Not Flesh of My Flesh But Still My Own Outline

Chapter 4: Presentation, Interpretation, and Analysis of Data

A. Substantive
a. Who May Adopt

Requirements for Aliens (sec. 7)

Joint Adoption

b. Who May be Adopted

Children who may be adopted (sec. 8)

Exceptions wherein those who are not minors can still be
adopted

c. Whose Consent is Necessary

Whose consent required (sec.9)

Written Consent

B. Procedural
a. Process of declaring a child legally available for adoption
b. Procedure of adoption
Hurried decision
Case Study
Supervised Trial Custody
-Nature of the Proceeding
Decree of Adoption to be entered when
- Effectivity
- Registration
- Middle name of the Adopted
Civil Registry Record
Confidentiality

C. Issues and Problems

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 143989

July 14, 2003

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM"), respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children.
The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr.DiosdadoLahom and
IsabelitaLahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring
him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and
support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and
Mrs.Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided
to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued
that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for
Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the
name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999,
Mrs.Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred
"7. That x xx despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent
refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of
petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death
he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented
by petitioner's supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to
give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the
future.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of
the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation
1

Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978
until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his
practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only
her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern
from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to
see her once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in
Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times
when petitioner would need most the care and support from a love one, but
respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner
which is not expected of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and
nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they
were only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and
uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered
wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondent's only motive to his adoption
is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and
her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for
partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards
respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the
child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there
is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation,"1
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
"SEC. 19.Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee,
with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of
age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on
any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical
and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling;
(b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.

"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission
by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code." (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of
action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by
way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively
apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the
regime of then Article 3482of the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of
R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family
Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court
could render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of said complaint
(De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an
adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code.
Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action.
"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the
provisions of the Family Code should be respected. Assuming for the sake of
argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted
on May 5, 1972, said right should have been exercised within the period allowed
by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal
grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more
than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999,
hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules
of Court)
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered
dismissed."4
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
petitioner raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?
3

A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject.
In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family.5 The
continuity of the adopter's family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters
relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention
about the rights of the adopted.6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an
effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized
adoption.7 It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still
later when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern.8 Spain itself which
previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept
of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans
came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe,
made the interests of the child an overriding consideration.9 In the early part of the
century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the Geneva
Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948,10 followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the
Child,11 were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of
adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines12 of 1950 on adoption, later modified
by the Child and Youth Welfare Code13 and then by the Family Code of the
Philippines,14gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In
1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The
Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared
to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the
adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only
in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an
adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to
sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right
to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case,
both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
process15 that expresses apresent fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action;16 it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the
right has become vested.17 Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida
C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential
Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After
the trial court had rendered its decision and while the case was still pending on appeal,
the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption
by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be
dismissed for having been filed by Mrs.Bobiles alone and without being joined by the
4

husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt
Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect,
the right of Mrs.Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by her husband,
according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller,21 spouses Claude and
Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the
couple filed a petition to formalize Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken into
their care. At the time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt.
After the decree of adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family
Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting
Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In
discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the
controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition
was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action
to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,22 had already
abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code
to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court
should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be
pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.
The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill
the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged
that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges.24 While adoption has often been
referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.25 It is a privilege that is governed
by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of
the child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the
State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime
before it has been exercised.28
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right
to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to
be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the
law. Dura lexsedlex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to
live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the
legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by
law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament,
may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
5

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 2526.

Art. 348. The adopter may petition the court for revocation of the adoption in
any of these cases:
(1) If the adopted person has attempted against the life of the adopter;
(2) When the adopted minor has abandoned the home of the adopter for
more than three years;
(3) When by other acts the adopted person has definitely repudiated the
adoption. (n)
3

Art. 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the
adoption in any of the following cases:
(1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting a ground for
disinheriting a descendant; or
(2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during
minority for at least one year, or, by some other acts, has definitely
repudiated the adoption. (41a, P.D. No. 603)
4

Rollo, pp. 3334.

The Law of Adoption, Morton L. Leavy& Rey Weinbey, 4th Edition (1979).

The Law on Adoption and Surrogate Parenting, Irving J. Sloan (1988).

Ibid., p. 7.

Id. The earliest adoption statute was reported in Mississippi in 1846. In 1850,
Texas and Vermont, USA passed their general adoption statutes, followed by
Massachusetts and New York in 1851.
9

A Comparative Study of the Adoption Law under the Spanish Civil Code and the
Code of Civil Procedure, 4 Phil. L.J. 313323 (1918).
6

10

United Nation General Assembly, Resolution dated 10 December 1948.

11

United Nation General Assembly/44/49 (1989).

12

Presidential Decree No. 386.

13

Presidential Decree No. 603 (10 June 1975), as amended by P.D. No. 1175 (15
August 1977).
14

Executive Order 209 (03 August 1988).

15

16 CJS citing City of Los Angeles vs. Oliver, 283 P. 298, 102 Cal. App. 299.

16

Ayog vs. Cusi, Jr. G.R. No.L-46729, 19 November 1982 (118 SCRA 492).

17

16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, p. 651.

18

Benquet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, No. L-7231, 28 March 1956 (98
Phil. 711) quoting Pearsall vs. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U.S. 646.
19

Reyes vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, 29 March 1999 (305 SCRA
512) as cited in Bernabe vs. Alejo, G.R. No. 140500, 21 January 2002 (374 SCRA
180).
20

G.R. No. 92326, 24 January 1992 (205 SCRA 356).

21

G.R. No. 125932, 21 April 1999 (306 SCRA 183).

22

Section, 26. Repealing Clause. Any law, presidential decree or issuance,

executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation
contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, or
modified, or amended accordingly.
23

SEC. 5. Time within which to file petition. A minor or other incapacitated

person must file the petition for rescission or revocation of adoption within the
five years following his majority, or if he was incompetent at the time of the
adoption, within the five (5) years following the recovery from such
incompetency.
The adopter must also file the petition to set aside the adoption within five (5)
years from the time the cause or causes giving rise to the rescission or revocation
of the same took place. (emphasis supplied)
24

Id. at 24, citing Brearly School vs. Ward, 210 NY 358, 40 LRA NS.1215; also,
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed. p. 546.

25

Martin vs. Putman (Miss) 427 So 2d 1373; There is no right of adoption. It is

the extension of a privilege.Eggleston vs. Landrum 210 Miss 645, 50 So 2d 364,
23 ALR2d 696.
26

Browder vs. Harmeyer (Ind App) as cited in AmJur, 2d, Vol. 2.

27

Adoption has also been characterized as a status created by the state acting
as parenspatriae, the sovereign parent. Douglas vs. Harrelson (Ala App) 454 So
2d 984.
28

16 CJS citing Robinsons vs. Mchugh, 291 P. 330, 158 Wash. 157.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22170

September 23, 1966

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR BERTHA ANN

RIVERA.
ROBERT H. CATHEY and HELEN O. CATHEY, petitioners and appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.
L. F. Lansangan for petitioners and appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor and appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

On January 26, 1963, the spouses Robert H. Cathey and Helen O. Cathey petitioned the
Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations for the adoption of the minor Bertha Ann
Rivera. Among other things their petition alleged that petitioners are both of legal age and
residents of Manila; that Robert Cathey is an American citizen, residing in the Philippines
since 1945 and Helen Cathey is a Filipino citizen residing here since birth; that they had
the care and custody of the child Bertha Ann Rivera three days after her birth on January
19, 1963; that Bertha is the natural child of Violeta O. Rivera who has given her written
consent to the adoption; that a copy of said consent is attached as Annex A to the petition;
that the child's natural father is unknown; that petitioners have no children and are
qualified to adopt.
Subsequently, upon orders of the Court, the petition was amended to further allege that
petitioners are permanent residents living at 1331 Carola St., Sampaloc, Manila, and to
attach thereto the child's birth certificate.
After petitioners had presented their evidence, without opposition from the Solicitor
General, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, on August 5, 1963, rendered a
decision that denied the petition, for two reasons: (1) It was not convinced that genuine
efforts were exerted to present Violeta O. Rivera before the Court, for inspite of her
refusal to testify, other remedies could have been availed of under the Rules of Court to
obtain her testimony; (2) As an alien, Robert Cathey is not qualified to adopt.
9

Petitioner appealed therefrom to Us, thereby raising questions purely of law.

Article 340 of the New Civil Code on consent to adoption provides that the written
consent of the following shall be necessary: "(1) the person to be adopted, if fourteen
years of age or over; (2) the parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be
adopted."
Section 3 of Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court (now Sec. 3 of Rule 99) likewise
provides:
SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.There shall be filed with the petition a written
consent to the adoption signed by the child, if over fourteen years of age and not
incompetent and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such
parents by the general guardian or guardian adlitem of the child, or if the child is
in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or
person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by
such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the
consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.
From these provisions, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, the requirement as to
consent has been met, for both our substantive and procedural laws do not further require
the testimony of the consenting parent before the court aside from the requisite written
consent attached to the petition.
And contrary to the court's opinion that genuine efforts were not exerted to bring the
mother to testify before it, the evidence before Us shows that petitioners, after their own
efforts had failed (Tsn of May 8, 1963, pp. 14, 29), sought the help of the Chief of Police
of Angeles, Pampanga to locate the mother. Patrolman Mariano Carbungco the
investigator assigned to locate the mother, finally found her in Pauline's Cavern where
she worked as a night club hostess. She refuse to reveal her residence and to testify in
court, but she re-affirmed the fact that she has given her written consent to the adoption.
Patrolman Carbungo executed an affidavit (Exhibit F) where such facts were attested to.
Subsequently, she could not be found anymore.
While it would have been ideal, to remove all possible doubts, for the mother to have
presented in court, the primary consideration the welfare of the child should not be
prejudiced by the absence of it in view of the circumstances showing that the petitioners
did all they could and all that reasonably could have been expected from them. Even the
Solicitor General, concerned about the child's welfare, filed a brief praying for the
adoption to be granted, reasoning that the mother's act of leaving the baby to the Catheys
10

three days after her birth constituted abandonment which under Sec. 3, Rule 100 (now
Sec. 3, Rule 99) even dispenses with the need for consent. This, the Solicitor General
believes, coupled with the affidavit of consent (Exhibit B) reaffirmed by her to Pat.
Carbungco also, show that she too, a mother, with the interests of her child at heart,
favors her adoption.
Anent the alienage of petitioner Robert H. Cathey, not all aliens are disqualified to adopt.
Article 335 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 335. The following cannot adopt:
x xx

x xx

x xx

(4) Non-resident aliens;

(5) Resident aliens with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has
broken diplomatic relations;
As this Court pointed out through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in UggiTherkelsen v.
Republic, L-21951, November 27, 1964: "the present Civil Code in force (Article 335)
only disqualifies from being adopters aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who
are residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with
their government. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify
a foreigner from adopting under our laws."
Petitioner, Robert H. Cathey though an American citizen, is a resident alien entitled to
remain in the Philippines, as his Immigrant Certificate of Residence (Exhibit D) shows.
He is legally married to Helen Olalia and presently is the administrative officer of the
U.S. Naval Construction office at Clark Air Base with an annual compensation of
$6,295.00 and has P25,000 worth of personal properties in the Philippines. As petitioners
spouses have no child of their own, they wish to adopt Bertha Ann Rivera and thus make
her their heir. The welfare of the child being the paramount consideration under the law
(Art. 363, New Civil Code), the child now sought to be adopted being virtually unwanted
by her own mother, who, by the way, has seven other children to feed (Tsn of May 2,
1963, p. 11), We see no reason why the adoption should not be granted. 1awphl.nt
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the court a quo is directed
to allow the adoption sought. No costs. So ordered.

11

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 168992-93

May 21, 2009

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to
set aside the Decision1dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General
Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which
dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim
and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June
1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents
were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so
eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it
appear that they were the childrens parents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old
when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.3 Michael was
11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1 August
1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records
12

and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000,

petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5 given
under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of
a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and
1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25
years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent.7Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her
natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for
Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The
trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article
185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in
the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner
did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552.
Petitioners argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable
because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and
certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in
this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is
merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption
is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child
acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not
petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty
of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
13

adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since,
at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since
they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband
Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the
petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA
8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support
and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee,
or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at
least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption
and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has
been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country,
and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her
adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived
for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship
and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
14

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter
of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis
supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption
were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court
was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And
third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an
American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such
as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such
residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his
own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and wellbeing.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall
not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another
15

person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains
the age of majority or 18 years of age16 emancipation terminates parental authority
over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for
all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of
legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is
the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and
the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is
entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end,
the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the
means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and
the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s)
had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and
adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to
be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs
of each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the
adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights19 of a
legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to
receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other
successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted
child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled20 such as
support21 and successional rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children
and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples
or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
16

reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled inRepublic v. Vergara:24
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of
the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a
manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied
with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the
Court is not in a position to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case
at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses petition for adoption.
(Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have
jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until
and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner
and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions
for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

17

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Antonio C. Lubao. Records of SPL. PROC. Case No. 1258,
pp. 161-162 and SPL. PROC. Case No. 1259, pp. 163-164.
2 Three children were actually entrusted to petitioner and Lim. The third, who was
named Primo Jude P. Lim, was still a minor at the time the petition for adoption
was filed. The case was docketed as SPL. PROC. No. 1260. Petitioner opted not
to appeal the decision insofar as the minor Primo Jude P. Lim was concerned.
3 Records (SPL. PROC. Case No. 1258), pp. 94-96.
4 Records (SPL. PROC. Case No. 1259), pp. 69-71.
5 Section 22 of RA 8552 provides:
SEC. 22. Rectification of Simulated Births.- A person who has, prior to the
effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a child shall not be punished
for such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was made for the best
interest of the child and that he/she has been consistently considered and
18

treated by that person as his/her own son/daughter: Provided, further, That

the application for correction of the birth registration and petition for
adoption shall be filed within five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act
and completed thereafter: Provided, finally, That such person complies
with the procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act and other
requirements as determined by the Department.
6 An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Domestic Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes, otherwise known as the "Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998." Approved on 25 February 1998.
7 Records (SPL. PROC. Case No. 1258), pp. 147-148.
8 Id. at 147.
9 Id. at 149.
10 Id. at 145.
11 Records (SPL. PROC. Case No. 1259), p. 8.
12 Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, 8 June 1994, 233 SCRA 9.
13 Article 209, Family Code.
14 Article 210, Family Code.
15 Article 212, Family Code.
16 Republic Act No. 6809, An Act Lowering the Age of Majority from TwentyOne to Eighteen Years, Amending for the Purpose Executive Order Numbered
Two Hundred Nine, and For Other Purposes.
17 Article 236, Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6809.
18 Section 33, Article VI, Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998.
19 Article 174, Family Code.
20 Section 34, Article VI, Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998.
21 Article 195, Family Code.
22 Section 18, Article V, RA 8552.
23 Bobanovic v. Montes, 226 Phil. 404 (1986).
24 336 Phil. 944, 948-949 (1997).

19

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-36309 November 26, 1973

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF THE MINOR LUIS ALBERTO MARTIN
DE SANTOS, FREDERICK WILLIAM MALKINSON and ANA MARIE DE
SANTOS MALKINSON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the JUVENILE and DOMESTIC
RELATIONS COURT OF MANILA, respondent.
De Santos, Balgos and Perez for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Solicitor Alicia V. Sempio-Diy for
respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this appeal from the dismissal orders of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, the Court, in reversing, reaffirms the established jurisprudence based on the plain
20

language of the codal provision that alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner
from adopting a Filipino child and that our Civil Code "only disqualifies from being
adopters those aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but the
Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their government."
Neither does our Civil Code require that both adopter and adopted be of the same
nationality.
On October 13, 1972, petitioners-spouses filed with respondent court their verified
petition to adopt the minor Luis Alberto Martin de Santos, who was born a Filipino
citizen in Madrid, Spain on August 4, 1969, the acknowledged natural child of petitioner
Ana Marie de Santos Malkinson who alone his parents extended him recognition.
Petitioners-spouses averred that since their marriage on March 6, 1972, the said child
who owns no property has been living with them under their care and custody at their
residence at No. 1443 Jose P. Laurel Street, Manila; that petitioner Frederick William
Malkinson is an American citizen, 1 gainfully employed as a seaman with an average
yearly income of US $7,000-$8,000, while his co-petitioner spouse is a Filipino citizen
and a property owner in the Philippines; and that it is to the best interest of the child that
he be adopted by petitioners-spouses who possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for such legal adoption.
Judge Vicente M. Santiago, Jr. then on detail with respondent court issued his order of
October 18, 1972 giving due course to the petition and setting it for hearing on January 8,
1973 and directed that appropriate notices be sent to the Solicitor General and the
Director, Bureau of Child and Youth Welfare, Department of Social Welfare and
publication of the order be made.
Upon respondent judge's return to her court after her leave of absence, she issued her
order of November 22, 1972, stating that upon a review of the petition wherein "it is
alleged that petitioner husband is an alien while the child sought to be adopted is a citizen
of this country" respondent court was of the opinion that "the petition, for that reason, is
not sufficient in substance, and the same cannot be given course" and ordered that "the
petition filed herein will be ordered dismissed after the lapse of 30 days from petitioners'
receipt of notice hereof unless, within said period, proper proceedings are instituted
before the Supreme Court for the purpose of questioning the correctness of this Order."
Petitioners moved for reconsideration on the ground that no law prohibits a resident alien,
who is not a citizen of a country without diplomatic relations with the Philippines and is
not otherwise legally disqualified, from adopting a Filipino, and respondent court denied
the same under its order of December 18, 1972.

21

Hence, the present appeal by certiorari from respondent court's dismissal orders.
Respondent judge thus ordered the dismissal of the petition on the basis of her known
view that "a Filipino could not adopt an alien and vice versa;" hence, since petitioner
husband is an alien while the child sought to be adopted is a Filipino, she decreed that the
petition cannot be given due course. While aware of the controlling doctrine enunciated
by this Court in the Therkelsen 2 and Cathey 3 adoption cases that alienage by itself does
not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a Filipino child and that the Philippine Civil
Code "only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either (a) non-residents
or (b) who are residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic
relations with their government" 4 respondent court felt that Justice J.B.L. Reyes'
statement in Therkelsen as to its non-exposition of its reasons for dismissal of the petition
therein as set aside by this Court left the way open for a review and restudy of the
controlling precedents.
Respondent court thus once again as in Therkelsen ordered dismissal of the petition
solely on the ground of alienage of the petitioner husband, maintaining inter alia that
Article 334 the Civil Code (which provides that "Every person of age, who is in full
possession of his civil rights, may adopt") "cannot be accepted literally. If Scaevola 5 is
correct, it should be construed as not permitting a citizen to adopt an alien, or vice versa;"
"that the prohibitions contained in Article 335 (4) an (5) of the Code should be construed
as aimed at the adoption of aliens by other aliens, and not at the adoption by an alien of a
Filipino;" "that an alien who has adopted a Filipino child cannot be expected, by precept
and example, to imbue the adopted with love of the Philippines and veneration for
Filipino national heroes" (under Article 358 of the Civil Code) and that "solidarity of a
family cannot be achieved if we hold the view that a Filipino child can be adopted by an
alien."
Petitioners-spouses therefrom urge that under the clear and plain language of the Civil
Code and the Court's express rulings in Therkelsen and Cathey, petitioner husband as an
America resident not suffering from any legal disqualification may jointly with his
co-petitioner Filipino wife legally adopt the latter's acknowledged natural child.
The Solicitor General in a manifestation in lieu of appellee's brief dated October 26, 1973
stated that "with all due respect to the opinion and reasons of the respondent judge for
wanting the above ruling to be reexamined and restudied by this Honorable Court,
undersigned counsel not only feel bound by said ruling but also honestly believe that the
same, is the correct, proper, and reasonable interpretation of our law on adoption; as a
matter of fact, in said cases of Therkelsen and Cathey, undersigned counsel were also
impelled by reason and the law to place themselves on the side of appellants in asking for
the reversal of the orders of the same respondent judge in said cases holding that an alien
22

cannot adopt a Filipino," and joined petitioners in praying for reversal of respondent
court's dismissal orders.
Petitioners-spouses' appeal must be sustained on the strength of the controlling doctrine
enunciated in the cited cases.
In Cathey, Justice Jose P. Bengzon ruled for a unanimous Court that "(A)s this Court
pointed out through Mr. J.B.L. Reyes in Uggi Therkelsen v. Republic, L-21951,
November 27, 1964: "the present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from
being adopters aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but the
Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their government.
Outside of these twocases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from
adopting under our laws." " The Court thus held therein that "(P)etitioner Robert H.
Cathey though an American citizen, is a resident alien entitled to remain in the
Philippines, as his Immigrant Certificate of Residence (Exhibit D) shows. He is legally
married to Helen Olalia and presently is the administrative officer of the U.S. Naval
Construction office at Clark Air Base with an annual compensation of $6,295.00 and has
P25,000 worth of personal properties in the Philippines. As petitioners spouses have no
child of their own, they wish to adopt Bertha Ann Rivera and thus make her their heir.
Thewelfare of the child being the paramount consideration under the law (Art. 363, New
Civil Code), the child now sought to be adopted being virtually unwanted by her own
mother, who, by the way, has seven other children to feed (Tsn of May 2, 1963, p. 11),
We see no reason why the adoption should not be granted."
In Therkelsen, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had occasion to discuss respondent court's contrary
view and to reject for a unanimous Court its imposition of an additional
requisite not imposed by the Civil Code that both adopter and adopted be of the same
nationality in this wise:
The court a quo denied the adoption sought, saying:
"In Sp. Proc No. D-00011 adoption of Benigno Lim, this
Court has had occasion rule that a Filipino cannot adopt an
alien (Chinese) minor about 19 years old. The adoption
would not confer Philippine citizenship on the Chinese, but
could definitely legalize his stay in this country. It was also
stated that conversely, an alien cannot adopt a Filipino
unless the adoption would make the Filipino minor a
citizen of the alien's country. As petitioner husband in this
case is a Danish subject it has to be held that he cannot
legally adopt the minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks,
23

whose citizenship is of this country following that of his

natural mother."
If we understand the decision correctly, the adoption was denied solely
because the same would not result in the loss of the minor's Filipino
citizenship and the acquisition by him of the citizenship of his adopter.
Unfortunately, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court did not expound
the reasons for its opinion; but it is clear that, if pursued to its logical
consequences, the judgment appealed from would operate
to impose a further prerequisite on adoptions by aliens beyond those
required by law. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief, the
present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being
adopters those aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who are
residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic
relations with their government. Outside of these two cases, alienage by
itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a person under
our law. Petitioners admittedly do not fall in either class.
The criterion adopted by the Court a quo would demand as a condition for
the approval of the adoption that the process should result in the
acquisition, by the person adopted, of the alien citizenship of the adopting
parent. This finds no support in the law, for, as observed by this Court
inChing Leng vs. Galang, G.R. No. L-11931, promulgated on 27 October
1958, the citizenship of the adopter is a matter political, and not civil, in
nature, and the ways in which it should be conferred lay outside the ambit
of the Civil Code. It is not within the province of our civil law to
determine how or when citizenship in a foreign state is to be acquired. The
disapproval of the adoption of an alien child in order to forestall
circumvention of our exclusion laws does not warrant denial of the
adoption of a Filipino minor by qualified alien adopting parents, since it is
not shown that our public policy would be thereby subverted.
The Court finds no justification for deviating or departing from the established doctrine.
Whatever may be the merit of respondent court's views as above-cited, they go into the
wisdom or policy of the statute which are beyond the Court's domain. 6 The Civil Code
provisions on adoption are quite plain and clear and are free from any ambiguity. Under
such circumstances, there is no room for construction, the law is controlling and the clear
task of the judiciary is to apply the law as it is. 7
If alienage alone of the adopter or of the adopted were to be a disqualification, it is
inconceivable that the lawmakers would not have so explicitly provided, considering that
24

in Article 335 of the Code non-resident aliens and resident aliens with whose government
the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations are the only two classes of aliens
expressly disqualified and prohibited to adopt while in Article 339 only an alien with
whose state our government has broken diplomatic relations is expressly disqualified and
prohibited to be adopted. Inclusio unius exclusio alterius. This is but in consonance with
the liberal concept that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them
the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow
childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a
child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law. 8
Finally, aside from the above decisive consideration that under the plain language of the
law alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner such as petitioner-husband from
adopting a Filipino child, the Solicitor General further enumerated correctly various other
factors that show the merit of the petition below, viz, that petitioner wife as the natural
mother is expressly authorized under Article 338, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code to
adopt her natural child and raise its status to that of a legitimate child, 9 that under
paragraph (3) of the same article, petitioner-husband as the step-father is likewise
expressly authorized to adopt his stepchild, and that the adoption sought would
strengthen the family solidarity of petitioners-spouses and the child, because the child
after adoption, would have its status of a natural child of petitioner wife and a step-child
of petitioner-husband raised to that of legitimate child of both petitioners with all the
rights an duties appertaining thereto, as provided in Article 341 of the Civil Code.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed dismissal orders of November 22 and December 18, 1972
are hereby set aside and respondent court is directed to give due course to the petition in
accordance with the previous order of October 18, 1972 and to reset the hearing thereof at
the earliest practicable date. In view of the established jurisprudence covering the case,
this decision shall be immediately executory upon promulgation.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Petitioners' brief (at page 5) further states that they would establish at the
hearing that petitioner husband "in addition to being a resident of the
25

Philippines, was born in the City of Manila, grew up in Manila, studied in

Manila and married his co-petitioner in Manila."
2 In re adoption of the minor Joseph Blancaflor Weeks; Therkelsen vs.
Republic, 12 SCRA 400 (Nov. 27, 1964).
3 In re adoption of the minor Bertha Ann Rivera; Cathey vs. Republic, 18
SCRA 86 (Sept. 23, 1966).
4 12 SCRA at p. 401.
5 As against Scaevola, petitioners cite Manresa who states the contrary
view that aliens may legally adopt under the laws of Spain which grant
them the same civil rights as Spanish citizens. II Manresa 105.
6 See Veneracion vs. Congson Ice Plant & Cold Storage, Inc., L-31213-14,
(July 23, 1973).
7 See Maritime Co. of the Phil. vs. Repacom, 40 SCRA 70 (1971); People
vs. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 (1958); Ysasi vs. Fernandez, 26 SCRA 393
(1968) and cases cited.
8 Santos vs. Aranzanso, 16 SCRA 344 (1966); Santos vs. Republic, 21
SCRA 378 (1967); Prasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 665 (1956).
9 Prasnick vs. Republic, supra; Jimenez vs. Republic, 101 Phil. 518
(1957).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
26

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21951

November 27, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE MINOR CHARLES JOSEPH

BLANCAFLOR WEEKS. UGGI LINDAMAND THERKELSEN and ERLINDA G.
BLANCAFLOR, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellee.
Campos, Mendoza & Hernandez for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General and J. Domingo de Leon for respondent-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This appeal was taken against a decision of the Manila Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, in its special Proceedings, No. D-00007, denying appellants' application for
adoption of the minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks.
The factual background of the case is stated in the decision appealed from to be as
follows:
In this adoption proceeding, the petitioners are husband and wife who were
married on June 2, 1962, or barely a year ago. The minor sought to be adopted,
born on February 16, 1960, is the natural child of petitioner wife. His father was
Charles Joseph Week, who abandoned mother and child after the latter's birth. He
is said to have gone back to the United States.
Except for the legal impediment hereinafter to be mentioned, the facts before the
Court may warrant the approval of the adoption sought herein. Petitioner husband
is a Danish subject, who has been granted permanent residence in the Philippines
(Exhs. "D" and "E"). A former employee of Scandinavian Airlines System, he is
now Manager of M. Y. Travel International Hongkong Ltd., with a monthly salary
of P1,200.00. plus allowances. It does not appear that either petitioner has been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the minor
sought to be adopted has been living with them ever since the marriage of
petitioners. Petitioner husband has treated the minor as his son, and the latter calls
him "Daddy." Although the possibility exists that petitioners may yet have their
own children, the adoption at this time, before any such children are begotten,
may strengthen, rather than disrupt, future domestic relations.
The court a quo denied the adoption sought, saying:
27

In Sp. Proc. No. D-00011, adoption of Benigno Lim, this Court has had occasion
to rule that a Filipino cannot adopt an alien (Chinese) minor about 19 years old.
The adoption would not confer Philippine citizenship on the Chinese, but could
definitely legalize his stay in this country. It was also stated that conversely, an
alien cannot adopt a Filipino unless the adoption would make the Filipino minor a
citizen of the alien's country. As petitioner husband in this case is a Danish
subject, it has to be held that he cannot legally adopt the minor Charles Joseph
Blancaflor Weeks, whose citizenship is of this country, following that of his
natural mother.
If we understand the decision correctly, the adoption was denied solely because the same
would not result in the loss of the minor's Filipino citizenship and the acquisition by him
of the citizenship of his adopter. Unfortunately, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court did not expound the reasons for its opinion; but it is clear that, if pursued to its
logical consequences, the judgment appealed from would operate to impose a further
prerequisite on adoptions by aliens beyond those required by law. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General in his brief, the present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only
disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either(a) non-residents or (b) who
are residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with
their government. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify
a foreigner from adopting a person under our law. Petitioners admittedly do not fall in
either class.
The criterion adopted by the Court a quo would demand as a condition for the approval
of the adoption that the process should result in the acquisition, by the person adopted, of
the alien citizenship of the adopting parent. This finds no support in the law, for, as
observed by this Court in Ching Leng vs. Galang, G.R. No. L-11931, promulgated on 27
October 1958, the citizenship of the adopter is a matter political, and not civil, in nature,
and the ways in which it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil Code. It is
not within the province of our civil law to determine how or when citizenship in a foreign
state is to be acquired. The disapproval of the adoption of an alien child in order to
forestall circumvention of our exclusion laws does not warrant, denial of the adoption of
a Filipino minor by qualified alien adopting parents, since it is not shown that our public
policy would be thereby subverted.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the
court a quo is directed to allow the adoption sought. Without costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Parades, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

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