G.R. No.

L-53703

August 19, 1986

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of
his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati,
Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the
ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been
performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the
existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first
husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that
ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence
of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting
the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence(1)

that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and

(2)

that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on
both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari
assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge(1)
the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for
resolution based on "agreed facts;" and
(2)
the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her
favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against
both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85,
Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when
she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to
respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court
a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly,
the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000]

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN,
respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA)[1] in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed
Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848,
which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the
crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3)
years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate
sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory
penalties provided by law.
Costs against accused.[2]
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment, as follows: From the evidence
adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma.
Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by
reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said
document, the status of accused was single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration
of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with
Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFIBr. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further
blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu
City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church
ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City.
Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two
children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this
Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22,
1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office,
accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22,
Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma
V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a
second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was
previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said
first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the
essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally

married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential
requisites for validity. x x x
While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous
marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of
the first marriage of accused.
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27,
1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been
initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V.
Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second
marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with
complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first wife.[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But
here, the final judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came not before the
celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried
in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved.[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.
B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt.[6]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.[7]
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is
undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was
still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who
subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are
considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to
have taken place at all.[8] Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also
quotes the commentaries[9] of former Justice Luis Reyes that it is now settled that if the first marriage is
void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a
defense.
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had been filed.
Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity
of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage
has been characterized as conflicting.[10] In People v. Mendoza,[11] a bigamy case involving an accused
who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the
accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he
married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held
that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted while the first marriage was
still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no
need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he married for
the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon,[12] which involved substantially
the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de
Consuegra v. GSIS,[13] Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still
subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the
first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the
second marriage. It held: And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observes that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
In Tolentino v. Paras,[14] however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife
was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death
Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that the second marriage that he contracted
with private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no
force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage.
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,[15] the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz
Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that
the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence
to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding
that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: x x x There is likewise no need of introducing
evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for
then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and

for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x.
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,[16] the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that there
was no need for such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,[17] the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary for
the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court
declared: The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for
the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With
the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.[18]
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of
a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several years
after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by
a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted
by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages.[19]
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article
41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a
judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was
necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law
authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:
[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may
be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again;
otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De
Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and
void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95
Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033).[20]
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such
declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold
that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.

The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,[21] which involved an
administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyers argument that he
was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. The Court further noted that the
said rule was cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code. Significantly, it observed that the
second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was bigamous
and criminal in character.
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed
his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first
obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage:[22]
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy
charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before
contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission
believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if
such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should
be allowed to marry again. x x x.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration
of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void
only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second
marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To
repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages
delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar
as it denied her claim of damages and attorneys fees.[23]
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain
affirmative relief from this Court.[24] In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent
ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder:
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the
innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when
she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we
find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
xxxxxxxxx
Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire belief,
especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took
the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being
by then already living with another man.
Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the
consequences of her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth
[would] come out, as it did in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed
damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making.[25]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the absolute nullity of a previous marriage in an indictment
for bigamy. The majority opinion, penned by my esteemed brother, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
enunciates that it is only a judicially decreed prior void marriage which can constitute a defense against
the criminal charge.
The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code is a given but I have strong reservations on its
application beyond what appears to be its expressed context. The subject of the instant petition is a
criminal prosecution, not a civil case, and the ponencia affirms the conviction of petitioner Vincent Paul G.
Mercado for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family code reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
The phrase for purposes of remarriage is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts, are
inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the Family code requires a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a subsequent marriage is contracted; without such
declaration, the validity and the full legal consequence of the subsequent marriage would itself be in
similar jeopardy under Article 53, in relation to Article 52, of the Family Code. Parenthetically, I would
daresay that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of
remarriage should be held to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least
ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial declaration of nullity, in my view, should still be deemed
essential when the marriage, for instance, is between persons of the same sex or when either or both
parties had not at all given consent to the marriage. Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code
has been meant and intended to refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35,
36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
In fine, the Family Code, I respectfully submit, did not have the effect of overturning the rule in criminal law
and related jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code expresses:
Art. 349. Bigamy.---The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not void, prior marriage. Covered by article 349
would thus be, for instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and subsisting until set aside by a
competent court. As early as People vs. Aragon,1 this Court has underscored:
xxx Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America
requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the
legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its
absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation.
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and therefore not a defense in
bigamy if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment), the complete nullity,
however, of a previously contracted marriage, being a total nullity and inexistent, should be capable of
being independently raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. I see no incongruence
between this rule in criminal law and that of the Family Code, and each may be applied within the
respective spheres of governance.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.

[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000]

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV
37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage
contract between private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It
also ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise Reyes
and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on
August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and
void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also
declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P.
Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On
April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying
that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license

when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna
Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria
had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4,
1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage
was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued
at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was
submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977.
These documents were submitted as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore
deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and
petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is
undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding
ceremony on April 4, 1982.[1]
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null
and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of
Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent
marriage could be validly contracted. Said the appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It does not say, however, that a second marriage
may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void, ab initio,
there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is
valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself for this would be the consequence of
allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even before a competent court issues a judicial decree
of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the least, and could not have been
the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code on marriage.
xxx
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and
defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of P15,000.00 to
his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that the Court of
Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS
MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS.
III

IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS
RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go over applicable laws
and pertinent cases to shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we
shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private respondent
null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private respondent and
Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioners claim that People v. Mendoza[3] and People v.
Aragon[4] are applicable in this case. For these cases held that where a marriage is void from its
performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But the appellate court said these
cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no
longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the provisions of law previously
obtaining.[5]
In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case. Although
decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the now-repealed provisions of
the Civil Code, as in the instant case.
xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .[6]
At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and
1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs significantly
from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis[7] and Mercado v. Tan,[8] both involving a criminal case for bigamy
where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code,[9] under which a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the
three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no
express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,[10] and People v. Aragon,[11] this Court held that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu. Accused
contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife,
accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife
initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is
void, having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a judicial

declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the first one
terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there can be no
bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to
judge whether a marriage is void or not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,[12] and Consuegra v. Consuegra,[13] however, we recognized the right of the second
wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the
retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there
was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the
husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in the estate
they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.[14]
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),[15] the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We
exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena Abella
in October of 1948 was void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of
the same year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void
marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.[16]
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),[17] the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration
of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man,
Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as
void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded
that:[18]
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court
a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still
be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
(Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,[19] however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of judicial
declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in
Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code.[20] Article 40
of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992)[21] the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a
bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977
was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that
the prevailing case law is that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993),[22] the Court
held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family
Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).[23]
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v.
Cantero, (1997)[24] the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second

marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his
first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza
and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born
before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before
Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of
private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of
its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private
respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v.
Court of Appeals,[25] the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In
the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we
are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate courts finding that despite private respondents
deceit and perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the issue.
Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private
respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that
petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents
allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage
license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church
rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the
appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical
marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during
trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due
consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage,
as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent
had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of
a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the
civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties
to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The
appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below
which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before
the trial court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting
the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls his own deceit and perfidy.
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees. Although the appellate court
admitted that they found private respondent acted duplicitously and craftily in marrying petitioner, it did
not award moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim.[26]
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but
for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is
suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her
husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her
prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common
funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates
against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband
and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.[27] There are other remedies.[28]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996
and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia
P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the
award of the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children,
Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled
thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

JOSELANO GUEVARRA,
Complainant,
versus
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL
EALA,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 7136
Promulgated:
August 1, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment[1] before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.
Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers
oath.
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann)
Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene
had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read I love you, I
miss you, or Meet you at Megamall.
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she
replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left
the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her
personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words I Love You on its
face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you
that you may find meaning in what youre about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal
pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because theres a bigger plan for the
two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to
love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent
together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in
me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always
remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]
Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned
still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a
concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter
was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended
social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended
the launch of the Wine All You Can promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at
Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24
September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala. A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.[4] (Italics
and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous relationship
supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4.
Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far
as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.[5]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his
membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a piece of paper.
Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainants bride on the very day of her wedding,

vowing to continue his love for her until we are together again, as now they are.[6] (Underscoring
supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his adulterous
relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his
membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondents relationship with Irene was not under
scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in
fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondents special friendship
with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter
to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to
the formality of the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution
regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).
[9]

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has
been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainants wife, he mocked the
institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainants marriage, commits adultery
with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that
under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[11]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,[12] alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girls father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as
Annex A, a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing Irenes signature and naming respondent as the
father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Lukes
Hospital.
Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS[14] dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainants Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case
filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery
against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants Complaint-Affidavit and REPLY to ANSWER were
adopted as his testimony on direct examination.[16] Respondents counsel did not cross-examine
complainant.[17]
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring
supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule
139[22] of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him.[24] The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. C) and the news item published in the
Manila Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an
adulterous relationship with complainants wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support
the accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the
following statements to wit: Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that]
their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . . ,
and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that
under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile

relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct . . .
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a special relationship
between him and complainants wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex H-1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship
between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child Samantha. In the Certificate of Live
Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainants wife Irene supplied the information that
respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship
with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the
paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the
father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married woman
who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge
of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.[26] (Italics
supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and
the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.[27] (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge of Irenes daughter Samantha
Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a lawyer, 38 years
old as the childs father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired information on DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate[28] with her
signature on the Marriage Certificate[29] shows that they were affixed by one and the same person.
Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father
of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit[30]
which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live
Birth that the childs father is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a lawyer.[31]
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by
more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive
and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other[32] which is the
quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary;
in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is
required.[33] (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not,
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence
of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.[34]

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous circumstances. Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have
sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit
with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.

Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug
v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We
disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried
adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to
betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under
penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been
carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely
low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably
unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.[39]
(Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear
that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.[40]
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law.
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation[41] on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainants
petition for nullity of his (complainants) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent
and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case, which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainants Motion to Withdraw Petition
for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are
inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which
provides that notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any
time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has
been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial.
The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.[43] As a lawyer,
respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[44] In carrying on
an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was

null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held
sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to
state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the
DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon
City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutors Resolution,
DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates
with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent phone calls
and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on
two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.]
In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the
illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Mojes subsequent
relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church
where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Ealas vehicle and that of
Mojes were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala
asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and
Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For
one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout
after her separation from complainant. It was both respondents love nest, to put short; their illicit affair
that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby
hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact
that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This
speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents.
Complainants supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for
both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the
child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves
the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed
in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath
of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000]

ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-TaranganPagsanjan, Samar, respondent. ALEX
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of
Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J.
Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy
and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging
"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and our marriage
was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar;
xxxalex
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our principal sponsor and
spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; xxx
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without any reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote the City Civil Registrar
to inquire regarding my Marriage Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that my marriage was
not registered; xxxSc lex
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies of the Marriage
Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest such as: x law
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage before the office of the Local Civil
Registrar."
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.

In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:

1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be solemnized by
respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due
to the following and pressing circumstances: Sc
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta.
Margarita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman
unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City, urgently requesting the celebration of their
marriage right then and there, first, because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able to
fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to another town for the marriage
would be expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of
witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former Undersecretary Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod
[member] Ramon Dean were already with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on August
28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their marriage license would lapse
and necessitate another publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled
marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives
as to date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic) for a valid marriage, which
respondent found all in order. Spped
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent realized, deserved more
than ordinary official attention under present Government policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good faith that by so doing
he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and complicated
for citizens to get married.
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the duplicate and triplicate
copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also occasioned by the following circumstances
beyond the control of respondent: Scmis
3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate, respondent left the three
remaining copies on top of the desk in his private office where the marriage ceremonies were held,
intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his office.
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the papers relating to the said
marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and private files, all the three last copies of
the certificate were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena xxx Mr. Yman to shed light on the
missing documents and he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage certificate in her
bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contact complainant for a confirmation of
Mr. Ymans claim. Mis sc
3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out of the country, a reasonable
conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim
of complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her without any
reason xxx but that said husband admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" xxx it
seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting parties probably absconded with the missing
copies of the marriage certificate. Jo spped
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to protect the public interest by
trying all possible means to recover custody of the missing documents in some amicable way during the
expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the City of Marikina, failing to do which said
respondent would confer with the Civil Registrar General for possible registration of reconstituted copies of
said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998 found that
respondent Judge " committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand

Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or future acts will be dealt with more
severely pointing out that:
"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to solemnize
marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer
within his area of jurisdiction. Miso
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a
marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; Nex old
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed to register the
marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides: Ncm
"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the
original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of
the certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where
the marriage was solemnized. xxx" (underscoring ours)
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge committed non-feasance in
office, he also undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic social institution in our
society whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge
indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he should have
exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is
expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His imputation that the missing copies of the
marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and does not deserve
consideration for being devoid of proof."
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation report of the OCA
well-taken. Mani kx
Jimenez v. Republic[1] underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus: "[M]arriage in
this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with
safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are
largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every member of the community to
prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its
destruction."
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among others, that
"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: Maniks
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction; xxx" (Italics ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be,
and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in

which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect." (Italics ours) Spped jo
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judges chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with
Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to
respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala.
What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the
marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized
deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy." Respondent Judge
further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he
was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for
citizens to get married." Manikan
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and
render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.[2] A judge is not only bound
by oath to apply the law;[3] he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so.[4] Certainly, judges,
by the very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.
[5]
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the marriage in
this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of social
institutions in the country. They also betray respondents cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture
which is more disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon
hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.Ncmmis
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to preserve so sacrosanct
an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines laid down by superior
authority should have given respondent judge pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his
authority and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed to
know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court.[6] Thus respondent Judge should
be reminded that
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only
within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice of this
Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long
as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions
may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[7] Scnc m
Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-TaranganPagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.
[8]
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra care
in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise
commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance
with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that
ART. 23. - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting
parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate
copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the
place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the
solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in
his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in

proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place
other than those mentioned in Article 8. (Italics supplied) Sdaad
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was less than
conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that
the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events.[9] However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record
management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.
[10] It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court
because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.[11]
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. This
Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA. Juris
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED. Mi sedp

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]

MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn
Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her
marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away.
However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was
not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator
Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required
respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan
Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been
assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his
sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed
him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is
located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could
solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another
date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions
for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if
he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke.
After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties
that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge
that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply,
respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite
the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the
petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of
the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due
to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances
that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage.
However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is
now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage
License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on
17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of
such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a
true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license.
Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a
Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage
license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found
the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing
so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent
judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges
and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by
the Supreme Court.

The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held office and
had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he
solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall
within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do
so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of
this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a
marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are
sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding
and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones
involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which
they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an
area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.[3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur
therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless,
he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void,
and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized
the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court
has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have
the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair
administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.[5] Disciplinary
actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend
upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We
cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Courts constitutional
power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of
a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G.
Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office
and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The
wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not
fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and
name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is
overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier
filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994,
and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is
still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F.
Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar,
confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.[1]
With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and
del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may
be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that
Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were
considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been
sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer
thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that
Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by
respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio
Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have
been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and
having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has
not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is
already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida
Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do
not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis
added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to
discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or
a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first
wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether
wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint
affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from
the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be,
and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the
aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in
the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3)
upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either
Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request
presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing
judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer."
Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so
only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of
this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was
not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing

Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent
judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles
applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to
conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are
sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding
and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones
involved in instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.[7]
Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed
by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which
they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an
area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore
void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a
deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period
of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127263

April 12, 2000

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which
affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition3 for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at
the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 4 Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed
with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,
respectively.5
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at
San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga.6
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately,
and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his
father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father.7
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later
amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without
just cause; that they have been living separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership.8 Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of
gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement
executed by the spouses.9 The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina. 10
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon
of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but
operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was
talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad,
took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina
away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her
husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was
dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the
blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren.
She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her. 11
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision 12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando
only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment.

Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as Civil Case
No. 8273, on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by
respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more
than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 13 dated December 4,
1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a
decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition 14 for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and
Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight
physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her
husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her
without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her,
performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological
incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter. 15
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 16 dated December 9, 1993, denied
the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that
the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which
may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the decision 17
of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning
respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a
marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held
that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the
time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's
marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their
marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and the
evidence on record. 18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 19 which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated
November 21, 1996. 20
Hence, this appeal by certiorari 21 wherein petitioner now raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON
THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY
STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein
respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY
STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE
HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE
SHOWN TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES
THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.
22

In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for
lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license
at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and
incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this
would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, 23 in a number of instances, we have relaxed
observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect
and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity
and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be defeated. 24 Hence, when
substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should
not be subject to cavil. 25 In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of
the marriage between Filipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the
parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a
declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage
before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the
marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning,
she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court.
The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in
their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. 26 The
date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is
admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer
admitting it. 27 This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her
direct examination, 28 as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's
birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the
trial. 29 These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders
the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona. 30
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not
expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the
documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after
the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was
indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates
on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code 31 is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an
exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under

Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth
certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were
marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and
admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due
execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed
that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view,
therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto,
these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. 33
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us. It is
mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, dated December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage
celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is
hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA,
Petitioner,
- versus ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 167746
Promulgated:
August 28, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners
appeal and affirming the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil
Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage[3] was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara
alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license,
went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them.
They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister

of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner
and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo,
Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage
license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is
a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their
child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after
due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel
the corresponding marriage contract[5] and its entry on file.[6]
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage
and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of
the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners representation, respondent gave birth to their
first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann
Alcantara on 27 October 1992.[7] Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children.[8] Petitioner
only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact,
has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as
support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.[11]

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioners appeal. His Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and
petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage
contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.[13]
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for
Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage
license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage
License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the
trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down
by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA
550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of
procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.[14]

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there
was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer
who arranged everything for them.[15] The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in
CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.[16] He and
respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license
from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place. The
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
certification states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara
and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage
license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.
[19]
Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties
states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.[21]
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The
cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the
marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due
search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to
the parties. The Court held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to
the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render
the marriage void ab initio.
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification
issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased
is undoubtedly void ab initio.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year
after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that
the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner
and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the
local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita
Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or
intents it may serve.[26]

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance
of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.[27] The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being
lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.[28] Significantly, apart from these,
petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither
he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis
to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not
the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence
of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.[30] An irregularity in any of the formal
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.[31]
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while
the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once
more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a
typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0
and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not
detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,[32] petitioner cannot pretend
that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without
the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he initiated
it.[33] Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and
voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at
his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot
countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad
faith.[34]

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year
utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony
in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the
part of the petitioner.
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit
Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall.
This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as follows
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit
church.
WITNESS
I dont remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I dont know if it is
good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a
Marriage Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract
issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.[35]
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that
time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever
irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.[36]
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer who arranged everything for
them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of
the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to
have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.[37]
Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has
been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that
the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the
license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the
requirements of law.[38]
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.
[39] Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is
of great weight.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of
Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183896

January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No.
86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24,
2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order
No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment
of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967,
issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is
this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in
Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He
arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the
afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate,
Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was
going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but
was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told
him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a
copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The
Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to
the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA
MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents
it may serve.7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001
and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get
certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No.
9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the
numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003,
was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona,
Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the
same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty.
Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He
testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence
of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez
(Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages
since 1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that
Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the
marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it
was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage
contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and
Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain
Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license
and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know
where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9,
1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage
contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law,
and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22
She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the
marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went
to their house with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person
went back to their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez
who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not
read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage
license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by
Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for
Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is
one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she
was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos;
and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage
contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty.
Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain
Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after
several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and

Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty.
Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed
were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain
Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but
that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the
one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were
Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as
Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had
been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a
resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in
violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from
the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal
requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the
respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent
even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office,
are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the
same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search
for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that
there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The
CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that
Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October
2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in
Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo
Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied
by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC
VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO
THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No.
209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that
would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the
formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage
ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage
license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on
whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no
valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied
on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of
said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was
there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record
or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of
the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative
value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for
Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to
another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the
names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not
comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have
been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be
given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth
noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a
marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did
not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the
officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely
necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official
duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We
held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office,
thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been
conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court.
The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court.
She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location
where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is
not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the
other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them
applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as
to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty.
Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in
securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying
for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the
license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as
well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of
the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the
marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court.
However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid
marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license
was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held that
the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became
the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and
that the required marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that
burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was

issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that
would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent.
No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce
a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed
were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant
and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was
even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their
consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract
was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the
solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellants family, taken during the
marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage
Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea
Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years
before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been
instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was
filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon
(Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of
his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own
deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)."
Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is
void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27
to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void
ab initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage
license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The
law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the
marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 160172

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,[2] declaring
that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding
instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they
applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They
had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter.
When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired.
Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated
13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The
couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs
birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her
private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City (trial court.[3] In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that
the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna
Tricia as his child.[4]
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign
the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her
pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He
also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor
acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,[5] the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on
the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is
not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting
until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born
during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon
petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state
with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners forgetfulness
should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible.
[6] Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein
he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial
court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There
was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no
collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a
marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter

that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The
proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the
child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
respondent.[7] The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the
appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid
until properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the
appellant.[8]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.[9] Hence
this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because
as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage
license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false
narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The
false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license.
[10] Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in
this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action
for support. Citing several authorities,[11] petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a
collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of
nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and
anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.[12]
Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial
of the childs paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his
legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.[13]
In her Comment,[14] respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the
finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she
argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she
pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not
evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the
challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing
to prove paternity and filiation.[15]
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court
to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case
of Nial v. Bayadog,[16] it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for
support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover,
the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man
and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five
years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid.[17] In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is
an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support.[18]
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether
the child is the daughter of petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.
[19] Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.[20]

Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,[21] the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass
upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial,
we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a marriage an absolute nullity.[22]
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.[23] In
the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that
they had been living together for more than five years.[24] However, respondent herself in effect admitted
the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last five
years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.[25]
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage.
The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due
to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.[26] In the instant case, there was no
scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to
support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.[27] Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[28]
The Certificate of Live Birth[29] of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the
child, thus stating:
1.
I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at
Better Living, Paraaque, Metro Manila;[30]

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony
of the latter, but also by respondents own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded
that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the
latters house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances,
petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While
respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the
occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. B, B-1, to B-3, C, C-1 and C-2, D, D-1 and D-2, E, E-1 and E-2, F, F-1 and F2, G, G-1 and G-2 and H, H-1 to H-3). In one of the pictures (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2), defendant is seen
putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger and in another picture (Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2) respondent is
seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.[31]

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City
in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133778

March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID
NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986
stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity
or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who
could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition
after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their
father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which
enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this
petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the
allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which
produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners,
this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC),
the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article
58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This
interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life
which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special
contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed
with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a
marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it
wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of
majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that
we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or
should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years
without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union.
In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.
This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is
based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse

to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license
unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to
the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall
forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to
the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception
in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital
affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions
monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's
first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature
of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party
as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their
father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy
to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon
by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of
either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that
is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the

action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,
23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article
43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond
between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there
was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void
hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary,
yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient
that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore,
being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not
like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during
the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the
same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the
ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta,
Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing
marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez,
Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on
21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born
out of that marriage.[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew
or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that
the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the late Manzano
was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be
charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with
a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint
and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate
affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff
upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that
they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective
marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never
cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of
those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and
are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and

Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract,
it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment,
which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had
he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another
marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous
marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to
before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal
separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed.
Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve
as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a
prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges,[8]
who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity,
and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal
principles.[9] And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased
to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,
- versus JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT,
Petitioner,
- versus JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 175581
G.R. No. 179474
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The
marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa
executed a sworn affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the
age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a
sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose,
he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house,
the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay
City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the
Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper
approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be
released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal
could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when
he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying
on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a
copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She
declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the
early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age
difference.[5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the
latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa

filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose
with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics
and Coordinating Board.[6] The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.[7]
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court
finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the
above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose
and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and
rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank
sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at
Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for
the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact
that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers.
And yet it took him, more or less, three months to discover that the pieces of paper that he signed was
[sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this
Court, to be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa
Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he
filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be
sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted
in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his
company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really
considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name
voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996)
and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his
[sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29,
1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really
chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his
consent was procured through fraud.[10]

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of
the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the
injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud,
trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the
earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract.
[Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.[12]

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion
of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances
constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code did not
exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on
the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck
down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to
the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the
Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party
was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after
the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased.
Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February,
1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that
Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio
for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76[16] of the Civil
Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband
and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the
solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals
gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The
appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza,
the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals
dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V.
Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that
either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or
religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not
govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license
under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the
legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered
an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.[19]

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and
reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on
the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived
together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as
follows:
x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.

This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based
on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not
comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in
order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between
Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore,
void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.[21]

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a
Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition
for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated
7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No.
179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved
to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought
before it for resolution.[23]
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E.[24]

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates
the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a
circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only
sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had
been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their
marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on
the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines
and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa,
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics position that the falsity of the
statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal
requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether
the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by
the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract
states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of
the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify
its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July
1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and
Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2
May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code
spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1)

Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by
the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages
of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)
[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license
is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is
the essence of the marriage contract.[30] This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby
the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.[32]
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising
Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death
during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital
cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6)
mixed marriages.[34]

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing
their status.[36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In
lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this
union, they desire to marry each other.[37] One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether
the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the
formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general
rule, should be strictly[38] but reasonably construed.[39] They extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.
[40] Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or
add to the latter by implication.[41] For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto
that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as
it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in
no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading
of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of
cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under
Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a
directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that
Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.[43] The
Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita
Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court also cited
Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.[45]
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is
factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.[47] It is
already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance
that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the
Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on
substantial evidence.[48]

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt
them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit
will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The
argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa
was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the
explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married.[50] The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to
which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered
into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of law or fact leans towards
the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a
violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license
or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be
used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the
evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.[52] The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but
the exposure of an invalid one as well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license
is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is
not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated
by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The
contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the
absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it
refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper,
without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should
be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing.
This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a
law.[54] There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article
76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties
marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.[55]
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the
legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together

from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and
that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisas marriage was
celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In
this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration
of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.[57] It
covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November
2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.