4.

Warrantless search

Incident to lawful arrest

Cases:
Senson v. Pangilinan, 410 SCRA 394 (2003)
FACTS: On 14 March 2000, several persons were apprehended for violation of
Section 86 of Republic Act No. 8550, also known as The Philippine Fisheries
Code of 1998[1] by members of the Philippine National Police. The items seized
from those arrested included (a) 1 unit fish net, (b) 36 units lights (300 watts), (c)
1 unit light (500 watts), (d) 1 unit buoy, (e) 7 containers, (f) 7 plastic container
boxes, (g) 4 styropore boxes, and (h) 10 boxes of fish. On the same day,
Criminal Case No.15019 against them was filed. Three days later, Danilo Alayon
and Norma Villarosa, asserting to be the co-owners of the M/B King Fisher that
was used in the illegal fishing activity, filed an Urgent Motion for Custody of
Fishing Net, alleging that the fish net which costs no less than P600,000.00 was
left unattended at the beach exposed to the elements and movements of the sea
which could cause its early deterioration and ultimate loss. Respondent Judge,
despite the vigorous objection of the public prosecutor, granted the motion in his
order of 22 March 2000, in part, to the following effect To obviate their possible loss, destruction and/or deterioration, pending
resolution of the above-captioned case, the apprehending officers or whoever
has the custody, are ordered to cause the immediate turn over of the following
items to movants who undertake to produce the same whenever needed in
court, as they can only be properly confiscated in favor of the government upon
conviction of the accused.
1. 1 unit fish net
2. 36 units lights (300 watts)
3. 1 unit light (500 watts)
4. 1 unit buoy
5. 7 containers
6. 7 plastic container boxes
7. 4 styropore boxes
8. 10 boxes of fish
The public prosecutor filed, on 24 March 2000, a motion for reconsideration.
Instead of deciding the pending motion, respondent Judge deferred its resolution
until after the arraignment of the accused and the pretrial of the case would have
been had.[2]
Special Prosecutor Romeo B. Senson filed an administrative complaint against
respondent Judge for Gross Misconduct with Prayer for Preventive Suspension
asseverating that the release of the evidence had exposed said evidence to
tampering and that the deferment of the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration virtually resulted in the undue archive of the case.

In his comment, respondent contended that Republic Act No. 8550, the law
under which the accused were charged with having transgressed, did not
provide for the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia pending trial and that the
prosecution still could prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
even without the evidence being presented since it had sufficient witnesses for
the purpose.
ISSUE: Was the seizure of fishing paraphernalia lawful?
HELD: Yes. As the Office of the Court Administrator has so correctly pointed out,
while it can be argued that the remedy is judicial in nature or that the case
involves an error in judgment, Rule 127, Section 12, of the Rules of Court
(however), is much too elementary to be brushed aside (and that) x x x the
existence of a judicial remedy does not (necessarily) preclude resort to an
administrative remedy. Nowhere in the statute would it appear that the seizure of
the items, alleged to have been used in the illegal fishing activity, is proscribed
by it. Evidently, the seizure of the fishing paraphernalia has been made as being
an incident to a lawful arrest. Rule 127, Section 12, of the Rules of Court[3]
provides:
SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.- A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
In Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr. vs. Francisco Arca,[4] where the crew of certain fishing
vessels were caught, in flagrante, illegally fishing with dynamite and without the
requisite license, their apprehension without a warrant of arrest and the seizure
of the vessel, as well as its equipment and the dynamites found therein, as an
incident to a lawful arrest was held to be lawful.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information are prosecuted
under the direction and control of the prosecutor.[5] The seized items ordered
released by respondent Judge have not yet been offered in evidence; hence, the
prosecution, not the court, could still be deemed to be in the legal custody and to
have the responsibility over such items.[6] The pronouncement by the Court in
Vlasons Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals[7] is instructive; viz:
x x x The outcome of the criminal action will dictate the disposition of the seized
property. If found to be contraband, i.e., articles the possession of which, without
more, constitutes a crime and the repossession of which would subject
defendant to criminal penalties and frustrate the express policy against the
possession of such objects, they will not be returned, but shall be confiscated in
favor of the State or destroyed, as the case may be. If not contraband, the
property shall be returned without undue delay to the person who appears from
the evidence to be the owner or rightful possessor.
Routinary searches at airports
(UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEILA REYES JOHNSON

FACTS: Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a
widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino
citizen who was naturalized as an American on 16 June 1968 and had since
been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those
with Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent homes in the United States. On 16
June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba,
Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25,
she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the
next day, 26 June 1998. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on
duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to
frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons,
bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked
Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental
Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon
inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she
had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not
satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4
Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon."
She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women's room for inspection.
Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal.
Embile stayed outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson was asked again by
Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and Johnson gave the same
answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing
under her girdle." Johnson brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then
turned over to Embile, outside the women's room. The confiscated packs
contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was fount by NBI Chemist
George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took
Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office
(1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket
were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal
belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 plastic
bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, weighing a total of
580.2 grams; a violation of 16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended
by RA 7659. On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City,
found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Johnson
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates
her right against unreasonable search and seizure.
RULING: The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was
never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without
warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides that "A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an

offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed and person to be
arrested has committed it; and xxx." The circumstances surrounding the arrest of
the accused falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the
allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being
accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the
routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause
by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a
lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security
procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has
come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board
an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well
as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search
and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject
to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not
apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine
hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search,
they are admissible in evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent
arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon
the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
FACTS:
On February 12, 1998, at about 1:30 p. m., Susan Canton was at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport, being a departing passenger bound for
Saigon, Vietnam. When the metal detector alarmed while Susan was passing
through, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National Action Committee
on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, made a
pat down search on the former. Upon Frisking, Susan, Mylene felt something
bulging at her abdominal area and when the latter inserted her hand under the
skirt of Susan, She noticed that the packages contained what felt like rice
granules. Mylene then reported the matter tom SPO4 Victorio de los Santos, her
supervisor on duty. The supervisor then instructed Mylene to call Customs
Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring Susan to a comfort room for a thorough physical
investigation. Upon further frisking, Mylene and Lorna discovered three
packages individually wrapped and sealed in grey colored packing tape which
Susan voluntarily handed to them. Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4 De
los Santos and after laboratory examination, it yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation

Office, testified that no investigation was ever conducted on Susan. However,
Susan signed a receipt of the following articles seized from her: (1) three bags of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one
American passport bearing Number 700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia
plane ticket with stock control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty
girdles. He said that he informed Susan of her constitutional rights but admitted
that she did not have a counsel when she signed the receipt. Yet he told her that
she had the option to sign or not to sign the receipt.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the search conducted on Susan was incidental to a lawful
arrest.
2.
Whether or not the scope of a search pursuant to airport security is
confined only to search weapons under Terry Search doctrine.
3.
Whether or not Susan was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
4.
Whether or not the constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused
under custodial investigation was violated.
5.
Whether or not Susans conviction and penalty on her are correct.
RULING:
The Supreme Court did not agree with the trial court and the OSG that
the search and seizure conducted in this case were incidental to a lawful arrest.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a
lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed. Susans arrest did not precede the search. . It was only after the strip
search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline
substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN
was arrested.
Under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235, the provision is clear that
the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons.
The Terry search or the stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a police
officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person with
whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. In this case, after the metal detector alarmed Susan, R.A. No. 6235
authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. Thus, the strip search
in the ladies room was justified under the circumstance.
Warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the
knowledge that Susan was committing a crime, the airport security personnel
and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her, under paragraph (a) of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
As testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome
Cause, no custodial investigation was conducted after Susans arrest. She
affixed her signature to the receipt of the articles seized from her, but before she
did so, she was told that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any

event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon by the prosecution to
prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her during her detention
and used in evidence against her. Hence, her claim of violation of her right to
counsel has no leg to stand on.
As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law. For possession of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of
the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In view of the net weight of
methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the possession of Susan, the trial
courts imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million is well within the range
prescribed by law.
Susan Canton was found guilty beyong reasonable doubt of the
violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 ( Republic Act No.
6425) as amended and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). The appellants
passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her.
Moving vehicles
Caballes v. CA, 373 SCRA 221 (2002)
Facts:
While on a routine patrol in Brgy. Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, Sgt.
Victorino Nocejo and Pat. Alex de Castro spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with kakawati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with
smuggled goods, the two officers flagged down the vehicle. Being the driver of
the jeep, Caballes was asked by the officers as to what was loaded in the jeep,
to which he did not respond, appearing pale and nervous. The officers checked
the cargo and discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively
owned by National Power Corporation. Caballes and the vehicle with the highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station, where he was
imprisoned for 7 days. The trial court found Caballes guilty of the crime of Theft
of property. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment
of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible
against Caballes.
Ruling:
No; the evidence are not admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute, but admits of certain exceptions. The situation in the case at bar does
not fall under any of the accepted exceptions.
1.
Search of a moving vehicle
The rules governing searches and seizures of moving vehicles have been
liberalized for the purposes of practicality. Obtaining a warrant for a moving
vehicle is particularly difficult for want of a specific description of the place,
things, and persons to be searches. Also, it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the

warrant must be sought. Still, however, there must be probable cause to conduct
such warrantless search. One form of search of moving vehicles is the stopand-search without warrant at checkpoints, which has been declared as not
illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a
mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search. Routine
inspections are not regarded as violative of an individuals right against
unreasonable search. The circumstances in this case, however, do not constitute
a routine inspection. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the leaves and look
inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers have probable cause to believe
that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In this case, the
officers flagged down the jeep because they became suspicious when they saw
that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves, which, to them,
was unusual and uncommon. The Court believes that the fact that the vehicle
looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered in
kakawati leaves does not constitute probable cause to justify a search without a
warrant. In addition, there was no tip or confidential information that could have
backed up their search, as jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped
information has become sufficient to constitute probable cause.
2.
Plain view doctrine
It is clear from the records that the cable wires were not exposed to sight
because they were placed in sacks andcovered with leaves. They had no clue as
to what was underneath the leaves. Object was not in plain view which could
have justified mere seizure without further search.
3.
Consented search
At most, there was only implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which
is no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Evidence
is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable
searches.
Stop and Frisk
People v. Binad Sy Chua, 396 SCRA 657 (2003)
Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section
16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession
of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant
that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn
Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives.
The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali
Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up.
Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just

arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant
alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2
Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As
accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a
crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2
Nulud subjected him to a bodysearch which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22
caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into
the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance.
SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O
juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car
used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who
arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez
at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a
different version of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her
and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along
McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel
to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches
and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker,
the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with
raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the
course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open
his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded
to search his car. At this time, the police officers companions arrived at the
scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away
from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom
for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call
the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and
accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were being taken.
The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet
convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this
appeal to the Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and
(2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu
allegedly found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.
Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the
accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its
vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to

secure a search warrant. Thesearch is valid being akin to a stop and frisk.
The trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of
a searchincidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searchesdiffer in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they
may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made
the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accusedappellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there
was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. Reliable information alone,
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
With regard to the concept of stop-and frisk: mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk
serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also
be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this
principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar.
To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure
of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police
operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellants business in
the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The
apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had
custody of accused-appellant.
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk
principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and

consequentsearch and seizure made by the police operatives on accusedappellant. Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted.
Objects in Plain View
People v. Go, 411 SCRA 81 (2003) (CAVEAT: disupted facts)
FACTS: [PROSECUTION] On April 28, 1999, SPO1 Fernandez, SP01 Serquea,
and a confidential informant conducted a test buy operation at the residence of
appellant during which they purchased from him 1.5K worth of shabu. The police
officers did not immediately arrest him. Instead, they applied for a Search
Warrant for appellants residence from RTC Pasay based on their firm belief that
there was a large quantity of illegal drugs in his house. Thereafter, a raiding team
proceeded to appellant's residence armed with a Search Warrant commanding
them to make an immediate search anytime of the day or night of appellants
residence and to seize and take possession of shabu, weighing scale, other drug
paraphernalias, and proceeds of the above crime in violation of Republic Act
6425. Soon after the police officers arrived at appellants residence at 6pm, they
sideswept (sinagi) a little appellants Corolla which was parked outside to enable
them to gain entry to the two-storey house. Upon their entry, they met Jack Go,
son of the Go and restrained him. As the former was the only one present at the
time they then called on two baranggay kagawads to act as witnesses on the
said search. As instructed, the kagawads proceeded to the upper floor of
appellants house with2 policemen while SPO1 Fernandez, who remained
downstairs in the sala, instructed the handcuffed Jack Go to witness the search,
the latter refused. In the course of the search of the premises which took place
from 6-11pm, Kagawad Lazaro and PO2 Abulencia recovered one knot tied
transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance from the drawer of
a cabinet. Also seized from the residence of appellant were: (a) one plastic bag
containing yellowish substance; (b) a weighing scale; (c) assorted documents;
(d) passports; (e) bank books; (f) checks; (g) a typewriter; (h) a check writer; (i)
several dry seals and (j) stamp pads; (k) Chinese and Philippine currency;[21] (l)
and appellant's Corolla GLI car. They then seized properties and objects even
those which were not included in the warrant. When they were almost finished
with their search Go arrived and immediately together with the two witnesses
was made to sign the inventory reciept. Based on the evidence taken from the
search Go was charged for violation of R.A. 6425.
[DEFENSE] In November 1998, while appellant was walking along Gen. Luna
Street, he was accosted by SPO1 Serquea and another police officer who
accused him of manufacturing shabu and divested him of money amounting to
more than 5K. He was later released as the policemen could not charge him
with anything. On July 14, 1999 at around 5:30pm, Jack Go opened the door of
their house after hearing somebody shout that the car had been bumped. Five
armed policemen then entered the house, one of whom handcuffed him while
two went up to the upper floor of the house and searched for about 30mins. At
past 6pm, as the two kagawads entered the house which was already in
disarray. PO2 Abulencia, together with Kagawad Lazaro, searched the room of
Jack Go. SPO1 Serquea, accompanied by Kagawad Manalo, searched the study
room where he seized documents, passports and assorted papers. SPO1

Serquea and Kagawad Manalo then proceeded to the room of appellant followed
by PO2 Abulencia and Kagawad Lazaro. From the room of appellant, the
policemen seized documents, passports, bankbooks and money. After the
search, the policemen and barangay kagawads went down with three boxes
containing passports, money and assorted Chinese medicine. When appellants
wife arrived, SPO1 Fernandez ordered her to open the safe inside appellant's
room where the police officers seized money, passports, bankbooks, Chinese
currency and pieces of jewelry. The seized items were placed on appellants table
on the first floor of the house where they were inventoried during which
the barangaykagawads did not see either the plastic bag containing the
suspected shabu, or the weighing scale. After SPO1 Fernandez prepared a twopage Inventory Receipt and Affidavit of Orderly Search, he asked Jack Go to
sign the receipt. While Jack Go initially refused, he eventually did sign both
documents without having read them completely after he was hit by the
policemen. The two barangay kagawads also signed both pages of the Inventory
Receipt as witnesses. When appellant arrived, he was handcuffed and likewise
made to sign the Inventory Receipt without having been able to read its contents.
Jack Go was prevented from explaining its contents to him. The first page of the
handwritten Inventory Receipt presented in court, which includes an
undetermined quantity of white crystalline granules placed inside a transparent
plastic envelope as among those seized from the residence of appellant, does
not bear the signatures of appellant, the kagawads and Jack Go, hence, it is not
the same first page of the handwritten Inventory Report on which they affixed
their signatures. In fact the policemen did not leave a copy of this Inventory
Receipt with either appellant or the barangay kagawads. The policemen
continued to search appellants residence until 11pm when they brought
appellant, Jack Go, Shi Xiu Ong, Samson Go and Peter Co, together with the
seized items, to Bicutan. On the way to Bicutan, PO2 Abulencia, who boarded
the same vehicle as appellant, told the latter that the policemen wanted 10M
from him or he would be charged with possession of illegal drugs. The amount
demanded was later reduced to 5M then to 2M and finally to 500K. Appellant
refused to heed the policemens demands since he did not commit any crime
The Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Go for violation of the
offense charged. On appeal, Go assails the decision of the RTC as well the
validity of the search performed by the raiding team and the admissibility of the
evidence taken therefrom. Go also asks for the return of the properties seized
that were not included in the search warrant.
ISSUE: WON there exists an illegality in the search and seizure? WON the
properties not included in the search warrant may be returned to Go?
HELD: The validity of the Search Warrant is clearly shown by the Affidavit of
Orderly Search signed by the accused and his son Jack Go and his witnesses
Salvador Manalo and Gaspar Lazaro. Such Affidavit of Orderly Search coupled
with the testimonies of the police officers have clearly established the propriety
and validity of the search. The rule that a trial courts findings are accorded the
highest degree of respect, it being in a position to observe the demeanor and
manner of testifying of the witnesses is not absolute and does not apply when a
careful review of the records and a meticulous evaluation of the evidence reveal

vital facts and circumstances which the trial court overlooked or misapprehended
and which if taken into account would alter the result of the case.
In the case at bar, an examination of the testimonies of the police
officers brings to light several irregularities in the manner by which the search of
appellants residence was conducted. By PO2 Abulencias own account, in order
to enter the premises to be searched, the police officers deliberately side-swiped
appellants car which was parked alongside the road, instead of following the
regular knock and announce procedure as outlined in Section 7 (formerly
Section 6), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Since the police officers had not yet
notified the occupant of the residence of their intention and authority to conduct a
search and absent a showing that they had any reasonable cause to believe that
prior notice of service of the warrant would endanger its successful
implementation, the deliberate sideswiping of appellants car was unreasonable
and unjustified. Also by PO2 Abulencias own account, upon entry to appellants
residence, he immediately handcuffed Jack Go to a chair. Justifying his action,
PO2 Abulencia explained that not only was he unfamiliar with Jack Go and
unsure of how the latter would react, but it was a standard operating procedure.
There is no showing, however, of any action or provocation by Jack Go when the
policemen entered appellants residence. Considering the degree of intimidation,
alarm and fear produced in one suddenly confronted under similar
circumstances, the forcible restraint of Jack Go all the more was unjustified as
was his continued restraint even after Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo
had arrived to justify his forcible restraint. While Search Warrant No. 99-99-0038
authorized the immediate search of appellants residence to seize
METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), weighing scale, other drug
paraphernalias and proceeds of the above crime, the policemen, by SPO1
Fernandezs admission, seized numerous other items, which are clearly
unrelated to illegal drugs or illegal drug paraphernalia. The delivery of the items
seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and accurate
inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the
substitution of said items by interested parties. Under Section 12 of Rule 126,
the judge which issued the search warrant is mandated to ensure compliance
with the requirements for (1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property
received, (2) delivery of the seized property to the court, together with (3) a
verified true inventory of the items seized. Any violation of the foregoing
constitutes contempt of court. Given the foregoing deviations from the normal
and prescribed manner of conducting a search, as disclosed by the members of
the raiding team themselves, the reliance by the trial court on the disputable
presumption that the police officers regularly performed their official duty was
evidently misplaced. It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional
requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant
is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described
in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize. At the same time, the raiding team
characterized the seizure of the assorted documents, passports, bankbooks,
checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as seizure of
evidence in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the
plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. To be sure, the

policemen also filed a complaint against Go for alleged possession of

instruments or implements intended for the commission of falsification under
paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of dry seals
and rubber stamps also found in appellants residence. The counterfeit nature of
the seals and stamps was in fact not established until after they had been turned
over to the Chinese embassy and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for
verification. It is, therefore, incredible that SPO1 Fernandez could make such
determination from a plain view of the items from his vantage point in the
sala.
In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant
the application of the plain view doctrine to justify the seizure and retention of
the questioned seized items. The things belonging to appellant not specifically
mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly described, must thus be
ordered returned to him. Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals
and eight (8) of the rubber stamps have been certified to be counterfeit by the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, they may not be returned and are
hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of according to
law. Moreover, the various bankbooks and passports not belonging to appellant
may not be ordered returned in the instant proceedings. The legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,
and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties.
5.
What may be seized
Rule 126, Sec. 2, Rules of Court
Exclusionary rule
Art. III, Sec. 3(2)
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 (2003)
FACTS: The PCGG (Presidential Commission on Good Government) created an
AFP Anti-Graft Board tasked to scrutinize the reports of unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices by any AFP personnel (active or retired). The AFP Board
investigated various reports of alleged ill-gotten wealth of respondent Maj. Gen.
Josephus Ramas. Along with this, the Constabulary raiding team served a
search and seizure warrant on the premises of Ramas alleged mistress,
Elizabeth Dimaano. The equipment/items and communication facilities which
were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by
elements of the PC Command of Batangas and aside from the military
equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able
to confiscate money in the amount of Php 2.87M and $50K. The Board then
concluded that Ramas be prosecuted for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019) and Forfeiture of unlawfully Acquired Property (RA
1379). Thereafter, they filed a petition for forfeiture against him before the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case on several grounds
one of which is that there was an illegal search and seizure of the items
confiscated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties and other belongings confiscated in

Dimaanos house were illegally seized which will consequently make it
inadmissible?
HELD: The petition was dismissed. The correct issues are: (1) whether the
revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution during the interregnum, that is, afterthe actual and effective takeover of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of
resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the
adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration)
remained in effect during the interregnum. We hold that the Bill of Rights under
the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, we
rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum. Even in the absence of a
Constitution, the right against unlawful seizure can be found in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum, the Filipino people
under the Covenant and Declaration continued to enjoy almost the same rights
found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. As stated in Article 2(1) of the
Convenant, the State is required to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant. Further, under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the
revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one else shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence. The Declaration also provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. The Court has taken into
consideration the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State. Hence, the revolutionary government
was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals
under the Declaration, because it didnt repudiated either the Covenant or the
Declaration during the interregnum.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de
jure government, assumed responsibility for the States good faith compliance
with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the
Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights[45] recognized in the present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence. The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a
signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a
legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated
under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration
during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have
repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another
matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the
Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human
beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the
Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As thede jure government, the revolutionary government could not
escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25
March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary government
became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such
directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill
of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The Provisional Constitution served as a selflimitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute
powers entrusted to it by the people. During the interregnum when no
constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government
officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted
them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not
have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the
revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the
revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge
upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The
warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the
warrant. However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in
the warrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated
items not included in the warrant. It is obvious from the testimony of Captain
Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team
confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to
seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of
warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority
when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items
are contraband per se,] and they are not, they must be returned to the person
from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such
person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure
warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to
Dimaano.
6.

Civil action for damages

Aberca v. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1988)

FACTS: Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units of the AFP
known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by respondents then Maj.

Gen. Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communistterrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans
to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. In compliance thereof, the TFM raided
several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search
warrants. During these raids, certain members of the raiding TFM confiscated a
number of purely personal items belonging to the 20 petitioners. Petitioners
were arrested without proper arrest warrants issued by the courts. For some
period after their arrest, they were arrested without denied visits of relatives and
lawyers; interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel, through
threats, torture and other forms of violence in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them.
Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of Quezon
City against respondents-officers of the AFP headed by Ver. Respondents, in
their motion to dismiss, claimed that (1) the wrti of habeas corpus was
suspended, thus giving credence to petitioners detention; (2) respondents were
immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties, and
that (3) the complaint did not state a cause of action against respondents.
On November 8, 1983, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss the
case. A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint, and a
supplemental motion for reconsideration were filed by petitioners. On May 11,
1984, the trial court, without acting on the motion to set aside the Order of Nov.
8, 1983, declared the finality of said Order against petitioners. After their motion
for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, petitioners then filed the instant
petition for certiorari, on March 15, 1985, seeking to annul and set aside the
respondent courts resolutions and order.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military
personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution;
(2)
Whether or not respondents may invoke state immunity from suit for acts
done in the performance of official duties and functions;
(3)
Whether or not a superior officer, under the notion of respondeat superior,
be answerable for damages jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the
person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.
HELD:
(1) The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
(PWHC) does not destroy petitioners right and cause of action for damages for
illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What
is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action
for damages are explicitly recognized in PD 1755 which amended Art. 1146 of
the Civil Code by adding the following text: However, when the action (for injury
to the rights of the plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act,
activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or
authority arising from martial law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the
plaintiff, the same must be brought within one year.

Even assuming that the suspension of the PWHC suspends

petitioners right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not
and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered
because of respondents confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of
their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and
inhuman treatment.
The question became moot and academic since the suspension of the
PWHC had been lifted with the issuance of then Pres. Corazon Aquino of
Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986.
(2) It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP, were
merely responding to their duties, as they claim, to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion in accordance with Proclamation
No. 2054 of Pres. Marcos, despite the lifting of Martial Law on January 27, 1981,
and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged
CT underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or
roving commission untrammeled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or
transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined and
protected by the Constitution.
Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or
employees, or any private individual, liable in damages for violating the
constitutional rights and liberties of another, does not exempt the respondents
from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Revised
Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing
their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor, to protect the
Philippines from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or
without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil
their very existence. What is meant is that in carrying out their task and mission,
constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed; otherwise, the very fabric
of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies, the
struggle of mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that
psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or
compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.
(3) The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in this case.
It has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master
and servant relationships. No such relationship exists superiors of the military
and their subordinates. However, the decisive factor in this case is the language
of Art. 32, Civil Code; the law speaks of an officer or employee or person
directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights
and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone who must answer for
damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for
the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Art. 32 makes the persons
who are directly as well as indirectly responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
Section 3 Privacy of communication and correspondence
Alejano v. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188 (2005)

FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now
detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale apartment complex, located in the
business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of
Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The
junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called
for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet
members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers
later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then
returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of
the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over
custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took
place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers
involvement in the Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers
involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors
accused the soldiers of coup detat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A
of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued the
Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV
(Trillanes) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service
Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command
who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who
were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, however the same
was denied. The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The
appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup detat
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this
case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of
which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.
ISSUE: WON the denial of the petition for Habeas Corpus was valid? YES
HELD: For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus
necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court
finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ
and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court
of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in
the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming
that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their
petition. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus
is not the proper remedy to address the detainees complaint against the
regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas
corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The
purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of

his liberty.If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the
release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the
habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very
limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
A mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The
courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances
is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to
the excess.
AS TO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: The scheduled visiting hours provide
reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer
with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined by the
scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano
Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a fact that
petitioners themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees denied
their right to counsel.
AS TO INHUMANE PUNISHMENT: The boarding of the iron grills is for the
furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends
to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on
contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure
security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished
illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention,
and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.
The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable,
non-punitive response to valid security concerns.
AS TO RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION: The letters alleged to have
been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from
detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees
personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for
mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the
ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked
confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for
inspection in the presence of the detainees.
Section 4 Freedom of expression
1.
Freedom of speech and press
a.
Meaning and scope
b.
Aspects
c.
Forms of abridgment
1.
Prior restraint concept and kinds
2.
Subsequent Punishment concept and kinds
d.
Tests
1.
Dangerous tendency
2.
Clear and present danger
3.
Balancing of interests

e.

Prior restraint

MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 448 SCRA 575 (2005)

FACTS: ABS-CBN aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of The Inside Story produced
and hosted by Loren Legarda. It depicted of female students moonlighting as
prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees and interviewed student
prostitutes, pimps, customers and some faculty members. Philippine Womens
University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and
the faade of PWU served as the background of the episode. It caused uproar in
the PWU community. Dr. Leticia de Guzman (Chancellor and Trustee of PWU)
and PWU Parents and Teachers Association file letter complaints with petitioner
MTRCB, alleging that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and
resulted in the harassment of some of its female students.
MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB
Investigating Committee alleging that respondents:
did not submit The Inside Story to MTRCB for review
exhibited the same without its permission, violating Sec. 7 of PD 1986
and Sec. 3, Chapter III and Sec. 7, Chapter IV of MTRCB Rules and Regulations
Respondents: The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary
and socio-political editorial, the airing of which is protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of expression and of the press. MTRCB has no power,
authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.
MTRCB Investigating Committee ordered respondents to pay P20,000 for nonsubmission of the program and declared that all subsequent programs of the The
Inside Story and all other programs of the ABSCBN Ch 2 of the same category
shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing. On
appeal, the Chairman of MTRCB issued a Decision affirming the ruling of the
Investigating Committee.
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with the RTC and sought to:
declare unconstitutional certain provisions of PD 1986 and MTRCB
Rules and Regulations
(alternative) exclude the The Inside Story from the coverage of such
provisions
annul and set aside MTRCB Decision and Resolution
because they constitute prior restraint on respondents exercise of freedom of
expression and of the press, and those provisions do not apply to the The Inside
Story because it falls under the category of public affairs program, news
documentary or socio-political editorials governed by standards similar to those
governing newspapers.
RTC decided in favor of ABSCBN:
annulled Decision and Resolution of the MTRCB
declared that assailed provisions do not cover The Inside Story and
other similar programs for being public affairs programs which can be equated to
newspapers

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari by MTRCB.

ISSUE 1: WON the MTRCB has the power/authority to review the The Inside
Story prior to its exhibition or broadcast by television. YES
MTRCB/SG: (1) all tv programs including public affairs programs, news
documentaries or socio-political editorials are subject to MTRCBs power of
review, (2) tv programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus
liberal regulation cannot apply, (3) power to review tv programs does not amount
to prior restraint, (4) Sec. 3(b) of PD 1986 does not violate respondents
constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.
SC: Rule in statutory construction: Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere
debemos (where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except
something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to
justify it). When the law says all television programs, the word all covers all tv
programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. Since The
Inside Story is a tv program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which
it has power of review.
There also has been no declaration by the framers of the Constitution that
freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status. If the SC did not
exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of MTRCB,
with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom The Inside Story.
The only exceptions are tv programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine
Government and/or its departments and agencies, and newsreels.
ISSUE 2: Is a prior submission to MTRCB a case of prior restraint?
SC: Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: first, all
television programs, including "public affairs programs, news documentaries, or
socio-political editorials," are subject to petitioners power of review under
Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this Courts ruling in Iglesiani
Cristo vs. Court of Appeals ;25second, television programs are more accessible
to the public than newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot
apply to the former; third, petitioners power to review television programs under
Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to "prior restraint;" and fourth,
Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not violate respondents constitutional
freedom of expression and of the press.
ISSUE 3: WON The Inside Story falls under the category of Newsreels.
Respondents: Yes.
SC: NO. It is not defined in PD 1986 but Websters dictionary defines it as short
motion picture films portraying or dealing with current events; mostly
reenactments of events that had already happened. The MTRCB Rules and
Regulations define it as straight news reporting, as distinguished from news
analyses, commentaries and opinions. The Inside Story is more of a public
affairs program, a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure tv news and
news-related commentaries, etc. within MTRCBs review power.

MTRCB did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program nor did it cancel
respondents permit. The latter was merely penalized for their failure to submit
the program to MTRCB for its review and approval. Therefore, there is no need
to resolve whether certain provisions of PD 1986 and MTRCB Rules and
Regulations contravene the Constitution. No question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry:
proper party
actual case or controversy
question raised at the earliest possible opportunity
the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to
the determination of the case itself
Petition of MTRCB Granted. RTC Decision Reversed. MTRCB Decision
Affirmed.