagoras, to certain unnamed thinkers, and to a
whole host of philosophers, including even Homer and Epicharmus (Theae. IS2C, e, ISSd, Is6a). These attributions are not taken too seriously by scholars today, who think that there is
little doubt that the theory is really Plato's 6.
The next question is, in what sense is the theory Plato's? It
could not be his view of knowledge, for knowledge does not consist of sensations huddled indiscrimately within us, like Greeks
in the Trojan horse (Theae. 184d). The expert is not one who accepts sensations uncritically, but one who goes behind them to
draw out the true element (Theae. 178b). Perception is not
knowledge; knowledge lies in reasoning about sensations (Theae.
186de). The whole burden of the reminiscence doctrine is that
knowledge is called forth in us with but not Irom sensation. We
must conclude that Campbell was correct when he judged the
Theaetetus account of sensation to be Plato's own. Though rejected
as a theory of knowledge, it is retained as a 'probable' doctrine
of sense 7.
This still might not seem satisfactory to some. How can the
knowledge of the meeting and mingling of two streams of light
be any less fluid and relativistic than that meeting itself? Furthermore, if knowledge is fixed and abiding, how can it be described
in terms of movement, even if this 'knowledge' be of sensation?
(Cf. Phileb. 33d-34a; Tim. 64a-c, 43b-d.) The answer must be,
partly at least, that the movement ascribed to the mind is not
a physical one. It is merely the description of rational regularity
or irregularity in physical terms.
Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, I935), p. 49, citing Jackson, in
Journal of Philology, XIII, 250 fi. and Burnet, Greek Philosophy, Part I (London,
1924), p. 242. Archer-Hind held the same view (The Timaeus of Plato, p. 21).
7 Campbell, The Theaetetus of Plato (Oxford, I883), pp. 59-60n.
45
For the remainder of the answer, we must again consider the

Receptacle and the nature of the simple bodies. Plato spoke of the
~UVcXILe:tI; that come and go in the seething turbulence of the Receptacle, prior to creation. Every variety of appearance was
presented by it (S2d-S3c). But these potencies and powers were
not abolished by the giving of specific forms and orderly ratios.
Indeed, the Receptacle is characterless, invisible, and unknowable in itself (SOd-SIb); only as it is delimited by plane-figures
can it be known in experience. We do not know the plane-figures,
except by rationalizing. But we do know the simple bodies which
those figures delimit. We know them through physical intermediaries, but regularity of effect (our knowledge) is always guaranteed by regularity of cause (the stable nature of the types of
plane-figure). The simple bodies are what release the potencies,
and make operative the powers latent in the Receptacle. Since
the physical thing must in some respects have a unitary, fixed
character, our knowledge of that thing must have the same nature.
Aristotle's view was that qualities were not merely found in
experience; they actually existed in matter. In Chapter Two and
Three (supra) we have already seen that matter is what potentially contains them, that privation is the absence of a quality in
actuality, and that form is what brings qualities into existence.
The first pair of primary qualities, the hot and the cold are active;
the second pair, the dry and the moist, are passive (De Gen. et
Carr. 329b24-6; d. Theae. Is6a). In the four terrestrial elements,
the simplest forms of sensible matter, the four qualities are to be
found, coupled in the only four possible ways (De Gen. et Carr.
332a27-8,330a3I-b6).
Every body exhibits certain perceptible qualities, but actually
is not constituted solely of them. The qualities are, however, a
revealing guide to the nature of a given sensible matter. A change
in the qualities of the elements involved is the occasion for a true
chemical union, and the resultant ({LLX6ev orxpcx6ev) is distinguished
from the prior elements by its qualities 8. Details of these processes are to be found in De Generatione et Corruptione (II, 4, S, 7, 8).
We become aware of things through the effect of these qualities.
Each organ of sense has a given normal state (ILe:0'6't'1)c;), which is
subject to alteration (CXAAOLWO'LC;) with an external stimulus which
Joachim, in Journal of Philology, XXIX, 57; 72-7, 8r, 84.
46
has either more or less of the quality which our sense organ possesses. In the act of alteration, the sense organ changes form a
state of sense-potency (OUVcx(l.~C;) to one of sense-act (evepye~cx). (De
An. II, S-II). The first entelechy (ev't'eAex.e~cx) of the organ of sense
(its potentiality) is converted into the second entelechy (its
actuality). (Cf. De An. II, I, 2.) There is a co-operation between
the sensed object and the sensor. Since by definition there must
l?e a difference between the state of each, part of the contrariety
will flow from each to the other. For example, with a hot object
and a cold hand, heat will go from the object into the hand, and
cold from the hand into the object. The same elements which
form the cxl~1J't'~ will also form the cxl0'61J't'~x~. (Cf. De Sensu,
44Ib8-IS, De Gen. et Corr. II, 2).
So far it appears that like is known by like, and that Aristotle
is apparently describing the world in terms of his experience of
it. This is far from true. In his view, thought could only discover
its objects within itself; these objects were the universals ('t'oc
xcx66AOU). Sense perception could only deal with particulars ('t'oc
xcx6' hcxO"'t'ov), and never could sensation be knowledge (Post.
Anal. I, 31). To contact the matter with the form in the manner
of plants, is to preclude any understanding. One who truly
senses extracts the sensible form alone (De An. II, 12). It is
the form which causes the qualities to appear and disappear in
matter, therefore, form is that which is expressed through them.
(Cf. De Gen. et Corr. II, g.)
To sum up their views on quality, we find a great deal in common between them. Both believe that there are rational elements
in things, and that these rational elements find expression in the
qualities which we sense in experience. Again, both men hold
that the physical qualities in themselves are not knowledge;
there must be a rational understanding of them. Another agreement is that qualities arise from the material, Plato, in the myth,
sees them in the Receptacle; they are actually there only for the
one who experiences them, as he interacts with a delimited part
of it. Aristotle believes them to be in matter directly, either in
actuality or potentiality. Lastly, the two men regarded the qualities as ultimately not self-explanatory; the forms accounted for
them in the case of Aristotle, the plane-figures in the case of Plato.
Although the one regarded quality as a result of the simple
47
bodies, and the other regarded quality as within the simple bodies,
neither believes that quality could be experienced apart from
interaction with external, quantitative bodies 9. Beare's harsh
words regarding Plato's conception scarcely seem warranted 10.
He says that Plato could not find in the operations of sense anything fixed or stable which could form the basis of knowledge.
The same is true of Aristotle. Both men had difficulties explaining
how knowledge, which is mental, could arise from sensation,
which is physical. The 'common sense' of Aristotle, which Beare
cites, is admittedly an improvement, but it only pushes the problem back one stage without finally solving it.
As a matter of fact, Plato was much more scientific in his
treatment of physical phenomena than was Aristotle. He pursued
explanation by mechanical causes as far as he could. Adequate
proof of this may be seen in his description of the simple bodies:
their composition, resolution, interaction, and effect upon human
percipients. These mechanical causes, Plato maintained, could
be rationally understood; for they were formed and operated
by rational means. Furthermore, the structure of the simple
bodies were determinate, which was always opposed to the indeterminate in the Greek mind as being the rational. It could be
known as itself instead of in relation to something else; that is,
it was known by essence, not by degree. At the same time, Plato
insisted that any of the simple bodies or their compounds must
also be subject to mensuration of their quantities.
Aristotle was primarily a biologist. For this reason, he tended
to describe and classify, rather than to explain, what we call
'physics'. With all his high regard for mathematics, in practise
he virtually ignored this science, today considered so indispensable
for the physical sciences. He was more ready to describe material
bodies in qualitative or metaphysical terms. This, possibly, is
why he entirely passed over the explanation of simple bodies in
rational-quantitative terms.
The first criticism generally thought to refer to the Timaeus
is that qualities cannot arise from geometrical figures. Those who
Reference to this aspect of Plato's view is made in Ritter, The Essence of Plato's
Philosophy (New York, 1933), p. 209; Robin, Etudes sur la signification et la Place de
la Physique dans la Philosophie de Platon (Paris, 1919), p. 50; and Robin, Platon
(Paris, 1938), pp. 238, 332.
,. Beare, op. cit., pp. 214-5.
48
put the planes together derive solids from them, but not qualities
(De Gen. et Corr. 316aZ-4). Now actually, Plato did not resolve
bodies into planes alone, as Aristotle recognized elsewhere in his
statements concerning the Receptacle and its function. Therefore,
this passage is not directed at Plato, but at those who dealt with
mathematicals to the exclusion of other factors.
Plato thought that the planes described solids. The elements
(triangles) did group themselves together in the same stated
ways, and exhibited regular features whenever they bounded a
given shape. But this was a far cry from constituting solids of
them. The mathematicians, however, did construct solids from
planes. The 'solidity' they attributed to plane-figures was mathematical; it was empty extension. From the plane-figures as
such, the Platonists did not even attempt to generate qualities 11.
Plato's view was entirely different than the mathematicians'
view. He believed that matter was full of potencies, so that
delimitations of it by the plane-figures could generate qualities,
whereas the delimitation of empty space by tri-dimensional
figures could not. Aristotle took notice of this in his identification
of the Receptacle with his own prime matter. The indictment
applies, therefore, to those who follow only the mathematical
aspects of Platonic doctrine, rather than to the master himself.
Aristotle's second general criticism was directed at those who
give shape to primary bodies. The geometrical figures, he said,
are not suitable to account for the given qualities (De Caelo
(306b30-2). For example, how can the power of burning be
restricted to fire alone? If it is connected with the sharp angles
of that body, will not a body with lesser angles have the same
power in a less degree (De Caelo 307aI4-21)? 12 In Aristotle's
judgment, the differences between the simple bodies should be
ascribed to variations of property, function, and power (De
Caelo 307bI8-22). He was criticizing those who based qualities
on shape alone (De Caelo III, 8), for example, the Atomists.
A subsidiary criticism to the above is that when simple bodies
are given shapes, they are constructed with a view to cutting,
thereby neglecting their property of uniting. Fire cannot be
Joachim, in Aristotle, On Coming-la-be and Passing-away (Oxford, 1922), p. 75n.
Plato said, in 56ab, that the other elements do have the property of sharpness,
but in a less degree than fire.
11
12
49
regarded as only a destructive force. While it separates those

bodies which are different in kind, it combines bodies which
are the same. Aristotle held that both properties should be provided for, and that in a choice between the two, the property
of combining should be given precedence (De Caelo 307a3z-b6).
While Plato did think that the chief characteristic of fire is
division, to him this division was but a prelude to a new union.
Fire can be broken down into air or water, which in tum can
change back into fire. All of the elements can combine, which is
why Plato thought that the characteristic of uniting should not
be restricted to fire alone (S6c-S7c, SBc-6IC). Moreover, like
always tends to unite with like in the universe (sze-S3a, 63e). It
cannot be fairly said, therefore, that Plato neglected the property
of combining, as our study of compounds in the Timaeus has
confirmed. In fact, he implies that fire is the cause of more combination than the other simple bodies are. The reason is that
fire more rapidly disintegrates other compounds, which makes
possible the swifter formation of new ones.
A third criticism relating to qualities, is that those who base
them on shape do not adequately explain 'cold'. As Aristotle
saw it, cold is contrary to heat, and was not assigned a figure
because there is no contrariety between figures. Accordingly,
cold should have been entirely omitted or given a distinctive
figure of its own (De Caelo 307b6-II). Plausible as this may seem,
Plato did not have a figure or body for 'heat'. He had one for
fire, which causes the affection of heat. But this is quite different
from having a figure for heat itself. Since cold, to Plato, is likewise
a quality which is felt, he believed that he had provided a sufficient description of the phenomenon by stating its physical
cause. It is evident, then, that Plato did not feel the necessity of
providing a separate figure for every sensible quality.
Aristotle had another difficulty in connection with 'cold'. He
thought that Plato contradicted himself in saying that cold
results from the crushing of passages by particles unable to pass
through them (De Caelo 307bII-3). This is the reason Plato
gave for the phenomenon (6zab), and indicates Aristotle's familiarity with the Timaeus as well as the accuracy with which he
reports it. But - he protested - in a case of this kind, large
pyramids would not be able to pass through the passages, so
4
50
that particles of fire would cause cold. This would prove that
hot and cold are distinguished, not by figure, but rather by the
size of particles involved (De Caeto 307bIZ-8). Quality would be
purely relative - to size.
It would, admittedly, be a strange paradox if the simple bodies
of tire were capable of making one feel cold. However, Plato has
said fire is the finest body, and hence has greater power of penetration than any other (58b). Nor can we forget that the chief
property of fire is its lacerating nature. Any passage that compressed particles of this class would soon find itself punctured
and torn, or else it would quench and dissolve the particles
(S7ab). Under either circumstance, the contradiction could not
be realized. But Aristotle's criticism is valid, if one considers
bulk alone. He is trying to show that the quality of coldness
cannot be dependent upon external factors (i.e., the size of passages penetrated by particles), but should arise from the material
itself. It does this, but through the co-operation of the specific
shapes in which the simple bodies are cast.
In brief, Aristotle's criticism with respect to qualities seems
to be directed primarily against the Pythagoreans and the Atomists. He felt that neither gave a sufficient account of reality.
The mathematicians gave an incomplete account of matter, and
the 'physicists' minimized or ignored reason. A complete picture
of the universe should make room for both. Since Plato does
deal with both features, as recognized elsewhere by Aristotle, it
is fair to assume that the present passage is not directed against
him. Instead, it is a protest against those who consider but one
feature of reality - the rational or the material- to the exclusion of the other.
When we leave the other qualities and come to the case of
weight, we find a graphic illustration of the methods of our
two philosophers. For both have much to say concerning it.
We shall begin with Aristotle's view of 'natural places', which
will serve to clarify certain scattered references in the Timaeus.
According to Aristotle, there is a place for each element, and
an absolute 'up' and 'down'. Among the simple bodies there is
one which is absolutely light, and one absolutely heavy. Earth
always has the tendency to move toward the center of the universe, in the direction called 'down'. Fire, on the contrary, flies
5I
upward toward the circumference (De Caela 307bz8-308a33,

308bI3-I4, 3IIbI5-3Izaz8). The intermediate bodies are heavy
compared with some bodies, and lighter when compared with
others. These, of course, are air, which is lighter than water but
heavier than fire; and water, which is heavier than air, but lighter
than earth (De Caeta 3IIaI5-z9). Every body has weight, except
fire, even in its own natural place. But if its weight is less than
that of a surrounding body, it will rise to the top of that body,
as seen in the case of wood floating on water. Yet wood has weight
in the next realm of air (De Caeta 3IIa30-bI4). While the intermediate bodies can be said to have weight relative to the other
bodies, there is nothing relative about their place in the universe.
Toward some natural place each body inexorably tends (Phys.
zo8bII-ZZ).
Plato did not develop the doctrine of natural places in a systematic treatment, but there is good reason to believe that he held
it. He spoke in 63e of the passage of each kind to its kindred
mass, and in 63b of the place in the universe 'where fire its special
abode'.
The simple bodies occupied different places even before the
universe was organized and generated out of them (53a), and in
the present state of things, the bulk of each primary body keeps
apart in a region of its own (57c, twice).
There are definite places, then, but where are they located?
Perhaps the relation of the simple bodies to each other will
provide a clue to these. A definite order seems to prevail among
the simple bodies, whatever the criterion be. For example, if the
bodies are arranged, beginning with those which permeate most
easily and ranging to those which permeate least easily (finest to
coarsest), the order will be fire, air, water, and earth (58b). They
may be listed in any number of ways - in order of generation
(56b), from the most to the least sharp (55a), from the most
mobile to the least mobile (56a) - always with the same result:
fire, air, water, and earth.
It is well known that Plato considered the outer sphere of
universe to revolve once a day. It would be natural, therefore,
to expect the most mobile body to be nearest the whirling outer
circle, and the least mobile to be at the center where movement
is at a minimum. This is exactly what happens. (See p. 63,
52
infra.} The particles shift upward or downward toward their

own proper regions (..-Yjv TWV T67t'C.o)v GTcX.GW, S8c), the main masses
of diverse bodies occupying regions opposite to one another
(63d). The arrangement would be the same as that later taught
by Aristotle - a series of concentric spheres in each of which
most of a given body would be located, and which would be the
proper place for all of it. Fire would be at the circumference of
the universe, next would be air, then water, and earth at the
center 13.
Plato presented his view of weight by means of an illustration.
Suppose it were possible, he said, for a man to travel to that
region in the universe where the bulk of fire is located. If it were
possible to detach a small amount of it from the bulk and carry
it out into the air, there would be a pull of the larger part on the
smaller, of like attracting like. Since the larger amount would
exert the stronger force, the smaller would tend to be drawn
back into it. This drawing force is the phenomenon we call
'weight'. If both be lifted simultaneously, the small amount
will always be labelled 'light' and be said to be moving 'up'. The
larger amount will be 'heavy', and said to be 'down'. The net
result will be that what is light in one region is not light in another;
and conversely, what is heavy in one region is not heavy in another. The quality 14 of weight, therefore, is a purely relative
matter. It is applicable to any body, anywhere in the universe
(63a- e) 15.
The first criticism apparently directed at Plato's view of weight
is one based on the doctrine of natural places. Earth is a cube
because it is stable and at rest, but it will not have this character
elsewhere in the universe; therefore, it cannot be a cube elsewhere
(De Caelo 307a7-8). A corollary of this would be that fire and the
13
Cf. Cornford, op. cit., p. 265.
14 1t'OCe~fLOC't'OC,
15
57c, 63e.
It is interesting to compare this with Newton's theory of mutual attraction,
namely, that two bodies attract each other in direct proportion to their joint mass,
and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. The socalled
'Law of Gravity' is a deduction from this larger principle.
Granted that Plato has no notion of the distance ratio, of density, nor of the attraction of all bodies; he does at least have a rudimentary intuition of the general principle on which Newton's 'Law of Gravity" is based. In view of this, and of Plato's
other serious contributions, it is unfortunate that the Timaeus is sometimes pictured
as a fantastic dream. Cf. Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science (Baltimore,
I925), I, II3, and Dampier, A History of Science (ed. 3, New York, I943), pp. 3I-2.
53
other elements have a pyramid or other form here, while in their

own place they would be at rest, and so have a cubic shape (De
Caelo 307an-I3). The statement regarding earth is correct,
according to the Timaeus: it is the most immobile body (ssde).
Aristotle's inference is also valid that Plato assigns a shape
based on qualities. Plato meant that qualities are first in the order
of perception; and that shape did not depend on experience.
Instead, the body with shape was in existence prior to experience,
and indeed is the external stimulus which causes it.
Aristotle's contention - that different qualities call for different shapes - is correct, provided that all qualities are accounted
for by shape. But Plato did not think that they were! Shapes
only account for some qualities. Others are due to a mass of
material in its relation to other masses, which might be called
'group phenomena'. Weight belongs to the latter, so that the shape
of any particle has no relation to it.
The premises of Aristotle's argument should be given close
attention. He says quite properly that earth is stable and at rest, 16
but goes on to assert that earth is not immobile anywhere it
happens to be, but only in its own place (De Caeto 307a9-IO). In
the first place, Plato thought that the simple bodies were mixed
and mingled in the universe, and that each had its shape whether
in its place or not (S8c, 63a-d). This includes earth.
Moreover, 'immobility' in earth does not imply that there is
no movement of the elementary triangles, because earth dissolves,
reforms, and forms compounds (S6d, 60b-e). What Plato did
mean is that earth is more resistant to such changes than is any
other body. For he said:
Fire and air do not melt masses of earth; for, inasmuch as their
particles are smaller than the interstices of its structure, they
have room to pass through without forcible effort and leave
the earth undissolved, with the result that it remains unmelted;
whereas the particles of water, being larger, must use force to
make their way out, and consequently dissolve and melt the
earth. Thus earth when it is not forcibly condensed is dissolved
(60e-6Ia)
only by water . . . .
By its nature, earth penetrates the least (S8b). Earth, therefore does not have its shape and peculiar triangles because of its
16 't'0 ~E:~'I)xevocL xoct (LeVE:LV (De Caelo 307a9), for &XLV'I)TO't'eX.'t"I) (Tim.
ssde).
54
location, but because of its nature. It will be of the same stubborn

character anywhere in the universe. From the standpoint of
Plato, the attempt to make fire a cube and earth a pyramid
(De Caelo 307aII-3) would be particularly inappropriate, since
according to his explicit statements, the two could never pass
into one another.
The force of the argument is not against Plato, but against
those who would account for the quality of weight by the shape
of particles. Plato accounts for weight by three causes: (1) by the
attraction of like to like, (2) by the attraction of smaller masses
to larger ones, and (3) by the movement of the universe, which
tends to sort the more from the less mobile. Shape relates to
none of these, with the possible exception of the third, and not
to that if interpreted in terms of mobility of parts 17. In this
instance, therefore, Aristotle is not attacking shape, per se. His
polemic is against those who explain only by means of the material, to the neglect of rational principles.
A second criticism, which might be taken to relate to Plato's
view of weight, is Aristotle's comment on 'up' and 'down'. Plato
had considered it a complete error to say that there are really
two distinct and totally opposite regions in the universe, half of
it termed 'above' (~vw), the other half, 'below' (x&''t"W, 62C).
According to this theory, probably that of Democritus 18, everything with mass moves toward the 'below', and the 'above' is
that toward which everything moves against its will (62cd).
Plato thought the proper view to be that the heaven is spherical.
Its outer parts, being equidistant from the center are equally
outermost, and the center is equally distant from every point
on the circumference.
How can anything be called 'above' or 'below' in this situation?
The central part is certainly neither above nor below, but 'central'
And while the circumference is not central, there is no part of it
any less central than any other part. A solid body at the center
of the universe would never be carried to the extremities, because
of its uniformity in all respects. Furthermore, a man walking
around such a body would be at one time called 'above' and an17 The first cause mentioned here only employs shape as a means. The basic principle is attraction, not the particular given shapes.
18 R.G. Bury in Plato Timaeus (Loeb ed.), p. Is8n.
55
other time, 'below'. He would change his location on the central

body, but not his relation to the center or circumference. Consequently, in a spherical universe there is an 'inner' and an 'outer',
but the terms 'above' and 'below' must be ruled out (62d-63a).
Aristotle argued for the retention of the terms 'up' and 'down',
but they have the same meaning with relation to the earth as
Plato's 'inner' and 'outer'. He rejected the implications which
Plato derived from the fire-illustration, because in the Aristotelian view simple bodies will behave the same elsewhere as they do
here (De Caela 277a5-9). Down and up might appear to be different relative to the individual's position, but with respect to the
universe, there was only one 'down' and one 'up' (Phys. 208b14-8).
Toward the center of the earth (and of the universe) is down,
toward the circumference of the universe is up. Therefore, if one
points down at right angles to the earth, he points straight toward
the center; and in the opposite direction from any place on earth
he points toward the circumference (De Caela 308a14-31, 2g6b1821, 3IIb33-6).
It is of the greatest moment to notice Aristotle's methodology
in this connection. Some might think his viewpoint is that of an
earth-bound mortal, who relies solely upon his own observations,
and takes them as the final means of comprehending reality.
Did not Plato use the terms 'up', 'down', and 'weight', in vastly
different fashion, making them relative to the bodies involved?
To be sure. But Aristotle's definitions of 'up' and 'down' have the
same meaning as Plato's 'inner' and 'outer', and are alike opposed
to the Democritean view of a disk-shaped earth, with layers above
and below.
Aristotle was evidently concerned lest certain important facts
about the universe be forgotten by one who emphasizes only
the fire-illustration of Plato. For example, it might lead to the
idea that there is more than one center, and that there are more
universes than the one. Neither of these two conclusions is correct
(De Caeta 277a9-12). Nor can it be that every chance direction
is 'up' (Phys. 208b1g-22). In this, he doubtless means that while
Plato thought he was taking a more cosmic view in the fireillustration, it was one with relation to a hypothetical observer.
A truly cosmic view treats of the universe as it is, rather than as
it is seen.
56
Aristotle attempted to take such a cosmic view. This is corroborated by his reason for earth's falling. The case is not just that
a clod will fall to the ground because the larger mass attracts the
smaller. Were all the earth removed to the moon, it would still
fall to its present place (De Caela 3IOb3-5). This is due to its
attraction toward the center of the universe (De Caela 2g6b8-r8),
and results from the motion of the whole, and the differences of
relative place of the simple bodies. It is not because of qualitative
differences alone, as is often mistakenly thought. Aristotle did not
probe the cause of relative place, but there was no real disagreement between him and his teacher on what they are. To
sum up, both agreed that there is one universe; they agreed that
'up' and 'down' may be regarded relatively, but that this has
no reference to the construction of the universe; and finally, both
took a cosmic view of the cause of weight, rejecting the approach
of crude realism.
The remainder of Aristotle's criticisms relate to the use of the
planes, and are variations on the theme that bodies cannot be
constructed out of planes which are perforce incorporeal. According to the Timaeus, Aristotle observed, a body which has a
greater number of parts is spoken of as heavy, and that which
has a lesser number, as light (De Caela 308b4-8). Nor can it be
denied that Plato did speak of fire as the lightest body, 'since it
is composed of the fewest identical parts', and of heavier bodies
as having more parts (s6ab).
Surely, Plato did not think of the whole as composed only of
planes as 'parts', at least not in Aristotle's technical sense of
'parts' (Phys. 2roar6, 2r8a7). The 'parts' (planes) are only the
intelligible aspects, the rational structure. If these are parts,
then one is forced to the absurd conclusion that inteIligibles have
weight and that the planes are material. Plato seems to have been
making no more than a passing comparison between his theory
and the facts of experience. It is not a final pronouncement that
contradicts his general theory. Such an ambiguity is of the sort
that a follower would have to clear up, particularly if the follower
taught a theory of 'parts' that emphasized the issue.
But suppose one did think that the planes were the sole constituents and responsible for all qualities? Aristotle proceeds to
explore the implications of that view. The weight of planes may
57
be responsible for the fact that a larger amount of lead weighs

more than a smaller, or a heavy substance weighs more than a
light one. Unusual consequences would result in the case of fire.
The more fire-particles there are, the slower they would go, due
to the added weight - according to this fantastic theory whereas in reality, Aristotle says, a larger amount of fire goes
faster. Or, in another instance, if planes have weight, a large
volume of air would weigh more than a small volume of water.
But experience shows that this is not so. It is therefore an impossible view that the atomic parts of bodies endowed with weight
are planes (De Caelo 30SbS-II, 15-309aI). Of course, as seen in
the previous chapter, Plato made no such claim.
By the same kind of logic, Aristotle continued, the point would
be said to have weight, for the isolated planes will contain nothing
but lines and points. The heavier the body, the greater the number
of points (De Caelo Z99bI5-Z4, Z9-30oa3). But unlike bodies,
points have neither density nor rarity, nor do they have the quality
of divisibility. Therefore, bodies composed of them will necessarily be weightless (De Caelo z99 aZ4-bS).
Turning his attention to the elementary triangles, Aristotle
noted that they are all triangles, therefore qualitatively the same.
If like attracts like, all the triangles will go together in a group,
making weight an impossibility! Everything will either move up
or down (De Caelo 3IZbZI-3). On all counts, therefore, the
conclusion must stand that weight cannot be accounted for by
the mathematicals alone; indeed, such a view inevitably leads
to absurdities. The simple bodies must be the most elementary
tangible materials, and they must be considered both in relation
to the world at large and to the intangible realities of form and
matter. This both men believed.
Plato did not disparage sensation in his explanation of the
world. To his way of thinking, all things visible and possessed of
body were apprehensible by sensation plus opinion (zSbc). He
felt that this quality belonged to all objects he was discussing
(i. e., bodies and their affections) 19. Aristotle, too, valued senseperception and attacked those who disregarded it in reasoning
about the universe (De Gen. et Corr. 3z5aI3-16). The hall-mark of
Aristotelianism, announced at the very beginning of the Physics,
10 6IC.
This doubtless excluded Ideas, which are neither tangible nor in place.
58
was to start with the things that are sensed in experience, and
proceed toward those which are more knowable by nature
(Phys. 1843-16-7, 19-21). It begins with observation (e7'Cocycuy1j),
but depends upon experience in the broadest sense (eILm:tpoc) 20.
To conclude, we find that Plato and Aristotle are apparently
of differing opinions with respect to quality. Aristotle made
quality to be inherent in specific bodies. Plato placed qualities
within experience, and attributed their origin to the stimulus of
the quantitative. Actually, however, Plato regarded the bodies
as capable of making the qualities arise. Therefore, in a sense,
the qualities were potentially in them. They were in the objects
insofar as these objects had content, or as Aristotle would say,
were 'material', and not merely because the objects possessed
structure.
As Plato avoided placing the qualities overtly in bodies, Aristotle steered away from a mathematical account of qualities.
Aristotle wanted to avoid the Scylla of pure mechanism 21, and
the Charybdis of dissolving everything into mathematicals alone.
To the extent that Plato was interpreted in either of these two
ways, Aristotle was opposed to him 22. But he was not opposed
to Plato per se, as proved by his lack of forthright denunciation.
There is good reason to believe that Plato himself would be as
distressed at the partial interpretations of his doctrine as Aristotle
was.
Both Plato and Aristotle thought that all qualities arose from
bodies that were (1) extended in space. (2) material, and (3)
full of potentialities. With respect to the specific quality of weight,
Plato stressed that it is relative to phenomena. But once again,
both he and Aristotle held the same views regarding the cause
of weight - that it is from differences in the simple bodies and
in relation to certain places which have different characteristics
because of their location. They agreed in three respects: (1) on
what is light and heavy on earth, (2) on the center and circumference of the universe, and (3) that the fire-illustration cannot be
empirically tested.
20
pp.
21
22
Cf. Mansion, Introduction a la Physique Aristotilicienne (ed.

21 7- 22 3
2;
Louvain, 1946),
With its tendency to subjectivism, d. Beare, op. cit., pp. 63, 205-8.
Cf. Mansion, op. cit., p. 338 f.
59
The differences between their views are more evident here

than elsewhere in their doctrines of natural science. Aristotle
thought that qualities resided directly in the substrate, and were
the differentiating characteristics. To Plato, qualities were
potentially in the substrate, but they were real only in experience,
and were actualized by the intermediate agency of particles.
These particles were to be described in terms of figure, shape,
and solidity.
Despite Aristotle's original approach to the problem of quality,
his conclusions are not in opposition to Plato. He was insisting
that qualities did not and could not arise from mathematicals
alone. Nor could they come from solidity alone, as represented
by 'shape'. In that teaching, he was true to the meaning of the
Timaeus and to the tradition established by Plato himself.
CHAPTER V
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF MOTION
The movement tha:t constantly abounds in the world of Nature

deeply impresses itself upon all human experience. It is seen in
the changing moods of the sky and the restless rhythm of the
tides, in the distant march of the stars and the leaf that falls to
one's feet, and in the transiency of all life. So it was inevitable
that, from the very dawn of philosophy, men should find it
necessary to account for change or the appearance of it. But it
remained for Plato and Aristotle to chart the regular kinds of
movement, and to state the causes of each.
One general type of motion designated by Plato in the Timaeus
is that common to human beings, namely, motion forward and
backward, to the right and to the left, and upward and downward (43b). These motions do not belong to man by virtue of his
soul, which has a motion all its own, but are the motions due to
his physical body, as a careful study of the context will confirm
(43a-c, 44ab, 4zcd). It would seem reasonable to infer, therefore,
that all corporeal bodies are able to exhibit these motions.
Aristotle furnishes an interesting commentary on these six
movements in De Caela II, z, which does not conflict with Plato's
account. Aristotle does not apply the six movements as a group
to bodies themselves, any more than Plato does, but holds rather
that they are primarily descriptive of animal movements. These
six movements belong to animals 'naturally' (De Caela z84b3I3S). The original distinction between right and left was made by
the Pythagoreans, although they neglected the other directions
(De Caela z8Sbz6-z8). The six directions are applied sometimes
to animal movements, while sometimes certain of them describe
corporeal shape (De Caela z8saI6-I7). Since the universe itself is
a body and possesses movement, the directions 'right', 'left', 'up',
and 'down', belong to it (De Caela z8saz8-b33). The six directions
61
are those of possible movements within the tri-dimensional

framework of the world. While those directions specifically refer
to the movements of animate bodies, they are applicable likewise
to the movements of inanimate bodies, relative to an observer
(De Cada z86a1-z, z84bz4-z8, 33-z85az; d. Tim. 36c).
A second general type of motion, and the only other kind
formally enumerated by Plato in the Timaeus is that which is
proper to reason, namely, circular motion (34a). The perfectly
rational character of the Soul of the World is marked by this
movement, which becomes visible through its influence upon the
fixed stars in their movement around the circle of the Same (36e37c, 4oab). Whenever a man is dominated by the same type of
reason that governs the stars, his thinking will be as orderly and
uniform as they are, and will be said to move in the same manner
(37a-c, 4zb-d, gocd). But that which is dominated by sensation
does not have this movement (77bc).
In addition to the circle of the Same, there is another circular
motion - the circle of the Other. The circle of the Other is said
to be divided into seven parts, each of which is assigned to a
planet (36cd). By means of the circle of the Other, 'opinions and
beliefs arise which are firm and true' (37b). These two circles are
identified with two forms of Being. The Same is in some way
related to Being which is indivisible and unchangeable; the Other
with that which is transient and corporeally divisible (35a). A
third kind of circular movement is combination. The circle of the
Same and the circle of the Other are both found in the universe
(35a-36d), their joint action being illustrated in the case of
planetary movements (3gab).
The third class of motions described in the Timaeus, though
not specifically listed as such by Plato, is that of corporeal bodies
coming-to-be. This includes both the generation and dissolution
of simple bodies, as well as chemical change, the formation and
destruction of compounds. (Cf. Chapter 3.)
The fourth group of motions discoverable in the Timaeus are
those ancillary to the coming-to-be of corporeal bodies, such as
the movements of the Receptacle. (Cf. Chapter z.) The' Receptacle
does not describe the world as it now appears in sense experience.
It probably represents the blind, erratic movement in Nature
considered apart from intelligent order. (Cf. 5zd-53a, 57c.)
62
Another movement related to the becoming of corporeal bodies

is the movement of the planes. There is no movement of constructing the planes themselves. Nor are the figures, considered
as types, constructed. But the planes are said to join together in
specific figures (S4b-d), even though they are not the sole constituents of bodies.
Movements of human bodies comprise the fifth class of motions.
Birth and death, the coming-to-be and passing-away of individuals,
are among these (9Ia-d, 8IH). So are feeding and growth; the
latter is made possible by ability to absorb food from the bloodstream, whereas old age and weakness come about through
inability to do so (80d-8Ib, 82d-83b). A third movement of human bodies is that made possible by our legs, movement to and
fro (44e-4sa). If motions were classified qualitatively, the best
motion of the body would be that caused by itself and in itself,
for this is most nearly akin to the motion of intelligence and the
motion of the universe. Animal bodies are capable of this, but
not inanimate bodies. The next best kind of motion is that due
directly to the agency of something else, and the third best is
that which moves the body piecemeal and through mediate
agents. This is why Plato values the healthiness that comes
through exercise more highly than that which is secured by
tonics and drugs (89ab).
A sixth class of motions may be ascribed to God or the Demiurge. Plato does not use the term 'movement' in connection with
the actions of God, possibly to indicate a qualitative distinction
between the actions of corporeal bodies and that of His incorporeal being. God does not move and is eternal, if He be regarded
as the goal and pattern of the universe (29a-e). However, He can
be thought of as being moved by a desire to make the world as
far as possible like Himself (cf. 2ge), and as creating, for He
brought order out of disorder (S3ab, 30a). Although the construction of all things mortal was committed to His servants (69c,
4Iab), the actual construction of the universe at large was by a
Craftsman or Demiurge. (Cf. 32C-34b.) Plato expressly identifies
God as the constructor of things divine (69c) , and therefore,
since the universe is a created god (34b) , He would seem to
qualify as the one who fills the office of Craftsman.
Each one of the classes of motion has a definite cause, some of
63
which have already been stated. In order to have any motion,

Plato says there must be two factors: first, a lack of uniformity
and lack of equality, because wherever there is uniformity,
there is rest. Second, there must be a moving agent (S7d-S8c).
The lack of uniformity which causes the six movements of
earthly bodies arises from the infinite varieties within the four
Kinds, based on triangles of different size (S7cd).
The question of the moving agent of the corporeal bodies
presents difficulties. Plato says:
The revolution of the All, since it comprehends the Kinds,
compresses them all, seeing that it is circular and tends naturally to come together to itself; and thus it suffers no void place
to be left.
(s8a)
This was taken by Archer-Hind to mean that the rotation of
the universe exerts a 'mighty inward pressure', which thus packs
the elements together 1. The Timaeus passage might suggest a
constricting force due to the pressure of the outer sphere, but
Plato did not mean this. Cornford and Taylor agree that the
passage refers rather to the round outer circumference of the
universe which encircles the contents and is the outer line of
demarcation, rather than something which is capable of exerting
centripetal force 2.
The natural rotation of the universe is sufficient to account for
the movements of bodies. Since the outer sphere has much
farther to go in the course of a daily revolution than inner spheres,
its movement will be swiftest of all. For this reason, fire, being
the most mobile body, will find its way to that region, whereas
bodies that are more sluggish will tend to drift toward the center.
According to Aristotle, the analogy of a whirlpool was used, by
all these who tried to generate the heavens, to explain why earth
came together at the center. As in any vortex, the larger and heavier bodies move toward the center (De Caelo 29Sa8-IS). This,
then, would seem to be the moving agent called for (S7e).
It is impossible for every particle to be with the great bulk of
its kind, since there is no void. Small bodies thus occupy the
1 Archer-Hind, The Timaeus of Plato (London, 1888), p. 209 n. 16.
Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London, 1937), pp. 242-6; Taylor, A Commentary
on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford, 1928), pp. 396-8.
64
interstices of the larger ones (SBb). This leads tofurther complications. Smaller particles placed near larger ones tend to disintegrate them, and in turn the constituents of the larger particles
unite, if they can, with the smaller. A whole new balance of
power is thus established, and the reconstituted particles then
tend to shift up or down towards their new proper region. The
result is an unceasing state of motion (SBc), for every physical
body is attracted toward its own kind (Bra).
There are also definite causes for the movements of the planets.
The planets are seven in number: the Sun, the Moon, and five
other 'wandering stars' (3Bcd). The Earth is nowhere in the
Timaeus included as one of them, which exempts it from their
motions. Plato did not feel obliged to go into detail in his treatment of planetary movements (40cd, 3Bde). He considered it
sufficient to say that they move by virtue of the circle of the
Other crossing the circle of the Same, which twists the circles of
the planetary orbits into spirals (3Be-39b). The Same prevails
over the Other. Evidently, this means that while to all appearances a planet is moving along the Ecliptic in a direction
opposite to that of the celestial Equator, the movement of the
universe is so swift that even apparent backward motions are
motions which are really being carried forward by the rotation
of the universe. The planetary paths, seen in a sidereal framework
are always in a spiral, forward direction.
In addition to the combination movements caused by the
Same and the Other, some think the planets have a rotating
movement. The case for such a rotating movement, however, is not
a strong one. The citations form ancient sources are rather
oblique, and arguments from Plato are usually based on the fact
he did not deny it 3. Moreover, Plato nowhere states that the
planets rotate, and the revolution on the axis, of 40ab, seems to
refer solely to the fixed stars 4.
The fixed stars have two movements, both of which are due
to the influence of the circle of the Same. The first is uniform mo3 Cf. Martin, Etudes sur Ie Timee (Paris, 1841), II, pp. 80-85, n. 36. Cornford, op.
cit., believes the planets rotate on their axis, as do the stars (p. Il9), but concedes
that it is only 'implied' (p. 137).

Taylor, op. cit., p. 226, properly points out that the participle 'revolving on axes'
is expressly contrasted with the participle 'going back in their steps,' as 'always
remaining' is with 'wandering and swerving'.
65
tion in the same spot (rotation). In this respect, the star is said
to be able to think identical thoughts about the same object and
to resemble the universe. The second motion is forward circular
motion. These fixed stars are located in the 'intelligence of the
Supreme', another name for the outer sphere of the circle of the
Same, and are made mostly of fire to be as bright and fair as
possible, a fitting adornment for the heavens (40ab).
True thought, as was previously indicated, has but one movement, and that is circular. This prize may be won only by
conscious devotion to learning, and to thoughts that are immortal and divine. In this way, one may escape the encircling thicket
of sense and attain blessedness both in this life and in the life to
come (90b-d).
Aristotle's view of motion is stated in a different terminology
from Plato's, and in more detail. It would seem proper to give
Aristotle's doctrine a closer study at this point, therefore, to
determine whether or not he differs from Plato, and in what
respects.
Aristotle defines motion as the fulfillment of what exists
potentially, insofar as it exists potentially (Phys. 20IaIQ-II). It
is any process of actualization, e.g., of learning, ageing, or practising a profession (Phys. III, I, 2). Other examples may be found
in the making of bronze into a statue, or in the restoration of one
who is sick to full health (Phys. 20Ia28-b3). Aristotle did not
think everything moves, as the Heracleitans did, but he did
believe that there was never a time when there was no movement,
and that there never would be such a time (Phys. 2sobS-?',
Phys. VIII, I, 2).
To Aristotle, the first kind of motion was locomotion, that is,
change of place (Phys. 26Ib28). It is primary because all other
motion depends upon it. Locomotion is prior in dependence
because the affecting agent must be near that which is affected;
it is prior in time, because this is the only motion possible for
eternal things; and prior in perfection of existence, for it is that
which characterizes things as they realize their natural development. (Phys. 260a27-26Ib27; d. Phys. VIII, 7.)
There are two types of simple locomotion (De Caelo 268bI722). One is the rectilinear movement seen in terrestrial bodies.
All bodies are either heavy or light, absolutely or relatively, and
5
66
therefore move either toward the circumference or toward the

center (De Caela 268b21-24, 308a8-33). The other simple type
of locomotion is the circular, which applies to heavenly bodies.
It is more simple and complete than the rectilinear and admits
of being eternal, for it is the only kind of movement in which the
body can be at rest while moving (Phys. VIII, 8, 9). One may
begin to measure this motion from any point on the circumference, but the movement itself is absolutely unbroken, without
any irregularity, starting, or stopping. Moreover, it does not
change into a different type of movement (De Caela 288a14289a8). It cannot possess any contrary motion (De Caela 27ob31271a34). Bodies which have this movement cannot exhibit rectilinear movement; they cannot be forced up or down (De Cada
269b18-270a12). Nor can such bodies be subject to increase or
diminution (De Cada 27oa13-3S). A third kind of locomotion is
compound motion, whose quality on which particular movements
is predominant (De Caela 268b30-269a2).
The second general kind of movement set forth by Aristotle is
alteration. This is the change of qualities in a body perceptible to
to the senses (Phys. 244b3-24SaS, b3-4). The alteration may be
of state or of disposition, of figure or of shape (De Gen. et Carr.
319b12-14)
A third kind of movement is change of size. This movement,
commonly called 'growth' or 'diminution', has two aspects.
On the one hand, it is change with respect to quantity, not of
substance or quality. On the other hand, it involves change of
place, not translation or rotation, but expansion (De Gen. et Carr.
32oa8-322a34) .
The fourth kind of motion, generation and dissolution, has already been discussed (De Gen. et Carr. I, 1-3; d. Chapter 3 supra).
If the movement in question be rectilinear, the cause will be
the attraction of the body toward its proper place (De Cada
269b23-30). But if the locomotion is circular, it will be caused
ultimately by the desire of the fixed starts to become like the
Prime Mover (Meta. XII, 7, 8). In this respect, Aristotle is again
not far from Plato's doctrine. (Cf. 39d-4ob).
The other motions also have their specific causes. Alteration
is due to a new quality of the persistent substratum becoming
perceptible in it (De Gen. et Carr. 319br5-21). The efficient cause
67
of growth is the nutritive soul, which mixes the food (potential

flesh) with the flesh of the body, and turns it into actual flesh
(De Gen. et Corr. 322aII-I3). Aristotle is not following the exact
terminology of his master at this point, but his 'nutritive soul'
does not seem one whit different from Plato's 'appetitive soul'.
(Cf. Rep. 4.439, Tim. 70de and esp. 77a--c).
The most general causes of the motion of all physical bodies
become most evident in the movement of generation and dissolution. These four classic causes are: that which moves, that out
of which a thing moves, that by which a thing is moved, and
that which is the goal of movement; or, as they are commonly
known, the formal, material, efficient, and final causes (d. Phys.
194b23-195b30). So it is that nothing can come-to-be without a
mover, and that the movers are chiefly two: (I) the form, and
(2) the Prime Mover (Phys. VIII, 5, 6; Meta. XII, 7). Here God
is presented as the First Cause of motion. All motions proceed
from it, and yet the First Mover, eternal and one, is that which
does not move itself. Aristotle hints at the solution of this difficulty in the Physics, and states it in detail in the Metaphysics
(Phys. 198a35-b9; Meta. I072a21-29, b4-29).
This study has shown that Aristotle's treatment of motion
corresponds to that of Plato in the Timaeus, both in the types
of motion and in many of their causes. Plato only formally
lists six straight and one circular motion, but the others are nonetheless present in the Timaeus. They are explicitly listed in the
Laws. A comparison of the movements described in the Timaeus
and the Laws with those listed by Aristotle, will make clear the
Stagirite's great indebtedness to Plato 5.
Aristotle
Plato
r. Locomotion
A. Simple.
A. Simple.
r. Rectilinear,
r. Rectilinear
(gliding,
two natural,
rolling) (2).
four unnatural.
2. Circular (I).
2. Circular.
B. Combination (found in the TimaB. Compound.
eus; e.g., planetary movement).
* The motions listed here are mostly those described in the Laws (893b-895b).
They are denoted by a number in brackets which indicates the order in which they
are enumerated in that passage. While details have been added for the purpose of
specifically pointing out how Plato's treatment of movements gave rise to Aristotle's,
in the opinion of the writer these do no violence to Plato's meaning. The discussion of
the ultimate causes of motion in both Plato and Aristotle is reserved for Chapters
Seven and Eight.
r. Locomotion
68
To Aristotle's way of thinking, motion was no minor feature

of the universe, but occupied a post of greatest significance. To
him, it was the chief characteristic of all things corporeal. Nature
was in fact defined as the source or cause of being moved or of
being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily (Phys. 192b2I24). The same sentiment echoes throughout his physical treatises:
Nature is inherent tendency to change, and all bodies which
possess this tendency are said to be parts of Nature (De Caeta
30IaI8-19). To Plato, on the other hand, Nature was eternal
and rational; it did not and could not change. But it brings about
change in the world of corporeal things. The important distinction between form and soul, which account for motion in the
philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, respectively, will be discussed
in detail below (d. Chapter Seven).
On occasion, Aristotle even sets out to prove that this was the
previous concept of Nature. For example, the atoms of Democritus had an inherent power to move, and the Timaeus describes
the elements as moving without order before the world was made.
This movement was either constrained or natural. If it was by
nature, there was already an ordered world. On the other hand,
if the elements were moved by a Prime Mover, then the Prime
Mover moved them by his own natural movements, in which
case there would also be an ordered world. Whichever way it
happened, there was order. But Aristotle's main contention is
that in either case, every body, directly or indirectly, moves
because of a natural movement (De Caeta 30obI7-2S).
When Aristotle contends that the bodies moving without
restraint would come to rest in the places they now occupy, he is
Plato
Aristotle
2.
Alteration.
3. Growth.
4. Generation and dissolution.
5. Efficient cause.
Combination (3) and separation (4) the addition and loss of parts without
changing the basic constitution.
3. Increase (5) or decrease (6) - of size
of parts.
4. Becoming (7) and perishing (8) the addition and loss of parts involving change of the basic constitution.
5. Other-affecting; secondary causation
2.
(9).
6. First Mover, though Aristotle's First

Mover is itself unmoved. However,
the individual forms are movers in
things that come-to-be.
6. Primary causation, which can move

both itself and other things (ro). This
dwells only in soul.
69
entirely correct. That is, the great bulk of the heavy would
shift toward the center, and the lighter would ascend toward
the circumference. As a matter of fact, Plato says that the motion
of the Receptacle shifts bodies up or down, so Plato does consider
movement in the world apart from the action of the Demiurge
(S7b).
It would be well at this point to notice the sharp contrast between
the two men in their approach to the study of Nature. There is
a famous distinction found in De Caelo (zggaIS-IS), and in many
other references throughout the Aristotelian writings, between
'!eX. e~ CtIPCtLpecrE:w<; and '!eX. Ex 1tpocr6ecrE:w<;, abstraction and addition. Physics is a theoretical science; not a productive one, which
aims at making something useful or beautiful, nor a practical
one which aims at knowledge as a guide to conduct. Physics is a
theoretical science because it seeks knowledge for its own sake.
But physics is only one of three theoretical sciences. It deals with
bodies which can be moved, and with substances which are by
definition inseparable from matter. The second, mathematics,
thinks of elements as separate which in reality are not able to
exist separately from bodies. The third theoretical science,
metaphysics, deals with entities which can be studied apart
from material bodies, and which in fact exist apart from them
(Meta. IozSbIS-Ioz6aI6, De An. 403b9-17).
While it is true that mathematical objects are derived from
physical objects, they are different from them. In their definition,
mathematical objects, qua mathematical, do not include any
sensible matter, even implicitly. For this reason, they are apart
from matter and E~ OCIPCtLpecrE:w<; (De An. 43IbI3-17, Phys. 193b3I34). On the other hand, the '!eX. EX 1tpocr6ecrE:w<; are discovered as the
word implied, by the addition of differentiating characteristics.
It is the less simple, as compared with the former which is more
simple. Hence, if one pursues the method of OCIPCt(PE:cr~<;, he makes
an abstraction of all determinations of a sensible order and thinks
of them only as they are quantitative and continuous (Meta.
I06IazS-b3). Plato has followed this very procedure in his
analyses of the simple bodies in terms of planes and figures.
Legitimate as the work of the mathematician is, it differs
from that of the physicist, in the judgment of Aristotle. The
physicist is always trying to consider attributes which are in
70
fact inseparable from the object, and to deal with them without a
separation even in thought (De An. 403bg--1S). This explains why
Aristotle attributed qualities to physical bodies; they were inseparable in experience and should be in thought, too. The one
illustration used by Aristotle as the constant reminder of his
intention is that of 'snubness'. The mathematician may plot a
curve of the nose, but 'snub' implies an identity with the object;
a curve is not snub, but a nose is. Therefore, Aristotle concludes,
all natural things are analogous to the 'snub', and we must investigate their nature as we would investigate the snub (Phys.
194aIZ-I4; Meta. 1ozSbz8-IOz6a6; De An. 4z9b18-zo, 431b1319). It is not in the province of the physicist, consequently, to
investigate motionless objects. Were he to do so, he would thereby
abdicate his office. Rather, he must investigate, in their conjunction with each other, the two inseparable aspects of the world
about us, form and matter. He must be like the builder, who
understands the plan of a house as well as the character of its
materials (phys. 194alz-z8) 6.
This immediately places Aristotle in a very difficult position.
He has already said that scientific knowledge cannot be attained
by the act of perception, even if we perceive the 'such' instead
of the 'this' (Post. Anal., 87bz8-39). And if we derive knowledge
of physics from objects that are necessarily in motion, knowledge
must necessarily change with them. If it does not, then knowledge
must be impossible, for it is certain that Aristotle did not believe
in a relativistic epistemology. Scientific knowledge is not in a state
of flux; even a law of motion is itself motionless. Moreover, a knowledge that would be limited to certain objects would not be science
in the most exact sense, for science deals with universal truths (Post.
Anal., 8salz-86a30). Aristotle has definitely involved himself in
contradictions, therefore, by following the method he sets for
himself in physics. Plato sidesteps the pitfalls by considering the
various factors in their universal characteristics. He has a surer
insight than Aristotle into the nature of physical sciences, as is
Plato, in the Timaeus, often considers the rational and the material in association
with each other, as may be seen in his lengthy study of the making of human beings
(4Ia-47d, 69d-92C). However, he is primarily interested in the consideration of these
two features of the world in separation from each other. This may be seen in the
description of the rational construction of the universe (z7a-4od), and in the treatment of the simple bodies, compounds and substrate (48b-69a).
7I
indicated both by the purposes he seeks to achieve in the Timaeus,

and by the methods that he employs.
By far the most celebrated controversy connected with the
interpretation of the Timaeus is the question whether Plato
teaches the rotation of the earth. Aristotle's direct comment
on the Timaeus has occasioned a wide range of speculation in
both ancient and modern times. Did Plato say that the earth
rotates, or that it is stationary? What of Aristotle? Did he understand Plato or did he misconstrue his meaning? The answers to
these questions should reveal not only their respective views on
one problem connected with motion, but likewise, the attitude
of Aristotle toward Plato. Since such questions are of immediate
relevance to the main purpose of this study, the sifting of evidence
on the problem, would seem a most essential as well as most
promising task.
In the midst of Aristotle's survey of previous theories of the
earth, in De Caelo II, I3, he declares:
As to the position of the earth, then, this is the view which
some advance, and the views advanced concerning its rest or
motion are similar. For here too there is no general agreement.
All who deny that the earth lies at the centre think that it
revolves about the centre, and not the earth only but, as we
said before, the counter-earth as well. Some of them even consider it possible that there are several bodies so moving, which
are invisible to us, owing to the interposition of the earth. . ..
Others, again, say that the earth, which lies at the centre, is
'rolled', and thus in motion [tAAeaeOC~ XOCL xLVeLcr6ocL, Bonitz],
about the axis of the whole heaven. So it stands written in the
Timaeus.
(293bI7-33)
The corresponding passage in Plato, found at 40bc is:
Earth, our nurse, which is globed around [O.AofL&v1)V, Burnet]
the pole that stretches through all, He framed to be the wardress and fashioner of night and day ....
Two questions are basically at issue in the dispute over these
passages. First, what is the participle in the Timaeus and its
intended meaning? Second, did Aristotle understand or misunderstand Plato's statements? As to the first, there is universal
agreement at least on the score that the verbs elAAw, e:t).w, and
72
lAA(J) are constantly confused in the manuscripts 7. But many

eminent scholars have held that the word in questionisetAAo(Lev'J)v,
meaning that the earth is squeezed, packed, pressed about the
celestial axis which passes through it. This was the position for
which Boeckh gave the classic defense 8.
One major difficulty in the way of accepting ett..e~cr6ext as the
correct reading of the Aristotelian text is the additional xext
xtVe~cr6ext. The latter is made all the more puzzling by its absence
in the Platonic text. Alexander was unable to understand this,
but believed Aristotle must have been right, that he knew the true
intent of Plato and followed it 9.
A number of interpreters take the position that the xext xtVe~a6exL
is an interpolation and not Aristotle's words at all 10. Among
these are Archer-Hind, who thought they were added by an
'unwise annotator' who had in mind a similar passage (De
Caelo 296a26), which he thinks does not refer to Platonic theory 11.
But as Heath contends, why say xtvda6ext does not apply, when
the previous word, ~t..t..ecr6exL, certainly applies to Plato and the
Timaeus? The two seem to stand or fall together 12.
Additional support for e:tAAO(.LeV1)V may be found in the Platonic
text. If LAAO(.LeV1)v were the participle, that would be the sole
occurrence of it in Plato. But etAAO(.Lev'J)v is found twice elsewhere
in the Timaeus, and in the same sense of winding up, rolling up
into a ball 13. Moreover, tt..t..ea6ext would require some important
corrections in Platonic doctrine. Plato, for instance, had demonstrated the immobility of the earth in the Phaedo (I09ab). A
Burnet, Early Greek PhilosoPhy (ed. 4, London, 1948), p. 303n.

Boeckh, Untersuchungen uebel' das kosmische System des Platon (Berlin, 1852), esp.
pp. 59-75. For the same view, cf. Martin, op. cit., II, 89-90; Rivaud, Timee-Gritias
(Bude ed., Paris, 1949), p. 62; K. Burdach, in Neue Jahrbuecher fuel' das Klassische
Altertum, xlix, pp. 254-78.
Simp!. De Gaelo, p. 518-18, 20-21 ed. Heib., cited in Heath, A,.istarchus ot Samos
(Oxford, 1913), p. 176.
10 Thomas Aquinas, in libros Aristotelis de caelo, II, lect II, as well as Zeller, Martin, Boeckh; cited in Heath, op. cit., pp. 177-8.
11 Archer-Hind, op. cit., p. 133n .
10 Heath, op. cit., pp. 177-8. Teichmueller says that Aristotle deliberately misrepresented Plato for the purpose of scoring a point; to Teichmueller, this reference is
another example of Aristotle's eristic, sophistic type of attack on Plato's doctrine
(cited in ibid., p. 178). Heath agrees that this must be the case with the XL\le:ra6aL.
The criticism is both extreme and ill-founded.
13 Rivaud, op. cit. (Bude ed.), p. 61.
7
73
hint of the same doctrine is found in the Timaeus statement

that earth is repugnant to motion (sse). But the argument of
62d-63a, that a body is at equilibrium at the center of the universe, is a hypothetical one and does not strengthen the case. It is
true, however, that all explanations of astronomical phenomena
in the Timaeus are based on the hypothesis of the immobility
of the earth 14.
Moreover, Plato's statement that the earth is the guardian
and creator of day and night (4obc) can only be accounted for by
a rotation in an opposite direction to the daily revolution of the
universe. A guardian is one who remains on the spot. In the same
way, if earth deserted its post, there would be day only, not day
and night 15. Proclus explains it as follows. The earth is the creator of night, because night is the effect of the earth's cone-shaped
shadow. The stolid position of the earth, while the sun revolves,
is what causes day and night to come into being 16. This evidence
from Plato tends to confirm the participle e:LM.O!lbnjV, with its
implication of a stationary earth.
The suggestion that Aristotle does not attribute this view to
the Timaeus, but says that others do 17, may be set aside at once.
Though the same formula ((AAe:(]'eOC~ XOC~ Xtve:r:(]'eoc~) is found at the
beginning of the next chapter (De Caeto 296a26-27), it is in a
context where Aristotle is proving that the earth is at rest. He
says that the earth must move with more than one motion, if it
moves. But if it moves with two motions (i.e., planetary motions)
there will be turnings and passings of the fixed stars. As a matter
of fact, no such thing is observed. The conclusion must be, then,
that Aristotle considers the earth to have two motions if it
moves at all, but that these cannot be both the motion of the
Same and the motion of the Other (De Caeto 296bI-7).
Rivaud has concluded that e:LM.O{JoEV'I)V was the original reading
" Ibid., p. 61. Rivaud must have intended to give the Pkaedo reference as logab
instead of the ggb that he cites .
.. Heath, op. cit., pp. 178-9; citing Martin, op. cit., II, 87, and Boeckh, op. cit., p. 6g.
Probably Froclus' argument and Plato's doctrine in this instance are both based on
Empedocles. (Cf. Plutarch, Quaestiones Platonicae, VIII, 1-3, I006c-f. Ed. Clough
and Goodwin; Boston, Igog.)
18 Ibid., pp. 178-9; citing Proclus in Tim. 282bc. Cf. Tim. LOCT. 97d and Cornford,
op. cit., p. 120.
17 Rivaud, op. cit. (Bud6 ed.), p. 61.
74
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMA-EUS
of the Timaeus text. It was changed to [Uo!JlV'l)v, he opines, by

later scholars of the Platonic school who wished to recast the
writings of the master in accordance with the hypothesis of the
rotation of the earth 18. However, Rivaud does not say who
changed the text, when it was changed, nor does he offer any
evidence for the unique theory that it was changed, save for a
vague reference from Cicero. If tllo~v only means an act of
being balanced, as Rivaud claims, this would in itself undermine
his 'recasting' theory.
Three ancient witnesses remain to be heard in favor of a
stationary earth. Simplicius thinks that Aristotle means: If
anyone were to suppose that Plato affirmed rotation in the earth
by taking tllo(.LevYlv to mean xwou(.Levov, there would then be
another class who thought the earth moved. And if anyone thought
Plato meant that, he would be wrong. Proclus stated categorically that while others thought the earth rotated, Plato made it
unmoved 19. Finally, Plutarch unmistakably says that in Plato
the earth is not moved, but stands still 20.
On the other hand, tllo~vYlv with its usual implication of
motion, has become increasingly accepted as the correct reading
in recent times. That it is the only reading of the manuscripts of
the Timaeus which count, has been acknowledged even by those
who differ on its meaning 21. The xoct xwe~O'eoc~ found in both De
Caelo references (Z93b3I, 296a26-27), confirms that movement is
involved; it does not hav~ to be explained away. Moreover, this
is a present participle. The perfect participle of etAe~O'eOC~ might
mean 'globed' or 'rolled into a ball', but the present participle
would mean 'winding up' or 'coiling around' - a strange, incompatible sense 22.
The presence of the word TIjv requires a verb of motion, a
movement of translation, according to some commentators. The
't'~v indicates the absence of a word like aoov, which would be
Ibid., p. 62.
Heath, op. cit., 176-8; citing Simp!. De Caelo, ed. Heib., pp. SIS. 9-519.S; refg.
to De Caelo 2g6a25. Also quoting Produs, in Tim. 2S1e .
Plutarch, Quaestiones Platonicae (op. cit.), VIII, 1-3, lo06c-f.
21 Taylor, op. cit., p. 233; d. Heath, op. cit., p. 175. Boeckh is another who thought
tAAOiLE:\I7j\l does not imply motion at all, but means 'globed' or 'packed'. (See Burnet,
op. cit., ed. 4, p. 302.)
Taylor, op. cit., p. 234.
18
10
75
entirely compatible with the sense of LJJ..O!liVYJV 23. The particular

movement to which Plato refers according to Burnet, is oscillation up and down along the axis of the universe 24. Taylor has
adopted Burnet's theory, but added certain refinements of his
own. For example, he holds that the man Timaeus appears as
spokesman for an early Pythagorean view. The Central Fire is
assumed, in this view, to be in the heart of the earth. There is no
invisible planet or counter-earth, and the center of the universe is
empty 25.
Taylor defends at some length the theory of an earth in
motion, with arguments which should be examined more closely.
He is embroiled in difficulties almost from the outset. For instance, he takes the statement that every planet has but one
real, uniform movement (Laws 822a) to mean that the other
motions of planets are only apparent and due to the real motion
of the earth 26. But this omits all notice of the Timaeus view of
the circle of the Other and of the planets having two motions of
their own. Another text he adduces is from the Epinomis (g87b),
which claims that the outermost circle does not really carry the
other circles around with it 27. Apart from the question of the
authenticity of the Epinomis, the reference should collapse of its
own weight when compared with Tim. 3gab and 40ab which, it
is generally agreed, teach that the circle of the Same dominates
all else and carries everything around with it.
Another passage to which Taylor alludes is the Phaedo lIIe,
which speaks of swaying movements (IXLWPIX), suggesting to him
excursions of the earth to one side of the center and the other 28.
But the reference itself plainly states that the swaying movements
pertain to rivers in the depths of the earth, not to the earth itself.
Taylor, in fact, holds two mutually contradictory views. The
The -rljv is still a disputed point. Burnet was the first to accord it a place in the
main text, though it appears regularly elsewhere as a variant reading. However, it is
mentioned by neither Aristotle, Plutarch, Simplicius, or Proclus; and Albinus,
Chalcidius, Theon, and Iamblichus take no notice of it. Cornford, op. cit., p. 120 n .
Burnet, op. cit. (ed. 4), p. 303 n. 2
Taylor, op. cit., pp. 234-7. But the Greeks all thought that the center was
occupied. The bouncing earth, itself an incongruous conception, would collide with
something else therefore as it attempted to reach or cross the center. Cornford, op. cit.,
p.124n .
Ibid., p. 231
., Ibid., p. 232.
2. Ibid., p. 234.
76
first, that earth oscillates through the center, is not 'Plato's own'
view, but from early pythagoreanism 119. The second, the planetary view with all of its associations of later Pythagoreanism, is
said to be Plato's personal view 30. But if there is any doctrine
which is untenable in the light of the Timaeus, it is the planetary
theory. If the earth were a planet, it would have part of the circle
of the Other, which would be divided eight times instead of
seven. Furthermore, it would be reckoned among the planets
when they are described as the instruments of Time, and the
total number of circuits measuring the Great Year would number
nine instead of eight. A final reason militating against the earth
as a planet is the fact that if it is not at the center, something
must be. Since even Taylor himself does not believe that the
Timaeus teaches that there is a separate Central Fire, only two
alternatives are left. Either the center of the universe is vacant,
which no system of ancient astronomy ever held; or, if the earth
is at the center and has a planetary motion, the very consequences predicted by Aristotle in De Caela 296b1-7 would follow 31. It
is evident that this is not the case.
Taylor has thus fallen into two traps. On the one hand, he
cites references that often have nothing to do with the motion of
the earth. On the other, he employs references at times to argue
for the planetary motion of the earth, a view foreign to the Timaeus. Therefore, Taylor's attempt to find in Plato evidence for
a movement of translation must be pronounced a failure. If
t).}"O(LEV'1)V means a movement of translation, proof of that must
come from elsewhere.
The XIXL xLveLa6IXL still stands as the classic proof that Aristotle
thought Plato believed in the motion of the earth. There is no
reason to believe, though, that its circular motion at the center
of the universe would preclude the natural movement toward the
center, a consequence Aristotle feared (De Caela 296a24-34).
Moreover, the two motions about which he speaks in the next few
Ibid., pp. 227, 234-7, 10, 19.
Ibid., pp. 232, 237. Cf. Taylor'S interpretation of 63a (ibid., pp. 437-8). He maintains that because Plato only spoke of supposing the earth to be at the center, Plato
did not really think it there. But note that Plato did not say the earth was not at the
center, and that Aristotle thinks that this view places it at the center, even though
Aristotle uses it to prove his own doctrine of an absolute 'up' and 'down' (De Caelo
308aI8-I9).
31 Corn ford, op. cit., pp. 123-4.
8.
77
lines cannot possibly be gravity and rotation, since these would

not account for the passings and turnings of the fixed stars
(De Caelo 296a34-b6). The stars would only have such an appearance if the two movements governing the earth were those of the
Same and the Other. Therefore, rotation about the center in some
other fashion is not necessarily ruled out. Whatever the motion
may be, the XIXl. xweLcr60cL lends strong support for the presence of
lAAofLeVYJv in the Platonic text.
I t is extremely unlikely that Aristotle misrepresented Plato
in speaking of his theory of the movement of earth. In the first
place, such a view would require the assumption that Aristotle
was dishonest. Then, too, the chief occupation of the Academy
after the death of Plato was the interpretation of the Timaeus.
Xenocrates, an immediate disciple of Plato, presided over the
Academy for many years, and both the Academy and Lyceum
had members who were close followers of Plato. If Aristotle had
departed from the sense of Plato, there surely would have been
an outcry from these familiar with the master and his book.
But Simplicius and Alexander record not a word of protest by
anyone 32. Aristotle must have given a correct statement of the
meaning.
Only in rare instances do ancient commentators support the
belief that Plato has a moving earth. One of these is the wellknown claim of Theophrastus that Plato abandoned the geocentric universe 33. If this were the case, the earth would have to
move in an orbit. But this is the sole reference of its kind extant
in the ancient commentators. It has also been challenged on
other grounds. While Plutarch cites the statement (giving no
reference), he does not agree with it, as the rest of Question VIII
indicates. Furthermore, it is extremely unlikely that Aristotle
would fail to have mentioned it, if Plato had adopted it when
extremely old 34. Such a view would require the earth to move
like a planet, which has already been seen to be impossible. And
in any case, Aristotle makes a careful distinction between the
Pythagorean view, which considers earth a planet, and the view
.. Taylor, op. cit., p. 234 and Burnet, op. cit. (ed. 4), p. 302 n. 2.
a Plutarch, Quaestiones Platonicae (op. cit.), VIII,!.
Taylor, op. cit., p. 231.
78
of Plato (De GaeZo 293aIS-b33). The Theophrastus statement

confirms that Plato did hold the geocentric theory, in saying
that he repented of it when he grew old. At any rate, there is no
mention or clear implication of a different theory in the Timaeus.
For these reasons, the statement of Theophrastus must be rejected. It is not definitive enough and is contrary to both the
external and internal evidence. There is still room for movement,
however, as suggested by Cicero's statement that some people
think Plato affirmed the rotation of the earth, but in obscure
terms. The rejection of the Theophrastus statement does not,
therefore, imperil Aristotle's attribution of movement.
An understanding of the position of the earth, as taught by
the Timaeus, will not settle the question of its movement, but
will serve to narrow down the possibilities. If the earth is at the
center of the universe, it will be either immovable or will move
in place; if it is away from the center, it will move with a translatory motion. It would therefore be of help to settle this subsidiary question before essaying a final solution of the main problem.
The Timaeus itself seems to imply clearly that the earth is at
the center. For example, all the orbits of planets and the fixed
stars are around the earth and out from it. Aristotle's word is not
that the earth is sometimes at the center and sometimes not, but
that it is situated, is lying (XL{LEV1JV) at the center (De Gado
293b31). The testimony of Proclus (III, 133) is clearcut in this
matter. The behavior of the heavenly bodies in the Timaeus is
always based upon a constant point of view, that of an observer
on an immobile earth. The central position would properly
account both for the regular character of day and night, and for
the eclipses.
As for the arguments that the earth is away from the center,
Theophrastus' statement has already been proved inconclusive.
Some find a basis for this view in Aristotle's report that 'others
believe' it wrong to give earth a central position. This place
should belong to fire (De Gado 293a35), because some think
fire, as the most perfect element, must be found at both the circumference and the center. Such a view would harmonize with
Taylor's theory that according to 'Timaeus' the Central Fire is at
the heart of the earth. It does not conflict with the conception
79
that the earth is located about the center 35. An interesting

confirmation of this possibility is found in the Timaeus (61a),
where it is said that earth when condensed is dissolved by fire
only, since no entrance is left for anything except fire. Earth
would certainly be most condensed at the center because of the
attraction of like to like and the staggering weight of the masses
above. Fire, thus, could be at the center by filling the interstices
of earth. And earth can still be the main body at the center.
Aristotle's statement does not require, therefore, that the earth
be a planet. The general evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of
the earth as the center of the universe.
On almost all sides it is now agreed that the word in Aristotle
(De Caeto 293b31) should be, ()).e:cr6OCL and the one on the Timaeus
(40b) should be l)).o[lev'Y)v; But those who believe in l)).o[leV'Y)v
do not all agree that it means movement, and further, those who
hold that it does imply movement do not believe it to be necessarily a movement of change of place. To come to a final solution
of the meaning of the word and of Plato's intention, it is now
necessary to review the various possibilities, in the light of the
evidence that has been presented. The interpretation which
must finally prevail is the one that involves the fewest difficulties
and explains the widest number of associated problems.
The first possible solution is that the earth is at rest. The
arguments in connection with this point of view have been explored
in the discussion of e:L)).O[lev'Y)v, above. The doctrine was seen to
accord with the evident intention of the Timaeus, with the appearances of the heavenly bodies and their description in the
dialogue, with other statements in Plato, with Aristotle's doctrine
and with the clear-cut declaration of Proclus. The only obstacle
is Aristotle's xoct XWe:'Lcr6OCL. It is difficult to believe that Aristotle
did not attribute these words to Plato.
There are a number of views that the earth is in motion. The
case for mobility in general rests primarily upon the word
lMo(11V'Y)V, but probably no less on Aristotle's words regarding
movement. One specific way in which the earth may move is in
an orbit. This theory was also held by the Pythagoreans, but
Aristotle is careful to put Platonists in a different category from
the Pythagoreans (De Caeto, II, 13). Again, if the earth moves
.5 Cornford, op. cit., pp. 126-g.
80
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMA.EUS
with the same movement as the planets, the fixed stars will
revolve instead of traversing the heavens (De Cada 296a34-b6).
Such a view is also rejected by the Timaeus. A number of reasons
for rejecting the view that earth is a planet have been discussed
above, the chief one being that earth does not appear in any
planetary classification in the Timaeus. There is, in the dialogue,
neither a Central Fire independent of the earth; nor any other
appurtenances of Pythagorean astronomy. The weakness of this
interpretation is shown by the fact that Taylor, whose preference
for it is seldom concealed, cannot prove it on the basis of the
Timaeus. Orbital revolution has too many disadvantages; it
must be ruled out.
Another suggested movement of the earth is that which is up
and down on the axis of the universe. This theory was originated
by Burnet and followed by Taylor, who assigned it to 'Timaeus'.
Oscillation through the center of the universe is the only motion
of translation that Burnet thinks tAAO!-,-SVl)V can mean in this case.
While the movement is on a rather limited scale, it is sufficient
to account for the apparent irregularities in the orbits of the
planets 36. But there are difficulties connected with this interpretation, too. It is predicated upon the use of the word TIjv. The
grammatical principle Burnet invokes is of course indisputable;
the question is, does it apply here? It would seem extremely
unlikely, in view of the absence of TIjv from previous standard
texts of the Timaeus and the silence of the ancients, ordinarily
so painstaking, regarding it. Moreover, the noun that should go
with the accusative article does not exist in the text.
Aristotle testifies to the fact that those who deny that the earth
lies at the center think that it revolves about the center (De
Cada 293bI8-19), and movement up and down is not orbital
revolution. Further, there is no record of any ancient philosopher
who thought the center had no permanent resident, which would
be the case under Burnet's theory. In the next place, both Burnet
and Taylor overlook the significance of Aristotle's word that
Plato believes the earth to be lying at the center (De Caeta
293b3I). It is true that Aristotle says that the earth will not
remain still at the center (De Cada 297a34-b3), but this refers
3. Burnet,
op. cit.
(ed. 4), pp. 303-4.
81
to the parts of earth at the core, not to the earth as a whole.

Aristotle means that the volume of even one piece of earth cannot
all be at the center at one and the same time. Hence, the movement is not of the earth as a whole, but of portions at the center
(De Caelo 297b2-13). It is not likely that Plato held that the earth
wobbled to and fro insecurely, since he vested it with the dignity
of being the first and eldest of the gods which have come into
existence with the heavens (4obc). For these reasons, movement
up and down cannot be admitted either.
A third possible way in which the earth could move is by
rotation on its axis. A rather crude version of this theory has
been put forth in modern times by Grote 37. According to Grote
the earth and the universe must revolve together or remain
stationary together. Plato, he says, does not conceive of the cosmos as an imaginary line, but as a solid, revolving cylinder. The
axis of the universe, on which the earth is located, is a literal,
solid pole. By virtue of the revolutions of the earth, the outer,
sidereal sphere spins. The earth is packed around the axis, and
both rotate together 38. It would seem scarcely worthwhile even
to discuss this view, since Grote ignores the daily rotation of the
fixed stars and the function of the circle of the Same, in addition
to holding the preposterous view that the axis of the universe is
a material rod. The theory of axial rotation of the earth with the
universe, in consequence, must fail to pass muster.
There still remains a fourth possible motion of the earth. It is
one which has found wide acceptance, and has been ably defended
in our own day by F. M. Cornford 39. In a word, it is that the
earth has two motions. One is the revolution of the Same, which
dominates it as well as all the rest of the universe. The second
movement is not that of the Other, since the earth is not a planet,
37 In 'Plato On the Earth's Rotation', pp. 239-75 of The Minor Works of
George Grote (London, 1873). This essay and book were edited and published posthu
mously by friends of Grote.
38 Ibid., pp. 246-9, 251-4 .
Cornford, GP. cit., pp. 120-34. The theory may be found earlier in the writings of
Martin, op. cit., II, 88, 137, Boeckh, op. cit., pp. 74-5, and R. G. Bury, Plato's Timaeus
(Loeb ed. London, 1929), 40b note.
It harmonizes with the statement of Diogenes Laertius, III, 75: 'And of all the
gods in heaven, the earth is the oldest. And it was fashioned to make night and day.
And being at the centre, it moves round the centre'. (Tr. R. D. Hicks, Loeb ed.;
London, 1938).
82
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TI MAEUS
but the earth is a god and therefore, like the fixed stars, is entitled
to a self-movement, which is rotation. The second movement
is equal to the rate of the movement of the Same, but in directly
the opposite direction, with the result that the earth remains
stationary with respect to the rest of the universe.
The testimony of the commentators, that the earth is at rest,
fits this interpretation, and even the participle, e:tAAO!LEV'l'jV,
would not clash with it. On the other hand, if one firmly believes
in the ~AAO!LEV'l'jV and the Xott xLVeL0'6ot~ there is still no contradiction.
Here, if anywhere, it is possible to secure 'an optimum satisfaction
of the arguments put forward on both sides of the question. This
interpretation is, therefore, the most satisfactory of all those
proposed, and is accepted here.
To summarize, all the kinds of earthly motion proposed by
Aristotle are found previously in the Timaeus. Moreover, Aristotle
has followed his master in the doctrine that all bodies are subject
to change. They are also agreed that change is made possible by
the material aspect of things. This very agreement leads to a
different treatment of Nature, as will be seen in Chapter Eight.
Aristotle believes that motion is the chief characteristic of Nature
since the natural philosopher studies material bodies; Plato on
the other hand deals with the elements apart from matter, that is,
in the unchanging terms of mathematics. The purposes and ultimate causes of motion will be examined in Chapter Seven.
Meanwhile, differences of emphasis in the question of motion
should not cause one to overlook the wide areas of agreement
between the two men.
The problem of the motion of the earth is a crucial issue, for it
has often been taken as the classic example of Aristotle's misinterpretation of Plato. The solution of it is, therefore, not of mere
philological interest. Questions of a most important nature to
astronomy have been answered. Plato and Aristotle have been
found in accord that the earth is not a planet, but rather that it is
a body at rest and at the center of the universe.
But most momentous of all are the conclusions to which this
case study leads with regard to the method and spirit of Aristotle's
criticisms. Aristotle does not misunderstand or falsify the doctrines
of his teacher; rather, he penetrates their deepest subtleties. Nor
does he acquiesce in a feeble repetition. Instead, he creative ly
83
thinks through for himself the principles he has received. The

difference between the men in methodology cannot be overlooked.
It will be understood best in the light of their ultimate purposes.
With the possible exception of these passages, the Aristotle
revealed in this chapter is one who has accepted his master's
views as his own, and who means to defend them with all the
vigor and intensity at his command.
CHAPTER VI
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF TIME

Time has long been associated with the moving shadow on the
sundial, with the swinging pendulum, and with motion in general.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Plato and Aristotle who devote
so much attention to motion, are equally concerned with Time,
which is really but another part of the same problem.
Plato defines Time as 'the moving image of Eternity' (37de).
While eternity (alwv) can mean unchanging duration, in this
case it probably signifies 'life', the first meaning given in many
lexicons. The word seems to be another term for the Living
Creature, which is the model after which Time is made (37d).
Time is also described as that in which Becoming proceeds. The
conditions which belong to sense-objects, by virtue of their
Becoming, are generated forms of Time (38a).
The nature of Time will be better understood if one has in
mind the means by which Plato thought it was 'made'. Time
came into existence simultaneously with the construction of the
heavens, for days and nights, months and years, which are
portions of Time, were non-existent until then (37e). Moreover,
if the heavens should ever be dissolved, Time would pass away
with them (38b f.). In other words, Time does not exist apart
from the movements of the universe. A few lines later, Plato
writes that the Sun, Moon, and five other planets came into
existence for determining and preserving the numbers of Time.
A reader who had only this reference, apart from its context,
might be misled into thinking that Time existed prior to the
planets and that they serve only as a means of demarking it.
But Plato is quite clear that this is not the case. Without the
planets there could be no Time, for their co-operation was required
for making it (38e). In this sense, the planetary movements are
said by Plato to be constitutive of Time (39cd). The planetary
8S
movements are instruments of 'times' (4Ie) in the sense that they

delimit a number of lesser times; they are called instruments of
'Time' (42d) in the sense that motion, of which they are the most
permanent and continuous representatives, is what makes Time
possible. The latter use refers to Time in general, the former to
specific periods of Time.
Mankind acquires the notion of Time from observation of the
universe, of night and day, of the months and circling years
(47a). Time is also known by means of numbers. For the moving
image of Eternity moves according to number (37d, 38a, c) and
from observing these movements, one learns to participate in
number (39b, 47a). This is due to the fact that to understand
motion, one must be able to measure it, and it must be measurable.
The clearest measure by which the relative speeds of planets may
be compared is that of the Sun (39bc). However, the real standard
of measurement is the collective movement of the planets (39cd).
A 'Complete Year' would occur when all eight circuits of the
celestial timepiece complete their revolutions at the same time
(39d). In 36d and 38cd, only seven orbits are mentioned. These
are the two groups of 'planets': the Sun, Venus, Mercury; and
the Moon, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. The eight orbits mentioned in
39b ate, no doubt, the seven orbits of the planets, plus the outermost sphere which is the path of the fixed stars.
The purpose of any image, or copy, is to represent the model
to the fullest possible extent. This is no less the purpose of the
image of Eternity (38b, e). There was already a likeness to the
Eternal Nature apparent in the world when Time 'began' (3ge).
And Time continues to exist for the purpose of making the world
'resemble its model still more closely' (37cd). By sharing in the
calculations of Time, man learns the regularity of Reason and
himself imitates the nature of God (47bc). Time thus confers
benefits, both direct and indirect.
In the Timaeus, Plato does not discuss the theory of forms in
as great detail as he does in the other dialogues, but he definitely
reaffirms his faith in them (SId-S2b). He repeats a number of
times the tri-partite division of Reality on which the theory is
based (soc, 48e-49a), and takes them for granted throughout.
Time cannot be connected with the world of Ideas, because the
Ideas are in a perfect state of absolute rest. There can be no
86
motion within uniformity (S7e). Nor can Time be connected with

the Receptacle. While the Receptacle is the seat of ceaseless
change, in and of itself it possesses no rational aspect. Furthermore, Time cannot be related to the geometrical figures, for the
figures do not change in their general types. Finally, Time does
not relate to the planes. Plato does not attempt to construct
them but rather considers them as eternally existing elements
which combine to form simple bodies. If the planes or plane-figures
alone existed, there could be no Time. Space can exist independently, but not Time.
The only remaining entities to which Time could possibly
apply are the objects of Becoming, since they alone are (1) images
of the Eternal, and (2) moving. They are not objects of Time
qua extended or capable of change, but qua changing (37e-38a).
The evident intent here is that the Idea has a perfection. One
does not apply the term 'was' and 'will be' to it; it is always in
Being, rather than existing as an object capable of change. But
the individual changing thing can yet be reflective of the rational,
and has the ability to become more and more like it. Moreover, a
body may express one aspect of the rational at one time and another at a different time. In contradistinction, that which is
ideal expresses these perfections at all times.
The conclusion must be that Time does not belong to Becoming
as such, but to Becoming as ordered by mind (S2d f., 37d). The
world with which Time is connected is a reflection of the intelligible world, and is changing to become now more, now less, like
the original. Time makes that change possible. And while numbers are not the essential nature of Time, they always co-exist
with it, and are the means by which it is understood and measured 1.
Aristotle makes a detailed analysis of Time, and begins by
restricting its nature. 'Time' is not movement, because change is
1 Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass., I948),
pp. 22-26, properly challenges the interpretation that Plato's view of Time was
'number' rather than the 'passage of Nature'. (Cf. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's
Timaeus (Oxford, I928), p. 689, and Burnet, Greek Philosophy, Part I (London, I924),
p. 342}. However, Plato does say (I) that the planets are instruments of Time, and
therefore it is greater than anyone of them or any aggregation; (2) that Time does
not change; (3) that Time and space are different orders. These Taylor recognizes
op. cit., pp. 689-9I}.
faster or slower, neither of which can be predicated of Time. Also,

change is found only in objects, while movement generally has an
external frame of reference (Phys. 218b8-20, 219b3, 221bIO). At
the same time, 'Time' is never found apart from movement
(Phys. 218b21, 34; Phys. 219a2, 9-10). It belongs to movement
(Phys. 219a8--g). Specifically, it is the number of motion, with
respect to before and after (Phys. 219a13-b2, 220a24-2S). The
next question is, what kind of number does Aristotle have in
mind, for number can mean either one of two things - what is
counted, or that by which one counts. Time, according to Aristotle, is the former (Phys. 219b3-8; 221a1-3, 8-13).
The general conditions which bring Time into being have already
been discussed in connection with Aristotle's general definition.
Time is the numerable aspect of movement. This movement may
be of any sort, so long as it is continuous (Phys. 223a29-34). Time
is called 'the number of locomotion' (Phys. 220a3). It could just
as well be called the number of any other motion in Aristotle 2.
However, since the number of uniform circular motion is the
best known, that motion is the best measure of Time (Phys.
223b18). The general position of Aristotle is that locomotion is
the only kind of motion that need not change its pace (Phys.
223a29-224a2). Indeed, when Aristotle says that movement is not
only measured by the time, but time by the movement, because
they define each other (Phys. 220b23-31). he is not far from
Plato's teaching that the movement of anything, and supremely
the planets, is that which both measures and constitutes Time.
This reflects the cyclic view of Time, so fraught with religious
overtones for the Greek mind 3.
Time is not a collection of 'nows'. Time is continuous, just as a
line is; but the 'now' is like a point on a line (Phys. 220~-24).
Time could no more be made of an infinite series of discrete points
than a rope could be woven of sand. There is a Time greater than
every specific thing in Time (Phys. 221a28), for no object can
exist throughout all Time (Phys. 220a1g-26). To be 'in Time'
means to have the attribute of Time, as things that are 'in num2 Aristotle even uses (LE't'IX[30Al) interchangeably with X(Vll<7LC; on occasion, but he is
aware of the distinction between them. Ross, Aristotle's Physics (Oxford, 1936), p.
597
Cf. Frank, Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth (New York, 1945),
pp. 67-8; 82-3, n. 41.
88
ber' are said to belong to number or to possess number (Phys.

22Ia8-13)
Aristotle's criticism of other views of Time begins with a
characteristic blanket dismissal. Traditional accounts, he says,
shed as little light on the nature of Time as they do on other
problems that have been examined (Phys. 218a3-33). One of
these accounts is the view held by some that Time is the movement of the whole (Phys. 218a34-bI). This theory is usually
attributed to Plato, who says that the movements of all heavenly
bodies constitute Time (39cd) 4. Although Aristotle does not
elaborate on this view or attack it further, he does reject it
(Phys. 218bI9). But the truth of the matter is that 'the movement
of the whole' was not Plato's ultimate definition of Time, any
more than it was Aristotle's. Plato nowhere says that the movement of the whole constitutes Time. He does say that the movement of the planets constitute Time, but this seems to be in the
sense that Time is most closely associated with, and best measured
by, their movements (39cd, d. 37de, 38bc). Time remains, to
Plato, the moving image of Eternity; to Aristotle, it is the number
of movement. To the former, it is the meaning of the movement
of the whole; to the latter, the means by which movement is
understood.
Aristotle is probably attacking the view that the motion of the
whole is Time because, as we have seen, he was opposed to the
identification of any movement with Time. But Aristotle thought
of Time, just as did Plato, as always associated with motion. In
the section now under consideration, Aristotle goes so far as to
call 'part of the revolution' (of the heavens) 'a time' (Phys.
zI8bI-Z); but he is careful not to confuse it with 'Time' itself.
However, there are questions of a deeper import connected
with Aristotle's comments. It is entirely possible that some did
regard Time as the revolution of the heavens instead of the imitation of that changeless eternal model, which their uniform
movements primarily suggested to Plato. Aristotle's criticism
may have been directed toward these misinterpretations of
Platonic doctrine, against which Plato himself might properly
have protested. A number of substantial reasons support this
view.
Ross, A"istolle's Physics, p. 596, citing Simp!. 700.18.
In the first place, Aristotle does not mention Plato by name in

his criticism of Time, nor does he imply that he is at odds with
his teacher (Phys. 218a34-b1). Besides, Aristotle can scarcely
be attacking Plato when the doctrine under fire is not even Platonic. Secondly, it is significant that Aristotle nowhere criticizes
the theory that Time is the moving image of Eternity, which is
Plato's main position. If, as some say, Aristotle was looking for
every possible fault in Plato's teaching, this silence is all the more
eloquent. Finally, when all of Aristotle's doctrine of Time is
considered, it will be found to bear a close resemblance, if not to
be identical, with that of Plato.
Some likenesses between the two men may be immediately
seen in the details of the passage at hand (Phys. 218a34-b2).
Aristotle is making the Platonic distinction between 'Time' and
'a time'. The planets, Plato said, are instruments of times (41e),
which would be days, months, or years (39c). Yet he also presented
the view of a Complete Year (39d) when all orbits completed their
revolutions together. This sidereal year is not Time, but only a
measure of it, to say nothing of the fact that the Complete Year
is, in practice, a myth, since there is no point on the outer sphere
to mark where it begins. Were one to observe even this epoch, it
would be but a new reminder of the vast, unmeasured reaches of
Time itself.
When Aristotle insists that all things are 'in Time', he is
speaking of the Time which is greater than any given 'time'. As
an ancient sage once said, there is 'a time' for everything under
the sun. To Aristotle, these would all be within Time itself.
Times are all different, but Time is everywhere the same (Phys.
223bII). Aristotle's usage, paralleling Plato's, is well-illustrated
in the Physics IV, II and 12. For example, he states that the
number of locomotion is time (Xp6voc;, Phys. 220a3). But Time
(0 Xp6voc;) is both made continuous by the 'now' and divided at it
(Phys. 220as). The first speaks of the locomotion of a specific
moving body and therefore of a limited time (Phys. 220a1-3);
the second is referring to all Time. Another instance of the two
terms is in the Physics, section 220b13-16.
Another statement Aristotle makes in this passage is that if
there were more heavens than one, the movement of any of them
would equally be Time. If that were the case, there would be
90
many Times at the same time (Phys. ZI8b3-4). Aristotle's observation is entirely correct. Yet actually, there is only one universe,
and therefore but one Time, as Plato had said (3Ia~, 3ZC-33C,
34b). Aristotle agrees with Plato; there is only one Time, and
none outside of this universe (De Gaelo z79aIZ-16). He is pointing up a similarity rather than making a rebuke. In this connection, it is worth noting that he does not censure the Platonic
view. The Pythagorean view, he says, is too naive to be given
serious consideration (Phys. zI8 bB-g), but no such indictment
is made of Plato. This would give backing to the possibility that
Aristotle's introductory statement (Phys. zIBa34-bl) relates to
the views of persons other than Plato. Moreover, Aristotle's own
doctrine seems quite in accord with Plato otherwise, on this
question.
There are a number of striking similarities between Aristotle's
doctrine of Time and that held by his teacher - all too many to
have happened by accident. (I) They both agree that there is no
Time apart from the heavens or outside of it (3Bbc; De Gaeto
z79aII-b3). (z) Both of them hold that all things at rest or in
motion are in Time (37e-3Bb; Phys. 22Ib27-30). (3) Just as
Aristotle conceives of Time as greater than any specific thing or
sum of things that are in it (Phys. 22Ia27-29, b2B-32), so Plato
views the image of the Eternal as greater than any part of that
image. Time is infinite, declares Aristotle (De Gaeto 2B3b26-284a6,
re-echoing Plato's teaching that the image of Eternity is itself
eternal (37c). A given thing may come to be and pass away, but
change itself cannot.
(4) Aristotle also concurs in Plato's view that Time is made
known by number (38a, 39bc; Phys. 22IaI-I3, bI4-23) (S)
Another point of likeness is their common belief that Time exists
apart from perceivers. Aristotle is convinced that Time is present
in motion as its numerable aspect, even if no-one be there to
count it (Phys. 223 a22-28). The same thing was taught by Plato
when he represented Time as created before man and therefore
independent of him (4Ic-42a). (6) They agree, too, that all
things perfect and unchangeable are not in Time, and that they
are not affected by it (38a; Phys. 22Ib3-7, 20-23, Meta. I07IaI6IB, I072bI4-29; d. 34a, Parm. 131, IS6b).
(7) Another doctrine to which Plato and Aristotle both assent
91
is the one that Time is measured by the revolution of the first

heaven, and is therefore circular (38a-Time 'circles round'; d.
Phys. 223b13-224a1; 39a, d, 36e, d. De Gen. et Carr. 337a32-33).
(8) Again, specific motions are used to measure Time, though
actually they are measured by it (39b; De Caela 287a23-4,
Phys. 22Ia1-2). (9) Moreover, there is agreement between the
men that the ultimate cause of Time is beyond Time. To Aristotle,
the Prime Mover, is eternal and prior to the things that are moved
but it is what brings about everlasting motion of the heavens
and the earth (Phys. 267b24-5, Meta. I072bIO-I4, I073a24-26).
The same meaning is conveyed in Plato's writings earlier, when
he represents God as the one who planned to make both the
heavens and the earth, and who in fact is responsible for them
(28c-29a, 37c-e). Apart from the question of creation for the
moment, it is clear the Plato traces all motions of the heavens
and the earth back to the movement of the circle of the Same,
itself invisible, eternal, and due to His agency (39b, 40ab).
(IO) The crowning likeness between Plato and Aristotle on the
question of Time is found in the doctrine that all things temporal
move because they attempt to imitate the first cause. This may
easily be seen in Plato, who says that Time imitates Eternity,
which is changeless and uniform. So do the stars, and so will the
man who lives uprightly (38de, 47bc). This is the whole purpose
of the image, to be made after the pattern of eternal Nature, to
the end that it might become as like it as possible (38bc).
The same doctrine must be constituted by piecing together
widely-scattered passages in Aristotle, but it is unmistakably
present in his thinking. He says, for instance, that a thing which
is moved is capable of being otherwise than it is (Meta. 1072b4).
It has already been noted that Aristotle regarded every earthly
thing as moving or movable. To him, this implies also that everything moved is moved by something (Phys. 24Ib24). Eventually
one is led to the common cause of all movements - the first
mover, thought itself which is eternal (Phys. 259b31-260aI9,
Meta. I075a5-II). The goal for which all things strive, and for the
sake of which they do whatsoever their nature renders possible,
is to partake of the eternal and divine Nature (De An. 415b1-2).
So far, Aristotle has not said anything essentially different
from Plato's statements that things move because they attempt
92
to become like the eternal being and to imitate it, as far as they
can, in their own way. But is there ever an 'image of the Eternal',
according to Aristotle? There must assuredly be, for this is
implied in his discussion of order. Is order separate from the
universe or in it? Aristotle finds that this question is analogous
to asking whether the good is in an army or its leader. Both
are true, but there is more good in the leader, because the order
of any army depends upon him; he does not depend upon it.
Aristotle is simply saying that the perfect order is separate from
the universe, at least in thought, and that the order expressed
in the universe is one which is a copy of the original (Meta. I075
aI2-24). The army is constantly being reorganized and trained
to conform to the standards the general has in mind. So it is not
unreasonable to infer that the universe is not only like that for
which it moves, but is continually trying to become more like
that perfect rationality.
The major question that now remains is whether Plato thought
Time had a beginning. Does he believe in a literal creation?
A first reading of the dialogue would seem to offer a prima facie
case that he did. There are all the trappings of a literal creation God and His desire to create, the Craftsman, the model, the making of various heavenly bodies, and finally the appearance of
earthly creatures - all in temporal sequence.
A closer examination will lead to doubt, though, that this is
what Plato meant. The whole account of creation is clothed in the
language of myth. He drops hints that it is not literal in his
general statements about Time. If 'before' and 'after' are terms
applicable only to the world as it exists (37c-38c), it would
scarcely be possible to speak of anything that is 'before' Time.
Consequently, true priority to Plato is based on the given entity's
relative importance in the universe, rather than on the order in
which he happens to describe it. (Cf. 34bc.) Practically every
Platonist of ancient times, with the exception of Plutarch,
recognized this and rejected the literal interpretation 5.
Aristotle was also numbered among those who could not
accept a literal view of the Timaeus account of creation. For
example, he could not conceive of an independent, primeval
chaos. In some sense there must always have been an ordered
Taylor, op. cit., pp. 67-70.
93
world (De Caelo 30obI7-2I). Many an uncharitable critic has

seized on this text as evidence that Aristotle misunderstood
Plato's basic intention. It is impossible, they say, to apply the
term 'before' to the situation in which the world was uncreated,
for in that case the time-sequence was still non-existent. But the
critics cannot deny the fact that Aristotle's final interpretation,
in this instance, is in harmony both with the Timaeus and with
the majority of ancient Platonists.
There is an alternate interpretation whose possibilities are
tempting indeed. Why could not Plato's vision of creation be
understood in the same sense as a geometrical construction?
The geometer adds one line to another until, finally, the completed
figure emerges. The fact that successive stages appear at different
times is purely incidental. His purpose is primarily didactic, to
show the observer how the parts are related, one by one, to each
other and to the whole (De Caela 279b32-28oa2).
Aristotle could not join with those 6 who held this to be Plato's
intention in the Timaeus. The analogy, he held, was not true to
the facts. In the construction of the figure, the various steps
result in the figure itself. But in the creation story, the resultant
is different from the elements themselves (following Guthrie,
Loeb tr.). This seems to acknowledge that chaos does not exist
separate from things. Moreover, unlike the case of the geometrical
figure, the antecedent and consequent are in contradiction to each
other. Plato had said that the ordered arose out of the unordered
(30a). These two, then, must be separated by a process. They
cannot be in the same state at the same time, while in the case of
geometrical figure, there is no temporal separation of parts (De
Caela 279b33, 28oa2-12).
One who does not carefully study this argument will be involved in a host of new difficulties. Aristotle emphasized that parts
of the geometrical figure are actually simultaneous, while order
and disorder exist at different times. Is he then reverting to a
literal view of creation, and to the old fallacy of a time before
Time began? Decidedly not. He is rather reaffirming the separation
of the potential and the actual. No material body can be both at
the same time; and to the extent that it is one, it is not the other.
Xenocrates and the Platonists, according to Simplicius, cited by
(279b33 n., Oxford ed.).
J.
L. Stocks
94
This holds true of the entire universe. The transition from potentiality to actuality requires time, and therefore 'the two terminal
states cannot be coeval. This teaching definitely corresponds to
Plato's doctrine of Becoming in Time, and to his exclusion of
both the Receptacle-in-itself and the Ideas from the world.
Moreover, Aristotle's criticism is justified from another point
of view. All the constituents which the geometer uses to construct
the figure are found in the finished product. If the Timaeus be
interpreted as a geometrical construction, this would imply that
all of the constituents are completely incorporated in the final
figure. However, they are not. If all of potentiality were to be
included in the world, there would be no actuality, and vice
versa. Plato had insisted previously that the Receptacle and the
Ideas were greater than any object or sum of objects. Neither
could be completely exhausted by the world of sense-objects.
Since this is the world which is supposed to correspond to the
'final figure' of the geometer, the Receptacle and world of Ideas
would be swallowed up in it. Such an interpretation perverts
Plato's doctrine. When Aristotle protests against it, therefore,
he is upholding his master's thought.
Another reference to the question of a literal creation of time
is found in the eighth book of the Physics. There Aristotle says:
Plato alone asserts the creation of time, saying that it had a
becoming together with the universe, the universe according
to him having had a becoming.
(Phys. 251b17-8)
Having recognized this, which is in undeniable accord with
some statements of the Timaeus (d. 38b), Aristotle proceeds to
analyze the notion of 'now'. 'Now' is a moment with time on
both sides of it. (This would mean, presumably, that even a
moment of 'beginning' required a prior time). The conclusion is
that Time has always existed, and always will (Phys. 251b19-26).
This text must be dismissed as a mere petitio principii based
on Aristotle's definition of 'now'. Aristotle is saying two things.
First, every moment is both the beginning of a new time-continuum, and the end of a previous one. Time, therefore, must be
continually beginning and continually ending. Like motion,
Time is eternal (Phys. 251b10-3, 19-26). Aristotle is once again
insisting on the interpretation most Platonists attach to the
9S
creation story - that it is not literal. Throughout the passage

there is a subtle undertone of agreement with Plato. The great
head of the Academy had said that Time began. His words were
true indeed, Aristotle implies. Time did have a beginning, and it
does and always will have one; for at every point on the infinite
continuum it begins afresh.
One last passage remains to be considered in connection with
the problem of a literal creation of Time. Aristotle anticipates
it in the De Caeta, I, 10, when he says that Plato in the Timaeus,
holds that the heaven is eternal though generated. The question
can only be settled by an examination of 'generation' itself (De
Caeta z80a31-4).
The promised analysis, found in the twelfth chapter of the
same book, runs as follows. If one says that anything is generated
yet undestroyed, and that this generation is once for all, he
destroys one of the premises. That is, by definition, what comes-to
be cannot be infinite, and what is infinite cannot come-to-be.
Aristotle supports this by saying, in the first place, that everything
is capable of acting or being acted upon, of being or not being,
for either an infinite or for a definitely limited space of Time. An
infinite time is in a way limited 7. But it cannot be limited by a
beginning. For if Time had a beginning, it would be neither
finite nor infinite, which is impossible.
Secondly, after an infinity of not-being, why was the world
generated at one moment rather than another? This is answered
by his own first argument, that a bounded infinity is not a true
infinity, hence the world was not eternally non-existent. And of
course if the world did have a literal beginning, there would be
no 'other moments' prior to it, for there would be no Time. But,
Aristotle continues, if every moment is alike and the moments
are infinite in number, a generated or destructible thing has
existed for an infinite time. In reply, one could point out that
the first clause contradicts his main argument here; for there is
no reason that the world cannot be created at any moment, since
they are all alike. The remainder of the comment is also rather
weak. Moments are without duration. As Aristotle said earlier,
7 Probably by the limit of time that is actually experienced or conceived. The writer
is following at this point, the translation of w. K. c. Guthrie, De Caela (Loeb ed.),
283a7-Io. Cf. Guthrie's note.
96
they are analogous to points on a line. Hence, an infinite number

of moments by no means implies an infinite time, for there are an
infinite number of points on any line, however short its length.
This does not nullify, but rather confirms, this first argument as
interpreted above. It does not mean that there is both an infinite
Time and a literal creation; but rather that an infinite amount
of Time may be added to any finite time.
Furthermore, Aristotle asserts, it is impossible for the capacity
of being in an infinite time, and of non-being in an infinite time,
to be actualized together, since they are opposites. He might
have said that neither can be actualized in any time, let alone on
infinite time; for both Being and Non-being are apart from Time.
Aristotle's statements have now led him to a peculiar position.
He speaks of a generated thing having the capacity of infinite
non-being after it is generated. This could mean that an existent
thing has the potentiality of eternal non-existence - a potentiality which may be realized. But if it was realized, how could it
ever have existed? Realizing this dilemma, Aristotle extricates
himself by means of a third argument, that these capacities are
not even possible in things generable and destructible.
There is a fourth argument to militate against a literal creation.
If the capacity is present prior to the activity, it will be present
for all time, even before the thing had been generated. That is to
say, while it was still non-existent, it had the potentiality of
existing-for-an-infinite-time. Aristotle might be criticized here on
the basis that there is no time before creation, so there is no
'all time' for the capacity to exist in. Nor can one speak of 'the
same time' (&fLOC) in which actuality 'was not' (De Cado 283a23-4).
In this passage, Aristotle's arguments have been by no means
flawless. But it cannot truthfully be said that he is mistaken on
the main issues. For (I) he is in accord with the Timaeus statements that the world is eternal, and with the Platonists who
overwhelmingly regard fiat creation as a myth. (2) He emphasizes
throughout the argument the mutual exclusiveness of absolute
potency and absolute act. Non-being cannot have the potentiality of eternally being, nor can Being have the potentiality of
eternally not-being. This is in perfect harmony with the teaching
of Plato that the Receptacle and the forms are separate, and that
neither can be reduced to the other.
97
A review of the points of comparison between Plato and Aristotle on the question of time is now in order. The similarities are
striking. For example, both men agree that Time presupposes
Being and Non-being which, in an absolute sense, are distinct
from the world. They also agree that the efficient cause of Time
is the world of Becoming, in motion made possible by the unrational, but realized because of the rational. The purpose of Time,
to both men, is to enable things to become more like eternal
rationality, which to Plato is God, and to Aristotle, the Prime
Mover. Moreover, they are united on the nature of Time - it is
uniform and coeval with the universe. Both concur that motion
is the means by which Time proceeds; and that by which it is
known is number. They bear a common witness to the doctrine
that there is only one Time, and none outside the heavens.
This agreement is further confirmed by Aristotle's interpretation of the Timaeus account of creation. Aristotle did not feel
obliged to explain its every detail. He simply recognized the
obvious fact that his master had made certain statements, and
then proceeded to explain why they could not be true in a literal
sense. In so doing, he aligned himself with the avowed followers
of Plato. Aristotle held that there was always an ordered world.
This meant that Non-being and Being are separate from the
world we know, and that creation cannot be conceived as a
'geometrical construction'. One could neither conceive nor discover a moment without a time before and after.
Furthermore, if the world were generated yet eternal, many
impossible consequences would follow. Time would be an anomaly
- neither infinite nor finite. But to Aristotle's way of thinking,
an infinite number of movements would require the existence of
the world for an infinite time. If the world were generated but
eternal, the actuality of eternal Being or Non-being would have
to co-exist. Such a situation is not only contrary to fact, but
even to possibility. Aristotle concludes, therefore, that creation
cannot be literal.
I t cannot be denied that these arguments are not directed
against the Timaeus, but rather against the literal interpretation
of it. On the positive side, Aristotle is upholding what most
Platonic scholars take to be Plato's true meaning, and does so
with arguments of his own. At no point does he betray a misun7
98
derstanding of Plato, nor a malicious attempt to twist his master's

teachings. The presence of possible discrepancies in his arguments
should not blind one to this fact of paramount importance.
Plato and Aristotle do not differ on the characteristics of Time,
but each does emphasize a different aspect of it, which becomes
in each case the definiens. Aristotle stresses how we know ('the
number of movement'); Plato places emphasis on that which is
known ('the moving image of Eternity'). This might suggest
that Aristotle believed the world to be constructed in the way it
appears, or that Plato considered it to be only in the way in
which we understand it. Or that Plato only finds teleology, and
Aristotle only description. Neither of these conjectures will be
found correct in the final analysis.
The various facets of Aristotle's comment on Plato's natural
philosophy in the Timaeus give mounting evidence that Aristotle,
at almost every tum, is supporting and defending the views of
his teacher. But at certain critical junctures in their thought,
they seem to be beyond reconciliation. One of these would be
Plato's description of the primary bodies and the cause of weight
- in terms rationally understood, while Aristotle has described
both in terms largely phenomenal arid empirical. And disconcertingly enough to those who regard the men as disagreed, Aristotle
also defined Time in the same type of terms, that is, empirical.
The task which still remains, in connection with this study,
is to determine the purpose of the T imaeus and the meaning of the
universe, according to both Plato and Aristotle. Perhaps the
same accord shown in their views of 'Time' will also appear in the
vital issues that now call for attention.
CHAPTER VII
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF SOUL

It must have been with great care that Plato made his decision
to cast the Timaeus in the form of a myth. Scientific theories of
his day were customarily stated in the language of finality and
dogmatism. Over the course of years, Plato had found elements of
value in many of these philosophies, but to none - rationalistic
or empirical - did he yield his complete allegiance. In a sense,
foes of each other could unite against him, for he opposed their
common intransigence. The use of myth would soften the antagonism his views might arouse, and gain them a wider hearing.
But his chief reason was doubtless beyond such considerations.
He honestly believed that the study of natural science could be
most fruitfully pursued by the use of 'probable' statements,
which were capable of further test and analysis.
Plato regarded myth as intermediate. It was between thought
and opinion, two levels of knowing which in turn related to the
ontological levels of Being and Becoming, respectively (z7d-z8a,
sre-szb). 'Thought' is that which is achieved by reasoning, and
deals with that which exists eternally, without change 1. Opinion
is acquired by the aid of unreasoning sensation, and has to do
with the world of perpetual change. Thus, Plato clearly announced
his rejection of the pure apriori approach to science, as well as
the approach of uncritical empiricism. Statements concerning
the world may not be all the truth, for at best we see through a
glass darkly, but they may be like the truth. To abandon 'true
opinion' would preclude observation, on which it is based. By the
use of myth, Plato sought to study changing things in the light
of the timeless and unmoved, in order to render the sensible
1 It corresponds to what in other dialogues is often called 'truth', which is said to
be accessible by means of dialectic. Cf. Rep. 6.484-6, 500-I, 7.532-3, PMleb. 58b-d.
100
progressively more intelligible. For him, then, myth represented

something lower, not higher, than science (&7tLa-rljIL'1J) 2.
It has frequently been observed that the whole discourse
delivered by Timaeus is a myth. But by myth (ILu6oc;), the Greeks
intended something different than we usually do today. To them,
the primary meaning of the term was 'a spoken word' or 'account'. It certainly did not have the connotation of fable or
superstitious belief, of purely fictitious recitals 3 or of aimless
drivel'. It was a probable account ("t'ov eLx6"t'Ot A6yov, 53d), I)
which had in it the confident ring of moral certitude. By means
of the myth, Plato was able to blend many views into a unified
account and add a subtle irony to the most serious of allusions 6.
At the same time, he infused it with a sense of awe and reverence
at the perfection of the universe.
For Plato's purpose, the use of the myth was not only desirable,
but an actual necessity. The matters which came within this
purview in the Timaeus could neither be demonstrated rationally nor could they be entirely confirmed by sense experience. He
could feel free, therefore, to make statements in summary form 7,
without shouldering the burden of a long digression 8. Instead
of adding a dull resume to the annals of science, Plato won his
readers by making them spectators at a cosmic drama. His
dialogue tacitly pointed to a gap in what other men called 'science'.
But it attempted to relate the assured results of experience
with that final truth to which men aspire, and of which they
often despair.
'Myth' then, for Plato, may be defined as a belief or group of
beliefs for which there is no possibility of final rational or experimental verification. It is incapable of complete rational demonstration because it deals with changing things, and of experimental verification because it goes beyond the methods and materials
of the sense-world. It is motivated by the desire 'to see things
Burnet, Greek Philosophy, Part I (London, 1924), pp. 340, 344.
Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon (Paris, 1930), pp. 13-15, ZI8-9, Robin, Greek
Thought (London, 1928), p. 222.
As 59Cd has been misinterpreted. Plato meant that the study of natural science
provides a restful interlude to the intense discipline of dialectical thought.
6 Cf. 2gcd,44cd, 48d, 5zbc, 56ab, 5gcd, 68cd.
Rivaud, in Timie-Critias (Bude ed.; Paris, 1949), p. 14.
7 5Id: Ihd: ~PtXX,fwV; 52d: V XI>q>tXAtXt<:>.
8 5IC: 1tIiPEPYOV &""0 (l-'ijxo~.
3
101
whole'. The myth describes a situation by recounting a story. It

places within the perspectives of space and time (usually 'long
ago' and 'far away') relations which Plato conceived but thought
incapable of presentation in scientific form, for reasons accidental
or inherent 9. In any such account, the coming-to-be of anything,
whether of language, the state, or the world, is not to be taken
literally. The author is describing their actual, permanent nature
by means of a symbol. On the interpretation of the given symbol
hinges the meaning of the myth. For example, the age of gold often
is taken to represent mankind living under perfect law; and the
destruction of Atlantis, the ruin awaiting the government that
forsakes reason and justice 10. Aristotle, on the other hand, did
not express as detailed a view of myth as Plato. For him, myth
was a device for persuading the multitudes, and thus of value in
the orderly control of the state (Meta. I074b3-S). But even this
terse comment assumes heightened significance in the light of
the ultimate political purpose of the Timaeus, and of the trilogy
of which it is a part.
Through the doctrine of 'soul', Plato ushered his audience into
the inner shrine of his teaching. Of the entities set forth in the
Timaeus, soul is the dominant one, and the one in terms of which
the others are best understood. Plato did not pretend to give an
exhaustive exposition concerning soul; he presupposed a great
deal about it, just as he did about body (6Id). But certain general
characteristics of soul were clear to Plato. Soul is invisible, in
contrast to the body which is visible (3Id, 34c, 36e, 46d). The
difference between the two is stated in other dialogues 11. Reason
cannot belong to anything apart from soul, for it dwells in soul,
as soul dwells in body (30b). While the Phaedo denies that the
soul is a harmony of the body, it is nevertheless represented in the
Timaeus as a harmony or numerical proportion, (37a, 3IC), doubtless because of its intelligible nature.
The function of the soul is to govern the body (42de), over
Frutiger, op. cit., pp. 222-3, Robin, Platon (Paris, 1938), pp. 192-3. Other definitions of myth given by Frutiger are: that it is a specific story which illustrates universal human experience, that it personifies natural forces, that it is the language of
childish mankind before it has the facility of abstract language, and that it is the
spontaneous product of primitive consciousness, often viewing the world anthropomorphically (op. cit., pp. 31-3).
10 Frutiger, op. cit., pp. 36, 191-6, 207-9.
11 Cf. Rep. 508d, 515c, 517aj Phaedo 65a, 67d, 82d, 83ab.
102
which it exercised a logical and temporal priority. The soul was

of a more excellent nature than body (37a), and though described
after it, was actually its senior (34b-3Sa). From the view that the
soul is to govern body, it is but a short step to the statement
of the Laws that the soul is the source of motion (896 ab, d.
Phaedrus 24Sd f.). This is proper, for the elder has the right to
rule the younger (Laws 892ab, 7I4e). And the paradox of how
there can be movement (in the Receptacle) before the creation of
the source of movement (the soul) is easily resolved by Plato's
own teaching 12. Soul did exist prior to any given thing; and since
he held that there was no literal creation, it must have existed
forever. The Receptacle imaginatively portrays physical movement apart from mind. Soul, in its truest phase, on the other
hand, represents that which is rational in itself and in the movements it engenders.
When Plato began speaking of the 'Living Creature' he was
setting the concept of soul in a bold, cosmic dimension. On the
basis of the Timaeus, it is not easy to say exactly what the Living
Creature is. On one side of the question, for instance, Plato spoke
of the universe itself as a Living Creature, and that God so intended it (68c, 32d). But on the other, the Living Creature is called a
model (1totpOC~e:LY!l-ot) of the universe, which the universe is to
approximate as closely as possible (37cd, 39c-e). Whatever wider
significance each of these statements may have, they at least
have the following import for this study: (r) They re-emphasize
Plato's belief in the Ideas, on the plan of which the world is
built. (2) They affirm that the present world is the only tangible
and visible embodiment of the Living Creature.
The doctrine of the world-animal was an ancient one even in
Plato's day, and occupied an honored place among the Greeks.
The word ~wov, it is true, was also applied to any figure in painting or a tapestry, not necessarily even to a living creature 13.
But in the Timaeus myth, Plato probably intended to present the
world as actually alive. The universe was a strange creature. It
was not one among all the others, but one which included all
other living things (30cd). There could, by definition, only be one
such (3rab), implying that there is but one actual world - the
12 Cf. Rivaud, Le probleme du devenir (Paris, 1906), p. 337.
,. Grube, Plato's Thought (London, 1935), p. 167.
103
one we know. So perfect and complete was it, both in part and
whole, that there were no fragments of unused material left
over. Unlike mortals, it had no organs for acquiring or excreting
food. And of eyes, hands, and feet it had no need - for there was
nothing beyond to see or handle, and no place to go (33c-34a).
This Living Creature enjoyed the best of health; it never became
ill nor grew old (33a). In assigning it a spherical shape, the most
perfect of all shapes (33b), Plato definitely sided with the Eleatic
tradition against the cosmogony of early Pythagoreanism 14. The
figure of an animate world differs from the figure of the 'image'
in that the former suggests self-sufficiency (cf. 34d), the latter,
dependency upon the original. But they are alike in that both
refer to our world, and in their implication that a complete
understanding of the world can never be reached merely by an
analysis of its material contents 15.
Plato believed that the Living Creature had a soul, just as
does every other rational animal (34b). This is generally called
'World-soul' by the commentators, to distinguish it from the
souls of lesser beings. It was given to the world by God himself
(34b) , who likewise fashioned it. The materials out of which it
was constructed were Being, the Same, and the Other (3Sa, 37a).
Soul was to be a third form of Being, evidently on the middle
ground between the forms and material things 16. Perhaps it was
the forms, thought of in an active, immanent sense, for the
World-soul was later to be interwoven and fabricated with the
corporeal throughout (36de). World-soul was not a tertium quid,
and certainly was not to be composed of the material. Plato
thought of it rather as the unified knowledge of Reason (the
Same), and Reason as known through separate individual things
(the Other). It was the forms as animating and explaining both
(1) the whole universe and (2) its separate parts 17.
These ingredients were placed in a bowl, and mixed together
into a compound (3Sa, 41d). The divine hand skilfully blended
Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London, r937), pp. 54-7.
Ritter, The Essence of Plato's PhilosoPhy (New York, r923), pp. 270-r.
18 Cf. Aristotle, De Gene,atione et Cor,uptione, 330br6-g, note 2, Oxford tr. This
evident reference to 35a is omitted by Bonitz in his list of Aristotle's references to the
Timaeus. Aristotle thought Plato's 'soul' was a 'blend' of the other two factors according to Joachim, Aristotle De Gene,atione et Cor,uptione, 330br6-g, note 2, Oxford tr.
17 Cf. Cornford, op. cit., pp. 60-6.
1&
15
104
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIM AEUS
them together according to certain numbers and proportions.

The first group are seven in number, composed of the number one,
and the numbers two and three - the first even and first odd
number respectively (35b-36a). Then to these is added the first
square and the first cube of each, arranged in the following manner according to tradition which is said to go back to Crantor's
commentaries 18:
2
4
~27
These numbers denote the possibility of a knowledge of material bodies, since all such bodies are subject to analysis in one, two,
or three dimensions. The intervals were then filled in such a
manner as to conform to the harmonic mean (36ab). The resultant
was kneaded out into a strip that was cut in haIf. The two were
placed at right angles and joined together at the middle of each.
Next, the two strips were bent into a circle, so that the four ends
came together. The outer circle is that of the Same, the inner,
that of the Other. At this point in construction, the inner circle
is tilted to a diagonal position. This corresponds to the Ecliptic,
while the circle of the Same is represented 19 by the sidereal
Equator. The Other is divided into seven orbits which, as we
have noted above, distinguish the seven orbits of the planets
(36b-d).
Obviously, much of this is part of the story, and is not intended
by Plato to be taken seriously. The mixing bowl, division into
strips, and twisting into shape cannot, therefore, come in for a
literal exposition. Plato does intend his readers to understand
that the world at large is made according to a plan and to mathematical proportions, just as simple bodies are. (Cf. 53b.) Since
soul rules the body, and soul is reasonable itself and made according to the forms, the world is guaranteed of intelligent control.
18 Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford, I928), p. I37, citing Plutarch
(De Animae Procreatione, I027d).
10 Although apparently Aristotle misunderstands this (De An. 407a2o-22), his
later conclusions show that he does not.
105
(Cf. 36e-37a.) This provides a fitting model for mortals, as we

shall see, the ideal of being governed by Reason. And as it knows
both eternal essences through the Same, and divisible things
through the Other, - World-soul holds toward man, by the
example of itself, the challenge and hope that he may know
them, too .
. The question of harmony can only be reduced to a literal
reading with absurd consequences. Of its presence in the Worldsoul, there can be no doubt (36e). Some tried to make it a real
music that was inaudible to human ears. This was certainly not
his meaning. Plato conceived of a rational harmony of order and
intelligibility (37a-c), the balance and symmetry that comes
from proper understanding and a devotion to ethical ideals. (Cf.
Phileb. 66a-c; Rep. 3.40ra; Laws z.6S3b.) The whole mathematical arrangement on which the World-soul is based, is opposed to
the musical scale. Plato would have started with the traditional
Pythagorean tetrachtys, the arithmetical progression of I, z, 3, 4,
had this been his motivation 20.
The announcement of the circle of the Same is epistemological,
not musical (37c). Plato is making a statement of fact. It would
be strange, indeed, if harmony, once firmly rejected by Plato as
the essence of soul (Phaedo 93f.; d. De An. 407bz7 f.), should
now be reinstated as the nature of World-soul! Aristotle was
entirely in keeping with the letter and spirit of Plato when he
spumed this Pythagorean interpretation (De Caeto, 11,9). Worldsoul is basically mind (30b). Though analogous to the human soul,
World-soul can scarcely be said to have personality, since references to its self-consciousness and will are virtually omitted 21.
In order that the All may truly be an All (4IC), that is, that
every degree of existence may be realized within it, God directed
that the other creatures should be created. Evidently, the fixed
stars are the visible and generated gods (40a-d). As such, they
would be endowed with souls. They exhibit most nearly the perfect
motion of the universe, and untiringly declare its rationality.
(Cf. Laws 899, 967.) In some manner they are also connected
with human beings. Although God committed to lesser deities
the making of men's bodies, He himself undertook the task of
o. Cornford, op. cit., pp. 68-72. Cf. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 138-47.
Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy (London, 1888), p. 358.
21
106
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMA.EUS
creating their souls (42e). The same materials that were used for
World-soul were mixed in the same proportions, and in much
the same way, except that they did not have the same degree of
purity as World-soul. He assigned each portion to a star (or
the moon or earth), from which they descend into their own
'proper organ of time' (body). Every soul which lives intelligently
will return to a star, but if any fails of this high calling, he goes
unperfected and unreasoning to Hades (4Id-42d, 44bc). The
section on man's origin and proper destiny is strongly reminiscent
of the Phaedrus (24SC-249d) and the Republic (Io.608c-62Ib).
Plato believed that every human being was endowed with an
immortal principle, the soul, and with a body, which serves as
its temporary dwelling-place and means of transport (44e, 69cd).
The immortal part of soul was housed in the cranium (44d-4Sb),
the mortal parts in the rest of the body (6ge). The chest contained
the spirited part; the abdomen, the appetitive (70a-e). There is
no contradiction between this tripartite division and the treatment of soul as one in the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and occasionally in
the Republic, for the latter dialogues in those references are dealing
with soul only in its immortal aspect 22. That Plato united the
soul to the body at the point of the marrow (73b, d, e), may
indicate an awareness of the importance of marrow to physical
life.
The purpose of the soul is to conform to the reason of the universe. When it first takes up residence in the body, it is gravely
disturbed by the physical (43c-e). The body - either by its
construction or by its temporary states - exerts a strong influence on the Nous. Never can the Nous entirely escape it. When
the intellect is housed in a body of strong natural appetites, it
does not have much chance to operate freely (86c-e, 87c-88c).
Even the ablest minds are influenced by humors that ebb and
flow in the body from time to time (86e-87b). Man's chief end is
to pass beyond the roaring rapids of sense-disturbance, and to
float serenely at last on the calm, quiet waters of Reason. (Cf.
4 2ab , 43 b-44b .)
In Aristotle's view, the soul had three characteristics. (r) It
moved, but was not self-moving (De An. 408brs-8). (2) It was
composed of the same elements which it knew (De An. 409br9.. Rivaud, Timee-Critias (Bude ed.; Paris, I949), p. 89.
107
4IIa7). (3) And finally, it was incorporeal (De An. 4043.20-1). The
difficulty with previous definitions, Aristotle thought, was that
they said body and soul worked together without explaining
how 23. That he proposed to remedy. Just as each body required
a form, so each living body possessed a 'soul', the characteristic
name of its form. Soul was the living body's 'first actuality', the
power to fulfill a certain function (De An. 407bz3-5, 4IzaIg-zI).
The second actuality of body is the function itself, in its fufillment
(De An. 4Izaz3-5, bZ7-8). The four offices filled by soul are those
of nutrition, sensation, movement, and thought (De An. 413az39, bII-3) Soul is so important to the living body that it may
aptly be termed its 'cause' or 'source'. In truth, it is the originator of movement, the end, and the essence of the body with which
it is identified (De An. 415b8-II).
Since the highest functions of soul are those concerned with
knowledge, the problem of knowledge in Aristotle is an especially
complicated one. Moreover, Aristotle is sometimes none too
clear about the status of Nous. Knowledge is acquired when the
passive reason in man changes into active reason (De An. III, 4-5).
This would suggest that knowledge is at least potentially within
us prior to our consciousness of it, and is probably not too far
removed from the intent of Plato's reminiscence doctrine (d. esp.
Rep. 7.5I8c). Aristotle states flatly, on some occasions, that the
soul cannot exist apart from the body (De An. 414aIg-zI). But at
other times he adds the qualification that at least certain parts
cannot (De An. 413a3-6). His final position is that the soul does
exist after death, and is therefore eternal (De An. 430az2, 4I3aZ47). The highest aspect of soul, namely, Nous (VOUI;, mind), is
what endures forever, although Aristotle does not explain whether
this is conscious immortality, or something impersonal, like the
deathlessness of truth. At any rate, 'eternal' to Aristotle signified
endless duration in both directions 24. Once again there is a
parallelism with Plato, this time with his doctrine of the post- and
pre-existence of the human soul and his view that N ous is the
immortal part of soul. (Cf. 69c-]Ia, 44d.)
Aristotle's doctrine of soul resembles that of Plato in another
aspect; it is prior to the body and moves it. The Stagirite thought
'S Nuyens, L'Evolution de la Psychologie d'ATistote (Louvain, 1948), pp. 231-2 .

Nuyens, 0/>. cit., p. 308.
loS
Nous to be separable because it is, in its essential nature, activity

(~!pye:tot). Being active, soul is superior to the passive factor; it
is the originating force of the matter which it forms (De An.
430aI7-9). In his insistence on its separability, Aristotle secured
once and for all the soul's absolute immateriality 20. God also
possessed 'the actuality of thought, which is life', and his life
was good and eternal (Meta. I072b26-9). Once more, this sounds
like an accurate restatement of Plato's doctrine of World-soul,
with its rationality and life, its similarity to the best in man, and
its ethical quality. Aristotle left the exact relation of Nous and
soul (vouc; and 1jJ6X:YJ) shrouded in mystery 26. But although the
Stagirite did concentrate more on the physiological and psychological aspects of soul during his middle period, he judged mind
to be eternal during his later teaching in only a slightly modified
version of his earlier, 'Platonic' view 27. Their doctrine on all
important points with respect to soul is the same, and if the
word 'energy' or 'activity' be substituted for the equivalent word
'movement' in Plato's writings, there would be no room for objection from Aristotle's point of view. It is small wonder, therefore,
that R. D. Hicks says that the differences between the two philosophers on this subject 'count for little' 28.
Aristotle's first criticism of Plato's view of soul was that he
constructed it out of elements (De An. 404bI6-7). Plato's description of the making of soul, already recounted above, has been
called 'the most perplexing and difficult passage of the whole
dialogue' 29. Aristotle's comments on that section of the Timaeus
are susceptible of misinterpretation, so that some observers
might become even more bewildered. For example, after describing how Empedocles compounds soul out of all the elements
(ex 'rwv O"'rOLXe:LWV), Aristotle goes on to say that Plato constructs
the soul out of elements 'in the same manner' (De An. 404bII-7).
This might lead one to believe that the doctrines just ascribed
to Empedocles are also held by Plato, that he made the soul out
of the four 'kinds', and regarded each as in some way endowed
with soul. Aristotle did not mean to imply these conclusions.
2. Hicks, Aristotle's De Anima (Cambridge, 1907), p. xliii.
.. Nuyens, op. cit., pp. 3I7-8.
27 See p. \V.f., supra.
28 Hicks, op. cit., p. xxxvi.
Taylor, op. cit., p. I06.
109
It should be remembered that Aristotle is using the terms

apx1j and (J't'otxe'iov loosely throughout this whole passage (De
An. 404b8-40sa2). They are almost synonymous, meaning 'first
principle', whether material or metaphysical. Plato refrained
from using apx1j to designate a material body. But there is no
evidence that Aristotle was speaking of material body when he
used the term here to describe Plato's views. And to claim that
Aristotle thought that 'soul' in the Timaeus was constructed out
of triangles would betray a serious misunderstanding of Aristotle's
meaning.
The comment refers rather to the general sense of the Timaeus,
35a. There Plato spoke of the two kinds of Being out of which
soul was made: Being which is indivisible and always the same,
and the Being which is transient and divisible in bodies. These
are probably the O''t'OtXeLOC to which Aristotle alluded, for he went
on to explain that 'like is known by like' (De An. 404bI7-8).
This was the likeness that he found between the doctrines of
Empedocles and Plato (De An. 404br6), although each man went
on to develop from that principle a different doctrine. Plato meant
that the soul must be akin to both the indivisible eternal forms,
and to divisible temporal bodies, since it knows both. Aristotle,
therefore, shows a grasp of the Timaeus and an insight into its
teaching 30.
The second objection we shall consider is found in De Anima I,
3, in the midst of Aristotle's attack on the view that the soul is
self-moving (40Sb31-406a2, 408b3O-I). It is one of the most
diverse and detailed criticisms that Aristotle leveled against the
Timaeus. He implied that Plato held soul to be a magnitude, and
to be in motion in a physically describable manner. Aristotle
thought that this view led to strange consequences and that it
failed to explain certain other data.
One way of escape from this criticism might be to apply Worldsoul, together with its circle of the Same and of the Other, to
the Living Creature. The Living Creature, in turn, would be
regarded as a part of the realm of forms, whose being is above
and apart from this world of space and time. But one need not
rely on this strategem to prove that physical movement is not
involved in the World-soul. It can simply be pointed out that
3. This view is also followed by Taylor (op. cit., pp. I09-II).
IIO
the constellations are not to be confused with the celestial Equator, nor are other heavenly bodies to be identified with the Ecliptic itself. The stars may move, and indeed do so. But their paths,
considered as mathematical entities, remain stationary. On
this basis it is possible to argue that the circle of the Same and the
Other do not revolve physically any more than any mathematical
circles do. Such a conclusion will be upset, however, by the plain
statements of the Timaeus that soul does revolve and move
(G't"Pe:CPOIL&vy), 36e ; VotXUxAOUIL&VY), 37a ; XWOUIL&VY), 37a).
Aristotle disputed the doctrine that soul was self-moving by
first opposing the view that the soul is a magnitude (De An.
407az-Io). This disagreement is expressed directly after his summary of the making of soul (De An. 406bz6-407a3), and is evidently directed against those who would take the myth literally.
Soul does have a kind of extension, if it is thought of as pervading
the whole universe. But this is not to be construed as visible
and tangible extension, which is the characteristic of body.
Aristotle's argument against the soul as a magnitude is a brief one.
If one should hold the view that points are parts (as the Pythagoreans do), the mind would never be able to think, for it would
never exhaust their infinite number (De An. 407a1z-4). In any
case, if soul had a magnitude, it would think with its extended
parts, probably thinking the same things over and over (De An.
407aI 4-S).
In this passage, Aristotle also opposed the type of movement
that Plato assigned to soul, namely, circular. One rash reason
he gave was that experience 'shows' that we can think a thought
once and no more 31. And if a soul can apprehend with one or
another of its parts, why does it have to move in a circle, i.e.,
expose its whole being to the thought? (De An. 407aIS-I8) Moreover, if soul moves in a circle, it will recurringly think the same
thought forever 32. Thought should be described as in a straight
81 In this argument, Aristotle has seized upon a weak straw. If it were true under
all circumstances, the continuous thought of the Unmoved Mover would be precluded;
thought would be punctilear and not continuous. Even in human experience, memory
would be impossible.
3. Which of course is the goal of even human souls according to Aristotle himself
(Nic. Eth. II 78b22-3 ; d. Meta. 12.I072b2S-g, I07saS-II). The argument therefore
has a point when applied to common experience, but is singularly inappropriate when
compared with the ideal. In the latter case, soul would recurringly think the same
thing, so the argument would prove the opposite of what he intended! Circular motion
would be regarded as aptly descriptive.
III
line instead of in a circle. The syllogism advances to a new conclusion; it does not return to the old premises (De An. 407a22-32).
Aristotle did not think it wise to connect any kind of movement
with thought. To him, thought implied 'rest' (De An. 407a32-b2).
And unless motion was the essence of soul, any motion it had would
be unnatural. If the common view were right, the soul under
such circumstances would be dragged around in the prison of the
body without hope of release (De An. 407b2-S); it would not be
master of its own house. Such a condition would be most unbecoming for so worthy a being. Similarly, World-soul should not be
thought of as endlessly 'pushing' around the outer sphere of the
world (De Caeto 284a27-3S).
Another argument against the motion of the soul is found in the
Metaphysics (12. I072aI-4), to the effect that the soul which
Plato sometimes says is the source of motion is later and coeval
with the heavens. Aristotle correctly observes that, in Plato,
the soul is that which moves itself. (Cf. Phaedrus 24Sc, Laws
894e.) As to the main objection, it poses no great difficulty, since
Plato did not believe in his creation myth in a literal sense; nor
did Aristotle, as we have seen (Chapter 6, pp. 92-96). Plato
expressly states that God constructed soul to be older than body,
and prior to it in birth and excellence and to be ruler of it (34c).
While soul is described after the making of the world's body in the
Timaeus, the reader is assured that this is due purely to the order
of exposition (34b). That the soul is the source of motion is,
therefbre, confirmed. This is in keeping with Aristotle's own view.
The final arguments Aristotle offered against the circular
motion of soul were directed against the lack of reason for that
motion, and Plato's failure to explain the relationship by which
soul and body interacted. Aristotle did not think that Plato said it
was better that the soul should be in motion, nor that this form
of movement was better than any other (De An. 407bS-II). Nor
did Aristotle think that Plato told why a particular soul requires
a given body, or how they affect each other. Soul seems to be
assigned indiscriminately to body (in the manner of the Pythagoreans). (De An. 407bI2-26).
This array of arguments requires evaluation. One may observe
at the outset that there are many indications that Aristotle is
familiar with the Timaeus, and that a number of his remarks
II2
AlHSTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS
accord with it. He recognized for instance that World-soul must

be what is called 'mind' (Nous, De An. 407a3-S). He knew that
circular movement was attributed to soul, and that soul was
interwoven with the body of the universe (De An. 406bz6-4o7az).
With Plato, he believed that there should be a teleological explanation for all things, as seen in his protest against the lack
of one for circular motion of soul (DeAn. 407bS-II). Furthermore,
Aristotle observed that when mind 'moves' it thinks (De An.
407azo), which makes it fairly clear that he understands Plato's
basic intention.
Certain of Aristotle's points are well-taken. Among these might
be listed Plato's failure to distinguish the different types of soul
as related to different types of body 33, and the lack of explanation of the means by which body and soul interact. At the same
time, Plato stated that he was not attempting to cover all of
these questions, and Aristotle himself left many unanswered.
Contrariwise, Aristotle employs many an argument which seems
to be based on misunderstanding, or on mere verbalisms. The
former may be seen in his serious criticism of the construction
of soul which can scarcely be understood as other than a patent
myth. The latter is displayed in his insistence that the circular
motion of soul will prevent it from thinking, since thought is either
in a straight line or entirely at rest. In short, Aristotle is overplaying his arguments, and to treat each one soberly will only
increase the absurdity. It is entirely probable that he was 'talking
for victory' and permitting himself some 'judicious levity' 34. The
circular motion, which represents the nature of thought and opinion, doubtless symbolizes the unity, continuity, and infinity of
soul's activity. This seems to be recognized by Aristotle (De An.
40 7a22-3)
Two questions now remain regarding Aristotle's criticism of
Plato's view of soul. First, did Aristotle correctly report the
Timaeus when he stated that the soul was in motion? Second,
if that was Plato's view, was he justified in holding it? As to the
first, some readers might dismiss it at once. Of course Plato did
not think the soul is in motion, they would say; that is just a
literary flourish. It is part of the myth, an imaginative extension
33 However, this criticism is made on the basis of Aristotle's personal philosophy .
Taylor, op. cit., p. I54.
II3
into a space-time framework of that which is a complex but

accomplished fact.
There are evidences from other dialogues which are not myths,
however, indicating that Plato felt the soul to be in motion
even when it was described in the non-pictorial language of
everyday reason. For example, he tells us that the best soul
takes care of the world and guides it along the good path. It
carries the heavens around and arranges the order of them (Laws
10.897-8). The best motion for one's body is that caused in and
by itself. This kind of motion is most nearly akin to intelligence
and to the motion of the universe (89a). And we have already
observed that the self-moving principle is superior to all other
kinds of motion (Laws 10.894-5). The self-moving is the fountain
and beginning of motion and of all that moves; it never ceases to
move (Phaedr. 245).
On the basis of these texts, there would seem little choice but
to concede that the soul must be in motion. But there is another
side of the question. Whatever motion is predicated of must
have an inherent lack of uniformity which makes that motion
possible (Tim. 57). To say that World-soul is unstable or irregular
in its nature would seem strange indeed. Is World-soul then in
some way at rest and in motion at the same time? Apparently
this is precluded by Plato's law of contradiction, that the same
thing cannot be both in motion and at rest at the same time
(Rep. 4.436bc). However, this refers to things that are becoming,
and so the possibility of World-soul being both at rest and in
motion must be pursued further.
Plato says that Being cannot be thought of as existing 'in
awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture' (Jowett tr.). Being
must include motion; it there is no motion, there is no N ous.
But, he continues, rest is also needed for the existence of Nous.
When asked which we must finally believe, the philosopher, like
the little child who is offered two attractive possibilities, chooses
both (Soph. 249). Rest and motion are in opposition to each
other, but both participate in Being. Being is not the combination
of them, therefore, but is distinct from both. In its own nature,
Being is neither definitively at rest nor in motion (Soph. 250).
This is no more paradoxical than Aristotle's assertion that the
Unmoved Mover is pure activity (Meta. 1071b19-22, 1073a3-13,
8
II4
24-5). The universe is intelligent in its operations, and is therefore

guided by N ous. But where can N ous reside, except in soul? If the
universe were moved from without, it would be in its own right
without soul and irrational. That which is moved from within
possesses soul (Phaedrus 245). To Plato, this was the reason that
the universe required soul. The soul, represented as moving, is
rationality as it extends to body and motion; N ous is static and
refers to rationality as it is in relation to itself. If this solves the
problem of the movement of soul in Plato, it but raises a more
pressing one: Why did Aristotle not feel the necessity of having a
'a self.:.moving Soul' in his world-system?
The answer can be found by further examining Plato's meaning.
However important the concept of soul, it does not occupy the
highest station in the universe, according to the Timaeus. At the
summit of Plato's metaphysical system is God, the one who
ultimately accounts for all lesser things, including soul. As in the
case of the Living Creature, it is difficult to state what Plato
meant, univocally. Apparently, for Plato, God is one. It is true,
of course, that even in the Timaeus the Olympian deities are
introduced; but Plato says that he is unfamiliar with them, although he will believe in them if others do (4ode). This is in a
vein of gentle irony far different from his frontal attacks elsewhere. (Cf. Euthyphro 6, 8, Rep. 2.378, 3.388 f., 408c.) To say that
God is one in Plato may seem a contradiction, because he presents
so many gods. Sometimes he admits the gods of mythology;
on other occasions he designates the planets and fixed stars as
gods, and the total universe as a god (39d-40e, 38a, 34ab). The
lesser deities have definite functions; they make the creatures
which inhabit air, water, and the earth (4Ib-d). They are even to
make man (6gcd). How can it be said that there are many gods
and yet only one?
This problem has troubled generations of Plato's readers. One
solution is that subordinate gods represent aspects of God's
character. Another is that the deities represent natural forces.
In either case, God would be the one real maker. In protest, of
course, one could even quote from the Timaeus. The statements
there seem clear enough that the gods were to make man, and
that they did so (6gcd, 4zde, 77a-e).
But these are only interludes. He comes back to his main
IIS
theme, in the larger sections, that God is the one who makes man's
body, devises it, and bestows the natural gifts (42c-47e, 7Ia-J6e).
It was God who originated the four simple bodies, and who
alone is wise enough to blend the colors; he planted order and
harmony in the structure of the universe (S3b, 68d, 69b). There
is, then, in the Timaeus an overlapping of function, particularly
in regard to the making of earthly creatures. There is, in addition,
often a free interchange of the terms 'gods' and 'God'. All of this
lends credence to the interpretation that the former should be
identified with the latter, especially since God is referred to more
frequently in the singular in the Timaeus. At any rate, the question was not an important one to the Greeks. While it cannot be
settled with finality in the case of Plato, he was probably, as
Burnet maintains, a monotheist 35.
The Timaeus not only leaves the impression that God is one,
but that he is rational. The planets came into being as a consequence of this reason and design of God (38c). The entire universe
reflects that same reason. When we possess the same type of
rationality, we imitate God (47bc). He knows the highest intelligible principles, and imparts that knowledge to the man dear
to him (S3d). The Receptacle is a graphic example of how things
behave and are in the absence of God: they are devoid of reason
and measure (&.A6yw~ xlXl. &.fle:'t'?W~, S3ab). God is constantly
distinguished from things of the tangible world, and from any
single rational purpose or sum of them. He is the author of the
rationality in the world, both collectively and distributively.
This conforms to the description in other dialogues of God
possessing all knowledge and wisdom (Parm. 134d, Phaedr. 278d).
As that which is most truly rational is good, his character is good
(Theae. 176c, Rep. 2. 379-382). The universe is to become like
him, who is the model of every kind of goodness (Tim. 29a,
30a).
Moreover, the God of the Timaeus is not a remote, static
principle, nor an aloof, distinterested Being. He is active and
dynamic, one who thinks and plans ahead, and who longs for
the universe and man to become like himself. He has that quali3. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, Part I (London, 1924), pp. 337-8. Rutenber, The
Doctrine of the Imitation of God in Plato (New York, 1946), is also in accord with this
view (pp. 4-17).
II6
ty of understanding for the frailty of mankind, so often labelled

'divine' even when it appears in men. (Cf. 6gc-e.) God intervenes
in the world to bring order and perfection. His activity, far
from being restricted to the intelligible, extends to the most
prosaic details of human physiology and the four simple bodies.
He is represented as organizing the cosmos, making certain
parts, and marshalling his subordinates to complete it.
Aristotle would have no difficulty agreeing that the Prime
Mover also was perfectly rational and good (Meta. 12.I072bI424). His difficulty was - how could God be considered so active?
Why should God be bothered with the details of making the
physical world? Why, indeed, should he be touched with emotion for man, or stoop to make the world more like himself?
Plato himself had plainly stated that motion resulted from irregularity and non-uniformity (57e-58a). In the pure rationality
and goodness of the Divine Being, these blemishes surely would
not be found. And Plato had held that God cannot lie; that he
abides the same, yesterday, today and forever; and that he has
no variableness, neither shadow of turning. (Cf. Rep. 2.380-382.)
Aristotle also believed that God had this steadfast, lofty kind
of character. But he went further than Plato and held that
movements could not be ascribed to God, which as we have seen
was the basis for his rejection of World-soul. Movements would
indicate either an instability in his character or some unrealized
potentiality. Both possibilities were untenable. God was the
complete actuality of thought; as such, he was immutable (Meta.
12.I07Ib3-4; I072b4-8, 25-9; I073a24-33; I075a8-rr). In a
very real sense, Aristotle's account appears consistent with
Plato's view of God's perfection and of the source of motion.
Aristotle thought that God continually 'is,' and that he can
therefore never 'become'. Since he was completely immobile
and divested of the desires that were attributed to God by Plato,
Aristotle transferred that desire to the world; it is what seeks to
become like God. While the Timaeus makes the universal imitation of God a result of God's own action 36, Aristotle is content
.6 Cf. Tim. 2ge, 4IC. Other references to this subject are located in 42e, 69C, and
39de. In the latter case, imitation is of the Living Creature, the model, but through
the model to God. For a detailed study of the general doctrine, see C. G. Rutenber, op.
cit.
to account for it by God's nature, and by the inherent longing of

the world. In the second case, God does not feature as the world's
creator, but he is just as surely its goal.
In considering the activity of God, as presented in the Timaeus, it is natural to think also of the Demiurge (~1j(lLo\)py6~,
craftsman). The Demiurge is assigned the business of carrying
out God's plans in the construction of the universe. This he does,
and the universe so made will be indissoluble except by his will
(68e, 4Ia-d, d. Statesman 269d-270a, 273b-d). Since this is the
case, rebellion would be abroad in the universe if the Demiurge
should set himself up as superior to God. But that is just the
point; the Demiurge is not above or below God; he is God in one
aspect of his divine activity. He has the qualities of God - his
goodness, lack of envy, rationality, and desire to make the world
like himself (28c-29a, 29d-30a). Moreover, he is explicitly stated
to be God (69bc). These simple facts seem often overlooked in the
controversies that rage about the interpretation of the Demiurge37
To be sure, the Demiurge is not to be equated with the God of
Christianity who creates ex nihilo. The Demiurge is not omnipotent, nor the sole cause. He finds certain given materials, and
out of them he sets about to make the best product that he can
(68e). In this respect, he is like any human workman, to whom,
incidentally, Plato also applies the term ~1j(lLO\)py6~ extensively
throughout the dialogues. The human workman is limited to the
use of available materials. God is limited likewise because of the
unvarying nature of the Ideas on the one hand, and on the other
by the uniform nature with which he endows various materials.
The Demiurge is a literary device, but it embodies what Shorey
calls Plato's 'favorite conception'. It represents artistic purposeas opposed to lawless chance - in a majestic figure clothed with
the moral dignity which is typical of the monotheistic aspirations of his predecessors 38
7 Taylor, op. cit., pp. 80-82, links the Demiurge with God, but makes a distinction
between the Ideas and God, the former being absolutely unchangeable, and the object
of thought rather than the process of thinking. A number of interpreters, notably
Zeller, identify the Demiurge with the Idea of the Good (cf. Frutiger, op. cit., pp.
206-7 and notes), while others, following Brochard, regard it as a composition or
effect of the Ideas (cf. Robin, Etudes sur la Signification et la Place de la Physique
dans la Philosophie de Platon; Paris, I9I9; p. 73). See Rivaud, Timee-Critias (Bude ed.,
op. cit.), p. 37.
Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, I933), p. 349.
lIB
Another term which Plato applies to God is that of 'cause'.

It was plain to him that there must be causes, for without them
nothing could come to be (28a, c). But not every kind of cause
could be predicated of God. There were two kinds of cause, the
primary cause and the auxiliary causes (och(oc and GUvoc('noc). It is
necessary to give a description of auxiliary or subordinate causes
if one attempts to account for the individual (48ab). These
causes are said to be 'the necessary,' as distinct from 'the divine'
(68e). This at once links the auxiliary causes to the Receptacle
and its contents. The Receptacle in itself always produces accidental and irregular effects (46c-e), and may therefore be known
as 'errant cause' (~ 7tAOCVOfLEVY) eXL't'(OC, 48a). Auxiliary causes may
loosely be identified with particular tangible materials (the four
simple bodies or their compounds, d. 76d), or more exactly
with their inherent properties (68e).
God must be cause in a different sense, namely, as being primary cause. The universe is the fairest of all things that have
come to be, and since it must have the best of all causes, God is
that cause (2ga). Primary cause always produces things which
are good and fair (46e). It cannot be other than God himself - in
whose providence the world has come to be - for 'the supreme
originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos' was his
desire to make it good and like himself (2gd-30c).
Plato regarded it as a mistake to omit either type of cause. He
wanted to avoid the snares into which both the extreme rationalists and the extreme empiricists had fallen. Things were not
to be reduced to Ideas, nor Ideas to things. There was a definite
distinction between the two causes, and rational cause was
superior to mechanical cause, but both were included. And the
causes connected with bodies existed for the sake of the cause
that is divine and eternal. The lover of thought must pursue the
latter (46c-e, 68e-6ga).
Plato was making clear the difference between causes and
conditions. For example, the cause of Socrates being in prison
was not basically to be explained by his bones and sinews, but
by the fact that he was condemned (Phaedo g8b-ggb). And he
was condemned, in turn, because of his moral convictions. That
was the real cause of his being there. Likewise, the cause of
beauty in specific things is beauty itself, and of particular goods is
II9
goodness (Phaedo IOob-d). The explanation of something is not

to be found in the series of which it is a member, but in something
beyond which explains the whole series. That 'something beyond'
for Plato was not accessory cause but true cause, often called
'causa essendi' or 'ground' by others.
Aristotle went into greater detail in giving an analysis of the
four causes, but a comparison of them shows that at least material
and efficient cause come under those designated by Plato as
'auxiliary' 39. Aristotle feels the need of a cause which is beyond
these causes. We do not really know a thing until we grasp its
first principles (Phys. 184a13-16), and when we have attained
them, we will know not merely the 'how', but the 'why' (Phys.
194b16-23). Fortunately, we are not limited to an infinite series
of material or final causes; there is such a first cause (Meta. 2.994a
1-10). This first cause is the source of all motion, though itself
unmoved; it is the Unmoved Mover (De Gen. et COTT. 324a26-8,
Meta. 12.1072a9-15, 1073aII-2, Phys. VIII, 8, 9). The immediate
material and efficient cause are inadequate to explain the world
fully; the Divine and intelligible causes are needed for that.
Aristotle is close to Plato in a number of emphases. He stresses
the transcendent as rational and supreme, the source of existence,
of movement, and of final intelligibility. He regards the material
world as incapable of being fully understood in its own terms,
but as that which harmonizes with a teleological interpretation.
To give an exact analysis of each concept of the Timaeus is a
difficult if not impossible task, due to the mythical character of
the dialogue. But certain general observations can be made. The
Demiurge, primary cause, and World-soul are all terms which
refer to God. The Demiurge represents God in his active role of
bringing order and balance to the four simple bodies, to the physical makeup of man, and to the universe at large. Cause has to
do with God as the source and origin of things and of motion.
Under the concept of soul, God is portrayed in the aspect in which
his ideas move bodies, doing so in intelligible patterns and for intelligent purposes.
Aristotle decisively rejects both the Demiurge and Worldsoul, but retains most of the content Plato intended by them.
a. The four causes are delineated in Phys. I94b23-19Sa3, Ig8aI6-22; Meta. I.g83a
26-32.
I20
He accepts Plato's distinction of the two types of causes, and the

distinctive function of the higher kind. For both Plato and Aristotle, God's character was unchanging, perfectly rational, and
good. They both thought that the soul was the cause or source
of the body, and the end for which it exists. The highest aspect
of soul was Nous, which was immortal. With Plato, Aristotle
thought that soul was prior to the body and moved it. If the
Unmoved Mover is compared with God, its Platonic opposite,
both will be seen to be separable from the world.
Once again we come back to the question of whether the Worldsoul really moves itself, for this is the heart of difference between
the two men. Plato says that mind, qua rational, is at rest, but
that soul, qua related to body and motion, is in motion. Aristotle's
contention is valid that it is out of place to think of what is
abstract and rational as moving in the manner that material
bodies move. This would be particularly true if that movement
were forced. There is also strength to his objection that soul
should not have movement, since this would imply unrealized
possibilities.
With respect to their views of primary cause, of God, and even
of soul, Plato and Aristotle have been found in almost complete
agreement. There is only a small area on which they are at odds,
and apparently beyond reconciliation. But the point of difference
must be investigated further. Either a complete harmony will
appear, or we shall see why this is impossible. A great deal of
thought went into Aristotle's criticisms. And the most important
aspect of them is not what they were, but rather, why they were
made. There is a deeper reason for movement in World-soul
and the lack of it in the Unmoved Mover.
CHAPTER VIII
ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF 'NATURE'
By and large, the centuries since Socrates have served to

confirm his severe judgment on the Sophists. Today, their name
is still associated with verbosity and exorbitant fees, with moral
and political relativism. Yet their very scepticism tended to
inaugurate that era of metaphysical and epistemological speculation whose brilliance is undimmed by time. The Sophists
focused interest upon the pressing problems of mankind, so
that philosophers who succeeded them devoted much of their
attention to ethical and political studies.
It had not always been so. Prior to them, Greek philosophers,
with the exception of the Pythagoreans, had been more interested
in the character and behavior of the physical world. Their interest was in what we call natural science. They wanted to understand the basic (j)UGL~, particularly the Milesians, who were
consequently dubbed the (j)uGLoA6YOL.
The term 'nature' has a number of different connotations in
our day. It can mean the universe in general, the qualities which
any specific thing does have, or those it should have. Among the
Pre-Socratics, the term (j)UGL~ also had several meanings. It
meant the cosmos at large, or the stuff out of which any part of
it was made 1. This implies certain powers which would be inherent in the material, including that of movement. Some students
of the word have stressed the latter meaning to the exclusion of
all others 2. J. L. Meyres linked (j)UO"L~ with (j)UO(LOCL, to grow, and
said that cpUGL~ signified 'the way things grow'. Walter Veazie
adopted the more moderate view that it is the essence of things,
their power of motion, while F. J. E. Woodbridge took it to
Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (ed. 4; London, 1930), pp. IQ-rr.
Cf. Veazie, 'The Meaning of <I>UI:II: in Early Greek Philosophy' in Studies in
the HistOl'Y 0/ Ideas (New York, 1918), pp. 37-42.
1
122
mean 'origin', or 'birth' 3. On the other extreme, E. Hardy

thought its meaning was limited to the collective designation for
the world of external phenomena. A third group of scholars
regard <puO't~ as something divine, in a personal or impersonal
sense '.
The interpretation of <puO't~ solely as the sum of things or the
principle of motion has not found general favor, for the reason
that each is only a partial truth. The <puO't~ of the Pre-Socratics
included both concepts. The theories of the Milesians, who
flourished in the 6th Century, especially illustrate this. Thales
thought that everything was composed ultimately of water, and
that water had the ability to change into many things which
veiled its basic character. Here it is both (I) that of which things
are made, and (2) the power to move. Water was this <puO't~; it
was tangible and basic. Anaximenes considered the universe to
be constituted of air (meu(Lcx.), which he thought was a distinct,
corporeal substance. Empedocles had four material substances,
each of which had a <pu(n~ of its own. Although Love and Strife
might seem to be external principles of movement, they are
actually corporeal, and therefore a potentiality of earth, air,
fire, and water. Leucippus and Democritus held that there were
an infinite number of atoms, which differed in shape, size, and
position, and that these, together with the void, were the <pu(n~ 5.
Anaxagoras put side by side with his kinds of material stuff, Mind
which initiates motion. But his view was so clumsily and inconsistently stated that it came in for the strictures of Plato and
Aristotle alike (Phaedo 97b; Meta. 1. 98SaI8).
These Pre-Socratics held in common that natural processes
often brought worthy results, but by good luck rather than by
Ibid., p. 29 (citing Meyres, 'The Background of Greek Science,' University of
California Chronicle, Vol. XVI), pp. 37-42, pp. 28-9 (citing Woodbridge, Philosophical Review, Vol. X, 1901). Among those who hold thatcpucn~ismovement is M. W. A.
Heidel, who maintains that it is the universal process (ibid., pp. 60, 62-3, citing Heidel,
IIe:pt<DuCJe:Cil~ in Proceedings otthe American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston,
1910, Vol. XLV, p. 96 n. 69, p. 129).
Mansion, Introduction a la Physique Aristotelicienne (Louvain, 1946), p. 59 (citing
Hardy, Der Begritf der Physics in dey Griechischen Philosophie, Erster Teil, Berlin,
1884, pp. 13-6); and p. 61 (citing E. Zeller-R. Mondolfo, La Filosofia dei Greci nel
suo sviluppo storico, Parte 1. I Presocratici, vol. II, Firenze (1932), pp. 27-98; and H.
Leisegange, art. 'Physics; 2' in Realenz. d. klass. Altertumswissensch., vol. 39, 1941,
col. 1130-II64).
5 Burnet, op. cit., pp. 72-5, II, 231-3, 336-7.
123
good management. Such a conception was decisively spurned by

Plato. He speaks of the philosophers (the Physicists) who say
that fire, water, earth, and air exist by nature and chance and
not by art. After this fashion they claim the whole earth has
been created (Laws Io.889ab). They say the gods exist not by
nature but by art (Laws Io.889cd), thus making them secondary
and derivative. But if law has no basis in nature, then might
becomes right, and indeed the term 'nature' is used in an improper sense (Laws Io.890a, 892a-c). The myth of disorder in a
previous state of the world accurately describes what nature
would be like if chance ruled. Men would be born of the earth
out of necessity and spontaneously (e~ cXveXyxfLC:; XCXL cxu'rofLeX'rWC:;,
States. 27Ibc). The revolutions of the earth would depend upon
fate and innate affection (dfLCXPfLv'YJ, ~U(.L(pu'roc:; em6ufLLcx), produced
by continual agitation (cre:LcrfL6c:;). Plato says that this was Nature
in bygone days (~ 7teXAcxL qJUcrLC:;, States. 272e-273b), implying that
it is not the case now.
In blunt terms, a famous passage from the Sophist confirms
this rejection of the Pre-Socratic view of Nature:
Stranger. Looking, now, at the world and all the animals and
plants, at things which grow upon the earth from seeds and
roots, as well as at inanimate substances which are formed
within the earth, fusile or non-fusile, shall we say that they
come into existence - not having existed previously - by the
creation of God, or shall we agree with vulgar opinion about
them?
Theaetetus. What is it?
Str. The opinion that nature brings them into being from some
spontaneous and unintelligent cause. Or shall we say that they
are created by a divine reason and a knowledge which comes
from God?
Theaet. I dare say that, owing to my youth, I may often
waver in my view, but now when I look at you and see that
you incline to refer them to God, I defer to your authority.
Str. Nobly said, Theaetetus, and if I thought that you were
one of those who would hereafter change your mind, I would
have gently argued with you, and forced you to assent ....
(26scd, Jowett tr.)
It is significant that in the Timaeus, the only Platonic dialogue
which deals specifically with natural science, the word qJumc:;
appears relatively seldom. And when it does, it does not refer
124
to the universe in general or to the sum of material out of which

it is made. Instead, CPUO'LC; has the meaning of basic characteristics
(as in 18d, 20a, 30b, 48b, 60b, 62b, 90d), of substance for a particular thing (74d, 7Sd, 84c), or of the proper order, or manner of
behavior (29b, 4Sb). In no case did Plato think it could be
fittingly applied to the Receptacle or to the sum of objects in the
world about us 6. If earth, air, fire, and water could be resolved
into different kinds of triangles, and if the order of the world
were derivative, too, either would fail to qualify as basic cpUO'LC;.
Plato has broken with the Pre-Socratics in no uncertain way.
Having seen what Nature 'is not', we tum to the inquiry
of what it is, which brings us to the threshold of the ultimate
meaning of the Timaeus. To understand the true nature of the
four kinds of material, one must understand them before the
world was made (48b). This is not to say that they should be
understood in the mass before they are understood in their
organization. Rather, we should understand them in terms of
their rational structure, which he proceeds to do in the following
section. 'Mind' in the Timae'Us then, is the CPUO'LC; of the world, for
it basically is rationality, and this is what directs its movement.
According to Plato, neither tangible and visible kinds of material,
nor the behavior associated with them, could be called primary
in the strictest sense (46d). They cannot, therefore, be Nature,
because as he says:
. .. the lover of thought and knowledge must needs pursue
first the causes which belong to the Intelligent Nature ('t'OCC; TIic;
E!LCPPOVOc; cpucre:6>C; cxhocc;), and put second all such as are of the
class of things which are moved by others, and themselves, in
tum, move others because they cannot help it.
(46de)
Plato followed his own advice and made Reason paramount.
Practically the whole first part of the Timaelts was an investigation of the works of Reason (47e); and even the works of Necessity, insofar as they were knowable, were known by reason. The
Ideas are those things which are unchangeable, invisible, and
absolute (Phaedo 78e, erato 439, 440). What is always in Being
is that which is known by reason (27d-28a, Sld-S2b). To Plato,
therefore, Nature is the world of Reason. It is described as Soul
Mansion, op. cit., pp. 87-9.
125
to emphasize its ability to initiate motion, since only soul can

do that, and mind dwells in soul (46d, Phaedr. 245e, Laws
896a-c). He identified the 0\1"-6)<;; O\l..-oc with the q>uGe~ O\l't'oc. This
has accurately been called a momentous step in Greek philosophy,
for it changed the content of physics from sensible matter to
something rational. Whatever promotes rationality is according
to Nature '. And rationality - thought, attention, mind, art,
law - will be prior to that which is sensed and felt. In short,
Mind will be supreme (Laws 89za-c).
Aristotle sets out to describe a q>UGLC; which at first sight seems
different from Plato's. He thinks that it is the source of motion
and that it is comprised of all objects in the world, or in his terms,
the forms and matter in conjunction with each other (Phys.
19zbzI-2, 194alz-z6) 8. He also uses the term 'physics' frequently to apply to the same world described by the Milesians. Although
this is true, the likenesses between Aristotle and the Pre-Socratics are superficial. Aristotle took their world, the world which
had been rejected by Plato as candidate for q>UG~<;; because of
previous associations, and clothed it with the attributes Plato
had ascribed to 'Intelligent Nature' 9. The physicist, he insisted,
must study the material-and-the-formal, in order finally to
understand the purpose (Phys. 194b7-13). One does not reach
science, the goal of physical inquiry, until he knows the 'why',
which is primary cause (Phys. 194bI6-Z3). This procedure is put
into definite practice in the Physics, where Aristotle declares
at the outset:
Plainly therefore in the science of Nature, as in other branches
of study, our first task will be to try to determine what relates
to its principles.
The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which
are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards
those which are clearer and more knowable by nature ....
So in the present inquiry we must follow this method and ad, Morrow, 'Plato and the Law of Nature,' in Essays in Political Theory, Konvitz and
Murphy (eds.), (Ithaca, I948) pp. 32-3. Campbell recognizes the two-fold character
of Reason (as Being, and as causing motion) in his analysis of 'Puent; (d. Campbell, The
Republic of Plato; Oxford, I894; I, p. 3I7 f.).
a The physicist studies both form and matter as they are found together. In this
sense, he is unlike the mathematician (cf. Ch. 3, pp. 29-30 supra and Phys. I93b23I94a 26).
Mansion, op. cit., pp. 88-92.
126
vance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us,

towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature.
(Phys. I84aI5-2I; Hardie and Gaye, Oxford tr.).
In the final analysis, it is form, rather than matter, which is
the nature (Phys. I 93b4-8, 19-20). The material is relative to
form (Phys. I94b9), and form is primary and absolute (Meta.
VII (Z), 3--6). Form does not change, therefore the source of the
world's motion lies in what always 'is', and is changeless (phys.
VIII, 5--6).
Much as Aristotle resembles the Pre-Socratics, his ultimate
stand on the meaning of Nature is the same as that of Plato.
Aristotle believes that rationality is the first cause and that it is
the final cause of the universe. This is made clear by his statement: 'Our first presupposition must be that in nature nothing
acts on, or is acted on by, any other thing at random .... '
(Phys. I88a3I-z) Nature was not characterized by the chance
juxtaposition of materials and forces, nor was it those forces
or materials in themselves. It was the material as mastered by
the rational, and consequently, pre-eminently the rational. While
Plato posited Soul, because he thought that it alone could contain mind and initiate motion, Aristotle held that reason resided
not in Soul, but in the Unmoved Mover. This is one of the
surprising paradoxes connected with the two men. Aristotle was
the biologist, but, save in his early days 10, the world for him was
not animate. Plato is not usually thought of as a biologist, yet
in the Timaeus, he puts biology before physics. He is not interested
in inorganic matter, but in matter as organized and animated 11.
It is understandable that a mind as brilliant as Aristotle's would
not be content with the repetition of a terminology, nor even of
exact ways of approach. For example, he often stresses rationality
in its distributed aspect (i.e., the form in the thing) rather than
in its unified aspect (i,e., as bound up in one system of truth, the
Unmoved Mover). But again, as in so many other instances,
the meaning and intent of 'Nature' is the same to him as it is
to Plato.
Physis, then, for Plato was Reason, while for Aristotle it was-
127
at least in the initial stages of his investigation - the moving world

of things. It was no small task which Plato undertook. In the
Timaeus from section 60 to the end, he showed himself equally at
ease in the fields which today are called physics, chemistry, meteorology, physiology, and medicine. He did not hesitate to
wrestle with the most formidable problems. Among them were
the attraction of similar bodies (63e, S3a), the constant revolution
of the heavens (s8a) which maintains a plenum (s8a, 7gb, 8oc),
sets up a m:p(wO'LC; (80c, 7gc), and makes impossible a positive
action at a distance (8oc). Also, the important distinction between
mobile and stable bodies (64ab), and the principle of stability
of the homogeneous and instability of the heterogeneous (S7a,
S8c). He attempted to explain diseases on purely physical grounds
and moral defect as due to physical conditions which could be
lessened if not removed (87b). He strove to find a continuity
throughout the animal kingdom, by tracing the rudimentary
organs of various species (76de) 12.
The results obtained by Plato in his examination of the world
may be stated very simply. He found purpose everywhere. It
was to be found in the most extensive operations of the universe,
and in the construction of the smallest part. He felt that the world
displayed the handiwork of a rational Maker. God (the Demiurge)
made the world at large (2ga, 68e), the planets (38c) , and the
simple bodies (S3b), to be as good and fair as possible. He causes
them to be in motion, and to become even more so (2ge, 37c, 40b).
To say that God created the world may sound strange at this
point. It has been shown that Plato probably did not believe in
a beginning in time, and that he regarded the creation-account
as myth. Still, his view of God as creator is an approach toward
truth, not a retreat to fiction. Plato is insisting on a higher entity,
perfectly rational, on whom the world depends - both for the
degree of being which it enjoys and for the intelligence it contains
and fosters. Only on the basis of such a Being does he consider
the world understandable. He is stating both metaphysical and
epistemological dependence, and a general teleological interpretation of the world.
Purpose is to be found in every individual thing and in the
11
Shorey "The Interpretation of the Timaeus' in A.
J. P.; IX, 4; 417.
128
universe as a whole. To take man for an example, there is a

definite reason for the length of his body, for his legs and hands,
face and eyes, and eyelids (44e, 45a, b, de, 46e-47b). Their structure has a purpose, and likewise their location on the person.
These Plato enumerates as he goes through his description of the
whole human anatomy. Man possesses his physical endowments
in order to live the moral life (4Id, 42de, 47b-e, 68e-69a). He is
like a plant whose roots are in heaven, whence comes his sustenance and life (89d--9od). The goodness man is to fulfill is confirmed
by the high destiny to which Plato directed his readers. That was
none other than the imitation of God himself. The world was to
imitate him, and did insofar as it was rational, and man was also
meant to follow this high calling (2ge, 38c-e; 4Ib-d, 42de, 44b-d,
47c). Plato did not wish men to forsake science. He urged them
to do all the research possible into earthly causes, but then to see
the ultimate unity and rationality. Science was not to be for its
own sake, but for the welfare and betterment of mankind (68e69a). It was to be humanitarian.
Plato often spoke of the perfection of God and of the pattern
(Living Creature) on which the world was made. The world of
experience does not attain this perfection because Necessity, the
realm of infinite possibility, is never fully actualized. It makes
possible the world of Becoming, but prevents it from completely
Being. One of the key passages of the entire Timaeus is 48a:
And inasmuch as Reason was controlling Necessity by persuading her to conduct to the best end the most part of the things
coming into existence, thus and thereby it came about, through
Necessity yielding to intelligent persuasion, that this Universe
of ours was being in this wise constructed at the beginning. (48a)
This means that out of the universe come certain forces which
operate, in dependable and orderly fashion, toward the realization of rational purposes. This is natural, and is not by chance or
capricious interference 13. Nor is it a compulsory process. Reason
in this cosmic sense fulfills the same duty as the legislator. He
sees the lofty demands of morallaw, and does not compromise them
in his practical regulations. But though the laws are severe,
he persuades men that it is best to obey them (Laws 8gobc). Such
18 Morrow, 'Necessity and Persuasion in Plato's Timaeus', in The Philosophical
Review (Vol. LIX, No.2), April, I950, pp. I56-7.
129
a course would naturally require foresight, and planning; so the

natural implication is that the universe gives evidence of these
as much as any work of human art. The Demiurge personifies
them.
Plato never says that the present world is the best world;
only the world of Reason could be that. This is the best of all
possible worlds (29a, 30a, 32d-33a, 40a, S6c), the most fair and
rational world that can be realized when all concomitants are
taken into consideration. This principle is more frequently identified in the history of philosophy with Leibniz, who no doubt
found it in Plato 14.
Aristotle also felt that his physics was incomplete until it
culminated in the knowledge of the purpose of the world. After
all, Nature is purposeful cause (Phys. 198bI0-I, 199b32-3), and
there is nothing in it without purpose (De An. 43ZbzI-Z). In
any series which leads to a completion, all the steps of that
series are for the sake of that completion. It is the same way in
Nature (phys. 199a8-Iz). Form is the most characteristic feature
of Nature (Phys. 199az6-33, 193a30-b8). This does not mean the
forms only as found in individual things, though it does mean
that. Pre-eminently it refers to God (Meta. XII, 6-g). And since it
is true that purpose implies intelligent reflection (Phys. 197a7-8),
Nature may be said to act like an intelligent workman (Gen. An.
73Iaz4). If purpose is present in art, it is also present in Nature.
Aristotle likened Nature to a doctor doctoring himself (Phys.
199bz9-3I), probably meaning that it possessed a rational aspect
and that rationality was also applied to it.
In all essential respects, this doctrine carries the same meaning
as that presented in the Timaeus. The only difference is that the
mythical and dramatic element is gone. Foresight, intelligence,
and purpose are all there 10. Aristotle even believed that the
supreme principle which governed all was one (Meta. I076a4).
Plato and Aristotle do differ in procedure. Aristotle began with
the world of things, and reasoned up to the First Cause. Plato
14 The definite influence of Plato on Leibniz is shown in the study of a little known
work of the latter, De rerum originatione radicali, by Paul Schrecker, 'Leibniz and the
Timaeus,' in The Review ot Metaphysics (Vol. IV, NO.4), June, 1951, pp. 495-505, esp.
pp. 502, 504
15 Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics (London, 1897), I, pp. 459-64.
130
began with God and the works of reason, and gradually came
down to the level of physical bodies, their compounds and uses.
But the men are not at variance in their chief conclusions. For
example, Aristotle insisted that what is posterior in the order of
Becoming is prior in the world of Nature (Phys. 261a13, 184a1521). Aristotle saw rationality issuing out of the world. It could be
discerned in final causes, which were identified with function,
and supremely in First Cause. Plato, on the other hand, spoke of
rationality being planted in the world and its arrangements.
Plato stressed the cause of the world, Aristotle emphasized
behavior; both factors were rational. This may explain why
Plato felt the need of myth, because the making of the world
transcended his experience. And he scarcely would have considered putting rationality in at the beginning, if he did not feel
that it was continually issuing forth from the world.
This also explains another puzzle. Plato had taken the name
tpUo"LC;; to apply to Reason rather than to the world of things. He
did this because CPUo"LC;; indicated the source of motion and the
ultimate character of things. Aristotle reversed this and once
more applied it to things. Was he contradicting his master? Far
from it. For though he applied the same term to the world of
things, he vested that world with attributes which the Pre-Socratics did not think it had. Through immanent forms and the influence of the Unmoved Mover, the world had the ability - no,
the necessity - to behave in rational ways. Now that Plato had
broken the myth of cpuO"Lc;;-as-disorderly-and-erratic, Aristotle
could apply the term to the world with less danger of being misunderstood.
One may well wonder whether this was so far removed from
Plato. Although Plato said a number of times that forms were
not in objects, but that only their reflections were, he may have
meant that they were never fully actualized in objects, and that
the forms were definitely not to be identified with them. Such an
interpretation is a distinct possibility. No analogy can walk on
all fours. The Parable of the Cave cannot be taken literally in all
respects, nor can the Ideas be thought of as hypostasized in some
heavenly museum on the basis of certain mythical aspects of the
Phaedrus and M eno. Perhaps they are like the ideals of justice
and the just man in the Republic, which are exhibited 'not with
131
any view of showing that they could exist in fact' (Rep. 472C).
They may be realized to some extent in this world, but never fully.
The major questions dealing with the view of Nature of the
two men, the manner in which they studied it, and results obtained, have now been dealt with. More may be learned about
the relative agreement in the two men by investigating their
attitude towards their predecessors. First, they may be compared
with the Atomists. There are certain superficial likenesses between
Plato and that school. For example, allusions to Democritus
are present in the Theaetetus, the Parmenides, and the Timaeus.
Moreover, Aristotle sometimes groups them together for common
critisism and both describe the vision of a world of jostling elements 16. Counterbalancing this is Plato's rejection of the void.
The elements fill the universe and move in a Receptacle which is a
plenum in the first place. Also, whereas for the Abderites nothing
is prior to brute mechanism and its blind, purposeless operations,
Plato finds mechanism only a tool. It is subordinate to rational
purposes and itself shows evidence of rational construction. The
atoms are indivisible and basic for the former; for Plato, the
simple bodies are divisible. They may be explained largely by
prior, rational determinations. Both in the means by which the
universe is made, and in the end for which it exists, Plato and the
Atomists are decidedly in disagreement.
Aristotle shuns the planes as principles of explanation, but
finds rationality, nevertheless, inherent in the universe in the
formal and final causes. It is guided to a common rational goal
by a striving to be like the Unmoved Mover. Aristotle thought
that the Atomist explanation was utterly inadequate. He repeatedly stated that no natural thing begins in chance (De Caelo
30IaII-2). To state that things operate 'at random' is to abolish
Nature (Phys. 199bI4-S). Aristotle's 'first presupposition' in
studying Nature was that 'nothing acts on, or is acted on by, any
other thing at random' (Phys. 188a31-3). Therefore, (1) in considering both material and the rational, (2) in asserting the mastery
of the latter, and (3) in asserting unified, all-embracing purposiveness, Plato and Aristotle stand agreed. In these respects, they
are diametrically opposed to the Atomists.
16 Rivaud, Le probteme du devenir .... , pp. 309-IO, 3IOn., citing Natorp, Platos
I deenlehre, (I903), pp. 266, 366.
132
Whether the Pythagoreans and Plato are in agreement is a

subject of endless dispute, the myriad details of which do not
concern us here. Some think that Plato virtually submits to
Pythagoreanism, while most interpreters find him sympathetic
to that point of view, yet independent 17. Aristotle assails the
supposition that the simple bodies are composed of planes, and
indeed that anything corporeal can be made of mathematicals
alone. This was also Plato's view. Aristotle, however, never did
describe the simple bodies in terms of geometrical shape, as
Plato did. This may have been to avoid accounting for experience
by the material alone {i.e., by what is in certain shape}, or by the
rational alone {i.e., by the shape Plato thought the smallest
particles were in}. If this was his reason, as it may well have been,
it was probably to assert the unity of the rational and the material. Here again, as regards this world, Plato thought that there
was co-operation of the two, although the world, by definition,
could not attain ultimate rationality. Another reason that Aristotle did not posit shapes is that he began with the world as
experienced, and reasoned toward its goal. Plato had to go back
to structure because he reasoned from its origin and source. In
that both reject the adequacy of mathematicals to explain the
world, they are in full agreement. To that extent, at least, they
are at variance with what is usually considered a fundamental
dogma of Pythagoreanism.
By the same token, when they say that abstract Reason, in
and of itself, cannot account for the world, both Plato and Aristotle
set themselves apart from the Eleatics. Rationality is supreme,
but it needs the material to make the universe come-to-be. They
agreed with the Eleatics that the heavens were arranged in a
system that was mathematically proportioned, and that Mind
{\lOue;} was permanent and unchanging. But Plato and Aristotle
believed that there was an existing world in which these purposes
and rationality were actualized. Plato thought that it was made
" Taylor has adopted the former thesis, and devotes his whole commentary to it
(see Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford, 1928) pp. 18-19, 304-5)' as
does Frank, Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer (Halle, 1923). The latter approach is
represented by Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London, 1937), pp. vii-xii, 3, et passim. A
third group regards the whole enterprise as too hazardous. The Pythagorean references
are too scanty and obscure for any dependable conclusions. (Cf. the comment of
Shorey, 'Platonism and the History of Science,' in American Philosophical Society
Proceedings (Philadelphia, 1927), LXVI, 176.)
133
possible through 'Necessity' or the 'Receptacle', while Aristotle

thought that it was through 'material cause'. The paradox is
that they also accepted a state of flux in things (Heracleitanism),
but each man in his own way insisted that this described the
appearance and present condition of things, not their true nature,
which was fixed and abiding.
Important as these conclusions are, the main question is not
whether Aristotle and Plato agreed with their predecessors, as
much as it is whether they agreed with each other. We have
found that in all main essentials the two men agree on the material
basis of things (the Receptacle), on what the four simple bodies
are which are in this world, on the natural places of the elements
and the explanation of weight. They agree that mathematicals
and extended stuff are, separately, unable to explain the universe,
but that both the rational and the material must be considered
together. They are also in harmony that qualities have a basis in
physical matter, though they differed in how they explained
this. In the case of motion, they stressed the same varieties, and
found the circular of highest value, descriptive of rationality. For
both, the earth was at the center of the universe and stationary.
Plato and Aristotle described 'Time' in the same terms, though
each gave it a different formal definition. Neither one thought
that Time had a literal beginning. Definitely they differed on
'soul'. Plato described it as moving, while Aristotle thought it
caused motion but was itself unmoved. Even at this point, the
two men are not beyond reconciliation. Plato was using a mythical
narrative to teach a real truth, namely that Soul directs and controls all the universe. He already had said that the eternal, regarded from a temporal point of view, seems in motion, while
seen from its own viewpoint is stationary. And the fact that
Reason 'persuades' Necessity indicates that Reason calls forth a
voluntary obedience. In meaning, this is the same as the desire
of the world to become like the Unmoved Mover; it is what
later philosophers called an innate conatus toward rationality.
The respect in which they seem to differ most is their definition
of cpUo"LC;;. Plato, some might think, takes flight to realms static
and supernal, while Aristotle, the earthbound mortal, continues
to deal with moving objects and the world of common experience.
Yet this is their point of most complete agreement; Nature in
134
its final definition is 'Reason and purpose as applied to this

world'. By different routes and points of departure, they arrive
at the same destination. The world is ultimately understood as a
unified system of efficiently-running processes. There is purpose
in each one, and purpose in the whole, for all things work together for good. This good is perfectly consistent, and the most
abiding reality there possibly can be.
The wrath of Aristotle may have been kindled against the
members of the Academy who, after Plato's death, devoted
themselves to mathematics and tended to minimize the 'physical'
basis of things. This is perhaps the explanation of his failure to
use the plane-theory, and of his constant attacks on Pythagoreans
Whatever his motive, he decidedly did not disagree with the theory of simple bodies as stated in the Timaeus. The fact is, his arguments are directed toward the preservation of those values
for which Plato in the plane-theory was contending, namely,
that rational and material explanations are both needed to
explain our world. All of this tends to confirm the conclusion that
Aristotle concurred with Plato on the great issues, and on most of
the minor ones, in connection with physical science.
Certain charges have been brought against Aristotle. It has
been said that he set up a rival school to refute Plato, that he
attacked his master's doctrine, and even that he drove Plato
by force from the Academy. These deserve no credence. Aristotle
established no school in Plato's life-time. He was treated as a
Platonist by contemporary opponents, and was not above calling
himself one. In his ethical precepts he encouraged faithfulness to
one's teachers, and no doubt respected that ideal himself. Moreover, in view of Xenocrates' unquestioned loyalties, it is questionable if he would have journeyed to Atarneus with Aristotle, if
Aristotle had been as scurrilous as sometimes reputed toward
Plato 18.
This study has corroborated the finding that Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's natural philosophy arise, as Jaeger says, precisely
out of his greater nearness to Plato, not out of distance from him.
Aristotle 'stands wholly on ground prepared by Plato, and ...
his works on physics and cosmology are essentially discussions
18
Zeller, op. cit., pp.
10-15.
135
within the Academy'19. While Aristotle praised mathematics,

perhaps in his reaction against Pythagorizing, he did not put
it to practical use in explaining Nature. But Plato did, and in
that respect accords more with today's scientific ideals. In the
writer's opinion, therefore, it is inappropriate to say that Aristotle
'completes' Platonic doctrine; but it is true that Aristotle's
agreement with Plato is far greater than his divergence 20.
In view of this study, there is need for a re-evaluation of the

place of Plato in the history of science. He has not only been
misunderstood, but grossly underestimated. Another subject
worthy of further study is the relation of Aristotle and Plato on
other matters. It would be interesting to determine whether, in
other respects, the two philosophers are really as confirmed in
their opposition as is often claimed. A new comparison of their
views in ethics, politics, and view of forms would be welcome.
Moreover, the whole problem of the mathematicals in Plato and
Aristotle awaits fresh investigation, as does the relationship of
Plato to the Pythagoreans.
In the Republic, Plato set forth his ideal of a state. It was ideal
because Reason ruled in the person of the philosophers. Until
that kind of government could be realized among men, there could
be no peace anywhere (Rep. 5.473c). Plato many times stresses,
however, that he is delineating the good state in order that one
might better understand the good life for the individual (Rep.
2.368e-369a, 4.434d-435a). The requirements for one's own life
can be seen better in the scale of the state, which is man writ
large. The moral of the Republic is - since unity, harmony, and
self-realization in the state come only through the rule of reason,
each person should let reason rule in him, to secure the same
results.
What Plato taught in the Republic by the analogy of the state,
he teaches in the Timaeus by the analogy of the world. There is a
governance in the world which is rational. While the world can10 Jaeger, Aristotle (Oxford, 1949), p. 308. Also see Mansion, op. cit., pp. 35. 338,
and Robin, Platon (Paris, 1938), p. 331.
so Both statements are made by Zeller, op. cit., p. 162.
136
not be fully described in terms of intelligence, the construction

and operations of the world are prevailingly reasonable (Tim.
41e-44c, 89d-9od). Both man and the state will be guided by
Reason if they are like the universe, at whose helm is felt the
guiding hand of God (States. 273c-274a; d. States. 275ab, Rep.
6.488a-489a). In the last analysis, what is rational is dominated
by the Good (Rep. 6.508-9). For Plato, truth is 'in order to'
goodness.
The conflict between human law and divine duty is expressed in
Sophocles' A ntigone. Creon had been made king, and decreed
that the body of Polyneices should receive no burial, since he had
been a traitor to his own people. To the Greeks, proper care of the
dead was a religious duty. Antigone determined to defy the tyrant
and was in consequence condemned to die. Although Creon
repented, it was too late to save Antigone, and at the end, the
king is left a humble and a tragic figure. If the play could be
summarized, it might well be in Antigone's words to Creon:
Yes; for it was not Zeus that had published me that edict
(Creon's order]; not such are the laws set among men by the
Justice who dwells with the gods below; nor deemed I that
thy decrees were of such force, that a mortal could override the
unwritten and unfailing statutes of heaven. For their life is not
of to-day or yesterday, but from all time, and no man knows
when they were first put forth. (Ant. 447-457; R. C. Jebb tr.)
Just as Sophocles contended for an eternal law above the passing rules of men, so Plato in the Timaeus unfolds the picture of
a universe whose true nature is steadfast and good. There may be
appearances to the contrary for a time, but they are temporary,
and cannot endure. The man who is guided by the light of reason,
and who devotes himself to the highest possible good, is secure
indeed. The very plan of Nature is the basis of his life.
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INDEX OF PASSAGES
IN ARISTOTLE AND PLATO
Aristotle,
De Anima, I, I.403bg-15: 70;
403b9-17: 69; z.404azo-2I: 107;
404b8-405az: 109; 404bll-17:
108; 404b16: 109; 404bl6-17:
108; 404bI7-18: 109; 3: 109;
3405b31-406az: 19; 406bz6407a3: 110, 112; 407az-IO: 110;
407a3-5: 112; 407alz-14: 110;
407aI4-15: IIO;407aI5-18: 110;
407azo: 112; 407azo-zz: 104 n.;
407azz-z3: 112;407azz-3z: III;
407a3Z-bz: III; 407bz-5: III;
407b5-II: I II, 112; 407blz-z6:
III; 407bz3-z5: 107; 4.407bz7
f.: 105; 408bI5-18: 106; 5.408b
31: 19; 409bI9-4I1a7: 106.
- - II, I: 46; I.4Izalg-ZI:
107; 4Izaz3-z5: 107; 4Izb6-g:
34 n.; 4I2bz7-z8: 107; 413a3-6:
107; z: 46; 24I3az3-Z9: 107;
413az4-z7: I07;413bII-13: 107;
4I4alg-ZI: 17; 4415bI- Z: 91;
415b8- I I : 107; 5-11: 46; IZ: 46.
- - III, 4-5: 17; 44z9bI8zo: 70; 5.430aI7-19: 108; 430a
2Z: 107; 643 0b6-14: 34; 43 ob1 4-zo: 34n.; 430bz7-31: 34n.;
743 IbI 3-17: 69; 43 IbI 3-19: 70;
9.43Zbzl-zz: 129.
De Caeto, I, z.z68bI7-Z2: 65;
268bzl-Z4: 66; z68b3o-z69az:
66; 3.z69bI8-z7oalz: 66; 269b
23-30: 66; 270aI3-35: 66; 4.z70
b3 1- z7Ia34: 66; 8.z77a5-g: 55;
Z77ag-Iz : 55; z79all- b3: 90;
9.z79alz-16: 90; 10: 95; 10.
z79b3z-z80az: 93; Z79b33: 93;
z80az-Iz: 93; z80a31-34: 95;
IZ: 95, 96; Iz.283a7-Io: 95n.;

z83az3-z4: 96.
- - II, I.z83bz6-z84a6: 90;
z84az7-35:III;Z:60;z.z84bz4z8: 61; z84b31-35: 60; z84b33285az: 61; z85al6-I7: 60; z85a
z8-b33: 60; 285bz6-z8: 60;
z86aI-Z: 61; 4.z87az3-z4: 91;
6.z88al4-z89a8: 66; 9: 105; 13:
70, 71, 79; 13z93aI 5-b33: 78 ;
z93a35: 78; Z93bI3-16: 26;
Z93bI7-33: 71; Z93bI8-19: 80;
Z93b3I:74,78,79,80;295a8-I5:
63; 14.z96az4-34: 76; Z96az5:
74 n. ; z96az6: 72; z96a26-z7 :
73, 74; 296a34-b6 : 77, 80;
Z96bl-7: 73,76; 296b8-18: 56;
Z96bI8-ZI:55; Z97a34-b3: 80;
Z97bz-13: 81.
- - III, I.298b33-z99a4: 30;
z99a6-g: 33; Z99aI 5-18 : 69;
Z99 az 4-b8 : 57; Z99bI5-24: 57;
299bz4-3 1: 32; 299bzg-300a3:
57; 300a16: 34 n.; 2300bI7-21:
93; 300bI7-Z5: 68; 30Iall-Iz:
131; 30IaI8-19: 68; 3-6: 27;
330zal6-zo: 21; 4.303aZ-304b
z3: 27; 5: 35; 53 04b2-7: 32 ;
304bz6-z8: 27; 7306al-6: 34;
306azl-b3: 35; 8: 48; 8306b3-g:
IS; 306bI7-19: 5; 306bzz-Z5:
36; 306bz6-z7: 32; 306b3O-3Z:
48 ; 307a 7-8 : 52; 307ag-Io : 53;
307all-13: 53, 54; 307aI4-zl:
48; 307a3z-b6: 49; 307b6-ll:
49; 307bll-13: 49; 307blz-18:
50; 307bI8-2Z: 48.
- - IV, I.307bz8-308a33: 51 ;
308a8-33: 66; 308aI4-31: 55;
INDEX OF PASSAGES
2308b4-8: 56; 308b8-II: 57;
308bI3-14: 51; 308bI5-309al:
57; 308bI8-19: 76 n.; 309aI828: 15 n.; 309a21: 15 n.; 3.310b
3-5: 56; 4-5: 27; 43 IIaI 5-29:
51; 3 II a3o-b 14 : 51; 3IIbI5-312
a28: 51; 3IIb33-35: 55; 5312b
21-2 3: 57
De Generatione A nimalium, I,
23.73Ia24: 129.
De Generatione et Corruptione, I,
1-3: 66; 2315a29-3I: 36 ; 3I5a
3 1-33: 3 6 ; 3 1 5b2S-33: 34; 3I6a
2-4:48; 316a3-4:32; 316aII-I2:
33; 3: II; 3317bI 6-IS: 10; 3 I 7b
23-25: II; 319a26-2S: 10; 319b
3-4: II; 43 19bI2-14: 66; 319b
15-21 :66; 320a3-4: II; 320a3-6:
27; 5320aS-322a34: 66; 322all13: 66, 67; 7324a26-2S: 119;
S325aI3-16: 57; 325b24-33: IS;
325b25-326b7: 34 n. ; 325b2S-29:
21.
- - II, I: 21; I-S: 27; I.329a
13-24: 8; 329a14: 8; 329aI4-15:
8; 329aI5: 9; 329aI 5-17: 9
(twice); 329aI7: 8; 329a22-23:
34; 329a22-24: 8, 31; 329a23: 6;
329a24-27: 6; 329a24-33: II;
329a30-33: 6; 2: 21, 28, 46;
2.329bll-13: 27; 329b23-26: 27;
329b24-26: 45; 329b33-330a29:
27; 333oa3o-b3: 27; 33oa3I-b6:
45; 330bl 6-19: 103 n.; 330b3433 1a3: 22 n.; 4: 45; 5: 45; 5332a
5-27: 27; 332a27-2S: 45; 332a
28-30 : 34; 332b6-333aI5: 27; 7:
45; 7334a23-b8 : 27; S: 2S, 45;
9: 46 ; 10337a 32-33: 91.
De Lineis Insecabilibus, 96Sa314: 33; 96Sa9- I2 : 33 n.; 971a1 7972a1 3: 33; 97Ia28-29: 33; 972a
2S-29: 33.
De Sensu, 44IbS-15: 46.
Metaphysics, I, 3.9S3a26-32:
II9 0.; 983b7-II: 21; 4985aI8:
122; 6.987bI9-23: 12; 988a1214: 13 0.; 9992a20-24: 34
- - II, 2.994al-Io: 119.
- - V: 34 0.; 3 IOI4a 30-35 :
21; 6.lo16bl-6: 340 ..
- - VI, I.I025bIS-I026aI6:
69; 1025b2S-I026a6: 70.
--VII,2.I02Sb21-24:34 n .;
3-6: 126; IO.I034aS:34 n.; I036a
2-13: 29; II1036bI2 : 33; I036b
3 2 - I0 37a 5: 29
- - VIII, 4. I044a4-9: 34 n. ;
6. I045b2 3: 34 n ..
- - XI, 3. I06Ia26-b 33: 29;
I06Ia2S-b3:69; I06Ia2S-b4: 29
- - XII, 5.I07IaI6-IS: 90;
6-9: 129; 6.I07Ib3-4: II6; 171
bI9-22: 113; I072aI-4: III;
I072ag-I5: II9; 7: 67; 7-8: 66;
7I072a21-29: 67; I072b4: 91;
I072b4-8: 116; I072b4-29: 67;
I072bIo-I4: 91; I072bI4-24:
116; I072bI4-29: 90; I072b2529: IIO n., II6; 1072b26-29:
108; I073a3-13: 113; 1073all12: 119; S.1073a24-25: 113;
1073a24-26: 91; I073a24-33:
II6; lO74b3-5: 101; 9.I075a5II: 91, lIon.; I075aS-II: n6;
IO.1075aI2-24: 92; 1076a4: 129.
- - XIII, 6.loSobIS: 34 n.;
9. 1085b27-34: 34 0 ..
- - XIV, I.IOS7b9-14: 12;
loS7bl3: 13; loS8aI5-b2: 13;
2.108Sb14-16: 34 n.; IOSSb2528: 34 n.; 4.109Ib3O-35: 34 n.;
51092aI7-21: 29.
Nicomachean Ethics, X, S.
II7Sb22-23: IIO o.
Physics, I, I.IS4aI3-16: II9;
IS4aI5-2J: 126, 130; IS4al6-17:
5S; IS4aI9-21: 5S; 4187aI7-18:
12; IS7b7-9: II; 5.ISSaI9-26:
6; 18Sa31-32: 126; 18Sa31-33:
131; ISSb22-23: 6; IS8b33-IS9a
2: 6; 189a5-9: 13; 7.190a25-26:
6;I90bI5-17:6;19Ia8:II;I9Ia
S-12: 9; S.19Ib6-12: 6; 9. 19 1b
35-192a2:12; 19Ib35-192a34:lo
0.; 192a3-7: 6; 192a3-13: 10;
192aII-12: 12 0.; 192aI3-14: 10
0.; 192a25-31: 10, II; 192a2629: 6; 192a 26-34: 6; 192a3233: 6.
- - II, I.I92b2l-22: 125;
192b21-24: 68; 192b32-34: 6;
193a 30- b8 : 129; 193b4-8: 126;
INDEX OF PASSAGES
193bI9-20: 126; 2.193b23-I94a

26: 125 n.; I93b3I-34: 69; I93b
3I -3S: 29, 30; I94aIo-II : 29;
194aI2-I4: 70; 194aI2-26: 125;
I94aI2-z8: 70; I94b 7-I 3: 125;
194b9: 6, 126; 3.I94bI6-23: II9,
125; I94b23-I9Sa3: II9 n.; I94b
23-19Sb30: 67; SI97a 7-8 : 129;
7.198al6-22: II9 n.; 198a3S-b9:
67; 8.I98blo-II: 129; I99a 8-I2:
129; 199a26-33: 129; 199bI4-IS:
131; I99b29-3 I : 129; I99b 32-33:
129.
- - III, 1-2: 65; I.20IaIoII: 65; 20Ia2S-b3: 65; 4.203a46: 13; 203aS-9: 13 n.; 203aIS16: 12; 203a16: 13 n.; 203bIS20: 25; S.204b29-32: 12; 6.206a
8: 12;206aIS: 12;206a27-29:12;
206b27-30: 13; 207aIS-2I: 12.
- - IV, I-S: 13; I.20SbS-S:
17; 208bII-22: 51; 20SbI4-IS:
55; 20SbI9-22: 55; 20Sb22-2S:
29; 209aS- I 2: 17; 2. 209bI-II:
15,26;209bII-I2:6;209bII-I7:
18; 209blI-3I: 18; 209bI2-I3:
IS; 209bI2-I4: 6; 209blS-I6:
16; 209bI6-17: 18; 209bI8-2I:
18; 209b33-2IoaI: 16; 209b342IOa2: 14; 209b3S-2IOa2: 6, I2;
2IOal-2: 6; 3.2IoaI6: 56; 4.2IOb
3S-2IIa7: 13; 2IIa28-34: 14;
2IIbI8-2S: 14; 2IIb3O-3S: 16;
212aI-3: 14; 2I2a3-S: 14; 2I2a
12-14: 14; S2I2a32-3S: 14;
212b3-7: 14;212b8-10: 14;2I2b
32: 27 n.; 6, 7: 14; 8.214b292lsaI: IS; 2ISaI4-23: IS; 10.
2ISa3-33: 88; 218a7: 56: 218a34bI: 88, 89, 90; 218a34-b2: 89;
2I8bI-2: 88; 2I8b3-4: 90; 21Sb
8-9: 90; 2I8bS-20: 87; 21Sb19:
88; II, 12: 89; 11.2ISb21: 87;
21Sb34: 87; 2I9a2: 87; 2I9a8-9:
87; 2I 9a9-IO: 87; 2I9aI3-b2:
87; 2I9b3: 87; 219b3-8: 87;
220aI-3:89; 220a3: 87, 89; 220a
4-24: 87; 220as: 89; 220aI9-26:
87; 220a24-2S: 87; 12.220bI 316: 89; 220b23-31: 87; 22IaI-2:
91; 22Ial-3: 87; 22Ial-13: 90;
22IaS-13: 87, 88; 22Ia27-29:
90; 22Ia28: 87; 22Ib3-7: 90;

221bl0: 87; 22IbI4-23: 90;
221b2o-23: 90; 22Ib27-30: 90;
22Ib2S-32 : 90; 14223a22-2S:
90; 223a29-34: 87; 223a29-224a
2: 87; 223bII: 89; 223b13-224a
I: 91; 223b18: 87.
- - VI, 1: 33; IO.24Ib24: 91.
- - VII, 2.244b3-24SaS: 66;
324Sb3-4: 66; S.2sobS-7: 65.
- - VIII, 1,2: 65; I.2SIbIO13: 94; 2S lbI 7-I S: 94; 2S Ib1 926: 94 (twice); S, 6: 67, 126;
6.2S9b31-260aI9: 9 1 ; 7: 65;
7260a27-26Ib27: 65; 26IaI3:
130; 8,9: 66, II9; 8.26Ib28: 65;
IO.267b24-2S: 91.
Posterior Analytics, I, 9.76a913: 30; 1378b34: 30 ; 79aIO : 30;
24SsaI2-S6a30: 70; 31 : 30, 46;
3I.87b2S-3S: 70.
Plato,
Cratylus, 439: 124; 440 : 124.
Epinomis, 9SIC: 23 n.; 987B:
75
Euthyphro, 6, 8: II4.
Gorgias, 466B: 21 n.
Laws, 2.6S3B: 105; 671A: 21
n.; 672C: 21 n.; 4.714E: 102;

6.7S3E: 21 n.; 76SD: 21 n.; 77S
E: 21 n.; 7.822A: 75; 10.S89AB :
123; 889CD: 123; 8goA: 123;
S90BC: 128; 892AB: 102; 892
A-C: 123, 125; S93B-89SB: 67
n.; 894-S: II3; S94E: II I; S96
AB: 102; S96A-C: 125; 897-8:
113; S99: 105; 12.967: 105
Meno, 7SA-76A: 26.
Parmenides, 131: 90; 134D:
115; 137D: 21 n.; IS3C: 21 n.;
IS6B: 90.
Phaedo, 6SA: 101 n.; 67D:
101 n.; 7SE: 124; 82D: 101 n.;
S3AB: 101 n.; 93 f.: I05; 97B :
122; 9SB-g9B: 1I8; 99B: 73 n. ;
IOoB-D: 119; 101E: 21 n.; 109
AB: 73, 73 n.; IIoB: 23n.; IIIE:
75
Phaedrus, 237B: 21 n.; 237D:
21 n.; 24S: II3, II4; 24SC: III;
24SCD: 21 n.; 24SC-249D: 106;
INDEX OF PASSAGES
24SD f.: 102; 24SE: 125; 262D:

21 n.; 278D: lIS.
Philebus, 3ID-32B: 40; 33D34A: 44; SICD: 28; S6E: 28;
S6E-57A: 28; S8l>-D: 99 n.;
66A-C: 28, 105.
Protagoras, 318A: 21 n.; 344C:
21 n ..
Republic, 1.353l>-E: 10 n.; 2.
368E-369A: 135; 377A: 21 n.,
39;378: 114;379-382:115;380382: lIS, II6; 3.388 f.: II4; 401
A: 105; 402A: 20; 408C: II4;
4.434D-435A: 135; 436BC: 113;
439: 67; 547 2C : 131 ; 473C : 135;
477-8: 10; 6.484-486: 99 n.;
488A-489A: 136; 500-501: 99 n.;
508D: 101 n.; 508-509: 136;
510B: 21 n.; 5IOC-5I1B: 28;
SIIBC: 21 n.; 5IIC: 28; 7.715C:
101 n.; 517A: 101 n.; 518C: 107;
524-531C: 29 n.; 529BC: 23 n.;
S32 f.: 28; 532-533: 99 n.; 533
C-E: 28; IO.602D-603A: 28;
608C-62IB: 106.
Sophist, 249: II3; 250 : Il3;
257-258: II.
Statesman, 248A: 28; 269D270A: II7; 271BC: 123; 272E273B : 123; 273l>-D: II7; 273C274A: 136; 275AB: 136.
Theaetetus, 152C: 44; 152E :
44; 155D : 44; 155D- 157C : 43;
156A : 44, 45; 176C : lIS; 178B :
44; 184D: 44; 186DE: 44; 201E:
20; 203A f.: 20; 265CD: 123.
Timaeus, 18D: 124; 20A: 124;
27A-40D: 70 n.; 27D- 28A : 99,
124; 28A: II8; 28BC: 57; 28C:
II8; 28C-29A: 91, II7; 29A:
lIS, II8, 127, 129; 29AB: 25;
29A-E: 62; 29B: 124; 29CD: 8 n.,
100 n.; 29D-30A: II7; 29D-30C:
II8; 29E: 62, II6 n., 127, 128; 30
A: 62, 93, lIS, 129; 30B: 101, 105,
124; 30CD: 102; 31AB: 102; 3IAC: 90; 31B: 22, 24 (twice); 3IB-32
B: 24; 31B-32C: 22; 3IC: 101;
3ID: 101; 32AB: 24; 32C-33B:
13 n., 22; 32C-33C: 90; 32C-34
B: 62; 32D-33A: 129; 32D: 102;
33A : 103; 33B : 22, 103; 33C-
34A: 103; 34A: 61, 90; 34AB :

II4; 34B: 62, 90, 103 (twice),
III; 34BC: 92; 34l>-3SA: 102;
34C: 101, III; 34D: 103; 3SA:
61, 103 (twice), 103 n., 109;
3SA-36D: 61; 35l>-36A: 104;
36AB: 104; 36l>-D: 104' 36C:
61; 36CD: 61; 36D: 85; 36DE:
103; 36E: 24, 91, 101, lOS, IIO;
36E-37A: 105; 36E-37C: 61;
37A: 101, 102, 103, IIO (twice);
37A-C: 61, 105; 37B: 61; 37C:
90, lOS, 127; 37CD: 85, 102;
37C-E: 91; 37C-38C: 92; 37D :
84, 85, 86; 37DE: 84, 88; 37E:
84; 37E -38A : 25, 86; 37E -38B :
90 ; 38A : 84, 85, 90, 91, II4;
38B : 85, 94; 38Bf.: 84; 38BC :
88, 90, 91; 38C: 85, lIS, 127;
38CD: 64, 85; 38C-E: 128; 38
DE: 64, 91; 38E: 84, 85; 38E39B: 64; 39A : 9 1; 39AB : 61,75;
39B: 85 (twice), 91; 39BC: 85,
90; 39C: 88, 89; 39CD: 84, 85,
88; 39C-E: 102; 39D: 85, 88, 89,
91; 39DE: II6 n.; 39D-40B:
66; 39D-40E: 114; 39E : 85
(twice); 39E-40A: 25; 4oA: 129;
40AB : 61, 64, 65, 75, 91; 40AD: 105; 40B: 79, 81 n., 127;
4oBC: 71, 73, 81, 81 n.; 40CD:
64; 40DE: II4; 4IAB: 62; 41AD: II7; 4IA-47D: 70 n.; 41B-D:
II 4, 128 (twice); 41C: 105, Il6
n. ; 41C-42A: 90; 41D: 103; 41D42D: 106; 41E: 85, 89; 41E-44C:
136; 42AB: 106; 42B-D: 61;
42CD: 60; 42C-47E; 42D: 85;
42DE: 101, II4, 128 (twice);
42E: 106, 1I6 n.; 43A-C: 60;
43B: 60; 43B-D : 44 (twice);
43B-44B: 106; 43C-E: 106;
44AB: 60; 44BC: 106; 44B-D:
128; 44CD: 100 n.; 44D: 107;
44D-45B: 106; 44E: 106, 128;
44E-45A: 62; 45A: 128; 45B:
124, 128; 45B-D: 44; 45DE :
128; 46A-C: 44; 46C-E: 21, 118
(twice); 46D: 23, 24, 101, 124,
125; 46DE: 124; 46E: 1I8;
46E-47B: 128; 47A: 85 (twice);
47 BC : 85, 91, 115; 47B-E: 128;
INDEX OF PASSAGES
47C: 128; 47E: 124; 48A: u8,

128 (twice); 48AB: II8; 48B:
21 no, 124 (twice); 48BC: 8, 21
(twice); 48B-D: 21; 48:B-69A:
70 no; 48CD: 8 no, 100 no; 48E49A : 85; 48E-S3C : 8; 49A : 5,
5 no, II, 85; 49CD : 35; 49DsoB: 10; 49D-soC: 7; 49E : 7;
soA: 5 no, 7; soB: 5 no, 9, 22 no;
soBC: 5, 7 (twice), 7 no, II (twice); SoC: 7, 9, 85; soCD: 5, 25
(twice); soC-E: 7 (twice); soD:
5 no (twice), 8, 10 no; soDE: 7;
soD-SIA: 10; SOD-SIB: 45;
soE: 7, 10; SIA: 5 (twice), 5 no,
7, II, II no, 14, 25; 5IAB: 8 no,
9, II; 51C: 100 no; 51D: 100 no;
5ID-5ZB: 85, 124; 5IE-5ZA :
7, 13 no, 25; 5IE-5zB: 99; 5 zA :
5 (twice), 7, 10, 13; 5zAB : 7, II,
13; 5zA-C: 8 no; 5zA- D : 5
(twice); 5zB: 5, 10, II, 13no;
5zBC: 100no; 5zD: 5no, 7, 10,
13, 25, 86, 100 no; 5zDE: 5, I I;
5 zD-53A : 61; 5zD-53C : 45;
szE-S3A : 49; 53A : 5 no, 51,
127; 53AB : 24, 62, 115; 53B: 25,
104, II5, 127; S3BC: 24 no; 53C:
24; 53C-6IC: 8; 53D: 21 no, 23,
100, II5; 53E-S4B: 25; 54AB:
23;S4B-D:24,34,62;54B-55C :
24; 54D : 21; 54D-S5C: 24, 32 ;
54D-S6C: 23; 55A: 51; S5A-C:
24; 55B : 21; 55C: 22, 24; 55DE:
53, 53 no; 5SE : 73; S6A: 51;
56AB: 32 no, 48 no, 56, 100 no;
S6B: 21, 24, 51; S6BC: 23, 25;
56C : 129; 56C-57D : 23, 49;
56C-57E : 24; 56D : 53; S7: II3;
57A : 32, 127; 57AB : 50; 57B :
69; 57C: 21, 51, 52 no, 61; 57CD:
23,63; 57D-S8C:63; 57E:63, 86;
57E-S8A: II6; 58A: 14, 15, 63,
127 (twice), 58A-6oC: 15; 58B:
50,51,53,64;58C:52,53,64,127;
58CD : 23; 58C-6IC: 49; 58D :
22, 23; S8E-59C : 23; 59CD:
145
100 no (twice); S9D-6oB: 23;

S9D-6ID: 36; 60fo: 127; 6oB:
124; 60B-E: 53; 60B-6IA: 23;
6oE-6IA: 53; 60E-6zB: 24;
61A: 21, 79; 6IA-C: 23; 61C:
23, 39 no, 57 no; 6ICD: 39 no,
40 no; 61D: 40 no, 101; 6ID-6zA:
40; 6ID-68D: 39; 61E: 32, 39 no;
6zA: 39 no; 6zAB: 40, 49; 6zB:
39 no, 124; 6zBC: 40; 6zC: 54;
6zCD: 54; 6zD.:()3A : 55, 73;
63A : 76no ; 63A- D : 53; 63A- E :
52; 63B : 51; 63D : 52; 63E :
39 no, 49, 51, 52 no, 127; 64A :
39 no (twice), 49 no; 64AB: 127;
64A-C: 44; 64B : 39 no (twice);
64C : 39 no; 64C-65B : 41; 64D :
39 no, 40 no; 65B: 39 no (three
times), 41; 65CD: 41; 65DE:
41; 6SE-66A: 42; 66A-C: 42;
66B: 39 no (twice); 66C: 39 no;
66D-67A : 42; 67A-C: 43; 67B :
39 no (twice); 67BC: 39 no; 67
C-E: 43; 67E : 39 no (twice);
67E-68D: 43; 68A: 39 no; 68C:
102; 68CD: 100 no; 68D: II5;
68E: II7 (twice), II8 (twice),
127; 68E-69A: II 8, 128 (twice);
69B: II5; 69BC: II7; 69C: 62,
II6 no; 69CD: 106, II4 (twice);
69C-E: II6; 69C-7IA: 107;
69D-gzC: 70 no; 69E: 106; 70
A-E: 106; 70DE: 67; 7IA-76E:
II5; 73B: 106; 73DE: 106; 73D74D: 36; 74D: 124; 75D : 124;
76D: II8; 76DE: 127; nA-C:
67; nA-E: II4; nBC: 61;
79B: 15, 127; 79C: 127; 80C:
14, 127 (three times); 80D-8IB:
62; 81A: 64; 81B-E: 62; 8zD83B: 62; 84C: 124; 86C-E: 106;
86E-87B: 106; 87B: 127; 87C88C: 106; 89A: II3; 89AB: 62;
89D-goD: 128, 136; 90B-D:
65; 90CD: 61; 90D: 124; 9IA-D:
62; 94A: 180
10
GENERAL INDEX
The names of Plato and Aristotle appear so frequently in this study
that they are not listed here. Nor are those men whose books are included
in the bibliography.
Abstraction, 29-30, 68-71.
Academy, 2 n., 3, 22 n., 28, 74, 77,
134
Actuality (ivepyeLOC), also Activity,
46, 96-97, 107, 108, II3, II6.
Affection (7t&'So<;, 7t&'S1){Loc), 39 n.
Air, 22-24, 27, 51, II4.
oc!a81)'t"6v, 18 n., 39, 46.
Albinus, 75 n.
Alexander, 7 2 , 77.
Alteration, 26, 45, 66, 68 n.
Analogy, Gold, 7-10.
Anaxagoras, 122.
Anaximenes, 122.
Aquinas, Thomas, 72 n.
a.pxY) , 7, 21, 22-23, 34, 109
Atomists, 20 n., 27, 48, 50, 122,
131.
Atoms, 36, 68,122.
Becoming (c/. Generation), 5-19,
68 n., 84, 86, 95-97, 99, 128, 130.
Being, 86,95-97,99, 103, 109, 113Iq, 124, 128.
Biology, 4, 47, 126.
Body, Human, 60-62, 105-108,
127-128.
Boethius, 2.
Cause, 26, 39, 39 n., 45, 47, 67, 107,
II7, II8-120, 123, 129-133.
Central Fire, 74-76, 78, 80.
Chalcidius, 2, 75 n.
Chance, 32-33, II7, 123, 126, 128,
131.
Change, 39, 68, 87.
Chemistry, 42 n.
Chronology, 3-4.
Cicero, 2, 20, 74, 78.
Cold, 40, 49-50.
Coming-to-be and passing-away, 62
Common Sense, The, 47.
Compounds, 23, 36, 45, 49
Contradiction, Law of, II3.
Contrariety, 6, 10, II, 21-22, 27,
28,35,46 .
Copy, see Image.
Craftsman, see Demiurge.
Crantor, 2, 104.
Creation, 18 n., 92-96, 97-98.
Demiurge, also Craftsman, 24, 62,
69, 92, II7, II9-120, 127, 129.
Democritus, 54, 55, 68, 122, 131.
Descartes, 15 n.
Dialectic, 28, 99 n., 100 n.
Diogenes Laertius, 81 n.
Dyad, 12-13, 12 n.
Earth, 6, 22-24, 27, 34-35, 50-51,
52-54, 56, 63
Earth, The, 78-79, 114, 123;
movement of, 71-82; as a planet,
75-76, 77, 80, 81.
Ecliptic, 64, 104, IIO.
Eleatic, 103, 132-133.
Element (cr't"OLXerOV), 20-22, 34-35,
108-IOg.
Elements, see Simple Bodies.
Empedocles, 73 n., 108, 109, 122.
Entelechy, 3, 46.
Epicharmus, 44.
GENERAL INDEX
Equator, 64, 104, IIO.
Eternity (ct. Time, Image of Eternity),84
Ether, 22-23 nn.
Euclid, 24 n.
Experience, 57-58.
Extension, 12-18, 16 n., 48, IIO.
Fire, 22-24, 27, 31-33, 48-57, 63,
78-79.
Forms, see Ideas.
Generation (ct. Creation), 26, 66,
67,68 n., 95-96.
Geometrical Figures, see Plane Figures.
Geometry, see Mathematics.
God, 24, 26, 62, 92, 97, 103-106,
114-120, 127, 128-130, 136 ;
imitation of, 85, 91, II5-1I8,
liS n., II6 n., II9-120, 128; in
Aristotle, 67.
Gods, 81, 81-82, 105-106, 1I4-1I5.
Goethe, 39, 39 n.
Good, The, II7 n., 136.
Good Life, 65.
Great and Small, 12-13, 16.
Growth, 66, 67, 68 n.
Harmony of the Heavens, 105, II5.
Health,62.
Heat, 40.
Heracleitans, 65, 133.
Homer, 44.
Iamblichus, 75.
Ideal,25
Ideas, also Forms, 6-7 nn., 13 n.,
14, 18, 25-26, 37, 39, 44, 45, 46,
57 n., 67, 85-86, 94, 102, II 7,
118, 125-126, 129, 130.
Image, also Copy, 5, 9, 85, 89, 90,
91-92, 98, 103.
Image of Eternity, 84, 85, 88, 89,
90,92,98.
Imitation (ct. God, imitation of),
88,91.
Indivisibility, 34.
Infinite, also Indeterminate, II-12,
25,47
Ionians, see Milesians.
Kantian, 16 n.
Kinds (ye:v1j) , see Simple Bodies.
Knowledge (t1tLO"TI)(L7), 28, 43-45,
46-47, 70-71, 99-101, 107, II5.
Law, 123, 128-129, 136.
Leibniz, 129, 129 n.
Leucippus, 122.
Life, 84.
Linit, 13-18, 26, 26 n.
Lindenblad, Nels, 37 n.
Lines, 29, 33-34, 36, 95-96.
Living Creature, 84, 102-103, 109,
114, 116 n., 128.
Locomotion, 65-66, 67 n.
Macrobius, 2.
Mathematicians, 29, 33, 48, 50.
Mathematics, 28-30, 38, 47, 50,
69-70,134.
Matter, 5-19, 13 n., 28, 29, 45, 46,
70 n., 125-126, 132-134.
Measure, 24.
Measurement, 28, 47.
Melissus, 12.
Metaphysics, 29, 30.
Milesians, also Ionians and Physicists, 38, 50, 121, 122, 123, 125,
125 n.
Mind (vou~), 3, 26, 106-108, II2,
II4, 120, 122, 124-125, 132.
Model, 5, 84, 85, 88, 92, 102, 104105,115.
Motion, 15,51-52, 60-83, 84, 85-88,
87 n., 90-91, 94, 107, II2, II3,
II6; cause of, 62-65, 66-67, III,
116-117, 118-119, 126, 130;
Plato and Aristotle compared on,
67,67 n.-68 n.
Myth, 96, 99-101, 110, 112-113,
130,133.
Nature, 68-69, 82, 85, 121-136.
Necessity, 123, 128, 128 n., 133.
Neo-Platonic, 2.
Newton, 52 n.
Non-being, 9-II, 12, 95-97.
Numbers, 14, 25 n., 85-88, 86 n.,
89,90,98.
Opinion (86~oc), 28, 57.
Other, 61, 64-65, 73, 77, 81, 103lOS, 109-110.
148
GENERAL INDEX
Parmenides, 12.
Parsimony, Principle of, 27, 37.
Peripatetic School, also The Lyceum, 33 n., 77.
Philolaos, 22 n.
Physicists, see Milesians.
Physics, 30, 37 n., 47, 69-71, 126,
12 7.
Place, 5, 13-18, 26, 29-30, 30-31,
36-37,50-54,56.
Plane-figures, also Geometrical Figures, 23-26, 28, 30-38, 46, 4748,62,86,93-94,132.
Planes, also Triangles, 9, 15, 21,
22-38, 56-57, 61-62, 86, 124,
131,134.
Planets, 64, 75, 84-85, 87, 88-89,
104,114.
Platonists, also Platonic' School
and Platonism, 2, 12, 12 n., 33,
38, 48, 77, 79, 93, 93 n., 94, 95,
96,97,134.
Pleasure, 40-41.
Plenum, 14-15, 131.
Plutarch, 73 n., 74, 74 n., 75 n., 77,
77 n., 92, 104 n.
Points, 33-34, 36, 57, 95-96, 110.
Position, 14.
Potentiality (potency, MVIXILL<;),
11,17,35,45,46,58,93-94,96-97.
Pre-Socratic, also Pre~Socratics, 6,
7,21,22,121-126,130 .
Primary Bodies, see Simple Bodies.
Prime Matter, 9-18, 21, 28, 48.
Prime Mover, 66-68, 68 n., 91-92,
97, 113, 116, 119, 120, 126, 131.
Privation, 6, 10, 10 n., 18-19, 45.
Proclus, 2, 73 n., 74, 74 n., 75 n.,
78,79.
Protagoras, also Protagorean, 43,
44
Pythagorean, also Pythagoreans
and Pythagoreanism, 18 n., 20,
23 n., 33-34, 38, 50, 60, 75, 76,
77, 79, 8~ 90, 10~ 105, II~ III,
121, 132, 132 n., 134, 135.
Qualities, 26, 27, 29, 39-59.
Raphael,2.
Rational, The, also Rationality,
23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 35, 39, 47,
70 n., 102, II4, II5, 124, 126,

127-1 36 .
Reason, also Thought, 32-33, 61,
65, 85, 101-106, 107, II5, 124125, 128-136.
Receptacle, 5-19, 25-26, 35, 36-38,
45, 46, 61-62, 68-6g, 86, 94, 96,
102,115,118, 124,133.
Reminiscence Doctrine, 44, 107.
Same, 61, 64-65, 73, 77, 81, 91,
103-105, 109-110.
Science, I, 26-27, 30, 47, 70-71,
99-101, 100 n., 126-127, 128, 134.
Sensation, 39-59, 47, 57
Shape, 22, 23 f., 48-49, 53, 54, lOS109, 132, 134
Simple Bodies, also Elements,
Kinds, and Primary Bodies, 9,
20-38, 46-47, 63, 98, 104, 108109, 118, 119, 122-126.
Simplicius, 22 n., 33 n., 72 n., 74,
74 n;75 n., 77,93 n.
Smell,42.
Snub, The, 70.
Socrates, 20, 121.
Solids, 22, 24, 24 n., 31, 32, 34 n.,
47-4 8 .
Sophists, 121.
Sophocles, 136.
Soul, 3, 66-67, 101-120, 124-125,
170-23; motion of, 109-120.
Sound, 42-43.
Space, 5, 13-19, 24, 25, 26, 86,
86n.
Speusippus, 12 n., 34.
Stars, 64-65, 73, 77, 81, 82, 105106,114
State, The, 135-136.
Strato, 33 n.
Structure, 24, 32, 36, 39,47,58,115.
Substrate, 5-19, 27, 28, 35, 66.
Taste, 41-42.
Teleology, 26, 98, II9-120, 127-131
Thales, 122.
Theon, 75 n.
Theophrastus, 33 n., 77-78.
Timaeus, 75, 78, 80, 100.
Timaeus Locrus, 17-18, 18 n., 73 n.
Time, 84-98, 133; cause of, 91-92.
Touch,4.
GENERAL INDEX
149
Triangles, see Planes.

Truth, 99 n.
Vision, 4 1, 43-45.
Void, 14-15, 63, 131.
Understanding (3LcXVOLIX), 2S.

Uniformity of Nature, 26, 27, 37.
Unintelligible, 10-11.
Universals, 46.
Unmoved Mover, see Prime Mover.
Unwritten Teachings, IS, IS n.
Up and Down, 54-56, 60, 76 n., SI.
Water, 22-24, 27, 51, 114, 122.

Weight, 50-57, 9S.
Whirlpool Analogy, 63-64.
World-soul, 61, 103-106, lOS, log,
112, 113, 116, 133.
Xenocrates, 12 n.,
93 n., 134.
22
n., 33 n., 77.

George S. Claghorn - Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Timaeus (1954)

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George S. Claghorn - Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Timaeus (1954)

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ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S 'TIMAEUS'

TO MY FATHER AND MOTHER

Copyright I954 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

St. Davids, Pa., U. S. A.

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE RECEPTACLE

Plato's 'Receptacle'; Aristotle's 'matter' . .

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE SIMPLE BODIES.

History of the term 'Element'

Aristotle's general view of soul . .

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF 'NATURE' .

'Nature' to the Pre-Socratics

INDEX OF PASSAGES IN ARISTOTLE AND PLATO.

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS

Moreover, the place of the Timaeus is secure in the mainstream of

Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford, 1928), pp. 1-2.

Shorey, 'The Interpretation of the Timaeus', in A. J. P.; IX, 4; 407.

Aristotle has benefited from these attempts to magnify their

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS

Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, History of Animals, Parts of

Ibid., pp. IIO-II3, 148, 167, 170-171, 189-93, 197.

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE RECEPTACLE

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS

to otherwise by Aristotle as l'e't'cxA1)1t't'n(6v or l'e6ex't'tx6v terms

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE RECEPTACLE

to determine whether they are valid in spirit and basic intention.

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS

the impression that the Receptacle is in things, just as they are

Tim. 29cd, 4Scd, 5lab (&'1t"OPWTIXTIX, 8ucrIXAWT6TIXTOV), 52ac.

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE RECEPTACLE

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS

are Non-being. Aristotle teaches that that out of which things

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE RECEPTACLE

sense. It may simply be 'other than Being' as Being is defined, i.e.,

51a; italics mine.

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS

or comprehension. Moreover, approximately the same place may

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE RECEPTACLE

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE RECEPTACLE

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS

ARISTOTLE'S CRITI CISM OF THE RECEPTACLE

but there is a space of the whole. A place describes an existing

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS

ment. And significantly enough, in it we are told that Plato

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE RECEPTACLE

unable to exist, but in the sense of not being completely realized

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE SIMPLE BODIES

Most of the Pre-Socratics had one or a small number of material

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS

which this designation holds true, literally, and absolutely, are

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE SIMPLE BODIES

Plato says regarding ether should prevail, Though the doctrine of

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS

together in sets of four to form a quadrangular equilateral plane.

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE SIMPLE BODIES

Plato had a definite purpose in devoting so much attention to

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OP PLATO'S TIMA.EUS

A geometrical figure, Plato observes in the Meno, is that in

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THE SIMPLE BODIES

tives were in harmony with the highest ideals of science. He was

See arrangement in Oxford tr., Physics, 212b32 n., as listed by R. P. Hardie.

ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO'S TIMAEUS