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Motion to Quash and Demurrer to Evidence


Condrada v. People, GR 141646, 2003

However, there are two exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was
with the consent of the accused:
first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and

Facts
Pablo Condrada was charged with rape. He was arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty. But the hearing for his case was thrice
postponed. On the third time, Pablo moved for the temporary dismissal of his case. The prosecution agreed, and the court
granted the motion.
Then, after almost a month, the prosecution moved for the reinstatement and/or revival of the case. Pablo opposed the motion
because of double jeopardy.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------What is the difference between permanent and provisional dismissals?

second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial.
Was double jeopardy present?
No double jeopardy. Pablo moved for the temporary dismissal. Nor did his case fall under the exceptions: first, the prosecution
has not presented evidence yet, and second, the dismissal was temporary in nature, subject to reinstatement within 30 days
from the date of dismissal.
(N.B. I think Riano mentioned this case to show that some dismissals do not amount to acquittal, e.g., temporary dismissal.
Thus, a motion to quash may be granted without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint or information. But grant of
demurrer to evidence because of insufficiency of evidence is deemed an acquittal.)

A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to


1.

the termination of the case on the merits, resulting in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused;

PEOPLE VS LAGUIO, 518 SCRA 393 G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007

2.

the dismissal of the case due to the prosecutions failure to prosecute; or

FACTS:

3.

the dismissal thereof on the ground of unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accuseds right to
speedy disposition or trial of the case against him.

Petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to this Court via this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set
aside the Resolution1 dated 13 March 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. 96149990 to 96-149992, entitled People of the Philippines v. Lawrence Wang y Chen, granting private respondent Lawrence C.
Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the three (3) charges filed against him, namely:

A provisional dismissal of a criminal case is a dismissal without prejudice to its reinstatement before the order of dismissal
becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense within the periods allowed under the Revised
Penal Code or the Revised Rules of Court.
Was the dismissal here permanent or provisional?
No permanent dismissal. The dismissal was not based on the violation of Pablos right to speedy trial. The trial court expressly
stated that the case would be reinstated within 30 days from the dismissal.
When does jeopardy attach?
As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach:
1.

a valid indictment,

2.

before a court of competent jurisdiction,

3.

the arraignment of the accused,

4.

a valid plea entered by him, and

5.

the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express
consent.

(1) Criminal Case No. 96-149990 for Violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article I of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act);
(2) Criminal Case No. 96-149991 for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms); and
(3) Criminal Case No. 96-149992 for Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166 (COMELEC
Gun Ban).
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department
of Interior and Local Government, namely, Captain Margallo, Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal,
arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly known as shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons,
Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set
after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu. At around 11:00 p.m. that
same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De
Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as
talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck
and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for Wang.
They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May 1996, and that
their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look

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for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and
his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang, who was
described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he
(witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as
police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open
the back compartment of the BMW car.
When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380
9mm automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the operatives searched the
BMW car and found inside it were the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance
with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride,
a regulated drug locally known as shabu; (b) cash in the amount ofP650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales;
and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date
within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence.
On 19 December 1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation to the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge
for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and not as regards the two cases for
Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96149992). Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3)
cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against
him. Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification to his
Demurrer of Evidence on 20 January 1997.
On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition alleging that the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the
lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is now time for the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed Resolution granting
Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that the trial court erred:
xxx in not admitting in evidence the evidence seized and offered by the prosecution and in not denying accused's demurrer to
evidence.
In its Resolution of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, required the public and private
respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice. Private respondent Wang filed his comment on 18 August 1997.
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a reply, which the Office of the Solicitor General did on 5
December 1997, after several extensions.
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda, which they did.

ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution may appeal the trial courts resolution granting Wangs demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all
the charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
RULING:
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court raising only pure questions of
law, ordinary appeal by mere filing of a notice of appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal directly to this Court. Then,
too, it bears stressing that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being merely a statutory
privilege which may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals).
Although Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may appeal, the right of the People to
appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition against putting the accused in double jeopardy.
It also basic that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole records of the case wide open for review by the appellate court, that
is why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy. In effect, the very same
Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, disallows appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal.
An order granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal.
Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has previously made some exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan 22 presents one exception to the rule on double jeopardy, which is, when the
prosecution is denied due process of law:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who by an amendatory
decree made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due
process of law. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to
exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth,
instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek
the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the
pressures of politics and prejudice.
No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the
trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is
denied due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby
violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus,
the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded
at will.
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute
a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).

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Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. (Emphasis supplied.)

In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the
lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accuseds demurrer to
evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result
in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action
via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.

Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the
accuseds demurrer to evidence. The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.
The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has
been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. The
demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is " filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the
same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to
place the accused in double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal
case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that
the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In
Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the accuseds
acquittal upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with leave of court, the CA ruling that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity of certain letter marked
therein as Exhibit "LL," which supposedly "positively identified therein petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged." The
Court, in a petition for certiorari, sustained the CAs power to review the order granting the demurrer to evidence, explaining
thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In
resolving accuseds demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall
not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order
amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the
accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a
direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of
acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against
wrongful conviction."
Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation
of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present
its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the

Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's
demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the
inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. The trial courts ratiocination is quoted as follows:
The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his warrantless arrest and search were lawful
as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it, and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement to another. None of these
circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment
and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The
accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to
commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that
the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. And the handgun was bantam and
slim in size that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done
by the accused. The arresting officers had no information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun,
nor did they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with magazine that were found and seized
from the car. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view. The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and
the Daewoo handgun was underneath the drivers seat of the car. The police officers had no information, or knowledge that the
banned articles were inside the car, or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere
suspicion that there was shabu therein.
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car were without probable cause
and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless
arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty. The
trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor
of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a
consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.

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The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.
*Remedy in denying motion to quash

What are the essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019?

LAZARTE V. SB, 2009

1. The accused is a public officer or private person charged in conspiracy with him;

Facts

2. Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his official duties or in relation to his public
position;

Information
Lazarte, Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers being then the Department Manager, Project Management Officer A and
Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to the office and while
in the performance of their official functions, connived, confederated and mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo
C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C.
Cruz Construction and to themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The felonious act consisted of causing to
be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works
on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by said
construction company as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by COA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------What is the remedy for denial of MQ?
The denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. When a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the
remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses
invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned
upon and often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court.
Exception:
If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies.
In the case at bar, the Court does not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of discretion.

3. He causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or private party;
4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
5. The public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Did the Information detail the individual participation of the accused in the allegation of conspiracy?
Conspiracy should be understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a mode of committing a crime or it may be constitutive of
the crime itself.
Generally, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its
commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition.
When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the
complaint or information. But when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime
as in the case at bar, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the
gravamen of the offense charged. (In other words, the allegations are sufficient).
The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them
answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is
collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all.
The allegation of conspiracy in the Information should not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to
prove it.

What is the fundamental test of this ground for MQ: Facts charged do not constitute an offense?

The other details cited by petitioner, such as the absence of any damage or injury caused to any party or the government,
likewise are matters of evidence best raised during trial.

The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime
defined in law.

Will residual averments be enough?

Take note of Sec. 6, Rule 110 (sufficiency of complaint or info)


The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable
certainty, of the offense charged.
The rationale of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.
Another purpose is to enable the accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.

Residual averments in the Information have not been rendered unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges against some of his
co-accused because the Information sufficiently makes out a case against petitioner and the remaining accused.

JAVIER V. SB AND PEOPLE, 2009


Facts
Javier was appointed to the Governing Board of the National Book Development Board (NBDB) as a private sector
representative for 1 year.

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She was supposed to represent the country in the canceled book fair in Spain.
The resident auditor advised Javier to immediately return/refund her cash advance considering that her trip was canceled.

Under the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office. Javier was appointed
by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that does not make her a private
person exercising a public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment.

But Javier failed to do so.

Is she a public officer under the RPC?

She was issued a Summary of Disallowances from which the balance for settlement amounted to P220,349.00. But no action
was forthcoming from Javier.

She is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in the government whether as an employee, agent,
subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation of
several rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the country in the canceled book fair
in Spain.

She was charged with malversation of public funds and properties and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
She maintained that she is not a public officer and only a private sector representative, stressing that her only function among
the eleven (11) basic purposes and objectives provided for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for the
book publishing industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she was the President of the BSAP, a book
publishers association. As such, she could not be held liable for the crimes imputed against her, and in turn, she is outside the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Is she at least a salary grade 27 officer?


Based on the Amended Information in the criminal case, Javier belongs to the employees classified as SG-28, included in the
phrase all other national and local officials classified as Grade 27' and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine book publishing industry. It is a
statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure the full development of the book
publishing industry as well as for the creation of organization structures to implement the said policy.

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She also interposed the defense of double jeopardy.

Requisites for double jeopardy: see Condrada v. People, 2003.

Her motion to quash was denied based on the Informations not alleging that she was a public official of at least salary grade
27.
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Javier pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. But she was not yet arraigned in the criminal
case for malversation of public funds because she had filed a motion to quash the latter information. Double jeopardy could
not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had
pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her.

What is a public office?

Requisites 3, 4, and 5 for DJ were not present.

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Is Javier a public officer?

A motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information
filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information.

Verily, Javier came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB. But the law invested her with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is achieved.
That she was appointed from the private sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does not take
her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that the
purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved.
The Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for appointing members
from the private sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to
cultivate the book publishing industry.
Is she a public officer under the Anti-Graft Law?

Double Jeopardy

What is a motion to quash?

Remedy for MQs denial: see Lazarte v. SB, 2009


Exceptions:
One is when the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not
the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or
a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.
The present petition does not fall under the exceptions wherein the remedy of certiorari may be resorted to after the denial of
one's motion to quash the information. And even assuming that Javier may avail of such remedy, the Sandiganbayan still did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.

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inquired [about] the whereabouts of the private complainants father, the latter replied that he died sometime on May 1993 or
1994.
Affidavit of Desistance, not a ground for a motion to quash
PEOPLE VS RAMIREZ G.R. Nos. 150079-80 June 10, 2004
FACTS:
Florentino O. Ramirez Jr. appeals the June 29, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan
(Branch 68), in Criminal Case Nos. L-6275 & L-6276, finding him guilty of rape on two counts and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua for each crime.
Two (2) Informations were filed against appellant on May 30, 2000.
Upon his arraignment on June 27, 2000, appellant, assisted by his counsel,pleaded not guilty to both charges. The RTC tried
the two cases jointly and thereafter rendered the assailed Decision.
THE PROSECUTION
At the initial hearing on August 24, 2000, Prosecutor Edmundo M. Manaois informed the trial court of an amicable settlement
reached between the parties as shown by an Affidavit of Desistance executed by private complainant During this hearing,
private complainant affirmed the veracity and the voluntariness of her Affidavit. She said that the document had been
translated to her in Ilocano, and that she fully understood its contents. She confirmed her awareness that by reason of her
execution thereof, her case was likely to be dismissed. The mother, Zenaida Pagaduan, affirmed that the Affidavit had been
explained to and signed by her daughter.
Prosecutor Manaois then called the following witnesses to the stand: (1) Soledad Pagaduan, private complainants older sister,
and (2) Dr. Maria Teresa G. Sanchez, a medical officer of the Western Pangasinan District Hospital. Their respective
testimonies are summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Brief as follows:
"SOLEDAD PAGADUAN, sister of private complainant, confirmed having brought the latter to the Western Pangasinan
District Hospital, in Alaminos, Pangasinan for medical examination on June 25, 1999. She also confirmed the fact that during
the preliminary investigation of these cases, she made the following statements, to wit: that at early dawn of May 26, 1999, she
was inside their house in Sitio Mangas, Ba[c]quieon, Sual, Pangasinan, [with] her brother, Romeo Pagaduan, her mother,
Zenaida Pagaduan, her sister, herein private complainant Diana Pagaduan; and appellant [Florentino Ramirez] who is her
mothers live-in partner; that when she woke up that morning, she went upstairs and saw appellant on top of private
complainant and holding her thigh; that when appellant saw her, he immediately picked up his shortpants and fled downstairs;
that when she confronted the private complainant about the incident, the latter cried I was raped.
"MARIA TERESA G. SANCHEZ, Medical Officer of the Western Pangasinan District Hospital related to the court that private
complainant was brought to her for medical examination on June 25, 1999 by her sister, Soledad, and uncle, Alejo Verzo; that
in the course of her examination, private complainant disclosed that she was raped by appellant; that the rape happened twice,
the first time on May 7, 1999 and the second time on May 26, 1999; that the May 7, 1999 incident occurred about 9:00 p.m.
when she was left behind in their house at Sitio Mangas, Barangay Ba[c]quieon, Sual, Pangasinan, with appellant and her
niece; [that] appellant poked a knife and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him; that the May 26, 1999 incident
occurred at 4:00 a.m. and her companions at that time were the father and mother of the appellant[; and that] when [she]

After formally offering private complainants Affidavit of Desistance and the Medical Certificate prepared by Dr. Sanchez as
documentary evidence, the prosecution rested its case. The RTC proceeded to hear the defense.
On October 6, 2000, after the defense had closed its presentation of evidence, Prosecutor Manaois objected to its formal offer
of the Affidavit of Desistance of private complainant.
On February 14, 2001, private complainant testified on rebuttal that the allegation by appellant that he was in Baguio City on
May 7, 1999, was not true. She declared that in reality, he had been at home in Sitio Mangas, Barangay Bacquioen, Sual,
Pangasinan, where he had sexual intercourse with her. She affirmed that she really wanted her mother to be separated from him
because, as private complainant declared in Tagalog, "Binaboy niya ako."
THE DEFENSE
"Accused FLORENTINO O. RAMIREZ, JR., under oath, testified that he is 29 years old, married, farmer and a resident of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. "It is not true, as testified to by his step-daughter Soledad Pagaduan, that the latter saw him suspiciously
wearing his brief half naked inside the mosquito net where Diana Pagaduan was then sleeping. While he admit that Diana
Pagaduan is beautiful, young and was studying in high school, he denied having a secret liking [towards] her. He considered
Diana as his own child. Diana Pagaduan filed these instant case[s] against him because his stepchildren wanted him to be
separated from their mother Zenaida Pagaduan. However, he never confronted any of his stepchildren on this matter, neither
did he ask his wife Zenaida, if the latter really wanted to separate from him.
"BOY RAMIREZ, 41 years old, laborer, and a resident of Camp 8, Baguio City, testified under oath on the following facts: that
he was with his brother Florentino Ramirez, Jr., the accused in these cases, on May 7, 1999, [at] Camp 8, Baguio City
particularly [i]n their uncle Cipriano Pianong Ramirez house[; t]he accused arrived thereat in the morning of May 7, 1999
and stayed at Camp 8, Baguio City for more than a week[; t]he accused worked for their uncle Pianong Ramirez in the
construction of a one[-]room extension at the latters house, and was assigned in digging a hole for the tie [b]eam foundation;
that their working time thereat was from 8:00 oclock in the morning to 12:00 oclock noon, and 1:00 oclock in the afternoon
to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon; that he has never seen the accused leave their uncle Pianong Ramirez house on May 7,
1999; that after their work on May 7, 1999, he was not with his brother Florentino, instead he attended to his family from 5:00
oclock p.m. to 9:00 oclock p.m. when he and his wife went to sleep.
"VILLAMOR AYATON under oath testified that he is 37 years old, married, unemployed and a resident of Barangay
Bacquioen, Sual, Pangasinan.
"On the morning of May 26, 1999 he was called by his mother Gloria Orpilla, who was then in the house of Diana Pagaduan
purposely to talk about the killing of his brother Virgilio Ayaton. Aside from his mother and stepfather, Soledad Pagaduan and
the latters mother were likewise present. When he reached the house of Diana Pagaduan, his half brother Florentino Ramirez,
Jr. was outside the said house while Diana was inside the house. His brother Florentino Ramirez, Jr. was then wearing only his
brief[,] which prompted his mother Gloria to tell Florentino to get something to wear. The latter then entered the house of
Soledad Pagaduan and at that juncture, he was surprise[d] to hear the latter confront[ed by] Soledad Pagaduan. [He did not]
talk to the mother of Soledad Pagaduan because he was so ashamed of what his brother Florentino Ramirez, Jr. allegedly did to
Diana Pagaduan. He likewise knew at that time that Diana Pagaduan was still inside the house. But despite his knowledge, he
neither look[ed] for Diana x x x nor talked to the latter because he left for his work. On the other hand, Soledad Pagaduan
likewise left and went to the house of one Alejo Ver[j]o. He did not give any statement about what he heard on that month,
neither did he report the same to the barangay officials."

7
The RTC gave more credence and weight to the prosecutions evidence, specifically to the testimony of private complainant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in finding that the guilt of the accused for two (2) counts of rape has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, despite failure of the prosecution to present evidence to prove the crimes charged.

the case in the RTC. They were not marked, much less formally offered before it. Evidence not formally offered cannot be
taken into consideration in disposing of the issues of the case. The Informations allege that the crimes were committed through
force, threats and intimidation as set forth under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (amended by RA 8353). Hence, to
convict appellant, the prosecution had the duty of proving not only carnal knowledge of private complainant, but also his use
of force or intimidation to accomplish it.
On direct examination, the testimony of private complainant centered on the veracity of her Affidavit of Desistance, which she
later recanted.

RULING:

While it is true that the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, it must
be clear, positive, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence

Mere accusation is not enough.

Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. First, in her Affidavit of Desistance
dated August 16, 2000, private complainant categorically stated that he was innocent of the crime charged. Second, she gave no
direct testimony describing the circumstances of the alleged rape. Her sweeping statement that he had sexual intercourse with
her was clearly inadequate to establish his guilt.

The simplistic assertion of private complainant that appellant had sexual intercourse with her on May 7 and May 26, 1999,
cannot suffice to establish moral certainty as to his guilt. Her statements miserably fell short of the requirement of the law on
the quantum of evidence required in the prosecution of criminal cases. As appellant correctly argued, her testimony was sorely
lacking in details. Equally important, there was absolutely no proof of force or intimidation.

Affidavit of Desistance

The circumstantial evidence in the present case consists of 1) the results of the medical examination conducted by Dr. Sanchez
and 2) Soledad Pagaduans testimony that on the morning of May 26, 1999, she saw appellant on top of the victim and holding
her thigh. Indeed, such evidence admits of the possibility that he could have had carnal knowledge of private complainant. But
we cannot affirm his conviction on the basis alone of a mere possibility. To stress, there was no evidence, either, that the
alleged offense had been perpetrated through force or intimidation.

As a rule, a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. Jurisprudence has invariably
regarded such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually
through intimidation or for monetary consideration
Indeed, the Affidavit of Desistance of private complainant is highly suspect. Apparently, she executed it on the basis of a
consideration of P5,000, which was later increased to P100,000. After her testimony had been rendered, however, appellant
refused to pay the amount agreed upon, thereby prompting her to recant the Affidavit. She had stated therein that "the accused
is indeed innocent of the crimes charge[d] since in truth, he never molested me sexually as charged." Such statement was a
mere legal conclusion, bereft of any details or other indicia of credibility, much less truth. More likely, it emanated not from
this young girls mouth, but from a trained legal mind. Moreover, while she affirmed her Affidavit on the stand, she also
declared, on clarificatory question from the judge, that she was 14 years old when she was molested and raped by
appellant. These facts raise doubts as to the reliability of her statements in her Affidavit.
At this point, we reiterate that, by itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once
it has been instituted in court. 19 In the present case, private complainant lost the right or absolute privilege to decide whether
the rape charge should proceed, because the case had already reached and must therefore continue to be heard by the court a
quo.
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Nonetheless, after a scrutiny of the records and the evidence in this case, we find ourselves unable to affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The testimony of private complainant on the commission of the two counts of rape does not satisfy the standard of proof
required to justify the conviction of appellant. Significantly, she failed to narrate just how the alleged rape took place. She said
nothing at all about how he had supposedly raped her. Private complainants Sworn Statements, which formed part of the
records of the preliminary investigation, cannot be used to convict appellant, because they do not form part of the records of

Our legal culture demands that before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of life, liberty or property, the
requisite quantum of proof must be presented. A strong suspicion or possibility of guilt is not sufficient. Rape is undoubtedly a
vicious crime, and it is rendered more loathsome in this case where the victim is a minor and the accused is a person whom she
perceives as a figure of authority. However, our sympathy for the victim and our disgust at the bestial criminal act cannot
prevail over our primordial role as interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice." If the prosecution fails to discharge its
burden, the court must sustain the presumption of innocence of the accused, whose exoneration must then be granted as a
matter of right.

PEOPLE VS SALAZAR G.R. No. 181900 October 20, 2010


FACTS:
This is an appeal from the June 8, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (Cebu City) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00553
entitled People of the Philippines v. Demetrio Salazar, which affirmed with modification the conviction of accused-appellant
Demetrio Salazar in Criminal Case Nos. A-1620 and A-1621 for two (2) counts of Statutory Rape.
On September 6, 1999, two Informations were filed before the RTC charging accused-appellant with two (2) counts of
statutory rape. It was alleged that accused-appellant, on two (2) separate occasions, had raped a 12-year-old girl, AAA.
On December 6, 1999, in his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. On December 13, 1999, pre-trial of the case
was terminated. Accused-appellant escaped from detention until he was caught, and the hearing of the case began on July 27,
2000.

8
Meanwhile, on February 22, 2000, AAA purportedly executed an Affidavit of Desistance wherein she stated that she was not
raped by accused-appellant and that she no longer intends to pursue the cases filed against accused-appellant. During the
hearing, she explained that her own mother forced her to execute the affidavit upon threat of harm.
The prosecution established that AAA is the daughter of BBB with whom accused-appellant was cohabiting. AAA, BBB, and
accused-appellant all lived in the same one-room house located in XXX, Lavezares, Northern Samar. AAAs biological father,
CCC, was serving time at the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa when the incidents occurred.

Thereafter, the CA issued the assailed decision.


The CA found accused-appellant guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape instead of statutory rape. The CA reasoned that the
prosecution failed to adduce evidence to establish that the rape victim was twelve (12) years old at the time of the
crimes. Further, the CA stated that a baptismal certificate is not sufficient proof of the age of a person. Thus, the victims age
was not established.[21] The CA then modified the penalty imposed upon accused-appellantfrom death penalty to reclusion
perpetua.

The first rape occurred at about 10:00 in the evening of May 18, 1999. At the time, AAA was only twelve (12) years old. While
BBB was out gambling, AAA who was then sleeping in their house was awakened by accused-appellant who had been
drinking. He placed his hand over her mouth, removed her panty, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. AAA felt pain in her
vagina and tried to scream but was stifled by accused-appellants hand over her mouth. She cried instead. Afterwards, accusedappellant stood up and returned to where he was previously sleeping. When her mother had arrived, AAA told her about the
rape. BBB, however, did not believe her and simply dismissed her claims.

Hence, we have this appeal.

On June 25, 1999, at around midnight, accused-appellant again raped AAA. Accused-appellant first slapped her. He then
placed a handkerchief inside her mouth, spread her arms, and inserted his penis inside her vagina while kissing her right
cheek. After the act, accused-appellant stood up, drank coffee, and proceeded to go to sleep. AAA again told the incident to her
mother, who had arrived from another bout of gambling. BBB confronted accused-appellant. After a short argument, BBB
again dismissed her daughters claims.

RULING:

Later, AAA informed her aunt, DDD, about the second rape. Her aunt brought her to the police station to report the
incident. She was later examined by the Municipal Health Officer of Lavezares, Northern Samar.

In any event, AAAs purported Affidavit of Desistance cannot cause the dismissal of the case. It must be pointed out that the
alleged affidavit was executed after the case had already been instituted. Thus, the Court already had acquired jurisdiction over
the case and control over the proceedings. As the Court ruled in People v. Montes: As admitted by appellant, the alleged
Affidavit of Desistance of the victim was never identified by her, but submitted in court only after the institution of the rape
cases. Such being the case, the Affidavit -- even when construed as a pardon in the erstwhile private crime of rape -- is
not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal cases, since the actions have already been instituted. To justify the
dismissal of the Complaints, the pardon should have been made prior to the institution of the criminal actions. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that on the date of the alleged first rape, he was at his farm at Sitio
Napunod, Barangay Caburihan, Lavezares, Northern Samar, making copra. He claimed that the farm is six (6) kilometers away
and could only be negotiated by hiking for one (1) hour. He further claimed that he was at the farm from May 15, 1999 to May
23, 1999.
As to the second alleged rape, accused-appellant alleged that while he was at their house in XXX, AAA was not there. He
claimed that AAA and her brother, EEE, asked permission from, and was allowed by, their mother BBB to watch a show at the
town proper of Lavezares in the evening of June 25, 1999. AAA and EEE allegedly returned home at 7:00 of the following
morning.
At the hearing of the case, the prosecution presented, among others, DDD, as a witness. DDD testified that AAA is her
niece. She also presented a Certificate of Baptism wherein it is stated that AAA was born on April 10, 1987. Dr. Ethel Parane
Simeon, the Municipal Health Officer of Lavezares, was also presented as a witness for the prosecution. She also found
lacerations at the 3, 6, and 11 oclock positions in AAAs vagina. She concluded that AAA was raped. The defenses sole witness
was accused-appellant, who alleged that the relatives of the victims father, CCC, did not approve of his relationship with
BBB. CCCs relatives wanted to take custody of AAA.Accused-appellant claimed that the instant cases were instituted to wrest
custody of AAA from BBB and himself.
The RTC issued its Decision dated July 7, 2003 GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) counts of Statutory Rape.
The records of the case were then transferred to this Court for automatic review. The parties were directed by the Court to
submit their respective briefs. However, in a Resolution dated June 7, 2005 the Court transferred the case to the CA by virtue of
its ruling in People v. Mate providing for intermediate review by the CA of cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court
is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the victims Affidavit of Desistance cannot be given any weight.
2.Whether or not AAAs testimony should be given full weight and credence.

1.The affidavit of desistance relied upon by appellant could not be given any probative weight considering that it was not duly
sworn to. Further, when private complainant was confronted about it, she testified that her mother threatened to kill her should
she refuse to execute the affidavit.

In People v. Ramirez, Jr., the Court was even more circumspect:


As a rule, a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. Jurisprudence has invariably
regarded such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually
through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that it would later on be
repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable.

Indeed, the Affidavit of Desistance of private complainant is highly suspect. Apparently, she executed it on the basis of a
consideration of P5,000, which was later increased to P100,000. After her testimony had been rendered, however, appellant
refused to pay the amount agreed upon, thereby prompting her to recant the Affidavit.
She had stated therein that the accused is indeed innocent of the crimes charge[d] since in truth, he never molested me
sexually as charged. Such statement was a mere legal conclusion, bereft of any details or other indicia of credibility, much less
truth. More likely, it emanated not from this young girls mouth, but from a trained legal mind. Moreover, while she affirmed
her Affidavit on the stand, she also declared, on clarificatory question from the judge, that she was 14 years old when she was
molested and raped by appellant. These facts raise doubts as to the reliability of her statements in her Affidavit.

9
At this point, we reiterate that, by itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action, once it has been instituted in court. In the present case, private complainant lost the right or absolute privilege
to decide whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case had already reached and must therefore continue to
be heard by the court a quo. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying People v. Ramirez, Jr. to the instant case, we find that accused-appellants contentionthat AAAs Affidavit of
Desistance merits the dismissal of the casehas no basis.
2. Next, accused-appellant questions the trial courts reliance on the testimony of AAA. Citing People v. Domogoy,[27] accusedappellant posits that AAAs testimony must be received with caution.
It must be stressed, however, that the victim in People v. Domogoy was twenty-one (21) years old. Here, the contention is that
AAA was only twelve (12) years old at the time that she was raped. This difference is pivotal in light of our ruling in People v.
Montes:[28]

In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled that the testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be given full weight and credence.
Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who barely understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any
man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not true. Her candid narration of how she was raped bears the earmarks of
credibility, especially if no ill will -- as in this case -- motivates her to testify falsely against the accused. It is well-settled that
when a woman, more so when she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the
ravishment. The accused may thus be convicted solely on her testimony -- provided it is credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
While in the more recent People v. Basmayor, the Court ruled:
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence,
considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being the subject of a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire
to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly
improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so
serious as rape if what she claims is not true.

PEOPLE VS ANTONIO G.R. No. 174372 January 20, 2009


FACTS:
The Court of Appeals having affirmed the conviction of Elpidio Antonio (appellant) by the trial court of two counts of rape of
his minor daughter AAA and the denial by the trial court of his Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial anchored
in the main on AAAs purported execution of an Affidavit of Desistance, the present appeal was lodged. Appellant Elpidio
Antonio was by separate Informations charged with two counts of rape of his minor daughter AAA before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Nueva Ecija. The two cases were jointly tried.
At around 6:00 oclock in the morning of June 6, 1994, the then 13-year-old AAA who was sleeping with her six siblings at
their house in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija awoke to find her fatherherein appellant lying beside her, touching her breasts and
vagina. Over her resistance, and at the point of a bladed weapon, he undressed her and inserted his penis into her vagina
causing it to bleed. And he threatened to kill her if she reveals to anyone what he had done.
In the morning of August 14, 1994, again as AAA was sleeping at their house with her siblings, she awoke to find appellant
mashing and sucking her breasts, licking her vagina, pointing a bladed weapon at her, following which, over her resistance, he
undressed her and himself and inserted his penis into her vagina. Again blood oozed from her vagina.
On August 20, 1994 or thereabouts, AAAs mother BBB, who was in Manila at the time the rapes took place, returned to their
house and learned from AAA what had happened to her.
Dr. Benjamin Lopez (Dr. Lopez) who conducted the medical examination explained that the lacerations on AAAs hymen could
have been due to the entry of a hard object into the vagina.
Admitting that AAA is his daughter, appellant denied the charges, claiming that they were filed at BBBs instance in retaliation
for his having driven her away from home following an altercation on August 13, 1994. And to show BBBs motive, appellant
presented his mother who claimed that BBB demanded the payment by appellant of P100,000 and the transfer to her of the
house and lot she (mother) owned as conditions for the dropping of the charges. By Decision of August 15, 2000, Branch 36 of
the Nueva Ecija RTC found appellant guilty of both charges.

Clearly, the trial court correctly gave great weight to the testimony of AAA.

After the promulgation of the trial courts judgment, appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for New
Trial anchored
in
the main on, as stated earlier, the purported execution by AAA of a September 23, 2000 Affidavit of Desistance.

Moreover, given the fact that the CA upheld the findings of the trial court on the factual issues of the case, the Court is bound
by the trial courts assessment of the witnesses, as the Court held in People v. Ducabo:

The trial court denied both motions.

It is well-entrenched that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of a witness deserve great weight, given the
clear advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. We have recognized that the trial court is in the
best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, because of their unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are significant factors
in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. Thus, except for compelling reasons, we are
doctrinally bound by the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.

The records of the cases were thereupon elevated for automatic review to this Court which, following People v.
Mateo providing for an intermediate review of criminal cases where the death penalty, life imprisonment and reclusion
perpetua are imposed, referred them to the Court of Appeals. By Decision of April 25, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial courts decision, hence, the present appeal.
Appellant hinges his appeal on the execution by AAA of an Affidavit of Desistance.
ISSUES:

10
Whether or not the Trial Court erred in its finding that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
rape, despite subsequent retraction and submission of [the] affidavit of desistance by the offended party.

Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Trial ensued
thereafter.

Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial and in not giving credence and disallowing the
probative value of [the] affidavit of desistance of the offended party.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: AAA, the private offended party; BBB, the mother of AAA; CCC,
the cousin of AAA; and Dr. Sarah Bongao Vasquez (Dr. Vasquez), the examining physician who conducted a medical
examination on AAA. AAA, BBB and CCC were likewise presented as rebuttal witnesses.

RULING:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
It bears noting that the affidavit was presented after the judgment of conviction by the trial court was promulgated which, as a
rule, the Court frowns upon. For AAAs supposed Affidavit of Desistance to warrant a new trial, it must deny the truth of her
complaint, not merely seek the withdrawal of appellants prosecution.Her statement that there is no sufficient basis for her
father to be convicted of rape and it is unjust to convict her father and let him suffer ( walang sapat na batayan at hindi
makatarungan na mahatulan at magdusa ang aking amang si Elpidio Antonio) is just a legal conclusion.
Apropos is this Courts pronouncement in People v. Junio:
x x x The unreliable character of [the affidavit of desistance] is shown by the fact that after going through the process of having
accused-appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a
physical examination of her private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her anguish, [the
victim] would suddenly turn around and declare that [a]fter a careful deliberation over the case, (she) find(s) that the same does
not merit nor warrant criminal prosecution.
Parenthetically, the affidavit is of doubtful authenticity, for AAAs purported signature thereon is different from her signature
on her Complaint-Affidavit which she identified in open court.
The conviction of appellant for both counts of rape must thus stand.

PEOPLE VS ALCAZAR G.R. No. 186494 September 15, 2010


FACTS:
For review is the Decision dated 14 March 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02236, which modified the
Decision dated 8 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, 5 th Judicial Region, Branch 9, in Criminal
Case No. FC-00-319, finding herein appellant Roy Alcazar y Miranda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified statutory
rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Article 266-B of the same Code, committed
against AAA and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death. The appellate court instead found appellant guilty of
simple statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellate court further deleted the award of exemplary damages awarded by the trial
court to AAA. The appellate court, however, affirmed the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages to AAA.
Appellant Roy Alcazar y Miranda was charged with raping AAA in an Information dated 27 June 2001.

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:


Sometime in the afternoon of 25 June 2001, while AAA, who was then 10 years old, [6] was sweeping the floor of their house
located in XXX, XXX City, when appellant arrived. AAA immediately climbed to the attic of their house to escape from
appellant for fear that the latter would again do something wrong to her. Unfortunately, appellant was able to get closer to her
in the attic. Appellant then removed AAAs clothes and subsequently took off his own clothes. At once, appellant licked AAAs
vagina. He thereafter inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and made a push and pull movement. AAA did not shout as the
appellant threatened to punch her if she does.
At this juncture, CCC suddenly came into the house of AAA. CCC called out for AAA believing that the latter was just in the
attic. Upon hearing CCC, appellant, instantly responded that AAA was not there as he had sent her for some errands. CCC
noticed from the voice of appellant that he was gasping and seemed tired. While appellant was busy answering CCCs queries,
AAA began putting on her clothes.
CCC then observed from the opening in the attic that somebody was struggling. She subsequently saw a portion of the dress
AAA was wearing on that particular day. With that, CCC hesitantly left the house.
Right away, appellant, once again, removed AAAs clothes. He then inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and made a push and
pull movement. Afterwards, appellant ejaculated. Satisfied, appellant put on his clothes. AAA likewise put on her
clothes. AAA did not tell anyone about her ordeal.
The following day, BBB was awakened by her sister, DDD, who is CCCs mother and to whom CCC revealed what she had
observed in the house of AAA. DDD went to BBB to tell the latter that AAA was raped by appellant. AAA was also awakened
by DDD and the former then narrated to her mother, BBB, and to her aunt, DDD, what the appellant did to her. They
subsequently went to the police station to file a complaint against appellant.
Dr. Vasquezs examination on AAA revealed healed hymenal lacerations at 6 oclock and 12 oclock positions.These findings
were reduced into writing as evidenced by a Medico-Legal Report dated 27 June 2001.
Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He denied having raped AAA and offered a different version of the case.
According to appellant, in the afternoon of 25 June 2001, he was at the old market place in Legazpi City, when his wife, the
sister of AAA, arrived and requested him to fetch their daughter, who was then at AAAs residence in XXX, XXX City. At first,
appellant refused as he still had things to sell and pay but he later on acceded because of his wifes incessant request. Appellant
then proceeded to AAAs residence and fetched his daughter. Thereafter, he left the house, together with his daughter, and they
went to Albay Park.
Appellant claimed that the possible reason why he was charged with rape was the misunderstanding between him and AAAs
uncle, EEE. Appellant averred that on 25 June 2000, he caught his wife inside a theater with another man. He then went to the
house of his in-laws to tell them about what he saw and it so happened that EEE was there. He told EEE about it but the latter

11
told him not to lay hands on his wife, otherwise, something wrong will happen to him. After the incident, he did not frequent
his in-laws place anymore.

somebody asked her to sign it despite the fact that she did not understand its contents. She likewise signed it in the presence of
appellants mother who even asked her to stop the case against her son.

The RTC rendered a Decision dated 8 November 2005 giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
rejecting the defense of denial adduced by appellant.

Given these circumstances, the affidavit of desistance is clearly worthless.

On 14 March 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision modifying the Decision of the trial court and finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple statutory rape.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed to this Court the aforesaid appellate courts Decision.
In a Resolution dated 15 April 2009, this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental
briefs if they so desire. Instead of filing their supplemental briefs, the Office of the Solicitor General and the appellant
manifested that they were adopting their respective briefs filed with the Court of Appeals as their supplemental briefs.
After a careful perusal of the records, this Court affirms appellants conviction for simple statutory rape.
This Court finds unmeritorious appellants argument that if he really raped AAA, the latter and her mother would not have
executed and signed an Affidavit of Desistance.
ISSUE:

As a last effort, appellant maintains that the charge of rape against him was the result of a misunderstanding between him and
AAAs uncle. This is far removed from reality.
It must be emphasized that no member of a rape victims family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the
dishonor to the family unless the crime was in fact committed, especially in this case where the victim and the offender are
relatives.
It is unnatural for a mother to use her daughter as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject her child to embarrassment
and lifelong stigma.
In comparison to the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, appellant could only muster the defense of denial
and alibi. As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the
positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the appellant was the author of the crime charged.
With all the foregoing, this Court is convinced that the appellate court properly convicted appellant for the crime of simple
statutory rape[40] and correctly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Whether or not the Trial Court erred in its finding that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory
rape, despite subsequent retraction and submission of [the] affidavit of desistance by the offended party.
RULING:
NO. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that it looks with disfavor on affidavits of desistance. The rationale for this was
extensively discussed in People v. Junio,[32] cited in People v. Alicante.
x x x We have said in so many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with disfavor by the
courts. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going through the
process of having the [appellant] arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the
humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her
anguish, [the rape victim] would suddenly turn around and declare that [a]fter a careful deliberation over the case, (she) find(s)
that the same does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution. Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an
afterthought which should not be given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before
the court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule
would make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits
of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has
invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable.

In the instant case, records disclose that AAA, who was then 10 years old, and her mother, who has only reached Grade VI,
signed the Affidavit of Desistance without understanding its contents as nobody explained it to them. Such lack of knowledge
as regards the contents of the affidavit was clearly manifested in the statement of AAAs mother that she signed the said
affidavit because appellant raped her daughter. Even AAA repeatedly declared that she filed the case against appellant because
he raped her and that she really wanted to pursue her case against him. AAA also divulged that she signed the affidavit because

Absence of Probable cause, not a ground for MQ


[G.R. No. 144159. September 29, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and MANUEL S. ALBA, respondents.
FACTS:
On February 17, 1999, an Affidavit-Complaint was filed by Luis G. Pabalan in the Office of the Ombudsman against the
respondent, then City Administrator Manuel S. Alba of Quezon City, and the Chairman of Iglesia Evangelica Metodista En Las
Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF), Jeremias T. Cruz. The case was docketed as OMB-0-99-0346 and was assigned to the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) which, in turn, assigned Graft Investigator Romeo M. Pamute to conduct an
evaluation and a preliminary investigation.
Based on the records, the Graft Investigator found that the case stemmed from the following facts:
Respondent MANUEL S. ALBA is a high ranking government official being the City Administrator of Quezon City with a
salary grade of 27 while respondent JEREMIAS T. CRUZ is a private person. The latter is the Chairman of the Evangelist
Methodist Church in the Philippines Novaliches Congregation, Novaliches, Quezon City.
In his sworn complaint, complainant, LUIS PABALAN, stated that he is the owner of a lot located at Susano Road,
Novaliches, Quezon City, where the Congregation of Evangelist Church of the Philippines (IEMELIF) headed by respondent
Architect JEREMIAS T. CRUZ encroached when improvements on their structure were made sometime in February 1997. The
construction was done without the necessary building permit. The Quezon City building official was, accordingly, informed
and consequently after hearing, the Assistant Building Official ordered the demolition of the structure. The Order becomes
final and executory upon failure of the religious congregation (IEMELIF) to appeal on time to the DPWH. TDCaSE

12
On November 4, 1998, however, IEMELIF, through respondent JEREMIAS T. CRUZ, wrote respondent City Administrator,
Mr. MANUEL ALBA requesting the latter that said order be not enforced pending appeal to the DPWH stating, among others,
that the Order of the Assistant Building Official is illegal and the implementation of the same will cause irreparable damage
and injury to the church (IEMELIF).
The letter of IEMELIF was received on November 5, 1998 by the Office of the respondent MANUEL ALBA but a
Memorandum ordering the recall of the demolition order was dated November 4, 1998 or a day before the receipt of said letter.
The complainant objected and in a letter requested respondent ALBA to revoke the Order recalling the demolition, but
respondent City Administrator refused and failed to respond and, as a result, the Building Official was not able to effect the
demolition.
Complainant presented his title to the lot, the Resolution of the Building Official ordering the demolition of the structure; the
Order granting the Motion for Execution; the letter of Appeal by respondent JEREMIAS T. CRUZ to the Mayor of Quezon
City thru respondent MANUEL ALBA stamped received by the City Administrator's Office on November 5, 1998; the
Memorandum of respondent MANUEL S. ALBA to Engr. Romualdo Santos showing that the date is November 4, 1998; and
the letter of objection and request that the recall order on the demolition be corrected was, likewise, presented by the
complainant. 1
In his Counter-Affidavit, the respondent alleged, inter alia, that he acted on the appeal of respondent Cruz and recalled the
demolition order which was issued by the building official. He did so on the basis of the authority delegated to him under the
January 12, 1994 Memorandum issued by the Mayor, as well as the guidelines implementing the said memorandum, where it
was stated that no demolition shall be allowed pending an appeal to higher authorities.
The Graft Investigator found probable cause against the respondent for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic (Rep.) Act No.
3019 and recommended the filing of the Information against him. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation.
On September 9, 1999, an Information was filed with the SB, charging the respondent with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019.
Appended to the Information were the following: (a) the memorandum of the Legal Counsel, Office of the Ombudsman duly
approved by the Ombudsman, which recommended the approval of the resolution of the EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman,
finding probable cause against the respondent, as well as the prosecution of the crime charged; (b) the affidavit-complaint; (c)
the counter-affidavit of the respondent; and (d) the Resolution of the EPIB. As ordered by the SB, the special prosecutor
submitted Annexes "A" to "F" of the affidavit-complaint and Annexes "1" to "4" of the respondent's counter-affidavit on
September 24, 1999.
On October 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the SB a Motion for Leave to Order Reinvestigation and/or Quash Information
on the following grounds:
I
THE FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, WHICH
WAS THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS
AND EVIDENCE OF THIS CASE.
II

THE FACTS RECITED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT SUFFICIENT IN SUBSTANCE TO INDICT THE ACCUSED
CRIMINALLY, BECAUSE THEY WERE BASED ON ERRONEOUS PREMISES CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTION
OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN. 3
During the hearing of the motion, the respondent, through counsel, agreed to convert his motion into a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of the Ombudsman finding probable cause against him.
On January 25, 2000, the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion, 5 informing the SB that, after a review of the
case, the Office of the Ombudsman was affirming its finding of probable cause against the respondent and prayed for his
arraignment.
and pleaded not guilty. On the same day, the SB issued an Order 9 granting his motion for leave to travel abroad without
prejudice to the resolution of his motion to quash information. On April 14, 2000, the Special Prosecutor filed her
Comment/Opposition 10 to the respondent's motion to quash.
On June 23, 2000, the SB issued a Resolution granting the motion to quash the information of the accused and acquitting the
respondent of the charge. 11 The SB held that based on the records, there was no probable cause to charge the
respondent of the crime. It based its findings on the Memorandum of then Mayor Ismael A. Mathay to the respondent dated
January 12, 1994, and a portion of the Resolution of Graft Investigator Romeo Pamute dated July 23, 1999 which was duly
approved by the Ombudsman. The SB lifted the Hold Departure Order it earlier issued on June 26, 2000. 12

ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ACQUITTED MANUEL ALBA OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 25653 DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE HAS NOT YET BEEN ARRAIGNED OR THE
PROSECUTION ALLOWED TO PROVE ITS CASE.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO


LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED MANUEL ALBA'S MOTION TO QUASH ON THE BASIS
OF A MEMORANDUM ISSUED BY THE QUEZON CITY MAYOR, WHICH MEMORANDUM HAS ALREADY BEEN
SUPERSEDED.
3. Whether or not the absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is a ground for the quashal of
the Information.
RULING:
On the first issue, the petitioner avers that the SB acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in quashing the information.
We agree with the petitioner. The records show that the SB quashed the information with the ruling that the respondent acted
on the basis of the January 12, 1994 Memorandum to him of then Mayor Ismael Mathay

13
The SB ruled that, based on the facts and the evidence on record, there was no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against the respondent; hence, the information should be quashed and the respondent be acquitted of the crime
charged. IacHAE
We also agree with the petitioner's contention that the January 12, 1994 Memorandum of Mayor Mathay is even contrary
to Section 307 of Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines,".
To rectify his erroneous January 12, 1994 Memorandum, Mayor Mathay had to issue Memorandum No. 4 to the respondent.
Moreover, in Opinion No. 36, Series of 1996, the Secretary of Justice succinctly ruled that only the city engineer, as the
building official, has the exclusive authority to act on matters relating to the issuance of demolition permits or the revocation or
suspension thereof.
What is worrisome is that, to justify its illegal quashal of the information, the SB quoted only a portion of the resolution of
Special Prosecutor Pamute, and omitted, either deliberately or inadvertently
We note that during the hearing of October 8, 1999, the respondent agreed that his motion for leave to order reinvestigation
and/or quash the information be converted to a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman,
finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.

With the conversion of the Omnibus Motion of the respondent into a motion for reconsideration, he, in effect, withdrew his
motion to quash the information. Accordingly, the required reinvestigation was conducted to ascertain, once again, if there was
probable cause for the filing of the information. There was, thus, no motion to quash the information pending resolution by the
SB.
Under Section 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion to quash an Information may be filed only for the
following grounds:
SEC. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

To quash means to annul, vacate or overthrow. 23 The absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
not a ground for the quashal of the Information but is a ground for the dismissal of the case.
It bears stressing that, even before the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Regional Trial Court issues a
warrant for the arrest of the accused only upon a finding of probable cause based on the resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor, the affidavits and other evidences appended to the Information, whatever evidence the Prosecutor may adduce
upon order of the court. If the court finds that there is no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, it may dismiss
the case. The dismissal of the case is without prejudice to the refiling thereof unless barred by prescription. Indeed, the
procedure is now encoded in Section 6, Rule 112, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court is mandated to
immediately dismiss the case upon finding that no probable cause exists to issue a warrant of arrest, and after having evaluated
the resolution of the prosecutor and the supporting evidence:
The absence or presence of probable cause is to be determined from the material averments of the information and the
appendages thereof, as enumerated in Rule 112, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
By quashing the Information on the premise of lack of probable cause instead of merely dismissing the case, the SB
acted in violation of case law and, thus, acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
On the second issue, we find and so rule that in acquitting the respondent of the crime charged before trial, and without the
latter having prayed for such relief, the SB acted without jurisdiction, thereby depriving the petitioner of its right to due
process.
And yet, the SB acquitted the respondent. It is basic that the dismissal of a case is different from the acquittal of the accused
therein. Except in a dismissal of the case based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of
the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case will not result in the acquittal of the said accused.
By its precipitate and patently illegal acts, the SB deprived the petitioner of its right to due process, an aberration that should
not be countenanced. The assailed Resolutions of the SB are, thus, null and void.

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are
NULLIFIED. The records are remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

Matters of Defense, Not a Ground for Motion to Quash

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

[G.R. No. 159517-18. June 30, 2009.]

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), and PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), respondents.

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;


(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 22

FACTS:
Hilario P. Soriano (Soriano) and Rosalinda Ilagan (Ilagan) were the President and General Manager, respectively, of the Rural
Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM). Allegedly, on June 27, 1997 and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency as
president and manager of the bank, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified the loan applications and
other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Maaol obtained loans of P15,000,000.00 each,
when in fact they did not.

14
Accordingly, on May 4, 2000, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia charged Soriano in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, with violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A. No. 337) or the General Banking Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, or Violation of the Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI) Rules
(DOSRI Rules).
On the same date, an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial document was also filed against Soriano and
Ilagan
Another information for violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended, was filed against Soriano, this time, covering the
P15,000,000.00 loan obtained in the name of Rogelio Maaol.
Soriano and Ilagan were also indicted for estafa thru falsification of commercial document for obtaining said loan.
Petitioners moved to quash the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000 (pending before Branch
14), and also in Criminal Case Nos. 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000 (pending with Branch 77), on grounds that: (i) more than
one (1) offense is charged; and (ii) the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Specifically, petitioners argued that the
prosecutor charged more than one offense for a single act. Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru
falsification of commercial document for allegedly securing fictitious loans. They further argued that the facts as alleged in the
information do not constitute an offense.
In an Order 6 dated November 15, 2000, RTC Branch 77 denied the motion to quash.
Petitioners' motion to quash informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000 before Branch 14 likewise
suffered the same fate, as Judge Braga Dime denied the same in an Order 8 dated November 27, 2000
Petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, assailing the Orders of Branch 77 and Branch 14. The petitions were
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 64648 and 64649. By decision 10 of August 5, 2003, the CA, which priorly consolidated the
petitions, sustained the denial of petitioners' separate motions to quash:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC Branch 14 and Branch 77 abused their discretion in denying their motions to quash informations and
whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing their petitions for certiorari.
RULING:
NO. The appeal should be denied.
The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner by
reason of passion and hostility. The word capricious, usually used in tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of
willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative. 12
We reviewed the records before us, and we discerned no caprice or arbitrariness on the part of the RTC in denying the motions.
Petitioners assail the validity of the informations against them on the ground that more than one (1) offense is charged. They
point that Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI Rules and with estafa thru falsification of commercial document for
allegedly obtaining loans from RBSM. Thus, they claim that the informations were duplicitous; hence, they should be quashed.

Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information under Section 3 (e), Rule
117 13 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous information to avoid confusing
the accused in preparing his defense. 14
By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense.
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with more than one
information, each charging a different offense violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in
separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations.
Petitioners also contend that Soriano should be charged with one offense only, because all the charges filed against him
proceed from and are based on a single act of obtaining fictitious loans. Thus, Soriano argues that he cannot be charged
with estafa thru falsification of commercial document, considering that he is already being prosecuted for obtaining a DOSRI
loan. TDcCIS
The contention has no merit.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a single act or incident might offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, 17 thus justifying the filing of several charges against the accused.
As aptly pointed out by the BSP in its memorandum, there are differences between the two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation
consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant
of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other related interests in the bank, i.e.,lack of written approval of the majority of
the directors of the bank and failure to enter such approval into corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP
supervising department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are essential
to the prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges against Soriano was,
therefore, proper. CE
Petitioners next question the sufficiency of the allegations in the informations, contending that the same do not constitute an
offense.
The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a), 19 Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. 20 The trial court may not consider a situation
contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information. Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against
the charge under the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute
proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the
offense.
Verily, there is no justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners. The RTC committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions.
In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a
motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without
prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an
adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. 25 Thus, petitioners should not have
forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the

15
special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case that
would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari.

and on the allegation that in denying his motion to quash, respondent Sandiganbayan had acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, petitioner brought the instant petition.

Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.

ISSUE:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Whether or not the absence of Preliminary Investigation is a Ground for Motion to Quash.
RULING:

Absence of Preliminary Investigation, Not a Ground for Motion to Quash

No.

[G.R. Nos. 71404-09. October 26, 1988.]

The analysis of respondent People, thru the Solicitor General, as to the real nature of the controversy at bar is correct. It is not
disputed that a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Tanodbayan prior to the filing of the informations. Petitioner,
however, was not able to participate therein as the subpoena addressed to him at PHILFINANCE his last known address, was
returned "unserved," petitioner having already severed his employment with said company at the time of service. As petitioner
reportedly left PHILFINANCE under most unfriendly circumstances, PHILFINANCE did not give the process server his
residence address on record with it.

HERMILO RODIS, SR., petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
On May 22, 1985, petitioner Hermilo v. Rodis, Sr., former President of the Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation
(PHILFINANCE), together with some other persons, was charged before the Sandiganbayan in separate informations docketed
therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 10389, 10390, 10391, 10393 and 10394 with five (5) counts of violation of Section 3(b)
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On May 31, 1985, petitioner filed a motion to quash said informations as against him on the ground of lack of preliminary
investigation, with the alternative prayer that the "issue and/or enforcement of the warrant of arrests as against him be held in
abeyance while he seeks a reinvestigation by the Tanodbayan pursuant to his right of (sic) preliminary investigation." 2
In its opposition to said motion, the Prosecution cited as basis therefor Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure enumerating the grounds for a motion to quash. It argued that since lack of preliminary investigation is not among
those enumerated thereunder, the motion to quash on this ground should be denied for lack of merit and instead, petitioner
should be ordered to file his Petition for Reinvestigation and/or Motion for Reconsideration in accordance with Section 13 of
the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Tanodbayan. 3
Petitioner filed a Reply to the Opposition controverting the prosecution's claim that lack of preliminary investigation is not a
ground for quashing the information; but manifesting that he would file a petition for re-investigation with the Tanodbayan as
suggested. 4 This he did, on June 24, 1985. prcd
On July 15, 1985, while petitioner's petition for reinvestigation was pending action by a the Tanodbayan, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated the assailed resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit, stating:
". . . this Court is of the considered opinion that the alleged absence of preliminary investigation with respect to the accusedmovant (herein petitioner) or his inability to participate in the preliminary investigation for the reason that he was not duly
served with a subpoena is not a proper ground for a motion to quash. If the accused was not afforded due preliminary
investigation, the proper remedy for him is to file a Petition for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, pursuant to
Section (13) of Administrative Order No. 111 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Tanodbayan, promulgated on December
1, 1979." 5
On the premise that no appeal or any plain and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law will prove adequate under the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar arraignment, pre-trial and trial having been set on August 26, 27 and 28, 1985

Under Section 3, sub-section (d) of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, "if the respondent cannot be
subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall
base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant." It is to be noted that this provision does not require as a
condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were
made, and an opportunity to controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him. The obvious purpose of the rule is to
block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing
dilatory tactics.
Considering that petitioner has voluntarily appeared before the respondent Sandiganbayan in connection with the criminal
cases in question and has appeared in other preliminary investigation of other PHILFINANCE charges filed in various fiscals'
offices and the Ministry (now Department) of Justice, it is apparent that the non-service of the subpoena upon him was not of
his own doing or liking. To apply the full force and effect of section 3, sub-section (d) of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure would, to our mind, greatly prejudice him.
It is worthwhile repeating that the avowed purposes of a preliminary investigation are "to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. 9 And while the "absence
of preliminary investigations does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case (n)or do they impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective, but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before
entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information, should
conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary
investigation may be conducted. 10 In this case, the Tanodbayan has the duty to conduct the said investigation. 11
Thus, although the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground
for quashing an information, it should have held the proceedings in the criminal cases in abeyance pending resolution
by the Tanodbayan of petitioner's petition for reinvestigation, as alternatively prayed for by him in his motion to quash.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of the respondent Sandiganbayan dated July 15, 1985 in Criminal Cases No. 10389,
10390, 10391, 10393 and 10394 is hereby affirmed, but respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered to hold in abeyance the

16
proceedings therein with respect to petitioner, subject to the outcome of the reinvestigation of the Tanodbayan of the aforesaid
cases. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court of August 1, 1985 is deemed superseded by this directive.

The Office of the Ombudsman through the OSP moved for reconsideration insofar as respondent Judge granted the
motion to quash the Informations.
ISSUE:

[G.R. Nos. 118813-14. April 8, 1997.]


HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman, Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner, vs. HON. MARIETTA
HOBILLA-ALINIO in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 62, Bago City, and MAYOR
LUIS MONDIA JR., SGT. RUBEN OLVIDO, PAT. ERNESTO ENESERIO JR., JERRY VISTA, JOEL TREYES,
RUFINO MONDIA, SAMSON MONDIA, MANNY MONDIA, RODRIGO MONDIA JR., NORBERTO ESPAOLA,
ROBINSON GALANZA and NOEL OCCEA, respondents.
FACTS:
SEEKING JUSTICE for the killing of her husband Dionesio Odelmo and her father-in-law Jose Odelmo on 31 December
1992, Corazon Odelmo appeared before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas on 12 February 1993 and filed a
complaint for murder against respondents Mayor Luis Mondia Jr. of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, Sgt. Ruben Olvido, Pat.
Ernesto Eneserio Jr., Jerry Vista, Joel Treyes, Rufino Mondia, Samson Mondia, Manny Mondia, Rodrigo Mondia Jr., Norberto
Espaola, Robinson Galanza and Noel Occea. cdphil
After preliminary investigation the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman concluded that there was probable cause to hold private
respondents liable for the crime charged. Thus, in a resolution dated 10 August 1993 it recommended the filing of an
Information for double murder against all of them before the Sandiganbayan.
However upon review the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) appreciated the evidence antithetically; it found that two (2)
separate crimes of murder were committed but the commission thereof was not in relation to the performance of the duties of
private respondents. In view thereof it recommended on 14 December 1993 the filing of two (2) separate Informations before
the Regional Trial Court of Bago City.
On 28 December 1993 the resolution of 14 December 1993 of the OSP modifying the resolution of 10 August 1993 of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman was approved by petitioner Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
Accordingly, on 17 January 1994 two (2) Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bago City, and on 18
January 1994 the corresponding warrants/orders of arrest were issued. That same day private respondents filed a motion to
recall warrants/orders of arrest on the ground that they had not yet received copy of the complaint, neither had they been
furnished by the Office of the Ombudsman copy of the resolution of 14 December 1993, as required under Sec. 6, Rule
II, 1 ofAdministrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman. 2 They claimed that this resulted in a denial of their right
to seek reconsideration or reinvestigation in contravention of Sec. 7 3 of the Administrative Order. Moreover, they posited that
the Office of the Ombudsman had no authority to file the Informations in view of its own finding that the crime was not
committed by the accused in relation to their office. The following day private respondents filed a motion to quash the
Informations based on lack of authority.
On 26 January 1994 respondent Judge found that the Office of the Ombudsman failed to furnish private respondents copy of
the resolution of 14 December 1993 depriving them of their right to move for reconsideration or to elevate the matter to a
higher office before the Informations were filed. Consequently she ordered that the execution of the warrants/orders of arrest
be held in abeyance. For the same reason, she also granted the motion to quash the Informations. 4

Whether or not the failure to furnish a copy of the resolution to private respondents was an authorized ground to quash the
Informations under Sec. 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
RULING:
No.
Petitioner further asks the Court to resolve the issue concerning the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute illegal acts and omissions of public officers which respondent Judge did not pass upon.
Private respondents on the other hand charge that certiorari is an improper remedy from an order quashing the Informations for
it cannot substitute for a lost appeal.
We rule for petitioner. Under Sec. 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, it is clear that failure of the prosecution to furnish
copy of the resolution to private respondents is not one of the grounds to quash an information. Private respondents'
proposition that the Office of the Ombudsman had no authority to file the Informations would have held solid ground under
Sec. 3, par. (c), of the Rule. But this seems to have been ignored by respondent Judge. Be that as it may, on the assumption that
this ground was invoked and applied, it would still be inappropriate to quash the Informations because the fact that private
respondents had not yet been served with copy of the resolution rendered the filing of the Informations premature, since the
avenue for a reconsideration or reinvestigation was still accessible. It is in this instance that the doctrine in Torralba rightfully
comes into play.
In Torralba we found that the averments of petitioners that they had not been served with copies of the final resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman, the approved modified memorandum of the Special Prosecution Officer as well as the special audit
report were not controverted. The inevitable conclusion then was that petitioners were not only effectively denied the
opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration but were also deprived of their right to a full preliminary investigation
preparatory to the filing of the Informations against them. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that
The incomplete preliminary investigation in this case . . . does not warrant the quashal of the information, nor should it
obliterate the proceedings already had. Neither is the court's jurisdiction nor validity of an information adversely affected by
deficiencies in the preliminary investigation. Instead, the Sandiganbayan is to hold in abeyance any further proceedings therein
and to remand the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for the completion of the preliminary investigation, 8 the outcome of
which shall then be indorsed to (the) Sandiganbayan for its appropriate action.
It is thus manifest that respondent Judge capriciously and whimsically ordered the quashing of the Informations
notwithstanding our ruling in Torralba and Sec. 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court.
While we recognize that certiorari as a remedy may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially a lost appeal, this rule
should not be strictly enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious. 14 In the final analysis, certiorari as an extraordinary
legal remedy is intended to annul or void proceedings in order to ensure the fair and orderly administration of justice.
Unquestionably, the circumstances of the present petition warrant direct recourse to this Court.
On the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to file the Informations before respondent Judge, we need only quote Sec.
15, of RA 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which provides:

17
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order of respondent Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alinio dated 26 January 1994
insofar as it quashed the Informations as well as the order dated 14 July 1994 denying reconsideration thereof is SET ASIDE.
Respondent Judge having in the meantime died, 16 any other Judge replacing her or to whom these cases may be reassigned is
directed to remand the cases to the Office of the Ombudsman for completion of the proceedings by furnishing copy of the
questioned orders to private respondents and thereafter resolving with dispatch whatever incidents may ensue thereunder, the
result of which shall then be immediately indorsed to the RTC-Br. 62, Bago City, or any other branch to which the cases may
be reassigned, for appropriate action.

Test in appreciating a MQ
GO V. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, 2009
Facts
Go was charged with a violation of section 83 of RA 337 or the General Banking Act.
Go moved for the quashal of the information.
Go averred that based on the facts alleged in the Information, he was being prosecuted for borrowing the deposits or funds of
the Orient Bank and/or acting as a guarantor, indorser or obligor for the banks loans to other persons. The use of the word
"and/or" meant that he was charged for being either a borrower or a guarantor, or for being both a borrower and guarantor. Go
claimed that the charge was not only vague, but also did not constitute an offense. He posited that Section 83 of RA 337
penalized only directors and officers of banking institutions who acted either as borrower or as guarantor, but not as both.
RTC granted Gos motion to quash.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------What is the determinate test in a appreciating a motion to quash?
The determinative test in appreciating a motion to quash is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether
the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by law without
considering matters aliunde.
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the finer details of why and how the illegal
acts alleged amounted to undue injury or damage matters that are appropriate for the trial.
Were the elements alleged sufficient to constitute the offense?
Under Section 83, RA 337, the following elements must be present to constitute a violation of its first paragraph:
1. the offender is a director or officer of any banking institution;

2. the offender, either directly or indirectly, for himself or as representative or agent of another, performs any of the following
acts:
a.

he borrows any of the deposits or funds of such bank; or

b.

he becomes a guarantor, indorser, or surety for loans from such bank to others, or

c.

he becomes in any manner an obligor for money borrowed from bank or loaned by it;

3. the offender has performed any of such acts without the written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank,
excluding the offender, as the director concerned.
The essence of the crime is becoming an obligor of the bank without securing the necessary written approval of the majority of
the banks directors.
To make a distinction between the act of borrowing and guarantying is therefore unnecessary because in either situation, the
director or officer concerned becomes an obligor of the bank against whom the obligation is juridically demandable.
Was the RTCs immediate approval of the MQ proper?
Even assuming that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an offense, it was erroneous for the RTC to
immediately order the dismissal of the Information, without giving the prosecution a chance to amend it.
SEC. 4, Rule 117. Amendment of complaint or information.If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
Although an Information may be defective because the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the dismissal of the case will
not necessarily follow. The Rules specifically require that the prosecution should be given a chance to correct the defect; the
court can order the dismissal only upon the prosecutions failure to do so.
There was grave abuse of discretion.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S.


BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST
DIVISION,|||
Facts:
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation,with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the
exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization for the stay of the aliens in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the
legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits
to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused."

18
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office
where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word
"office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused. 8

Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to dismiss or quash said
information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
issue an order suspending petitioner.

En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of the information must be
determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct thereof. It has been said that

On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her.

The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof
to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction issuing suspension to petitioner.

RULING:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with
violation of the provisions ofRepublic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute
provides:

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
In view of suspension NOT as a penalty
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity
of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to
issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it."

Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged
may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.

". . . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a
fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him e.g. that he has
not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his
mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of
the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court . . .'
"xxx xxx xxx
"Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is
charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right
to present a motion to quash the information on any other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of court.
"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the accused is charged
do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code,
should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground
provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an
inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense
punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code."

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the
merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against
him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose
a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing
preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office
under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in
Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of
RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board
of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

19
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People vs.
Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,

The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 and assigned to Branch 83 of the said court.

(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions.'

On 2 March 1992, the private respondent filed a Motion to Quash alleging prescription of the offense as ground therefor. She
contended that by the petitioner's admissions in his testimony given-on 23 January 1991 in Civil Case No. 90-52730, entitled
"Jose G. Garcia v. Delia S. Garcia," and in his complaint filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on 16 October 1991,
the petitioner discovered the commission of the offense as early as 1974. Pursuant then to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), 4 the period of prescription of the offense started to run therefrom. Thus, since bigamy was punishable by prision
mayor, 5 an afflictive penalty 6 which prescribed in fifteen years pursuant to Article 92 of the RPC, then the offense charged
prescribed in 1989, or fifteen years after its discovery by the petitioner.|||

"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019." 16

The trial court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the criminal case

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge
its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, he contended therein that: (a) the trial court erred in quashing the
information on the ground of prescription; and (b) the counsel for the accused was barred from filing the motion to quash the
information against the accused.|||

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks under the Constitution which provides that each
". . . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence
of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days."

JOSE G. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ADELA TEODORA
P. SANTOS
Facts:
The issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's order granting
the motion to quash the information for bigamy based on prescription.
Petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office an "Affidavit of Complaint" 1 charging his wife,
private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos alias "Delia Santos," with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A.
No. 6085, and Falsification of Public Documents. However, in his letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor
George F. Cabanilla, the petitioner informed the latter that he would limit his action to bigamy.|||
After appropriate proceedings, Assistant Prosecutor Cabanilla filed on 8 January 1992 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City an information, 3 dated 15 November 1991, charging the private respondent with Bigamy allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or before the 2nd day of February, 1957, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being previously united in lawful marriage with REYNALDO QUIROCA, and without the
said marriage having been dissolved, (or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
JOSE G.GARCIA, which marriage has [sic] discovered in 1989, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such
amount as may be awarded under the provisionsof the Civil Code.

Petitioner referred to the general rule stated in People v. Alagao 15 "that in resolving the motion to quash a criminal complaint
or information[,] the facts alleged in the complaint or information should be taken as they are." The information in this case
mentioned that the bigamy was discovered in 1989. He admitted, however, that this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the
ground for the motion to quash is prescription of the offense, as provided in Section 4 of the old Rule 117 of the Rules
ofCriminal Procedure. Nonetheless, he advanced the view that this exception is no longer available because of the implied
repeal of Section 4, as the amended Rule 117 no longer contains a similar provision under the rule on motions to quash; and
that granting there was no repeal, the private respondent failed to introduce evidence to "support her factual averment in her
motion to quash," which is required by Rule 117.
Court of Appeals gave credence to the private respondent's evidence and concluded that the petitioner discovered the private
respondent's first marriage in 1974. Since the information in this case was filed in court only on 8 January 1992, or eighteen
years after the discovery of the offense, then the 15-year prescriptive period had certainly lapsed. 16 It further held that the
quash of an information based on prescription of the offense could be invoked before or after arraignment and even on appeal,
17 for under Article 89(5) of the RPC, the criminal liability of a person is "'totally extinguish[ed]' by the prescription of the
crime, which is a mode of extinguishing criminal liability." Thus, prescription is not deemed waived even if not pleaded as a
defense.
ISSUE:
The issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's order granting the
motion to quash the information for bigamy based on prescription.
RULING:
The petitioner's contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 which
states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is palpably unmeritorious. Even People v. Alagao, 24 which he cites, mentions
the exceptions to the rule as provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117 viz., (a)
extinction of criminal liability, and (k) double jeopardy. His additional claim that the exception of extinction can no longer be
raised due to the implied repeal of the former Section 4, 25 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction
after its revision, is equally without merit. No repeal, express or implied, of the said Section 4 ever took place. While there is

20
no provision in the new Rule 117 that prescribes the contents of a motion to quash based on extinction of criminal liability,
Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the former Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the old Rule 117. The said Section 2 reads as follows:
SEC. 2. Form and contents. The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his counsel. It shall specify
distinctly the factual and legal groundstherefor and the court shall consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. (3a, 4a, 5a). (emphasis supplied)
It is clear from this Section that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal
liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it
necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds. As a matter of fact,
inquiry into such facts may be allowed where the ground invoked is that the allegations in the information do not constitute the
offense charged. Thus, in People v. De la Rosa, this Court stated:
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense
charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted. However, as held in the case of People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516, additional facts not alleged in the
information, but admitted or not denied by the prosecution may be invoked in support of the motion to quash. Former Chief
Justice Moran supports this theory.

Facts:
Jimmy Tabio was charged with three (3) counts of rape in a single Information, 1 the accusatory portion of which
reads as follows:
That between June 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002 in [Aurora] 2 the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and
willfully, have carnal knowledge of mentally retarded AAA 3 by means of force and intimidation three times all committed
while the victim was alone inside their house and during nighttime which was taken advantage of to facilitate the commission
of the crime.
Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96. 4 Trial on the
merits ensued.
RTC handed down a decision finding appellant guilty and imposing the penalty of death on three (3) counts of qualified rape,
defined in Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) and penalized under Article 266-B, paragraph 6 (10) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court of Appeals 15 affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The appellate court found appellant guilty
of all three (3) counts for simple rape only and not qualified rape.
ISSUE:

In Criminal Case No. 92-27272, the trial court, without objection on the part of the prosecution, allowed the private respondent
to offer evidence in support of her claim that the crime had prescribed. Consequently, the trial court, upon indubitable proof of
prescription, correctly granted the motion to quash. It would have been, to quoteDe la Rosa, "pure technicality for the court to
close its eyes to [the fact of prescription] and still give due course to the prosecution of the case" a technicality which would
have meant loss of valuable time of the court and the parties. cdasia
As noted by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, Jr., consultant of the Rules of Court Revision Committee, the aforequoted Section 2 of the
new Rule 117 on "factual and legal grounds"of a motion to quash is based on the De la Rosa case.
The petitioner likewise claims that the factual bases of the private respondent's motion to quash are inconclusive. The
petitioner cannot be allowed to disown statements he made under oath and in open court when it serves his purpose. This is a
contemptible practice which can only mislead the courts and thereby contribute to injustice. Besides, he never denied having
given the pertinent testimony. He did, however, term it vague in that it was not clear whether the prior marriage which Eugenia
Balingit disclosed to him was that entered into by the private respondent with Reynaldo Quiroca. It is immaterial to whom the
private respondent was first married; what is relevant in this case is that the petitioner was informed of a prior marriage
contracted by the private respondent.
Neither may the petitioner be heard to cast doubt on the meaning of his statements in his sworn complaint filed before the
CSC. We find no hint of vagueness in them. In any event, he has not denied that he in fact discovered in 1974 that the private
respondent had been previously married.

1.
whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of qualified rape with the penalty of death in view of the prosecution's
failure to allege a qualifying circumstance in the information;
2.
whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of all three (3) counts of rape despite the alleged failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
The Court of Appeals properly resolved the first error in appellant's favor. The information should have warranted a
judgment of guilt only for simple, not qualified rape. We quote with approval the appellate court when it said:
Under Article 266-B (10) 17 of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional
disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the
imposition of the death penalty. Rule 110 18 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and aggravating
circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information. 19
In the case at bench, however, the information merely states that the appellant had carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded
complainant. It does not state that appellant knew of the mental disability of the complainant at the time of the commission of
the crime. It bears stressing that the rules now require that the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the
death penalty should be specifically stated in the information. Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code could not, thus, be
applied and the supreme penalty of death could not be validly imposed. 20
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be alleged with specificity in the information.

Effect of failure to assert any ground of a MQ


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JIMMY TABIO

The Court also observes that there is duplicity of the offenses charged in the information, which is a ground for a motion to
quash. Three (3) separate acts of rape were charged in one information only. But the failure of appellant to interpose an
objection on this ground constitutes waiver. As provided under Rule 117, Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any

21
ground therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this
Rule.|||
While the Court affirms that appellant is guilty of simple rape, we nonetheless find that only the first rape was conclusively
proven. The second and third rapes of which appellant was charged and found guilty, were not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
Our courts have been traditionally guided by three settled principles in the prosecution of the crime of rape: (1) an accusation
for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand
on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. 24 In a prosecution for rape, the
complainant's candor is the single most important issue. If a complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused
may be convicted on the sole basis thereof.

Denial of a MQ
Serana vs Sandiganbayan

RULING:
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a
motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards interlocutory
orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. 21 The evident reason for this rule is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action. 22 HADTEC
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 23 the Court clearly illustrated explained and illustrated the rule and the
exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final
judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go
to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order
denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of
acquittal.

Facts:
Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student regent of the University of the
Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance of her official functions, she represented to former President
Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Student Hall and for which purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00.
Petitioner moved to quash the information. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person
because as a UP student regent, she was not a public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a member in
representation of the student body since she merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a simple student and did not receive
any salary as a UP student regent; and 3.) she does not fall under Salary Grade 27.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be
unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is
made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.

The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had the general powers of
administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an essential part of public office.

In de Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, this Court granted the petition forcertiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent
court to dismiss the case.

Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant
belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university. It is wellestablished in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of
non-stock corporations.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this
Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of
jurisdiction in not quashing the information and dismising the case notwithstanding that is has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged in the information.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted
the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted
the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case. aCHDAE

22
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.

Petitioner filed a Motion praying that a hearing be conducted to determine the existence of probable cause and to hold in
abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him. On June 16, 2004, private respondent filed an Opposition thereto.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double
jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss
the same.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the three (3) Informations to which private respondent filed an Opposition. On
June 30, 2006, Branch 49 issued a Joint Order denying the aforesaid motion. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
petitioner citing absence of probable cause and lack of jurisdiction over his person as grounds in support of his motion.
However, upon the request of private respondent's parents, the Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from hearing the three (3)
cases. Finally, the cases were raffled to Branch 3 of the RTC of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, presided over by Judge Venancio J.
Amila (Judge Amila).|||

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and
the criminal case was dismissed by this Court. 24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. (Laurel vs
Desierto)
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.

The lower court issued an Omnibus Order denying petitioner's omnibus motion for reconsideration to quash the informations.
On November 22, 2006, petitioner filed anew an Urgent Omnibus Motion to Quash. On November 30, 2006, the RTC issued
an Order denying the second omnibus motion to quash, and set the arraignment on December 15, 2006. A day before the
arraignment, petitioner filed a Second Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying his motion to quash.|||
Petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari 5 before the CA claiming that the family court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the orders denying his omnibus motions to quash the informations.|||
A rendered a Decision 6 affirming the Orders of the RTC. In denying the petition, the CA ratiocinated that it cannot reverse the
RTC orders because: (1) an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and not appealable; and (2) the petitioner failed to
positively prove grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge in the issuance of the assailed orders.

ISSUE:
Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Third, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the
public office.
Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

LYNDON D. BOISER vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


Facts:
The main issue in this case is whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC which
denied petitioner's omnibus motion to quash the informations filed against him.
Three (3) Informations were filed against petitioner, charging him with acts of lasciviousness, other acts of child
abuse, and rape 4 of minor AAA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tagbilaran, Bohol.

Whether or not Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in denying the Motion to Quash

RULING:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy against an order denying a motion to quash. The
accused should instead go to trial, without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion
and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Based on
the findings of the investigating prosecutor and of the trial judge, probable cause exists to indict petitioner for the 3 offenses.
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the investigating prosecutor or any other officer authorized by law to
conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officer's finding and determination of probable cause,
since the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.
It is obvious to this Court that petitioner's insistent filing of numerous motions to inhibit the judge hearing the 3 criminal cases
and of motions to quash is a ploy to delay the proceedings, a reprehensible tactic that impedes the orderly administration of
justice. If he is truly innocent, petitioner should bravely go to trial and prove his defense. After all, the purpose of a preliminary
investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause needs only
to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

23
As to the allegation of petitioner that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over his person, this issue has been rendered moot
and academic with petitioner's arraignment in the 3 cases and his taking part in the proceedings therein.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

*See also Lazarte v. SB, 180122, 2009


*And Javier v. SB, 147026-27, 2009

At the heart of the policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the
same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The constitutional provision, therefore,
guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Nevertheless, the prosecution is entitled to one opportunity to require the accused to stand trial. Should the prosecution waive
this right to a full-blown trial, the defendant has the right to have his or her trial completed by a particular tribunal. If the trial
is terminated before it is completed, and it is dismissed with the consent of the defendant, then double jeopardy will not attach.
Were all requisites present?

*See Go v. BSP, 178429, 2009

The fourth requisite was not. The Order dated 11 February 2004 of the RTC categorically stated that the defense counsel
moved for the dismissal of the cases against the respondents. Verily, respondents, through counsel, had given their express
consent to the termination of the case on 11 February 2004.

Double Jeopardy

The defense counsels reason for motion was the prosecutors motion to withdraw information.

CO V. LIM, 2009

What is the high courts directive?

NBI raided Gos video store for cell cards that were stolen from Co. Lim, who was found administering the store at the time of
the raid, was arrested. A total of thirty (30) boxes containing cell cards worth P332,605.00 were seized from the store. Lim was
charged with the violation of PD 1612 or Anti-Fencing Law.

The records of this case shall be remanded to the trial court in order that it may resolve the Motion to Withdraw Informations
filed by the public prosecutor based on an independent assessment of the evidence in this case.

When court shall order the amendment of the info or complaint

RTC dismissed the case because of prosecutions unwillingness to prosecute the case.
Co appealed to CA.
Is petitioners right against double jeopardy violated?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Double Jeopardy
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
When does a first jeopardy attach?

Garcia vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:

This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife of retired Major Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief in
order issued by the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan denying the motion to quash or dismiss Civil Case No. 0193, a suit for
the forfeiture commenced by the Republic against petitioner and her immediate family.
The forfeiture suit was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias allegedly acquired and amassed.
Then Republic then filed with the Sandiganbayan through the OMB a petition for forfeiture of those alleged unlawfully
acquired properties of the Garcias. The case was docketed as Civil Case 0193(Forfeiture I) and subsequently another case of
forfeiture involving the same parties was filed docketed as Civil Case 0196(Forfeiture II).

1.

there is a valid complaint or information;

Thus the two cases were consolidated for convenience and clarity.

2.

the complaint should be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;

3.

the accused has pleaded to the charge; and

Before the filing of Forfeiture II but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias with violation of RA
7080(plunder) and the case raffled to the second division of SB. The plunder charge covered substantially the same properties
identified in both Forfeiture I and II.

4.

the accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or terminated without the express
consent of the accused.

What is the rationale of prohibition against DJ?

Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the Forfeiture I case, that the the plunder case and the Forfeiture
I case should be consolidated in the 2nd division of SB pursuant to RA 8249. On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the
motion for the reason that the forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the criminal case of plunder.

24
Petitioner argues that the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4thDivision of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case and that
the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements.
Issue:

Whether or not the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and her three sons
considering that:
First, vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have been ineffectively or
improperly served and,

CAES V. IAC, 1989


Joel Caes was charged in two separate informations with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Joel was arraigned on August 31, 1982, but was never actually tried until the cases were provisionally dismissed on
November 14, 1983, following eleven postponements of the scheduled hearings, mostly because the prosecution was not
prepared.
The accused was never absent at these aborted hearings. He was prepared to be tried, but either the witnesses against him were
not present, or the prosecutor himself was absent, or the court lacked material time.

Second, that the plunder case Crim. Case No. 28107 has already been filed and pending with the 2nd division of the SB.

Meantime, the charges against him continued to hang over his head even as he was not given an opportunity to deny them
because his trial could not be held.

Held:

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The court ruled that the forfeiture cases and plunder cases have different causes of action.

What is res judicata in prison grey?

The former is civil in nature and the latter is criminal. On the matter of double jeopardy the court held that:

Fittingly described as res judicata in prison grey, the right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a person for a
crime of which he has been previously acquitted or convicted.

Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, suggesting that double
jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a
necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a criminal offense.
Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for
plunder.
The court also said that RA 7080(plunder) did not repeal RA 1379(forfeiture) stating that: Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find
any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most
basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least P50M. on the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in
nature, in that it does not make a crime the ac of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property
manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right if the State to recover
the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.
However, on the matter on Jurisdiction over the person of Clarita Garcia(wife) and his sons, the court said that the 4tth division
of SB did NOT acquire jurisdiction because there was no valid substituted service of summons made, the SB did NOT acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children for the reason that there was no voluntary appearance since they
questioned the jurisdiction of the 4th division of the SB through their motion to dismiss and quashal for lack of jurisdiction into
their person.
And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null
and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner
and her three children are concerned.
For the forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias summons on
the petitioner and her children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.

The purpose is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be
subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense.
Requisites for DJ: see CONDRADA V. PEOPLE, 2003
What is a provisional dismissal?
A case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the
express consent of the accused. Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional.
But a dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was made without the express consent of the
accused. This consent cannot be presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object. As
we have held in a number of cases, such consent must be express, so as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity.
Otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the case.
When is a dismissal made on motion of the accused considered final?
The first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested.
Such dismissal has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.
People v. City of Salay
The trial court dismissed the case on motion of the accused on the ground of insufficiency of the prosecution evidence. The
government came to this Court on certiorari, and the accused pleaded double jeopardy. Our finding was that the case should
not have been dismissed because the evidence submitted by the prosecution was not insufficient. Even so, the petitioner had to
be denied relief because the dismissal amounted to an acquittal on the merits which was therefore not appealable.

25
The second exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a
speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to prosecute.

A review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond
the ambit of appeal.

Conde v. Rivera

In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh
the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error
committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari.

Here the prosecution was dismissed because the accused was made to dance attendance on courts and subjected to no less
than eight unjustified postponements extending over a year that unduly delayed her trial.
Were the requisites of DJ present?
The last requisite isnt.
There is no proof that Caes expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent is not enough; neither may it be
lightly inferred from the presumption of regularity, for we are dealing here with the alleged waiver of a constitutional right.
Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Also, Joels case is like Condes case. The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against Joel was described by the trial
judge as provisional did not change the nature of that dismissal. As it was based on the lack of interest of the prosecutor
and the consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal of the accused on the merits.
Thus, it was error on the part of the trial judge to order the revival of the case against Joel because of double jeopardy.
Effects of Double Jeopardy
PEOPLE V. SB, 2010 (GR 173396)
The aim of the present petition is to overturn the SB's conclusion that there is no doubt that dredging work was performed
along the Palto and Pakulayo Rivers and the project was actually undertaken and accomplished by the said contractor;
hence the payment made to the latter was justified.
From such finding, the trial court held that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of all the elements of the offense
charged, resulting in the acquittal of private respondents.
Petitioner points out that the lower court erred in arriving at such conclusion, since prosecution evidence shows that as of
September 2, 1991 to October 2, 1991, when the dredging works were supposedly conducted, there was as yet no approved
plans and specifications as required by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1594 before bidding for construction contracts can
proceed.

An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by
the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
What is the effect of an acquittal? Exception?
An acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double
jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.
Was there mistrial?
The foregoing is essentially an issue involving an alleged error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. Petitioner has not
convincingly shown that the prosecution has indeed been deprived of due process of law. There is no showing that the trial
court hampered the prosecution's presentation of evidence in any way.
On the contrary, the prosecution was given ample opportunity to present its ten witnesses and all necessary documentary
evidence. The case was only submitted for decision after the parties had duly rested their case.
Respondent trial court clearly stated in its decision which pieces of evidence led it to its conclusion that the project was
actually undertaken, justifying payment to the contractor. Clearly, petitioner failed to show that there was mistrial resulting in
denial of due process.

G.R. No. 174504

March 21, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

Petitioner doubts that the proper procedure for bidding had been followed. Petitioner then asks how the project could have
proceeded on September 2, 1991 when the required plan was only dated November 18, 1991.

vs.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.

HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third division) and MANUEL G. BARCENAS, Respondents.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FACTS:

Will certiorari lie?

On May 21, 2004, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 14452 before
the Sandiganbayan. The Information reads

Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its
conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MANUEL G. BARCENAS, a high-

26
ranking public officer, being a Vice-Mayor of Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained
cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE PESOS (P61,765.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound
to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P61,765.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.3
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27990 and raffled to the Third Division. On October 20, 2004, private respondent
was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented its lone witness, Manolo Tulibao Villad, Commission
on Audit (COA) State Auditor. Thereafter, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
On April 20, 2006, private respondent filed a motion4 for leave to file demurrer to evidence. On June 16, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution5 granting the motion. On June 30, 2006, private respondent filed his demurrer6 to
evidence.
Sandiganbayans Ruling
On July 26 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Resolution, viz:
WE find the demurrer to evidence well taken.
The testimony of the prosecutions lone witness City Auditor Manolo Tulibao confirming his Report (Exhibit "D") that the
accused had indeed liquidated his cash advances did not help the prosecution but rather weakened its cause of action against
the accused. At the time this case was filed in Court, the accused had already liquidated his cash advances subject matter
hereof in the total amount of P61,765.00. Hence, We find the element of damages wanting in this case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted and this case is hereby ordered. DISMISSED
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in giving due
course to and eventually granting the demurrer to evidence.
HELD:
An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the effect of an acquittal unless the order was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is
tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double
jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or
where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void.The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate
that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that
the government suffered any damage from private respondent's non-liquidation of the subject cash advance because it was later
shown, as admitted by the prosecution's witness, that private respondent liquidated the same albeit belatedly.

G.R. No. 168982

August 5, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
DIR. GEN. CESAR P. NAZARENO, DIR. EVERLINO NARTATEZ, DIR. NICASIO MA. S. CUSTODIO, and THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION), Respondents.
FACTS:

Three (3) separate but related contracts between the Philippine National Police (PNP) and Beltra Industries, for the purchase
and delivery of Caliber .45 Thompson Brand pistols spawned the filing of the criminal charge against the respondents. The
first of the contracts, covered by Purchase Order (PO) No. 081190-654 dated November 8, 1990, was for the purchase and
delivery of 2,822 units at P18,550.30 each, for the total amount ofP52,348,946.60. The second was covered by PO No. 0-240492-185 dated April 24, 1992 for the purchase of 1,617 units for P29,995,835.10. The third was under PO No. 0-050-582-153
dated May 5, 1992, for the purchase of 1,242 units at a total price of P23,039,472.60. The purchase orders were signed by then
Director General Nazareno and then Director Nartatez, while the corresponding checks were signed by then Director Custodio.
Allegations of irregularity or overpricing surrounded the procurement, leading then President Fidel V. Ramos to order the
creation of a tri-agency investigating committee composed of lawyers from the PNPs Inspector Generals Office, the National
Police Commission, and the Office of the President. This committee found no overpricing; neither did it find collusion among
the officers of the PNP participating in the transactions.
The Commission on Audit, for its part, created a special audit team to look into the same allegations of overpricing. After an
investigation that compared the AFP Logistics Command (LOGCOM) purchase price ofP10,5873.25 per unit for the same
brand and the PNPs purchase of 5,681 units at P18,550.30 per unit, the audit team found that the PNP procurement appeared
to have been overpriced; the PNP purchases, if made at the AFP LOGCOM unit price, would have cost P45 Million less.
After due proceedings and based on the report of the special audit team, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an
information against the respondents with the Sandiganbayan. The information reads:
That on or about January 1, 1991 and May 29, 1992, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Cesar P. Nazareno, then Director General,
Philippine National Police (PNP) and Everlino P. Nartatez and Nicasio Ma. S. Custodio, then directors of PNP Logistics
Support Command, successively while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and
committing the crimes in relation to their offices, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one
another, enter in behalf of the said PNP Contract/Document with Beltra Industries, Inc. a private enterprise at PILAND
Building, Javier cor. Santillan Street, Makati for the supply of Five Thousand Six Hundred Eighty-One (5,681.00) units of
Caliber .45 Pistol in the amount of One Hundred Five Million Three Hundred Eighty Four Thousand Three Hundred Fifty four
Pesos and Seventy Centavos (105,384,254.70), under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.

27
The respondents pleaded not guilty to the charge.
At the trial, the People presented the members of the special audit team to testify on the overpricing that the team found.
Among others, a member of the special audit team testified that there was a big difference between the AFP price and the
PNPs; as shown by documents obtained from the Philippine Navy, the AFP purchased the pistols at a unit cost of P10,578.25.
The People then presented the documents related to the various contracts and the documents the members of the audit team
mentioned in their testimonies.
PNP PO No.

Qty.

Unit Cost Amount LOGCOM U/C

Amount Price Difference

081190-854

2822

P18,550.30

P52,348,946.60

P10,578.25

P29,851,821.50

P22,497,125.10

240492-185

1617

P18,550.30

P29,995,835.10

P10,578.25

P17,105,030.25

P12,890,804.85

050592-153

1242

P18,550.30

P23,039,472.60

P10,578.25

P13,138,186.50

P9,901,286.10

P105,384,254.30

P60,095,038.25

P45,289,216.05

The Sandiganbayan, in its Decision,2 graphically presented the claimed price difference as follows:
In their defense, the respondents took the basic position that the AFPs unit price could not be the basis for a comparison to
support the conclusion that the PNP purchase was overpriced. They presented witnesses3 who commonly testified that the AFP
purchases were made under a foreign military assistance program the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program extended by
the United States of America (US) to the Philippines pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Military Assistance
Agreement of 1953. The FMS program, one of the witnesses testified, was a security assistance program that allowed eligible
countries to purchase defense articles, defense services and training from the US government; it was "non-appropriated,"
which meant that a foreign military financing program was available for loan grants to eligible countries. US laws (specifically,
the Arms Export Control Act [AECA]), however, imposed certain limitations, one of which was that the PNP, as a police
organization, was not entitled to FMS benefits. Evidence of this (duly marked and presented) was the US JUSMAG Chiefs
letter to then AFP Chief of Staff Lisandro Abadia. Another witness also claimed that a comparison showed a big difference
between the cost of articles acquired through FMS and those through direct commercial sales; a local purchase was 2 to 3
times more expensive than a purchase through FMS, although local procurement was faster than FMS. Still another witness
echoed this statement through the declaration that the AFP could not have purchased pistols in the local market at a price or
cost similar to the FMS price.
The respondents also presented some of the members of the tri-agency team that investigated the alleged overpricing;4 all of
them testified that they found no irregularity in the procurement of the pistols. The respondents completed their case with the
presentation of their documentary evidence, including those identified or touched upon in the testimonies of their witnesses.
ISUE:
WHETHER OR NOT DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAS ALREADY ATTACHED TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS AND THUS
PROSCRIBES THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER.
HELD:
We resolve to dismiss the petition on the basis of the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution.

Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense." Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right, reads:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches
only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.10
A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable.11 It is also immediately executory and the State may not seek its
review without placing the accused in double jeopardy.12 We had occasion to fully explain the reason behind the double
jeopardy rule in People v. Velasco13:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws
and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x." Thus
Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty.
The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively
presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a previous final
judgment.14 Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has
already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendants culpability; after failing to persuade the court
to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and
becomes compelling.15 The reason is not only the defendants already established innocence at the first trial where he had
been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a
government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily
result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendants guilt while
strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the governments power and resources are
once again employed against the defendants individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not
make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience.

Thus, the absolute and inflexible rule is that the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal through either a
regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, or an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the
same Rules.

28
In this case, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over the nature of the case is not disputed, nor was its jurisdiction over the
respondents ever brought into question. Neither does the petition substantively and effectively impute any error based on the
Sandiganbayans grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of its jurisdiction. In other words, the petition, styled as a Rule 45
petition, is not even one that we can liberally treat as a Rule 65 certiorari petition that may permit a review of a verdict of
acquittal.23
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. Nos. 148424-27

December 11, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,


vs.
DANILO CARAANG, VIRGILIO CANLAS JR., MANNY BELAGOT (at large), ROLANDO REBOTA (at large) and
four JOHN DOES (at large), accused, DANILO CARAANG, appellant.
FACTS:
In its Brief,13 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the factual antecedents of the case as follows:
"About 11 oclock on the night of November 10, 1990, the group of Vanelyn Flores, Lorna Salazar, Angeline Flores, Jona
Ampil, Gina Canzon, Froilan Galamay, Jimmy Pascual and Tirso Ganzon were on their way home to Sitio Abibeg, Gen. Luna,
Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. The group had just attended a bangsal-bangsal or a pre-nuptial dance at Barangay Dipaan,
Car[r]anglan, Nueva Ecija.

"The moon [had] just begun to rise, and the road they were traversing was quite dark. Reaching the boundary of Abibeg and
Dipaan, the group was accosted by two (2) armed men. Brandishing their guns, the men ordered the group to follow them. The
two (2) armed men wore bonnets. However, Vanelyn Flores recognized one of them as appellant Danilo Caraang, having
known him for a long time since they were neighbors in the same barangay and because of the peculiar way he walked and
stood. Jimmy Pascual likewise recognized the two armed men as appellant Danilo Caraang and Virgilio Canlas.

"The group was forced to walk through rice paddies till they reached an uninhabited and grassy place near a creek or parang,
approximately 500 meters away from the place where they were waylaid. "Upon reaching the parang, the armed men ordered
the female members of the group to sit down while the male members were ordered to lie on the ground face down.

"Vanelyn Flores was the first female removed from the group by appellant. She knew that it was appellant who grabbed her
hand and who pulled her to a nearby creek about 50 meters away. There, Vanelyn saw another man waiting.
"All of a sudden, appellant poked his gun on Vanelyns temple and ordered her to remove her pants. Vanelyn became terrified
and cried. Appellant forced her to lie down on the ground. He repeated his order that she remove her pants. Vanelyn, however,
refused. This prompted appellants companion to grab both of Vanelyns hands. As Vanelyn was immobilized, appellant

succeeded in removing her pants and underwear. Thereafter, appellant removed his pants, mounted Vanelyn and had sexual
intercourse with her. Vanelyn felt excruciating pain.

"By then, the place was well-illuminated by moonlight. The moment appellant removed his bonnet, Vanelyn saw that her rapist
was indeed appellant Danilo Caraang. Vanelyn was sexually abused by appellant for more than 15 minutes, after which she
was returned to their group.

"After an hour, Vanelyn was again forcibly brought by appellant to the nearby creek. Vanelyn was made to lie down by
appellant who poked his gun at her. Petrified with fear, Vanelyn could not resist as appellants companion removed her
underwear and her pants. Then appellants companion mounted her and sexually abused her. Vanelyn again cried because of
terrible pain. After appellants companion had satisfied his lust, appellant returned Vanelyn to the group. He approached Lorna
Salazar and forced her to go with him.

"Lorna Salazar was first blindfolded and then brought to a place away from the group. She was turned over to a man who
removed the cover from her eyes. Lorna saw [that] the man [was] wearing a bonnet.

"The man ordered Lorna to remove her pants but she fought back. Thus, he kicked Lorna hard in the abdomen which caused
her to lose consciousness. When she regained consciousness, Lorna felt weak and dizzy. She also saw that she was naked. The
man who raped her ordered her to put on her pants. Thereafter, she was returned back to the group.

"Subsequently, two other companions of appellant, who were also armed, took Lorna Salazar away from the group. They also
wanted to rape her. However, as the men were starting to remove her clothes, Lorna cried and pleaded for mercy. The two men
relented. One of them asked Lorna to give him a kiss mark instead. As he prepared to be kissed, the man removed his bonnet.
Lorna was able to identify him as Manny Belagot. Then she was returned to the group.

"Around 4 oclock in the morning, the group was released at the place where they were abducted. Before departing, the armed
men threatened the group thus pag nagsumbong kayo, papatayin naming kayo lahat.

"Vanelyn Flores and her sister Angeline, together with Lorna Salazar, arrived at their house crying. They narrated to Vanelyns
parents all about the incident. Immediately, Vanelyn was brought by her parents to San Jose City, where she was examined by
Dr. Rolando Valencia. Dr. Valencia reported the following findings:

First, Erymetamous vulva meaning the vulva was reddish. Vulva is the external part of the female organ. Then, there was
slight abrasion on the vaginal fourchette. Meaning, there was an abrasion in the fourchette. If you will spread the vagina of a

29
woman, the portion that you will see is the fourchette and in the lower portion thereof was the abrasion. My third findings is:
Hymenal laceration with sharp edges at 3 oclock and 7 oclock. Meaning there was laceration in the hymen particularly at 3
oclock and 7 oclock position. The hymen is the rigid membrane. x x x [The] vagina admitted two fingers with difficulty and
the patient felt pain. Vaginal cervical [smear], meaning the taking of the fluid from the vagina for examination and it proved of
the presence of sperm cell (tamod).

"Meanwhile, on November 16, 1990, Lorna Salazar was medically examined by Dr. Restituto Duran who reported the
following findings:

Breast-no contusion, no abrasion, well formed and firm, nipple small, areola brownish in color. Abdomen-no contusion,
abrasion, hematoma, rest of the body show no sign of contusion, abrasion and hematoma. Vagina-no signs of contusion,
abrasion and hematoma. Pubic hair moderate. Hymen-lacerated at 12:00 oclock, seven oclock and six oclock much
lacerated. Vagina canal-admits 1 finger with resistance, admits 2 fingers with much resistance. Cervix is somewhat soft and
tender upon touching.

The laceration suggests that there was a forceful entrance at the vaginal canal by a hard object."14 (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, appellant, in his Brief,15 summarizes the facts of the case as follows:
"This is a case of 4 counts of rape with forcible abduction filed against CARAANG and others. CARAANG was convicted
based on the testimonies of the complainants whereby they alleged that they were waylaid and raped by a group of men
belonging to the CAFGU. CARAANG [denies] the accusations against him. He maintains that he is innocent and that he was
not at the place of the incident and that he was sick at that time. This defense was not believed by the trial court [which] x x x
dismissed it as a mere alibi. [Hence] this appeal."16

The court a quo found that only one act of abduction had been committed by all the accused. It added that the crafty way in
which they made the victims go with them revealed the lewd intention of the abduction. That the former had intended to have
carnal knowledge of the latter from the very beginning was further held by the lower court. The rapes were thus complexed
with the crime of abduction. However, the RTC held that the subsequent instances of rape committed were separate and
distinct counts thereof. As to the fourth criminal Complaint, it found appellant guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, since no
carnal knowledge had occurred.

ISSUES:

In his appeal, appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:

"A. The trial court erred in finding that there was positive identification of Caraang as the rapist."18

"B. The trial court erred in not appreciating the existence of other facts and circumstances which are of weight and substance in
favor of the accused-appellant which shows that there is reasonable doubt."19

"C. The evidence against the accused did not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient for conviction."20

"D. The trial court erred in finding that there was conspiracy."
Simply put, the issue to be resolved is whether the prosecution was able to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In the
main, appellant contests the positive identification made by the victims and the trial courts finding of conspiracy. He also cites
questionable circumstances that allegedly create reasonable doubt in his favor.

HELD:
Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant and his cohorts had conspired in abducting the victims and
eventually raping them. It gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, especially those of the
two victims -- Vanelyn Flores and Lorna Salazar. Upholding the positive identification they had made, it rejected appellants
alibi.

The appeal of the rape charges is unmeritorious; however, the alleged acts of lasciviousness have not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

Preliminary Consideration:
No Double Jeopardy

30
Hence, appellant is guilty of two complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape -- one against Flores and the other against
Salazar. Since there were two victims, the trial court erred in convicting him of only one count of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. There can be no violation of the constitutional right of appellant against double jeopardy, because the
decisive issue here is whether he was convicted of a crime charged in the Information. A reading of the four separate
Informations shows that in each one, he was indeed charged with forcible abduction with rape. Having been sufficiently
informed of the accusations against him, he can thus be convicted of two counts of the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape, as we have done here based on the evidence presented.

Moreover, it is settled that when the accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, they waive their right to the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throw the whole case open to review by the appellate court. The latter
court is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate -- whether favorable or unfavorable to them, and
whether the issues it resolves have been assigned as errors or not.89 Such an appeal confers upon it full jurisdiction over the
case and renders it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law.90

Peeping through potted plants perched on top of a neighbor's fence Tanael saw Romulo Cario, Manuel Oriente, the latter's
daughter, Marilou Lopez and her husband, Paul Lopez and one Rogelio Gascon arguing. He heard Paul Lopez telling Romulo
Cario, "Ikaw Cario, ang liit-liit mo, ang yabang mo!" Then Tanael saw Marilou coming out from their house with a lead pipe
and handed it over to Paul. Paul then hit Romulo with a lead pipe at his right arm. Accused-appellant got the lead pipe from
Paul and hit Romulo on his left eyebrow. Romulo reeled and fell down. Upon seeing Romulo fall down, Arnel got confused,
hence, he went back inside the house and switched off the light and turned the television off. He went outside again and saw
Romulo moaning. At this point, Paul Lopez was already poking a gun at Romulo, then pulled the trigger twice but the gun did
not fire. Arnel then shouted, "Putang ina ninyo, bakit niyo ginagawa iyan sa bayaw ko, bakit ninyo ginaganito siya, ano ba ang
kasalanan niya sa inyo." Oriente and his company did not say anything. Romulo Cario was brought by Arnel to the East
Avenue Medical Center where Romulo, two hours after, passed away.

The accused pleaded self-defense, arguing that the victim was the one who shot the gun and that he was only defending
himself and his family when he hit the victim. The RTC rendered a Decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of
Homicide. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

Conspiracy
In the present case, appellant should also be held liable for the other count of rape he and his co-accused committed -- one after
the other -- against Flores. Clearly, there was conspiracy as shown by their obvious, concerted efforts to perpetrate the crimes.
It should be clear that appellant is responsible not only for the rape he personally committed, but for the rape committed by the
others as well.
Finally, the conviction of Appellant Caraang for acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. C-17(91) is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether accused may claim self-defense.


Wheter or not when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy.

HELD:
G.R. No. 155094

January 30, 2007

MANUEL O. ORIENTE, Petitioner,


vs.

No. The petitioner emphasizes that the victim, allegedly a troublemaker in the vicinity, was drunk, fired his gun twice, and then
proceeded towards the petitioner and his companions. The Court is not convinced.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.


FACTS:
On 16 March 1996, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Arnel Tanael was on his way to the house of Romulo Cario. He
passed in front of the house of [petitioner] Manuel Oriente and saw the latter and his companions having a drinking spree at the
terrace of the petitioner's house. He arrived at Romulo's house where the latter was drinking beer alone. Thereafter, Romulo
went out of the house to buy cigarettes. While watching television in the house of Romulo, Arnel Tanael heard two gunshots.
Hence, he rushed outside the house to check on what the gunshots were all about.

When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was legally justified.
Having owned the killing of the victim, the accused should be able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court the elements of
self-defense in order to avail of this extenuating circumstance. He must discharge this burden by clear and convincing
evidence. When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of
the accused.

Self-defense requires that there be (1) an unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part

31
of the person defending himself. All these conditions must concur. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.

Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or
imminent danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude but most importantly, at
the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. To invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an
unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the
assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.

The testimonies of the defense witnesses, including the accused, that Cario threatened the persons gathered in front of
Oriente's house with a gun is quite difficult to believe in view of the admissions of the same defense witnesses, including the
accused, that Cario was able to get up from the ground after being hit and ran away with gun in hand. A person who was
already threatening to kill with a gun and who was then hit with a piece of wood in a serious manner, can be reasonably
expected to make use thereof. Here, the defense makes a rather unusual claim that Cario simply ran away and did not use the
gun he was holding while running.

This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 1698,
convicting appellants Clarence Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo and Hilario Astudillo of the crime of Murder; sentencing them to
suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua and ordering them, jointly and severally, to pay damages to the heirs of the deceased,
Silvestre Aquino, Jr.

The Information filed against the appellants reads:

That on or about November 12, 1995, at around 7:30 o'clock in the evening at Zone 7, Municipality of Bangued, Province of
Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed with a sharppointed instrument (unrecovered) did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one SILVESTRE AQUINO, JR.,
thereby inflicting multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused his death and thereafter, the accused
rode on an unregistered motorized tricycle (recovered) with Municipal Plate No. 7077, which they used in escaping from the
crime scene.

Upon arraignment on November 21, 1995, appellants pleaded not guilty.3 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
In line with double jeopardy:

It is well settled that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy, and, as discussed above, throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is
then called to render judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable, and whether they are made the
subject of assigned errors or not. This precept should be borne in mind by every lawyer of an accused who unwittingly takes
the risk involved when he decides to appeal his sentence.

.G.R. No. 141518

April 29, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

The prosecution's account of the antecedent facts are as follows: At around 7:00 p.m., of November 12, 1995, brothers
Clarence, Crisanto and Hilario Astudillo, went to house of Alberto Damian who was celebrating the eve of his birthday.
Clarence greeted Alberto and thereafter asked the victim, Silvestre Aquino, who was one of the visitors, to go with him.4
Silvestre acceded and the two walked towards Floras' Store, where they were later joined by Crisanto and Hilario. While at the
store, Crisanto and Silvestre had an argument.5

At around that time, prosecution eyewitnesses Manuel Bareng and Eduardo Bata, 12 and 11 years of age, respectively, were
selling balut in front of Floras' Store. They saw Clarence stab Silvestre with a bolo while Crisanto and Hilario held him by the
wrists. Clarence delivered several stab blows at the back and on the chest of the victim until the latter fell to the ground.
Thereafter, the three appellants fled on board a tricycle.6

vs.
CLARENCE ASTUDILLO, CRISANTO ASTUDILLO, alias "ANTENG" or "ENTENG", HILARIO ASTUDILLO,
alias "BODA", appellant

Silvestre was rushed to the Municipal Health Office of Bangued, Abra, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The Autopsy
Report prepared by Dr. Milagros Cardenas-Burgos revealed that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds and 1 abrasion.

Caveat: Short ra ang case, so full text ni. :)

On the other hand, the version of the defense is as follows: On November 12, 1995 at around 7:00 p.m., Clarence passed by the
house of Alberto Damian where Silvestre and several others were playing cards. Silvestre offered Clarence a glass of gin,
which he declined. Silvestre got embarrassed and cursed him so he decided to leave the house. However, Silvestre followed

32
him in front of Floras' Store and pushed him twice, causing him to fall on the ground. Then, Silvestre struck him on the head
and arm with an empty one-liter softdrink bottle.8
Hilario arrived and tried to pacify Silvestre but the latter attacked him. As he retreated, he saw a knife which he then swung at
the victim. Silvestre was hit but continued to attack him. Left with no choice, Hilario stabbed Silvestre 2 or 3 times. When the
latter collapsed to the ground, Hilario rushed to the succor of his elder brother, Clarence.9 Meanwhile, Clarence suffered from
shock and remained seated on the ground while their other brother, Crisanto, stood on the roadside and called for help.10 The
appellants left the scene on board a tricycle and proceeded to the house of Clarence's in-laws. On the same night, they
surrendered to the Philippine National Police, stationed at Bangued, Abra.11

On March 16, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting appellants of the crime of Murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength.12 Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and, assuming that it did, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not having been
alleged in the information, cannot be appreciated against them.13 Appellants' motion for reconsideration was denied in an
Order dated July 13, 1998.14 However, an Amended Decision15 was rendered where the phrase "abuse of superior strength"
was replaced with "TREACHERY" in the body of the Decision and in the decretal portion thereof, which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep Act No. 7659, qualified by TREACHERY AND for having conspired
together and helping one another to kill Silvestre Aquino, Jr., with the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle,
[which is] however, offset by the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and sentences them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Silvestre Aquino, Jr., the amount of P65,288.50 [as]
actual damages, P50,000.00 for his death and suffering plus P500,000.00 [as] moral and exemplary damages and to pay the
costs of this suit.

Hence, appellants interposed the instant appeal, raising the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT ACQUIT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.

THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED ALL THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED WHEN IT RULED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF CONSPIRACY
AND SENTENCED THEM TO A UNIFORM PENALTY.17

The resolution of the instant case hinges on the credibility of the witnesses. The settled rule is that the matter of assigning value
to a declaration on the witness stand is more competently performed by a trial judge who had the front-line opportunity to
personally evaluate the witnesses' demeanor, conduct, and behavior while testifying. In the absence of a clear showing that
some fact or circumstance of weight or substance had been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied, the trial judge's
assessment of the witnesses' testimonies shall not be disturbed on appeal.

A careful review of the records of the case at bar shows that the trial court did not miss any such material circumstance, nor did
it commit any palpable error in upholding the facts as established by the prosecution. We see no reason to doubt the positive
and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, Manuel Bareng and Eduardo Bata, that the appellants ganged
up on the defenseless victim. These witnesses were not shown to have been impelled by ill-motive to falsely testify against the
appellants, hence, their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.18

Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and their affidavit are too
inconsequential to merit consideration. Specifically, appellants point to the failure of Eduardo Bata to state in his sworn
statement that appellants Crisanto and Hilario restrained the victim while Clarence stabbed him, as well as the alleged
unfamiliarity of prosecution witness Manny Bareng with the Ilocano words "bagsol" and "binagsol" (which mean stab and
stabbed, respectively), in his sworn statement. Suffice it to state that inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct
testimony given in open court do not necessarily discredit the witness since an affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes
incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of
the fact that testimonies given during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements, usually
being incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons, at times because of partial and innocent suggestions or for want of
specific inquiries. Additionally, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are
not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses' direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to their
extrajudicial statements. This is especially so because their testimony to the effect that Crisanto and Hilario held the victim's
wrists while Clarence stabbed him remained consistent even under cross-examination.19

THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT CONVICTED THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OF MURDER.

THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED THE SECOND DECISION DATED JULY 10, 1998.

The trial court correctly rejected the appellants' self-defense theory. When an accused invokes self-defense, he thereby admits
authorship of the crime. The burden of proof is thus shifted on him to prove all the elements of self-defense, to wit: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.20

33
In the instant case, even if it was true that the initial act of aggression came from the deceased, still the appellants' plea of selfdefense will not prosper. As stated above, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that appellants Crisanto and Hilario were able
to restrain the victim by the wrists. At that point, any unlawful aggression or danger on the lives of the appellants ceased,
hence, it was no longer necessary for appellant Clarence to repeatedly stab the victim. Verily, their act could no longer be
interpreted as an act of self-preservation but a perverse desire to kill.21 Furthermore, the number of wounds sustained by the
victim negates self-defense. It certainly defies reason why the victim sustained a total of 15 wounds on the different parts of his
body if appellants were only defending themselves. Parenthetically, the number of wounds was eloquently established by the
physical evidence, which is a mute manifestation of truth and ranks high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.22

Anent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find no merit in appellants' contention that the trial cannot validly
appreciate the same in its amended decision because the attendance of treachery was not one of the issues raised in their
motion for reconsideration. Otherwise stated, appellants posit that the reconsideration of the judgment of conviction should be
limited only to the issues raised in their motion for reconsideration, i.e., their guilt or innocence and/or the propriety of
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of "abuse of superior strength" which was not alleged in the information.

Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,24 a motion for reconsideration of a judgment of
conviction may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the court, with the consent of the accused. Likewise, under Rule 120,
Section 7,25 a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion of the accused.26 These provisions
changed the previous rulings27 of the Court to the effect that such modification may be made upon motion of the fiscal,
provided the same is made before a judgment has become final or an appeal has been perfected.28 The requisite consent of the
accused to such motion for reconsideration or modification is intended to protect the latter from having to defend himself anew
from more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked.29 Accordingly, once the
judgment has been validly promulgated, any reconsideration or amendment to correct a manifest substantial error, even if
unwittingly committed by the trial court through oversight or an initially erroneous comprehension, can be made only with the
consent or upon the instance of the accused. Errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the accused consents thereto, or
himself moves for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision.30

It must be stressed, however, that the protection against double jeopardy in the foregoing rules may be waived by the accused.
Thus, when the accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy
cannot be invoked because the accused waived his right not to be placed therein by filing such motion.31 His motion gives the
court an opportunity to rectify its errors or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of law and make them
conformable with the statute applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to render.32 The raison d'etre is to afford the
court a chance to correct its own mistakes and to avoid unnecessary appeals from being taken.33 In effect, a motion for
reconsideration or modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the entire evidence open for the review of the
trial court without, however, conducting further proceedings, such as the taking of additional proof.

squarely raised by the appellants in their alternative prayer for conviction for the lesser offense of homicide in view of the
erroneous appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength which was not alleged in the information.
Hence, the court a quo is not only empowered but also under obligation to rectify its mistake in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength instead of treachery. Verily, it is precluded from considering the attendance of a
qualifying circumstance if the complaint or information did not allege such facts.34 Even before the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure35 took effect on December 1, 2000, qualifying circumstances were required to be so specified in the
complaint or information, otherwise they cannot be appreciated against the accused.

In the case at bar, appellants voluntarily surrendered to the authorities on the same night of the incident when they learned that
the authorities were looking for them.39 Though they did not give a statement regarding the stabbing incident, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should nonetheless be considered in their favor. What matters is that they spontaneously,
voluntarily and unconditionally placed themselves at the disposal of the authorities. This act of respect for the law indicates a
moral disposition favorable to their reform.40

The award of actual damages should also be modified. In order that actual damages may be recovered, the amount actually
expended in connection with the death of the victim must be substantiated with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. In the instant case, the records show that the amount
of P65,288.50 awarded by the trial court as actual damages is not fully substantiated by receipts.48 However, as the heirs of the
deceased actually incurred funeral expenses, they are entitled to temperate damages.49 In the recent case of People v.
Abrazaldo,50 we ruled that where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of absence or lack of receipts
to prove the amount claimed, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be awarded.

Finally, the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed. In murder, the grant of civil indemnity which has been
fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00, requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the
accused's responsibility therefor.51

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal
Case No. 1698, finding appellants, Clarence Astudillo, Crisanto Astudillo @ "Anteng" or "Enteng", and Hilario Astudillo @
"Boda", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the civil liability. As modified, appellants are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay
the heirs of the deceased, Silvestre Aquino, Jr., the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008


Clearly, therefore, appellants cannot dictate upon the trial court which aspects of the judgment of conviction should be
reviewed. Having filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the court to acquit, or in the alternative, convict them of the
lesser offense of homicide, appellants waived the defense of double jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken at the
trial open for the review of the trial court. At any rate, the issue of the attendant qualifying circumstance in the case at bar was

JEROME CASTRO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


Facts:

34
Justin, Alberts son, for violation of disciplinary probation, was ordered dismissed by the Reedley International School. RIS
reconsidered its decision upon request of Albert, but disallowed him from participating on the graduation ceremonies, thus
Albert filed a complaint with the Department of Education, which found the code violation point system implemented by the
school null and void. Consequently, Justin was allowed to graduate. After the graduation ceremonies, Albert met Bernice, a
fellow RIS parent. He intimated to Bernice his intention of filing civil cases against the officers of RIS, including Jerome, the
assistant headmaster. Bernice then relayed the conversation to Jerome, who, before he hung up, told Bernice Okay you too
take care and be careful talking to [Tan], hes dangerous. Bernice also relayed what Jerome said to Albert. Feeling insulted,
Albert filed a case for grave oral defamation against Jerome before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City on
August 21, 2003. After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court convicted Jerome for grave oral defamation, hence he appealed his
conviction to the Regional Trial Court. While affirming the factual findings of the lower court, however, in view of the
animosity between Jerome and Albert, it ruled that Jerome can only be convicted for slight physical injuries. Since the case
was filed only on August 21, 2003 or five months after discovery, prescription had already set in, thus Jerome was acquitted on
the criminal case. Because of this the Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
which the latter granted, holding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it misapprehended the totality of the situation
and found Jerome liable only for slight oral defamation. Aggrieved by the turn of events, Jerome filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court.

The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or, as we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,
when there was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the
State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.[17]
The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued
without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.
In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTCs finding on the nature of petitioners statement, that is, whether it constituted
grave or slight oral defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs erroneous
evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.
What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or those involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of law).
However, a court, in a petition for certiorari, cannot review the public respondents evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction
(or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion).
Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking cognizance of its petition and, worse, in reviewing
the factual findings of the RTC. We therefore reinstate the RTC decision so as not to offend the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.

Issue:
Whether or not there would be double jeopardy if he will be tried and convicted of slight oral defamation.

Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123340, [August 29, 2002], 436 PHIL 641-655)
Facts:

Ruling:
We grant the petition.

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. This constitutional mandate is echoed in Section
7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or in information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before a competent court (3) after arraignment (4)
when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate
court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy.

Petitioner Lutgarda Cruz was acquitted by the Manila Regional Trial Court of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document. However, since the offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action, she was ordered to return
to the surviving heirs the parcel of land located in Bulacan. Thus, the petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court on the ground that the Office of the City Prosecutor was not furnished a
copy thereof within the reglementary period. The second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for being in violation
of the Interim Rules. In a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals, the latter
sustained the trial court's orders denying petitioner's motions for reconsideration and upheld the assailed decision of the trial
court on the civil aspect of the case. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
"Whether or not the RTC OF MANILA had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of criminal case no. 87-57743
for falsification of public document, involving a property located outside the courts territorial jurisdiction and would bar to an
institution of a civil case.
Ruling:
Thee trial court had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case eventhough the property
is outside of the trial courts territorial jurisdiction.
There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. First, the
court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the
offense was committed. Third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 18 In the instant case, the trial

35
court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases
involving estafa through falsification of a public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since
the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court also acquired jurisdiction over the person of accusedpetitioner because she voluntarily submitted to the court's authority.

It is now emphasized in paragraph 1 that a demurrer may be filed with or without leave of court. Leave of court means before
your demurrer, you file muna a motion for permission to file the demurrer. The court grants permission, you file the demurrer.
You can still file the demurrer even without the permission of the court. If you file demurrer with or without leave and it is
granted, then you have no problem because the accused will be acquitted.

Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed
within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to
resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime. Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that "[E]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Article 104 of the same
Code states that "civil liability . . . includes restitution."

The problem is, if your demurrer is denied. Meaning, the court says that there is sufficient evidence to prove at least the guilt
of the accused. If the demurrer was filed with prior leave of court and it is subsequently denied, the accused is allowed to
present evidence to prove his defense.

The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless reserved by the offended party. 19 In
the instant case, the offended party did not reserve the civil action and the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal
action. Although the trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded on reasonable doubt, did not
extinguish the civil liability. 20 Thus, the Manila trial court had jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant case
ordering restitution even if the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.

But if you filed the demurrer without prior leave of court and the demurrer is denied, then you are already convicted because
the accused has forfeited his right to present evidence. It is practically equivalent to a waiver of his right to present evidence.
So conviction automatically follows. This is what the rules say.

Requisites of Double Jeopardy


CUDIA V. CA, 1998

ANAMER SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION

Cudia was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga for possessing an unlicensed firearm.


The city prosecutor of Angeles city filed an information against him.

Facts:

His trial ensued.

Petitioner Anamer Salazar was charged with estafa. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to
Evidence with Leave of Court. The trial court granted the demurrer. However, on the civil aspect of the case, it ordered the
petitioner to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that she be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court. This was denied by the trial court. In this petition, the petitioner claimed that she was denied due process as
she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent.

The provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information against him.

Issue:

What are the requisites of DJ?

Where an accused was acquitted following a demurrer too evidence, may she be adjudged civilly liable without first
requiring her to present evidence?

See CONDRADA V. PEOPLE, 2003.

Ruling:
No. If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on
the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and
acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of
the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated. This is
so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and
civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to
issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for
continuation of trial for him to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to adduce
evidence by way of rebuttal.

Thus, prosecutor of Angeles city moved to dismiss/withdraw the information. This motion was granted.
Cudia then moved to quash the information filed by the prosecutor of Pampanga because of double jeopardy.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Were all the requisites present in this case?


Did RTC Branch 60 have jurisdiction over the case?
The question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before it must be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for
or defining its jurisdiction.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, and Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 864, dated January 17, 1983, the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Region One to Twelve
are hereby defined as follows:
xxx
PAMPANGA

36
xxx
1. Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City comprising ANGELES CITY and the municipalities of
Mabalacat, Magalang, and Porac as well as part of Clark Field U.S. Airbase.
Clearly, branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned. Consequently, notwithstanding the
internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case.
Was there a valid complaint or information?
The City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the
Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction.
PD 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987:
Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and
ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the
persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral
evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.
Was there first jeopardy?
As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner's
subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily
dismissed by the prosecution.
Wouldnt it be an injustice to punish the accused for the mistake of the fiscal?
The State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and employees. To rule otherwise could very
well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection to the community, and give rise to the possibility of connivance
between the prosecutor and the accused.

Petitioner argues that the dismissal of the later Informations against private respondent on the ground of double jeopardy had
no factual or legal basis, because his arraignment in the earlier cases was only conditional.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Requisites for double jeopardy
(1) first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
Was Espinosas arraignment conditional?
Espinosa pleaded simply and unconditionally on April 22, 1999. No unusual ceremony punctuated his arraignment. The SBN
itself found this simple process inconsistent with its studied manner of conditionally arraigning the accused pending
reinvestigation in other cases.
The alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. They must be
expressly stated in the Order disposing of the arraignment. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be simple and
unconditional.
Did Espinosa waive his right against double jeopardy?
The relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out convincingly. Such waiver must be clear, categorical, knowing
and intelligent.
But Espinosa has amply shown that he learned of the Motion only after the cases had been dismissed. It is clear that the
dismissal, having been secured by petitioner without the express consent of the accused, does not amount to a waiver of the
right against double jeopardy.

Cerezo v. People, G.R. No. 185230, [June 1, 2011], 665 PHIL 365-373
Facts:
PEOPLE V. ESPINOSA, 2003
Separate cases of estafa and attempted corruption of public officers were filed against Espinosa.
While the cases were reevaluated, Espinosa moved for leave to travel abroad.
SBN required Espinosa to be conditionally arraigned. Thereafter, SBN granted his Motion to Travel.
OMB moved to withdraw ex parte the 2 cases against Espinosa. The motion was granted.
Then, OMB filed 7 informations for malversation of public funds against Espinosa and several others.

Petitioner filed a complaint for libel against respondents. Finding probable cause, the Prosecutor filed the
corresponding Information against them, but reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the Information.
Relying on the recommendation of the prosecutor, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed on the ground that it is a
settled rule that the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the Public Prosecutor who is vested with
quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this function. Being vested with such power, he can reconsider his own resolution
if he finds that there is reasonable ground to do so.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the November 20, 2003 OP-QC
resolution has not yet attained finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before the
Department of Justice (DOJ). 12 The RTC deferred action on the said motion to await the resolution of the DOJ. 13

37
On June 26, 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution reversing and setting aside the OP-QC's November 20,
2003 resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier Information for libel.
On October 24, 2006, the RTC issued its first assailed Order granting petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
conformably with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, thus:
Considering the findings of the Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the Court gives favorable
action to the Motion for Reconsideration. In the same manner as discussed in arriving at its assailed order dated 17 March
2004, the Court gives more leeway to the Public Prosecutor in determining whether it has to continue or stop prosecuting a
case. While the City Prosecutor has previously decided not to pursue further the case, the Secretary of Justice, however,
through its resolution on the Petition for Review did not agree with him.
The Court disagrees with the argument raised by the accused that double jeopardy sets in to the picture. The order of dismissal
as well as the withdrawal of the Information was not yet final because of the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court[,] therefore, can still set aside its order. Moreover, there is no refiling of the case nor the filing of a new one. The
case filed remains the same and the order of dismissal was merely vacated because the Court finds the Motion for
Reconsideration meritorious.
Issue:

By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court
abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with
grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainant's right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and
produced no effect whatsoever. 23
This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to determine if a
prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew.
It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a
first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for
the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 24 DaESIC
Since we have held that the March 17, 2004 Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of
discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the
fifth requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of
the accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.

Whether or not double jeopardy sets in that would warrant the motion to quash of the second filing on information.
Ruling:
No, Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not
rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. 20 It is the court's bounden duty to
assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the
motion. 21 While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding
on courts.
In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to
make his own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an
independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and
recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to
Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on
whether to indict respondents.
The same holds true with respect to the October 24, 2006 Order, which reinstated the case. The RTC judge failed to make a
separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. This is evident from the general tenor of the Order
and highlighted in the following portion thereof:
As discussed during the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court will resolve it depending on the outcome of the
Petition for Review. Considering the findings of the Department of Justice reversing the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the
Court gives favorable action to the Motion for Reconsideration. 22

PEOPLE V. DE GRANO, 2009


Respondents were charged with murder. But, since the evidence of guilt was not strong, their motion for bail was granted.
Prosecution moved for reconsideration, which was denied. It then filed a petition for CA. But, again, the petition was denied.
Then, it sought recourse before SC.
SC ordered RTC to set aside the grant of bail and issue warrant of arrest against accused.
But Joven and Armando were not re-arrested.
RTC initially convicted Joven and Armando of murder.
But, at the promulgation of the decision, only Estanislao was present despite due notice to the other respondents.
Upon a joint motion for reconsideration, RTC acquitted Joven and Armando, and downgraded the convictions of other accused
to homicide.
This, the RTC did despite the fact that Joven and Amando were still at large.
Petitioner petitioned for certiorari with the CA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Was the petition for a writ of certiorari proper?
A writ of certiorari is warranted when

38
(1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Wont the foregoing violate the constitutional right against double jeopardy?
A judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but
only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible
errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process,
thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
In which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardythe revered constitutional safeguard against
exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense.

Was there double jeopardy?


Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had
acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void
and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.

PEOPLE V. TAN, 2010


On September 18, 2001, petitioner completed its presentation of evidence and, on the day after, filed its formal offer of
evidence.

Why is the exception allowed?

On January 21, 2002, respondent filed an opposition to petitioners formal offer. Instead of filing a reply as directed by the
RTC, petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence and to Re-open Presentation of
Evidence. Said motion was granted by the RTC and petitioner thus continued its presentation of evidence.

Exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or acquittal existed where the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The theory is that a
defendant before such a court was not actually placed in jeopardy.

On January 28, 2003, petitioner ended its presentation of additional witnesses and was then ordered by the RTC to formally
offer its exhibits.

Hence, any acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the principle of double jeopardy
since it failed to attach in the first place.

On February 26, 2003, petitioner filed a request for marking of certain documents and motion to admit attached formal offer of
evidence. The motion was initially denied by the RTC, but on motion for reconsideration the same was granted by the RTC.
The RTC, thus, ordered petitioner to file anew its formal offer of evidence. Finally, on November 24, 2003, petitioner filed its
Formal Offer of Evidence.

Why did RTC commit grave abuse of discretion?


If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies.
He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the
respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed
by Estanislao.
Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
When is the accused not allowed to be absent?
Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not
at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit:

After respondent filed its Demurer to Evidence, the RTC, in an Order dated January 29, 2004, directed petitioner to file its
opposition thereto. On February 18, 2004, petitioner filed its Opposition to the demurrer.
RTC granted the demurrer to evidence.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------What is a demurrer to evidence; effects?
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases is filed after the prosecution had rested its case, and when the same is granted, it
calls for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the
accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
Was first jeopardy present here?

(a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt;

(1) the Informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832 against respondent were sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction;

(b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and

(2) the RTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832;

(c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or
representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.

(3) respondent was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty; and

39
(4) the RTC dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832 on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.
What is the exception to an attachment of jeopardy?
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial
was a sham.
However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its
very power to dispense justice.
What are examples of courts gravely abusing discretion?
Galman v. SB
The sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to
rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total
absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused.
People v. Bocar
No double jeopardy existed when the prosecution was not allowed to complete its presentation of evidence by the trial court.
People v. Judge Albano
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically held that the prosecution failed to establish the culpability of the
accused in a proceeding which does not even require the prosecution to do so. It acted with grave abuse of discretion,
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it preemptively dismissed the cases and, as a consequence thereof, deprived the
prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to due process.
Saldana v. CA
The trial court in this case was ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process by
aborting its right to complete the presentation of its evidence. Hence, the first jeopardy had not been terminated.
Was petitioners right to due process violated?
Given the facts, no, it wasnt. While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to
evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it mandated to do so.
Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the same as an error on the part of the RTC, the same would merely constitute
an error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as persistently argued by petitioner.
Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of antrefois acquit (Fr. previously
convicted).
SC is bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been committed effecting the dismissal of the case cannot now be
corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.

Heirs of Honrales v. Honrales, G.R. No. 182651, 182657, [August 25, 2010], 643 PHIL 630-642
Facts:
On August 19, 2002, Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent Jonathan Honrales. Bernardino R.
Camba, Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila, recommended the filing of an information for parricide against respondent.
On May 30, 2003, the RTC issued an Order 12 granting leave to conduct the reinvestigation and authorizing 2nd
Assistant City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa to reinvestigate the case.
On September 9, 2003, the heirs of the victim (petitioner heirs) moved before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for
the inhibition 13 of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa from conducting the reinvestigation and praying that the case
be remanded to the court for trial. 14
On September 25, 2003, City Prosecutor Ramon R. Garcia issued Office Order No. 1640 15 reassigning the case to Assistant
City Prosecutor Antonio R. Rebagay. Hearings were scheduled on October 15 and 22, 2003.
On October 15, 2003, both parties appeared but petitioner heirs manifested that they earlier moved to reconsider Office Order
No. 1640. Respondent moved that he be given up to October 22, 2003 to file an opposition.
On October 22, 2003, respondent filed his opposition. Counsel for petitioner heirs then manifested that they be given until
November 5, 2003 to submit a reply thereto.
On November 17, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued an Order 16 denying petitioners' motion to reconsider
Office Order No. 1640 and set the continuation of the hearings on December 3 and 10, 2003.
On December 3, 2003, both parties appeared. Petitioner heirs moved that the hearing be suspended on the ground that they
have filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) to assail the Order of November 17, 2003.
Respondent's counsel objected in view of the presence of their witness Michelle Luna. Thus, the hearing proceeded. After the
hearing, petitioner heirs moved for the cancellation of the December 10, 2003 hearing and filed a formal motion to that effect.
On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a Motion and Manifestation praying that the case be submitted for resolution or, in
the alternative, that it be set for final clarificatory hearing on December 22, 2003.
The following day or on December 16, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued an Order denying the prayers for
suspension and submission of the case for resolution and instead set the hearing on December 22, 2003.
On December 19, 2003, however, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued a Resolution 17 setting aside the October 28, 2002
Resolution and recommending the withdrawal of the information for parricide and the filing of an information for reckless
imprudence resulting in parricide in its stead. City Prosecutor Garcia approved the Resolution. 2005jur
On January 16, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the information for
parricide. 18
On January 28, 2004, while the Motion to Withdraw Information was still pending, an Information 19 for Reckless Imprudence
resulting in Parricide was filed against respondent before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Issue:

40
Whether or not Jonathan would be put on double jeopardy in case the parricide case would be reopened.

FACTS:

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It is beyond cavil that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the withdrawal of the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest without making an independent
assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record 48 By relying solely on the manifestation of the public
prosecutor that it is abiding by the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. What remains for our resolution is whether the case may be remanded to the RTC
without violating respondent's right against double jeopardy. On this question, we find the answer to be in the affirmative.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended provides:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. 49
In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal
case for parricide was still pending before the RTC. In Dioquino v. Cruz, Jr., 50 we held that once jurisdiction is acquired by
the court in which the Information is filed, it is there retained. Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
parricide was included in the charge for intentional parricide 51 pending before the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no jurisdiction
over the criminal case filed before it, the RTC having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the exclusion of all other courts.
The requisite that the judgment be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent.
*See also Javier v. SB, 147026-27, 2009
*See also Co v. Lim, 164669-70, 2009

Court must have competent jurisdiction


*See Pp v. Degrano, 167710, 2009
*See Cudia v. CA, 284 scra 173

LEGASPI VS PP

The case for the prosecution is woven basically on the testimony of Socrates Platero as follows:
On January 14, 1990, at 8:00 oclock in the evening, witness Platero and Mayor Leonardo Cortez of Bayugan, Agusan Del Sur
were on their way home from Butuan City. En route, the patrol car they were riding ran out of gasoline, prompting them to stop
at the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Monitoring Station, Barangay Maygatasan, Bayugan. With no gasoline to spare,
Station Guard Pfc. Michael Gatillo accompanied them to the nearby Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) checkpoint.[8] There, they found Pacheco Tan. Pfc. Gatillo approached Tan and requested for extra gasoline.
Suddenly, Tan ran towards the guardhouse.[9] After a few seconds, Platero heard a gunshot originating therefrom. The bullet
hit Mayor Cortez, causing him to collapse to the ground.[10] Thereupon, Platero saw petitioner Raul Zapatos, holding an
armalite in a firing position. Platero immediately retaliated and an exchange of gunfire ensued. During this time, Platero tried
to pull Mayor Cortez away from the crossfire. Plateros foot was hit.[11] He did not see who shot him.[12] He then took cover
on the other side of the highway.
Pfc. Gatillo testified that he was the policeman assigned at the BIR Monitoring Station on January 14,1990.[13] At about 8:00
oclock in the evening, he accompanied Platero and Mayor Cortez to the DENR checkpoint to ask for some gasoline.[14] Upon
seeing Tan, he asked him about petitioners whereabouts. Tan replied that petitioner was sleeping inside the guardhouse.[15]
Mayor Cortez also inquired from Tan where petitioner was. Tan merely reiterated his answer.[16] Then Tan walked towards the
guardhouse and in a matter of seconds, he (witness Gatillo) saw petitioner firing his gun at Mayor Cortez.[17] Mayor Cortez
fell to the ground with blood oozing from his mouth.[18] Platero attempted to pull Mayor Cortez but another shot was fired
and this time, the Mayor was hit on the leg. While running across the highway to take cover, Platero was also hit on the leg.
[19] When the shooting stopped, he (Gatillo) brought Platero and Mayor Cortez to Bayugan Community Hospital.[20]
Dr. Romeo Cedeo, Chief of the Bayugan Community Hospital, declared that when he attended to Mayor Cortez on January 14,
1990,[21] the latter was already dead.
Building his case on the justifying circumstance of self-defense, petitioner presented a different version. He testified that he
was the Team Leader of the DENR Sentro Striking Force whose primary duty is to seize illegally-cut forest products.[23] He
held office at the DENR checkpoint, Barangay Maygatasan, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. On January 14, 1990, at about 7:00
oclock in the evening, he instructed Pacheco Tan, his co-worker, to man the checkpoint as he was sleepy. He also directed Tan
to wake him up should there be any problem.[24] While sleeping, a burst of gunshots awakened him. He saw that the
guardhouse was being riddled with bullets,[25] piercing the walls and hitting some objects inside. Immediately he dropped to
the floor and took the armalite rifle from the locker located under his bed.[26] Hiding behind a barricade, he fired at his
attackers. Thereafter, fearing for his life, he broke the flooring of the guardhouse and crawled through the hollow portion
underneath to reach its back door.[27] He walked away until he reached Nilo Libres' house where he stayed overnight.[28] The
next day, he heard the news that Mayor Cortez was killed.[29] He immediately surrendered himself and his armalite rifle to
Sgt. Benjamin Amorio of the Philippine Army Brigade, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.[30]
Pacheco Tan corroborated petitioners testimony. On the same date and time, petitioner, who was about to sleep, instructed Tan
to take the first shift. While petitioner was sleeping, Pfc. Gatillo, Mayor Cortez and Platero arrived.[31] Pfc. Gatillo
approached Tan and inquired where petitioner was. He replied that petitioner was sleeping inside the guardhouse.[32] Pfc.
Gatillo returned to the parked patrol car where Mayor Cortez and Platero were waiting. Tan noticed that there were other
policemen within the vicinity.[33] Then, Mayor Cortez and Platero, each carrying an M-16 rifle, alighted from the vehicle and
approached the guardhouse. Again, Mayor Cortez asked Tan where petitioner was. Again Tan gave him the same answer.[34]
Mayor Cortez reacted in disbelief, saying ah. Suddenly, Tan heard a burst of gunshots directed at the guardhouse. He

41
immediately ducked on the ground and then ran towards the pasillo leading to the back of the guardhouse.[35] Seized by fear,
he was not able to wake petitioner.[36] He ran away and, upon reaching a banana plantation, stayed there until morning.[37]
The next day, he went to the Chief of Police of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur.[38] He was brought to the Bayugan Police Station so
that he could give a statement regarding the incident. But he refused to sign the typewritten statement prepared by the Bayugan
Police because it pinpoints to petitioner as the killer of Mayor Cortez. He was against such statement because he did not see
petitioner shot Mayor Cortez.[39]
NBI Agent Virgilio Decasa testified that upon inspecting the DENR checkpoint at Maygatasan, Bayugan, he observed that it
was riddled with bullets.[40] The locations of the bullet holes showed that those responsible surrounded the building.[41] From
his investigation, it was Mayor Cortez, together with Platero and Pfc. Gatillo, who approached the DENR checkpoint. They
were followed by several policemen who were instructed by Mayor Cortez to prepare for any eventuality.[42] He was not able
to collect the guns and have them tested by the NBIs ballistic technician because the policemen refused to submit themselves
to an investigation.[43] He recommended that the cases filed against petitioner be reviewed and/or investigated to prevent
injustice.[44]
Lazarito Estorque recounted that on January 14, 1990, at about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, he and Mayor Cortez were having
a drinking session at the house of his compadre Bong Kadao. Mayor Cortez, together with his three (3) policemen, left Kadaos
house at 7:00 o clock in the evening.[45]
**Consequently, two Informations for frustrated murder and murder, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 414 and 415, were filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch VII, Bayugan Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to this Courts Resolution dated August 2,
1990, the venue was transferred to the RTC, Branch V, Butuan City where the cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
4194 and 4195. Before petitioner could be arraigned, the private prosecutor filed with the RTC a motion to refer the cases to
the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in an Order dated March 11, 1991.[46] Petitioner was then arraigned and pleaded not
guilty to both charges.[47]
**The private prosecutor filed with this Court a petition for certiorari questioning the order of the RTC, but the same was
dismissed.[48] This time, the public prosecutor filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss[49] on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. On August 9, 1991, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order[50] granting the motion and dismissing Criminal Cases
Nos. 4194 and 4195.
This prompted Special Prosecution Officer Dela Llana to file with the Sandiganbayan the two Informations quoted above.
.. In two separate Informations, Special Prosecution Officer Gualberto J. Dela Llana charged both petitioner and Victoriano
Vidal[3] with murder and frustrated murder, committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 17015 (Murder)
xxxxxx
Criminal Case No. 17016 (Frustrated Murder)
xxxxx
ISSUES:
Whether or not THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT DOUBLE
JEOPARDY HAS ALREADY ATTACHED AND THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES;
HELD:

The People counters that since petitioner was on a 24-hour duty as Team Leader of the DENR Sentro Striking Force when the
crimes took place, it follows that his acts were committed in relation to his office. Necessarily, the previous dismissal of his
cases by the RTC could not result in double jeopardy.[51] The presentation of petitioners weapon or the autopsy report is
immaterial considering that both Pfc. Gatillo and Platero positively identified petitioner as the culprit.[52] Moreover, the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not in any manner affect their credibility for they merely
involve immaterial matters.[53] Lastly, petitioners plea of self-defense cannot be sustained because of the absence of all its
requisites.[54]
The petition is impressed with merit.
First, we shall resolve the issues of jurisdiction and double jeopardy. Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over his cases on the ground that the crimes imputed to him were not committed in relation to his office.
Well-settled is the principle that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of
the institution of the action.[55] Here, the applicable law is Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606,[56] as amended by P.D. No.
1861.[57] Section 4, paragraph (a) thereof provides:
SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
In a catena of cases decided under the aegis of P.D. No. 1606, such as Aguinaldo vs. Domagas,[58] Sanchez vs. Demetriou,[59]
Natividad vs. Felix,[60] and Republic vs. Asuncion,[61] we ruled that two requirements must concur under Sec. 4 (a) (2) for an
offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: (1) the offense committed by the public officer must be in
relation to his office; and (2) the penalty prescribed must be higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years,
or a fine of P6,000.00. Obviously, the first requirement is the present cause of discord between petitioner and the People.
An offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the accuseds office when such office is an element of the crime charged
or when the offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge of the official function of the accused.[62] In Cunanan
vs. Arceo,[63] we held:
In Sanchez vs. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term offense committed
in relation to [an accused's] office by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla vs. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an
exception to that principle which was recognized in People vs. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in
Montilla vs. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused's office if the offense cannot
exist without the office such that the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x. In People vs. Montejo, the Court,
through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract,
the facts in a particular case may show that x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused's]
respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official

42
functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they
not held their aforesaid offices. . . .
The Informations filed with the Sandiganbayan allege that petitioner, then a public officer, committed the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder in relation to his office, i.e., as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer of the DENR.[64] It
is apparent from this allegation that the offenses charged are intimately connected with petitioners office and were perpetrated
while he was in the performance of his official functions. In its Resolution[65] dated August 25, 1992, the Sandiganbayan held
that petitioner was on duty during the incident; that the DENR Checkpoint was put up in order to prevent incursions into the
forest and wooded area; and that petitioner, as a guard, was precisely furnished with a firearm in order to resist entry by force
or intimidation. Indeed, if petitioner was not on duty at the DENR checkpoint on January 14, 1990, he would not have had the
bloody encounter with Mayor Cortez and his men.[66] Thus, based on the allegations in the Informations, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the cases.
Significantly, while petitioner had already pleaded not guilty before the RTC, jeopardy did not attach as it did not acquire
jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in court that had no jurisdiction]

2.
Held:
1.

YES. RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the SB shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense: 1.
Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
grade "27" and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 Under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989, mayors are "local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher

2.

The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though
they had already pleaded not guilty to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never
attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy
where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction. The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to
move for the quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy. Their
remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Jejomar C. Binay vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan


Facts:
Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity) against Mayor Binay of Makati for Illegal Use of
Public Funds (RPC A220) and Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) on September 1994.
The informations filed constituted crimes which were committed by the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation of his constitutional
right of due process. His arraignment therefore was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the
SB issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to quash and further the latters motion for reconsideration. In the
meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused pendente lite (benefits) which was later granted and ordered
for a 90-day suspension.
Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration be
set aside and claimed that he was denied of his rights when the suspension was ordered even before he could file
his reply to the petitioners opposition. SC then, directed the SB to permit petitioner to file said reply. The SB nonetheless
reiterated its previous resolutions and order after the submission of the reply. Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction
of SB took effect on May 1995 so much
so that the petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati alleging that the SB has no jurisdiction
over said cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied the
petitioners motion.
Hence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB over the criminal cases.
Issue:
1.

WoN SB has jurisdiction over the case of after the passage of RA 7975.

won the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall not be dismissed, will expose the petitioners who
are accused therein to double jeopardy?

Court must have competent jurisdiction


*Pp v. Degrano, 167710, 2009
*Cudia v. CA, 284 scra 173
SALDANA VS PP
Where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the
information for insufficiency of evidence, may the case be remanded for further proceedings?
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Saldana was charged with the crime of estafa. The petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
At the trial on May 27, 1986, the prosecution presented Mercedes Tan, vice-president of the complainant Association, as its
witness. She Identified certain exhibits, including a Consolidated Financial Report dated February 24, 1984 allegedly
submitted by the petitioner to the Association. The report showed that petitioner had collected a total of P2,855,133.93 as
occupancy fees and association dues from members of the Association and disbursed P1,915,719.50 from April 25, 1982 to
December 31, 1983, leaving a balance of P939,414.43. She issued three (3) checks to cover the balance, one of which, for P
642,538.86, bounced, and became the subject of Crim. Case No. 64758.
On June 13, 1986, the trial court, upon request of the prosecution, issued a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum
ordering the Manager of the Citytrust Banking Corporation, Ortigas Branch, to appear and testify on June 17, 1986. The
Manager was also required to bring the ledger of Current Account No. 32-00066-9 for the period of March 1, 1982 to March 1,
1984, the signature card for the account, the Board resolution authorizing the opening of the account, and the deposit slips of

43
the account for the period of March 1, 1982 to March 1, 1984. The People and the Association alleged that the account was
opened by the Association and the petitioner was instructed to deposit her collections therein.

prosecution was denied due process as it never had the chance to offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In setting aside the order of dismissal and remanding the case for trial on the merits, this Court held:

The Bank Manager did not come to court on June 17, 1986. The prosecution asked that a show-cause order be issued to him. In
the meantime, the prosecution called Linel Garcia Cuevas to testify that as a member of the Association she paid her
amortizations and association dues to the petitioner, and to Identify the receipts issued to her by the petitioner. The defense
objected to the presentation of Cuevas because she was not the offended party. The trial judge sustained the objection, ruling
that "granting that she (accused) received the money from the members and did not give the amount to the Corporation, it
should be the individual members who will file the necessary complaint, not the corporation."

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby
violated (Uy vs. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29, 1974]; Serino vs. Zosa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug. 31, 1971];
People vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20 SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA 1119 [Aug. 31, 1966]).

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the prosecution. Memoranda were submitted by both sides.
The trial was reset. At the prosecution's behest, another subpoena was served on the Bank Manager to bring the records of
Current Account No. 32-00066-9 for the hearing on July 29, 1986, but he again failed to appear in court. The prosecution
manifested that it had a ready witness and other evidence besides. However, the court reset the trial because the prosecution's
motion for reconsideration of the court's order sustaining the defense' objection to Cuevas' testimony, was still unresolved.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus,
the violation of the State's light to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage,
L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be
regarded as a 'lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head'
(Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).

On August 8, 1986, the prosecution received a copy of the accused's "Motion to Consider the Prosecution to Have Rested Its
Case and to Dismiss the Case for Insufficiency of Evidence." The prosecution promptly opposed it.

Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute
a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).

At the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the prosecution informed the court that it had other witnesses to present and that it
would file a petition for certiorari should the trial court deny its pending motion for reconsideration of the order disallowing
Cuevas, and other association members from testifying.

xxx xxx xxx

On September 9, 1986, the court denied the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the order barring Cuevas and other
members of the Association from testifying. The court also terminated the presentation of further evidence for the prosecution
and dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence.

(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;


(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

The People elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, and the Court of Appeals granted the petition

Legal jeopardy attaches only:


(a) upon a valid indictment,
(b) before a competent court,
(c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil.
851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the reopening of the case, violating the rule on double jeopardy.
HELD:
The order of the Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by the trial court does NOT violate the rule
on double jeopardy.
One of the elements of double jeopardy is a competent court.
The trial court in this case was ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process by
aborting its right to complete the presentation of its evidence. Hence, the first jeopardy had not been terminated. The remand of
the case for further hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy. It does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy (People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166).
In Bocar, an information for theft was filed against the three accused therein who, upon arraignment, pleaded "not guilty."
Respondent Judge conducted a "summary investigation" questioning the complainant and the accused, after which he issued an
order dismissing the case. Acting upon a special civil action seeking the annulment of said order, this Court found that the

Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present:

In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the
lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.