Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any
issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his
widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of
the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias
Chua of his first marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the
lower court issued an order dated January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating,
among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the
sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion
de la Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias
Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of
Lorenze Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua,
his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28,
1932 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of
Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners proindiviso of Lot No. 399.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and
REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in
her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.

On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage

died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot
No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la
Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor
the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No.
399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion
de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the
descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.

Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.

MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which
dismissed the complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A,
entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre,
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"

In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp.

Proc. No. 7839-A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the
first marriage and dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed
legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the
first marriage filed the complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated as
a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11,

It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia
S. Militar alias Sy Quio he sired three children, namely: Ignacio,
Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S.
Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros

Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot
No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed
to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a
reservable property for the reason that the lot in questionn was
subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil
Code, Private respondent as administratrix of the estate of
individually the complaint of petitioners 4

died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within
the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and
Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate
children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the
petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first
requisit of reserva troncal whether the property in question was
acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua,
gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court
said:

On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision

dismissing the complaint of petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil
Code provides:

It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the
property in question was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre
and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely,
that the legatees were to pay the interest and cost and other fees
resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is
undeniable that the lot in question is not subject tot a reserva
troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code, and as such the
plaintiff's complaint must fail.

ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to
the line from which said property came.

We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion

that the lot in question is not subject to areserva troncal under Art.
891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa which
this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil.
186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether
the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges;
what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by
an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing
any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person
receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably
put by an eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing is
that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure

Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be

impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must
exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant
from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title;
(2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property
is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that
there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came. 5 In the case before Us, all of the
foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records,
Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952;
he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of
Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It

is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in
question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the
death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary
succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the order
(Exh. "D") of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816
which estates in express terms;

to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject to reserva
troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose
Frias Chua to the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by
the heirs in their project of partition based on the last will and
testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the
supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never
probated. The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in
paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer. 7 There is nothing
mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 7839
A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of
January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding
No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the Last Will
and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has ever been probated. With the
foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and Testament
has in fact been probated there would have been no need for the
testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among
themselves. The very will itself could be made the basis for the
adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of
partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by
inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's
second marriage.

2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la

Torre, viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua,
menor de edad, todos residente de San Enrique, Negros Occidental,
I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, estas
propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la
Carlota, Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y
cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales
pro-indiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las Standard Oil Co.
of New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas
gastos resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the
amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and
Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua
in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the
Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the
transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition
imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of
pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court
orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the
Standare oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This does
not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27,

1952 without any issue. After his death his mother Consolation de
la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399.
This was, however, subject to the condition that the property was
reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of
relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the
property came. These relatives are the petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the onehalf portion of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias
3

P1550respectively. (Manuel already died). Juanito also died

intestate without issue. Consolacion de la Torre executed a
declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso
share of her son Juanito in the lot in question. When dela Torre
died, Ignacio and the heirs of Lorenzo filed a complaint praying
that the one-half portion of the Lot be declared as a reservable
property for the reason that the lot in question was subject to
reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 NCC.Lower court
dismissed complaint.

Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966.
We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners
herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the
reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the
petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half
(1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
hereby set aside. The petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador
Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided
portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental
is hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796
covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre
and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion
de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4
undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4
undivided portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Issue:
WON property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua
from his father Jose Frias Chua gratuitously(as first requisite of
Reserva Troncal).
Held:
YesRatio:

SO ORDERED.

In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable

character the following requisites must exist,to wit: (1) that the
property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or
from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said
descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is
inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that
there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which said property came.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Mu;oz Palma, Fernandez and

Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Chua v. CFI
Facts:

All of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by

the records, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died
intestate in 1952; he died with our leaving any issue; his proindiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother,
Consolacion de la Torre died, Juanito Frias Chua who died
intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives
are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua,
the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias
Chua, who are the petitioners herein

Jose Frias Chua had 2 marriages. First with Patricia, he had 3

children- Ignacio, Manuel and Lorenzo. When Patricia died, he
married Consolacion de la Torre and had one child- Juanito Frias
Chua. Jose Frias Chua died intestate.After the intestate
proceeding the court adjudicated half of lot in question to
Consolacion and the other half to their only son, Juanito. The two
sons in the first marriage, Lorenzo and Ignacio, received P3k and

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

According to Manresa, "The transmission is gratuitous or by

gratuitous title when the recipient does notgive anything in
return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be
not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the
transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere
liberality of the person making it, without imposing any
obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person
receiving the property gives or does nothing in return.

FACTS: Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio sired three

children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. When
Patricia died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage
with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the
name of Juanita Frias Chua.
1. Manuel died without leaving any issue.
2. Then in 1929, Jose died intestate leaving his widow
Consolacion and his son Juanito of the second marriage
and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first marriage.

"the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so

gratuitously, from pure generosity,without requiring from the
transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the
transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of
the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua
was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore
gratuitous.

3. In the Intestate Proceeding, the lower court issued

an order adjudicating, among others, the one-half
portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor
of Jose's widow, Consolacion, the other half of Lot
No. 399 in favor of Juanito; P3,000.00 in favor of
Lorenzo; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio. By virtue of
said adjudication, a TCT was issued by the Register of
Deeds in the names of Consolacion and Juanito.

As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free

from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the
property is given out of pure generosity, itg is gratuitous
DOCTRINE: The gratuitous acquisition of the reservable property
by the prepositus from the origin of the reservable property was
interpreted in this case. Even if the prepositus had to pay a
certain amount to a third party for the purpose of acquiring the
reservable property, if such payment obligation was not imposed
by the origin, the acquisition by the latter is still gratuitous in
nature.

Patricia
Ignacio
Lorenzo
Manuel

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

Jose

4. On Feb.27, 1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue.

After his death, his mother Consolacion succeeded to
his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's
time, Consolacion executed a declaration of
heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro- indiviso
share of her son Juanito as a result of which a TCT
covering the whole lot was issued in her name. Then
on March 5, 1966, Consolacion died intestate
leaving no direct heir either in the descending or
ascending line except her brother and sisters.

Consolacion

5. In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the

petitioners herein, Ignacio, of the fi rst marriage and
Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed
legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Chua, also
of the first marriage filed the complaint before the
respondent CFI of Negros Occidental, praying that the
one-half portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged

Juanito

to Juanito but which passed to Consolacion upon the

latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for
the reason that the lot in question was subject to reserval
troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the NCC.

In the case at bar, all of the requisites are present: Juanito Frias
Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died
without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No.
399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre, by
operation of law. When Consolacion de la Torre died, Juanito Frias
Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree.
These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and
Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased
Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.

6. The respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the

complaint of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the property in question as acquired by Juanito
Frias Chua from his father, Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not, in
relation to first requisite of reserve troncal

It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not

subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the
transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality
of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the
part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property
gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent
Filipino commentator, "the essential thing is that the person who
transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without
requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from
the record that the transmission of the property in question to
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his
father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession
and therefore gratuitous

HELD: Yes
The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return." It matters
not whether the property transmitted be or be not
subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that
the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of
mere liberality of the person making it, without
imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and
that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in
return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator,
"the essential thing is that the person who transmits it
does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without
requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident
from the record that the transmission of the property in question
to Juanito Frias Chua upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua
was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore
gratuitous.

The obligation of paying the Standard is imposed upon

Consolacion and Juanito not personally by the deceased Jose in
his last will and testament but by an order of the court. As long
as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any
condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is
given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. The order of the
court does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission
of the property to him. As far as the deceased Jose is concerned
the transmission of the property to his heirs is gratuitous. This
being the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal
under Art. 891.

In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable

character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the
property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from
a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died
without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another
ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
property came.
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

not subject to reserva troncal, but should go to the half-sister, in

accordance with the order prescribed for intestate succession,
particularly Articles 1003 of the Civil Code, pursuant to which a
sister, even if only a half-sister, in the absence of other sisters or
brothers, or children of brothers or sisters, excludes all other
collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter
belong to the line from which the property of the deceased
came.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
declaring that the parcels of land in litigation are property of
intervenor Jacoba Marbebe.
This action was instituted by Ricardo, Patrocinia, Patria, Faustino,
Leonor, Ramona, Asuncion, Emiliana, Arsenio and Felipe, all
surnamed Lacerna, for the recovery of three parcels of
unregistered lands, situated in the municipality of Maasin, Iloilo,
and more specifically described in the complaint, upon the
ground that said lands belonged to the deceased Juan Marbebe,
and that his cousins, plaintiffs herein, are his sole heirs.

[G.R. No. L-14603. April 29, 1961.]

RICARDO LACERNA, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
AGATONA PAURILLO VDA. DE CORCINO,Defendant-Appellee.
JACOBA MARBEBE, Intervenor-Appellee.

In her answer, defendant Agatona Vda. de Corcino alleged, inter

alia, that Juan Marbebe might still be alive; that she held the
disputed lands under a power of attorney executed by Juan
Marbebe; and that, if he has died, she is entitled to succeed him
in the same manner as plaintiffs herein, she being related to him
in the same manner as plaintiffs are.

SYLLABUS
1. SUCCESSION; RESERVA TRONCAL; ARTICLE 891 NOT
APPLICABLE WHERE A DESCENDANT INHERITED FROM THE
ASCENDANT. Article 891 of the Civil Code applies only to the
properties inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by
an ascendant from a descendant, and does not apply to a case
where the property in dispute was inherited by a descendant
from an ascendant. Hence, where the property was inherited by
the son from his mother and the nearest surviving relatives of
the son are a half-sister and several first cousins, the property is
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

With the courts permission, Jacoba Marbebe filed an answer in

intervention alleging that she is a half sister of Juan Marbebe
who died intestate, leaving neither ascendants nor descendants,
and that, as his half sister, she is entitled, by succession, to the
properties in dispute.
After due trial, the court rendered judgment for the intervenor.
Hence, this appeal by the plaintiffs.
7

Jacoba Marbebe contends, however, and the lower court held,

that brothers and sisters exclude all other collateral relatives in
the order of intestate succession, and that, as Juan Marbebes
half- sister, she has, accordingly, a better right than plaintiffs
herein to inherit his properties.

The lower court found, and appellants do not question, that the
lands described in the complaint belonged originally to Bonifacia
Lacerna. Upon her death in 1932, they passed, by succession, to
her only son, Juan Marbebe who was, subsequently, taken to
Culion, where he died intestate, single and without issue, on
February 21, 1943. The question for determination is: Who shall
succeed him?

The main flaw in appellants theory is that it assumes that said

properties are subject to the "reserva troncal", which is not a
fact, for Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

It appears that his mother, Bonifacia Lacerna, had two (2)

brothers, Catalino Lacerna and Marcelo Lacerna, and a sister,
Agatona Paurillo Vda. de Corcino, the defendant herein; that
Catalino Lacerna died in 1950 and was survived by his children,
plaintiffs Ricardo, Patrocinia and Patria, all surnamed Lacerna;
and that Marcelo Lacerna, who died in 1953, was survived by his
children, the other plaintiffs herein, namely, Ramona, Faustino,
Leonor, Asuncion, Emiliana, Arsenio and Felipe, all surnamed
Lacerna. Upon the other hand, intervenor Jacoba Marbebe is a
daughter, by first marriage, of Valentin Marbebe, husband of
Bonifacia Lacerna and father of Juan Marbebe, who, accordingly,
is a half brother of said intervenor.

"The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property

which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for
the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who
belong to the line from which said property came." (Emphasis
supplied.)
This article applies only to properties inherited, under the
conditions therein set forth, by an ascendant from a descendant,
and this is not the case before us, for the lands in dispute were
inherited by a descendant, Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant,
his mother, Bonifacia Lacerna. Said legal provision is, therefore,
not in point, and the transmission of the aforementioned lands,
by inheritance, was properly determined by his Honor, the Trial
Judge, in accordance with the order prescribed for intestate
succession, particularly Article 1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, pursuant to which a sister, even if only a halfsister, in the absence of other sisters or brothers, or of children
of brothers or sisters, excludes all other collateral relatives,
regardless of whether or not the latter belong to the line from
which the property of the deceased came.

With this factual background, the issue is narrowed down to

whether Jacobo Marbebe, as half sister of Juan Marbebe, on his
fathers side, is his sole heir, as held by his Honor, the Trial
Judge, or whether plaintiffs herein, as first cousins of Juan
Marbebe, on his mother side, have a better right to succeed him,
to the exclusion of Jacoba Marbebe, as plaintiffs-appellants
maintain.
The latters pretense is biased upon the theory that, pursuant
to Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, establishing
what is known as "reserva troncal", the properties in dispute
should pass to the heirs of the deceased within the third degree,
who belong to the line from which said properties came, and
that since the same were inherited by Juan Marbebe from his
mother, they should go to his nearest relative within the third
degree on the maternal line, to which plaintiffs belong, not to
intervenor, Jacoba Marbebe, despite the greater proximity of her
relationship to the deceased, for she belongs to the paternal
line.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,

with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Ricardo LARCERNA, et al., vs. Agatona Paurillo VDA. DE

CORCINO,
G.R. No. L-14603, April 29, 1961
FACTS:
Valentine Marbebe begot a daughter, Jacoba Marbebe, before his
marriage with Bonifacia Lacerna. Valentine and Bonificia had an
only son, Juan.
Valentine and Bonifacia died leaving three parcels of land to
their only son Juan. Juan, then, executed a power of attorney
authorizing the sister of his mother or his aunt, Agatona Vda. de
Corcino take care of the disputed land. Eventually, Juan died
intestate and without any issue. The Court of First Instance
declared that the land is property of Jacoba being the half sister
of Juan. Agatona Vda. de Corcino and the nephews and nieces
of Bonifacia questioned the decision of the court. According to
them, the case should be based upon Article 891 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines which establishes what is known as
"reserva troncal." According to them, under this principle, the
properties in dispute should pass to the heirs of the deceased
within the third degree, who belong to the line from which said
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

properties came. Thus, since Juan Marbebe inherited the land

from his mother, they should go to his nearest relative within the
third degree on the maternal line or to his aunt and cousins and
not to Jacoba Marbebe for she belongs to the paternal line. This,
however, was protested by Jacoba Marbebe. She contends that
pursuant to Articles 1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, brothers and sisters exclude all other collateral
relatives in the order of intestate succession, and that, as Juan
Marbebe's half-sister, she has, accordingly, a better right than
plaintiffs herein to inherit his properties.

latter belong to the line from which the property of the deceased
came.
Based on the foregoing, Jacoba Marbebe has the better right to
succeed Juan.

ISSUE:
Who has the better right to succeed Juan?
RULING:
The provision on reserve troncal cannot be applied in this case.
In reserve troncal, the ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (Emphasis supplied.) This article applies only to
properties inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by
an ascendant from a descendant, and this is not the scenario in
the given case, for the lands in dispute were inherited by a
descendant, Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother,
Bonifacia Lacerna. Said legal provision is, therefore, not
applicable in this case.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-34395. May 19, 1981.]

Furthermore, the Trial Judge, correctly awarded the land to

Jacoba Marbebe. The said decision is in accordance with the
order prescribed for intestate succession, particularly Articles
1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, pursuant to
which a sister, even if only a half-sister, in the absence of other
sisters or brothers, or of children of brothers or sisters, excludes
all other collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

BEATRIZ L. GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA,
ROSARIO L. VALDES, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA
LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y
FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ,
10

FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y

HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA
Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA.
TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA,
and the ESTATE OF DOA FILOMENA ROCES DE
LEGARDA, Respondents.

degree (her sixteen grandchildren) and deprive the reservees in

the second degree (her six children) of their share therein.
Decision Reversed.

1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; RESERVA TRONCAL;

NATURE. Resersa troncal is also called lineal, familiar,
extreordinaria o semi-troncal. It is provided for in Article 811 of
the Spanish Civil Code now article 891 of the Civil Code. In
reserva ironcal, (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by
gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant
or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said
descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said
property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) who belong
to the tine from which the property came.

Eligio G. Lagman and Roberto A. Gianzon for Petitioner.

Teves, Campos, Mendoza and Hernandez Baizas, Alberto
and Association, Macias and Achos for privaterespondents.
SYNOPSIS
The real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were
partitioned in three equal portions by his two daughters and the
heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De La Paz who was
survived by his widow, Filomena Roces y Legarda and their
seven children: four daughters named, Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa
and Filomena and their three sons, named Benito, Alejandro and
Jose. Meanwhile. one of the daughters, Filomena, died intestate
and without an issue and her mother Filomena Roces y Legarda
who became her sole heir, partitioned their one-third share in
the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason with her six surviving
children and then conveyed the properties she inherited from
her deceased daughter by holographic will to her 16
grandchildren. In opposition thereto, one of the daughters
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales filed a motion in the testate
proceeding and an ordinary civil action in the lower court
contending that the disputed properties are resersable
properties. The lower court dismissed the complaint.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSMISSION INVOLVED. The three

transmissions involved are: (1) a first transmission by lucrative
title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or
sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission,
by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the
deceased descendant (causante de la reserva) in favor of
another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two
transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmission of the same property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or
the relatives within the third degree from the deceased
descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother
or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Toneas,
Derecho Civil, Part I, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9). If there are only
two transmissions there is no reserva.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS INVOLVED. The persons involved
in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from
whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative
or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (propositus)
who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista), the

On appeal by certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the

properties in question are subject to raserva troncal under Art.
891 of the Civil Code which the testatrix as reservor could not
dispose by holographic will to the reservees within the third
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

SYLLABUS

11

other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus

by operation of law and (4) the reservee (reservatarin) who is
within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to
the line (ltnea o tronco) from which the property came and for
whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the

recipient gives nothing in return such as donation and
succession (Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing
6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th. Ed., 1951, p. 360).
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTORY CONDITIONS CREATED BY
RESERVA. The reserva creates two resolutory conditions,
namely: (I) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve; and
(2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the fine from which the property came
(Sienes v. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATIVES CONSIDERED RESERVEES. The

reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodrigues v.
Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua v. Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, L-2990l, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412).
Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin v. Villamayor, 72
Phil. 392). First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree
and are not reservees. They cannot even represent their parents
because representation is confined to relatives within the third
degree (Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF RESERVORS TITLE. The

reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The
reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferees rights are revoked upon the survival of the
reservees at the time of the time o the death of the reservor but
become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the
reservor (Sienes v. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso v.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino v.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Director of Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279).
"The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatorios
that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have
enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property."
(J.B.L. Rayes in Cano v. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The rationale of reserva

troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos
sedularmente por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo
gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras", or "impedir que, por un azar de la vida, personas
extraas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel
hubieran quedado en ella" (6 Castan Tobeas, Derecho Civil, Part
1, 6th Ed., 1960, p. 203; Padura v. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PREPOSITUS DEFINED. Prepositus or the
person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by
descent (Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 190).

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESERVORS TITLE COMPARED WITH THAT
OF THE VENDEE A RETRO OR TO A FIDEICOMISO CONDICIONAL.
The reservors title has been compared with that of the
vendee a retro in a pacto de retro sale or to a fideicomiso
condicional. The reservors alienation of the reservable
property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at
the time of the reservors death, there are reservees, the
transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. If
there are no reservees at the time of the reservors death, the
transferees title would become absolute (Lunsod v. Ortega, 46
Phil. 664: Gueco v. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Nono v. Nequia, 93

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NEAREST RELATIVE EXCLUDE THE MORE

REMOTE. Within the third degree, the nearest relatives
exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation.
But the representative should be within the third degree from
the prepositus (Padura v. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP CONTEMPLATED.
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship.
Illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are
excluded.
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

12

Phil. 120).

not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant

prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
causa. subject to the condition that they must survive the
reservista." (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,
Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L.
Reyes in Padura v. Baldovino, L-l1960, December 27, 1958, 104
Phil. 1065). Hence, upon the reservistas death, the
reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, "automatically
and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property."
(Cano v. Director of Lands, Supra) Mrs. Filomena Legarda, as
reservor in the case at bar could not convey in her holographic
will to her sixteen grandchildren (the reservees within the third
degree) the reservable properties which she had inherited from
her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not
form part of her estate (Cobardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186,
191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of
the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF RESERVEES TITLE. The

reservee has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His
expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor.
It would become absolute should the reservor predecese the
reservee. There is a holding that renunciation of the reservees
right to the reservable property is illegal for being a contract
regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, 58 Phil.
89, 96). And there is a dictum that the reservees right is a real
right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The
condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the
vendee only if and when the reservee survives the tetervor
(Sienes v. Esparcia, ill Phil. 349, 353). "The reservatorio receives
the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin
from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservistas lifetime" (J.B.L. Reyes in Cano v. Director of
Lands, Supra).

16. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESERVABLE PROPERTIES INHERITED FROM

THE PREPOSITUS; CASE AT BAR. As repeatedly held in the
Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable
properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor. Art. 891
clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be
inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from
the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the
reservable property should be given and deprive the other
reservees of their share therein.

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESERVEES (RESERVATORIOS) RIGHT

OVER THE PROPERTY DURING RESERVORS (RESERVISTAS)
LIFETIME. The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made
by the reservor but he can require that the reservable character
of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa v. Rocha,
48 Phil. 737; Edroso v. Sablan 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco v.
Lacson, 118 Phil. 944). "Even during the reservistas lifetime,
the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the
property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista
from doing anything that might frustrate their revisionary right.
and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their
right in the registry of property even while the reservista is
alive." (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso v.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295)

17. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN RESERVATION IS EXTINGUISHED;

CASE AT BAR. Under the rule of stare decisis at non quieta
movere. the Court is bound to follow in this case the doctrine of
the Florentino case which means that as long as during the
reservors lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within
the third degree of the prepositus, regardless of whether those
reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the
ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains
its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest
reservees. Hence, in the case at bar, the reservation could have
been extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time

15. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESERVABLE PROPERTY, NOT A PART OF THE
ESTATE OF RESERVOR (RESERVISTA); CASE AT BAR. The right
to reserva troncal is incompatible with the mere expectancy that
corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista (reservor). It is
likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista (raservor) who may not dispose of them
(it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios (reservees) existing
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

13

of Mrs. Legardas death. Since at the time of her death, there

were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third
degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable
character. The disposition of the said properties should be made
in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and
not in accordance with the reservors holographic will. The said
properties did not form part of Mrs. Legardas estate (Cano v.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 4).

(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a
credit balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company
and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery,
Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular
Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to
80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry
of deeds.

DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez appealed from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint for
partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding,
as not subject to reserva troncal, the properties which her
mother Filomena Roces inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda
(Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:

1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714,

48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the
Manila registry of deeds;

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason,

died in Manila on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow,
Filomena Roces, and their seven children: four daughters named
Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named
Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT

No. 41862 of the Manila registry of deeds;

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y

Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his
daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son
Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F.
Legarda.

1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila

registry of deeds (Streets);

Filomena Legarda y Roces died intestate and without issue on

March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena
Roces Vda. de Legarda.

2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of the registry

of deeds of Tayabas.

1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry

of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property
described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;

1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael described

in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551

of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets and Estero);

These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of

the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Roces succeeded her
deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the
properties held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating

extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from
her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties
consist of the following:
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

14

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two hand-written

identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties,
which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of
her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in
all). The document reads:

that said properties are reservable properties which should be

inherited by Filomena Legardas three sisters and three
brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose,
all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the
administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

"A mis hijos:

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzalez

filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mothers estate
for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties
are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not
bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz v.
Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).

"Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos, hijos de Ben,

Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija
Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Distileria La Rosario
recientemente comprada a los hermanos Valdes Legarda.
"De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un lote de
terreno que yo he donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit.

As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs.

Gonzalez. In this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she
contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court
erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.

"La casa No. 181 San Rafael, la cedo a mi hijo Mandu, solo la
casa; porque ella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos
Legarda Roces.
"(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA

On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counterassignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not
holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter
Filomena Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary
shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz
and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzalez waived her right to the
reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel,
laches and prescription.

"6 Marzo 1953"

During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs.
Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties
consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda
y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their
father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted
to probate as a holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968
of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No.
70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda. The
decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
Legarda v. Gonzalez, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30, 1976.

The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to

the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzalez petition for review is a closed
matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied
respondents motion to dismiss and gave due course to the
petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can
be raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of the
stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of
whether the properties in question are subject to reserva
troncal, that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzalez, a daughter

of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from
the inventory of her mothers estate the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

15

considered unjust and inequitable.

The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly
those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in this
appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is
no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.

However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the

Code Commission, restored the reserva troncal, a legal
institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobeas, has
provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.

The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable

properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article
811, and whether Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could dispose
of them in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion
of her six children.

Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil

Code, now article 891, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente
bienes que ste hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrativo de otro
ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado reservar los
que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los
parientes que esten dentro del tercer grado y pertenezcan a la
linea de donde los bienes proceden."cralaw virtua1aw library

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what
she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees
within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the
second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the
reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs.
Legarda?

"ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property
came."cralaw virtua1aw library

As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a

question of first impression. It was resolved in Florentino v.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to
this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other
pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on
the nature of reserva troncal, also called lineal, familiar,
extraordinaria o semi-troncal.

In reserva troncal, (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by

gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant
or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said
descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said
property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who
belong to the line from which the said property came.

Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their
five briefs in descanting on the nature of reserva troncal, which
together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was
abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedents
estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in
ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty
impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to
discourage the confinement of property within a certain family
for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic
oligarchy and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.

So, three transmissions are involved: (1) a first transmission by

lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or
brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior
transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or
legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la
reserva) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or
reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and

The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of

feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the
reservas, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

16

(3) a third transmission of the same property (in consequence of

the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the
deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first
ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6
Castan Tobeas, Derecho Civil, Part I, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).

An illustration of reserva troncal is found in Edroso v. Sablan, 25

Phil. 295. In that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land
from his father Victoriano. Pedro died in 1902, single and without
issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two
parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of
Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan,
the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina
could register the land under the Torrens system in her name
but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her
two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in
the title.

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserva. Thus,

where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were
inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan,
those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the
exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not
reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna v.
Vda. de Corcino, 111 Phil. 872).

In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in

1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was
inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died
intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her
father, Anacleto Maalac who owned the other one-half portion.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or

brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or
prepositus (propositus) who received the property, (3) the
reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the prepositus by operation of law and (4) the
reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the line (linea o tronco) from
which the property came and for whom the property should be
reserved by the reservor.

Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and

their six children. It was held that the said one-half portion was
reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon
his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista
Aglibot, sisters of Maria and maternal aunts of Juliana Maalac,
who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came
(Aglibot v. Maalac, 114 Phil. 964).

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez v.

Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua v. Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412).
Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin v. Villamayor, 72
Phil. 392).

Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino v.

Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala v. Alcala and
Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez v. Balcita, 46
Phil. 551; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon v. Galang, 48
Phil. 601; Riosa v. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno v. Centeno, 52
Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands
v. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina v. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.

The rationale of reserva troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que

bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen
bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de
los enlaces y muertes prematuras", or "impedir que, por un azar
de la vida, personas extraas a una familia puedan adquirir
bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella" (6 Castan
Tobeas, Derecho Civil, Part 1, 6th Ed., 1960, p. 203; Padura v.
Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the

descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by
descent. He is called the prepositus (Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44
Phil. 186, 190).

17

In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property

from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her
estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. In his hands, the
property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo,
the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a
maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within
the third degree.

(Sienes v. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil.

295; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino v. Florentino, 40
Phil. 480; Director of Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservors title has been compared with that of the vendee
a retro in a pacto de retro sale or to a fideicomiso condicional.
The reservors alienation of the reservable property is subject
to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the
reservors death, there are reservees, the transferee of the
property should deliver it to the reservees. If there are no
reservees at the time of the reservors death, the transferees
title would become absolute (Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;
Gueco v. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Nono v. Nequia, 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reservee has only an inchoate, expectant
or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. It would become absolute should the
reservor predecease the reservee.

First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are
not reservees. They cannot even represent their parents
because representation is confined to relatives within the third
degree (Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more
remote subject to the rule of representation. But the
representative should be within the third degree from the
prepositus (Padura v. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva
troncal
contemplates
legitimate
relationship.
Illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.

The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made by the

reservor but he can require that the reservable character of the
property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa v. Rocha, 48
Phil. 737; Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco v. Lacson,
118 Phil. 944).

Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission

wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donation
and succession (Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186-189-190,
citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 360).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservees right

to the reservable property is illegal for being a contract
regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, 58 Phil.
89, 96).

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the

death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,
at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the property came (Sienes v.
Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).

And there is a dictum that the reservees right is a real right

which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The
condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the
vendee only if and when the reservee survives the reservor
(Sienes v. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The
reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferees rights are revoked upon the survival of the
reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become
indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

"The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of

the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to
the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally
strayed during the reservistas lifetime. The authorities are all
agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista,
18

the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life

interest in the reservable property." (J. J.B.L. Reyes in Cano v.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)

mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her

sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the
second degree, her three daughters and three sons.

"Even during the reservistas lifetime, the reservatarios, who

are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert
the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that
might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose,
they can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of
property even while the reservista is alive" (Ley Hipotecaria de
Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).

As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or

cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic
will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which
she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo v.
Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a
disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as
the reservees survived the reservor.

This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that

corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise
clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the
reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as
there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo v. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226,
237).

As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees

inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus, not from
the reservor.

"The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from
the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the
heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservista." (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286;
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J.
J.B.L. Reyes in Padura v. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27,
1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties

should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third
degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children
of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the
reservable property should be given and deprive the other
reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary
disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees
in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in
the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891.
That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

Hence, upon the reservistas death, the reservatario nearest to

the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of law,
the owner of the reservable property." (Cano v. Director of
Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably
reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly,
she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at
the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third
degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they
survived Mrs. Legarda.

We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine

of Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it
was ruled:
"Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the
death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own property
in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no
part of the latters lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the
reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as

reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

19

heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant

has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the
third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the
property, if he has at the same time the right of a reservatario"
(reservee).

are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant

from whom the property came, the property retains its
reservable character. The property should go to the nearest
reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the
reservee to whom the reservable property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva
troncal when the only relatives within the third degree are the
common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the
ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and
sans binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino
case.

In the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and

his second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children,
Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from
their father. Upon Apolonio IIIs death in 1891, his properties
were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. In her
will she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her
properties, including those coming from her deceased husband
through their son, Apolonio III.

It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in

question are not reservable properties because only relatives
within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and
that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen
grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena
Legarda who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the
reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a
family from securing, by some special accident of life, property
that would otherwise have remained therein."

The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife

Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased
children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the
recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which
Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III, which the
latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which
Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.

That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case

where the reservor willed the reservable properties to her
daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the
other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the
prepositus.

Plaintiffs theory was that the said properties, as reservable

properties, could not be disposed of in Severinas will in favor
of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties,
did not form part of Severinas estate and could not be
inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.

In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable

property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not
form part of the reservors estate nor of the daughters estate
but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest
relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a

reservee, to one-seventh of the properties. The other sixsevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the

reservable property to only one reservee it did not pass into the
hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the
heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there
is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other
reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable

Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are

bound to follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case.
That doctrine means that as long as during the reservors
lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third
degree of the prepositus, regardless of whether those reservees
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

20

property (pp. 894-5).

respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.

Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda

could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even if
the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree
from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of
article 891, should go to Mrs. Legardas six children as
reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.

SO ORDERED.
BEATRIZ GONZALES V. CFI MANILA, 104 SCRA 481 (1981)
DOCTRINE: Gonzales gives an extended discussion on the nature and
effects of reserva troncal. Among other things, it stresses that the
reservable property does not form part of the estate of the reservor, if upon
his or her death he or she is survived by qualified reservees. As such, the
reservor cannot will or bequeath the reservable property in his or her will,
nor can the reservor choose who or discriminate among the reservees
should get the property. The reservees inherit the reservable property not
from the reservor, but from the prepositus. Thus, Gonzales affirms the ruling
in Padura v Baldovino and follows the theory of delayed intestacy in the
matter of distributing the reservable property among the reservees. It should
be noted that the Court relied heavily on the ruling in Florentino and quotes
substantially from the text of the said decision. However, there is a failure to
note the oversight committed by the Court when it failed to distinguish
between full-blood brothers from half-blood brothers. The opportunity to
rectify an error was lost.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the

reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the
heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservor (Padura v. Baldovino, L-11960, December
27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their
reservable character due to the non-existence of third degree
relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the
reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except
third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and
Roces lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been
extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of
Mrs. Legardas death. Since at the time of her death, there
were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third
degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable
character. The disposition of the said properties should be made
in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and
not in accordance with the reservors holographic will. The said
properties did not form part of Mrs. Legardas estate (Cano v.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 4).

Benito Legarda Tuason

Consuelo
Rita
+Benito Legarda de la Paz
Beatriz
Rosario
Teresa
+Filomena
Benito

WHEREFORE, the lower courts decision is reversed and set

aside. It is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by
Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena
Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are
reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as
reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda,
who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

Filomena Roces

Carmen Legarda y Fernandez

Ramon Legarda y Hernandez
Filomena Legarda y Lobregat
Jaime Legarda y Lobregat
Celso Legarda y Lobregat
Alejandro Legarda y Lobregat
Ma. Teresa Legarda y Lobregat
Ma. Antonia Legarda y Lobregat

Alejandro
Jose

21

Jose Legarda y Lobregat

Rosario Legarda y Lobregat
Benito Legarda y Lobregat
Eduardo Legarda y Lobregat
Trinidad Legarda

the deceased daughter, on the ground

thatsaidpropertieswerereservableand
should be inherited by Filomenas 3
sisters and 3 brothers, not by the 16
grandchildren of Mrs. Legarda, or
Filomenasnephewsandnieces.Shealso
filed an action securing a declaration
thatthepropertiesarereservablewhich
Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her
holographicwilltohergrandchildrento
theexclusionofher6chidlren

FACTS:
Benito Legarda y dela Paz (Benito II), son of Benito Legarda y
Tuazon (Benito I), died and was survived by his widow, Filomena
and their 7 children. The real properties left by his deceased
father, Benito I, were partitioned in 3 equal parts by Benito IIs
sisters and his heirs pro-indiviso. One of his daughters, Filomena,
died without issue and her sole heiress was her mother,
Filomena vda de Legarda

3. Itiscontendedherethantheproperties
in question are not reservable
propertiesbecauseonlyrelativeswithin
the third paternal line have survived
and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the
propertiestohergrandchildren,whoare
third degree relatives of Filomena and
who belong to the paternal line, the
reasonforthereservatroncalhasbeen
satisfied:topreventpersonsoutsidea
family from securing, by some special
accident of life, property that should
otherwisehaveremainedtherein.

1. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit

adjudicating to herself the properties
she inherited from her daughter as a
result of which she succeeded her
deceased owner as coowner of the
properties held proindiviso by her
other 6 children. Later, Mrs. Legarda
executed 2 handwritten documents
disposing of the properties which she
inheritedfromherdaughterinfavorof
her 16 grandchildren (the children of
hersons).Eventually,Mrs.Legardaand
her6survivingchildrenpartitionedthe
coownedproperty

ISSUE: WON the properties could be conveyed by will to the 16

grandchildren (reservees within the third degree) to the
exclusion of the 6 children (reservees within the second degree)

2. Mrs. Legarda died and in the testate

proceeding of her estate, Beatriz
Gonzales,oneofherdaughters,fileda
motion to exclude in the inventory of
the properties inherited from Filomena,
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

HELD: No. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will
to her 16 grandchildren the reservable properties she inherited
from her daughter because the reservable properties did not
form part of her estate. The reservoir cannot make a disposition
22

mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the

reservees survived the reservoir.

were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters,

Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito
Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was
her mother, Filomena Races. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit
adjudicating to herself the properties which she inherited from
her deceased daughter, Filomena. As a result, Filomena Races
succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as coowner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six
children.

Art 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should

be inherited by all the nearest within the third degree from
prepositus who in this case are the 6 children of Mrs. Legarda.
She could not select the reservees to whom to the reservable
properties should be given and deprive the other reservees of
their shares therein. To allow the reservoir to make a
testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor
the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore
the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation
of Art 891, this cannot be allowed.

Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents

wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from
her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito,
Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). Mrs. Legarda
and her six surviving children partitioned the properties
consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda
y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their
father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of the properties in question in

her will even if the disposition is in favor of relatives within the
third degree from Filomena. The said properties, by operation of
Art 891, should go to Mrs. Legardas 6 children as reservees
within the second degree from Filomena. Reservees do not
inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the
reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition
that they must survive the reservor.

Mrs. Legarda died. Her will was admitted to probate as a

holographic will. The decree of probate was affirmed by the CA.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter
of the testatrix, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of
her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties
are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena
Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the
children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose. That motion was opposed
by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

The reservation could be extinguished only by the absence of

reservees at the time of Mrs. Legardas death. Since at the time
of her death, there were reservees belonging to the second and
third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their
reservable character. The disposition of the properties should be
made in accordance with Art 891 and in accordance with the
reservors holographic will.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Beatriz filed an

ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a
declaration that the said properties are reservable properties.
Lower court dismissed the action of Beatriz.

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, Petitioner, vs. CFI OF

MANILA, et al., Respondents
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
Facts: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y
Tuason, died. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races,
and their seven children: (Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose). The real properties left by Benito
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

Issue: whether the properties in question are subject to reserva

troncal under art.

23

Held: In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired

by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother
or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another
ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the
said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the
said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who
belong to the line from which the said property came.
3 transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative
title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or
sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission,
by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the
deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of
another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two
transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or
the relatives within the third degree from the deceased
descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother
or sister of the deceased descendant .

at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree

belonging to the line from which the property came.
The properties in question were indubitably reservable
properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. She was a reservor. The
reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death
the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived
Mrs. Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her
sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had
inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot
make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as
long as the reservees survived the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties
should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third
degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children
of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the
reservable property should be given and deprive the other
reservees of their share therein.

The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or

brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the
reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the
reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which
the property came and for whom the property should be
reserved by the reservor.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary

disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees
in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in
the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891.
That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

Reserva
troncal contemplates
legitimate
relationship.
illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission
wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion
and succession.
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the
death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

24

Tomas P. Aonuevo for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in C.A. G.R.
No. CV-01292-93, which affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna in the consolidated
cases in Civil Case No. SC-956 1 and Civil Case No. SC-957. 2
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo,
which is summarized as follows:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the
two (2) sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3)
interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio
(Liliw) Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of the complaint in
Civil Case No. SC-956 from his father Jose, Sr., who died on
January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest proindiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered lands described in
paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from his
maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3,
1950.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991
MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGROINDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and
AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS, ERASTO, LUISA,
JOSE and DOLORES, all surnamed
BALANTAKBO, respondents.

On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue,
and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo,
as his sole surviving heir to the real properties above-mentioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above
described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario
del finado Raul Balantakbo" which provided, among others:

Ceriaco A. Sumaya for petitioners.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

25

I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose

Balantakbo, he tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo,
llamado Raul Balantakbo.

Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc.,

on December 30, 1963. On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio
Development Corporation transferred and assigned its rights over
the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
The documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Laguna and the corresponding certificates of
titles were issued. The properties are presently in the name of AgroIndustrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining
1/3 share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.

II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio

de 1952, en la Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minolia de edad sin
dejar testamento alguno.
III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado
descendiente alguno.

Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo

sold the properties described in the complaint in Civil Case No. SC957 to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in
turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor
of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which
properties are presently in its possession.

IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo

Raul Balantakbo y por lo tanto su unica heredera formosa, legitima
y universal.
V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.

The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above
described properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable
character.

VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes

inmuebles situados en la Provincia de Laguna.
VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el
finado Raul Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto padre, Jose
Balantakbo, y de su tia abuela Luisa Bautista.

On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.

On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all
surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo
and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo,
surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother
of the first named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil
cases to recover the properties described in the respective
complaints which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in
their favor.

xxx xxx xxx

(Rollo, p. 29)
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold
the property described in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H.
Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by a deed attached as Annex "C"
to the complaint. The same property was subsequently sold by
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

26

The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the
identity of the subject matter of res involved, the transferees, the
dates of the conveyances but involve the same legal question
of reserva troncal. Hence, the consolidation of the two (2) cases.

from the properties herein ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs,

said accounting and payment of income being for the period from
January 3, 1968 until date of reconveyance of the properties herein
ordered:

After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the
Balantakbos, the dispositive portion of which reads:

3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are

to pay plaintiffs

WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957,

judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, as follows:

a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.

1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut

Cooperative, Inc. to convey to the plaintiffs

4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC956 and 957.

a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 the one-third (1/3) interest and

ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the parcel of land described in
paragraph three (3) sub-paragraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2)
of this decision;

xxx xxx xxx

(p. 46, Rollo)

b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 the one-seventh (1/7) interest and

ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the ten (10) parcels of land
described in paragraph three (3), sub-paragraph 2, of pages two (2)
and three (3) of this decision;

This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed

the decision of the court a quo in toto. The motion for
reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the appellate court
which found no cogent reason to reverse the decision.

c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein

ordered to be conveyed to them by the defendants with plaintiffs
Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, receiving onethird (1/3) of the one share pertaining to the other plaintiffs who are
their uncles:

This petition before Us was filed on November 12, 1984 with the
petitioners assigning the following errors allegedly committed by
the appellate court:

b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.

I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent

purchaser for value and in good faith of the properties covered by
certificates of title subject of litigation.

2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.

to account for and pay to the plaintiffs the value of the produce
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

27

II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the

reservable interest of the reservee in the properties covered by
certificates of title subject of litigation.

ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the said

affidavit.
It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties
in question show that they were free from any liens and
encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains however,
that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating
the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature
thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and
this is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with
Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of
R.A. 496) which provides:

III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the
plaintiffs (private respondents) has not yet prescribed.
IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in
favor of the plaintiffs by virtue of the institution of Civil Cases Nos.
956 and 957.
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the
court a quo, which the appellate court affirmed, that they were not
innocent purchasers for value. According to petitioners, before they
agreed to buy the properties from the reservor (also
called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, they first
sought the legal advice of their family consultant who found that
there was no encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate
of title coveting the properties.

Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION.

Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if
registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for
the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be
constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering,
filing or entering.

The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus,
Raul Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo
caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the
estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were
inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., as regards the subject
matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from his maternal
grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter of Civil
Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that said affidavit
was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the
Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of the properties. In
Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated that the affiant,
Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her
son, who died leaving properties previously inherited from other
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27

SCRA 706, 712-713, cited in People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27,
July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597; Garcia v. CA and PNB v. CA, et al.,
G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-40911, both dated January 22, 1980, 95
SCRA 380 and Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600,
We held:
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is
constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein . . .

28

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has

examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such
presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an
examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption
cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith.
Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a
record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated
by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any
more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of
the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule
must be absolute, any variation would lead to endless confusion and
useless litigation. . . .

On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in

case of voluntary registration of documents an innocent purchaser
for value of registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in
contemplation of law the holder of a certificate of title, the moment
he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the
same is entered in the day book and at the same time he surrenders
or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title covering the
land sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be
done lies not within his power to perform. The register of deeds is
duty bound to perform it. (See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196).
In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo
vda. de Balantakbo which contained a statement that the property
was inherited from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited
by the latter from another ascendant, was registered with the
Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to
annotate the reservable character of the property in the certificate of
title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.

In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was
laid down that the mere entry of a document in the day book
without noting it on the certificate of title is not sufficient
registration. However, that ruling was superseded by the holding in
the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420. As explained
in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 20,
1980, 95 SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this
jurisdiction.

Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual

knowledge of the reservable character of the properties before they
bought the same from Consuelo. This matter appeared in the deed
of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by Consuelo in favor of Mariquita
Sumaya, the first vendee of the property litigated in Civil Case No.
SC-956, as follows:

That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases
of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420, where a distinction was made
between voluntary and involuntary registration, such as the
registration of an attachment, levy upon execution, notice of lis
pendens, and the like. In cases of involuntary registration, an entry
thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons even if
the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the
register of deeds.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

xxx xxx xxx

That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of
the one-third (1/3) portion of the above described parcel of land by
virtue of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition executed by the Heirs
of the deceased Jose Balantakbo dated December 10, 1945 and said
portion in accordance with the partition above-mentioned was
adjudicated to Raul Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I inherited
29

after his death and this property is entirely free from any
encumbrance of any nature or kind whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)

third persons. This was suggested as early as the case of Director of

Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No. 42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279.
The main issue submitted for resolution therein was whether the
reservation established by Article 811 (now Art. 891 of the New
Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom
the ascendant reservor received the property, should be understood
as made in favor of all the relatives within said degree and
belonging to the line above-mentioned, without distinction
legitimate, natural and illegitimate ones not having the legal status
of natural children. However, in an obiter dictum this Court stated
therein:

It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in

Civil Case SC-957, no such admission was made by Consuelo to
put Villa Honorio Development on notice of the reservable
character of the properties. The affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by Consuelo and registered with the Registry would still
be sufficient notice to bind them.
Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private
respondents were long time acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio
Development Corporation and its successors, the Laguna AgroIndustrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family corporations of the
Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all along that the properties
litigated in this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his
father and from his maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda.
de Balantakbo inherited these properties from his son Raul.

The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition

of the ascendant reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is
fulfilled, that is, if upon the ascendant reservor's death there are
relatives having the status provided in Article 811 (Art. 891, New
Civil Code), the property passes, in accordance with this special
order of succession, to said relatives, or to the nearest of kin among
them, which question not being pertinent to this case, need not now
be determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the property is
released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular
order of succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the
resolutory condition, the efficacy or cessation of the reservation, the
acquisition of rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena
which have nothing to do with whether the reservation has been
noted or not in the certificate of title to the property. The purpose of
the notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons entitled to
the reservation, if any,
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it
ineffective . . . (p. 292, Ibid)

The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin

vda. de Balantakbo. Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva
troncal provides:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate
court that there is no need to register the reservable character of the
property, if only for the protection of the reservees, against innocent
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January

14, 1926, 48 Phil. 601, 603, this Court ruled that the reservable
30

character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for

value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed
on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a
property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal.
(See also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913, 25
Phil. 295).

descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to

annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of
Property of the right reserved in real property subject of reserva
viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the
abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is
consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section
51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of registration shall
be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied)

Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third

persons, Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now
register nor record in the Registry of Deeds their reservable
character; neither can he effect the fee simple, which does not
belong to him, to the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado,
who acquired the said land in good faith, free of all incumbrances.
An attempt was made to prove that when Juan Medina was advised
not to buy the land he remarked, "Why did he (Vicente Galang) not
inherit it from his son?" Aside from the fact that it is not clear
whether this conservation took place in 1913 or 1914, that is,
before or after the sale, it does not arise that he had any knowledge
of the reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone that
Vicente Galang had inherited the land from his son, but also from
the fact that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it from his
mother Rufina Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the record
shows, Juan Medina had not been aware of. We do not decide,
however, whether or not Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado are
obliged to acknowledge the reservation and to note the same in
their deeds, for the reason that there was no prayer to this effect in
the complaint and no question raised in regard thereto.

The properties involved in this case are already covered by a

Torrens title and unless the registration of the limitation is effected
(either actual or constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced
thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause
of action of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause
of action of the reservees did not commence upon the death of the
propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of
the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968.
Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right (or
property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple
over the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only
when the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter
acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only
then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of
whom they are relatives within the third degree (SeeVelayo
Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89).
The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it
then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the
reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor.
Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time for recovery

Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged
to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in
the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property,
in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a
descendant property which the latter inherited from another

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

31

and lone ascendant heir of Raul who left the properties inherited from his
father and grandmother. Consuelo sold the properties to Mariquita
Sumaya, who sold the same to Villa Honorio Development Corporation
which subsequently transferred its right over the property in favor of
Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative. Certificates of title were
issuedin Agros name. However, such title do not contain any annotation
of the property being reservable in character. Two years after Consuelos
death, Amadeo et al, brothers, sisters, nephew and nieces of Raul filed a
civil case for the recovery of the parcels of land sold to Agro alleging that
such is subject of reserva troncal. Court a quo ruled in favor of plaintiffs,
finding Agro as not innocent purchasers for value. The CA affirmed the
lower courts decision and ruled that there is no need to annotate the
reservable interest of reserves in property covered by the certificate of
title.

may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil
Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601, October 28,
1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of
the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved
property was brought by herein private respondents on March 4,
1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the reservor.
Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed
yet.
Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual
litigation expenses and two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for
attorney's fees is proper under Article 2208(2) of the New Civil
Code. Private respondents were compelled to go to court to recover
what rightfully belongs to them.

ISSUE:
Whether there is a need to annotate the reservable character of the
property subject of reserva troncal.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision

of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the
modification on the necessity to annotate the reversable character of
a property subject of reserva troncal.

RULING:
Yes. In a ruling decided by the Court, the reservable character of a
property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value and hence, the
obligation is imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable
character of a property subject of reserve viudal. Such obligation is also
applicable in reserva troncal. Moreover, the purpose of notation is nothing
more than to afford the persons entitled to reservation, if any, due
protection against any act of the reservoir, which may make it ineffective.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Mariquita Sumaya and Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative
v. IAC et.al GR 68843-44
FACTS:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two different ascendants two sets of
parcels of property, one from his father and the other from his maternal
grandmother. Raul died intestate, single and without any issue, leaving
Consuelo Balantakbo, his mother as sole heir. Subsequently, Consuelo
adjudicated to herself the property in affidavit stating that she is the sole
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

32

Affidavit.
She then later sold the property in Laguna to Sumaya which was
subsequently sold by Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development Corporation,
Inc., which later on transferred and assigned its rights over the property in
favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. Consuelo also sold the
properties in the 2nd inheritance to Villa Honorio Development
Corporation, Inc. which also in turn transferred and assigned all its rights
to the properties in favor of Agro-Industrial Cooperative.
Consuelo died and now comes her children, brothers of Raul to recover
said properties which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in
their favor. Trial Court ruled in favor of the brothers. This decision was
appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the court a
quo in toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by
the appellate court which found no cogent reason to reverse the decision.
Sumaya v. IAC, 201 SCRA 178

According to petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties from

the reservor, Consuelo they first sought the legal advice of their family
consultant and that there were no liens and encumbrances hence they
were buyers in good faith. The fact remains however, that the affidavit of
self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source of the
properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered
with the RD, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world.

Doctrine: Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right (or
property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the
reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the
reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the
reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take
their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are
relatives within the third degree. The reserva is extinguished upon the
death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the
part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor.

Issue: 1) WON said properties are reservable and that the brothers have
a better right, and 2) if such right has already prescribed.
Ruling: Yes. No.

Facts: Raul inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of
properties subject of this case: 1) 1/3 interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of
land in Laguna from his father; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest proindiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered lands from his maternal
grandmother.

In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda.

de Balantakbo which contained a statement that the property was
inherited from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the
latter from another ascendant, was registered with the Registry of
Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable
character of the property in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to
Consuelo.

Raul died intestate leaving only his mother, Consuelo, as his sole
surviving heir.
Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties in an
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

33

The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of
action of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of
action of the reservees did not commence upon the death of the
propositus Raul but upon the death of the reservor Consuelo. Relatives
within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved have no title of
ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime
of the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the reservees
will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple,
and only then will they take their place in the succession of the
descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree. The
reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then
becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who
can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not
exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in 10 years under
the old Code of Civil Procedure.

Luis G. Hofilea and Efrain B. Treas for petitioners.

Eugenio G. Gemarino for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENTS; NOT TO INCLUDE PERSONS NOT PARTIES. It
was error for the lower court to award a part of the land in
question to persons whom the complaint had expressly excluded
and who had previously acknowledged the right to the land of
herein petitioners, defendants below.
2. APPEALS; COURT OF APPEALS TO SUPREME COURT; QUESTION
OF CHARACTER OF DOCUMENT IS FACTUAL. The character of
a document, whether a sale or a mere mortgage, is a question of
fact on which the Court of Appeals pronouncement is final.

BENGZON, C.J.:
Review of the decision of the Court of Appeals awarding ownership
of a parcel of land in Jaro, Iloilo.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

It formerly was the paraphernal property of Paz Hollero who died

in June 1935, leaving her husband Generoso Hollero and their only
son Felix. The latter died in 1944 followed shortly by his father
Generoso.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16579

The plaintiffs Jose Hollero, et al. brothers and nephews or nieces

of Paz Hollero claim the property by virtue of the reserva
troncal provisions of the Civil Code. Upon the death of Paz, they
contend, the property passed to Felix; and upon the latter's death, it
passed to Generoso. Thereafter, the reserva troncal began to
operate, to wit: when Generoso died, the property had to be
transmitted by operation of law to the relatives of Felix up to the
third degree, i.e., the brothers and sisters of Paz (Jose, Severo,
Socorro, Estrella, Benjamin and Manuel) who survived him.

June 29, 1964

SATURNINA HOLLERO and JOSE CAMENO, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE HOLLERO, ANITA
HARDER,
ISAGANI EVANGELISTA, ET AL., respondents.
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

34

On the other hand, the defendants allege in short, that they inherited
the land from Saturnina's brother Generoso, upon the latter's death.
They assert that Paz Hollero, in her lifetime, had sold the property
to Andrea Gustilo in 1934; and that in 1936, Generoso purchased it
from Andrea.

WHEREFORE, we hereby reverse the decision a quo, and render

another declaring that the transaction between Paz Hollero and
Andrea Gustilo, executed on December 21, 1934, was an equitable
mortgage which was validly cancelled by payment of the loan on
February 28, 1936; declaring that the land, subject-matter of the
mortgage, or lot 2376-D of the Jaro cadastre, described in
paragraph 3 of the complaint, was the paraphernal property of Paz
Hollero, ordering the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel transfer
certificate of title T-5941 (Exh. 30) and in lieu thereof to issue
another title in the names of Jose Hollero, Severo Hollero, Manuel
Hollero, and the other brothers and sisters of these persons who
were alive at the time of death of Generoso Hollero, in pro
indiviso and equal shares, upon the repayment to the defendants of
the charges evidenced by the receipts, Exhs. 7, 8, 9 to 14, and 17 to
22, which charges may however be offset against their share in the
produce of the land due from the defendants; and condemning the
defendants to pay to the owners of the property the sum of P5,000
per year beginning with the crop year 1956-1957, until possession
of the land shall have been restored to the latter. No pronouncement
as to costs in this instance.

It appears that on December 21, 1934, Paz Hollero executed a

document transferring the property by " pacto de retro" to Andrea
Gustilo for P240.00. After her death, i.e. on February 28, 1936,
Andrea sold the same land to Generoso for P200.00. And the
principal issue, debated both in the court of first instance and the
Court of Appeals, was whether the "pacto de retro" constituted a
true sale or was merely a mortgage. If a sale, Generoso got
ownership of the land and his successors-in-interest the
defendants - have a right to judgment. 1wph1.t
Substantially, the Court of Appeals held: (a) it was a mere
mortgage; (b) Generoso merely repaid the debt; and Felix inherited
it upon the death of Paz, his mother; and (c) when Felix in turn
died, it passed to Generoso subject to the provisions on reserva
troncal.1

The petitioners who were defendants below maintain that it

was error to award "a part of the land in question to Manuel Hollero
and Felix Harder" whom the complaint had expressly excluded,
and who had previously acknowledged the right to the land of
herein petitioners-defendants below.

At this level, the character of the document whether a sale or a

mere mortgage is foreclosed: it is a question of fact on which the
Appeals' Court pronouncement is final. This disposes of the last
error assigned by , the petitioners of this review.

It appears that the complaint itself stated that although said two
persons were also heirs of Paz and Felix Hollero, they were not
parties plaintiff because "they have relinquished their rights in
favor of the defendants"; it also appears in Civil Case No. 3239 of
the Iloilo court of first instance, the herein petitioners sued said two
persons for ejectment from the land; and both having expressly

The other two assignments while not necessarily assailing the

second and third declarations of the appellate court, tend only to
modify the dispositive part of its judgment now under review,
which reads as follows:

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

35

acknowledged the ownership of then plaintiffs (petitioners here

now), were ejected therefrom (in 1951).

Now therefore, in upholding the rights of petitioners to the portion

of Manuel Hollero and Felix Harder, it should be stated that Manuel
Hollero was entitled, upon the death of Generoso, to one-sixth of
the land (they were six brothers and sisters of Paz); but Felix
Harder, as explained, is now entitled to one-fourth of the one-sixth
which his mother Socorro inherited, i.e., 1/24 of the land.

(By the way, this litigation commenced in 1956 by plaintiffsrespondents, seeks to recover the same land.)
There is merit in this (first) assignment of error. Having won Civil
Case 2239, the herein defendants must be deemed to have the rights
of Manuel Hollero and Felix Harder to the property. Now, what are
those rights?

Wherefore, the dispositive part of the appellate court's decision

should be modified to the effect that the property belongs proindiviso to Jose Hollero 4/24; Severo Hollero 4/24; the heirs of
Socorro Hollero 3/24; the heirs of Estrella Hollero 4/24; the heirs of
Benjamin Hollero 4/24: and the spouses of Jose Camemo and
Saturnina Hollero 5/24.

It must be explained that the record makes reference to two Manuel

Holleros. One is the plaintiff Manuel Hollero who is the nephew of
Paz (as the son of her brother Benjamin Hollero) and another
Manuel Hollero who is Paz' own brother excluded from the
complaint. The latter is the one enumerated erroneously in
the dispositive part of the Court of Appeals' decision. Given the
result of the Iloilo Civil Case No. 2239, his portion should have
been reserved or adjudicated to herein petitioners-defendants
below. What about Felix Harder? He is the son of Socorro, sister of
Paz. She is awarded one-sixth of the property by the above
decision; and as she had left four children (Anita, Meriam, Alatia
and Felix) the latter's share is one-fourth of such one-sixth, i.e.,
1/24, which must be awarded to herein petitioners-defendants
below.

Needless to add, the amount to be repaid to defendants for the

charges evidenced by the receipts, etc., must correspondingly be
decreased by 5/24, in the same way that the indemnity per year
(P5,000) payable to plaintiffs, must also be reduced by 5/24; such
indemnity to be computed up to the day this decision becomes
final.
As surrender of the entire lot to plaintiffs may not now be ordered
the case should be, and is hereby remanded to the court of first
instance, so that further proceedings may be had to separate the
portion belonging to defendants; and upon such separation, orders
shall be made for the delivery to plaintiffs of the pants
corresponding to them with the fruits thereof; and the issuance of
the corresponding titles. Unless, of course, the parties come to an
agreement to hold the property pro-indiviso in which case, a new
title may be issued in the corresponding names and proportions.
With these modifications, the appellate court's decision is affirmed.

The second assignment of error challenges the part of the decision

awarding damages. No evidence was adduced say petitioners
about the annual crops harvested from the land. In reply, the
respondents point out the page of the stenographic notes and the
evidence supporting the appellate court's decision and findings. As
this issue depends on the evidence, we must decline to interfere.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

36

Paz and another Manuel Hollero who is Paz' own brother

excluded from the complaint. The latter is the one enumerated
erroneously in the dispositive part of the Court of Appeals'
decision. Given the result of the Iloilo Civil Case, his portion should
have been reserved or adjudicated to herein petitioners-defendants
below. What about Felix Harder? He is the son of Socorro, sister of
Paz. She is awarded one-sixth of the property by the above decision;
and as she had left four children (Anita, Meriam, Alatia and Felix) the
latter's share is one-fourth of such one-sixth, i.e., 1/24, which must
be awarded to herein petitioners-defendants below.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and

Regala, JJ., concur.
Labrador, Barrera, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

Holero v. CA
Doctrine: Heirs may relinquish their rights to their inheritance.
Facts: Jose Hollero et. al (brothers and sisters of the decedent)
claim the property by virtue of the reserva troncal. Upon the death of
Paz, they contend, the property passed to Felix; and upon the latter's
death, it passed to Generoso. Thereafter, the reserva troncal began
to operate, to wit: when Generoso died, the property had to be
transmitted by operation of law to the relatives of Felix up to the third
degree.
Defendants allege, that they inherited the land from Saturnina's
brother Generoso, upon the latter's death. They assert that Paz
Hollero, in her lifetime, had sold the property to Andrea Gustilo; and
that Generoso purchased it from Andrea.
It appears that Paz Hollero executed a document transferring the
property by " pacto de retro" to Andrea Gustilo which was later on
ruled by the CA to be an equitable mortgage. CA also ordered a new
title in the name of Jose Hollero et al which also included the Manuel
Hollero and Felix Harder.
The petitioners maintain that it was error to award "a part of the land
in question to Manuel Hollero and Felix Harder" since they were not
parties plaintiff because "they have relinquished their rights in favor
of the defendants"; it also appears that in the Iloilo civil case, the
petitioners sued said two persons for ejectment from the land; and
both having expressly acknowledged the ownership of the former.
Issue: WON the two heirs should be included.
Ruling: No.
It must be explained that the record makes reference to two Manuel
Holleros. One is the plaintiff Manuel Hollero who is the nephew of
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

37

Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death

on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a son named
Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's
death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15,
1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two
parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina
Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the
application for registration of her ownership.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles

german of Pedro Sablan appeared in the case to oppose the
registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration
be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the
opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E.,
11, 12.)

EN BANC
G.R. No. 6878

September 13, 1913

The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the

application appealed through a bill of exceptions.

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.

Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels
of land in question partake of the nature of property required by law
to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be
presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles
of Pedro Sablan.

Francisco Dominguez for appellant.

Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:

The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second

assignment of error), and denies that the land which are the subject
matter of the application are required by law to be reserved a
contention we regard as indefensible.

The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain

property classified as required by law to be reserved. Marcelina
Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels
of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of
Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1
hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for
each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant
Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them
from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3)
38

Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from

his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they
having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary
property had between him and his brothers. These are admitted
facts.

The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or
discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation
in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the
property in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil
Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be
reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the
right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right,
admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).

A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one

without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so
characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires
by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a
very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are
within the third degree of blood relationship.

However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be

unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two parcels of land
from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The
trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on
the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died
without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to
her son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the
latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another
ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve
what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property
proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)

In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the

deceased, his ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of
collaterals.

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him

these two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable
consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is
obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line
of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands
proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature
property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance
with the law.

The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had

demonstrated that any of these lands had passed into her possession
by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no
testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property
from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's
wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels
of land was abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or
the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No.
26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have
therefore been fully complied with.

But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels
of land in question have been acquired by operation of law, and that
only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is
by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal

heiress of his property, all he left at death would not be required by
39

law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as
the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.

Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant

deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the
following statement of hers at the trial:

The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by onehalf of the hereditary estate of the children and descendants. The
latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the
exception of what is established in article 836. (Civil Code, art.
809.)

The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried,
his brother came to my house and said that those rice lands were
mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of
them. (p. 91).

In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be
required by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation of
law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other
half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that
article 811 of the Civil Code says.

The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92.

From the fact that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the
appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he
renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands by
virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they
really belong to her and must be delivered to her.

No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land
which are the subject matter of the application are required by law
to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that
either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of
her son.

The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of

the right of action. The appellant alleges prescription of the
opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation
they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right
required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of
the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it
prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190.
She adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force
of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)

Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who

alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's
inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The
law provides that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by
operation of law that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise,
proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested
party, that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and
not by operation of law.

The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of
the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first instance, where
she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do
not refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be
reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of
action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for
seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the
Mortgage Law grants a period of time for recording it in the

Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial

court failed to sustain the renunciation of the right required by law
to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents.
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

40

property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking

entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that right of
action, such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has
prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be
reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing
in the property registry that this property is required by law to be
reserved" (p. 69 of the record).

The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two

parcels of land in question being indisputable, even though it be
admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as
a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the
only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in
the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land
can and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly
established by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly
organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the
allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure
such an intricate subject as this of the rights required to be reserved
in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential
points may not be out of place here.

The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has

prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute the mortgage
imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of
the required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action
has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character
of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such
character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went
into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of
the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by
law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893,
property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the
character of property reserved by operation of law was such
independently of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of
the positive legislation of the country; that although the Mortgage
Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in
no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has
operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the right of
action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by
operation of law to require of the person holding the property a
guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement,
in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the
guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the
principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and
loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and
sixth allegations.)

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude,
is the amended one of the colonies, not the first enforced in the
colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said
amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into
effect, with the modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the
Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on December 1,
1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the law
on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year,
1889, but on the eight day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are
distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof,
where it says:

41

Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or

widower contracting a seconds marriage shall be obliged to set
apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the
ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the
deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other
transfer without a valuable consideration."

Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30,

1897, that: "As the supreme court has already declared, the
guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights
required by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are
applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the
same principle exists and because of the general nature of the
provisions of the chapter in which they are found."

The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect
in the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain any
provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of
the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In
those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the
effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first
marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage.
Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the
first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894,
has been reiterated:

From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from

December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right
required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such
right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who
must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and
guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first
marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The
proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the
property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property
registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of
the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the
assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is
validly alienated.

That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code
that tend to secure the right required to be reserved in the property
refer especially to the spouses who contract second or later
marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the right
establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason,
which is the same in both cases, such must be the construction from
the important and conclusive circumstance that said provisions are
set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common,
either testate or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the
section that deals in general with property required by law to be
reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it
would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and
of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them
applicable to that right.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of
July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not only a principle of
jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the
right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and
guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a
positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law
of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article
811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives in
whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if
minors, it will be require by the person who should legally
42

represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose

favor the property must be reserved will be secured by
the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to
the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the
person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to
the father.

. . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person obligated

to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage
Law says: "In the case of article 199 of the law the proceedings to
which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety
days succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the
inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property; after
this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the
institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other
case, their legal representatives."

In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in

connection with article 199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads as
thus:
Legal mortgage is established:

Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the
expiration by prescription of the period for the right must be
reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to
exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the
annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two
parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of
the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute
proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against
the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.

1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code
refers, for the property required to be reserved, upon the property of
the person obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating
parties agree that the period of ninety days fixed for the right of
action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that
guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law to be
reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in
this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not
prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage
Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the persons
entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the
obligation of the person who must make the reservation.

Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription
of the right of action for requiring that the property be reserved, for
she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no
necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance
with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the
right of action cannot take place, because such right of action does
not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in
the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the property required by
law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present case,
to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by
the two opponents for recording therein the right reserved in either
parcel of land.

Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the
father's instituting in court the proceeding to which the foregoing
article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc.,
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

43

Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the
registration because of this finding set forth in its decision:

June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895,
somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.

Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the

applicant and the two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the
application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in
common. (B. of E., p. 20.)

Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points
the usufruct and the fee simple; the remaining features of the
arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence
of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that
the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep
what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)

It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to

use, enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person who has in himself
all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing;
otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have
the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and
recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is
granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an
enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple that is,
the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who,
after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.

In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion
can now be maintained that is, that the surviving spouse (the
person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be
regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately
as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code."
(Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the
latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the inheritance by
virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the
attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively
use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership,
which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if
there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the
property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the
possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be
relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the
property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership
would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be
determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law
wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation
consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere
usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery,
does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have,

The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's

brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it
subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary,
the ultimate title belonging to the person in whose favor the
reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property
could not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose
favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion
does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported
by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and

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44

according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of

the rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a
marked difference between the case where a man's wish institutes
two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner
of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the
father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the
slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the
hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the
usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the
hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of
usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the
Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in
the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he
totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the
property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of
mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of
the property they might itself, the former from his descendant and
the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and recover it from
anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose
favor the right is required to be reserved in either case cannot
perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.

death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage

survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be
reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void,
as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he
could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation
subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are
still pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he
preserve the right of the parties interested in said conditions by
expressly reserving that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first
marriage in whose favor the right is reserved cannot impugn the
validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is
pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve
the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person
who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose
favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the
condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the
law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would
disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in
very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid
when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is
respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a
condition, because it will or will not become definite, it will
continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This
is what the law establishes with reference to the reservation of
article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the
surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to
the children or descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article

Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by

article 9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which
may be made by the surviving spouse aftercontracting a second
marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death no legitimate
children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether
effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her

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45

811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must make the
reservation.

Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He

says:

Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under

the heading, "Rights and obligations during the existence of the
right required by law to be reserved," in these words:

The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent,

to wit, whether or not there exists at the time of his death relatives
within the third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit
in the line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist,
they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the
ascendants. If they do not exist, the ascendants can freely dispose
thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject to
conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants
may alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but he
will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can give
what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore
receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third
degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property while
the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to
their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the
person who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the
relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to
be reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple,
because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the
death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes
reservable, 304, 305.)

During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of

the right required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof,
the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their
turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an
expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to
transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use
and enjoy the things according to their nature, in the manner and
form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code
referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though
conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the property, he can
dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the
same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion
General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared
that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they
refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the
attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the
third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved in
article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975,
chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries
with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those
conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109
of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending
fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve

the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct.
He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has,
under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the
property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who
possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited
and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even
46

though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the

right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do
anything that a genuine owner can do.

conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis

causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third
degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be
reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the
object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December 30,
1897.)

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose
favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first
because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in
their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of
ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another,
on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the
right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee
simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of
the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree,
that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate
succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If
any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after
their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even
nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his
act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the
decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to
determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the
time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope
of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right
cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the
person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute
should that person die."

Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person

reserving the right to the condition of a mere usufructuary, the
person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the
alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law
requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant
has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party,
because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent
to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480
of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the
property required by law to be reserved are all that the person who
must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the
usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an
incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she
transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not
real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs,
one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of
the predecessor in interest.

Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act

of disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the
right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because
such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership,
except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third
party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that
he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all
the rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and
recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in
law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition,
the whole question is reduced to the following terms:

47

Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely

because a condition subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal,
himself alone register the ownership of the property he has
inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be
made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the
two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?

purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person

who must make the reservation the provision therein relative to the
vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is
the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis
dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu
thereof decide and declare that the applicant is entitled to register in
her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter
of the applicants, recording in the registration the right required by
article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo
Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special
findings as to costs.

It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all
the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions.
(Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this
same title after he has once acquired it. This title, however, in its
attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed
that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if
the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507,
which says:

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves

to himself the right to recover the thing sold, with the obligation to
comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been
agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the
vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding
this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that
the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a
thing mortgaged that is to say, the latter with the consent of his
creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may
alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the
title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a
fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than the
purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is
reserved a right to inherit some day what another has inherited. The
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

Marcelina EDROSO vs. Pablo and Basilio SABLAN

G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913
FACTS:
Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son
named, Pedro who inherited two parcels of land upon the death
of his father. Subsequently, Pedro died, unmarried and without
issue, the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his
mother. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the
application for registration of her ownership. The two uncles of
48

Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of

Victoriano) opposed
the registration claiming that either the
registration be denied or if granted to her, the right reserved by
law to them be recorded in the registration of each parcel. The
Court of Land Registration denied the registration holding that
the land in question partake of the nature of property required
by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could
only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the
said two uncles. Hence, this appeal.

valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another

ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquire them by
operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third
degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita
Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where the lands proceeded.
The trial courts ruling that theypartake of the nature property
required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with
the law.
The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to
reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights to use
and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and
dominion,although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has
under an express provision of the law the right to dispose of the
property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although
under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is
the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it,
although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title
and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him
while he lives. After the right required bylaw to be reserved has
been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a
reservable property.
2. Whether or not Marcelina Edroso has the absolute title of the
property to cause its registration.
RULING:
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is
one without a valuable consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is
so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who
acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he
receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the
uncles are within the third degree of blood relationship.

On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in

whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the
property, first because it is no way, either actually or
constructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover,
because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple
which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only
when the person who must reserve the right should die before
them will they acquire it.

Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from his

descendant property
which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another descendant,
or form a
brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve
what he has
acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within
the third degree and belong to the line where the property
proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him
the two parcels of land which he had acquired without a

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

49

That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia

Faz de Leon; that during the marriage he begot nine children called,
Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and
Magdalena of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming
a widower he married the second time Severina Faz de Leon with
whom he had two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III of the
surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II
died on February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second wife
Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first above mentioned;
that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the following 4th
of March 1890.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14856

November 15, 1919

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven

children, Juan, Maria and Isabel died single,without leaving any
ascendants or descendants; that Ramon, Miguel, Victorino,
Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the deceased
Jose Florentino who was one of the children of the deceased
Apolonio Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and
Dolores are the legitimate children of Espirita Florentino, now
deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose and
Asuncion are the children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the
deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino.

Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for

appellants.
Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for
appellees.
TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her
husband Simeon Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel,
Victorino, and Antonino of the surname Florentino; for Miguel
Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario Florentino; for
Eugenio Singson, the father and guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus,
Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the surname Singson y
Florentino; and for Eugenio Singson, guardian of the minors Jose
and Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her
husband, alleging as follows:

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo

Florentino executed a will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur,
instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned ten children,
the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon;
that he declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his
property should be divided among all of his children of both
marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to
Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property marked
with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary,
50

pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some

personal property and other objects mentioned in the complaint.

suit. Wherefore they pray it be declared that all the foregoing

property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs had and do have a
right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in the
aforementioned paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the defendants
Mercedes Florentino and her husband be ordered to deliver to the
plaintiffs their share of the property in question, of the palay and of
the corn above mentioned, or their value; and that they be
condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) together with the costs of this instance.

That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second

marriage, died in 1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
succeeded to all his property described in the complaint; that the
widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving
a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter,
Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took
possession of all the property left at the death of her mother,
Severina Faz de Leon; that among same is included the property,
described in the complaint, which the said Severina Faz de Leon
inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as
reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of the said
Mercedes Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone
the fruits of lands described in the complaint; that each and every
one of the parties mentioned in said complaint is entitled to oneseventh of the fruits of the reservable property described therein,
either by direct participation or by representation, in the manner
mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint.

To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred,

alleging that the cause of action is based on the obligation of the
widow Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the property she inherited
from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y de Leon who, in turn,
inherited same from his father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that,
there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that
the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry after the death of
this husband nor have any natural child; that the right claimed by
the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968 and the following
articles, but that established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that
the object of the provisions of the aforementioned articles is to
avoid the transfer of said reservable property to those extraneous to
the family of the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the
widow Severina Faz de Leon from her deceased son Apolonio
Florentino y Faz de Leon (property which originated from his
father and her husband) has all passed into the hands of the
defendant, Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the
common ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino with the deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident
that the property left at the death of the posthumos son Apolonio
Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass after the death of his mother
Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of
strangers; that said property having been inherited by Mercedes
Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article 811 of

That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked

the defendants to deliver their corresponding part of the reservable
property; that without any justifiable motive the defendants have
refused and do refuse to deliver said property or to pay for its value;
that for nine years Mercedes Florentino has been receiving, as rent
for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at fifty pesos per
bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos per bundle; that
thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen
thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fifty-eight
centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight pesos and fiftyeight centavos for the value of the fruits not gathered, of one
thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the
aforementioned reservable property and for the expenses of this
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51

the Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case

because, when the defendant Mercedes, by operation law, entered
into and succeeded to, the possession, of the property lawfully
inherited from her mother Severina Faz de Leon, said property had,
while in the possession of her mother, lost the character of
reservable property there being a legitimate daughter of Severina
Faz de Leon with the right to succeed her in all her rights, property
and actions; that the restraints of the law whereby said property
may not passed into the possession of strangers are void, inasmuch
as the said widow had no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes
Florentino is a forced heiress of her mother Severina Faz de Leon;
that, in the present case, there is no property reserved for the
plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress, entitled to the property left
by the death of the widow Severina Faz de Leon who never
remarried; that the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty of
respecting the legitime; that in the instant case, the widow Severina
Faz de Leon was in duty bound to respect the legitime of her
daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her obligation to reserve the
property could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the legitime
which belongs to her forced heiress, citing in support of these
statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain of January 4,
1911; that, finally, the application of article 811 of the Civil Code in
favor of the plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion of the
defendant from here right to succeed exclusively to all the property,
rights and actions left by her legitimate mother, although the said
defendant has a better right than the plaintiffs; and that there would
be injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the plaintiffs,
as well as violation of section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates
any law depriving any person of an equal protection. Wherefore
they prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs against the
plaintiffs.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge
absolved the defendants from the complaint and condemned the
plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it
and to grant them a new trial; said motion was overruled; the
plaintiffs expected thereto and filed the corresponding bill of
exceptions which was allowed, certified and forwarded to the clerk
of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants
to the complaint of the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter
to amend their complaint within the period prescribed by the rules
undoubtedly believing that the plaintiffs could not alter nor
change the facts constituting the cause of action, and that, as both
parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as well
as in the demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of the law,
already submitted to the decision of the court the said judge,
disregarding the ordinary procedure established by law, decided the
case by absolving the defendants from the complaint and by
condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants,
instead of answering the complaint of the plaintiffs, confined
themselves to filing a demurrer based on the ground that the facts
alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action.
However, the judge preferred to absolve the defendants, thereby
making an end to the cause, instead of dismissing the same, because
undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy between the
parties, that the arguments adduced to support the demurrer would
be the same which the defendants would allege in their answer
those dealing with a mere question of law which the courts would
have to decide and that, the demurrer having been sustained, if
the plaintiffs should insist they could do no less upon
52

alleging the same facts as those set out in their complaint and if
another demurrer were afterwards set up, he would be obliged to
dismiss said complaint with costs against the plaintiffs in spite
of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that the
plaintiffs absolutely lack the right to bring the action stated in their
complaint.

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property

acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or
from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as
he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which
such property came.

Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is

not necessary as in this case what has been done does not
prejudice the parties the appellate court will now proceed to
decide the suit according to its merits, as found in the record and to
the legal provisions applicable to the question of law in controversy
so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided,
inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be followed, the
suit would be subsequently decided in the manner and terms that it
is now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and conscientiously
formed for its determination.

During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina

Faz de Leon two children were born, namely the defendant
Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio Florentino III (born after the
death of his father). At the death of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino
under a will, his eleven children succeeded to the inheritance he
left, one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as
his share, the aforementioned property enumerated in the
complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III
died and was succeeded by his legitimate mother Severina Faz de
Leon, who inherited the property he left and who on dying,
November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole heiress her
surviving daughter, Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein, who
took possession of all property left by her father, same constituting
the inheritance. Included in said inheritance is the property,
specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III from his
father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the death of the
said posthumos son, had in turn been inherited by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina left in her will said
property, together with her own, to her only daughter and forced
heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not
lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the
common ancestor of the litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited
by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same (by operation of
law) to his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.

In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to

invoke, in their favor, the provisions of article 811 of the Civil
Code, and whether the same article is applicable to the question of
law presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine whether the
property enumerated in paragraph 5 of the complaint is of the
nature of reservable property; and if so, whether in accordance with
the provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina Faz de Leon
(the widow of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who
inherited said property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born
after the death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to
preserve and reserve same for the relatives, within the third degree,
of her aforementioned deceased son Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property,

now claimed by his brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance
53

from his aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo

Florentino II. Although said property was inherited by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless, she was in duty bound,
according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the property
thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within the third
degree, of the line from which such property came.

called reservatarios, who belonged within the third degree to the

line from which such property came.lawphil.net
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession,
when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree,
the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista(person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by
the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and
for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the
relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the
succeeding degrees can never be considered asreservatarios, since
the law does not recognize them as such.

According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the

reservable property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the
reason that said law imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve
same for certain designated persons who, on the death of the said
ascendants reservists, (taking into consideration the nature of the
line from which such property came) acquire the ownership of said
property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as
forced heirs (because they are also such) said property reverts to
said line as long as the aforementioned persons who, from the death
of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact the right
of reservatarios(person for whom property is reserved), and are
relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant from whom the
reservable property came.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation

on the part of one alleging his right asreservatario who is not
within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of
representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third
degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased
person
from
whom
the
reservable
property came.
These reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants
(fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased
person and relatives within the third degree in accordance with
article 811 of the Civil Code.

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property,

while there are living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter,
is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable
property received. He is, however, the legitimate owner of his own
property which is not reservable property and which constitutes his
legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if,
afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the
descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or
disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of
law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir
who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or
testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of
reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives,
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the

plaintiffs Encarnacion, Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate
children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario
54

are both grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and

children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same have
the right to represent their aforementioned father, Jose Florentino;
that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate
children of the deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of
the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the right
of their aforementioned mother; and that the other plaintiffs, Jose
and Asuncion, have also the right to represent their legitimate father
Pedro Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact, admitted by both parties, that the
other children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that this decision does
not deal with them.

In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already

cited, the trial judge refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs
and, accepting that of the defendants, absolved the latter from the
complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely inapplicable
to the instant case, inasmuch as the defendant Mercedes Florentino
survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable
property came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of
her father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that the defendant
Mercedes, being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is
likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the property left
at the death of her mother, together with that which came from her
deceased brother Apolonio III, the fundamental object of article 811
of the Code was thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger
that the property coming from the same line might fall into the
hands of strangers had been avoided; and that the hope or
expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the
property of the deceased Apolonio III never did come into existence
because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such property.

There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the

reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos
son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three
children of his first marriage Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena;
his three children, Jose, Espirita and Pedro who are represented by
their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino,
his daughter by a second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the
relatives of the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III,
within the third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and
the remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of
his three half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within the
third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by
representation, all of them are indisputably entitled
as reservatarios to the property which came from the common
ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by
inheritance during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his
legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the
aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that

article 811 of the Civil Code does not destroy the system of
legitimate succession and that the pretension of the plaintiffs to
apply said article in the instant case would be permitting the
reservable right to reduce and impair the forced legitimate which
exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in
violation of the precept of article 813 of the same Code which
provides that the testator cannot deprive his heirs of their legitime,
except in the cases expressly determined by law. Neither can he
impose upon it any burden, condition, or substitution of any kind
whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the usufruct of the
surviving spouse, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
of January 4, 1911.

55

The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists

mainly in determining whether they property left at the death of
Apolonio III, the posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was
not invested with the character of reservable property when it was
received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon.

With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her
will of all her own property in favor of her only living daughter,
Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision
there is in her will concerning the reservable property received
from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce
the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews
of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as
said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct
or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same
to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes
Florentino.

The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their

complaint came, without any doubt whatsoever, from the common
ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio
III without issue the same passed by operation of law into the hands
of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became
reservable property, in accordance with the provision of article 811
of the Code, with the object that the same should not fall into the
possession of persons other than those comprehended within the
order of person other than those comprehended within the order of
succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source
of said property. If this property was in fact clothed with the
character and condition of reservable property when Severina Faz
de Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not
thereby acquire the dominion or right of ownership but only the
right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to
preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property to
her deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is
her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.

It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express

provision of law, that by operation of law all of the reservable
property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from
her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the legitime
pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come to
be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon,
her only legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes,
could not inherit all by operation of law and in accordance with the
order of legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the
deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself are
entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of
Mercedes Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her mother
Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and the
application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case in no way
prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes Florentino,
inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable property,
there being no lawful or just reason which serves as real foundation
to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other relatives, within the
third degree, to participate in the reservable property in question.
As these relatives are at present living, claiming for it with an

Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute

dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his
descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property nor
become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own
property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall
have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses
such character.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

56

indisputable right, we cannot find any reasonable and lawful motive

why their rights should not be upheld and why they should not be
granted equal participation with the defendant in the litigated
property.

Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of

Spain held that the legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or
impaired and said article is expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their
supposed rights, it has not been shown, upon any legal foundation,
that the reservable property belonged to, and was under the absolute
dominion of, the reservista, there being relatives within the third
degree of the person from whom same came; that said property,
upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the deceased
reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former; and that the
said forced heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an
exclusive right to receive all of said property and to deprive the
other reservatarios, her relatives within the third degree of certain
portions thereof.

The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress,

her daughter Mercedes, the property received from the deceased
son Apolonio III lost the character, previously held, of reservable
property; and that the mother, the said Severina, therefore, had no
further obligation to reserve same for the relatives within the third
degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently erroneous for the
reason that, as has been already stated, the reservable property, left
in a will by the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter
Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by her death
nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a
forced heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve
Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which she
received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of
reservable property, held before the reservatarios received same.

Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for

damages and the delivery of the fruits collected, it is not proper to
grant the first for there is no evidence of any damage which can
give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As to the second, the
delivery of the fruits produced by the land forming the principal
part of the reservable property, the defendants are undoubtedly in
duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits or
rents of the portions of land claimed in the complaint, in the
quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same, from January 17,
1918, the date the complaint was filed; and the remaining seventh
part should go to the defendant Mercedes.

It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the

reservista Severina, took possession of the property in question,
same did not pass into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise true
that the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And there is no
reason founded upon law and upon the principle of justice why the
otherreservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives within
the third degree in accordance with the precept of article 811 of the
Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of the property which,
as reservable property, pertain to them.

For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the
order of decision appealed from we should declare, as we hereby
do, that the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased
Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is
reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the
deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to six-

From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced
by the Supreme Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the violation
of articles 811, 968 and consequently of the Civil Code is not
applicable in the instant case.
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

57

Facts: Apolonio Florentino II married Antonia Faz de leon, they

have 11 children. One of the children is Encarnacion, plaintiff in
this case. Apolonio became a widower and married again, he
married Severina Faz de leon, they had 2 children, Mercedez
Florentino and Apolinio III. Mercedez was the defendant in this
case.

sevenths of said reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes is

entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter,
together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the
plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from
said portion of the land and of the quantity claimed, from January
17, 1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one
thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied,
without special findings as to the costs of both instances. So
ordered.

Apolinio Florentino died.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avancea,

JJ., concur.

That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo

Florentino executed a will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur,
instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned 11 children,
the posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon;
that he declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his
property should be divided among all of his children of both
marriages.

Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil 480

That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was

given to Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property
marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a
gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table service,
livestock, palay, some personal property and other objects
mentioned in the complaint.

Doctrine: Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise,

by the death of ascendants (reservista) together with his own
property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir,
forms no part of the latters lawful inheritance nor of the
legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be
reservable, the heir receiving same as an inheritance from his
ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest,
without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of
property, if he has at the same time the right of reservatorio.

That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second

marriage, died in 1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
succeeded to all his property described in the complaint; that
the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908,
leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living
daughter, Mercedes Florentino
Issue: whether the property left at the death of Apolonio III, the
posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested
with the character of reservable property when it was received
by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon?

Note: Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate

succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within
the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called
reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote.
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

Held: Was invested with the character of reservable property.

58

The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their

complaint came, without any doubt whatsoever, from the
common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of
Apolonio III without issue the same passed by operation of law
into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it
became reservable property, in accordance with the provision of
article 811 of the Code, with the object that the same should not
fall into the possession of persons other than those
comprehended within the order of person other than those
comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law
from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said property.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO,
NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and
GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.

Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute

dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from
his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own
property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It
becomes his own property only in case that all the relatives of
his descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case said
reservable property losses such character.

NARVASA, J.:

With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her
will of all her own property in favor of her only living daughter,
Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision
there is in her will concerning the reservable property received
from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will
reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers
and nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and
void, inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has only
the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to
preserve and to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom
is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.

This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil
Code on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower
court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and
Partial Compromise":

For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the
order of decision appealed from we should declare, as we hereby
do, that the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased
Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is
reservable property; that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the
deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to sixsevenths of said reservable property; that the defendant
Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof.

2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. TongoCamacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who
had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and
great grandfather of defendant. The family relationship of the
parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex 'A' and
made an integral part of this stipulation.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho

and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and
Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said
defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.

59

3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime

gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia
Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are
presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165,
64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of
which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.

7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate,

and her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned
were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving
husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died
intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived

by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children,
Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay
D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four (4)
parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal
pro-indiviso shares.

9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho

now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad
Dizon-Tongko.

5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate,

survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix
(among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3)
parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of
which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated
as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had
predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of
land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.

10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal

advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon
upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate
succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her
said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half
pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights
(3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third
degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single

and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in
the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father,
Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said
property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently
annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B2', 'C' and 'C-l'.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in

this case the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in
question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of
the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by
Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to threefourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights
60

(3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to threeeights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant
Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of
land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to
plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals, the court renders

judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of
the seven (7) parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. TiocoCamacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents
received by her on the properties involved in this action for the
purpose of determining the legal interests which should be paid to
the plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of the property in
question.

12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and
have acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims,
and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their family
relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each other for
damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in the rentals
which this Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the
respective parties. 1

SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.

On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs

Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the
defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to
one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal
proportions, rendering judgment as follows:

The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees

and ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within
the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction
to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, as seems
to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:

... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the

parties, the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of onehalf (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7)
parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are,
likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to
be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from the
tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real
estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said
relatives are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on
intestate succession.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties

expressly waived all their claims against each other for damages
including attorney's fees and expenses of litigation other than the
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

61

That question has already been answered in Padura vs.

Baldovino, 3 where the reservatario was survived by eleven
nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of
whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made
that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal
shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that
the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a
share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in
accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:

The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property

has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But
from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In
the relations between one reservatario and another of the same
degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore,
the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit
the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that
upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property
should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those
nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los
Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third degree of
relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs.
Florentino, supra).

The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case

of reserva troncal, where the onlyreservatarios (reservees)
surviving the reservista, and belonging to the fine of origin, are
nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of
the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood,
should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally,
or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as
large as that of the nephews of the half blood?

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession

when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree,
the right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by
the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and
for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the
third degree of the person from whom the reservable property
came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees
can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not
recognize them as such.

xxx xxx xxx

The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have
concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva
troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of
the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the
line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant
(reservista).
xxx xxx xxx

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

62

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation

on the part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not
within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of
representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third
degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased
person from whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino
vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also
Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)

aquehos extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan

fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the
new Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions,
as exemplified by the suppression of the reserva viudal and
the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on
intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without
any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of
Faustino Dizon (thepraepositus), they are excluded from the
succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are
related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this effect
is Abellana vs. Ferraris 4 where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of
the Civil Code were cited and applied:

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles

of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood
brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers
and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of
the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of
representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double
share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be
likewise operative.

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of
intestacy nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other
collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005
and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as
follows:

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of

relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned;
but within that group, the individual right to the property should be
decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession,
since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is
strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an
exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly
needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by
Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.

... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe

ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto,
manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese
realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando las reglas
generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de sucesi6n, en

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the
full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.

63

Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with

nephews and nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers
and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and
the latter per stirpes.

merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and
brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the
preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children
of brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to
the estate.

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession,
a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long
as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed. ...

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters,

nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other
collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in
force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889
prescribed as follows:

This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made

in Padura, supra, that as to the reservable property,
thereservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long
as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil.
237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but
from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the
heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive
thereservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa,
Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .

Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or

nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not,
the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children
of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.

To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was

ruled that intestacy proceedings to determine the right of
a reservatarioare not necessary where the final decree of the land
court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista over
property subject to reserva troncalIdentifies the reservatario and
there are no other claimants to the latter's rights as such:

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference

among them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters
and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the
surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the
widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

64

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests

upon the assumption that thereservatario win succeed in, or inherit,
the reservable property from the reservista. This is not true.
The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor
is the reservable property part of the reservista's estate;
the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line
of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed
during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that
there beingreservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must
be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the
reservable property.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is

reversed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs
against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., took no part.
Tioco de Papa vs. Camacho
Facts:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code
on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all
the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of

the reservista, the reservatario nearest
to
the prepositus (the
appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of
law, the owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that
property is no part of the estate of thereservista, and does not even
answer for the debts of the latter. ... .

1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho and the

plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are
legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and
granduncles.

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus,

there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been
excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate
succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain
simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by
the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour"
through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before
its transmission to the reservatario.

2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. TongoCamacho

have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by
the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously
donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate
sister of plaintiffs)
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, TongkoCamacho) and leaving the aforementioned four (4) parcels of land as the
inheritance of her said two children in equal proindiviso shares.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited,
the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the
entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs-appellees.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

65

5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by

his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs)
and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the
partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'Cl', were
adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had
predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land
devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad
Dizon in equal proindiviso shares.

appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property

upon the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the
Civil Code or, as asserted by the defendantappellant, the rights of said
relatives are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on
intestate succession.
Ruling:
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the
return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to
the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant
(reservista).
xxx xxx xxx

6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and
without issue, leaving his one half (1/2) proindiviso share in the seven (7)
parcels of land abovementioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole
intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal.

The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has
devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time
on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between
one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for
applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in
the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of
intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that
of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista,
the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class
but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus),
excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree.

7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad DizonTongko died intestate, and

her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were
inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband,
defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate,
survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho.

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there

are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the
reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot
be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the
right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree
personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are
within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property
came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can
never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize
them as such.

9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho now

owns onehalf (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as
her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad DizonTongko.
10. xxx
11. xxx
12.xxx
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco
Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay
TongkoCamacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to onehalf of the seven
parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions
Issue:
Whether, as contended by the plaintiffsappellees and ruled by the lower
Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the
part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third
66

degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the

part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as
in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the
reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480,
489490) (Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and
de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of
ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and
nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of
half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se,
proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made
to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole
blood should be likewise operative.

DE PAPA ET AL VS CAMACHO
FACTS:
Plaintiffs and respondents of this case are legitimate relatives,
plaintiffs being aunt and uncles of the respondent. Camacho
inherited her property from her mother Trinidad, a descendant of
Dizon, first degree cousin of defendants.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of

relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but
within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by
the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does
not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the
circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application
should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of
the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not uncles and aunts, together with niece who
survived the reservista would be considered reservatorios.
RULING:

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on

intestate succession, the plaintiffsappellees must be held without any
right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon
(the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendantappellant, although they are related to him within the same
degree as the latter.

The court ruled that the uncles and aunts shall not share in the
reserveable property, since, under the law of intestate
succession a descendants uncles and aunts may not succeed ab
intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive
and are willing and qualified to inherit. The rule on proximity
applies. (The relatives in the direct ascending shall exclude
relatives in the collateral line.)

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there
is no doubt that the plaintiffsappellees would have been excluded by the
defendantappellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no
reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the
transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the
reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendantthereby
giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.

Art. 891
De Papa v. Camacho
Propositus died. The uncles and aunts want the property for them. The
niece wants the property for herself. Where does the property go?

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the
defendantappellant Dalisay Tongko Camacho is entitled to the entirety of
the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffsappellees.
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

67

Held: To the niece. The uncles and aunts are excluded from the
succession by the niece, although they are related to him within the same
degree as the latter. Why? Because the reversion of the reservable
property is governed by the rules on intestate succession, wherein the
nieces/nephews succeed ahead of the spouse, and only in the absence
of the spouse will the uncles and aunts succeed.

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988
of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia
Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of
ownership and possession and damages, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and
against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be
divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half
for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted the
expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related expenditures.
Against the share of defendants shall be charged the expenses for
scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Memorial Foundation;'

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire

estate property, including but not limited to, specific items already
mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting of the
property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to plaintiff;

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.

c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of

litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.

Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana,
Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the
Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives

MEDIALDEA, J.:

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

68

are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster
half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private
respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased
father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be

named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the
purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia
agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted
by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated
April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special
Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:

He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months
after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four
months before Esteban, Jr. was born.

4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the

immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the
relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the
younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent
herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed
to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have
closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and
they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away
for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and

his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial
High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various
parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she
had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's
first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired
during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the

proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia
in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8,
1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later,
she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of
administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the
deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of
inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115,
Rollo).

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her
only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo
City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles
of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to
his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his
estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he
died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up
the foundation.

After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her

amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three
reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about
what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

69

sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative
on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of
the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be
facilitated.

In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of

Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court
of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the
decision of the trial court in toto.Hence, this petition for review
wherein she raised the following legal issues:

On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC)
declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold
properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the
deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA.
DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July
17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).

1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to

entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still
pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in
Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;

Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana

Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order
declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too
was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was
denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of
appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one
year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia JavellanaVillanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages.

3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva

troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on
his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she
had agreed to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that
conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been formed
and properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.

On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in

Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.

I. The question of jurisdiction

On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its

judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an
inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for
reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the
properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were
in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the

petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for
partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540)
for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the
70

same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and
approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting,
distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the
proceedings (p. 31, Record).

xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby
declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana,
who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.

It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of

the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the
intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far
relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v.
Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).

The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the

settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16,
Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of
the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's
motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of
Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and
recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly
filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court
denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals
for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that
remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the
same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate
action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate.

The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring
Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did
not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last
paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the
settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions of the order are
quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss
Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears
from the record that despite the notices posted and the publication
of these proceedings as required by law, no other heirs came out to
interpose any opposition to the instant proceeding. It further
appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the
estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.

In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and

conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not
interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.
Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117,
where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of
partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of her mother:

During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March

17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban Javellana died
single, without any known issue, and without any surviving parents.
His nearest relative is the herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister
of his late mother who reared him and with whom he had always
been living with [sic] during his lifetime.
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71

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under

administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
The finality of the approval of the project of The probate court, in
the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to
determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is
entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or illegality of the
testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court
making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold
that a separate and independent action is necessary to that effect,
would be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of
avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory,
and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)

administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not

through an independent action,which would be tried by another
court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the
probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar,
89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines,
L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis
supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency
of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil
action in which they claimed that they were the children by a
previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence,
entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties
acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in
the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not
children of the deceased, that the properties in question were
paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the
latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such
declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the
decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No.
1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily,
in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).

A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the

decedent is exclusively within the range of the administratrix
proceedings and can not properly be made an independent action.
(Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper.
(Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding
(Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961;
Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v.
Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to
obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not
elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice,
however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand
his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings

had been closed and terminated for over three years, the action for
annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue.
Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still
pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have
herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted

72

likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest

of justice.

court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against such
judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31,
1971). (cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno;
Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)

The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case
No. 13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23
(formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and
declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the
estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and
requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the
least, for these matters he within the exclusive competence of the
probate court.

A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral

fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any
fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial
of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from
presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting
his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the
jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972,
45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694,
October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)

II. The question of extrinsic fraud

Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate
proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is
noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's
original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her
amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was
alleged for the first time.

The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the

following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to
be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and
Celedonia had agreed that the latter would "initiate the necessary
proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus
paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:

Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act

or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a fair
submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A
fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial or presenting all of
his case to the court, or one which operates upon matters pertaining,
not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which such
judgment was procured so much so that there was no fair
submission of the controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent
machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to
withdraw his defense or was prevented from presenting an available
defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment was
obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his day in
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the
late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least
effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant
shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes
and other obligations, and to do everything else required by law,
and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the
plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition
73

the estate, for their agreement was to place the estate in a

foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied)

The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the
requisites of a petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for
new trial.

Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the

proceedings. She stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the
estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio,
and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the
deceased had planned to do.

The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:

Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of
probate court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or
irregularities are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean
132 So. 20)

2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the

time and place of hearing of the petition is required to be published
(Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court).
Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition was published
in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p.
197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended
petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by
order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light)
issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The
publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice
to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to
intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as well as
constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by the probate court
in its order of October 27, 1978:

Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of
Esteban within the third degree on his mother's side was not false.
Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that
because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not
his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his
mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been selfdefeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirshipif she
stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission
to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.

... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about

five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ...
.

Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which

would defeat one's own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud
as will justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489,
citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust
Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109
SW 2d 1144, 1149)

Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly
published as required by law, despite which the present movant
only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on
her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)

It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a

decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2,
Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not
preclude Concordia from filing her own.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

74

III. On the question of reserva troncal

the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance

subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who
is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side.
The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant
from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9
brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a
descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered
by Article 891.

We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the

deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as
his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side.
The reserva troncalprovision of the Civil Code is found in Article
891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came.

Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without

descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the
distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil
Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.

ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor

children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate.

2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the

reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the third degree counted
from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from
which the property came.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference

among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.

3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title

and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by
operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:

Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of
the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each,
therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of
line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not

reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

75

whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of
the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)

SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20,

1988, 161 SCRA 347).

IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share

The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia

who, significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she
could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly
indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and sonin-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her
husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia,
but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not
intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation
(p. 323, Record).

However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of

the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an
agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to
Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she
filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed
to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have
closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and
they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away
for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)

The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana

Foundation" was established and duly registered in the Securities
and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the
following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships
for such deserving students as the Board of Trustees of the
Foundation may decide of at least one scholar each to study at West
Visayas State College, and the University of the Philippines in the
Visayas both located in Iloilo City.

she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she

did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did
agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime,
planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the education
of indigent but deserving students as well.

2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements

Redemptorist Community for a deserving student who has the
religious vocation to become a priest.

Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did.
Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be
presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil.
227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966,
18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24
SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the

advancement and enrichment of the various fields of educational
endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by
this foundation may be named after its benevolent benefactors as a
token of gratitude for their contributions.
76

4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to

determine community needs and be able to alleviate partially or
totally said needs.

and upon domestic corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 910, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:

5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper

care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the King
Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana Memorial at the
West Visayas State College, as a token of appreciation for the
contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana which has
made this foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman
Catholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their
equivalents will be offered every February and October, and
Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth, their death
anniversaries, as part of this provision.

The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its
eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1) from
UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated
with honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other was a recipient of
Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being the most outstanding
student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso
Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by the
Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay
High School for Region VI.

6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments

and financial aids or loans from whatever source, to invest and
reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and pay or apply only
the income or such part thereof as shall be determined by the
Trustees for such endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the
objectives of the Foundation.

The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who

would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier Major
Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a
member of the Redemptorist Association that gives yearly
donations to help poor students who want to become Redemptorist
priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing
known as the Esteban Javellana Award.

7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease,

mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest,
trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real and personal
property of every kind and description or any interest herein.

Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana

Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State University for
teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious
civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst other's. (p. 10,
Rollo)

8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or

proper for the accomplishments of any of the purposes herein
enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the
protection or benefit of the corporation, including the exercise of
the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in general,
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

77

Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia brought up Esteban, Jr.

Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the

Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as
Celedonia has honored hers.

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties which

she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio
Solivio's first wife but no conjugal property was acquired during
her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of

the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE.
Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However,
comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir,
Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be
conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of
which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be
trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of
trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which
shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its charter.
The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the
probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the
deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to

her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz,
Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time,
the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of
Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed
to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place
his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor
but
deserving
students
obtain
a
college
education.
Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack without having set up
the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked
about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told
Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a
foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his
properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in
their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the
deceased. Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would
take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the
foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her
counsel, filed for her appointment as special administratrix of
the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She was declared sole heir of
the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Collateral Relatives
FACTS:
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban
Javellana, Jr., who died a bachelor, without descendants,
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only
surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner
Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia
Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration

of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of
Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On
October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for
tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia for
78

partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.Trial

court rendered judgment in favor of Concordia JavellanaVillanueva.
ISSUE:
Whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva
troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree
on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them.
HELD:
The Court heldthat the property of the deceased, Esteban
Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not
an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio,
from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he
did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of
his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third
degree on his mothers side. The reserva troncal applies to
properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who
inherited it from another ascendant or a brother ora sister. It
does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his
ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Art. 891.

G. R. No. L-11960, December 27,

1958
DIONISIA PADURA, ET AL. , PETITIONERSAPPELLEES, VERSUS MELANIA BALDOVINO, ET
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

79

years later, on October 6, 1940, Manuel Padura also died.

Surviving him are his legitimate children, Dionisia, Felisa, Flora,
Gornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino, all surnamed Padura,
the appellees herein.

AL., OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS
D E C I S I O N

Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista), on October 15,

1952, appellants and appellees took possession of the
reservable properties. In a resolution, dated August 1, 1953, of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Special Proceedings No.
4551, the legitimate children of the deceased Manuel Padura
and Candelaria Baldovino were declared to be the rightful
reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the
original reserveess Candelaria Padura and Manuel Padura,
having predeceased the reservista). The instant petition, dated
October 22, 1956, filed by appellants Baldovino seeks to have
these properties partitioned, such that one-half of the same be
adjudicated to them, and the other half to the appellees,
allegedly on the basis that they inherit by right of representation
from their respective parents, the original reservees. To this
petition, appellees filed their opposition, maintaining that they
should all (the eleven reservees) be deemed as inheriting in
their own right, under which, they claim, each should have an
equal share.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna in its Special Proceedings No. 4551.
The facts are simple and undisputed. Agustin Padura contracted
two marriages during his lifetime. With his first wife, Gervacia
Landig, he had one child whom they named Manuel Padura, and
with his second, Benita Garing; he had two children named
Fortunato Padura and Candelaria Padura.
Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will and
testament, duly probated in Special Proceedings No, 664 of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, wherein he bequeathed his
properties among his children, Manuel, Candelaria and
Fortunato, and his surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Under the
probate proceedings, Fortunate was adjudicated four parcels of
land covered under Decree No. 25960 issued In Land
Registration Case No. 86 G. L. R. O. No. 10818, object of this
appeal.

Based on the foregoing finding of facts, the lower court rendered

judgment declaring all the reservees (without distinction) "coowners, pro-indiviso, equal shares of the parcels of land subject
matter of the suit.

Fortunato Padura died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without

having executed a will; and not having any issue, the said
parcels of land were inherited exclusively by her mother, Benita
Garing. She applied for and later was issued a Torrens
Certificate of Title in her name, but subject to the condition that
the properties were reservable in favor of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which said property
came, in accordance with the applicable provision of law, under
a decree of the court dated August 25, 1916, in Land
Registration Case No. G. L. R. O. No. 10818.

The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case

of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees)
surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are
nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews
of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood,
should the reserved properties be apportioned among them
equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share
twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?

On August 26, 1934, Candelaria Padura died leaving as her only

heirs, her four legitimate children, the appellants herein,
Cristeta, Melania, Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed Baldovino, Six
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

The appellants contend that notwithstanding the reservable

character of the property under Art, 891 of the new Civil Code
(Art. 811 of the Code of 1889) the reservatarios nephews of the
80

whole blood are entitled to a share twice as large as that of the

others, in conformity with Arts, 1006, 1008 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines (Arts. 949 and 951 of the Code of 1889) on
intestate succession.

Legislaciones Forales" (Madrid, 1884, Vol. 1, pp. 226-228, 233235) in the following words:
"La base cuarta, ms de estar en pugna con la
legislacion espaola, es una desviacion del
antiguo derecho romano y del moderno derecho
europeo, perfectamente conformes ambos con el
tradicional sistema de Castilla. En qu se fund,
pues, la Comision para semejante novedad? Que
razones pudieron moverla establecer la sucesion
lineal, separndose del cuce secular?

"Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full

blood survive together with brothers and sisters of
the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a
share double that of the latter.(949)n
"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the
half blood shall succeed per capita or per stripes,
in accordance with the rules laid down for
brothers and sisters of the full blood, (951)

"Lo dir en breves frases. Hay un case, no del

todo raro, que subleva el sentimiento de cuantos
lo imaginan lo ven: el hijo mayor de un magnate
sucede su padre en la mitad Integra de pingues
mayorazgos, tocando sus hermanos un lote
modestisimo en la division de la herencia paterna;
aquel hijo se casa y fallece al poco tiempo
dejando un tierno vstago; la viuda, todavia jven,
contrae segundas bodas y tiene la desdicha de
perder al hijo del primer matrimonio heredando
toda su fortuna con exclusion de la madre y los
hermanos de su primer marido. No hay para qu
decir que, si hay descendientes del segundo
matrimonio, ellos se trasmite en su dia la
hereticia.
Por
donde
resulta
el
irritante
espectculo de que los vstagos directos del
magnate viven en la estrechez y tal vez en la
miseria, mientras gozan de su rico patrimonio
personas extraas su familia y que, por un
rden natural, la son profundamente antipticas.
Esta hiptesis se puede realizar y se realize,
aunque por lo general en menor escala, entre
propietarios, banqueros industriales. labradores
y comerciantes, sin necesidad de vinculaciones ni
titulos nobiliarios.

The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have
concluded that the position of the appellants is correct.
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure
the return of the reservable property to the third degree
relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of
the inheriting ascendant (reservista). To this end, the Code
provides:
"Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who
are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came. (811)"
It is well known that the reserva troncal had no direct precedent
in the law of Castile. The President of the Spanish Code
Commission, D. Manuel Alonso Martinez, explained the motives
for the formulation of the reserva troncal in the Civil Code of
1889 in his book "El Codigo Civil en sus relaciones con las
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

"Pues bien, la mayoria de la Comision se preocup

vivamente de esto, considerando el principio de
familia como superior al del afecto presumible del
81

difunto. A esta impresion obedecia la propuesta

del Sr. Garcia Goyena, para que los
ascendientes se les diera su legitima tan slo en
usufructo: en idntica razon se apoyaba el Sr.
Franco para pedir con insistencia se declarase
que, si un ascendiente tenia hecha una donacion
su descendiente, bien fuese al contraer
matrinionio bien con cualquiera otro motivo, y
muriese el donatario sin sucesion, volvieran los
bienes donados al donante, sin perjuicio de la
legitima que pudiera corresponderle en su calidad
de ascendiente. La Comision no se atrevi a ir tan
all como estos dos Sres. Vocales; pero, para
eludir las consecuencias que las veces produce
el principio de la proximidad del parentesco y que
he puesto de relieve poco h, proclam, no sin
vacilar, la doctrina de la sucesion lineal." (pp.226227)

un hermano, se halla obligado

reservar los que hubiese adquirido
por ministerio de la ley en favor de
los parientes del difunto que se
hallaran comprendidos dentro del
tercer grado y que lo sean por la
parte de donde proceden los
bienes.'
"No voy discutir ahora si esta frmula es ms
mnos feliz, y si debe aprobarse tal cual est
redactada si h menester de enmienda
adicion. Aplazo este examen para cuando trate
de la sucesion intestada, la cual tiene mayor
aplicacion. Por el momento me limito reconocer.
primero: que con esta base desaparece el peligro
de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una
familia pasen bruscamente y titulo gratuito
manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y de
muertes prematuras; segundo: que sin negar que
sea una novedad esta base del derecho de
Castllla, tiene en rigor en su abono la autoridad de
los Cdigos ms niveladores y el ejemplo de las
naciones ms democrticas de Europe, si no en la
extension en que lo presenta la Comision
Codificadora, lo mnos en el principio generador
de la reforma. (pp.233-235)

Y este fu el temperamento que, por indicacion

mia, adopt la Comision Codificadora, norabrando
una Sub-comision que redactara las bases que
habia de sujetarse esta especie de reversion de
los bienes inmuebles al tronco de donde
procedan, lo mismo en la sucesion testamentaria
que en la intestada, sin perjuicio del derecho
sacratisimo de los padres al disfrute de la
herencia
de
sus
hijos
malogrados
prematuramente.

The stated purpose o the reserva is accomplished once

property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of
origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its
application. In the relations between one reservatario and
another of the same degree, there is no call for applying Art. 891
any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the
reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules
of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this
Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not
to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in
degree
to
the
descendant
(prepositus)
,
excluding

"Dicha Subcomision, compuesta de los Sres.

Durn y Bs y Franco como defensores del
rgimen f oral, y de los Sres. Manresa y Garcia
Goyena en representacion de la legislacion
castellana, sometieron la deliberacion de la
Comision Codificadora la proposicion siguiente:
'El ascendiente que heredare de su
descendiente bienes que este
hubiese
adquirido
por
titulo
lucrativo de_ otro ascendiente de
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

82

those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentine vs.

Florentine, 40 Phil. 489-490; T. S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los
Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third degree of
relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs.
Florentino, supra).

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic

principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that
whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share
double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of
degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to
apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the
whole blood should be likewise operative.

"Following the order prescribed by law in

legitimate succession, when there are re1atives of
the descendant within the third degree, the right
of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over
the property which the reservista (person holding
it subject to reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more remote. The right
of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable
property is not among the relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which such
property came, inasmuch as the right granted by
the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest
degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are within the third
degree of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth
and the succeeding degrees can never be
considered as reservatarios, since the law does
not recognize them as such.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group

of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be
returned; but within that group, the individual right to the
property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary
intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise.
This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that
the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be
limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of
the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6,
6th Ed., p. 250):
crendose un verdadero estado excepcipnal del
derecho, no debe ampliarse, sino ms bien
restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo
la excepcin mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese
realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando
las reglas generales y fundamentals del Cdigo en
materia de sucesin, en aquellos extremos no
resueltos de un raodo expreso, y que quedan
fuera de la propia esfera de accin de la reserva
que se crea.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right

of representation on the part of one alleging his
right as reservatario who is not within the third
degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right
of representation on the part of reservatarios who
are within the third degree mentioned by law, as
in the case of nephews of the deceased person
from whom the reservable property came. x x x.
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490)
(Emphasis supplied) (see also Nieva and Alacala
vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of

the new Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and
reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserve
viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Arts. 812
and 968-980).
There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during
the reservistas lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate
acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
83

the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their

reversionary right: and for this purpose they can compel the
annotation of their right in the Registry of Property even while
the reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168,
199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295). This right is incompatible
with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs
of the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property
is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of
them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo
vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit
from the reservist, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez
Roman, Vol. VI, Torao 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6,
6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) Had the nephews of whole and half-blood
succeeded the prepositus directly, those of full-blood would
undoubtedly receive a double share compared to those of the
half-blood (Arts. 1008 and 1006, jam cit.) Why then should the
latter receive equal shares simply because the transmission of
the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva?
The decedent (causante) the heirs and their relationship being
the same, there is no cogent reason why the hereditary portions
should vary.

found in the following, passage of Manresa's Commentaries (Vol.

6, 7th Ed., p. 346):
A esto se objeta que el derecho consignado en el
articulo 811 es un derecho propio que nace de la
mera calidad de pariente; no un derecho que se
adquiere por sucesin. Ciertamente, el derecho se
concede a los parientes lineales dentro del tercer
grado; pero se les concede con motivo de la
muerte de un descendiente y en la sucesin de
este. Ellos suceden por la procedencia especial de
los bienes despus de ser stos disfrutados por el
ascendiente; pero suceden a titulo lucrativo y por
causa de muerte y ministerio de la ley, lo cual es
dificil poderlo negar. Hasta podrlan estimarse
esos parientes legitimarios o herederos forzosos,
como el mismo autor reconoce en otro lugar de su
obra. De modo que este argumento no es
convincente.
All told, our considered opinion is that reason and policy favor
keeping to a minimum the alterations introduced by
the reserva in the basic rules of succession mortis causa.

It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is

supported by distinguished commentators of the Civil Code of
1889, among them Sanchez Romn (Estudios, Vol. 65 Tomo 2, p.
1008) and Mucius Scaevola (Cdigo Civil, Vol 14, p. 342). The
reason given by these authors is that the reservatariosare called
by law to take the reservable property because they belong to
the line of origin; and not because of their relationship. But the
argument, if logically pursued, would lead to the conclusion that
the property should pass to any and all the reservatarios, as a
class, and in equal shares, regardless of lines and degrees. In
truth, such is the thesis of Scaevola, that later became known as
the theory of reserva integral (14 Scaevola, Cod. Civ. p. 332 et
seq.). But, as we have seen, the Supreme Courts of Spain and of
the Philippines have rejected that view, and consider that the
reservable
property
should
be
succeeded
by
the reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to the basic
rules of intestacy. The refutation of the trial court's position is
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 5, 1956 is

reversed and set aside, and the reservatarios who are nephews
of the whole blood are declared entitled to a share twice as large
as that of the nephews of the half-blood. Let the records be
remanded to the court below for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision.
So Ordered.
DIONISIA PADURA ET AL, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES V.MELANIA
BALDOVINO, ET AL, OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS GR NO L-11960
DECEMBER 27, 1958
REYES, JBL,J.,

84

SV: Fortunato Padura without any heirs, hence the four parcels of
land he received from his father were transmitted to her mother.
After her mother died, Fortunatos nephews and nieces from his
full sister and half-brother took possession of the property. The
court ruled that these nephews and nieces will have equal
shares over the property.

3.

SC: Rule on Reserva troncal should be applied, meaning the

relatives of Fortunato up to the third degree will get the
reservable property after his mother dies. The children of such
relatives (the reservatarios) can receive the property by way of
right of representation. But after applying the rule, the
reservatarios and their relationship will be considered in
determining their shares. The rules on ordinary intestate
succession would be followed after the reservatarios have been
determined.

4.

5.

1. Agustin Padura married twice. His first wife was

Gervacio Landig with whom he had one child named
Manuel Padura. His second wife was Benita Garing
with whom he had 2 children named Fortunato and
Candelaria Padura
2. He died leaving a last will and testament duly
probated wherein he bequeathed his properties
among his children, Manuel, CAndelaria and
Fortunato, and his surviving spouse Benita (2nd wife).
Fortunato was adjudicated 4 parcels of land
a. Fortunato died unmarried and without having
executed a will; and not having any issue, the
4 parcels of land were inherited exclusively by
Benita. Benita applied for an later was issued a
Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, BUT
subject to the condition that the properties
were reservable in favor of relatives within the
3rd degree belonging to the line from which the
property came (Fortunato)
b. Candelaria (Fortunatos full sister) died
leaving as her heirs her 4 legitimate children
(the appellants) Melania, Anicia and Pablo all
surnamed Baldovino
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

6.

c. Manuel (Fortunatos half brother) also died. His

heirs were his legitimate children (the
appellees) Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio,
Francisco, Juana and Severino, all surnamed
Padura1
Benita Garing (the reservista) died. The children of
Candelaria and Fortunato took possession of the 4
parcels of land (the reservable properties).
a. CFI Laguna issued a resolution declaring the
legitimate children of Manuel and Candelaria
are the rightful reserves and as such entitled
to the 4 parcels of land
The Baldovinos filed this present petition wherein
they seek to have the properties partitioned suh that
one-half of the same be adjudicated to them, the
other half to the Paduras on the basis that they
inherited by right of representation from their
respective parents, the original reserves.
The Paduras opposed, arguing that they should all (all
11 of them) be deemed inheriting in their own right
hence, they should have equal shares.
TC rendered judgment declaring them all reservees
without distinction and have equal shares over the
properties as co-owners, pro indiviso.

ISSUE: should the properties be apportioned among the

nephews 2 of the whole blood and nephews of the hald-blood
equally? Or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share
twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood? The
nephews of the whole blood get twice the share.

1
2
3
4

85

The Baldovinos contend that notwithstanding the rule on

Reservable character of the property under Art. 891, the
reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to
a share twice as large as that of the others pursuant to
Arts. 10063, 10084 on intestate succession.

The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to

assure the return of the reservable property to the third
degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated
into and by their relatives of the inheriting ascendant
(reservista)
o Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who
are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came. (871)
o The motives for such rule were explained by D.
Manuel Alonso Martinez in his book El Codigo
Civil en sus relaciones con Las Legislaciones
Forales 5
Summary of not so good translation:
consider this sample case: father dies
leaving his wife and lone son as heirs. Wife
remarries and had children with 2 nd
husband. Lone son dies and his mother
(wife) inherits whatever he got from the
father. In case the wife dies, the relatives
of the lone son are prejudiced since the
wifes children from the second marriage
will inherit the properties of the lone son as
opposed to his uncle (fathers brother)
The code commission chose to give more
importance to lineal succession than the
presumed affection of the deceased.
The
commission
settled
with
the
suggestion of Manresa, among others, to
reserve the property in case the
ascendants inherit in favor of relatives up
to the third degree. No reason was given
why 3rd degree.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

Aside from the sample case, another

reason why this rule was adopted was to
make it the law more democratic
(Democracy was becoming a trend when
the civil code was being made by the
Spaniards, so fetch).
The purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the
property has devolved to the specified relatives of
the line of origin. After that, Art. 891 has nothing to do
with the relations between one reservatario and another
of the same degree. Their shares should be foverned
by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. Upon
the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable
property should pass, not to all reservatarios as a class,
but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant
(prepositus), excluding those reseravatarios more remote
in degree.
o The right of representation cannot be alleged
when the one claiming the same as a reservatario
of the property is not among those relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which
the property came. Relatives of the fourth and the
succeeding degrees can never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does not recognize
them as such
o But there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree
mentioned by law as in the case of nephews of
the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic
principles of intestate succession so is the rule that whole
blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share
double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood.
o In determining the rights of the reservatarios inter
se, proximity of degree and the right of
representation of nephews are made to apply, the
rule of double share for immediate collaterals of
the whole blood should likewise be operative.
Reserva Troncal merely determines the group pof
relatives to whom the property should be returned.

86

Within the group, the individual right to the property

should be decided by applicable rules of ordinary
intestate succession (since art. 891 is silent on the
matter).
Reserva Troncal is an exceptional case and its application
should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish
the purpose of the law
Even during the lifetime of the reservista, the
reservatarios could compel the annotation of their right
(over the property) in the registry of property. The
reservable property is no part of the estate of the
reservista, who may not dispose them by will so long as
there are reservatarios existing. The reservatarios are in
fact inheriting from the descendant prepositus from
whom the reservista inherited the property.
If the nephews of whole and half-blood inherited the
prepositus directly, the whole bloods would receive a
double share compared to those of the half-blood. Why
then should the half-bloods inherit equally just because
of the delay in the transmission of the property (when it
was with the reservista)? The hereditary portions should
not change
Philippine (and Spanish Jurisprudence) agrees with this
despite the contrary opinions of authors such as Sanchez
Roman and Mucius Scaevola.

Fortunato was adjudicated four parcels of land. He died unmarried on May 28,
1908, without having executed a will; and not having any issue, the parcels of
land were inherited exclusively by his mother Benita. Benita was issued a
Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, subject to the condition that the
properties were reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which said property came.
On Aug 26, 1934, Candelaria died, leaving as her heirs her four legitimate
children: Cristeta, Melania, Anicia, and Pablo Baldovino (Oppositors-appellants).
On Oct 6, 1940, Manuel also died, survived by his legitimate children Dionisia,
Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino Padura (Petitionersappellees)
Upon the death of Benita (the reservista) on Oct 15, 1952, the heirs took
possession of the reservable properties. CFI Laguna declared the children of
Manuel and Candelaria to be the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the
reservable properties (the original reservees, Candelaria and Manuel, having
predeceased the reservista)
The Baldovino heirs filed a petition seeking to have the properties partitioned,
such that one-half be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the appellees,
allegedly on the basis that they inherited by right of representation from their
respective parents, the original reservees.
Padura heirs opposed, maintaining that they should all be deemed as inheriting in
their own right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal share.
(In essence, the Baldovino heirs, who are whole blood relatives of the reservista,
were contending that they should get more than their half-blood relatives, the
Padura heirs. They anchor their claim on Articles 1006 and 1008 of the Civil
Code)
RTC RULING
Declared all the reservees, without distinction, co-owners, pro-indiviso, in equal
shares of the parcels of land.
ISSUE
WON the reserved properties should, as the trial court held, be apportioned
among the heirs equally.
HELD
NO.
The nephews of the whole blood should take a share twice as large as that of the
nephews of the half blood. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed
primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree
relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and
avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant
(reservista). Article 891 of the Code provides:
ART 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another

Appealed order REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Whole blood

nephews will get twice the share of those who are nephews of
Half-blood.
PADURA vs BALDOVINO
G.R. No. L-11960 December 27, 1958
FACTS
Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime. With his first wife
Gervacia Landig, he had one child, Manuel Padura. With the second wife, Benita
Garing, he had two children, Fortunato and Candelaria Padura. Agustin died on
Apr 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly probated, wherein he
bequeathed his properties among his three children and his surviving spouse,
Benita Garing.

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

87

ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he

may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came.
The purpose of the reserva troncal is accomplished once the property has
devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on,
there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between one
reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no call for applying Art 891
any longer; the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules of interstate succession.
Florentino v Florentino (as restated in the case): upon the death of the ascendant
reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a
class, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus),
excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree... And within the third
degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews.
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary
intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are
entitled to share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the
right of representation of nephews are made to aply, the rule of double share for
immedaite collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be operative.
In other words, reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives
(reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that group,
the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of
ordinary intestate succession, since Art 891 does not specify otherwise. The
reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is
strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.
Even during the reservistas lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate
acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista
from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right: and for this
purpose they can compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of Property
even while the reservista is alive. This right is incompatible with the mere
expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is also clear
that the reservable property is not part of the estate of the reservista, who may not
dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing. The latter,
therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus,
of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that
they must survive the reservista.

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88

25 Phil., 295; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil., 664; Florentino v.

Florentino, 40 Phil., 480; and Director of Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil.,
279.)
2. ID.; ID.; RESERVA INSTITUTED BY LAW IN FAVOR OF
RESERVEES IS ALIENABLE TO A RESOLUTORY CONDITION. THE
reserva instituted in favor of the heirs within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the reservable property came,
constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and
dispose of, although conditionally, the condition being that the
alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reservee survives the reservor.
3. ID.; ID.; WHEN RESERVEE BECOMES EXCLUSIVE OWNER.
Upon the death of the reservor, there being a surviving
reservee, the reservable property passes in exclusive ownership
to the latter.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-12957. March 24, 1961.]

DECISION

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FIDEL

ESPARCIA, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

DIZON, J.:

Proceso R. Remollo, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Appellants commence this action below to secure judgments (1)
declaring null and void the sale executed by Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia
and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to
reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of
Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the
appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of
P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In their answer
appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding
the sale allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in
favor of appellants and alleged that if such sale was made, the
same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right
to dispose of the property subject matter thereof. They further
alleged that said property had never been in possession of
appellants, the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been
in continuous possession thereof since the death of Francisco
Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they
further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso,

Leonardo O. Mancao for Defendants-Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. "RESERVA TRONCAL" ; RESERVABLE PROPERTY; RESERVOR

HAS LEGAL TITLE AND DOMINION OVER PROPERTY SUBJECT TO A
RESOLUTORY CONDITION; ALIENATIONS MADE BY HIM SUBJECT
TO RESERVATION; TRANSFEREES RIGHT REVOKED BY THE
SURVIVAL OF A RESERVEE UPON DEATH OF RESERVOR. The
reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to a resolutory condition. Thus he may
alienate the same but subject to reservation, i.e., the rights
acquired by the transferee being revoked upon the survival of
reservees at the time of death of the reservor (Edroso v. Sablan,

SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

89

as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a public

instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been registered together
with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and
Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid
deceased; that since then the Esparcias had been in possession
of the property as owners.

where left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot

3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375, to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern
portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco.
As a result of the cadastral proceedings. Original Certificate of
Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of
Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his
mother administered the property for him, declared it in her
name for taxation purposes (Exhs. A & A-1), and paid the taxes
due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & A-2). When Francisco died on May
29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant,
his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument
Exhibit F entitled extra-judicial settlement and sale whereby,
among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of
P800.00, she sold the property in question to appellants. When
thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her
husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate of
Title No. 10275 which was in their possession the latter
refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion
in the cadastral record No. 507. The same, however, was denied
(Exhs. 8 & 9).

After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered
judgment as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring (1) that the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea
Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva
Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed for by them is
denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in
favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving
the same lot is also void, and they have no valid title thereto;
and (3) that the reservable property in question is part of and
must be reverted to the estate of Cipriano Yaeso, the lone
surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of
Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as
to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and

Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as
such had declared the property in their name on January 1, 1951
executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia
and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their
name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in
their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 and
5-A).

From the above decision the Sienes spouses interposed the

present appeal, their principal contentions being, firstly, that the
lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral
Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in
annuling the sale of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in their
favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee,
was entitled to inherit said land.

As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already

stated, that the land in question was reservable property.
Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father
Saturnino, and upon Franciscos death, unmarried and without
descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea
Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it
for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The
record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on
December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being
Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).

There is no dispute as to the following facts:chanrob1es virtual

1aw library
Lot 3368 originally belong to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife,
Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando,
Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang,
he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral
records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his
death - the date of which does not clearly appear of record SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

90

obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute

owner of the reservable property upon Andreas death. While it
may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to
this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the
resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the
appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the
property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the
vendees the Esparcia spouses did not appeal therefrom.

In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is

that the reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1)
the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the
survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the property came (6
Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). The Court has held
in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal
title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a
resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the
reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject
to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable
and conditional ownership of the reservista, the rights acquired
by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of
reservatorios at the time of death of the reservista (Edroso v.
Sablan, 25 Phil., 295; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil., 664; Florentino
v. Florentino, 40 Phil., 480; and Director of Lands v. Aguas, 63
Phil., 279).

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is

affirmed, with costs, and without prejudice to whatever action in
equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of
Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Paredes, JJ., concur.
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees. G.R. No.
L-12957 March 24, 1961

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was,

therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would
definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if
the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to
the reservable property. Inasmuch as when Andrea Gutang died,
Cipriano Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes
inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor
of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable
property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership
to Cipriana.

FACTS:
The case involves Lot 3368 which originally belonged to
Saturnino Yaeso. According to the cadastral records, upon
Saturninos death, he left the aid land to Francisco, his only son
with his second wife, Andrea Gutang.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the
sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaesco in favor of the spouse Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory
condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs
within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the
reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the
condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to
the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person
obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of
the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person
SUCCESSION OCTOBER 15

Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother

administered the property for him, declared it in her name for
taxation purposes and paid the taxes due thereon. When
Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and
without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed
an extrajudicial settlement and sale whereby, among other
things, she sold the property in question to the appellant,
Constancio Sienes. Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the
surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who had declared the
questioned property in their name, executed a deed of sale in
favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes. The Trial
91

court declared both sale as void and ordered that the property
be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving
relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea
Gutang.

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was,

therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would
definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if
the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to
the reservable property. When Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana
Yaeso was still alive; thus, the previous sale made by the former
in favor of appellant
became of no legal effect and the
reservable property passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

ISSUE:
WON the sale of the property by the ascendant who is obliged to
reserve the property is valid although at the time of his death,
there are still surviving relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the property came.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the
sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory
condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs
within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the
reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the
condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to
the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person
obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of
the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person
obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute
owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death.

RULING:
The land in question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso
inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and
upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it
was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter
was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which
said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses
that when Andrea Gutang died, the lone reservee surviving her
is Cipriana Yaeso.
The reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the
death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,
at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the property came. The
reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a
life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may
alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation
transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the
reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked
or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the
death of the reservista.

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