Fabie v. City of Manila, 21 Phil.

, 486 (1912)
FACTS:
On the 26th day of November, 1909, the plaintiffs and appellees
sought to obtain from the city of Manila a building permit authorizing the
construction of a small nipa house upon the property in question. It was
claimed that the purpose of the building was to serve as a guard house in
which watchmen might be stationed in order to prevent the carrying away
of zacate from the premises. The permit was denied by the city
authorities on the ground that the site of the proposed building did not
conform to the requirements of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of
the city of Manila, as amended by Ordinance No. 124, which provides:
"That the building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a
private street or alley which has been officially approved." It is the
contention of the appellees herein that this provision is unconstitutional
and in violation of the fundamental rights of the property owners of the
city of Manila as guaranteed by the established laws of these Islands and
by the Constitution of the United States, in that it constitutes an invasion
of their property rights without due process of law. The lower court found
in favor of appellees and declared the ordinance null and void, at least to
the extent of the above-cited provision. From this judgment this appeal
has been duly perfected. The only question submitted for the adjudication
on this appeal is the constitutionality of the ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is constitutional? YES.
HELD:
It is undoubtedly on of the fundamental duties of the city of Manila
to make all reasonable regulations to regulate and protect the security of
social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence
in thickly populated communities, the enjoyment of private and social life,
and the beneficial use of property. In the absence of any constitutional
prohibition, a legislature may lawfully prevent all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society though the prohibition invades the
right of liberty or property of an individual.
The extent of the police power of the State are, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under
the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrary interfere with private
business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, is determination as to what is a proper
exercise of its police powers is not conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the court.

There can be no question as to the intent an purpose of the

provision of the ordinance under discussion. It is manifestly intended to
subserve the public health and safety of the citizens of Manila generally
and was not conceived in favor of any class or of particular individuals.
Those charged with the public welfare and safety of the city deemed the
enactment of the ordinance necessary to secure these purposes, and it
cannot be doubted that if its enactment was reasonably necessary to that
end it was and is a due and proper exercise of the police power.
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)
FACTS:
The validity of an energy conservation measure, Letter of
Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979 the response to the
protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 is put in issue in this
prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners for being allegedly violative of
the due process and equal protection guarantees 1 of the Constitution.
The use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends
and holidays was banned from "[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00
a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the day
after the holiday.
It was then alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the
issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the
provision banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is unfair, discriminatory,
[amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the
equal protection clause. 5 Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is
a denial of due process, more specifically, "of their right to use and enjoy
their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family
gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays," inviting
attention to the fact that others not included in the ban enjoying
"unrestricted freedom." 6 It would follow, so they contend that
Memorandum Circular No. 39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of
the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for
being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative power."
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban is constitutional? YES.
HELD:
The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. There may
be instances where a police power measure may, because of its arbitrary,
oppressive or unjust character, be held offensive to the due process
clause and, therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of them. The

problem sought to be avoided are the limited production and the

fluctutating prices of petroleum products. That is undeniable is that the
action taken is an appropriate response to a problem that presses
urgently for solution. It may not be the only alternative, but its
reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus, to repeat, substantive
due process, which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, is not
ignored, much less infringed.
Tested by the applicable standard that must be satisfied to avoid
the charge of a denial of equal protection, the objection of petitioners is
shown to be lacking in merit. To assure that the general welfare be
promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the
rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show
that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the
attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or
at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices
then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed.
A rule is binding on tile courts so long as the procedure fixed for
its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory granted
by the legislature. Memorandum Circular No. 39 cannot be held to
be ultra vires as long as the fine imposed is not less than ten nor more
than fifty pesos. As to suspension of registration, the Code provides that
whenever it shall appear that within a twelve-month period more than
three warnings for violations of this Act have been given to the owner of a
motor vehicle, or that the said owner has been convicted more than once
for violation of such laws, the Commissioner may, in his discretion,
suspend the certificate of registration. The ban being within the legislative
limitation, it is therefore valid.
Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils .v. COMELEC,
189 SCRA 337 (1998)
FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal
standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to
show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of
the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the
requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner
operates
radio
and
television
broadcast
stations
in
the

Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881
which provides: Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be
allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of
coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the
franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during
the period of campaign. Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the
same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers
and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be
procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92
singles out radio and television stattions to provide free airtime.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million
pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the
1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands
to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year.
Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and
television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require
these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00
in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years
elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs
requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for
such.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws?
(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of
property without due process of law and without just compensation?
HELD:
The State does not own the airwaves and broadcast frequencies.
It merely allocates, supervises and regulates their proper use. Thus,
other than collecting supervision or regulatory fees which it already does,
it cannot exact any onerous and unreasonable post facto burdens from
the franchise holders, without due process and just compensation.
Moreover, the invocation of the "common good" does not excuse the
unbridled and clearly excessive taking of a franchisee's property. The
Constitution is silent as to the ownership of the airwaves and frequencies.
It is then reasonable to say that no one owns them. Like the air we
breathe and the sunshine that sustains life, the air lanes themselves "are

not property because they cannot be appropriated for the benefit of any
individual," but are to be used to the best advantage of all. The State
in the exercise of its police power allocates, supervises and regulates
the use of airwaves, so as to derive maximum benefit for the general
public. The franchise granted by the legislature to broadcasting
companies is essentially for the purpose of putting order in the use of the
airwaves by assigning to such companies their respective frequencies.
The purpose is not to grant them the privilege of using public property.
For, as earlier stated, airwaves are not owned by the government.
A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the
constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms." (Zwickler v. Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]).
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose.
Let me grant for the moment and for the sake of argument that the
State owns the air lanes and that, by its grant of a franchise, it should
thus receive compensation for the use of said frequencies. I say,
however, that by remitting unreasonably high "annual fees and charges,"
which as earlier stated amounts to millions of pesos yearly, television
stations are in effect paying rental fees for the use (not just the
regulation) of said frequencies. Except for the annual inspection
conducted by the NTC, no other significant service is performed by the
government in exchange for the enormous fees charged the stations.
Evidently, the sums collected by the NTC exceed the cost of services
performed by it, and are therefore more properly understood as rental
fees for the use of the frequencies granted them. Since the use of the air
frequencies is already paid for annually by the broadcast entities, there is
no basis for the government, through the Comelec, to compel unbridled
donation of the air time of said companies without due process and
without payment of just compensation. In fact, even in the case of stateowned resources referred to earlier like oil, minerals and coal once
the license to exploit and develop them is granted to a private
corporation, the government can no longer arbitrarilyconfiscate or
appropriate them gratis under the guise of serving the common good.
Crude oil, for instance, once explored, drilled, and refined is thereafter
considered the property of the authorized explorer (or refiner) which can
sell it to the public and even to the government itself. The State simply

cannot demand free gasoline for the operation of public facilities even if
they benefit the people in general. It still has to pay compensation
therefor.
CIR v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, 406 SCRA 414 (2005)
FACTS:
Respondent is a domestic corporation engaged in the retailing of
medicines and other pharmaceutical products. In 1996 it operated six (6)
drugstores under the business name and style Mercury Drug. From
January to December 1996 respondent granted 20% sales discount to
qualified senior citizens on their purchases of medicines pursuant to RA
7432. For said period respondent granted a total of 904,769.
On April 15, 1997, respondent filed its annual ITR for taxable year
1996 declaring therein net losses. On Jan. 16, 1998 respondent filed with
petitioner a claim for tax refund/credit of 904,769.00 alledgedly arising
from the 20% sales discount. Unable to obtain affirmative response from
petitioner, respondent elevated its claim to the CTA via Petition for
Review. CTA dismissed the same but on MR, CTA reversed its earlier
ruling and ordered petitioner to issue a Tax Credit Certificate in favor of
respondent citing CA GR SP No. 60057 (May 31, 2001, Central Luzon
Drug Corp. vs. CIR) citing that Sec. 229 of RA 7432 deals exclusively
with illegally collected or erroneously paid taxes but that there are other
situations which may warrant a tax credit/refund.
CA affirmed CTA decision reasoning that RA 7432 required neither
a tax liability nor a payment of taxes by private establishments prior to the
availment of a tax credit. Moreover, such credit is not tantamount to an
unintended benefit from the law, but rather a just compensation for the
taking of private property for public use.
ISSUE: Whether or not the exercise by the State of its power of eminent
domain was denied? YES.
HELD:
Sec. 4a of RA 7432 grants to senior citizens the privilege of
obtaining a 20% discount on their purchase of medicine from any private
establishment in the country. The latter may then claim the cost of the
discount as a tax credit. Such credit can be claimed even if the
establishment operates at a loss. Before a tax credit is used to reduce
directly the tax that is due, there ought to be a tax liability before the tax
credit can be applied.

Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 deny the exercise by the State of its
power of eminent domain. Be it stressed that the privilege enjoyed by
senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the
private establishments concerned. Accordingly, the tax credit benefit
granted to these establishments can be deemed as their just
compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The
concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use
by the public, but held synonymous with public interest, public
benefit, public welfare, and public convenience. The discount privilege to
which our senior citizens are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the
general public to which these citizens belong. The discounts given would
have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private
establishments concerned, were it not for RA 7432. The permanent
reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the
taking of private property for public use or benefit. While it is a declared
commitment under Section 1 of RA 7432, social justice cannot be invoked
to trample on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution
and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in
our [C]onstitution [is] not intended to take away rights from a person and
give them to another who is not entitled thereto. For this reason, a just
compensation for income that is taken away from respondent becomes
necessary. It is in the tax credit that our legislators find support to realize
social justice, and no administrative body can alter that fact.
Maosca v. RP, 252 SCRA 412 (1997)
FACTS:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street,
Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492sqm. When the
parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1,
Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260,
declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was
approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports to which the
Secretary of Justice concurred.
Accordingly, the Republic, through the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging that pursuant to
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National Historical Institute
issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which was approved on
January, 1986 by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports,
declaring the above described parcel of land which is the birthsite of Felix
Y. Manalo, founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a National Historical
Landmark. The plaintiff perforce needs the land as such national
historical landmark which is a public purpose.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that

the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally,
that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious
entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking is constitutional? YES.
HELD:
Eminent domain is a right to reassert dominion over property
within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. The only
direct constitutional qualification is that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. The term public use, not having
been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its
general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. Public use
is one which confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not
confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public
to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long
as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of
public, a public advantage or public benefit accrues sufficient to constitute
a public use. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a
time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to
enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines
what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer,
through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise
to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
Petitioners ask: But (w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that
the expropriation of (Felix Manalos) birthplace become so vital as to be a
public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain
when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to
give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration,
for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual
consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The
purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the , rather than to

commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The

practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a
peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in
nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the
expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and
character of public use.
Just Compensation
Republic v. Lim, 462 SCRA 265 (2005)
FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for
expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots
were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The
Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots.
Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the
Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.
The Denzons appealled to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11,
1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National
Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied
knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the
claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots
within a reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20,
1961, the Denzons successors-in-interest, Valdehueza and Panerio, filed
with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages
against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property.
On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the
names of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the
priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of
land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market
value".
On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of
Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have
retained their right as such over lots because of the Republics failure to
pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings.
However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered
to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.
They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that
Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and
939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the
Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession of
the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value.

Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932

to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their
failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in
1976. The lot title was issued in his name.
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title
with the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered
a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive
owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right
to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision
dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ...This
is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount
to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just"...
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review
alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932.
ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot
932 despite its failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest
the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI
rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
HELD: One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no
person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of
law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is
that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken
for public use.7 Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution
mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it
failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation for Lots 932 and 939.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay
is contrary to the rules of fair play. In jurisdictions similar to ours,
where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of
compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in
a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab
initio.
As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated
the Republic to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the sum of
P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question."
Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass

without obeying this Courts mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation of

private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to
the need of government, and the government may take them whenever
the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however from the
taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent
domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his
loss.
There is a recognized rule that title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon
full payment of the just compensation. So, how could the Republic
acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the
just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly,
without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of
title from the landowner to the expropriator.
SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of
two stages. First is concerned with the determination of the authority of
the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of
its exercise. The second is concerned with the determination by the court
of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." It is only
upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have
been completed In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled
that, "the process is not completed until payment of just compensation."
Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the
expropriation process incomplete.
Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this
case entitle respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from
the Republic.
While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from
the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the
owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes
property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment
of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just
compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a

reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be

considered "just."

Tax exemptions
Tan v. del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324 (1994)
Tan v Del Rosario
Facts:
1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified
Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain
provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law.
2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates
the following provisions of the Constitution:
-Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
- Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . . property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making
authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner
contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for
being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the
Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their
Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title
actually reads,
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The
Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their
Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal
Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due
process.
5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.
6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating

due process
NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is
a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the
exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident in herein
case.
1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely
requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to
be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not
violate classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor
are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to
achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal,
to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies
equally well to all those belonging to the same class.
2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to
increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular
approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain,
by and large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. The
Court does not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents exceeded their
authority in promulgating the RR
No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the
amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant
variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their
respective professions individually and of those who do it through a
general professional partnership.
- See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/tan-v-delrosario-digest.html#sthash.afvCEoL9.dpuf
Substantive due process
Montescarlos v. COMELEC, 384 SCRA 269 (2002)
Facts: The Commission on Elections, on December 4, 2001 issued
Resolution Nos. 4713 and 4714 to govern the SK elections on May 6,
2002. On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros
sent a letter to the COMELEC, demanding that the SK elections be held
as scheduled on May 6, 2002. She also urged the COMELEC to respond
to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will
seek judicial relief.

On the other hand, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo, wrote

letters dated 20 February 2002 to the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President about the status of pending bills on the SK and
Barangay elections. In his letters, the COMELEC Chairman intimated that
it was operationally very difficult to hold both elections simultaneously in
May 2002. Instead, he expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin
Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and
postpone the SK elections to November 2002.
Instead of receiving a response letter, petitioners received a copy of
COMELEC En Banc Resolution 4763 dated February 5, 2002
recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to
November 2002 but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as
scheduled. Eventually, on March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK
elections. On March 11, 2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee of
the Senate and the House came out with a Report recommending
approval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill 2050 and House
Bill 4456. The Bicameral Committees consolidated bill reset the SK and
Barangay elections to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age in
the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age. On this same
date, Montesclaros filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction, seeking to prevent the postponement of the SK elections
originally scheduled 6 May 2002 and also to prevent the reduction of the
age requirement for membership in the SK. The consolidated bill was
approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives and later on
signed into law by the President.
Issue: Whether or not there is an actual controversy in the case which
seeks to prevent a postponement of the 6 May 2002 SK elections, and
which seeks to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill
lowering the membership age in the SK.
Ruling: At first, the Court takes judicial notice of the following events that
have transpired since petitioners filed this petition. These are as follows:
1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay
elections were not held as scheduled.
2. Congress enacted RA No. 9164 which provides that voters and
candidates for the SK elections must be "at least 15 but less than
18 years of age on the day of the election." RA No. 9164 also
provides that there shall be a synchronized SK and Barangay
elections on July 15, 2002.

3. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules

and regulations for the conduct of the July 15, 2002 synchronized
SK and Barangay elections.
In this case, the court mentioned the requisites which must be complied
with for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review. These are (1)
the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
The Court ruled that in this case there is no actual controversy requiring
the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a
postponement of SK elections, petitioners are but amenable to a resetting
of the SK elections to any date not later than 15 July 2002, the date
which RA 9164 has reset the SK elections. This only shows that with
respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual
controversy requiring judicial intervention. Also, their prayer to prevent
Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership
age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy.
According to the Court, a proposed bill is not subject to judicial review
because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no
duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal
effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to
declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that
would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed
act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in
vacuo.
It also emphasized that there can be no justiciable controversy involving
the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power
of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
It also noted that under the separation of powers, the Court can neither
restrain Congress from passing any law nor dictate to Congress the
object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into law.

The Court stated that a party must show that he has been, or is about to
be denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled.
A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By "real
interest" is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a
mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential
interest.
In this case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law
on those who were at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. But with
the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who on the date
of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old. The new
law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group. Not falling
within this classification, petitioners have ceased to be members of the
SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK
elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial
interest in the SK elections.
The Court had not seen constitutional issue on this case. At the time
petitioners filed their petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK elections
and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet
enacted into law and even after the passage of RA No. 9164, they failed
to assail any of its provisions that could be unconstitutional. The Court
however mentioned the only semblance of a constitutional issue which is
the petitioners claim that SK membership is a "property right within the
meaning of the Constitution. This argument however is bereft of merit.
Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK
membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment
in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK
membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based
on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or
from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right
protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right
conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or
even withdraw the statutory right.

The Court cannot also direct the COMELEC to allow over-aged voters to
vote or be voted for in an election that is limited under RA No. 9164 to
youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all
those who have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Petitioners' remedy is
legislation, not judicial intervention.

The Court also gave emphasis that public office is not a property right. As
the Constitution expressly states, a "Public office is a public trust." No
one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an
expectancy of holding a public office.
The petition is dismissed.

Regarding petitioners personal and substantial interest, the Court ruled

that petitioners have no such rights or interests in maintaining the suit.

Procedural due process

Judicial

ANAMER SALAZAR v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y.

BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 151931, 23 September 2003, Second Division (Callejo Sr., J.)

ISSUE:
Whether or not Salazar was denied due process.

If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only

granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting
him but also on the civil liability, the judgment on the civil aspect
of the case would be a nullity as it violates the constitutional right
to due process.

HELD:

FACTS: In 1997, petitioner Anmer Salazar and Nena Jaucian Timario

were charged with estafa before the Legazpi City Regional Trial Court.
The estafa case allegedly stemmed from the payment of a check
worth P214,000 to private respondent J.Y. Brothers Marketing
Corporation (JYBMC) through Jerson Yao for the purchase of 300 bags
of rice. The check was dishonored by drawee Prudential Bank as it
is drawn against a closed account. Salazar replaced said check with a
new one, this time drawn against Solid Bank. It is again dishonored for
being drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD).
The DAUD means that the account to which the check was drawn
had sufficient funds. However, the fund cannot be used because it was
collected against a deposited check which is yet to be cleared.
Trial ensued. After the prosecution presented its evidence, Salazar filed
a demurrer to evidence with leave of court, which the trial court granted.
In 2002, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting Salazar, but
ordered her to remit to JYBMC P214,000. The trial court ruled that
the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the existence of
conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the
issuer of the check, Timario. As a mere endorser of the check, Salazar's
breach of warranty was a good one and did not amount to estafa under
Article 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. Timario remained at large.
As a result, Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect
of the decision with a plea to be allowed to present evidence. The trial
court denied the motion.
Because of the denial of the motion, she filed petition for review
on certiorari before the Supreme Court alleging she was denied due
process as the trial court did not give her the opportunity to adduce
evidence to controvert her civil liability.

Salazar should have been given by the trial court the chance to present
her evidence as regards the civil aspect of the case.
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court explained
the demurrer to evidence partakes of a motion to dismiss the case for the
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a
case where the accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of
court, thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the
case for decision on the basis of the prosecution's evidence he has
the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect, but also on
the civil aspect of the case of the demurrer is denied by the court.
In addition, the Court said if the demurrer is granted and the accused is
acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence
on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting
the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on
the civil liability, the judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a
nullity as it violates the constitutional right to due process.
The Supreme Court explained that the trial court erred in rendering
judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordering the petitioner to pay
for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner
could adduce evidence thereon is patently a denial of her right to due
process.
Citing Aante vs Savelana, Jr., the Court stressed that Section 14 (1)
and (2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which are elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are
tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due
process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial".

Administrative
DOH v. Camposano, 457 SCRA 438 (2005)

completely relying on the PCAGCs findings, the secretary of health failed

to comply with administrative due process. Hence, the Petition.

FACTS: Respondents Camposano, Perez, and Agustin are former

employees of the Department Of Health National Capital Region (DOHNCR). Some concerned DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before
the DOH Resident Ombudsman Ringpis against Dir. Majarais, Acting
Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and respondents, arising out of
an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous
Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth
P330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory.

ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the PCAGC have jurisdiction to investigate the
anomalous transaction involving respondents
b) Whether or not the health secretary had disciplinary authority over
respondents
c) Whether or not a Department Secretary may utilize other officials and
report facts from which a decision may be based
d) Whether or not the Health Secretary has the competence and
authority to decide what action should be taken against officials and
employees who have been administratively charged and investigated
e) Whether or not the Order of Health Secretary is valid

Thereafter, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to

the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of a formal administrative
charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against respondents and
their co-respondents. Subsequently, the Secretary of Health filed a formal
charge against the respondents and their co-respondents for Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019.
Afterwards, then Executive Secretary Torres issued A.O No. 298 creating
an ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed against
the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). Consequently, the
PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the investigation,
it issued a resolution finding respondents guilty as charged. Then
President Ramos issued AO No. 390 dismissing the respondents from
service as recommended by the PCAGC in their resolution.
Subsequently, the Secretary of Health issued an Order disposing of the
case against respondents and Cabrera dismissing them from service.
Respondents and Cabrera filed their separate appeal with the CSC which
was both denied. Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied on
September 30, 1999. While Cabreras motion for reconsideration was
denied on January 27, 2000. Respondents, however, received the
resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on November 2001
which was promulgated on . Thus, Horacio Cabrera was able to appeal to
the CA the CSCs resolutions ahead of respondents. The petition of
Cabrera was granted by the CA setting aside the resolutions of the CSC
and exonerated Cabrera of the administrative charged against him. Not
satisfied with the denial by the CSC of their appeal, respondents brought
the matter to the CA which nonetheless used the same legal bases for
annulling the CSCs Resolution against respondents and held that the
PCAGCs jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to
presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to
investigate the charges against respondents. Moreover, in simply and

RULING:
a) YES. PCAGC have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous
transaction involving respondents. Executive Order No. 151
granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate administrative
complaints against presidential appointees allegedly involved in
graft and corruption. From a cursory reading of its provisions, it is
evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to investigate charges
against presidential, not non-presidential, appointees. In its
Preamble, specifically in its Whereas clauses, the EO
specifically tasked the PCAGC to investigate presidential
appointees charged with graft and corruption More pointedly,
Section 3 states that the Commission shall have jurisdiction over
all administrative complaints involving graft and corruption filed in
any form or manner against presidential appointees. The Court
notes, however, that respondents were not investigated pursuant
to EO 151. The investigation was authorized under AO No. 298,
which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against respondents.The Investigating
Committee was composed of all the members of the PCAGC. The
Chief Executives power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally
granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the
law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the

investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or

that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry. Parenthetically, the perceived vacuum in
EO 151 with regard to cases involving non- presidential
appointees was rectified in Executive Order No. 12. which created
the PAGC. Non-presidential appointees who may have acted in
conspiracy, or who may have been involved with a presidential
appointee, may now be investigated by the PAGC.
b) YES. The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department
secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the
formers jurisdiction. Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary
authority over respondents. Note that being a presidential
appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of
the President, in line with the principle that the power to remove
is inherent in the power to appoint. While the Chief Executive
directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless
recognized the health secretarys disciplinary authority over
respondents when he remanded the PCAGCs findings against
them for the secretarys appropriate action.
c) YES. As a matter of administrative procedure, a department
secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report the
facts from which a decision may be based. In the present case,
the secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the
PCAGC. Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the power to
impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was
limited to conducting investigations and preparing their findings
and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged
to the disciplining authority, who had to observe due process prior
to imposing penalties.
d) YES. The health secretary has the competence and the authority
to decide what action should be taken against officials and
employees who have been administratively charged and
investigated. However, the actual exercise of the disciplining
authoritys prerogative requires a prior independent consideration
of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement

results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not

merely and solely rely on an investigators recommendation, but
must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There
can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the
reputation, and the livelihood of the person administratively
charged. In the present case, the health secretarys two-page
Order dismissing respondents pales in comparison with the
presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to the
issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V. Ramos
conducted a restudy of the doctors case. He even noted a
violation that had not been considered by the PCAGC. On the
other hand, Health Secretary Reodica simply and blindly relied on
the dispositive portion of the Commissions Resolution. She even
misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation with
regard to Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.
e) NO. While the Health Secretary has the power as mentioned
above, Due process in administrative proceedings requires
compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the
respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present
ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the
decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be
substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a
decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of
the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply
accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be
rendered in such manner that respondents would know the
reasons for it and the various issues involved. The CA correctly
ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in
the present factual milieu. Furthermore, The Order of Secretary
Reodica denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration also
failed to correct the deficiency in the initial Order. She improperly
relied on the Presidents findings in AO 390 which, however,
pertained only to the administrative charge against Dr. Majarais,
not against respondents. To repeat, the Chief Executive
recognized that the disciplinary jurisdiction over respondents

belonged to the health secretary who should have followed the

manner in which the President had rendered his action on the
recommendation. The Presidents endorsement of the records of
the case for the appropriate action of the health secretary did not
constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of respondents.
Like that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica
should have contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of
the controversy to enable respondents to know the bases for their
dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they
so desired. Inasmuch as the health secretarys twin Orders were
patently void for want of due process, the CA did not err in
refusing to discuss the merit of the PCAGCs or the Ad Hoc
Committees recommendations. Such a discussion should have
been made by the health secretary before it could be passed
upon by the CA. In representation of petitioner, the Office of the
Solicitor General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges
and, like Dr. Majarais, deserve dismissal from the service. Suffice
it to stress that the issue in this case is not the guilt of
respondents, but solely due process.
ADJUDICATION
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted. the assailed decision of the
court of appeals is modified in the sense that the authority of the ad hoc
investigating committee created under administrative order 298 is
sustained. Being violative of administrative due process, the orders of the
health secretary are annulled and set aside.