ARTICKE III- BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 6. The liberty of abode and the changing of the same within the limits
prescribed by the law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
Q: What is the meaning liberty of abode?
A: it is the right of a person to have his home in whatever place chosen by him
and thereafter to change it at will.
Q: Can it be infringed if there is a lawful order of the court?
A: Yes, it is one of the limitations of Sec. 6, Art. III on the liberty of abode
Q: If no lawful order of the court?
A: No, otherwise, the freedom of the person to choose his own residence is
abridged and the purpose of the constitutional right or the right to be protected
is rendered inutile. In addition, this goes against not only the Constitution but as
well as internationally accepted principles, which the Constitution also respects
and recognizes. (suggested answer ko lang to, di ko alam san yung reference
nung sagot e)
1. LIMITATION on liberty of abode: lawful order of the court
a) Art. 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Art. 12 of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that everyone has the
right of freedom of movement and residence within the border of each
State.
Q: A purchased a lot in Manila to build a dream house after purchasing, Manila
issued an ordinance classifying the land as a highly industrialized zone. Can A
insist to build his house, even if there has been no lawful order of the court?
A: No, reclassification of the land is a valid exercise of power vested in the
executive department and the ordinance which was issued may be construed as
to mean the lawful order of the court or laws which prescribes the limit for such
exercise of a right. Furthermore, a reclassification of a land as a highly
industrialized zone would be unfit for residential purposes, which in turn may
lead into harmful effects for its residents, including A.
Q: Restrictions on the Right to Travel?
2. LIMITATIONS on the right to travel: interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as may be provided by law
a) A lawful order of the court is also a valid restriction on the right to
travel.
b) Sec. 6, Art III of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean
that whole the liberty to travel may be impaired even without court
order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities
are not armed with arbitrary discretions o impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of national security, public safety or
public health and as may be provided by law.
c) Art. 13(2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provide that
everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.

d) Art. 12(4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provide that no one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
Q: What activities are covered by the restrictions?
A: Ones freedom of movement and Right to Travel. It may be classified either as:
a) travel within the country; b) travel form the Philippines to another country
CASE DOCTRINES:
a) Marcos vs Manglapus
RIGHT TO RETURN IS NOT COVERED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS
FACTS:
On February 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via
the non-violent people power revolution and forced into exile. In his stead,
Corazon Aquino was declared President. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed,
has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time,
when the stability of the government is threatened from various directions
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood
firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
Manglapus, et al., however, point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos
and his family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national
security and public safety has international precedents.
DOCTRINE:
The right to return to ones country is NOT among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of
abode and the right to travel. Nonetheless, it is the Courts wellconsidered view that the right to return may be reckoned as a
generally accepted principle of international law and, under our
Constitution, is part of the law of the land.
The right to return is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys different protection under the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights, i.e., against being arbitrarily deprived thereof.
The President did not act arbitrarily in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare.
The power involved is the Presidents residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the
President, as steward of the people.
This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of
the peace. The power is NOT limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence.
Q: What kind of power was exercised by the President?

A: Residual Powers. It belongs to the government but DOES NOT belong to any of
its branches. It is an inherent power of the government which is exercised by the
President being the HEAD of the State.
b) Manotoc vs Court of Appeals
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT
FACTS:
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of TransInsular
Management
Inc.
and
the
Manotoc Securities Inc.,
a
stock brokerage house. He was in US for a certain time. He went home
to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee for
both businesses. Pending disposition of the case, the SEC requested the
Commissioner of Immigration not to clear Manotoc for departure, and a
memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner. Meanwhile,
six clients of Manotoc Securities Inc. filed separate criminal complaints
for estafa against Manotoc. Manotoc posted bail in all cases. He then filed
a motion for permission to leave the country in each trial courts stating as
ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his
business transactions and opportunities." His motion was denied. He also
wrote the Immigration Commissioner requesting the recall or withdrawal of
the latter's memorandum, but said request was also denied. Thus, he filed
a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the judges' orders, as well as the communication-request
of the SEC, denying his leave to travel abroad. The same was denied;
hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court. He contends that having been
admitted to bail as a matter of right, the courts which granted him bail
could not prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
DOCTRINE:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from
leaving the Philippines. This is necessary consequence of the nature
and function of a bail bond.
Bail is a security required and given for the temporary release of a
person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before the
court in any court in which his appearance is required as stipulated in
the bail bond or recognizance.
The condition imposed is to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operated as a valid
restriction on his right to travel.
If the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed
of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the
custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their
charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been
regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment.
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the
state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely

derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person remains
unaffected despite the grant of bail to the later.
Q: PGMAs medical treatment in HongKong, may it be prevented by SOJ by a
departmental circular?
A: Yes. The 1987 Constitution provides that one of the restrictions for the right to
travel does not necessarily limits its application when national security is at risk,
public safety or public health but as well as the phrase as may be provided by
law.
c) Silverio vs Court of Appeals
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL MAY BE IMPAIRED BY COURTS OF JUSTICE EVEN FOR
REASONS OTHER THAN THE PROMOTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY, PUBLIC
SAFETY OR PUBLIC HEALTH
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised
securities act. Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner
and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel
petitioners passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not been
arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the
country without the knowledge and the permission of the court. CA
affirmed. Hence, this petition, where Silverio contends that the right to
travel can only be impaired in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health.
DOCTRINE:
A condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all
times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may
be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad,
compelled to return.
An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity
of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines prior
permission of the Court where the case is pending.
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to
mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without
court order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. They can impose limits ONLY on the basis of national
security, public safety, or public health and as may be provided by
law.
It should NOT be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the
Courts to use all means necessary to carry orders into effect in criminal
cases pending before them. When by all, jurisdiction is conferred on a
Court or Judicial officer, all auxiliary powers, writs, process and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court
or officer.

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern

shall be recognized. Access to official records, and documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transaction, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as a basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
1. Right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction. However, the right ONLY affords access
to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to
inspect and copy them at his expense.
The right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect integrity of
public records and to minimize disruption of government operations.
EXCEPTION: does NOT extend to information regarded as privileged
information rooted in separation of powers, not to information on
military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security,
and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement
agencies before the prosecution of the accused.
2. Need for publication of laws reinforces this right
In Tanada vs Tuvera, the Court said: x x x Mysterious pronouncements
and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
In Subido vs Ozatea, the Court said: Except perhaps when it is clear
that the purpose of the examination is unlawful or sheer, idle curiosity,
we do not believe it is the duty of under the law of registration officers
to concern themselves with motives, reasons and objects of the person
seeking access to the records.
In Legaspi vs Civil Service Commission, it was held that while the
manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to
disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records, CANNOT be DISCRETIONARY on the part of the
agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right maybe
rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion.
The Supreme Court said that when the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one
hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand,
along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings
in ensuring fair and impartial trial race against another, jurisprudence
tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win.

 In Bantay Republic Act No. 7941 vs COMELEC, the Court declared that
the right to information is a public right, where the real parties in the
interest are the public, or the citizens, to be precise. The right to
information and its companion right of access to official records, like all
constitutional guarantees, are not absolute. The peoples right to know
limited to matters of public concern and is further subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law.
In Hilado vs Reyes, the Court held that unlike court orders and
decisions, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case
need not be parties need not be matters of public concern or interest,
and that access to public records may be restricted on a showing of
good cause.
CASE DOCTRINES:
Q: In the right to information, is there a need for a legislative act?
A: No. It is self-executing
Q: is there a difference when we talk about right of information(ROI) from
disclosure?
A: ROI merely relates to issues of public concern while disclosure relates more to
public interest
a) Legaspi vs Civil Service Commission
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN IS A SELFEXECUTING RIGHT; THE DUTY TO REGULATE INSPECTION OF THE PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS DOES NOT INCLUDE THE POWER TO PROHIBIT; EXEMPTIONS
TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
FACTS:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public
concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the
civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as
civil service eligible that passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
i.

DOCTRINES:
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN IS A SELFEXECUTING RIGHT
Theses constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the
rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by
guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford to sources to
information.
What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions
and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy, disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest.

 The right may be properly invoked in a MANDAMUS proceeding

For every right of the people as fundamental, there lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern, to respect and
protect that right.
ii. THE DUTY TO REGULATE INSPECTION OF THE PUBLIC DOCUMENTS DOES NOT
INCLUDE THE POWER TO PROHIBIT
Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of,
or access to, information of public concern,
The power to regulate the manner of examining public records does not
carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made
between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of, or access
to, particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in
which the access of the information is to be afforded.
The manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government, agency in custody thereof, the duty to
disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
iii. EXEMPTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
The law may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny,
such as those affecting national security
In every case, the availability of access to a particular public record
must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e.,
(a) Being of public concern or one that involves public interest
(b) Not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee
iv. MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN
Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know either because;
(a) These directly affect their lives or,
(b) Such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.
b) Valmonte vs Belmonte Jr.
RIGHT TO INFORMATION CONCEPT; THE RIGHT TO INFORMSTION EXTENDS
TO GOCCs, AND MAY LIKEWISE COVER THE NEGOTATION STAGE OF THE
TRANSACTIONS; THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION DOES NOT INCLUDE THE
RIGHT TO DEMAND COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS OR TO DEMAND
SUMMARIES THEREOF
FACTS:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be
directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were
able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru
the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos;
and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to
the public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently
not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and

Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte

wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply,
"(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary
within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public
interest."
DOCTRINE:
i. RIGHT TO INFORMATION CONCEPT
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political,
moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free
exchange of ideas and discussions on issues thereon, is vital to the
democratic government envisioned under our Constitution.
Denied access to information on the inner workings of the government,
the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those
whom the power had been delegated.
It is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and
expression.
It goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public service.
ii.

THE RIGHT TO INFORMSTION EXTENDS TO GOCCs, AND MAY LIKEWISE

COVER THE NEGOTATION STAGE OF THE TRANSACTIONS
GOCCs whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people.
Transactions entered into by the GSIS, a GOCC created by special
legislation are within the ambit of the peoples right to be informed
pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government
dealings.

iii.

THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION DOES NOT INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO

DEMAND COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS OR TO DEMAND SUMMARIES
THEREOF
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant
thereto, are entitled to access to official records, the constitution
does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information or matters of public concern.
It is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and
that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act
required.

c) Province of Cotabato vs The Govt of the Republic of the Philippines Peace

Panel on Ancestral Domain
CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BY THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT IN THEIR
OFFICIAL CAPACITY SHALL BE DISCLOSED TO THE PUBLIC AS PART OF THE
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the

petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the
complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon.
They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court
issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
DOCTRINE:
The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution
involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state
policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective
exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature,
subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be
provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right
to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to
the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations
on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace
partners and concerned sectors of society.
d) Echegaray vs Secretary of Justice
THE MANUAL FOR DEATH EXECUTION IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST
FACTS:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y
Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law
spouse. The supreme penalty of death was to be imposed upon him. He
then filed motion for recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape.
Both were denied. Consequently, Congress changed the mode of
execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and
passed Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal injection.
Echegaray filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal
injection against him under the grounds that it constituted 1. cruel,
degrading, or unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due process, 3. a
violation of the Philippines obligations under international covenants, 4.
an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful
exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an

unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his

motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
DOCTRINE:
The requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual even
when respect to the convict is unduly suppressive.
The contents of the manual are matters of public concern which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affects their
lives, or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen.
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to
information of public concern is recognition of the essentiality of the
free flow of ideas and information in a democracy.
Free discussion enables members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their rime, access to information of general interests aid
the people in decision-making by giving them a better perspective of
the vital issues confronting the nation.
e) Chavez vs Presidential Commission on Good Governance
FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE EXTENDS TO INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE
NEGOTATION OF THE PUBLIC TRANSACTION; LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT
TO INFORMATION
FACTS:
Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the
peoples constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the
correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions
involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any
and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of
recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.
i.

DOCTRINE:
FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE EXTENDS TO INFORMATION RELATIVE TO
THE NEGOTATION OF THE PUBLIC TRANSACTION
It is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on
any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
Such information must pertain to definite propositions of the
government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
exploratory stage.

Q: Four groups of information which may be exempted

ii. LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION
(a) National Security Matters
A governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
matters. But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the
privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other
information, PROVIDED, that they are examined in strict confidence
and given scrupulous protection.

(b) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions

(c) Criminal Matters
Those relating to apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of
criminals which the courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest,
detention and prosecution.
(d) Other Confidential Information
Confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason
of their office and not made available to the public
Diplomatic correspondence
Closed door Cabinet meetings
Executive sessions of either house of Congress
Internal deliberations of the Supreme Court

SEC. 8-11, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Scope: The right to form, or join, unions or associations, includes the right
not to join or, if one is already a member, to disaffiliate from the
association.
This right is not absolute.
Atty G. Question: Are workers employed in the in the public sector allowed
to associate?
Answer: Yes, the law did not distinguish between employees of public and
private sector; thus, they can associate. However, those employed in the
public sector is prohibited from engaging in a strike.
THE RIGHT TO STRIKE: However, even if the provision expressly
guarantees the right to form unions in public and private sectors,
members of the civil service may not declare a strike to enforce economic
standards. (SSS Employees Association v CA)
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. The right of
the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees
was clearly recognized at common law; thus, it has been frequently
declared that modern rules, which prohibit strikes, either by statute or by
judicial decision, simply incorporate or reassert the common law rules.

The claim that the right to strike is part of the freedom of expression and
the right to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances, and should thus, be recognized even in the case of
government employees, was rejected by the Supreme Court. (GSIS v
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS)
The Anti-Subversion Act does not violate this provision, because the
purpose of the statute was to outlaw only those organizations aimed at
the violent overthrow the government, and that the government has a
right to protect itself against subversion is a proposition too plain to
require elaboration. (People v Ferrer)
The right to association was not violated when political parties were
prohibited from participating in the barangay elections in order to insure
the non-partisanship of candidates; political neutrality is needed to
discharge the duties of barangay officials. (Occena v COMELEC)
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of RA 3350, allowing workers to
disassociate from or not to join a labor union despite a closed shop
agreement, if they are members of any religious sect which prohibits
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization. (Victoriano v
Elizalde Rope Workers Union)
Art. 245 of the Labor Code which makes managerial employees ineligible
to join, assist or form a labor union, does not violate Sec. 8, Art. III of the
Constitution. Those who qualify as top or middle managers are executives
who receive from their employers information that is not only confidential
but also not generally available to the public, or to their competitors, or to
other employees. (United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union v Laguesma)
Compulsory membership of a lawyer in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines does not violate the constitutional guarantee. (In Re: Edillon)

CASE DOCTRINES:
1. SSS Employees Association v CA
The right to strike is not included in the guarantee of association to
government employees.
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and
employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution
itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil

Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as
"all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters,"
that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also
provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no
question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to
organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to
strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show
that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that
"[tlhe right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees"
[Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed by
Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long.
When we proposed this amendment providing for self-organization
of government employees, it does not mean that because they have
the right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a
different matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a
union. With regard to the right to strike, everyone will remember
that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision that the right to form
associations or societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall
not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit
the strikes coming from employees exercising government
functions, that could be done because the moment that is
prohibited, then the union which will go on strike will be an illegal
union. And that provision is carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic
Act 875, workers, including those from the government-owned and
controlled, are allowed to organize but they are prohibited from
striking. So, the fear of our honorable Vice- President is unfounded.
It does not mean that because we approve this resolution, it carries
with it the right to strike. That is a different matter. As a matter of
fact, that subject is now being discussed in the Committee on Social
Justice because we are trying to find a solution to this problem. We
know that this problem exist; that the moment we allow anybody in
the government to strike, then what will happen if the members of
the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will happen to those

people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of discussion in the

Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an
organization does not carry with it the right to strike. [Record of the
Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed
by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in
the Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental functions,
but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:
.Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. The
terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by
law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees
therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes or
modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such
employees may belong to any labor organization which does not
impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike:Provided, however,
That this section shall apply only to employees employed in
governmental functions and not those employed in proprietary
functions of the Government including but not limited to
governmental corporations.
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it
recognized the right of employees of government corporations established under
the Corporation Code to organize and bargain collectively and those in the civil
service to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before
its amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he
terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including
employees of government owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed
by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably,
the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government employees may strike,
for such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree
[P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of
government employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which
provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall
be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The
President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the
Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the
enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government
employees ... enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government
officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or

disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At
present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to
strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right,
they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular
No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that the
validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the
1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also
Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated
as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such governmentcontrolled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A.
No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.
69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike
staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of
Labor and Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1:983, 124 SCRA 11 is
relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in the
private sector and government employees with regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms
and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law"
(Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and
Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the
terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their
employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry
is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by
law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest
on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation,
the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private
sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In
government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where
properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And
this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules,
and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements. [At
p. 13; Emphasis supplied].

Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his

position paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and quoted with
approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the
nature of the public employer and the peculiar character of the
public service, it must necessarily regard the right to strike given to
unions in private industry as not applying to public employees and
civil service employees. It has been stated that the Government, in
contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all people
in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests
as are present in private labor relations could not exist in the
relations between government and those whom they employ. [At pp.
16-17; also quoted in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No.
64313, January 17,1985,134 SCRA 172,178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize
of government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however,
relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of
employment involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:
.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements
thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of
negotiations between duly recognized employees' organizations and
appropriate government authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the
settlement of labor disputes in the public sector to wit:
.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures,
whenever applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of
complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees.
In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the
available remedies under existing laws and procedures, the parties
may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector LaborManagement] Council for appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations,
either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of
employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not
fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred
to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But
employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other
temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the
Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III
of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government-

Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute
arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and
controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

2. Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union

The right to join associations includes the right not to join.
Atty G. Question: Is a closed-shop agreement a violation of the right to
associate?
Answer: No. He is free to accept or not the employment contract
containing the agreement.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association.
Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of
Article IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall have the right to selforganization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing
for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the
Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right"
to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded
by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a
"right", it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e.,
the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without
being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he
pleases, join or refrain from Joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee
who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and
should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association
he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the
power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any
time. 20 It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to
abstain from joining any union. 21 Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and
the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the
"right" to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law
also imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join
associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any
association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of
the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such
right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union

and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer
may employ only member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees
must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in
order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before
its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization" the employer is, however, not
precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop
agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person,
regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his
employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union.
Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and
withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No.
3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial
Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of
any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the
application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging
to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor
organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when
said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of
any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not
members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the
assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of
association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said
religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members
the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer
to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their
religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce
them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may
the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350,
therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.

Non-impairment Clause. According to Black, any statute which introduces

a change into the express terms of the contract, or its legal construction,
or its validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement, impairs
the contract. The extent of the change is not material. It is not a question
of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its
obligation or dispensing with any part of its force. There is an impairment

of the contract if either party is absolved by law from its

performance. 22 Impairment has also been predicated on laws which,
without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial contractual
rights. 23
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation
of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording
a broad outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is
not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits
unreasonable impairment only. 24 In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the
State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people.
Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate
contracts already in effect. 25 For not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate
of the legal order. All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject
to regulation under the police power must be understood as made in reference to
the possible exercise of that power. 26 Otherwise, important and valuable reforms
may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose
of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited. The policy of protecting
contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by
virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. The contract
clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be not only in harmony with, but also
in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to
safeguard the vital interests of the people. It follows that not all legislations,
which have the effect of impairing a contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional
prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed in the legitimate exercise of
police power, although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights, must be
upheld by the courts. This has special application to contracts regulating
relations between capital and labor which are not merely contractual, and said
labor contracts, for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the
common good.

3. In Re: IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial Edillon

The right to association is not violated by integrating the bar.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is a ready a member.8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free
to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers.
There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5
of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable
fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and
regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity
and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin
maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme
law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into
anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use

without just compensation.

(See discussion, POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN)

Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition does not
prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the prohibition, the
change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, bu the
impairment must be substantial. Moreover, the law must effect a change
in the rights of the parties with reference to each other, and not with

respect to non-parties. (Phil. Rural Electric Coopeeratives Association v

Secretary DILG)
Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. There
is substantial impairment when the law changes the terms of a legal
contract between the parties, either in the time or mode of performance,
or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or
authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its
terms.
Unreasonable impairments are prohibited.
LIMITATIONS:
A) POLICE POWER
The Supreme Court held that a municipal zoning ordinance is a police
measure and prevails over a restriction contained in the title to property.
(Ortigas v Feati Bank)
B.P. 22 was sustained as not violative of the non-impairment clause, and
even if it were, the law was a police measure and therefore superior to
contracts. (Lozano v Martinez)
In Ilusorio v CAR, pre-existing share tenancy contracts could be validly
converted into leasehold tenancy through the valid exercise of police
power.
In Tiro v Hontanosas, an administrative order discontinuing the
assignment of salaries of public school teachers to their creditors was
declared not violative of the guarantee, as the latter could still collect its
loans after the teachers themselves had received the salaries.
In Canleon v Agus Development Corporation, regulating the rentals of
dwelling units, was held as a constitutional exercise of the police power,
and an exception to the non-impairment clause.
In Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v POEA, the POEA resolution
and memorandum circular increasing and adjusting rates of compensation
and other benefits in thePOEA Standard Employment Contracts for
seafarers, being a valid implementation of E.O. 797 which was enacted
under the police power of the State, prevail over the non-impairment
clause.

But in Ganzon v Insierto, it was held that the clause would be violated by
the substitution of a mortgage with a security bond as security for the
payment of a loan, as this would change the terms and conditions of the
original mortgage contract over the mortgagees objections.
B) EMINENT DOMAIN
C) TAXATION
Franchises, privileges, licenses, etc., do not come within the
context of the provision. See Section 11, Art. XII, which provides that
Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
the Congress when the common good so requires.
Thus , in C & M Timber Corporation v Alcala, Timber licenses, permits and
licenses agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. They merely evidence a privilege granted by
the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced, or rescinded
by the Chief Executive when national interest so requires. They are not
contracts within the purview of the due process clause.
Also, in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v
Comelec, the Supreme Court said that all radio and TV stations have
franchises, and the challenged provision of the Omnibus Election Code
was inserted by the Congress in the exercise of this power under Sec. 11,
Art. XII of the Constitution.
CASE DOCTRINES:
1. Rutter v Esteban
Moratorium laws are constitutional.
Statutes declaring a moratorium on the enforcement of monetary obligations are
not of recent enactment. These moratorium laws are not new. "For some 1,400
years western civilization has made use of extraordinary devices for saving the
credit structure, devices generally known as moratoria. The moratorium is
postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the
medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the
sovereign power" (58 C.J. S., p. 1208 footnote 87). In the United States, may
state legislatures have adopted moratorium laws "during times of financial

distress, especially when incident to, or caused by, a war" (41 C.J., p.213). Thus,
such laws "were passed by many state legislatures at the time of the civil war
suspending the rights of creditors for a definite and reasonable time, . . . whether
they suspend the right of action or make dilatory the remedy" (12 C.J., p 1078).
The laws were declared constitutional. However, some courts have also declared
that "such statutes are void as to contracts made before their passage where the
suspension of remedied prescribed is indefinite or unreasonable in duration"
(12C.J., 1078). The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of the moratorium
statute lies in the determination of the period of a suspension of the remedy. It is
required that such suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be
violative of the constitution.
One of the arguments advanced against the validity of the moratorium law is the
fact that it impairs the obligation of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution. This argument, however does not now hold water. While this may
be conceded, it is however justified as a valid exercise by the State of its police
power. The leading case on the matter is Home Building and Loan
Association vs. Blaisdell, 290 U. S., 398, decide by the Supreme Court of the
United States on January 8, 1934. Here appellant contested the validity of
charter 339 of the laws of Minnesota of 1993, approved April 13, 1933, called the
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as being repugnant to the contract clause
of the Federal Constitution. The statute was sustained by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota as an emergency measure. "Although coceding that the obligations of
the mortgage contract was impaired, the court decided that what it thus
described as an impairment was, notwithstanding the contract clause of the
Federal Constitution, within the police power of the State as that power was
called into exercise by the public economic emergency which the legislative had
found to exist". This theory was up-held by the Supreme Court. Speaking through
Chief Justice Hughes, the court made the following pronouncements:
Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the measure of control
which the State retains over remedial processes, but the State also
continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interest of its people.
It does not matter that legislation appropriate to that end "has the result
of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect." . . . . Not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is
also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of
protecting contracts against impairement presupposes the maintenance of
a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and
good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional
prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power has had
progressive recognition in the decision of this Court.

2. Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v Feati Bank & Trust Co.

Zoning regulation may impair the contractual relations of parties.

The need for reconciling the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and the
valid exercise of police power may also be gleaned from Helvering v.
Davis 45 wherein Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court, resolved the conflict
"between one welfare and another, between particular and general, thus
Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were
narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day
with the well-being of the nation What is critical or urgent changes
with the times. 46
The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable,
and it being a " legitimate response to a felt public need," 47 not whimsical or
oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not
bar the municipality's proper exercise of the power. Now Chief Justice Fernando
puts it aptly when he declared: "Police power legislation then is not likely to
succumb to the challenge that thereby contractual rights are rendered
nugatory." 48
Furthermore, We restated in Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor
General 49 that laws and reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power
are read into contracts agreed upon by the parties. Thus
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts
against impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government
by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
and good order of society.
Again, We held in Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 50 through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that ... the law forms part of, and is
read into, every contract, unless clearly excluded therefrom in those cases where
such exclusion is allowed." The decision in Maritime Company of the Philippines
v. Reparations Commission, 51 written for the Court by Justice Fernando, now
Chief Justice, restates the rule.

3. Lozano v Martinez
B.P. 22 does not impair the freedom to contract.
The freedom of contract, which is constitutionally protected, is freedom to enter
into "lawful" contracts. Contracts that contravene public policy are not lawful.
Besides, we must bear in mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere

contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system
and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

4. Ganzon v Inserto
Courts cannot change the obligations of the parties.
Applying the principles underlying the nature of a mortgage, the real estate
mortgage constituted on Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-lF of the subdivision plan Psd27482, located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-50324 can not be substituted by a surety bond as ordered by the trial
court. The mortgage lien in favor of Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is inseparable
from the mortgaged property. It is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To
substitute the mortgage with a surety bond would convert such lien from a
right in rem, to a right in personam.This conversion can not be ordered for it
would abridge the rights of the mortgagee under the mortgage contract.
Moreover, the questioned orders violate the non-impairment of contracts clause
guaranteed under the Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety
bond to secure the payment of the P40,000.00 note would in effect change the
terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very
issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from
its terms, diminished its efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition.

Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies

and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person
by reason of poverty.
This is a social justice provision, implemented by the Rules of Court
provision allowing Pauper Suits. Note the additional guarantee of
adequate legal assistance.
Only a natural person can suffer poverty. This right is not applicable to
juridical persons.
CASE DOCTRINES:
1. In Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi
The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State
with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a
juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property
of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in
conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical
person, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to

indigent

litigants.

The Court stated that the free access clause of the Constitution applies only to a
natural person who suffers from poverty. It added that extending the exemption
to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged
people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation
requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing
the rule on payment of the fees and that the scrutiny of compliance with the
documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the
courts.

NO ARTICLES 12 &13-MAGGIE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
SEC. 14, ART. III:
1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his
behalf.
However,
after
arraignment,
trial
may
proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused, provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

Q. Explain the requirement of due process in criminal cases.

A. The requirement that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law simply that the rules prescribed by Section 14 and all other
provisions related to criminal prosecution are followed.

a) In Mejia v. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457, the Supreme Court enumerated the
ingredients of due process as applied to criminal proceedings, as follows:
1) The accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction;
2) The accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes of law;
3) The accused has been given notice and the opportunity to be heard;
and
4) The judgment rendered was within the authority of a constitutional law.

b) Unreasonable delay in resolving complaint. In Roque v. Ombudsman, G.R. No.

129978, May 12, 1999, it was held that the failure of the Office of the
Ombudsman to resolve a complaint that had been pending for six years clearly
violates the constitutional command for the Ombudsman to act promptly on
complaints and the right of the petitioner to due process of law and to speedy
trial. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the
complaint. A similar ruling was made in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
108595, May 18, 1999, and in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70, where it
was held that the unreasonable delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the
Tanodbayan violated the due process clause.

i) However, in Santiago v. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214, although the

offense was allegedly committed on or before October 17, 1988 and the
information was filed only on May 9, 1991, and an amended information
filed on December 8, 1992, the delay did not constitute a denial of due
process, because there was continuing investigation, snarled only because
of the complexity of the issues involved. In Socrates v. Sandiganbayan,
253 SCRA 559, it was found that the six-year delay in the termination of
the preliminary investigation was caused by petitioners own acts, not by
inaction of the prosecution. Accordingly, there was no violation of the
petitioners right to due process of law or of his right to speedy disposition
of the case.

TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NOS. L-72335-39, MARCH 21, 1988]

FACTS: Complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report"
with the Legal Panel of PSC on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of
RA No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report"
was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until December 1979, when the 1974
complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan.
The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint in April 1980 by referring the complaint to the
CIS, PSC, for investigation and report. In June 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the
Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against
former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 1982, all affidavits and counteraffidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it
was only in July 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending
the filing of the corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad.
Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan in June 1985, all against
petitioner Tatad. Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the
constitutional mandate of "due process" in unduly prolonging the termination of the
preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more
than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to due process.

RULING: We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to
due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct
of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
(both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We
are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and
gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government
official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment,
which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities
required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and
factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a
delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two
charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a
relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not
warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the
case.

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation
does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the absence of a preliminary
investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue
delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now,
man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.

After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to
hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the
information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the
petitioner to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing,
we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.

c) Impartial court or tribunal. A critical component of due process of law is a

hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. In order to disqualify a
judge on the ground of bias and prejudice, the movant must prove such bias by
clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the petitioners failed to adduce any

extrinsic evidence to prove that the respondent judge was motivated by malice or
bad faith when she issued the assailed rulings [Webb v. People, G.R. No. 127262,
July 24, 1997].

i) In Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995,

October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court, reiterating its ruling in Tabuena v.
Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, declared that the cross-examination of the
accused and the witnesses by the trial court indicated bias, and thus
violated due process.

ii) But where the questions propounded by the court are merely for
clarification, to clear up dubious points and elicit relevant evidence, such
questioning will not constitute bias [People v. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213;
Cosep v. People, 290 SCRA 378; People v. Galleno, 291 SCRA 761], Thus, in
People v. Herida, G.R. No. 127158, March 5, 2001, where the trial court
intensively questioned the witnesses and the accused (approximately 43%
of the questions asked of the prosecution witnesses and the accused were
propounded by the judge), it was held that the questioning was necessary.
Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious
presentation of evidence and have the duty to ask questions that would
elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by
witnesses, and address the points overlooked by counsel. See also People
v. Medenilla, G.R. No. 131638-39, March 26, 2001.

d) Right to a hearing. In Alonte v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998,

and in Concepcion v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131728, March 9, 1998, the Supreme
Court held that the accused were denied due process of law when the trial court
convicted them (after having declared that they had waived their right to present
evidence), but it was shown that there were deviations from the regular course of
trial, e.g., petitioners were not directed to present evidence to prove their
defenses nor dates set for that purpose, petitioners were not given an opportunity
to present rebuttal evidence nor dates set for that purpose, and petitioners had
not admitted the offense charged in the information which would have justified
any modification in the order of the trial. In Defensor- Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 123792, March 8, 1999, it was held that the re-opening of a case without
giving the accused the opportunity to introduce controverting evidence is an error
and a denial of due process of law.

ALONTE VS. SAVELLANO [G.R. NO. 131652, MARCH 9, 1998]

FACTS: Juvie-lyn Punongbayan charged Bayani Alonte, the incumbent mayor of Bian,
Laguna, with the crime of rape. According to Punongbayan, on or about September 12,
1996, Alonte offered her a drinking water which made her dizzy and weak. Thereafter,
Alonte unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with her against her will and

consent. During the pendency case, however, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her
parents and counsel, executed an affidavit desisting her testimonies against Alonte.
Nonetheless, respondent Judge Savellano found Alonte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the heinous crime of rape. Accordingly, the accused did not present any countervailing
evidence during the trial. They did not take the witness stand to refute or deny under
oath the truth of the contents of the private complainant's aforementioned affidavit. They
left everything to the so-called "desistance" of the private complainant. In this petition,
Alonte avers that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when respondent Judge rendered a decision in the case
thereby depriving him of his Constitutional right to be presumed innocent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of innocence stands in favor of Alonte.

RULING: NO. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in
favor of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present
his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence. Hence, any deviation from the
regular course of trial should always take into consideration the rights of all the parties to
the case, whether in the prosecution or defense. There can be no short-cut to the legal
process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court.
Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights,
is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
In the case at bar, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan does not contain
any statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely
seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the case for
varied other reasons. In People vs. Ballabare we have said that any recantation must be
tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by
it to crossexamine the recanting witness. A retraction does not necessarily negate an
earlier declaration. Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants his
testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the
basis of the recantation. They should determine which testimony should be given
credence through a comparison of the original testimony and the new testimony,
applying the general rules of evidence.

INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS. It does seem to the Court

that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings. Perhaps the
problem could have well been avoided had not the basic procedures been, to the Court's
perception taken lightly. And in this shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the
trial court certainly is not alone to blame.

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the
fundamentals.
1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.
2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a

speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require:
a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it;
b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The
principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted
statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial."

e) In People v. Hubert Webb, G.R. No. 132577, August 17, 1999, the Supreme
Court said that there was no denial of due process where the trial court refused to
grant the petition of Webb to take the deposition of witnesses residing abroad,
considering that the testimony of the witnesses would be merely corroborative,
the defense had already presented 57 witnesses and 464 documentary exhibits,
and the trial court had already admitted the exhibits on which the said witnesses
would have testified.

f) In Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19,

2001, RA 7080 (Plunder Law), as amended by RA 7659, was challenged on the
following grounds:
1) it is vague;
2) it dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminal
prosecutions; and
3) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under the Revised Penal Code;
All of which are purportedly violations of the right of the accused to due process of
law and to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him.
The Court ruled that every legislative measure is presumed constitutional, and the
petitioner failed to discharge the burden to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality:
1) The law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of the
violation. Sec. 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts,
conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the
elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity.

2) Sec. 4 does not circumvent the immutable obligation of the prosecution

to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts showing unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. The prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the number of acts sufficient to form a combination or a series
which would constitute a pattern involving an amount no less than P50million.
3) The legislative declaration in RA 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is malum in se. If the acts punished are inherently
immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se even if punished
under special laws, particularly because in plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se.
g) Plea of guilt to a capital offense. In People v. Sta. Teresa, G.R. No. 130663,
March 20, 2001, the Court enumerated the stringent constitutional standards
impelled by the due process clause whenever the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, viz:
1) The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences thereof;
2) The prosecution shall be required to present evidence to prove the guilt
of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3) The accused must be asked if he desires to present evidence on his
behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires.
In People v. Ostia, G.R. No. 131804, February 26, 2003, the Supreme Court said
that the procedure is mandatory, and a judge who fails to observe with fealty the
said rule commits grave abuse of discretion. The Court has cautioned trial judges
to proceed with meticulous care whenever the imposable penalty for the crime
charged is death.

h) The State and the offended party are entitled to due process. The State, and
more so, the offended party, is also entitled to due process of law. In Galman v.
Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274, the judgment of acquittal was vacated upon a finding
by the Supreme Court that there was bias and partiality on the part of the judge
and the prosecutor. In Merciales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124171, March 18,
2002, it was held that the petitioner (mother of the victim in a rape with homicide
case) was denied due process when the public prosecutor, who was under legal
obligation to pursue the action on her behalf, reneged on that obligation and
refused to perform his sworn duty. But, in People v. Verra, G.R. No. 134732, May
29, 2002, it was held that the People could not claim that it was denied due
process, because there was a public prosecutor who represented it at every stage
of the proceedings from arraignment to promulgation of the dismissal order
to protect its interest.

GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NO. 72670, SEPTEMBER 12, 1986]

FACTS: On October 22, 1983, then President Marcos created a Fact- Finding Board to
investigate the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. The minority and majority reports of the
Board both agreed that Rolando
Galman was not the assassin but was merely a fall guy of the military which plotted the
assassination itself. The minority report tags 26 persons, headed by General Ver, as
respondents to the case. Marcos rejected the reports of the Board and stuck to his claim
that it was Galman who killed Aquino. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
acquitted the respondents of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally
absolving them of any civil liability. In this petition, Petitioners Saturnina Galman, wife of
the late Rolando Galman, and 29 others filed the present action alleging that respondent
courts committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage
of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. Allegedly, then President Marcos had ordered the
respondent courts to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused
and produce a verdict of acquittal. In his comment, the Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel
Herrera, affirmed the allegations and revealed that Malacaang had planned the scenario
of the trial. Respondents-accused prayed for its denial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial was a mock trial and that the predetermined judgment of
acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.

RULING: The fact of the secret Malacaang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the
authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the
entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges against
all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been
confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding
day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under our penal laws, supra.
This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan
court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission noted: "The
very acts of being summoned to Malacaang and their ready acquiescence thereto under
the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and
exemplified... Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to
presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside
Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985."

No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments
on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder
cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatory
required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts
martial over criminal offenses committed by military men made it possible to refer the
cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due
process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by
law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily
transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. "This
criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at
the secret Malacanang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice

Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio

its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of
respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as
accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that
the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory
of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the
witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all
these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein
ordered before a neutral and impartial court.

The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to
stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and
equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools
of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial
justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or
redress of a wrong, without fear or favour and removed from the pressures of politics and
prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to
know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused
before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to
due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead
once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of
the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab
initio.

Q. May the Supreme Court review decisions of military tribunals?

A. Generally, the Supreme Court has no supervisory authority over military courts.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 171; Martelino v. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106 (March 25, 1970).
By the National Security Code, P.D. 1498, June 11, 1978 (74 O.G. 11066), the SC does not
review decisions of military commissions but of the Court of Military Appeals in cases
appealed to the latter by military commissions. Therefore, the issue of denial of the right
to present evidence should first be passed upon by military authorities. Buscayno & Sison
v. Military Commissions, 109 SCRA 273 (November 19, 1981). But see dissents of
Fernando and Teehankee and Art VIII, Section 1.

Q. May military commissions or tribunals have jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses
allegedly committed during martial law when civil courts were open and functioning?
A. No. Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987), explicitly reversing
Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 264 (1975) and all decided cases
affirming the same.

Q. The rule is that jurisdiction over a person is acquired only upon arrest. Does this apply
to military jusrisdiction?
A. No. This is a rule for ordinary courts. See Article of War 2 and Section 8 of Manual for
Courts Martial, AFP. Abadilla v. Ramos, 156 SCRA 92 (December 1, 1987). [The reasoning
here is unconvincing.]

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

Q. What is the reason for the presumption of innocence?

A. It is based on the principle of justice. The presumption is not designed to protect the
guilty but to prevent the conviction of one who is innocent, for it is a rule that accusation
is not synonymous with guilt. Proof must survive the test of reason. The conviction must
be based on moral certainty, for it is better to acquit a guilty person rather than to
convict an innocent man. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 60).

PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO [G.R. NO. L-21325, OCTOBER 29, 1971]

FACTS: In a drinking session, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin brought up the idea of
killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case which Dramayo
and Ecubin was a prime suspect thereof. That same night, Ecubin hit Estelito with a piece
of wood on the side of the head while Dramayo repeatedly stabbed him with a short
pointed bolo. The next morning, Dramayo went to the house of the deceased and
informed the latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. Upon
interview, the Chief of Police noticed blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo and asked
the latter to explain where he obtained it. Dramayo answered that it was caused by his
daughter who has a skin ailment. It was on this basis that Dramayo and Ecubin were
charged of the crime of murder. Upon trial, the lower court found Dramayo and Ecubin
guilty beyond reasonable doubt basing on the testimonies offered by the prosecution. In
this appeal, Accused-Appellants invoke their constitutional right to be declared
presumptively innocent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Accussed-Appellants constitutional right to be presumed

innocent can stand against judgment of conviction against them.

RULING: NO. The presumption of innocence could not come to appellants rescue as it
was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution.

ACCUSATION IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH GUILT. It is to be admitted that the

starting point is the presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the
Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to
the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to
demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer
evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need,
therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the
judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had
been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the
sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he
perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty.

So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. United States v.
Lasada, decided in 1910, yields this excerpt:

"By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but
it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability,
after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal
charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every
proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense."

To the same effect is an excerpt from the opinion of the late Justice Tuason in People v.
Esquivel. Thus:

"In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the attention of
prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before the court the
pertinent facts as their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention,
clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the
end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may
not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the
prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state."

It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to

establish the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi interposed
hardly meriting any further discussion. It cannot be denied though that the credible and

competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty being entertained not only by
the trial judge but by us as to the culpability of appellants. The force of the controlling
doctrines, on the other hand, required that the other three accused be acquitted
precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the requisite quantum of proof to
show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present. There is no question as to the other
two who testified for the state being likewise no long subject to any criminal liability. The
reference then to opinion of the late Justice Laurel, stressing the need for adhering to the
fundamental postulate that a finding of guilt is allowable only when no reasonable doubt
could be entertained, is unavailing. This is evident from the very citation in the brief of
appellants of the opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Manoji. Thus: "Upon the other hand
there are certain facts which if taken together are sufficient to raise in the mind of the
court a grave doubt as to the guilt of the defendant-appellant, 'that doubt engendered by
an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation, to let the
mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90, 96.) The
finding of the two gold teeth of the deceased the suitcase of Maradani, and the testimony
of Erajio Ello that he gave the hat ... to Maradani not only engender serious doubt in our
minds as to the guilt of the appellant but also seems to sustain the theory of the defense
and strengthen the suspicion of the trial court, that Maradani and Salupudin are not
foreign to, or entirely ignorant of, the killing of Seijin Ige. In the light of the facts and
circumstances of record, we feel that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of
reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the
penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may be innocent. ..." The facts of
the present case certainly do not fit within the above mold. Reliance on the part of
appellants on the above decision is therefore futile.

Q. What is the principal effect of the guarantee of presumption of innocence?

A. Its principal effect is that no person shall be convicted unless the prosecution has
proved him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Q. For purposes of disqualification in an election, Section 4 of Batas Blg. 52 says: the

filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact
(disqualification). Valid?
A. No. This violates the guarantee of presumption of innocence. The disqualification put
the candidates in the category of convicts without first finally convicting them. Dumlao
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980.

DUMLAO VS. COMELEC [G.R. NO. L-52245, JANUARY 22, 1980]

PRESUMPTION OF GUILT UPON THE FILING OF CHARGES VIOLATES THE

CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. In so far as the petition of Igotand
Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of BatasPambansa Blg. 52,
quoted in full earlier, and which they challenged, may be dividedin two parts. The first

provides:"a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimesshall be

conclusive evidence of such fact. . . . "

The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of
the presumption of validity that attached to a challenged statute, of the well-settled
principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and
that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear
case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this in one such clear
case.

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified
from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against
him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate
effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such
acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to
run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually
placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of
arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold
office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the
proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the
Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible
conflict of finding between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person
charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative administrative determination
of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.

Q. Section 40 of the Local Government Code disqualifies from running from office a (e)
Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. If applied to one
who has not yet been convicted of any offense but was merely fleeing from trial, would
there be violation of the presumption of innocence?
A. This was defended against the suggestion that it violates presumption of innocence on
the argument that the disqualification is not a penalty and that Congress is allowed to
prescribe reasonable qualifications for local candidates both by Article V, Section 1 and
Article X, Section 3. Marquez, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995. (But the

Court remanded the case to the lower court for determination of the fact of being a
fugitive from justice.)

MARQUEZ VS. COMELEC [G.R. NO. 112889, APRIL 18, 1995]

Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs no
further interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather
clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who
flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee
to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine
Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138
Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be
so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in
charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly agrees;
however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must
merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can
neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes
and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during
the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term
"fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by
final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact,
private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and
applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the
COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quowarranto on the basis instead of Rule
73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court
itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC
for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

Q. Does preventive suspension pendent lite violate the right to be presumed innocent?
A. No, because preventive suspension is not a penalty. Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 96131, September 6, 1991.

Q. Does presumption of innocence preclude the State from shifting the burden of proof
to the accused?

A. The State having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well
defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well
as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the
defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not
committed with any criminal intent or intention. US v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 (1916).

a) Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment [People v. Austria, 195 SCRA
700], Thus, in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, the provision of an election
statute which disqualified from running for public office any person who has
committed any act of disloyalty to the State provided that the filing of charges
for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal shall be
prima facie evidence of such fact, was declared unconstitutional for being
violative of the presumption of innocence clause. Likewise, in People v. Lomboy,
G.R. No. 129691, June 29, 1999, it was held that the acquittal of the accused is
inevitable if inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt.

b) The presumption of innocence was held not to have been overcome by

prosecution evidence where the victim had difficulty in identifying the accused not
only during the hospital confrontation but also in open court [People v. Alcantara,
240 SCRA 122]; or where the prosecution failed to present the alleged poseurbuyer, because without the testimony of the latter, there is no convincing
evidence that the accused was a marijuana peddler and not merely a victim of
instigation [People v. Tapeda, 244 SCRA 339]; or where the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses is marred by inconsistencies [Layug v. Sandiganbayan, 245
SCRA 123].

c) The presumption that official duty was regularly performed cannot, by itself,
prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. If the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused, and the other consistent with guilt,
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction [People v. Martos, 211 SCRA 805]. Thus, in People v. Briones,
266 SCRA 254, the fact that SP01 Alilio was presumed to have regularly
performed his official duty was held insufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence, as it was inconceivable that the accused would still sell shabu to SP01
Alilio when the accused knew Alilio to be the police officer who earlier arrested his
friend, Ormos, for allegedly selling shabu.

i) But where it is not the sole basis for conviction, the presumption of
regularity of performance of official functions may prevail over the
constitutional presumption of innocence [People v. Acuram, 209 SCRA
281].

d) The constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is some logical
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the
inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a
purely arbitrary mandate. In such a case the burden of proof is thus shifted to the
possessor of the dangerous drug to explain the absence of animus possedendi
[People v. Burton, 268 SCRA 531, citing Dizon- Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63].
This is reiterated in People v. Balluda, G.R. No. 114198, November 19, 1999.

i) In order that this constitutional presumption may be overcome in a

prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements
must be proven:
a) that the transaction or sale took place;
b) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as
evidence; and
c) that the buyer and seller are identified.
To comply with the second element, it is imperative that the integrity of
the corpus delicti be preserved, and the chain of custody requirement, as
provided in R.A. 9165, performs this function for it ensures that there are
no unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence. [People v.
De Guzman, G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010]

ia) The seizure and custody of the drugs remain valid despite failure
to comply with the chain of custody procedure, if:
1) the non-compliance is attended by justifiable grounds;
and
2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properply preserved.
However, in the case, not only did the prosecution fail to present
any justifiable ground for non-compliance, but there is a gaping
hole in the chain of custody. The length of time that lapsed from the
seizure of the items until they were given to the investigating
officer for marking took all of 3-1/2 hours, despite the fact that De
Guzmans house was walking distance from the police station.
Moreover, it took more time before the items were submitted to the
PNP Crime Laboratory, without any explanation on who had custody
in the meantime. [People v. De Guzman, supra.]

e) This constitutional presumption may be overcome by contrary presumptions

based on the experience of human conduct, such as unexplained flight which may
lead to an inference of guilt, or the inability of an accountable officer to produce
funds or property entrusted to him which is considered prima facie evidence of
misappropriation.

i) However, in Madarang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112314, March 28,

2001, and in Agullo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132926, July 20, 2001, it
was held that the prima facie presumption of accountability does not
shatter the presumption of innocence which the petitioner enjoys, because
even if prima facie evidence arises, certain facts still have to be proved,
and the Sandiganbayan must be satisfied that the petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. And this finding must rest upon the strength of
the prosecutions own evidence, not on the weakness, deficiency or
absence of evidence for the defense. In Monteverde v..People, G.R. No.
139610, August 12, 2002, it was held that the presumption that the
possessor of a forged or falsified document is the author of the forgery or
falsification will not prevail over the presumption of innocence.

f) In Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126858, September 16, 2005, the

constitutionality of R.A. 1379 (Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property) was
challenged because it is vague, violates the presumption of innocence and the
right against self-incrimination,and breaches the authority of the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. It was held that the law is not vague, because it defines with sufficient
particularity unlawfully acquired property, and provides a definition of what is
legitimately acquired property. Neither is the presumption of innocence by Sec. 2
thereof, which states that property acquired by a public officer during his
incumbency in an amount which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property shall be prima facie presumed to have been
unlawfully acquired. The Court held that under the principle of presumption of
innocence, it is merely required that the State establish a prima facie case, after
which the burden of proof is shifted to the accused.

Q. When does presumption of innocence end?

A. Moreover, where the conviction by a lower court is still on appeal, it has not yet
reached finality and the accused still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence.
It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicateing the guilt of the
accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the
inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or
explanation, proves the accuseds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accuseds
guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues. Thus in Mangubat
v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that respondent Sandiganbayan did not act with grave
abuse of discretion, correctible by certiorari, when it ruled that despite her conviction,
the accused still enjoyed presumption of innocence. Re: Judge Angeles, A.M. No. 06-9545-RTC, January 31, 2008.

Q. What do you understand by the conscience test for conviction?

A. It means that only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime has been
committed by the person on trial should the sentence be for conviction. If the
prosecutionss evidence miserably fails to pass the conscience test, then, the accused

must be acquitted. (People v. Frago, 51 SCAD 497, G.R. Nos. 104492-93, May 31, 1994;
People v. Abellanosa, et al., 76 SCAD 596, G.R. No. 121195, November 27, 1996).

Q. What is the basis of the conscience test of conviction? Explain.

A. It is based on the right of the accused to be presumed innocent. In the case of People
v. Mejia, et al., 84 SCAD 245, G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407, July 7, 1997, it
was said:

Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed

innocent until the contrary is proved. To overcome the presumption, nothing but
proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. Save in
certain circumstances as where, for instance, the accused admits the commission
of the acts alleged to constitute a crime but interposes justifying circumstances,
the burden never shifted to the accused or diminished by the weakness of his
defense. Indeed, unless the prosecution successfully discharges that burden, the
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. (People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA
349).

In our jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The freedom

of the accused is forfeited only in the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the most careful scrutiny of
the evidence for the State, both oral and documentary, independent of whatever
defense is offered by the accused. Every circumstance favouring the accuseds
innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof aginst the accused must
survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the
responsibility of the offense charged. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59). If the
prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accuseds right to
be freed, it is, even more, the courts constitutional duty to acquit him. (People v.
Pido, 200 SCRA 45; People v. Cordova, 43 SCAD 135, G.R. Nos. 83373-74, July 5,
1993)

Q. Give the concept of derivative, not positive, identification of an accused and cite an
example.
A. Derivative identification is one patterned from the identification of an accused by
another person, not by the witness himself/herself. (People v. Frago, 51 SCAD 497, G.R.
Nos. 104492-93, May 31, 1994, citing People v. Domingo, 165 SCRA 620 [1988]).
Example:
The accused was identified by two (2) sisters on September 28, 1960. The
victim identified him on October 8, 1990. They are neighbours. The possibility that
they conferred with one another is not remote, hence, she got the identification
from them.

g) Circumstantial evidence. In People v. Bato, G.R. No. 113804, January 16, 1998,
the Supreme Court held that in order that circumstantial evidence may warrant
conviction, the following requisites must concur:
1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence gleaned from the
sole testimony of the son of the deceased, the prosecution evidence does not
constitute an unbroken chain leading, beyond reasonable doubt, to the guilt of the
accused and, therefore, cannot overthrow the constitutional presumption of
innocence.

h) Equipoise rule. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only
where the evidence adduced by the parties are evenly balanced, in which case
the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused [Corpus v. People, 194 SCRA 73].

i) The right to presumption of innocence can be invoked only by an

individual accused of a criminal offense; a corporate entity has no
personality to invoke the same [Feeder International Line v. Court of
Appeals, 197 SCRA 842].

CORPUS VS. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. 74259, FEBRUARY 14, 1991]

EQUIPOISE RULE. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where
the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such
equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been
overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The
presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed
the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached.
His conviction must be affirmed.

FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE VS. CA [G.R. NO. 94262 MAY 31, 1991]

Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, it bears
mention that petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right
to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused
in a criminal case.

NOTE: The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a
criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence
should tilt the scales in favour of the accused. There is no equipoise if the
evidence is not evenly balanced. The equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the
evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming. [Malana v. People, G.R. No. 173612,
March 26, 2008]

RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL

Q. Discuss the importance of the right to counsel.

A. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard
by counsel. Even the most intelligent person may not have the skill in law, especially the
rules of procedure, hence, the accused may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he may not know how to establish his innocence. (Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA
422; Abriol v. Homeras, 84 Phil. 525; People v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752). In People v.
Lucero, 61 SCAD 401, G.R. No. 97936, May 29, 1995, it was said that if the Constitution
has any value, it is because it stands up for those who cannot stand for themselves.
Thus, it protected those under custodial investigation with the all-important right to
counsel. The right to counsel cannot be diluted without tampering the scales of justice.

BORJA VS. MENDOZA [G.R. NO. L-45667, JUNE 20, 1977]

FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Borja, accused of slight physical injuries, was convicted and
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty days of arresto menor by
respondent Judge Senining, despite the absence of an arraignment. The judge proceeded
with the trial in absentia and promulgated the assailed decision. An appeal was duly
elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza.
Without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a
decision on the appealed case was rendered against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision was validly rendered despite the absence of an
arraignment.

RULING: NO.

ARRAIGNMENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT OF THE RIGHT OF THE

ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION

AGAINST HIM. An arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means "forbringing

the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required tomeet . . ." Its
importance was stressed by Justice Moreland as early as 1916 in theleading case of
United States v. Binayoh. He pointed out that upon the accusedbeing arraigned, "there is
a duty laid by the Code [now the Rules of Court] upon thecourt to inform [him] of certain
rights and to extend to him, on his demand, certainothers. This duty is an affirmative one
which the court, on its own motion, mustperform, unless waived." To emphasize its
importance, he added: "No such duty,however, is laid on the court with regard to the
rights of the accused which he maybe entitled to exercise during the trial. Those are
rights which he must asserthimself and the benefits of which he himself must demand. In
other words, in thearraignment the court must act of its own volition, . . . ." In the terse
and aptlanguage of the Solicitor General: "Arraignment is an indispensable requirement
inany criminal prosecution." Procedural due process demands no less.

Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly arraigned.
As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an
accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that
confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of
freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the
very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is
mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose. Thereafter, he is no longer in
the dark. It is true, the complaint or information may not be worded with sufficient clarity.
He would be in a much worse position though if he does not even have such an
opportunity to plead to the charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to
enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do so
immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an arraignment assures
that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him and the
circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the
constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much less an idle
ceremony.

PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [G.R. NO. L-2809, MARCH 22, 1950]

FACTS: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon
with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person,
he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag
in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours. On the day set for trial, he
appeared alone without the assistance of a lawyer. He was subsequently arraigned and
pleaded guilty upon the instruction of a certain Mr. Numeriano Ocampo. Judgement was
rendered convicting him of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

ISSUE: Whether the accused was afforded of his right to be heard by himself and
counsel.

RULING: NO. Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the
accused who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial
court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense,
and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor
to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of
the case.

DUTIES OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE WHENEVER AN ACCUSED APPEARS BEFORE

IT WITHOUT COUNSEL. The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from
thebeginning. It is expressly provided in our Rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:

"If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed bythe

court that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned, and must be
asked if he desires the aid of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable
time must be allowed for procuring attorney."

Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four
important duties to comply with:
1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being
arraigned;
2) After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of
an attorney;
3) If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de
oficio to defend him; and
4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him
a reasonable time therefor.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases
there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.
It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it
has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of
procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor
or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.

Q. What are the elements of the general right to be heard?

A. It includes:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

the
the
the
the
the

right
right
right
right
right

to be present at trial;
to counsel;
to an impartial judge;
of confrontation; and
to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses.

Q. Why must an accused enjoy the right to counsel?

A. This is a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not
have the professional skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power
to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is represented by an experienced and
learned counsel. Johnson v. Zerbist, 304 US 458 (1938).

Q. What duty is imposed on the judge by the guarantee of the right to counsel?
A. If the defendant appears without counsel he must be informed by the court that he
has a right to have counsel before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the
aid of counsel. If he desires and is unable to employ counsel, the court must assign
counsel to defend him. This is a right which the defendant should not be deprived of, and
the failure of the court to assign counsel or, after counsel has been assigned, require him
to perform this duty by appearing and defending the accused would be sufficient cause
for the reversal of the case. US v. Gimeno, 1 Phil. 236 (1905).

Q. What are the pre-arraignment duties of the trial judge?

A. Under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the four-fold duties are:
1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before
being arraigned;
2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of
counsel;
3) if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him
reasonable time to do so; and
4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must
assign counsel de oficio to defend him. People v. Agbayani, G.R. No.
122770, January 16. 1998, 284 SCRA 315, 333 (citing People v. Holgado, 85
Phil. 752, 756 [1950]).
PEOPLE VS. AGBAYANI [G.R. NO. 122770, JANUARY 16, 1998]

THE FAILURE OF THE RECORDS TO DISCLOSE THAT THE ACCUSED WAS

INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE VIOLATION OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. This obviously means that the appointment had
takenplace earlier. The trial court's order of 22 December 1994 states that said de
oficiocounsel were "duly appointed by the Court with the consent of the accused."
Sinceappellant has miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right
tocounsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has

beenregularly performed by the trial court stand. In other words, the trial court
ispresumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under Section 6 of Rule 116 ofthe
Rules of Court, namely:
1) to inform the accused that he has the right to havehis own counsel before
being arraigned;
2) after giving such information, to askaccused whether he desires the aid of
counsel;
3) if he so desires to procure theservices of counsel, the court must grant him
reasonable time to do so; and
4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court
must assign counsel de oficio to defend him.
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction.
The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the
procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a
presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has
been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved
that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed
that the accused was informed by the court of such right.

In U .S. v. Labial, this Court held:

Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question to be
determined in this case is whether the failure of the record to disclose
affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of their right to have counsel
is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the case
back for a new trial. Upon this point we are all agreed that in the absence of an
affirmative showing that the court below did in fact fail to advise the accused of
their rights under the provisions of sections 17 of General Orders No. 58, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 440, the mere omission from the record brought
here upon appeal of an entry affirmatively disclosing that he did so, is not
reversible error.

In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court below must be
presumed in matters of this kind to have complied with the provisions of law prescribing
the procedure to be followed in the trial had before him. While in People v. Miranda this
Court explicitly stated: However, said counsel calls attention to the fact that the record is
silent as to whether or not, at the time appellant was arraigned, the trial court informed
him of his right to be assisted by an attorney, under section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.

This precise issue was determined in United States vs. Labial (27 Phil. 87, 88), in the
sense that unless the contrary appears in the records, it will be presumed that the
defendant was informed by the court of his right to counsel. ". . . If we should insist on

finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can be punished for an offense against
the laws, we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled license to crime. Much
must be left to intendment and presumption, for it is often less difficult to do things
correctly than to describe them correctly." (United States vs. Labial, supra.) The same
doctrine was reiterated in People vs. Abuyen (52 Phil. 722) and in United States vs.
Custan (28 Phil. 19). We see no reason to modify it now.

The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. It is more than
just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard
questions and objections. It means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause of the defense and acts
accordingly. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, and not
simply a perfunctory representation [People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999].
In Estrada v. Badoy, A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC, January 16, 2003, the Supreme Court said that
a PAO lawyer is considered an independent counsel within the contemplation of the
Constitution since he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the
police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the
accused.

Q. Both the transcript of stenographic notes and the order issued by the trial judge failed
to disclose categorically that the court informed the accused of his right to counsel. Is
this sufficient ground to reverse conviction?
A. No. The trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed
by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and such a presumption can only be overcome
by an affirmative showing to the contrary. People v. Agbayani, G.R. No. 122770,
January 16, 1998, 284 SCRA 315, 334. However, the Court admonished all trial courts to
have their compliance with their pre-arraignment duties put on record. Id. at 335-36

a) The right to counsel during the trial is not subject to waiver [Flores v. Ruiz, 90
SCRA 428], because even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill
in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel,
he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how
to establish his innocence [People v. Holgado, 86 Phil 752]. Thus, the
conviction of the accused in the lower court was set aside and the case remanded
for new trial, as the accused was represented by someone who was not a member
of the Philippine Bar [People v. Santociles, G.R. No. 109149, December 21, 1999],
But the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial court advised
the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction.
The trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed
by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and such presumption can be overcome
only by an affirmative showing to the contrary [People v. Agbayani, G.R. No.
122770, January 16, 1998].

b) The decision of conviction was set aside where it appeared that there was
merely a pro forma appointment of a counsel de officio who did not exert his best
efforts for the protection of the accused [People v. Magsi, 124 SCRA 64]. Where
the accused manifested that he had lost confidence in his counsel de officio and
wanted to retain a counsel de parte, but the court still appointed the same lawyer
as counsel de officio, and proceeded with the trial, there was deemed a denial of
this constitutional guarantee [People v. Malunsing, 63 SCRA 493]. Likewise, in
People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325, where the accused, a Cantonese, could not
understand English, Pilipino or any Philippine dialect, it was held that he was
denied the right to counsel because although he was provided with one, he could
not understand or communicate with his counsel concerning his defense.

c) Although the right to counsel is not indispensable to due process of law

[Feeder International Line v. Court of Appeals, supra.], there are instances
when the Constitution and/or the laws provide that the same may not be waived.
Thus, the accused cannot waive the right during the trial, and no valid waiver of
the right to remain silent or to counsel can be made by a person under custodial
interrogation without the assistance of counsel. However, while the right to be
represented by counsel during the trial is absolute, the option of the accused to
hire one of his own choice is limited. Such option cannot be used to sanction
reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with the Rules of Court, or to prejudice the
equally important rights of the State and the offended party to speedy and
adequate justice [People v. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, June 20, 1997].

Q. The accused contends that the judges appointment of a counsel de oficio deprives
him of his constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice. Decide.
A. The preference in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly and specifically to a
person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in criminal prosecution.
Amion v. Judge Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999.

d) An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to

counsel will show that the preference in the choice of cqunsel pertains more
aptly and specifically to a person under custodial investigation rather than one
who is accused in criminal prosecution. And even if the application of the concept
were to be extended to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential
discretion cannot partake of discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make
the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused. Thus,
there is no denial of the right to counsel where the counsel de oficio was
appointed during the absence of the accuseds counsel de parte pursuant to the
courts desire to finish the case as early as possible under the continuous trial
system [Amion v. Judge Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999].
This is reiterated in People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001.

AMION VS. JUDGE CHIONGSON [A.M. NO. RTJ-97-1371, JANUARY 22, 1999]

FACTS: At the scheduled hearing of the criminal case against Amion, trial was not held
because on the day before the scheduled hearing, he was informed that his retained
counsel, Atty. Depasucat, was ill. The hearing was reset with a warning that no further
postponement would be entertained. On the date of re-scheduled hearing, Atty.
Depasucat again failed to appear. To avoid further delay, the court appointed Atty. Jacildo
of PAO as counsel de oficio who was however, prohibited to represent a party who has
retained the services of a counsel of his own choice. At the next scheduled hearing Atty.
Depasucat still did not show up in court. In view of the fact that the victim's wife, Mrs.
Vaflor and another government witness both reside about 70 to 80 kilometers from
Bacolod City, and that the appearance of Atty. Depasucat remained uncertain, Judge
Chiongson, appointed Atty. Lao-Ong from the Free Legal Aid Office to represent Amion
without prejudice to the appearance of Amion's counsel de parte. Amion filed a complaint
charging respondent judge with Ignorance of the Law and Oppression relative to the
former's criminal case. Amion asserts that his right to due process was violated and that
he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his
own choice.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge's appointment of a counsel de oficio constitutes

a violation of accused-complainant's right to due process and a deprivation of his
constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice.

RULING: The accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of
counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other
equally competent and independent counsels from representing him.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE HEARED BY COUNSEL

CANNOT BE EXERCISED TO THE PREJUDICE OF OTHER PARTIES. The claim
ofaccused-complainant that respondent judge's appointment of a counsel de
oficioconstitutes a clear violation of his right to due process and a deprivation of
hisconstitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice cannot
becountenanced by this Court.

An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel,

will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and
specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a
criminal prosecution.

Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of
counsel" to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot
partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel
refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.

As held by this Court in the case of People vs. Barasina:

"Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person
under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then,
the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused
who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his
interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers
of the charter"

Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the accused's
discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much
as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other equally competent and
independent counsels from representing him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal
prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual
resolution of the case.

Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional
right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to
present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing
in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings.

Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and every available opportunity to
present his side which would have led to the expeditious termination of the case. A party
cannot feign denial of due process when he had the opportunity to present his side.

Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was
appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's
desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system.

Thus, it has been held by this Court in the case of Lacambra v. Ramos:

"The Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers resorted to
and repeated importunings of the accused or his counsel, which resulted in the
protracted trial of the case, thus making a mockery of the judicial process, not to
mention the injustice caused by the delay to the victim's family."

Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainant's own strategic machinations which brought

upon the need for the appointment of a counsel de oficio in as much as the criminal case
had been dragging on its lethargic course.

e) The long standing rule is that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer
[Andrada v. People, G.R. No. 135222, March 4, 2005], except when the negligence
or incompetence of counsel is deemed so gross as to have prejudiced the
constitutional right of the accused to be heard. Thus, in U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil.
74, the case was remanded for new trial when counsel for the accused
inadvertently substituted a plea of guilty for an earlier plea of not guilty, thus
resulting in the precipitate conviction of his client. In Aguilar v. Court of Appeals,
320 Phil. 456, the dismissed appeal from a conviction for estafa was reinstated
after it was shown that the failure to file the appellants brief on time was due to
the sheer irresponsibility on the part of appellants counsel. In De Guzman v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103276, April 11, 1996, the case was remanded for
reception of evidence after counsel filed a demurrer to the evidence
notwithstanding that his motion for leave of court was denied, thus precluding the
accused to present his evidence. In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111682,
February 6, 1997, a new trial was ordered after a showing that counsel for the
accused abandoned the accused without explanation. In People v. Bascuguin, G.R.
No. 1444o4, September 4, 2001, it was held that the counsel de officios haste in
proceeding with the arraignment falls short of the standard mandated by the rules
of effective and adequate counselling.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION

AGAINST HIM

Q. What are the purposes of the requirement that the accused should be informed of the
nature of the accusation filed against him?
A. The accused must be informed of the nature of the accusation against him in order to
prepare his defense. He should not be made to guess the charge against him.

Q. What is the purpose and scope of the right to be informed?

A. The object of the written accusation is first, to furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and
second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for prosecution against a further
prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one
should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not
conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set
forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation

of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. US v.

Karelsen, 3 Phil. 223 (1904).

a) Rationale. In People v. Valdesancho, G.R. No. 137051-52, May 30, 2001,

reiterated in People v. Monteron, G.R. No. 130709, March 06, 2002, the Supreme
Court said that the reasons for this guarantee, as explained in US v. Karlsen, are:
1) to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against
him as will enable him to prepare for his defense;
2) to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause; and
3) to inform the Court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether
they are sufficient in law to support a conviction.
i) In People v. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653, the conviction of the accused who
was a deaf-mute was reversed by the Supreme Court because no one who
knew how to communicate with the accused was utilized by the trial court
during the entire proceedings. Similarly, in People v. Parazo, G.R. No.
121176, July 8, 1999, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial
court was vacated where there was no showing that the accused, a deafmute, was aided by a competent sign language expert able to fully
understand and interpret the actions and mutterings of the appellant. See
also People v. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People v. Montes, 122 SCRA 409.

ii) Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an
accused is apparently in a condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his
discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such
affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper
defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend proceedings and commit the
accused to a proper place of detention until he recovers his faculties. To
arraign the accused while he is in a state of insanity will violate the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him [People v. Alcalde, G.R. Nos. 139225-26, May 29, 2002].

Q. What must a criminal information contain in order to comply with the constitutional
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him?
A. According to Sections 6 and 8 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it must state the
following:
1) the name of the accused;
2) the designantion given to the offense by the statute;
3) a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the
offense;
4) the name of the offended party;
5) the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and
6) the place where the offense had been committed. People v. Quitlong, G.R.
No. 121562, July 10, 1998, 292 SCRA 360.

PEOPLE VS. QUITLONG [G.R. NO. 121562, JULY 10, 1998]

Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of
conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal
consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the
charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements.
Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person
shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise
explicit in procedural rules. The practice and object of informing an accused in writing of
the charges against him has been explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court in
U.S. vs.Karelsen; viz:

First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against
him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same
cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
(United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542). In order that this requirement may
be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up
of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.

An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be

informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the name
of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the
acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense has been committed. In embodying the essential elements of the
crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a
bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint
against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of
an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be
corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one
that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is
indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his
own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime.
Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to
perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable
to all the others. Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a
criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.

A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or
allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe
conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive
offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts relied upon to
be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty
as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may
plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It
is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the
statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged
with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient
statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the
conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes
defining them."

b) Requisites. In order that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed

of the nature and cause of the accusation against him may not be violated, the
information must state the name of the accused, the designation given to the
offense by statute, a statement of the acts or omission so complained of as
constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time
and date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense had
been committed. The information must set forth the facts and circumstances that
have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused, so that the accused
can prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a
complaint against two or more persons is conspiracy. Where no such allegation is
made in the information, the courts finding of conspiracy violates the
constitutional requirement [People v. Quitlong, G.R. No. 121502, July 10, 1998].
Every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information,
because the accused is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense charged [People v. Tabion, G.R. No. 132715, October
20, 1999]

i) But it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the

precise time when the offense was committed, except when time is a
material ingredient of the offense. The act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was
committed as the information or complaint will permit [People v. Marcelo,
G.R. No. 126714, March 22, 1999], This rule was reiterated in People v.
Alba, G.R. Nos. 131858-59, April 15, 1999 and in People v. Flores, Jr., G.R.
No. 128823-24, December 27, 2002, where it was held that the exact date
the rape was committed is not an element of the crime.

ii) Due process requires that the acts or omissions constitutive of the
offense must be stated in the information to fully apprise the accused of

the charge against him [People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463; People v.
Bolatete, G.R. No. 127570, February 25, 1999]. The nature and the cause
of the accusation must be reasonably stated in the information [People v.
Ambray, G.R. No. 127177, February 25, 1999], Thus, in People v.
Puertollano, G.R. No. 122423, June 17, 1999, where the information (for
rape) failed to allege the victims exact age, it was held that the imposition
of the death penalty was not warranted, considering that for the imposition
of the death penalty the special qualifying circumstance of the victims age
and her relationship to the offender must be alleged. Likewise, in People v.
Bonghanoy, G.R. No. 124097, June 17, 1999, because the information
failed to allege the relationship between the accused and the victim, the
death penalty was not imposed. See also People v. De la Cuesta, G.R. No.
126134, March 2, 1999.

iii) The description not the designation of the offense controls [Soriano v.
Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 184; Santos v. People, 181 SCRA 487; Pecho
v. People, 262 SCRA 918], The accused can be convicted only of the crime
alleged or necessarily included in the allegations in th,e information
[People v. Legaspi, 246 SCRA 206], Thus, in People v. Paglinawan, G.R. No.
123094, January 31, 2000, where during the trial for murder, it was shown
that the mother and the brother of the victim were also injured during the
same incident, it was held that the accused-appellant could not be
convicted of the said injuries because they were not properly charged in
the information.

iv) While the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more criminal cases
and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot convict the accused of
the complex crime constitutive of the various crimes in the two
informations. To do so would violate the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him [People
v. De Vera, G.R. Nos. 121462-63, June 9,
1999].

v) The fundamental test to determine the adequacy of the averments in an

information is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the crime. [People v. Robert Balao, G.R.
No. 176819, January 26, 2011]

SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NO. L-65952, JULY 31, 1984]

FACTS: Thomas Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City
Fiscal of Quezon City, assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then an
Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded
P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the

National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. The Sandiganbayan

convicted petitioner as guilty for violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of R.A. 3019 which
penalizes: "Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public
officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law."Petitioner contends that the
preliminary investigation of a complaint does not constitute a "contract or transaction"
and thus he cannot be convicted for violation of R.A. 3019. And if acquitted, he cannot be
subsequently convicted of direct bribery because that would violate his right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against him.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not preliminary investigation constitutes a "transaction or contract."
2) Whether or not, if previous conviction for violation of R.A. 3019 were wrong, he
can now be convicted for direct bribery without violating his right to be informed.
RULING:
1) NO. The term 'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to
a commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of transaction,
whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature, pending with the
government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so stated in the
"Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not. The investigation was also
not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed
as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one
which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element
(consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner. We
agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to have
convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
2) YES. The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the
Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A
reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a
case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be
informed.
THE DESCRIPTION IN THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION CONTROLS OVER THE
DESIGNATION OF THE OFFENSE. The principal issue in this petition to review
adecision of the Sandiganbayan is whether or not the preliminary investigation of
acriminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or transaction" so as to bringit
within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known asthe AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal
Code because to do so would be violative of his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information
which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the
petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.

PECHO VS. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. 111399, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996]

FACTS: Petitioner and his co-accused Joe Catre were alleged to have conspired in
representing Pecho as a representative of Everson Commercial Trading of Cotabato City,
which turned out to be not-existent. Pecho was then tried and convicted by the
Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A No. 3019. The SC modified the
Sandiganbayan decision, holding the petitioner guilty of the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents. Although the petitioner
could not be convicted of the crime charged, viz., violation of Section 3(e) of R.A No.
3019, as amended because the said section penalizes only consummated offenses and
the offense charged in this case was not consummated he could, nevertheless, be
convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents, which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration as the conviction for estafa after his acquittal from
violation of R.A. 3019 constitutes double jeopardy. As such, he could not be convicted
without violating his right to be informed of the accusation against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction for estafa after acquittal from the original crime
charged violates his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.

RULING: NO.

AN ACCUSED MAY BE CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE WHICH IS NECESSARILY

INCLUDED IN OR NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE OFFENSE PROVEN. In short, weheld
that although the petitioner could not be convicted of the crime charged, viz.,violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended -- because the said sectionpenalizes only
consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was notconsummated -- he
could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime ofattempted estafa through
falsification of official and commercial documents, whichis necessarily included in the
crime charged.

Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of
the offense charged included in that which is proved.

Analyzing this provision, this Court stated in Esquerra vs. People:

"Stated differently, an accused may be convicted of an offense provided it

is included in the charge, or of an offense charged which is included in that
proved. Still stated differently, an accused can be convicted of an offense only
when it is both charged and proved. If it is not charged although proved, or if it is
not proved although charged, the accused cannot be convicted thereof. In other
words, variance between the allegation and proof cannot justify conviction for
either the offense charged or the offense proved unless either is included in the
other."

Section of Rule 120 states when an offense includes or is included in the other:

"Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense

charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included
in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form a part of those constituting the latter.

In view of the aforesaid rules, it follows then that:

a. When the offense proved is less serious than, and is necessarily included in, the
offense charged (as when the offense proved is homicide and the offense charged
is murder), in which case the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved
(U.S. vs. Macalintal, 2 Phil. 448; . . .)
b. When the offense proved is more serious than and includes the offense charged
(as when the offense proved is serious physical injuries and the offense charged is
slight physical injuries), in which case the defendant shall be convicted only of the
offense charged (U.S. vs. Guzman, 8 Phil. 21).
As earlier adverted to, the evidence established by the prosecution proves beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime of estafa was only at its attempted stage and that it was
sought to be consummated through the falsification of the following documents: the
packing list (Exhibit "A-3") and Invoice (Exhibit "A-4"), which appear to be prepared by
the exporter, Kowa Tsusho Co. Ltd. through one Masayuki Higuchi, its general manager;
Bill of Lading (Exhibit "A-5") which appears to be issued in Yokohama by the Kisen Kaishe
Ltd.; the sworn Import Entry Declaration (Exhibit "A-6") all of which show that the cargoes
imported were "agricultural disc blades and irrigation water pumps; as well as the Import
Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration signed by customs broker Constantino Calica and
prepared on the basis of the foregoing documents. The falsifications consist in making it
appear that the importer-consignee indicated is a legitimate importer or an existing
importer which had participated in such importation and authorized the accused to
request the release of the imported articles although, in truth, it is non-existent and,
therefore, had no participation in the importation; and in the untruthful statements that

what were imported were agricultural disc blades and irrigation water pumps when in
truth they were automotive diesel engines.

Q. Accused is charged with two informations containing two set of facts. May the facts in
the two informations be combined to allow a conviction for a complex crime consisting of
the allegation in the two informations?
A. No. Although the trial of the two cases may be joint, there should be two separate
verdicts for the two informations. To combine the two set of facts to form one complex
crime would violate his right to be informed of the accusation against him. People v.
Ramirez, G.R. No. 92167-68, July 14, 1995.

c) Void for Vagueness Rule: The accused is also denied the right to be informed of
the charge against him, and to due process as well, where the statute itself is
couched in such indefinite language that it is not possible for men of ordinary
intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished. In such
a case, the law is deemed void. See Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001.

i) In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371, the petitioner argued

that Sec. 5 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which penalizes
any relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree of the
President who intervenes in any business or contract with the Government
is void for being vague. The Supreme Court said that the term
intervene should be understood in its ordinary acceptance, which is to
come between. The challenged provision is not vague.

NOTE: Void for Vagueness and Strict Scrutiny

The doctrine of strict scrutiny is different from void for vagueness rule.
Strict scrutiny and overbreadth are analytical tools developed for testing on their
face statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. As
has been pinted out, vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] as applied to a
particular defendant. The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on
free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to facial
challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be

possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in tha case of

penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the
doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial
power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute
is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to
consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the
allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the
States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can
hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere
showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad,
notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him. Spouses Romualdez v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011, December 11, 2008.

d) Waiver. Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him may not be waived, but the defense may waive the right
to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of not guilty [People v. Bryan
Ferdinand Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29, 2002]. The right cannot be
waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or
information filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such,
an indictment must fully state the elements Of the specific offense alleged to
have been committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if
duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or
information [People v. Flores, Jr., G.R. No. 128823-24, December 27, 2002].

i) However, it is altogether a different matter if the accused themselves

refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them. The defense cannot hold hostage the court by such refusal. Thus, in
this case, it was held that there was substantive compliance with this right
when the counsel of the accused received a copy of the Prosecutors
resolution sustaining the charge for rape and acts of lasciviousness. The
failure to read the information to the accused was a procedural infirmity
that was eventually non-prejudicial to the accused. Not only did they
receive a copy of the information, they likewise participated in the trial,
cross-examined the complainant and her witnesses and presented their
own witnesses to deny the charges against them. The conduct of the
defense, particularly their participation in the trial, clearly indicates that
they were fully aware of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them.

ii) Failure to object to the multiple offenses alleged in the criminal

information during the arraignment is deemed a waiver of the right [Abalos
v. People, G.R. No. 136994, September 17, 2002], Thus, in Dimayacyac v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136264, May 18, 2004, the Supreme Court said
that the accused may be convicted of as many offenses charged in the
information and proved during the trial, where he fails to object to such
duplicitous information during the arraignment.

iii) An information which lacks certain material allegations (in this case,
rape through force and intimidation) may still sustain a conviction when
the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the
deficiency is cured by competent evidence presented therein [People v.
Palarca, G.R. No. 146020, May 29, 2002].

e) Political Offense Doctrine. Under the political offense doctrine, common

crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are devisted of their
character as common offenses and assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty. [People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515. 541 (1956)].

i) Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is

not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political
complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and
punished as rebellion alone. However, this is not to say that public
prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents with simple
rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-entrenched
principle in criminal procedure that the institution of criminal charges,
including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion
of the public prosecutor.

ii) But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the
trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of
killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political
motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated. Thus, in Saturnino
Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014, the
Court said that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be
discharged by the defense; the proof showing political motivation is
adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to
present evidence. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in
the instant petition for certiorari.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

Q. What is the concept of a speedy trial?

A. It is one that is free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, the purpose of
which is to free the accused from anxiety and expenses of a court litigation. (Andres v.
Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216; People v. Jardin, 124 SCRA 167; Gonzales v. SB, et al., G.R. No.
94750, July 16, 1991; Hipolito v. CA, et al., 48 SCAD 385, G.R. No. 108478-79, Feb. 21,
1994)

Q. What is the meaning of speedy trial?

A. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative and determination of whether the
right has been violated must be based on the balancing of various factors. Length of
delay is certainly a factor to consider, but other factors must also be considered such as
the reason for the delay, the effort of the defendant to assert his right, and the prejudice
caused by the defendant. Conde v. Rivera, 59 Phil. 650 (1924), is the leading case on
the subject of speedy trial. After reciting the pitiful plight of petitioner Conde, Justice
Malcolm concluded:

We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,

without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his
protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a
year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus
to obtain freedom. Id. at 652.

CONDE VS. RIVERA [G.R. NO. 21741, JANUARY 25, 1924]

RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena,

Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less the five information for various crimes
and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less
than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been
required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of
more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far
away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.

Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other
accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free,
and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble
position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are
arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a
detriment to the public. By the use of upon the appropriate information, could have
attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a
trial free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

Once before, as intimated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her grievances.
We thought then we had pointed out the way for the parties. We hope propose to do all in
our power to assist this poor woman to obtain justice. On the one hand has been the
petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but fortunately assisted by a persistent
lawyer, while on the other hand has been the Government of the Philippine Islands which
should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of

justice. The Court is thus under a moral and legal obligation to see that these
proceedings come to an end and that the accused is discharged from the custody of the
law.

We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause,
secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information,
or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S. vs. Fox
[1880], 3 Montana, 512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs. Judge of First
Instance, Fourteenth Judicial District, and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236.

Q. What is the test in determining whether there is a violation of the right to speedy
trial?
A. The test for a violation of the right to speedy trial has always been made to begin from
the time of the filing of the information (People v. Orsal, 113 SCRA 262). In Martin v. Ver,
123 SCRA 745, it was said that the conduct of the parties, the length of delay, the reason
for delay, the defendants assertion or non-assertion of the right are some of the tests in
determining whether there has been a violation. (See also Hon. Adelina Calderon-Bargas,
et al. v. Hon. Padolina, 45 SCAD 165, G.R. Nos. 103259-61, Oct. 1, 1993)

Q. A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and
the rules and regulations, free from vexations, capricious and oppressive delays. In
Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held that where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a
defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance, for
more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A
determination as to whether the right has been violated involves the weighing of several
factors such as the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the
prosecution and the accused, and the efforst exerted by the defendant to assert his
rights, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the accused. When is the right of
the accused to speedy trial violated?
A. In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of
the case. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when:
1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, caprcious, and oppressive delays;
or
2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or
3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.

a) Speedy trial: a trial free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. But
justice and fairness, not speed, are the objectives. See Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36
SCRA 247; Martin v. Ver, 123 SCRA 745. Accused is entitled to dismissal,
equivalent to acquittal, if trial is unreasonably delayed.

i) The right to speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays and

postponements arising from illness, medical attention, body operations,
etc. Speedy trial means one that can be had as soon after indictment is
filed as the prosecution can, with reasonable diligence, prepare for trial.
While accused persons do have rights, many of them choose to forget that
the aggrieved also have the same rights [People v. Ginez, 197 SCRA 481].
In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do
more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements
of scheduled hearings, of the case. What offends the right are unjustified
postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. In
this case, the hearing was only postponed twice and for a period of less
than two months; thus, there was no violation of the constitutional right to
speedy trial [People v. Tampal, 244 SCRA 202]. The right to speedy trial is
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried
[De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 499; Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 131483, October 26, 1999].

ia) The different interests of the defendant which the right to

speedy trial are designed to protect are:
1) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration;
2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
But the right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the
same would result in a clear denial of due process to the
prosecution. In essence, the right to a speedy trial does not
preclude the peoples equally important right to public justice [Uy v.
Hon. Adriano, G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006]

ii) A separate trial is consonant with the right of the accused to a speedy
trial. In this case, it has been eight years since the information was filed,
and the case has yet to be tried. The long delay has clearly prejudiced the
petitioner who is more than 73 years old. The inconvenience and expense
on the part of the government resulting from separate trial cannot be
given preference over the right to a speedy trial [Dacanay v. People, 240
SCRA 490]

iii) See Republic Act No. 8493 [The Speedy Trial Act], which provides,
among others, that the arraignment of an accused shall be held within 30

days from filing of the information, or from the date the accused has
appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is
entered, the accused shall have at least 15 days to prepare for trial. Trial
shall commence within 30 days from arraignment as fixed by the court. In
no case shall the entire trial period exceed 180 days from the first day of
trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.

iiia) R. A. 8493 is a means of enforcing the right of the accused to a

speedy trial. The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on
record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he
does not do this, he must be held, in law, to have waived the
privilege [Uy v. Hon. Adriano, G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006].

iv) The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by the
Constitution or statute, may be waived except when otherwise expressly
provided by law. Ones right to speedy disposition of his case must,
therefore, be asserted. Due to the failure of the petitioner to assert this
right, he is considered to have waived it. [Barcelona v. Lim, G.R. No.
189171, June 3, 2014].

PEOPLE VS. TEE [G.R. NOS. 140546-47, JANUARY 20, 2003]

RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law
of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held
that "where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial
of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in
mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty,
by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom."

The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the

right has been violated involves the weighing of several factors such as the length of the
delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and the
efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage
caused to the accused.

The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general
shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. However, in determining the right of an accused
to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number

of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The right to a speedy trial is
deemed violated only when:
1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or
2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or
3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or
discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of,
at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the
detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as
the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the
filing of the application. Any such supervening events are the issuance of a judicial
process preventing the discharge of the detained person.

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on the
petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on
its face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to
allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such
process.

Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration with the CID, offered to post a
bail bond for his provisional release to enable him to secure the necessary documents to
establish the appropriate grounds for his permanent stay in the Philippines. By offering to
post a bail bond, the petitioner thereby admitted that he was under the custody of the
CID and voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the CID.

FLORES VS. PEOPLE [G.R. NO. L-25769, DECEMBER 10, 1974]

WHEN PROCEEDINGS ANTERIOR TO THE TRIAL IS DELAYED, THE TRIAL IS

LIKEWISE DELAYED. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in arecent
decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, "means one free from vexatious, capriciousand
oppressive delays, . . ." Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he maywithin the
shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arisingfrom a
prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to thefate in store for
him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity topresent any valid
defense. As was also pointed out in Sarmiento:

"The remedy inthe event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas

corpus if the accused wererestrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus for the finaldismissal of the case."

The above ruling is a reiteration of the doctrineannounced, even before the 1935
Constitution, in Conde v. Rivera, a 1924decision. In that case, Justice Malcolm announced
categorically that the trial, tocomply with the requirement of the then organic law, the
Philippine Autonomy Act,must be "free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays." Further: "Welay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
without goodcause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyonda reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused
isentitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of theinformation,
or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain hisfreedom."

In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took effect, People v.
Castaeda, where it was shown that the criminal case had been dragging on for almost
five years and that when the trial did finally take place, it was tainted by irregularities,
this Court set aside the appealed decision of conviction and acquitted the accused. As
was pointed out by the ponente, Justice Laurel:

"The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and

oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation
of this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an
end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody of the law."

It was on the basis of the above judgment that the dismissal of a second information for
frustrated homicide was ordered by this Court, where the evidence disclosed that the
first information had been dismissed after a lapse of one year and seven months from the
time the original complaint was filed during which time on the three occasions the case
was set for trial, the private prosecutor twice asked for postponements and once the trial
court itself cancelled the entire calendar for the month it was supposed to have been
heard. The same result followed in Esguerra v. De la Costa, where the first complaint was
filed on August 29, 1936, the accused having been criminally prosecuted for an alleged
abuse of chastity in a justice of the peace court but after over a year and three months,
with the lower court twice dismissing the case, he still had to face trial for the same
offense on a new information, thus compelling him to resort to a mandamus suit to
compel the lower court to terminate the case was his right to a speedy trial was violated,
a remedy deemed appropriate by this Court.

There was another occasion where Justice Laurel spoke for this Court on this specific
issue. That was in Mercado v. Santos. Here, for a period of about twenty months, the
accused was arrested four times on the charge of falsifying his deceased wife's will.
Twice, the complaints were subsequently withdrawn. The third time he was prosecuted
on the same charge, he was able to obtain a dismissal. Then came on the part of the
provincial fiscal, a motion for reinvestigation. The lower court was in a receptive mood. It
ordered that the case be heard on the merits. The accused moved to dismiss, but he did
not succeed. He tried the Court of Appeals, but he failed again. He elevated the matter to
this Court; he prevailed. It was stressed in Justice Laurel's opinion:

"An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. . . . He

cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable
length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is
necessarily delayed."

The opinion likewise considered as not decisive the fact that the provincial fiscal did not
intervene until an information was filed charging the accused with the crime of
falsification the third time. Thus: "The Constitution does not say that the right to a
speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and
undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by
private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a
speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is
authorized to be commenced." The latest decision in point, Acebedo v. Sarmiento,
presented an even clearer case. The information for damage to property was filed on
August 3, 1959. There the matter rested until May 19, 1965, when the accused moved to
dismiss. The lower court denied the motion in his order of July 10, 1965. Two more years
elapsed, the period now covering almost eight years, when the trial was commenced.
When one of the witnesses for the prosecution failed to appear, the provincial fiscal
sought the postponement, but the accused countered with a motion for dismissal. The
lower court acceded, and this Court sustained him, even if thereafter it changed its mind
and reinstated the case.

Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be speedy.
In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. In this
case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the Court of Appeals,
petitioners could validly contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried
as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of
their cases that should be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate
tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to them. What is
decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the resolution of August
5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional
safeguard. That is the sole
basis for the conclusion reached by us considering the controlling doctrinenannounced
with such emphasis by this Court time and time again.

Q. What is the remedy for violation of the right to speedy trial?

A. The accused is entitled to dismissal of the case, and, if he is under detention, to
release by habeas corpus. Moreover, dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is
equivalent to acquittal and is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.

Q. May the right to speedy trial be invoked even if it would result in deprivation of the
States right to due process? Explain.
A. No. The right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the same would result
in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. It should not operate in depriving the

State of its inherent prerogative to prosecute criminal cases or generally in seeing to it

that all those who approach the bar of justice is afforded fair opportunity to present their
side. For it is not only the State; more so, the offended party who is entitled to due
process in criminal cases. In essence, the right to a speedy trial does not preclude the
peoples equally important right to public justice. (Uy v. Hon. Arsenio P. Adriano, et al.,
G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006).

Q. State the effect if a party to a case fails to timely question the delay in the trial of the
case. Explain.
A. Ones failure to timely question the delay in the trial to a case would be an implied
acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right to question the same. Except when
otherwise expressly so provided, the speedy trial right, like any other right conferred by
the Constitution or statute, may be waived when not positively asserted. A partys
silence may amount to laches. The right to a speedy trial is a privilege of the accused. If
he does not claim it, he should not complain. R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a
means of enforcing Section 14(2), Art. III of the Constitution. The spirit of the law is that
the accused must go on record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisiting delay. If
he does not do this, he must be held, in law, to have waived the privilege. (Uy v. Hon.
Arsenio P. Adriano, et al., G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006).

Q. What are the different interests of a defendant that may be affected by the violation
of his right to speedy trial? Explain.
A. The different interests of a defendant which may be affected by the violation of the
right to a speedy trial were identified. It was held that prejudice should be assessed in
the light of the interests of a defendant which the speedy trial right was designed to
protect, namely:
1) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration;
2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant to adequately
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear
during delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are
unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not
always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown.
Even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints
on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility. After
all, arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendants liberty,
whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his
financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create
anxiety in him, his family and friends. (Uy v. Hon. Arsenio P. Adriano, et al., G.R. No.
159098, October 27, 2006).

b) Impartial trial. The accused is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial

judge. In People v. Opida, 142 SCRA 295, the judgment of conviction was

reversed upon showing that the trial judge was biased because of the appearance
and criminal record of the accused. In Imelda Romualdez Marcos v.
Sandiganbayan, supra., reiterating Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, supra., the cross
examination of the accused and the witnesses by the court constituted bias and
partiality. But the impartiality of the judge cannot be assailed on the ground that
he propounded clarificatory questions to the accused [People v. Castillo, G.R. No.
120282, April 20, 1998], Indeed, trial judges must be accorded a reasonable
leeway in asking questions as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring
out the truth. This is not only the right but the duty of the judge who feels the
need to elicit information to the end that justice will be served [People v. Vaynaco,
G.R. No. 126286, March 22, 1999].

i) In Go v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 397, the Supreme Court said that
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, although required for the
benefit of litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the
judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain the peoples faith
in the institutions they
have erected when they adopted our Constitution.

ii) In People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 121039-45, January 25, 1999, the
Supreme Court, citing People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54, rejected
the appellants contention that he was denied the right to an impartial trial
due to prejudicial publicity. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to
the right of the accused to a fair trial.

Q. Give an example of a judge who lacks impartiality.

A. The application of the right to criminal prosecution was recently emphasized in
Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18 (1972). One of the accused in the case had made an
extrajudicial statement, which he subsequently subscribed before the judge, implicating
his co-accused. Later, however, the same accused repudiated his statement claiming
that he had made it as a result of a threat by a government agent. The co-accused then
sought the disqualification of the judge claiming that the repudiation of the statement
would not sit well with the judge before whom it had been subscribed. The Court, noting
the imperative character of the safeguard of due process connoting at the very least, an
impartial tribunal, disqualified the judge.

MATEO, JR. VS. VILLALUZ [G.R. NOS. L-34756-59, MARCH 31, 1973]

IMPARTIAL JUDGE. It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the
absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants
of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the
decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge

who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal footing. In the language
of Justice Dizon:

"It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before
an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to
nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."

He should, to quote from another decision "at all times manifest depth commitment and
concern to the cause of justice according to legal norms, a cerebral man who deliberately
holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he
shares with the rest of his fellow mortals." A judge then, to quote from the latest decision
in point, Geotina v. Gonzales, penned by Justice Castro, should strive to be at all times
"wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity." Nor is this to imply that prior to
Gutierrez, there had been no awareness of the due process aspect of an impartial
tribunal even if not explicitly referred to. As noted by Justice Street as far back as 1926 in
Government v. Abella, a 1926 decision, if the Supreme Court "were of the opinion that
the litigant had not had a fair trial, a new trial could be granted." There was a reiteration
of such a view in a case decided in 1933, Dais v. Torres, with Justice Vickers as ponente,
in these words:

"Although a judge may not have been disqualified [according to the Code
of Civil Procedure], nevertheless if it appears to this court that the appellant was
not given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice,
this court will order a new trial, if it deems it necessary, in the interest of justice."

Conformably to what was so emphatically asserted in Gutierrez as the fundamental

requisite of impartiality for due process to be satisfied, the Rules of Court provision on
disqualification when revised three years later in 1964 contains this additional
paragraph:

"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."

Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench that outside of pecuniary
interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication,
there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus
calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to
preferences or predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such
should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist, the better course for a judge is
to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for probity

and objectivity is preserved. What is even more important, the ideal of an impartial
administration of justice is lived up to. Thus is due process vindicated. There is relevance
to what was said by Justice Sanchez in Pimentel v. Salanga, drawing "attention of all
judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a
case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the
parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with
bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of
inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should
exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflects the probability that a losing party might
nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the
scales of justice against him. That passion on the part judge may be generated because
of serious charges misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether
remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise
great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where
that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case
could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be
occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit
may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting a case
where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted
as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He
serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice."

Q. When is a trial public?

A. It is public when attendance is open to all irrespective of relationship to defendants.
However, when the evidence to be presented may be characterized as offensive to
decency or public morals, the proceeding may be limited to friends, relatives and
counsel. Garcia v. Domingo, L-30104, July 25, 1973.

Q. What is the meaning of public trial?

A. It is one held openly or publicly. It is sufficient that relatives and friends, who want to
watch the proceedings are given the opportunity to witness the same.

Q. What is the purpose of the guarantee of a public trial?

A. The purpose of this guarantee is to serve as a safeguard against any attempt to
employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial
is subject to contemporaneous review in the form of public opinion is an effective
restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. Garcia v. Domingo, supra.

GARCIA VS. DOMINGO [G.R. NO. L-30104, JULY 25, 1973]

PUBLIC TRIAL. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents
of this petition, as set forth at the outset, explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial
to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made clear, under the present
dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision that needed only
a single, terse summation from the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights,
Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by him:

"Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in

an illegal and unjust manner."

It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked
any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration of what appeared in the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones Law. Earlier, such a right
found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then
government of this country as an unincorporated territory of the United States.
Historically, as was pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the United States Supreme
Court in the leading case of In re Oliver:

"This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an

accused has its roots in [the] English common law heritage."

He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely evolved long
before the settlement of [the United States] as an accompaniment of the ancient
institution of jury trial." It was then noted by him that there, "the guarantee to an
accused of the right to a public trial first appeared in a state constitution in 1776." Later
it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. He
could conclude his historical survey thus:

"Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or

judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the public."

Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the right to a public trial.

The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The
Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. What does it signify?
Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be
given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must
be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a
judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on
such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to
the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that

thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted
with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate
Laurel in his terse summation of the importance of this right singled out its being a
deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed
embraced in procedural due process. Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the
courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It is
the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so.
There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public
where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."

What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of
the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held.
Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be
in the negative. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be
admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those
who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this
right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others.
Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to
satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends,
relatives and counsel present,
no matter with what offense he may be charged."

c) Public trial. This is intended to prevent possible abuses which may be

committed against the accused. The rule is not absolute. See Garcia v.
Domingo, 52 SCRA 143.

i) An accused has a right to a public trial, but it is a right that belongs to

him more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would
not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in
secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with a
publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those
who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe the trial process [Re: Request for Live TV
Coverage of the Trial of former President Joseph Estrada, A.M. No.
01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001]

IN RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO AND TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE
SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT
JOSEPH ESTRADA [A.M. NO. 00-1-4-03-SC, SEPTEMBER 13, 2001]

COURT PROCEEDINGS MAY BE FILMED FOR RECORD PURPOSES ONLY, AND NOT
FOR PUBLIC SHOWING. Thus, many important purposes for preserving the recordof the

trials can be served by audio-visual recordings without impairing the right ofthe accused
to a fair trial.

Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, this Court set aside a lower court's injunction
restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among
other things, the role of then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986
EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long
been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information
sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public
character."

No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a
documentary record is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be produced
can be checked for its accuracy against such documentary and any attempt to distort the
truth can thus be averted.

Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or

causes clbres was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School.
As he explained:

In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends

found similarly moving. An educational television network filmed a trial in Denver
of a Black Panther leader on charges of resisting arrest, and broadcast the
document in full, in four installments, several months after the case was
concluded concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.

No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking
way in which the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with
uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense
of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.

I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar
good reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for
the broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an
educational experiment that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and
with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual
trial is an agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its impact on the public
understanding. Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational
system, is now a desperate need.

Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It
is perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of
justice by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high on the
issues stirred by a case, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping
audio-visual recordings of the proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and
exhibition, after passions have subsided.

WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan,
under the following conditions:
a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as
the Sandiganbayan determine should not be held public under Rule 119,
21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure;
b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings;
c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only
and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes
depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them;
d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have
rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be
prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of
violations of the prohibition;
e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of
the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to
rules promulgated by it; and
f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public
broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum
and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and
exhibition in accordance with law.
Q. If the trial of the accused is conducted inside the Bilibid Prisons without objections, is
this a public trial? Why?
A. Yes, for as long as the public has not been excluded. (Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA
143; US v. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304; People v. Tampus, 96 SCRA 625).

Q. When is the exclusion of the public valid without violating the right to public trial?
A. The exclusion of the public from the trial is valid without violating the right to public
trial when the evidence to be produced is offensive to decency or public morals. (Rule
119, Sec. 13, Rules of Court).

Q. When does publicity prejudice due process?

A. The rule is that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by
the barrage of publicity. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of

publicity... because these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. Webb v. De
Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995. See also People v. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. No.
111206-08, October 6, 1995.

RIGHT TO MEET WITNESSES FACE TO FACE (RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION)

Q. What is the concept of the right to confrontation?

A. It is the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face. It is the
right of the accused to cross examine the witnesses.

Q. What are the purposes of the right to confrontation?

A. The purposes are:
1) to cross-examine the witness to test their credibility. (Anciro v. People, 46
SCAD 967, G.R. No. 107819, Dec. 17, 1993); and
2) to enable the court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. (US v. Javier,
37 Phil. 449).
UNITED STATES VS. JAVIER [G.R. NO. L-12990, JANUARY 21, 1918]

AFFIDAVIT OF A DECEASED PERSON WHO HAS NOT BEEN CROSS-EXAMINED IS

INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. The foregoing statement of the facts and the
lawdisposes of all but one assignment of error, namely, that the lower court erred
inadmitting Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statementof
sergeant Presca, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the justice of the
peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas.Appellant's argument is
predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rightswhich says, "That in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to meet the witnesses face to face,"
and the provision of the Code of CriminalProcedure, section 15 (5), which say that "In all
criminal prosecutions thedefendant shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by
and to crossexaminethe witnesses against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill
ofRights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin(Dowdell
vs. U.S. [1911], 221 U.S. 325) that it "intends to secure the accused inthe right to be
tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by onlysuch witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in hispresence, and give to
the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It wasintended to prevent the
conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parteaffidavits, and particularly to
preserve the right of the accused to test therecollection of the witness in the exercise of
the right of cross-examination." Inother words, confrontation is essential because crossexamination is essential. Asecond reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have
before it thedeportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. vs.
Anastasio[1906], 6 Phil., 413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied
thisconstitutional provision on behalf of accused persons in a number of cases. (See

forexample U.S. vs. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. vs. Bello [1908, 12 Phil. 87.)It is
for us now to determine whether the present facts entitle the accused to theprotection of
the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fall under some exceptionthereto.

Q. What is the purpose of the right of confrontation?

A. The right has a two-fold purpose:
1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the
witness by cross-examination; and
2) secondarily to allow the judge to observe the deportation of the witness.
Right to cross-examine complainant and witnesses. The testimony of a witness who has
not submitted himself to crossexamination is not admissible in evidence. The affidavits of
witnesses who are not presented during the trial and thus, are not subjected to crossexamination are inadmissible because they are hearsay [People v. Quidato, G.R. No.
117401, October 1, 1998; Cariago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.143561, June 6, 2001].
Thus, in People v. Monje, G.R. No. 146689, September 27, 2002, the Supreme Court said
that to administer by final judgment the dreaded lethal injection on the basis of
circumstantial evidence consisting mainly of the testimony of a witness who failed and
refused to return to court and submit to cross-examination four times is judicial tyranny
of the highest order. But the right to cross-examine witnesses may be waived.

a) In People v. Lacbanes, G.R. No. 88684, March 20, 1997, it was held that the
failure to present as witness the poseur-buyer in a prosecution for illegal sale of
marijuana, is not fatal to the prosecutions case, because what is required is
merely proof of the consummation of the sale transaction, and in this case, the
entire transaction was witnessed by Pfc. Rosales who testified on the same.
Distinguish this case from People v. Tapeda, 244 SCRA 339, where the Supreme
Court said that the failure of the prosecution to present as witness the poseurbuyer in a buy-bust operation was fatal to the prosecutions case, because without
the testimony of the latter there is no convincing evidence that the accused was a
marijuana peddler and not simply the victim of instigation.

Q. Is the right of confrontation absolute? Why?

A. No, because there is an express exception which is the admission of dying declaration.
This is because the dying declaration may be the only evidence of the prosecution.
(People v. Gueron, 121 SCRA 115).

Q. What are the principal exceptions to the right of confrontation?

A.

(1) the admissibility of dying declarations; and

(2) trial in absentia under Section 14(2).

Q. Is the right of confrontation available in preliminary investigation?

A. No. It is a right available during trial which begins only upon arraignment. Dequito v.
Arellano, 81 Phil. 128 (1948).

NOTE: From Section 5 of Rule 112 it is clear that unlike in the preliminary
investigagtion proper, an accused is not entitled as a matter of right to be present
during the preliminary examination nor to cross-examine the witnesses presented
against him before his arrest, the purpose of said examination being merely to
determine whether or not there is sufficient reason to issue a warrant of arrest.
The provision commanding the determination of probable cause prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, requires no notice to an accused. A preliminary
examination is generally a proceeding ex parte in which the person charged has
no right to participate or to be present. Marinas v. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423, 437 (L25707 & 25753-4, May 14, 1981).

Q. Several accused were tried separately. May one be convicted on the basis of the
testimony of another who was not cross-examined? Why?
A. No, because that is violative of his right to cross-examine the witness against him.
(Talino v. Sandiganbayan, 148 SCRA 598).

TALINO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NOS. L-75511-14, MARCH 16, 1987]

IF SEVERAL CO-ACCUSED WERE TRIED SEPARATELY, TESTIMONIES MADE IN ONE

CASE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE OTHERS UNLESS THEY ARE ACCORDED
THEIR RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION. It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed toone
of two or more defendants, his testimony therein imputing guilt to any of theco-accused
is not admissible against the latter who was not able to cross-examinehim. The issue in
this case is whether or not such testimony was considered by therespondent court
against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole basisof his conviction.

The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the

Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who
his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No
accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is any
derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent
by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That
is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the affiant is
presented in court and hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of
Court, like the dying declaration.

Q. Must an informant who led the police to the arrest of the accused be presented for
cross examination?
A. No. There is no right of confrontation against informants who are not witnesses.

RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES

AND THE PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE

Q. What is the basic purpose of the right of the accused to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of the witnesses in his behalf?
A. The purpose is to assure a full and unimpeded opportunity for him to meet what in the
end could be a baseless suit or accusation. The due process clause simply requires, too,
that before a person may be deprived of his life, lipberty or property, he must be given
the opportunity to be heard.

Q. What processes may be resorted to compel the attendance of a person in court?

A. The different processes that may be resorted to compel attendance of parties in court
as well as witnesses are: subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, warrant of arrest, contempt,
perpetuation of testimony and modes of discovery.

a) A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to

testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under
the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition [Caamic v. Galapon,
237 SCRA 390], In this jurisdiction, there are two kinds of subpoena, to wit:
subpoena ad tbstificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to
compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of
books, records, things or documents therein specified. Well- settled is the rule that
before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that
the following requisites are present:
1) the books, documents, or other things requested must appear prima
facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of
relevancy); and
2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily
identified (test of definiteness) [Roco v. Contreras, G.R. No. 158275,
June 28, 2005].
ROCO VS. CONTRERAS [G.R. NO. 158275, JUNE 28, 2005]

A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the
hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the
Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.

In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person totestify,
while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, thingsor documents
therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil
Company:

The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad
testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an injunction thatthe witness
shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books,documents, or things
described in the subpoena.

Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must
first be satisfied that the following requisites are present:
1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant
to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and
2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified
(test of definiteness).
Again, to quote from H.C. Liebenow:

In determining whether the production of the documents described in a

subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is proper to consider,
first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific
documents, orrather for specific proof, and secondly, whether that proof
is prima facie sufficientlyrelevant to justify enforcing its production.A
general inquisitorial examination of all the books, papers, and documents of an
adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of value may
not show up, will not be enforced. (Emphasis supplied)

Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al.,[9] we held: Wellsettled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a
'subpoena duces tecum, it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the
book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and
material to the issue before the court, and that theprecise book, paper
or document containing such evidence has been so designated
ordescribed that it may be identified. (Emphasis supplied)

b) In People v. Chua, G.R. No. 128280, April 4, 2001, the Court reiterated what, in
US v. Ramirez, it declared as the requisites for compelling the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence, as follows:
1) the evidence is really material;

2) accused is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production

of such evidence;
3) the evidence will be available at the time desired; and
4) no similar evidence can be obtained.
NOTE: In Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995, the Court ruled
that, since a preliminary investigation can result in arrest and therefore in a
deprivation of liberty, the accused should not be denied access to evidence
favourable to him, in this case an earlier version of an affidavit made by a witness
for the prosecution.

TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

Q. What are the purposes of trial in absentia?

A. The basic purpose of trial in absentia is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases
considering that if the accused would not always be present, that would derail the trial of
the cases.

Q. What are the requisites of a valid trial in absentia?

A.

(1) the accused has already been arraigned;

(2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and
(3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Parada v. Veneracion, A.M. No. RTJ-961353, March 11, 1997, 269 SCRA 371, 376 (citing People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163
[1986]).

Q. What is the scope of the right to be present at trial?

A. It covers only the period from arraignment to promulgation of sentence. US v.
Beecham, 23 Phil. 259 (1972). However, this has been modified by Section 14(2) which
says that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

Q. What are the conditions for waiver of the right to be present at the trial?
A. The right may be waived provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to
appear for the purpose of identification by the witness of the prosecution, or provided he
unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as
the defendant in the case on trial. Reason for requiring the presence of the accused,
despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all stages of the proceeding without

giving the Peoples witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, he may in his
defense say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and,
therefore, is entitled to acquittal. People v. Presiding Judge, G.R. No. L-64731, October
26, 1983; Aquino , Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2, L-37364. April 24, 1975.

Q. What are the effects of the waiver of the right to appear by the accused?
A. The effects are:
(1) there is a waiver of the right to present evidence;
(2) the prosecution can present evidence if accused fails to appear; and
(3) the court can decide without the accuseds evidence.

Q. Is trial in absentia violative of the accuseds right to due process? Why?

A. No, because it does not mean that the judgment will result in conviction. It is not also
violative of the right to be presumed innocent because the judgment may not necessarily
result in conviction. The judgment will still be based on the evidence presented as the
prosecution is still bound to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no violation of the right to due process because he was given the opportunity to
be heard. (Jimenez v. Nazareno, L-37933, April 15, 1988).

Q. Does the provision on trial in absentia preclude forfeiture of bail bond under the Rules
of Court for one who jumps bail?
A. No, the new provision does not lend itself to a latitudinarian construction. People v.
Judge Prieto, Jr., L-46542, July 21, 1978. (Prietos argument was that the time to forfeit
bail should be after conviction, not upon jumping bail.)

The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which
could, in the past, be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned,
because of the defendants escape [People v. Agbulos, 222 SCRA 196]. Sec. 6, Rule 120
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizes the promulgation of judgment in
absentia in view of the failure of the accused to appear despite notice. This is intended to
obviate the situation where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused
jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment [People v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 140285, September 27, 2006]. Trial in absentia is mandatory upon the court
whenever the accused has been arraigned, notified of date/s of hearing, and his absence
is unjustified. See Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1; People v. Judge Salas, 143 SCRA
163; Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546.

a) Waiver of appearance or trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is
thereby deprived of the right to require the presence of the accused for purposes
of identification by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused

[People v. Macaraeg, 141 SCRA 37]. Even after the accused has waived further
appearance during the trial, he can be ordered arrested by the court for nonappearance upon summons to appear for purposes of identification [Carredo v.
People, 183 SCRA 273].

b) Thus, the presence of the accused is mandatory:

1) during arraignment and plea;
2) during trial, for identification; and
3) during promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense wherein the
accused may appear by counsel or a representative.
c) An accused who escapes from confinement, or jumps bail, or flees to a foreign
country, loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits himself
to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived his right to seek
relief from the court, including the right to appeal his conviction [People v.
Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79], One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason
for his non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the
court can render judgment in the case and promulgation can be made by simply
recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his
counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation
of judgment is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel [People v.
Acabal, G.R: No. 103604-05, September 23, 1993].

PEOPLE VS. MAPALAO [G.R. NO. 92415, MAY 14, 1991]

AN ACCUSED WHO IS TRIED IN ABSENTIA WAIVES HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT

EVIDENCE AS WELL AS HIS RIGHTS TO BAIL AND APPEAL. By the same token,
anaccused who, after the filing of an information, is at large and has not
beenapprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court,cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts until he
submitshimself to its jurisdiction or is arrested.

In Gimenez vs. Nazareno, this Court had occasion to rule on a similar case in this wise
"First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the accused-private respondent when he appeared during the arraignment on August 22,
1973 and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest or voluntary appearance in court.
Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what
accused-private respondent did in this case.

But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the
custody of the law and failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question in the
negative. As We have consistently ruled in several earlier cases, jurisdiction once

acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is
terminated.

To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at
the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by
the court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case,
notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.

Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a
'trial in absentia' may be had when the following requisites are present:
(1) that there has been an arraignment;
(2) that the accused has been notified; and
(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified.

In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the
facts show, the private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the said
arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set
on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice
issued by the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter that
private respondent escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to
appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court
considered his absence unjustified.

The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other
accused in the absence of private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the
proceedings as to the private respondent and rendered a decision as to the other
accused only.

Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the
evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who
escaped from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and
cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this
purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. As it has
been aptly explained:

'. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as
there were quite a number of reported instances where the proceedings against a
defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because of his non-appearance. What the
Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued enjoyment of his freedom
even if his guilt could be proved. With the categorical statement in the

fundamental law that his absence cannot justify a delay provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be
remedied. That is the way it should be, for both society and the offended party
have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.'

The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still
presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence
presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also,
there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to
be heard.

Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to
cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the
trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently
held that the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is
a personal right and may be waived. In the same vein, his right to present evidence on
his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection, may be waived by him.

Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is buttressed by the
provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1(c) of Rule 115
which clearly reflects the intention of the framers of our Constitution, to wit:

'. . . The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial
on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his
right to be present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been
notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived
his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody
is regained . . .'

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has been
duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to
confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him."

d) Under Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, an accused who failed to appear
at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies
available against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. The accused
on bail who fails to present himself during promulgation of judgment loses his
standing in court. Without any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its
jurisdiction to seek relief. Sec. 6, Rule 120 does not take away substantive rights;
it merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be
implemented. Like an appeal, a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or
privilege. As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be

exercised in the manner provided by law; the party filing such a motion must
strictly comply with the requisites laid down by the Rules. [Reynaldo Jaylo v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 183152, January 21, 2015]

PEOPLE VS. VALERIANO [G.R. NOS. 103604-05, SEPTEMBER 23, 1993]

A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION MAY BE PROMULGATED AFTER THE ACCUSED HAS

BEEN TRIED IN ABSENTIA. The trial court further erred in holding that no penaltycould
be imposed on accused Engracio Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 becausehe "is
nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being afugitive or at
large." The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after hehad been arraigned,
just before the retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph(2), Section 14, Article III of
the Constitution permits trial in absentia after theaccused has been arraigned provided
he has been duly notified of the trial and hisfailure to appear thereat is unjustified. One
who jumps bail can never offer ajustifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial.
Accordingly, after the trialin absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and
promulgation may bemade by simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket with
a copy thereofserved upon his counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be
present at thepromulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.

NO SEC. 15, 16, 17-ROY

SECTION 18.
(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs
and aspirations
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.
May the State hold political prisoners?
Answer: No because No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations
What is involuntary servitude?
It is every condition of enforced or compulsory service of one to another no
matter under what form such servitude may be disguised (Rubi vs Provincial
Board)
What are some exceptions to the rule against involuntary servitude?
1. As a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted

2. In the interest of national defense all citizens may be compelled by law to

render personal military or civic service
3. A return to work order
PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY WORKERS' UNION (CLO) VS. PHILIPPINE
REFINING CO.
FACTS:
Case No. 32-V, Philippine Refining Company, Inc. vs. Philippine Refining Company
Worker's Union (CLO), was scheduled for hearing before the Court of Industrial
Relations. Upon that date, said court renewed its efforts to effect a temporary
settlement of the case before going on the merits of the petition. Considering the
circumstances and facts of the case at that stage of the proceedings, the Court
of Industrial Relations came to the conclusion that, "for the welfare of everybody
concerned, for the interest of the public," and because the court might not be
able to decide the case promptly the striking laborers should be directed to
return and resume their work in the Philippine Refining Company.
The petitioning company filed with the court an urgent report to the effect that a
strike was declared by the union at the plant of the company. In view of this
development and of the other facts and considerations set forth in the lower
court's order, the lower court ruled that the strike by the union or by the workers
of the company therein mentioned on April 30, 1947, "is contemptuous and
illegal because it is a violation of the law and the order of the court.
ISSUE:
Is section 19, Commonwealth Act 103, which is the only source of the authority
the Court of Industrial Relations to prohibit the employees to stage a strike
unconstitutional?
RULING/DOCTRINE:
As ruled in Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas vs. Gotamco Saw
Mill, the Court stated that:
. . . It does not offend against the constitutional inhibition proscribing involuntary
servitude. An employee entering into a contract of employment after said law
went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed in
said section 19, among which is the "implied condition that when any dispute
between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been
submitted to the Court of Industrial relations for settlement or arbitration,
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the
employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when
so enjoined by the court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if
he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the
court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or
when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled. ..." The
voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment

he has a free choice between entering into it or not with such an implied
condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing. . . .

SEGIFREDO L. ACLARACION vs. HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN

FACTS:
On May 29 and July 29, 1974 Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan and Justice Jose N.
Leuterio, Chairmen of the Third and Seventh Divisions of the Court of Appeals,
respectively, ordered the Chief of Police of Makati, Rizal, to arrest Aclaracion, a
resident of that municipality, and to confine him in jail until he submits a
complete transcript of his notes in the said cases.Aclaracion was arrested on June
21, 1974 and incarcerated in the municipal jail. In a petition dated July 12, 1974
he asked the Court of Appeals that he be not required to transcribe his notes in
all the cases tried in the Gapan court. He suggested that the testimonies in the
said cases be retaken.The Third Division of the Court of Appeals in its resolution
of August 7, 1974 ordered the releaseof Aclaracion. Later, he transcribed his
notes in the Muncal case. However, the warden did not release him because of
the order of arrest issued by the Seventh Division.On August 9, 1974 Aclaracion
filed a petition for habeas corpus. He advanced the novel contention that to
compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes, after he ceased to be a
stenographer, would be a transgression of the rule that "no involuntary servitude
in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted" (Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of Rights, 1972
Constitution). He was averse to being subjected "to involuntary servitude sans
compensation". He desired to be released from the obligation of transcribing his
notes.
RULING/ DOCTRINE:
A COURT STENOGRAPHER SEPARATED FROM OFFICE MAY BE COMPELLED TO
TRANSCRIBE HIS NOTES UNDER PAIN OF CONTEMPT - We hold that an Appellate
Court may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe his stenographic
notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate jurisdiction and is
a part of its inherent powers which are necessary to the ordinary and efficient
exercise of its jurisdiction and essential to the due administration of justice.
The provision of section 12, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that "upon the approval
of the record on appeal the clerk shall direct the stenographer or stenographers
concerned to attach to the record of the case five (5) copies of the transcript of
the oral evidence referred to in the record on appeal" includes stenographers
who are no longer in the judiciary. (See sec. 7, Rule 122 and sec. 7, R. A. No.
3749).
The traditional mode of exercising the court's coercive power is to hold the
recalcitrant or negligent stenographer in contempt of court if he does not comply
with the order for the transcription of his notes and imprison him until he obeys
the order (Sec. 7, Rule 71, Rules of Court).
Aclaracion's contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes
would constitute involuntary servitude is not tenable. Involuntary servitude
denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another (Hodges

vs. U.S., 203 U.S. 1; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) or the
condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and
against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid or not (Black's Law
Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 961). That situation does not obtain in this case.
Also untenable is Aclaracion's argument that the imprisonment of a stenographer
who had defied the court's resolution for the transcription of the notes
constitutes illegal detention. The incarceration of the contemning stenographer
is lawful because it is the direct consequence of his disobedience of a court
order.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10364

AN ACT EXPANDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9208, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO INSTITUTE
POLICIES TO ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND
CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR
THE PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the "Expanded Anti-Trafficking
in Persons Act of 2012.

Section 2. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as

follows:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees the respect of individual rights. In
pursuit of this policy, the State shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures and development of programs that will promote human dignity,
protect the people from any threat of violence and exploitation, eliminate
trafficking in persons, and mitigate pressures for involuntary migration and
servitude of persons, not only to support trafficked persons but more
importantly, to ensure their recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration into the
mainstream of society.

"It shall be a State policy to recognize the equal rights and inherent human
dignity of women and men as enshrined in the United Nations Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, United Nations Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, United Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant
Workers and their Families, United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime Including its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and all other relevant and
universally accepted human rights instruments and other international
conventions to which the Philippines is a signatory."

Section 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as

follows:

"SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:

"(a) Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing,

offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons
with or without the victims consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of
the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the
purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

"The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a

child for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form
of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as trafficking
in persons even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph.

"(b) Child refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is
over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition.

"(c) Prostitution refers to any act, transaction, scheme or design involving the
use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in
exchange for money, profit or any other consideration.

"(d) Forced Labor refers to the extraction of work or services from any
person by means of enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use of,
force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority
or moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception including any work or
service extracted from any person under the menace of penalty.

"(e) Slavery refers to the status or condition of a person over whom

any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are
exercised.

"(f) Involuntary Servitude refers to a condition of enforced and

compulsory service induced by means of any scheme, plan or pattern,
intended to cause a person to believe that if he or she did not enter
into or continue in such condition, he or she or another person would
suffer serious harm or other forms of abuse or physical restraint, or
threat of abuse or harm, or coercion including depriving access to
travel documents and withholding salaries, or the abuse or threatened
abuse of the legal process.

"(g) Sex Tourism refers to a program organized by travel and tourism-related

establishments and individuals which consists of tourism packages or activities,
utilizing and offering escort and sexual services as enticement for tourists. This
includes sexual services and practices offered during rest and recreation periods
for members of the military.

"(h) Sexual Exploitation refers to participation by a person in prostitution,

pornography or the production of pornography, in exchange for money, profit or
any other consideration or where the participation is caused or facilitated by any
means of intimidation or threat, use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, debt bondage, abuse of power or of position or of
legal process, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person; or in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
caused or facilitated by any means as provided in this Act.

"(i) Debt Bondage refers to the pledging by the debtor of his/her

personal services or labor or those of a person under his/her control as
security or payment for a debt, when the length and nature of services
is not clearly defined or when the value of the services as reasonably
assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt.

"(j) Pornography refers to any representation, through publication, exhibition,

cinematography, indecent shows, information technology, or by whatever
means, of a person engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any
representation of the sexual parts of a person for primarily sexual purposes.

"(k) Council shall mean the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking created
under Section 20 of this Act."

Section 4. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as

follows:

"SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. It shall be unlawful for any person,

natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:

"(a) To recruit, obtain, hire, provide, offer, transport, transfer, maintain, harbor,
or receive a person by any means, including those done under the pretext of
domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose
of prostitution, pornography, or sexual exploitation;

"(b) To introduce or match for money, profit, or material, economic or other

consideration, any person or, as provided for under Republic Act No. 6955, any
Filipino woman to a foreign national, for marriage for the purpose of acquiring,
buying, offering, selling or trading him/her to engage in prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;

"(c) To offer or contract marriage, real or simulated, for the purpose of acquiring,
buying, offering, selling, or trading them to engage in prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or debt
bondage;

"(d) To undertake or organize tours and travel plans consisting of tourism

packages or activities for the purpose of utilizing and offering persons for
prostitution, pornography or sexual exploitation;

"(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;

"(f) To adopt persons by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes or to

facilitate the same for purposes of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

"(g) To adopt or facilitate the adoption of persons for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;

"(h) To recruit, hire, adopt, transport, transfer, obtain, harbor, maintain, provide,
offer, receive or abduct a person, by means of threat or use of force, fraud,
deceit, violence, coercion, or intimidation for the purpose of removal or sale of
organs of said person;

"(i) To recruit, transport, obtain, transfer, harbor, maintain, offer, hire, provide,
receive or adopt a child to engage in armed activities in the Philippines or
abroad;

"(j) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, obtain, maintain, offer, hire, provide or
receive a person by means defined in Section 3 of this Act for purposes of forced
labor, slavery, debt bondage and involuntary servitude, including a scheme,
plan, or pattern intended to cause the person either:

"(1) To believe that if the person did not perform such labor or services, he or she
or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or

"(2) To abuse or threaten the use of law or the legal processes; and

"(k) To recruit, transport, harbor, obtain, transfer, maintain, hire, offer, provide,
adopt or receive a child for purposes of exploitation or trading them, including
but not limited to, the act of baring and/or selling a child for any consideration or
for barter for purposes of exploitation. Trafficking for purposes of exploitation of
children shall include:

"(1) All forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, involuntary servitude,

debt bondage and forced labor, including recruitment of children for use in
armed conflict;

"(2) The use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of
pornography, or for pornographic performances;

"(3) The use, procuring or offering of a child for the production and trafficking of
drugs; and

"(4) The use, procuring or offering of a child for illegal activities or work which, by
its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm their
health, safety or morals; and

"(l) To organize or direct other persons to commit the offenses defined as acts of
trafficking under this Act."

Section 5. A new Section 4-A is hereby inserted in Republic Act No. 9208, to read
as follows:

"SEC. 4-A. Attempted Trafficking in Persons. Where there are acts to initiate the
commission of a trafficking offense but the offender failed to or did not execute
all the elements of the crime, by accident or by reason of some cause other than
voluntary desistance, such overt acts shall be deemed as an attempt to commit
an act of trafficking in persons. As such, an attempt to commit any of the
offenses enumerated in Section 4 of this Act shall constitute attempted
trafficking in persons.

"In cases where the victim is a child, any of the following acts shall also be
deemed as attempted trafficking in persons:

"(a) Facilitating the travel of a child who travels alone to a foreign country or
territory without valid reason therefor and without the required clearance or
permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development, or a written
permit or justification from the childs parent or legal guardian;

"(b) Executing, for a consideration, an affidavit of consent or a written consent

for adoption;

"(c) Recruiting a woman to bear a child for the purpose of selling the child;

"(d) Simulating a birth for the purpose of selling the child; and

"(e) Soliciting a child and acquiring the custody thereof through any means from
among hospitals, clinics, nurseries, daycare centers, refugee or evacuation
centers, and low-income families, for the purpose of selling the child."

Section 6. A new Section 4-B is hereby inserted in Republic Act No. 9208, to read
as follows:

"SEC. 4-B. Accomplice Liability. Whoever knowingly aids, abets, cooperates in

the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts defined in this Act
shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of Section 10(c) of this Act."

Section 7. A new Section 4-C is hereby inserted in Republic Act No. 9208, to read
as follows:

"SEC. 4-C. Accessories. Whoever has the knowledge of the commission of the
crime, and without having participated therein, either as principal or as
accomplices, take part in its commission in any of the following manners:

"(a) By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of

the crime;

"(b) By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or effects or instruments

thereof, in order to prevent its discovery;

"(c) By harboring, concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal of the

crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his or her public functions or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

"Acts defined in this provision shall be punished in accordance with the provision
of Section 10(d) as stated thereto."

Section 8. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as

follows:

"SEC. 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. The following acts which
promote or facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:

"(a) xxx

"(b) To produce, print and issue or distribute unissued, tampered or fake

counseling certificates, registration stickers, overseas employment certificates or
other certificates of any government agency which issues these certificates,
decals and such other markers as proof of compliance with government
regulatory and pre-departure requirements for the purpose of promoting
trafficking in persons;

"(c) xxx

"(d) xxx

"(e) xxx

"(f) xxx

"(g) xxx

"(h) To tamper with, destroy, or cause the destruction of evidence, or to influence

or attempt to influence witnesses, in an investigation or prosecution of a case
under this Act;

"(i) To destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate or possess, or attempt to destroy,

conceal, remove, confiscate or possess, any actual or purported passport or
other travel, immigration or working permit or document, or any other actual or
purported government identification, of any person in order to prevent or restrict,
or attempt to prevent or restrict, without lawful authority, the persons liberty to
move or travel in order to maintain the labor or services of that person; or

"(j) To utilize his or her office to impede the investigation, prosecution or

execution of lawful orders in a case under this Act."

Section 9. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as

follows:

"SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. Violations of Section 4 of this Act shall

be considered as qualified trafficking:

"x x x

"(d) When the offender is a spouse, an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a

person who exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is
committed by a public officer or employee;

"x x x

"(f) When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies;

"(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the

offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS);

"(h) When the offender commits one or more violations of Section 4 over a period
of sixty (60) or more days, whether those days are continuous or not; and

"(i) When the offender directs or through another manages the trafficking victim
in carrying out the exploitative purpose of trafficking."

Section 10. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 7. Confidentiality. At any stage of the investigation, rescue, prosecution

and trial of an offense under this Act, law enforcement officers, prosecutors,
judges, court personnel, social workers and medical practitioners, as well as
parties to the case, shall protect the right to privacy of the trafficked person.
Towards this end, law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges to whom the
complaint has been referred may, whenever necessary to ensure a fair and
impartial proceeding, and after considering all circumstances for the best
interest of the parties, order a closed-door investigation, prosecution or trial. The
name and personal circumstances of the trafficked person or any other
information tending to establish the identity of the trafficked person and his or
her family shall not be disclosed to the public.

"It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of
printed materials, announcer or producer in case of television and radio,
producer and director of a film in case of the movie industry, or any person
utilizing tri-media facilities or electronic information technology to cause publicity
of the name, personal circumstances, or any information tending to establish the
identity of the trafficked person except when the trafficked person in a written
statement duly notarized knowingly, voluntarily and willingly waives said
confidentiality.

"Law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, court personnel, social workers

and medical practitioners shall be trained on the importance of maintaining
confidentiality as a means to protect the right to privacy of victims and to
encourage victims to file complaints."

Section 11. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 8. Initiation and Prosecution of Cases.

"(a) Initiation of Investigation. Law enforcement agencies are mandated to

immediately initiate investigation and counter-trafficking-intelligence gathering
upon receipt of statements or affidavit from victims of trafficking, migrant
workers, or their families who are in possession of knowledge or information
about trafficking in persons cases.

"(b) Prosecution of Cases. Any person who has personal knowledge of the
commission of any offense under this Act, such as the trafficked person, the

parents, spouse, siblings, children or legal guardian may file a complaint for
trafficking.

"(c) Affidavit of Desistance. Cases involving trafficking in persons should not be

dismissed based on the affidavit of desistance executed by the victims or their
parents or legal guardians. Public and private prosecutors are directed to oppose
and manifest objections to motions for dismissal.

"Any act involving the means provided in this Act or any attempt thereof for the
purpose of securing an Affidavit of Desistance from the complainant shall be
punishable under this Act."

Section 12. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. The following penalties and sanctions are
hereby established for the offenses enumerated in this Act:

"(a) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in Section
4 shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and a fine of not
less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00);

"(b) Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in Section
4-A of this Act shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a
fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more
than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);

"(c) Any person found guilty of Section 4-B of this Act shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00);

"In every case, conviction shall cause and carry the automatic revocation of the
license or registration of the recruitment agency involved in trafficking. The

license of a recruitment agency which trafficked a child shall be automatically

revoked.

"(d) Any person found, guilty of committing any of the acts enumerated in
Section 5 shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years and a fine
of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than
One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);

"(e) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00);

"(f) Any person who violates Section 7 hereof shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);

"(g) If the offender is a corporation, partnership, association, club, establishment

or any juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president,
partner, manager, and/or any responsible officer who participated in the
commission of the crime or who shall have knowingly permitted or failed to
prevent its commission;

"(h) The registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
license to operate of the erring agency, corporation, association, religious group,
tour or travel agent, club or establishment, or any place of entertainment shall
be cancelled and revoked permanently. The owner, president, partner or
manager thereof shall not be allowed to operate similar establishments in a
different name;

"(i) If the offender is a foreigner, he or she shall be immediately deported after

serving his or her sentence and be barred permanently from entering the
country;

"(j) Any employee or official of government agencies who shall issue or approve
the issuance of travel exit clearances, passports, registration certificates,
counseling certificates, marriage license, and other similar documents to
persons, whether juridical or natural, recruitment agencies, establishments or
other individuals or groups, who fail to observe the prescribed procedures and

the requirement as provided for by laws, rules and regulations, shall be held
administratively liable, without prejudice to criminal liability under this Act. The
concerned government official or employee shall, upon conviction, be dismissed
from the service and be barred permanently to hold public office. His or her
retirement and other benefits shall likewise be forfeited; and

"(k) Conviction, by final judgment of the adopter for any offense under this Act
shall result in the immediate rescission of the decree of adoption."

Section 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 11. Use of Trafficked Persons. Any person who buys or engages the
services of a trafficked person for prostitution shall be penalized with the
following: Provided, That the Probation Law (Presidential Decree No. 968) shall
not apply:

"(a) Prision Correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor or six (6) years
to twelve (12) years imprisonment and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) but not more than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00): Provided, however, That the following acts shall be exempted
thereto:

"(1) If an offense under paragraph (a) involves sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct with a child, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua or seventeen (17) years to forty (40) years imprisonment
and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not
more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);

"(2) If an offense under paragraph (a) involves carnal knowledge of, or sexual
intercourse with, a male or female trafficking victim and also involves the use of
force or intimidation, to a victim deprived of reason or to an unconscious victim,
or a victim under twelve (12) years of age, instead of the penalty prescribed in
the subparagraph above the penalty shall be a fine of not less than One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) and
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua or forty (40) years imprisonment with no
possibility of parole; except that if a person violating paragraph (a) of this section
knows the person that provided prostitution services is in fact a victim of
trafficking, the offender shall not be likewise penalized under this section but

under Section 10 as a person violating Section 4; and if in committing such an

offense, the offender also knows a qualifying circumstance for trafficking, the
offender shall be penalized under Section 10 for qualified trafficking. If in
violating this section the offender also violates Section 4, the offender shall be
penalized under Section 10 and, if applicable, for qualified trafficking instead of
under this section;

"(b) Deportation. If a foreigner commits any offense described by paragraph (1)

or (2) of this section or violates any pertinent provision of this Act as an
accomplice or accessory to, or by attempting any such offense, he or she shall
be immediately deported after serving his or her sentence and be barred
permanently from entering the country; and

"(c) Public Official. If the offender is a public official, he or she shall be

dismissed from service and shall suffer perpetual absolute disqualification to hold
public, office, in addition to any imprisonment or fine received pursuant to any
other provision of this Act."

Section 14. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 12. Prescriptive Period. Trafficking cases under this Act shall prescribe in
ten (10) years: Provided, however, That trafficking cases committed by a
syndicate or in a large scale as defined under Section 6, or against a child, shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years.

"The prescriptive period shall commence to run from the day on which the
trafficked person is delivered or released from the conditions of bondage, or in
the case of a child victim, from the day the child reaches the age of majority, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information and shall
commence to run again when the proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to the accused."

Section 15. Section 16 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 16. Programs that Address Trafficking in Persons. The government shall
establish and implement preventive, protective and rehabilitative programs for
trafficked persons. For this purpose, the following agencies are hereby mandated
to implement the following programs:

"(a) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) shall make available its resources and
facilities overseas for trafficked persons regardless of their manner of entry to
the receiving country, and explore means to further enhance its assistance in
eliminating trafficking activities through closer networking with government
agencies in the country and overseas, particularly in the formulation of policies
and implementation of relevant programs. It shall provide Filipino victims of
trafficking overseas with free legal assistance and counsel to pursue legal action
against his or her traffickers, represent his or her interests in any criminal
investigation or prosecution, and assist in the application for social benefits
and/or regular immigration status as may be allowed or provided for by the host
country. The DFA shall repatriate trafficked Filipinos with the consent of the
victims.

"The DFA shall take necessary measures for the efficient implementation of the
Electronic Passporting System to protect the integrity of Philippine passports,
visas and other travel documents to reduce the incidence of trafficking through
the use of fraudulent identification documents.

"In coordination with the Department of Labor and Employment, it shall provide
free temporary shelters and other services to Filipino victims of trafficking
overseas through the migrant workers and other overseas Filipinos resource
centers established overseas under Republic Act No. 8042, as amended.

"(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) shall implement

rehabilitative and protective programs for trafficked persons. It shall provide
counseling and temporary shelter to trafficked persons and develop a system for
accreditation among NGOs for purposes of establishing centers and programs for
intervention in various levels of the community. It shall establish free temporary
shelters, for the protection and housing of trafficked persons to provide the
following basic services to trafficked persons:

"(1) Temporary housing and food facilities;

"(2) Psychological support and counseling;

"(3) 24-hour call center for crisis calls and technology-based counseling and
referral system;

"(4) Coordination with local law enforcement entities; and

"(5) Coordination with the Department of Justice, among others.

"The DSWD must conduct information campaigns in communities and schools

teaching parents and families that receiving consideration in exchange for
adoption is punishable under the law. Furthermore, information campaigns must
be conducted with the police that they must not induce poor women to give their
children up for adoption in exchange for consideration.

"(c) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) shall ensure the strict
implementation and compliance with the rules and guidelines relative to the
employment of persons locally and overseas. It shall likewise monitor, document
and report cases of trafficking in persons involving employers and labor
recruiters.

"(d) Department of Justice (DOJ) shall ensure the prosecution of persons

accused of trafficking and designate and train special prosecutors who shall
handle and prosecute cases of trafficking. It shall also establish a mechanism for
free legal assistance for trafficked persons, in coordination with the DSWD,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and other NGOs and volunteer groups.

"(e) Philippine Commission on Women (PCW) shall actively participate and

coordinate in the formulation and monitoring of policies addressing the issue of
trafficking in persons in coordination with relevant government agencies. It shall
likewise advocate for the inclusion of the issue of trafficking in persons in both its
local and international advocacy for womens issues.

"(f) Bureau of Immigration (BI) shall strictly administer and enforce immigration
and alien administration laws. It shall adopt measures for the apprehension of
suspected traffickers both at the place of arrival and departure and shall ensure
compliance by the Filipino fiancs/fiances and spouses of foreign nationals with
the guidance and counseling requirement as provided for in this Act.

"(g) Philippine National Police (PNP) and National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
shall be the primary law enforcement agencies to undertake surveillance,
investigation and arrest of individuals or persons suspected to be engaged in
trafficking. They shall closely coordinate with each other and with other law
enforcement agencies to secure concerted efforts for effective investigation and
apprehension of suspected traffickers. They shall also establish a system to
receive complaints and calls to assist trafficked persons and conduct rescue
operations.

"(h) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and Overseas

Workers and Welfare Administration (OWWA) POEA shall implement PreEmployment Orientation Seminars (PEOS) while Pre-Departure Orientation
Seminars (PDOS) shall be conducted by the OWWA. It shall likewise formulate a
system of providing free legal assistance to trafficked persons, in coordination
with the DFA.

"The POEA shall create a blacklist of recruitment agencies, illegal recruiters and
persons facing administrative, civil and criminal complaints for trafficking filed in
the receiving country and/or in the Philippines and those agencies, illegal
recruiters and persons involved in cases of trafficking who have been rescued by
the DFA and DOLE in the receiving country or in the Philippines even if no formal
administrative, civil or criminal complaints have been filed: Provided, That the
rescued victims shall execute an affidavit attesting to the acts violative of the
anti-trafficking law. This blacklist shall be posted in conspicuous places in
concerned government agencies and shall be updated bi-monthly.

"The blacklist shall likewise be posted by the POEA in the shared government
information system, which is mandated to be established under Republic Act No.
8042, as amended.

"The POEA and OWWA shall accredit NGOs and other service providers to
conduct PEOS and PDOS, respectively. The PEOS and PDOS should include the
discussion and distribution of the blacklist.

"The license or registration of a recruitment agency that has been blacklisted

may be suspended by the POEA upon a review of the complaints filed against
said agency.

"(i) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall institute a
systematic information and prevention campaign in coordination with pertinent
agencies of government as provided for in this Act. It shall provide training
programs to local government units, in coordination with the Council, in ensuring
wide understanding and application of this Act at the local level.

"(j) Commission on Filipinos Overseas shall conduct pre-departure counseling

services for Filipinos in intermarriages. It shall develop a system for accreditation
of NGOs that may be mobilized for purposes of conducting pre-departure
counseling services for Filipinos in intermarriages. As such, it shall ensure that
the counselors contemplated under this Act shall have the minimum
qualifications and training of guidance counselors as provided for by law.

"It shall likewise assist in the conduct of information campaigns against

trafficking in coordination with local government units, the Philippine Information
Agency, and NGOs.

"(k) Local government units (LGUs) shall monitor and document cases of
trafficking in persons in their areas of jurisdiction, effect the cancellation of
licenses of establishments which violate the provisions of this Act and ensure
effective prosecution of such cases. They shall also undertake an information
campaign against trafficking in persons through the establishment of the
Migrants Advisory and Information Network (MAIN) desks in municipalities or
provinces in coordination with the DILG, Philippine Information Agency (PIA),
Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), NGOs and other concerned agencies.
They shall encourage and support community-based initiatives which address
the trafficking in persons.

"In implementing this Act, the agencies concerned may seek and enlist the
assistance of NGOs, peoples organizations (POs), civic organizations and other
volunteer groups."

Section 16. A new Section 16-A is hereby inserted into Republic Act No. 9208, to
read as follows:

"SEC. 16-A. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Database. An anti-trafficking in persons

central database shall be established by the Inter-Agency Council Against
Trafficking created under Section 20 of this Act. The Council shall submit a report
to the President of the Philippines and to Congress, on or before January 15 of

every year, with respect to the preceding years programs and data on
trafficking-related cases.

"All government agencies tasked under the law to undertake programs and
render assistance to address trafficking in persons shall develop their respective
monitoring and data collection systems, and databases, for purposes of ensuring
efficient collection and storage of data on cases of trafficking in persons handled
by their respective offices. Such data shall be submitted to the Council for
integration in a central database system.

"For this purpose, the Council is hereby tasked to ensure the harmonization and
standardization of databases, including minimum data requirements, definitions,
reporting formats, data collection systems, and data verification systems. Such
databases shall have, at the minimum, the following information:

"(a) The number of cases of trafficking in persons, sorted according to status of

cases, including the number of cases being investigated, submitted for
prosecution, dropped, and filed and/or pending before the courts and the number
of convictions and acquittals;

"(b) The profile/information on each case;

"(c) The number of victims of trafficking in persons referred to the agency by

destination countries/areas and by area of origin; and

"(d) Disaggregated data on trafficking victims and the accused/defendants."

Section 17. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 17. Legal Protection to Trafficked Persons. Trafficked persons shall be

recognized as victims of the act or acts of trafficking and as such, shall not be
penalized for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of, or as an incident or in
relation to, being trafficked based on the acts of trafficking enumerated in this
Act or in obedience to the order made by the trafficker in relation thereto. In this

regard, the consent of a trafficked person to the intended exploitation set forth in
this Act shall be irrelevant.

"Victims of trafficking for purposes of prostitution as defined under Section 4 of

this Act are not covered by Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code and as such,
shall not be prosecuted, fined, or otherwise penalized under the said law."

Section 18. A new Section 17-A is hereby inserted into Republic Act No. 9208, to
read as follows:

"SEC. 17-A. Temporary Custody of Trafficked Victims. The rescue of victims

should be done as much as possible with the assistance of the DSWD or an
accredited NGO that services trafficked victims. A law enforcement officer, on a
reasonable suspicion that a person is a victim of any offense defined under this
Act including attempted trafficking, shall immediately place that person in the
temporary custody of the local social welfare and development office, or any
accredited or licensed shelter institution devoted to protecting trafficked persons
after the rescue."

Section 19. A new Section 17-B is hereby inserted into Republic Act No. 9208, to
read as follows:

"SEC. 17-B. Irrelevance of Past Sexual Behavior, Opinion Thereof or Reputation of

Victims and of Consent of Victims in Cases of Deception, Coercion and Other
Prohibited Means. The past sexual behavior or the sexual predisposition of a
trafficked person shall be considered inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of
proving consent of the victim to engage in sexual behavior, or to prove the
predisposition, sexual or otherwise, of a trafficked person. Furthermore, the
consent of a victim of trafficking to the intended exploitation shall be irrelevant
where any of the means set forth in Section 3(a) of this Act has been used."

Section 20. A new Section 17-C is hereby inserted into Republic Act No. 9208, to
read as follows:

"SEC. 17-C. Immunity from Suit, Prohibited Acts and Injunctive Remedies. No
action or suit shall be brought, instituted or maintained in any court or tribunal or
before any other authority against any: (a) law enforcement officer; (b) social
worker; or (c) person acting in compliance with a lawful order from any of the

above, for lawful acts done or statements made during an authorized rescue
operation, recovery or rehabilitation/intervention, or an investigation or
prosecution of an anti-trafficking case: Provided, That such acts shall have been
made in good faith.

"The prosecution of retaliatory suits against victims of trafficking shall be held in

abeyance pending final resolution and decision of criminal complaint for
trafficking.

"It shall be prohibited for the DFA, the DOLE, and the POEA officials, law
enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges to urge complainants to abandon
their criminal, civil and administrative complaints for trafficking.

"The remedies of injunction and attachment of properties of the traffickers,

illegal recruiters and persons involved in trafficking may be issued motu proprio
by judges."

Section 21. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 20. Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking. There is hereby established

an Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking, to be composed of the Secretary of
the Department of Justice as Chairperson and the Secretary of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development as Co-Chairperson and shall have the following
as members:

"(a) Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs;

"(b) Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment;

"(c) Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government;

"(d) Administrator, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration;

"(e) Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration;

"(f) Chief, Philippine National Police;

"(g) Chairperson, Philippine Commission on Women;

"(h) Chairperson, Commission on Filipinos Overseas;

"(i) Executive Director, Philippine Center for Transnational Crimes; and

"(j) Three (3) representatives from NGOs, who shall include one (1)
representative each from among the sectors representing women, overseas
Filipinos, and children, with a proven record of involvement in the prevention and
suppression of trafficking in persons. These representatives shall be nominated
by the government agency representatives of the Council, for appointment by
the President for a term of three (3) years.

"The members of the Council may designate their permanent representatives

who shall have a rank not lower than an assistant secretary or its equivalent to
meetings, and shall receive emoluments as may be determined by the Council in
accordance with existing budget and accounting rules and regulations."

Section 22. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 22. Secretariat to the Council. The Department of Justice shall establish
the necessary Secretariat for the Council.

"The secretariat shall provide support for the functions and projects of the
Council. The secretariat shall be headed by an executive director, who shall be
appointed by the Secretary of the DOJ upon the recommendation of the Council.
The executive director must have adequate knowledge on, training and
experience in the phenomenon of and issues involved in trafficking in persons
and in the field of law, law enforcement, social work, criminology, or psychology.

"The executive director shall be under the supervision of the Inter-Agency

Council Against Trafficking through its Chairperson and Co-Chairperson, and shall
perform the following functions:

"(a) Act as secretary of the Council and administrative officer of its secretariat;

"(b) Advise and assist the Chairperson in formulating and implementing the
objectives, policies, plans and programs of the Council, including those involving
mobilization of government offices represented in the Council as well as other
relevant government offices, task forces, and mechanisms;

"(c) Serve as principal assistant to the Chairperson in the overall supervision of

council administrative business;

"(d) Oversee all council operational activities;

"(e) Ensure an effective and efficient performance of council functions and

prompt implementation of council objectives, policies, plans and programs;

"(f) Propose effective allocations of resources

objectives, policies, plans and programs;

for

implementing

council

"(g) Submit periodic reports to the Council on the progress of council objectives,
policies, plans and programs;

"(h) Prepare annual reports of all council activities; and

"(i) Perform other duties as the Council may assign."

Section 23. A new Section 26-A is hereby inserted into Republic Act No. 9208, to
read as follows:

"SEC. 26-A. Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction. The State shall exercise jurisdiction

over any act defined and penalized under this Act, even if committed outside the
Philippines and whether or not such act or acts constitute an offense at the place
of commission, the crime being a continuing offense, having been commenced in
the Philippines and other elements having been committed in another country, if
the suspect or accused:

"(a) Is a Filipino citizen; or

"(b) Is a permanent resident of the Philippines; or

"(c) Has committed the act against a citizen of the Philippines.

"No prosecution may be commenced against a person under this section if a

foreign government, in accordance with jurisdiction recognized by the
Philippines, has prosecuted or is prosecuting such person for the conduct
constituting such offense, except upon the approval of the Secretary of Justice.

"The government may surrender or extradite persons accused of trafficking in

the Philippines to the appropriate international court if any, or to another State
pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties."

Section 24. Section 28 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended, to read as
follows:

"SEC. 28. Funding. The amount necessary to implement the provisions of this
Act shall be charged against the current years appropriations of the Inter-Agency
Council Against Trafficking under the budget of the DOJ and the appropriations of
the other concerned departments. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary
for the continued implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act."1wphi1

Section 25. A new Section 28-A is hereby inserted into Republic Act No. 9208, to
read as follows:

"SEC. 28-A. Additional Funds for the Council. The amount collected from every
penalty, fine or asset derived from any violation of this Act shall be earmarked as
additional funds for the use of the Council. The fund may be augmented by
grants, donations and endowment from various sources, domestic or foreign, for
purposes related to their functions, subject to the existing accepted rules and
regulations of the Commission on Audit."

Section 26. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9208 of the Repealing Clause is hereby
amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 32. Repealing Clause. Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders,
rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Act
are deemed amended, modified or repealed accordingly: Provided, That this Act
shall not in any way amend or repeal the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610,
otherwise known as the Special Protection of Child Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

Section 27. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as
follows:

"SEC. 33. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation."

Approved,

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE

President of the Senate

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 6339 and Senate Bill No. 2625
was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on December
4, 2012 and December 5, 2012, respectively.

(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES

Secretary of Senate

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

Secretary General
House of Representatives

Approved: FEB 06 2013

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

President of the Philippines

PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading

punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard
or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt
with by law.
PEOPLE V. ESTOISTA
FACTS:
Estoista was for acquitted for homicide through reckless imprudence and
convicted for illegal possession of firearm under one information by the CFI of
Lanao. The firearm with which the appellant was charged with having in his
possession was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held a
legal permit for it. Father and son live & in the same house, a little distance from
a 27hectare estate belonging to the family which was partly covered with cogon
grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to
120 meters from the house, the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit
Diragon Dima, a la borer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chickens
and whose presence was not perceived by the accused. Estoista is assailing his
conviction saying that the 5-10 years penalty for the illegal possession of
firearms is cruel and excessive.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
As to the facts. The firearms with which the appellant was charged with having in
his possession was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held a
legal permit for it. Father and son lived in the same house, a little distance from a
27-hectare estate belonging to the family which was partly covered with cogon
grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to
120 meters from the house, the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit
Diragon Dima a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chicken and
whose presence was not perceived by the accused.
Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the
duration of imprisonment, it is our opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years
for possessing of carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to
the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The
rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the
Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and

use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances

might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion
to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be
declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the
legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small
transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are like small fishes, bound
to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to
make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the
penalty.
The sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the penalty authorized
by Republic Act No. 4. The judgment is therefore modified so as to sentence the
accused to imprisonment for five years. However, considering the degree of
malice of the defendant, application of the law to its full extent would be too
harsh and, accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be furnished to the
President, thru the Secretary of Justice, with the recommendation that the
imprisonment herein imposed be reduced to six months. the appellant will pay
the costs of both instances.
WHEN IS A PENALTY CRUEL, DEGRADING, OR INHUMAN?
ANSWER:
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for
a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute, is severe does not make it cruel and unusual."
Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate
to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."
GUIDES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT IS CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL:
1.
2.
3.
4.

It
It
It
It

must
must
must
must

not
not
not
not

be
be
be
be

so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings

applied arbitrarily
acceptable to contemporary society
excessive, thus serving a penal purpose

PEOPLE VS. ESPARAS

FACTS:
Esparas was charged with violation of DDA for importing 20kg of shabu. After
arraign-ment and pleading not guilty, she escaped from jail and was tried in
absentia. She was found guilty and was sentenced to death. She remains at large
at present.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
ALL DEATH PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE
AUTOMATIC REVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT REGARDLESS WHETHER THE

ACCUSED JUMPED BAIL OR DOES NOT INTEND TO APPEAL - As the accused

remains at large up to the present time, the issue that confronts the Court is
whether or not it will proceed to automatically review her death sentence. The
issue need not befuddle us. In the 1910 ground-breaking case of U.S. vs. Laguna,
et al.,we already held thru Mr. Justice Moreland, that the power of this Court to
review a decision imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either by the
accused or by the courts, viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx
"It is apparent from these provisions that the judgment of conviction and
sentence thereunder by the trial court does not, in reality, conclude the trial of
the accused. Such trial is not terminated until the Supreme Court has reviewed
the facts and the law as applied thereto by the court below. The judgment of
conviction entered on the trial is not final, cannot be executed, and is wholly
without force or effect until the cause has been passed upon by the Supreme
Court. In a sense the trial court acts as a commissioner who takes the testimony
and reports thereon to the Supreme Court with his recommendation. While in
practice he enters a judgment of conviction and sentences the prisoner
thereunder, in reality, until passed upon by the Supreme Court, it has none of the
attributes of a final judgment and sentence. It is a mere recommendation to the
Supreme Court, based upon the facts on the record which are presented with it.
This is meant in no sense to detract from the dignity and power of Courts of First
Instance. It means simply that that portion of Spanish procedure which related to
cases where capital punishment was imposed still survives.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a case in which capital
punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one having for
its object simply and solely the protection of the accused. Having received the
highest penalty which the law imposes, he is entitled under that law to have the
sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is founded placed
before the highest tribunal of the land to the end that its justice and legality may
be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is merciful. It gives a
second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a
positive provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no
evasions."
"It shall not be necessary to forward to the Supreme Court the record, or any part
thereof, of any case in which there shall have been an acquittal, or in which the
sentence imposed is not death, unless such case shall have been duly appealed;
but such sentence shall be executed upon the order of the court in which the trial
was had. The records of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been
imposed by any Court of First Instance, whether the defendant shall have
appealed or not, and of all cases in which appeals shall have been taken shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for investigation and judgments as law and
justice shall dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of

the Supreme Court within twenty days, but not earlier than fifteen days after the
rendition of sentence."
We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence
mandating our review of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the
convict and regardless of the will of the Court. Nothing less than life is at stake
and any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as
possible. We must strive to realize this objective, however elusive it may be, and
our efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his appeal or
has escaped. Indeed, an appellant may withdraw his appeal not because he is
guilty but because of his wrong perception of the law. Or because he may want
to avail of the more speedy remedy of pardon. Or because of his frustration and
misapprehension that he will not get justice from the authorities.Nor should the
Court be influenced by the seeming repudiation of its jurisdiction when a convict
escapes. Ours is not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty
cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the
Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to
assure the People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in
crimes that slight but even more, in crimes that shock the conscience. This
concern cannot be diluted.
The Court is not espousing a "soft, bended, approach" to heinous crimes for as
discussed above, we have always reviewed the imposition of the death penalty
regardless of the will of the convict.Our unyielding stance is dictated by the
policy that the State should not be given the license to kill without the final
determination of this Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last,
effective hedge against an erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court. This
enlightened policy ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life
ends all rights, a matter of societal value that transcends the personal interest of
a convict. The importance of this societal value should not be blurred by the
escape of a convict which is a problem of law enforcement. Neither should this
Court be moved alone by the outrage of the public for the rise in statistics of
heinous crimes for our decisions should not be directed by the changing winds of
the social weather. Let us not for a moment forget that an accused does not
cease to have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is implicit in our
Constitution which recognizes that an accused, to be right, while the majority,
even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.
ECHEGARAY VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for
the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse. The
supreme penalty of death was to be imposed upon him. He then filed motion for
recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently,
Congress changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution
to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal

injection. Echegaray filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal
injection against him under the grounds that it constituted 1. cruel, degrading, or
unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due process, 3. a violation of the
Philippines obligations under international covenants, 4. an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of
the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the
Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal
protection as a ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has declared that the death
penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal
injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); in
addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not
expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
The main challenge to R.A. 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored on
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition
of "cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment. "The prohibition in the Philippine
Bill against cruel and unusual punishments is an Anglo-Saxon safeguard against
governmental oppression of the subject, which made its first appearance in the
reign of William and Mary of England in 'An Act declaring the rights and liberties
of the subject, and settling the succession of the crown,' passed in the year
1689. It has been incorporated into the Constitution of the United States (of
America) and into most constitutions of the various States in substantially the
same language as that used in the original statute. The exact language of the
Constitution of the United States is used in the Philippine Bill." "The counterpart
of Section 19 (1) in the 1935 Constitution reads: 'Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel and inhuman punishment inflicted.' xxx In the 1973
Constitution the phrase became 'cruel or unusual punishment.' The Bill of Rights
Committee of the 1986 Constitutional Commission read the 1973 modification as
prohibiting 'unusual' punishment even if not 'cruel.' It was thus seen as an
obstacle to experimentation in penology. Consequently, the Committee reported
out the present text which prohibits 'cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment' as
more consonant with the meaning desired and with jurisprudence on the
subject."
Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for
the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to
be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the
accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the
date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of
execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the

convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in

administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Before the Court proceeds any further, a brief explanation of the process of
administering lethal injection is in order.
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney and
wheeled into the execution room. A trained technician inserts a needle into a
vein in the inmate's arm and begins an intravenous flow of saline solution. At the
warden's signal, a lethal combination of drugs is injected into the intravenous
line. The deadly concoction typically includes three drugs: (1) a nonlethal dose of
sodium thiopenthotal, a sleep inducing barbiturate; (2) lethal doses of
pancuronium bromide, a drug that paralyzes the muscles; and (3) potassium
chloride, which stops the heart within seconds. The first two drugs are commonly
used during surgery to put the patient to sleep and relax muscles; the third is
used in heart bypass surgery.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of
Prisons, this Court held that "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture
or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."
Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by
lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court
believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A.
No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of
administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court"
will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of
notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which
designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused,
that is, after this Court has reviewed the entire records of the case and has
affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Thereupon, the procedure is that the
"judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days
thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified
copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the
date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section
15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last sentence
of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be
carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months
from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and
executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of
eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty
became final and executory wherein he can seek executive clemency and attend
to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.

Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection, considering and as petitioner claims,
that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the
choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection
a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. Such supposition is highly
speculative and unsubstantiated.
Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything
is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment
imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are
cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is
to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a
convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the
necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely. Numerous federal and state courts of the United States have been
asked to review whether lethal injections constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. No court has found lethal injections to implicate prisoner's Eighth
Amendment rights. In fact, most courts that have addressed the issue state in
one or two sentences that lethal injection clearly is a constitutional form of
execution. A few jurisdictions, however, have addressed the merits of the Eighth
Amendment claims. Without exception, these courts have found that lethal
injection does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. After reviewing the
medical evidence that indicates that improper doses or improper administration
of the drugs causes severe pain and that prison officials tend to have little
training in the administration of the drugs, the courts have found that the few
minutes of pain does not rise to a constitutional violation.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society." Indeed, "[o]ther (U.S.) courts have focused on 'standards
of decency' finding that the widespread use of lethal injections indicates that it
comports with contemporary norms." the primary indicator of society's standard
of decency with regard to capital punishment is the response of the country's
legislatures to the sanction. Hence, for as long as the death penalty remains in
our statute books and meets the most stringent requirements provided by the
Constitution, we must confine our inquiry to the legality of R.A. No. 8177, whose
constitutionality we duly sustain in the face of petitioner's challenge. We find that
the legislature's substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of petitioner
herein.
WHY DID THE NEW CONSTITUTION ABOLISH DEATH PENALTY?
ANSWER:

1. It inflicts traumatic pain not just on the convict but also on the family,
even if the penalty is not carried out
2. There is no convincing evidence that it acts effectively as a deterrent for
serious crim
3. Penology favors reformative rather than vindictive penalties
4. Life is too precious a gift to be placed at the discretion of a human judge
5. The law itself by imposing to many safeguards manifests a reluctance to
impose death penalty
MAY THE LEGISLATURE RESTORE DEATH PENALTY IN THE FUTURE?
Yes, if it finds compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
This means that the congress must
first, describe what is meant by heinous crimes;
second, specify and penalize by death only crimes that qualify as heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty billand/or
designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case,
death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in
court
third, the congress in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes
WHAT ARE HEINOUS CRIMES?
Crimes are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society;
WHEN IS A FINE EXCESSIVE?
When it is disproportionate to the offense
IF A COURT FINDS A PUNISHMENT TO BE CRUEL, DEGRADING, OR
INHUMAN, OR A FINE EXCESSIVE, MAY A PERSON BE CONVICTED UNDER
SUCH LAW?
No. Without a valid penalty, the law is not a penal law.

SECTION 20
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a
poll tax.
SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG
FACTS:
Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then
municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case
was filed against her. Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a
case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant
of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of
estafa are not present. Further she contended that no person should be
imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. Two months after
respondent dismissed plaintiffs case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance of
law. Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.)
RULING/DOCTRINE:
THERE WAS NO FINDING THAT THE CRIME OF ESTAFA WAS COMMITTED, ONLY A
SIMPLE LOAN WAS THE BASIS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANT - The
Judiciary Act, Republic Act No. 296, precisely requires in section 87 thereof that
"(N)o warrant of arrest shall be issued by any municipal judge in any criminal
case filed with him unless he first examines the witness or witnesses personally,
and the examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers." Respondent utterly failed to comply with this
requirement of searching questions and answers in his examination of the
complaining witness. Worse, the one question propounded by him shows that he
did comprehend that the "criminal" complaint involved a mere failure to pay a
simple indebtedness and yet he found probable cause of the herein
complainant's guilt of estafa and forthwith issued the warrant of arrest against
her which would indicate that either he believed that non-payment of an
indebtedness constitutes the crime of estafa which would make him guilty of
gross ignorance of the law or although knowing the law, of nevertheless
disregarding it and giving due course to the town police chief's "prosecution" on
behalf of the municipal secretary which would constitute an utter betrayal of his
oath of office to render justice to every man.
DOES THE CONVERSION OF A MONETARY INDEMINITY IMPOSED AS PART
OF A CRIMINAL INDEMNITY INTO SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT VIOLATE
THE PROHIBITION OF IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT?
No. the obligation to indemnify was not ex contractu but ex delicto.
WHAT IS A POLL TAX?

A poll tax can be understood as the cedula tax or residence tax. It may also be
understood as a tax the payment of which is made requirement for the exercise
of the right of suffrage.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ
FACTS:
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly
known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account
or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less
than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the
check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00,
or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover
the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from
the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or
drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to
cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult
to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its
application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within
five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer
makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder
the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides
that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the
drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto,
giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or
issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and
the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the
drawee on such dishonored check."

The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course
to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
PURPOSE OF BP 22/GRAVAMEN OF THE OFFENSE - BP 22
stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are
that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The
later, is proscribed by the state because of the injury
interests.

is aimed at putting a
worthless, i.e. checks
practice, as discussed
it causes to t public

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing
a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of
the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of
public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient
that a reasonable nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual
and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to
understand the public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been
reported that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to
200 million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central
Bank, it averaged between 50 minion to 80 million pesos a day.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests
of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated
The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the
pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place
him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts,
and for whom the constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except
in cases of fraud was intended as a shield and not a sword.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
PS BANK VS BERMOY
FACTS:
Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (petitioner),
respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy (respondent spouses) were charged
with estafa thru falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial Court.
Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge and
the case was set for trial.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed, with leave of court, a
demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify
respondent spouses as the accused. The trial court dismissed the case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied
petition holding that the trial court was correct in granting the demurrer to
evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper identification
of the accused. But even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the
accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari
for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
Thus this petition. The Solicitor General contends that the trial courts dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted with grave abuse of discretion thus,
double jeopardy does not apply in this case.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged
with the same offense in two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is
prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted
of such offense, or (c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same
case. The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which
provides that [a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if
the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.
Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal
Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a
judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution and Section 7, the courts
are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of
the dismissal. Thus, we held in an earlier case:
In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the
order granting the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence and the consequent acquittal of the accused, as it will place the latter
in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in
acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion
will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two
exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy
trial xxx In the case before us, the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was
based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence xxx Hence, it clearly falls under
one of the admitted exceptions to the rule. Double jeopardy therefore, applies to
this case and this Court is constitutionally barred from reviewing the order
acquitting the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
The strict rule against appellate review of judgments of acquittal is not without
any basis. As the Court explained in People v. Velasco
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial
court cuts deep into the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over
the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x
Thus, Green [v. United States] expressed the concern that (t)he underlying idea,
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality
of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute
nature of acquittals is part of the paramount importance criminal justice system
attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction. The
interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not
guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for repose, a desire to know the exact
extent of ones liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has
built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence
rests upon a jurys leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendants interest in his right to have his
trial completed by a particular tribunal. xxx [S]ocietys awareness of the heavy
personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is
manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding
to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate
goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the
finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, (t)he
fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should
not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process.
Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment,
the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.

Petitioner, together with the Solicitor General, contends that the Court can
inquire into the merits of the acquittal of respondent spouses because the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was void. They contend that the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it disregarded evidence allegedly proving respondent spouses
identity.
The contention has no merit. To be sure, the rule barring appeals from judgments
of acquittal admits of an exception. Such, however, is narrowly drawn and is
limited to the case where the trial court act[ed] with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process i.e.
the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case xxx or that the
trial was a sham xxx.

PEOPLE VS OBSANIA
FACTS:
The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of
Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the
dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion
was granted. From this order of dismissal theprosecution appealed.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
REQUISITES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY - An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal
case is not available if the defendant would thereby be placed in double
jeopardy. Correlatively, section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an
accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution:
(a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
DISMISSAL WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED - From the above
named statement, it is clear that what in Salico was repudiated in Labatete was
the premise that the dismissal therein was not on the merits and not the
conclusion that a dismissal, other than on the merits, sought by the accused, is
deemed to be with his express consent and therefore constitutes a waiver of his
right to plead double jeopardy in the event of an appeal by the prosecution or a
second indictment for the same offense. This Court, in Labatete, merely pointed
out that the controverted dismissal in Salico was in fact an acquittal." Reasoning
a contrario, had the dismissal not amounted to acquittal, then the doctrine of
waiver would have applied and prevailed.
In Cloribel, the case dragged for three years and eleven months, that is, from
September 27, 1958 when the information was filed to August 15, 1962 when it
was called for trial, after numerous postponements, mostly at the instance of the
prosecution. On the latter date, the prosecution failed to appear for trial, and
upon motion of defendants, the case was dismissed. This Court held "that the
dismissal here complained of was not truly a 'dismissal' but an acquittal. For it

was entered upon the defendants' insistence on their constitutional right to

speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on the date of
trial." (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the factual setting in the case at bar, it is clear that there is no
parallelism between Cloribel and the cases cited therein, on the one hand, and
the instant case, on the other. Here the controverted dismissal was predicated on
the erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was defective and
such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not on the right of
the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute.
The appealed order of dismissal in this case now under consideration did not
terminate the action on the merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other related
cases the dismissal amounted to an acquittal because the failure to prosecute
presupposed that the Government did not have a case against the accused, who,
in the first place, is presumed innocent.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine
qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the
defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must
not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal.
Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said
doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our
jurisprudence.
QUESTION: Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty and immediately
moved to quash the complaint on the ground that it charged no offense. Motion
was granted and correctly. An amended complaint was filed. Is there double
jeopardy?
ANSWER: No, because a defective complaint did not place the accused in first
jeopardy

PAULIN VS GIMENEZ
FACTS:
Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust
when they were overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by
such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an
establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of the
owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners
allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his
subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent the petitioners escape.
Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down and were
immediately apprehended.
A complaint grave threats was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No.
5204). It was dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners.
Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed
for certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the
issuance of a TRO (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for
being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case.
Hence, this instant petition.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
DOUBLE JEOPARDY - For double jeopardy to be validly invoked by petitioners, the
following requisites must have been obtained in the original prosecution;
a) a valid complaint or information;
b) a competent court;
c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent (People v.
Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249 [1968]: Caes v. IAC, 179 SCRA 54 [1989]).
Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions thereto which finds
application to the case at bar has been laid down by this Court as follows:
. . . However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the
criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the
dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant; (2)
the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or
of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the
appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the
case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (People v. Villalon, 192 SCRA
521 [1990], at p. 529.)

For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the
express consent of the accused (People v. Gines, 197 SCRA 481 [1991]). Where
the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the
accused, he is deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In
the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners. Double
jeopardy thus did not attach. This doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was
examined and formally introduced in People v. Salico (84 Phil. 722 [1949]), where
Justice Felicisimo Feria stated:
. . . when the case is dismissed, with the express consent of the defendant, the
dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because,
his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional
right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction
against him. (See also People v. Marapao (85 Phil. 832 [1950]); Gandicela v.
Lutero (88 Phil. 299 [1951]), People v. Desalisa (125 Phil. 27 [1966]); and, more
recently, People v. Aquino (199 SCRA 610 [1991]).
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACQUITTAL AND DISMISSAL - In People v. Salico (supra),
distinctions between acquittal and dismissal were made, to wit:
. . . Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable
doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the
defendant is not guilty. Dismissals terminate the proceedings, either because the
court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that
the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the
complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. . . .
(at pp. 732-733.)
CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN DISMISSAL DEEMED FINAL - Jurisprudence recognizes
exceptional instances when the dismissal may be held to be final, disposing of
the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the
accused himself, to wit:
1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the
merits and operates as an acquittal.
2. Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the
denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute. (Caes
v. IAC, 179 SCRA 54 [1989] at pp. 60-61.)
NOTES FROM NACHURA REVIEWER:
The dismissal of the action may either be a permanent dismissal or a provisional
dismissal. A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to the
termination of the case on the merits, resulting in either the conviction or
acquittal of the accused; to the dismissal of the case because of the
prosecutions failure to prosecute; or to the dismissal thereof on the ground of

unreasonable delay in the proceedings in violation of the right of the accused to

speedy trial. In contrast, a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is dismissal
without prejudice to reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes
final, or to the subsequent filing of a new information within the periods allowed
under the Revised Penal Code or the Revised Rules of Court
Revival of the criminal cases provisionally dismissed. Sec. 8, Rule 117,
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides a time-bar of two (2) years within
which the State may revive criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party, if
the offense charged is penalized by more than six (6) years imprisonment; and
one (1) year if the penalty imposable does not exceed six (6) years imprisonment
or a fine in whatever amount. This rule took effect on December 1, 2000, and
must be applied prospectively in order to prevent injustice to the State and avoid
absurd, unreasonable and wrongful results in the administration of justice
[People v. Panfilo Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 01, 2003].
ICASIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte
and for his appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that
the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and
through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an original and a
carbon copy.
2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the
original copy of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in
Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy
but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he signed
the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and
other witnesses in his presence.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT ATTACH WHEN THE FIRST ACTION IS
ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE - It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to
hold that double jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because the
Supreme Court case (against the herein petitioner) was administrative in
character while the Sandiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in
nature.
When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any of the
personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as personnel administrator,
imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies.
Administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the same acts subject
of the administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is fundamental that the

following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) a valid arraignment; (d) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent. All these elements do not apply vis-a-vis the
administrative case, which should take care of petitioner's contention that said
administrative case against him before the Supreme Court, which was, as
aforestated, dismissed, entitles him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in
the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan.
The charge against petitioner Judge Icasiano before the Sandiganbayan is for
grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and incompetence in having issued
two (2) orders of detention against complaining witness Magbago. Ordinarily,
complainant's available remedy was to appeal said orders of detention in
accordance with the Rules. It is only when in appellate court reverses the lower
court issuing the questioned orders can abuse, partiality or incompetence be
imputed to the judge. Here no appeal from the questioned orders of the issuing
judge (petitioner Icasiano) was taken: instead, administrative and criminal cases
were filed against the judge for issuing the orders.
It is precisely for this reason, among others, that the administrative case against
petitioner was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit; and yet, it
cannot be assumed at this point that petitioner is not criminally liable under R.A
3019, par. 3(e) for issuing the questioned orders of detention. In fact, the
Ombudsman has found a prima facie case which led to the filing of the
information.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT ATTACH IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION - In any
case, the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the
present prosecution, since double jeopardy does not apply. As held in Cirilo
Cinco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, a preliminary
investigation (assuming one had been conducted in TBP-87- 00924) is not a trial
to which double jeopardy attaches.
In Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court also held:
Moreover, there is no rule or law requiring the Tanodbayan to conduct another
Preliminary investigation of a case under review by it (him). On the contrary,
under Presidential Decree No. 911, in relation to Rule 12, Administrative Order
No. VII, the Tanodbayan may, upon review, reverse the findings of the
investigator, and thereafter "where he finds a prima facie case, to cause the
filing of an information in court against the respondent, based on the same sworn
statements or evidence submitted, without the necessity of conducting another
preliminary investigation.
LEJANO VS PEOPLE
FACTS:

On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer
were brutally slain at their home in Paranaque City. Four years later in 1995, the
NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica
Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she had witnessed the crime. She
pointed to Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian,
Hospicio Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits.
She also tagged police officer,
Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Alfaro had been working as an
asset to the NBI by leading the agency to criminals. Some of the said criminals
had been so high-profile, that Alfaro had become the darling of the NBI
because of her contribution to its success. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that Alfaros direct and spontaneous narration of events unshaken
by gruesome cross-examination should be given a great weight in the decision of
the case.
In Alfaros story, she stated that after she and the accused got high of shabu, she
was asked to see Carmela at their residence. After Webb was informed that
Carmela had a male companion with her, Webb became piqued and thereafter
consumed more drugs and plotted the gang rape on Carmela. Webb, on the
other hand, denied all the accusations against him with the alibi that during the
whole time that the crime had taken place, he was staying in the United States.
He had apparently left for the US on 09 March 1991 and only returned on 27
October 1992. As documentary evidence, he presented photocopies of his
passport with four stamps recording his entry and exit from both the Philippines
and the US, Flights Passenger Manifest employment documents in the US during
his stay there and US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by the
Philippine DFA. Aside from these documentary alibis, he also gave a thorough
recount of his activities in the US.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places
the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21,
Article III, that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. x x x
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of
being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is
reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of
the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to
prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the
infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation
would eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the
will to fight.
As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:

[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to
subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm the
government with a potent instrument of oppression. The provision therefore
guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty. Societys awareness of the heavy
personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is
manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal
proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is
possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that
absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of
jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may
assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
PEOPLE VS BALICASAN
FACTS:
Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon
being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y
counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and
consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In addition,
he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the
basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution
appealed.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
DOUBLE JEOPARDY REQUIRES A VALID PLEA - This Court now turns to Section 2,
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides that: "The People of the
Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy." The present state of jurisprudence in this regard is that the above
provision applies even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the question of
double jeopardy (People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956; People v. Bao, L12102, September 29, 1959; People v. De Golez, L-14160, June 30, 1960).
The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the accused in double
jeopardy. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to
double jeopardy (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People v. Quimsing, L-19860,
December 23, 1964). In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered
a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being
allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete selfdefense. Said testimony, therefore as the court a quo recognized in its
decision had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo
should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a

new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in
effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered
its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the
appeal herein.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY WILL NOT ATTACH IF THE PROSECUTION WAS DENIED ITS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS - Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided
the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to
present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so,
it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental
prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a
nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute
a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21
Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth 124 Fed. 2d. 445).
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge
below already gave credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the
prosecution, without in any way doubting the integrity of said trial judge, We
deem it proper to remand this case to the court a quo for further proceedings
under another judge of the same court, in one of the two other branches of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.
PEOPLE VS CITY COURT OF SILAY
FACTS:
Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan
and Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company,
weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were
placed in tarjetas (weight report cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown
that there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that the information
on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be heavier than its actual
weight. The three accused then were charged with Falsification by private
individuals and use of falsified document. After the prosecution had presented,
the respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that
the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its order
dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do
not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised
penal code defining the crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that
their case be dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not
tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed because according to them, it was
done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving there defense of double
jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal
was due to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as
an acquittal which will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it
will be unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due to double jeopardy rule
thus the appeal of the plaintiff.

RULING/DOCTRINE:
It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the
accused; however, this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its
case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case
on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.
In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge
against them was one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from
other dismissals at the instance of the accused. All the elements of double
jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent
jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the
prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The
dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea
of double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
ESMENA VS POGOY
FACTS:
Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of
Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money
worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a game
of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No trial came in
after the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on another date.
Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the
fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant
was sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge
dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that
the priests telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for
the court to recognize the complainants reason to be valid in order to
reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to
revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact
that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea
and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
DISMISSAL BASED ON THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL IS DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS
- The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on their constitutional right
to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in
court. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The
petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional
dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy.
Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the
dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still
place them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the

legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Gandicela vs.
Lutero, 88 Phil. 299).
If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he
should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the
prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of
the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently,
fails to prove the defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall
dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant" (4
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed., p. 202, citing Gandicela vs.
Lutero, 88 Phil. 299, 307 and People vs. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714-717).
The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the
prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his witnesses
did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense
NOTES FROM NACHURA REVIEWER:
Discharge of co-accused. The discharge from the information of a co-accused
who is to be utilized as a government witness must be considered solid for
purposes of determining whether a second prohibited jeopardy would attach
upon reinstatement as a co-accused x x x Petitioner, having been acquitted of
the charge of qualified theft, could not be subsequently reinstated as a co
accused in the same information without a prohibited second jeopardy arising
under the circumstances, absent satisfactory proof that he had refused or failed
to testify against his co-accused [Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. v. Son 209 SCRA 329].
PEOPLE VS PINEDA
FACTS:
That on or about the 17th day of August, 1971, in the municipality of Pasig,
province of Rizal, Philippines, the above-named accused, being then private
individual did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public
document by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, committed as
follows: the said accused on August 17, 1971, executed a document entitled
"Application For Registration" for parcels of land located at Taytay, Rizal, to the
effect that She is the exclusive owner in fee simple of a parcel of land situated in
Malaking Bundok, Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal with Psu-248206 and that she
"does not know of any mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever
affecting said land or that any person has estate or interest therein, legal or
equitable, in possession remainder, reversion or expectancy", as a result of
which the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972 declared the herein accused
the true and absolute owner of said parcel of land free from all liens and
encumbrances of any nature, when in truth and in fact the herein accused has
already sold and encumbered to one Edilberto V. Ilano said parcel of land referred
to above as can be gleaned from a document entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Ng

Lupa Na May Pasubali O Condicion" dated August 12, 1969 and said Edilberto V.
Ilano has already paid partial amount of P130,850.00 to the herein accused.
On October 28, 1975, private respondent Consolacion Naval moved to quash the
information for falsification, premised, among other things, on the apprehension
that she is in danger of being condemned for an identical offense. The following
day, Naval pleaded not guilty to the charge levelled against her for falsification
and on December 22, 1975, the court a quo denied her motion to quash.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
PRIOR CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL OR DISMISSAL OF THE CASE WITHOUR THE
CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED IS NECESSARY TO SET IN MOTION DOUBLE JEOPARDY
- Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an
appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy
has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case
without the consent of the accused (People vs. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 586 [1982];
Nierras vs. Dacuycuy,181 SCRA 8 [1990]).
In People vs. Miraflores (supra), the accused therein, after he had pleaded to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 88173 and subsequent
to his arraignment on a separate charge of Murder in Criminal Case No. 88174,
invoked the plea of double jeopardy but Justice Barredo who spoke for the Court
was far from convinced:
But the more untenable aspect of the position of appellant is that when he
invoked the defense of double jeopardy, what could have been the first jeopardy
had not yet been completed or even began. It is settled jurisprudence in this
Court that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same
offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain
that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple
reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the
accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the
same has been terminated without his consent. (Bulaong vs. People, L-19344,
July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 746; Silvestre vs. Military Commission No. 21, No. L46366, March 8, 1978, Buscayno vs. Military Commissions Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25,
No. L-58284, Nov. 19, 1981, 109 SCRA 273).
From the conclusion thus reached, it would appear that one simply "charged"
may claim possible jeopardy in another case. However, a closer study of the case
adverted to reveals that the ponente may have overlooked the fact that the
accused therein was not only charged, but he actually admitted his guilt to the
charge of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and more
importantly, he was convicted of such crime and commenced serving sentence.
Verily, there was no occasion in said case to speak of jeopardy being properly
invoked by a person simply charged with an offense if he is again charged for the
same or identical offense. It may be observed that in City Court of Manila the
accused therein pleaded on the first offense of which he was charged and
subsequently convicted, unlike in the scenario at bar where private respondent

entered her plea to the second offense. But the variance on this point is of no
substantial worth because private respondent's plea to the second offense is, as
aforesaid, legally incomplete to sustain her assertion of jeopardy for probable
conviction of the same felony, absent as there is the previous conviction,
acquittal, or termination without her express consent of the previous case for
estafa, and it being plain and obvious that the charges did not arise from the
same acts. In short, in order for the first jeopardy to attach, the plea of the
accused to the charge must be coupled with either conviction, acquittal, or
termination of the previous case without his express consent thereafter.
NOTES FROM NACHURA REVIEWER:
1. There is no double jeopardy where the accused was sentenced on pleabargaining approved by the court but without the consent of the fiscal [People
v. Judge Villarama, 210 SCRA 246].
2. Neither will double jeopardy that had already been earlier cancelled and
removed from the court calendar for that day [Gorion v. Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, 213 SCRA 138].
3. The re-taking of testimony, made necessary because the transcript of
Stenographic notes was incomplete and a new judge had taken over the case,
does not give rise to double jeopardy [Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, supra.].
4. Withdrawal of the appeal lies in the sound discretion of the Court. Thus,
where the motion of the petitioner to withdraw his appeal from the decision of
the MTC (which imposed only a fine as penalty) was denied, his payment of
the fine did not make the decision of the MTC final and executory,
Accordingly, petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy by the decision of
the RTC [Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 603].
5. The promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the modified civil
indemnity liability, is not a bar to the promulgation of the other part, the
imposition of the criminal accountability, and does not constitute a violation
of the proscription against double jeopardy [Cuizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No.128540, April 15, 1998].

PEOPLE VS TAMPAL
FACTS:
Facts: Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon,
Pablito Suco, Dario Suco and Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with
homicide and multiple serious physical injuries in the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge. However, only
private respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, and
Samuel Padumon were arrested, while the others remained at large.

The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Wilfredo Guantero moved for postponement due to his failure to contact the

material witnesses. The case was reset without any objection from the defense
counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not
present. The respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as
unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute. The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was
because such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of the Provincial
prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was denied by respondent judge.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
DISMISSAL OF A CASE BASED ON ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL MAY BE APPEALED WITHOUT VIOLATING THE RIGHT AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY - In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of the
accused to speedy trial, courts should carefully weigh the circumstances
attending each case. They should balance the right of the accused and the right
of the State to punish people who violate its penal laws. Both the State and the
accused are entitled to due process.
In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. What offends the right of the accused to speedy
trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable
length of time. We reiterate our ruling in Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan:
. . . The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious
or oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of trial are asked for
and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is
the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his
right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter in which
the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, and such
factors as length of delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right
and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.
Private respondents cannot also invoke their right against double jeopardy. The
three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy, must be for the same offense as that in
the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a
competent court, (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted , or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
It is true that in an, unbroken line of cases, we have held that dismissal of cases
on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed,
however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused
to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench

considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been
violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their
right against double jeopardy.
QUESTION: How is first jeopardy terminated in a manner that satisfies the
second element of the defense of double jeopardy?
1.
2.
3.
4.

By
By
By
By

acquittal
final conviction
dismissal without the express consent of the accused
dismissal on the merits

(CAR)MELO VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on
December 27, 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon
Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious
wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period
of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor
for the same period of time.
On December 29, 1949, at eight o'clock in the morning, the accused pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 in the evening of the same day
Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of death was available to the
prosecution only on January 3, 1950, and on the following day, January 4, 1950,
an amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated
homicide. The accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging
double jeopardy, motion that was denied by the respondent court.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY - "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense," according to article III, section 1 (20) of our
constitution. The rule of double jeopardy had a settled meaning in this
jurisdiction at the time our Constitution was promulgated. It meant that when a
person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal
or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the
latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. This principle
is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the
maxim of the civil law non bis in idem, in the common law of England, and
undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence, and instead of having specific
origin it simply always existed. It found expression in the Spanish Law and in the
Constitution of the United States and is now embodied in our own Constitution as
one of the fundamental rights of the citizen.
It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a
second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the
same Constitution, that "if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,

conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution

for the same act." The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always
been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same
as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are
identical. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to
support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction
for the other. This so called "same-evidence test" which was found to be vague
and deficient, was restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate
form. Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses not only when the
second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense
is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessary
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information.
(Rule 113, sec. 9; U.S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil., 484; U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., vs.
Martinez, 55 Phil., 6.) In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged
in the information constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to
be necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the former
constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.) In
other words, on who has been charged with an offense cannot be again charged
with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the
former. "As the Government cannot be with the highest, and then go down step
to step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein,
neither can it begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the
same result." (People vs. Cox, 107 Mich., 435, quoted with approval in U. S. vs.
Lim Suco, 11 Phil., 484; see also U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., 431 and People vs.
Martinez, 55 Phil., 6, 10.)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE SECOND OFFENSE DOES NOT
EXIST AT THE TIME THE FIRST JEOPARDY ATTACHES - This rule of identity does not
apply, however when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the
first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for
the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was
then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and
after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the
same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. This is the ruling laid down by
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Philippines case of Diaz vs. U. S.,
223 U. S. 442, followed by this Court in People vs. Espino, G. R. No. 46123, 69
Phil., 471, and these two cases are similar to the instant case. Stating it in
another form, the rule is that "where after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character
of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new
and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in
second jeopardy if indicated for the new offense.
This is the meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by our constitution for was
the one prevailing in jurisdiction at the time the Constitution was promulgated,
and no other meaning could have been intended by our Rules of Court.

Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily

included in another offense, for the purpose of determining the existence of
double jeopardy, when both offenses were in existence during the pendency of
the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then inexistence,
no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and consequently
a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second jeopardy. By the
very nature of things there can be no double jeopardy under such circumstance,
and our Rules of Court cannot be construed to recognize the existence of a
condition where such condition in reality does not exist. General terms of a
statute or regulation should be so limited in their application as not to lead to
injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be
presumed that exceptions have been intended to their language which would
avoid results of this character. (In re Allen, 2 Phil., 641.)
QUESTION: What is the same evidence test?
ANSWER: Whether the evidence needed in one case will support a conviction in
the other
PEOPLE VS ADIL
FACTS:
Margarito Fama Jr., while armed with a piece of stone, assault, attack and use
personal violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone,
hitting said Miguel Viajar on the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries
which required medical attendance from 5 to 9 days baring complications. On
July 7, 1975, the accused entered a plea of not guilty (slight physical injuries). On
June 8, 1975, when Viajar developed a permanent scar and deformity on the
face, he filed a more serious charge (serious physical injuries) arising from the
same incident.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT - In Silva, there was no question that the
extent of the damage to property and physical injuries suffered by the offended
parties therein were already existing and known when the prior minor case was
prosecuted, What is controlling then in the instant case is Melo vs. People, 85
Phil. 766, in which it was held:
This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such
case there is no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
So also is People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA, 230, to the following effect:

Stated differently, if after the first. prosecution 'a new fact supervenes on which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and
giving rise to a new and distinct offense, 'the accused cannot be said to be in
second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
In People vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 112, We explained how a deformity may be
considered as a supervening fact. Referring to the decision in People vs.
Manolong, 85 Phil. 829, We held:
No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries had caused
deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing was mentioned in
the first medical certificate about the deformity and the loss of the use of the
right hand, we presumed that such fact was not apparent or could have been
discernible at the time the first examination was made. The course (not the
length) of the healing of an injury may not be determined before hand; it can
only be definitely known after the period of healing has ended. That is the reason
why the court considered that there was a supervening fact occuring since the
filing of the original information.
PEOPLE VS RELOVA
FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to
set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information
for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and
denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas
police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with
a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia.
They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority
from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the
building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings
of electric current consumption in the plants electric meter. The case was
dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months
prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act
being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975,
another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of
Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized
electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in
the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to
quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is
not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was
unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and
necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an
ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense
which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code
making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against
Mr.Opulencia.

RULING/DOCTRINE:
DOUBLE JEOPARDY OF PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAME ACT - The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense
that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or
set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the
general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is
available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different
from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the
Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set
of acts.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by
different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important
inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one
offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a
statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said
to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses:
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the
acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal
ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense
charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under
two different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are
charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under a
municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the second
sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the
Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute.
An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an
offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the same
offense having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities though
one be subordinate to the other and the plea of double jeopardy would never
lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that
the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a situation which would not
otherwise be covered by the first sentence.
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining
the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements
are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The
question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both
under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the

first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When
the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each
other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on
the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the
same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may
be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to
penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal
ordinance and a national statute).
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not
to be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses that must be
shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be
regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes
the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for
the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical
elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition
of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused
person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one
another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets
of technical elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras
cautioned in People vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same
offense, it seems elementary that an accused should be shielded against being
prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise, an
unlawful act or omission may give use to several prosecutions depending upon
the ability of the prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many offenses as
can be justified by said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting essential
elements. Under the theory of appellant, the crime of rape may be converted
into a crime of coercion, by merely alleging that by force and intimidation the
accused prevented the offended girl from remaining a virgin. (88 Phil. at 53;
emphases supplied)
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion
and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form
a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as
many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes
that an enterprising prosecutor can find
NOTES FROM NACHURA REVIEWER:
Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical
injuries punished under Art. 365, RPC is not identical with violation of Art.275,
RPC, for abandonment of ones victim [Lamera v. Court of Appeals, 198SCRA
186].