VENUE

RULE 110, SECTION 15. PLACE WHERE ACTION IS TO BE INSTITUTED.

a. Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality
or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
b. Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle in the course of its
trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where
said train, aircraft, or other vehicle passed during its trip, including the place of departure and arrival.
c. Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory where the
vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.
d. Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall
be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed.
a. RPC ARTICLE 2. Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the treaties and laws
of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the
Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also
outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
i. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
ii. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
iii. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;
iv. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of
their functions; or
v. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined
in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
CONSTITUTION, ART. VIII, SEC. 5(4)
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, SECTION 18
Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme Court shall define the territory over
which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over the said branch may exercise appellate
jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to
the people of the different parts of the region and making the attendance of litigants and witnesses as
inexpensive as possible.
PD 1069. PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW

COMPLAINT AND INFORMATION

RULE 110, RULES OF COURT

Section 1. Institution of criminal actions. Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:
a. For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant to section 1 of Rule 112, by
filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary
investigation.
b. For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly with the Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or the complaint with the office of the prosecutor. In
Manila and other chartered cities, the complaints shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor
unless otherwise provided in their charters.
The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the
offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws.
HOW ARE CRIMINAL ACTIONS INSTITUTED?
1. For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required, by filing a complaint with the proper officer
for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation
2. For the other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly with the MTC or complaint with
the office of the prosecutor
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE INSTITUTION OF THE CRIMINAL ACTIONS ON THE PERIOD
OF PRESCRIPTION OF THE OFFENSE?
- It shall interrupt the running off the period of prescription of the offense unless otherwise provided for in
special laws
- Rule doesnt apply to violations of municipal ordinances and special lawsinterrupted only by the
institution of the judicial proceedings for their investigation and punishment, while violations of
municipal ordinances prescribe after 2 months
Sec. 2. The complaint or information The complaint or information shall be in writing, in the name of
the People of the Philippines and against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense
involved.
WHAT IS THE FORM REQUIRED FOR THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION?
1. Shall be in writing
2. In the name of the People of the Philippines
3. Against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved
WHY SHOULD THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION BE IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES?
- Crime is considered an outrage against the peace and security of the people at large, its vindication must
also be in the name of the people
HOW MANY OFFENDED PARTY COULD THERE BE?
- Public and private offended parties
- The State, which is the public offended party
- The individual, who is the private offended party
WHY SHOULD THE COMPLAINT BE IN WRITING?
- So that the court has a basis for its decision
- To inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation to allow him to present his defense
- So that given the fallibility of human memory, nobody will forget the charge
-

TO WHOSE DECISION IS IT TO CHARGE PERSONS WHO APPEAR TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR

THE OFFENSE?
- Prosecutor
Sec. 3. Complaint defined. A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the enforcement
of the law violated.
WHAT IS A COMPLAINT?
- Sworn written statement
- Charging a person with an offense
- Subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the
law
WHO MAY FILE A COMPLAINT?
- May be filed by the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of
the law violated
WHO IS THE OFFENDED PARTY?
- Person actually injured or whose feeling is offended
- One to whom the offender is also civilly liable under Article 100 of the RPC
IF THE COMPLAINT IS NOT SWORN TO BY THE OFFENDED PARTY,
IS IT VOID?
- No, a complaint presented by a private person when not sworn to by him is not necessarily void
- The want of an oath is merely a defect in form, which doesnt affect the substantive rights of the
defendant on the merits
WHEN IS A COMPLAINT REQUIRED?
- If the offense is one which cannot be prosecuted de officio
- Offense is private in nature
- Where it pertains to those cases which need to be endorsed by specific public authorities
Sec. 4. Information defined. An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.
WHAT IS AN INFORMATION?
- Accusation in writing
- Charging a person with an offense
- Subscribed by the prosecutor
- Filed in the court
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. All criminal actions commenced by
a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor. In case of heavy work, schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of
lac of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the
Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution to prosecute the
cases, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the
criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the
end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is
revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including the guilty parties, if both alive, nor, in any case, if the
offended party has consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by any of them. If the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before
she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents or guardian,
the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.
The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the
offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness independently of her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing
so. Where the offended party, who is a minor, fails to file the complaint, her parents,
grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file the action granted to
parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be
exercised successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in the preceding
paragraph.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of the offenses
mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed
by the offended party. (5a)
The prosecution for violation of special laws shall be governed by the provisions
thereof. (n)

CAN A PROSECUTOR BE COMPELLED TO FILE A PARTICULAR

COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION?
- No
- A prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced
that he has evidence to support his allegations thereof
- May generally be not compelled by mandamus except if the prosecutor shows evident bias in filing the
information and refuses to include co-accused without justification
- But before filing of mandamus, the party must first avail himself of such other remedies such as the
filing of a motion for inclusion
- The power of prosecution is discretionary in nature
TO WHOM SHOULD ONE APPEAL A DECISION OF THE PROSECUTOR?
- The decision of the Prosecutor may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the
President of the Philippines
- The resolution of the Secretary of Justice may be appealed to the Office of the President in cases of
offenses punishable by death or reclusio perpetua
IS THE PROSECUTOR REQUIRED TO BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT IN THE TRIAL OF A
CRIMINAL CASE?
- If he is not physically present, it cannot be said that the prosecution was under his supervision and
controlas held in the case of People v. Beriales
- People v. Malinao and Bravo v. CAproceedings are valid even without the physical presence of the

fiscal who left the prosecution to the private prosecutor under his supervision and control
AFTER A CASE IS FILED IN COURT, TO WHOM SHOULD A MOTION TO DISMISS BE
ADDRESSED?
- Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction
- Whatever the disposition the prosecutor may feel would proper in the case thereafter should be properly
addressed to the consideration of the court, subject only to the limitation that the court could not impair
the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the people to due process
WHERE SHOULD A MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION BE FILED?
- should be to the trial judge and to him alone
IF THE PROSECUTOR THINKS AFTER FILING A CASE, THAT A PRIMA FACIE CASE DOES
NOT EXIST, CAN HE REFUSE TO PROSECUTE?
- No, he cannot refuse to prosecute
- He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action
- He cannot impose his opinion on court
- At most, he could file a Motion for Reinvestigation or a Motion to Withdraw Information
WHAT IS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CONTROL BY THE PROSECUTION AND
CONTROL BY THE COURT?
- Before the filing of the case in court, the prosecution has control over the followingwhat case to file,
if need be; whom to prosecute; the manner of prosecution; to conduct reinvestigation
- The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretionthe discretion of whether,
what, and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors which are best
appreciated by the prosecutors
- After the filing of the case in court, the court has control over the followingthe suspension of
arraignment; reinvestigation; prosecution by the prosecutor; dismissal or withdrawal of the case; and
downgrading of the offense or dropping of the accused even before plea; and review of the Secretarys
recommendation and reject it if there is grave abuse of discretion
WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS ON THE CONTROL OF THE COURT?
1. Prosecution is entitled to notice
2. The court must await the result of the petition for review
3. The prosecutions stand to maintain prosecution should be respected by the court
WHAT ARE THE CRIMES THAT MUST BE PROSECUTED UPON COMPLAINT OF THE
OFFENDED PARTY?
1. Adultery and concubinage
2. Seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness
3. Defamation which consists in the imputation of an offense mentioned above
WHAT IS A PRIVATE CRIME?
- Private offense which cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party
- Only to give deference to the offended party who may prefer not to file the case instead of going through
a scandal of a public trial
AFTER THE CASE FOR A PRIVATE CRIME IS FILED IN COURT, WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF
PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY?
- Will not have any effect on the prosecution of the offense
- Once a complaint has been filed in court, jurisdiction over the offense will be acquired and will continue

to be exercised by the court until the termination of the case

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE STATEMENT THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULE IS
JURISDICTIONAL?
- Complaint filed by the offended party is what starts the prosecution, without which the courts cannot
exercise their jurisdiction
- Prosecution cannot proceed without the complaint being filed by the complainant

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included
in the complaint or information. (6a)
Section 7. Name of the accused. The complaint or information must state the name
and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has been or
is known. If his name cannot be ascertained, he must be described under a fictitious
name with a statement that his true name is unknown.
If the true name of the accused is thereafter disclosed by him or appears in some
other manner to the court, such true name shall be inserted in the complaint or
information and record. (7a)
Section 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it. (8a)
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. (9a)
Section 10. Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed
or some of the essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of
the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential
element of the offense or is necessary for its identification. (10a)
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it
is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (11a)

Section 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or information must state
the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has
been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described
under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown,
the property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify
the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose properly the
offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must
cause the true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the
record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or
any name or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified,
without need of averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in
accordance with law. (12a)
Section 13. Duplicity of the offense. A complaint or information must charge but
one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.
(13a)
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its
order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon
the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19,
Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (14a)
Section 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil
action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule
111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
(16a)

CASES

VENUE
LOPEZ V. CITY JUDGE (1966)
FACTS:
-

Villasor, together with Lopez et al. entered into a contract with Lazatin for the
development and subdivision of three parcels of land belonging to said intestate estate

Lazatin then transferred his rights to the Terra Dev. Corp.

Months later, petitioner et al. filed for the rescission of said contract with the CFI QC on
account of alleged gross and willful violation of its terms

Lazatin and the company then filed before the Fiscals office of the City of Angeles a
complaint against petitioners with the crime of falsification of a private document

The fiscal filed with the court of said city an information charging the petitioners with the
crime of falsification of a private document made it appear that certain persons were the
guardians of a certain minor eventhough they werent

Petitioners filed for reinvestigation, fiscal acceded after which they moved for the
dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the city of Angeles had no jurisdiction of
the offense because said document was signed beyond the territorial limits of said city
motion to dismiss was delayed, city court had set the crim case for arraignment, the
defendants secured several postponements of the arraignment

In view of the fiscals failure to act on the motion to dismiss, petitioners moved to quash
the information on account of the court having no jurisdiction regarding the offense
charged

Complainants filed an opposition with the conformity of the city fiscal

Respondent judge denied motion to quash reset the arraignment

Hence this petition for certiorari

W/N THE CITY OF ANGELES HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE THE CASE AT BAR?

SUPREME COURT:

It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed not only
determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction (U.S. vs. Pagdayuman 5
Phil. 265). Thus, under the provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have
original jurisdiction only over criminal offenses committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction.

The crime of falsification of a private document defined and penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code
(now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) is consummated when such document is
actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such falsified document is or is not
thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was intended
Applying the above ruling to the facts before Us, it would appear that if the private document subject of
the information was falsified by the persons therein charged, the act of falsification the signing of the
document and the coetaneous intent to cause damage was committed and consummated outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles, and that whether the falsified private document was
thereafter put or not put to the illegal use for which it was intended, or was signed by the other
contracting party within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles is in no wise a material or
essential element of the crime of falsification of the private document, nor could it in any way change
the fact that the act of falsification charged was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles
City. Thus, that the City Court of Angeles has, no jurisdiction over the offense charged is beyond
question.
Respondents, however, contend that the motion to quash filed by the defendants necessarily assumes the
truth of the allegation of the information to the effect that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City and that they may not be allowed to disprove this at this early
stage of the proceedings. This is not exactly the law on the matter at present. It was the law applicable to
a demurrer now obsolete to an information. The motion to quash now provided for in Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court is manifestly broader in scope than the demurrer, as it is not limited to defects
apparent upon the face of the complaint or information but extends to issues arising out of extraneous
facts, as shown by the circumstance that, among the grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2 of said
Rule provides for former jeopardy or acquittal, extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of the
accused etc., which necessarily involve questions of fact in the determination of which a preliminary
trial is required.
In the present case, the portion of the record of the reinvestigation which was submitted to the
respondent judge for consideration in connection with the resolution of the motion to quash filed by the
defendants shows beyond question that the offense charged was committed far beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of Angeles City.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extra-ordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimate analysis,
intended to annul void proceedings; to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority
and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice.

PEOPLE V. JUDGE GROSPE AND MANUEL PARULAN

FACTS:
- Accused Manuel Parulan is an authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corporation
- He was charged with violation of BP 22 for having issued a check in favor of SM but which was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds (RTC PAMPANGA)
- Accused was also charged with estafa for having made out another check in favor of SMC in payment of
the beer he purchased, but again, such check was dishonored on account of insufficient funds
- RESPONDENT JUDGE (relied on deceit and damage): DISMISSED CASES; REASONED THAT
NONE OF THE ELEMENTS TOOK PLACE IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
1. 2 CHECKS ISSUED AT GUIGUINTO, BULACAN
2. DISHONORED BY PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANKK AT STA. MARIA BULACAN
WHICH WERE RECEIVED BY THEM FROM BPI SAN FERNADO
3. PROSECUTION: SMC DEPOSITED THE CHECKS AT THE BPI SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA
W/N VENUE WAS SUFFICIENTLY CONFERRED IN THE RTC PAMPANGA?
SUPREME COURT:

Estafa: deceit and damage essential Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory
or continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in separate
places (People vs. Yabut, supra). In this case, deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, while the
damage was inflicted in Bulacan where the cheek was dishonored by the drawee bank in that place (See
People vs. Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may, therefore, be entertained by either the Bulacan Court or the
Pampanga Court What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereat The delivery of the instrument
is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation" (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited in
People vs. Yabut, supra). For although the check was received by the SMC Sales Supervisor at
Guiguinto, Bulacan, that was not the delivery in contemplation of law to the payee, SMC
Bp 22: deceit and damage are not essential essential: knowledge on the part of the maker of the
check of the insufficiency of the funds mere issuance of check punishable In respect of the
Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is
committed by the very fact of its performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33
SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but
also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No.
L-62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the determinative factor (in
determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check". However, it is likewise true that
knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which
is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be
within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11,
1987). Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga.
JURISDICTION OR VENUE IS DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION,
WHICH ARE CONTROLLING
The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent Judge, predicated on his lack of jurisdiction,
is correctable by Certiorari. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on
the merits. Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a
petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion, which are equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction
The present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of Respondent Judge does not
place Respondent-accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will be recalled that the
questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits.

GAMBOA V. CA
FACTS:
- Benjamin Hayco, former employee of Units Optical Supply Company in its optical supply business
- In 1973, 124 complaints of estafa were filed against him by the company with the office of the city of
fiscal of manila
- After prelim. Investigation, the fiscal filed 75 cases of estafa against him before the city court of manila
for having allegedly misappropriated, misapplied, and converted the payments of the companys clients
to his own personal benefit by depositing said payments in his own name and personal account with the
Associated Banking Corp.
- A civil action for accounting (docketed as Civil Case No. 89373 of the Court of First Instance of Manila)
was likewise filed by Lu Chiong Sun, the owner of the Units Optical Supply Company, complaining that
during his hospital confinement from September 27, 1972 to October 30, 1972, private respondent
initiated discharging the business functions and prerogatives of the company. And to paint a shade of
validity to this exercise of powers, private respondent, thru fraud, deceit and machinations duped Lu
Chiong Sun into affixing his signature and thumbprint on a general power of attorney in his (private

respondent's) favor. With the use of this deed, private respondent closed the accounts of Lu Chiong Sun
with the Equitable Banking Corporation and, thereafter, opened accounts in his own name with the same
bank and with the Associated Banking Corporation.
HAYCO MOVED FOR A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION WITH PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
BEFORE CFI MANILA against petitioners and city court judges averring that the institution of the 75
cases against him was oppressive and whimsical one crime lang dapat since such actuations were
impelled by a single criminal intent
Lower court dismissed petition
CA reversed lc decision, granted the petition ordered dismissal of the 75 cases consolidate in one
info lang dapat

W/N THE BASIC ACCUSATIONS CONTAINED IN THE 75 INFORMATIONS AGAINST RESPONDENT

CONSTITUTE A SINGLE CRIME OF ESTAFA?
SUPREME COURT: NO
In the case before Us, the daily abstractions from and diversions of private respondent of the deposits made by
the customers of the optical supply company from October 2, 1972 to December 30, 1972, excluding Saturdays
and Sundays, which We assume ex hypothesi, cannot be considered as proceeding from a single criminal act
within the meaning of Article 48. The abstractions were not made at the same time and on the same occasion,
but on variable dates. Each day of conversion constitutes a single act with an independent existence and
criminal intent of its own. All the conversions are not the product of a consolidated or united criminal
resolution, because each conversion is a complete act by itself. Specifically, the abstractions and the
accompanying deposits thereof in the personal accounts of private respondent cannot be similarly viewed as
"continuous crime". In the above formulation of Cuello Calon, We cannot consider a defalcation on a certain
day as merely constitutive of partial execution of estafa under Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised Penal Code.
As earlier pointed out, an individual abstraction or misappropriation results in a complete execution or
consummation of the delictual act of defalcation. Private respondent cannot be held to have entertained
continously the same criminal intent in making the first abstraction on October 2, 1972 for the subsequent
abstractions on the following days and months until December 30, 1972, for the simple reason that he was not
possessed of any fore-knowledge of any deposit by any customer on any day or occasion and which would pass
on to his possession and control. At most, his intent to misappropriate may arise only when he comes in
possession of the deposits on each business day but not in futuro, since petitioner company operates only on a
day-to-day transaction. As a result, there could be as many acts of misappropriation as there are times the
private respondent abstracted and/or diverted the deposits to his own personal use and benefit. Thus, it may be
said that the City Fiscal had acted properly when he filed only one information for every single day of
abstraction and bank deposit made by private respondent.
The characterization or description of estafa as a continuing offense cannot be validly seized upon by private
respondent as basis for its inference that the acts of abstraction in question constitute but a single continuing
crime of estafa. The sole import of this characterization is that the necessary elements of estafa may separately
take place in different territorial jurisdictions until the crime itself is consummated. The moment, however, that
the elements of the crime have completely concurred or transpired, then an individual crime of estafa has
occurred or has been consummated. The term "continuing" here must be understood in the sense similar to that
of "transitory" and is only intended as a factor in determining the proper venue or jurisdiction for that matter of
the criminal action pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. This is so, because "a person charged
with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is part committed. In transitory or
continuing offense in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation
occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the other."
IBASCO V. CA & PEOPLE

property is across the sea lol

FACTS:
- Ibasco was charge with violation of BP 22 with RTC Gumaca, Quezon for having issued three postdated checks in favor of Manuel Trivinio for payment for feeds purchased fom the latter despite
knowing that he had insufficient funds
- The original records of the aforementioned criminal cases show that after the presentation of the
evidence for both parties had been concluded, the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
- However, before submitting his memorandum, the petitioner's new counsel filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction since, it is claimed, the checks were "prepared, issued and delivered to
the payee ... at the office of the accused in Daet, Camarines Norte." denied checks were delivered
at the Trivinios residence at Gumaca
- Petitioner appealed to the CA denied gave credence to Trivinios testimony (delivery at
Gumaca) cited Grospe
- 1995 SC Resolution petition denied but was later reinstated, Court askedd for comments
SUPREME COURT: CONVICTION SUSTAINED
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is in the nature of a continuing crime. Venue is determined by the place
where the elements of making, issuing, or drawing of the check and delivery thereof are
committed. Thus, as explained in People vs. Yabut, "[t]he theory is that a person indicted with a
transitory offense may be validly tried in any Jurisdiction where the offense was in part
committed. x x x The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not
necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive
importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act
essential to its consummation as an obligation."

In her testimony, Maria Negro categorically stated that the three checks were delivered by the petitioner
to their residence in Gumaca, Quezon, their place of business.
It is well-settled in criminal jurisprudence that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the appellate
court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court considering it was in a better position to settle such
issue. Indeed, the trial court has the advantage of hearing the witness and observing his conduct during trial,
circumstances which carry a great weight in appreciating his credibility.
The case of Magno is inapplicable to him. The material operative facts therein obtaining are different from
those established in the instant petition. In Magno, the bounced checks were issued to cover a "warranty
deposit" in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It was a modus
operandi whereby the supplier of the goods is also able to sell or lease the same goods at the same time
privately financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the check thus
becomes an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker
did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to
cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value. Also, in Magno, the payee in the former was made
aware of the insufficiency of the funds prior to the issuance of the checks.
Case of Co also inapplicable. Ibasco issued the questioned checks on account of a pre-existing
obligation (1) The checks were issued after all deliveries were made at such time when the petitioner's
obligation was already in existence; (2) The sum of the checks equalled the petitioner's total obligation in the
amount of P51,566.40; (3) The petitioner prepared a statement of account, where the checks issued were applied
to his accounts due to Manuel Trivinio; (4) The act of the petitioner in issuing three checks of different dates is

inconsistent to his claim that Manuel Trivinio requested a post-dated check to show to his creditors; and (5)
After the checks bounced, the petitioner offered a property for its replacement. (OBVIOSLY PAYMENT FOR
VALUE, NOT MERELY AN ACCOMODATION)
ISIP V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
- Manuel Isip was charged with estafa before the RTC Cavite City
- It was alleged that he received from Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat diamond (mens ring), valued
at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of
the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold, on or before March 15, 1984, but the herein accused
once in possession of the above-described articles, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of
confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert the same to his own personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made by
Leonardo A. Jose for the return of the jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to
do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated amount of
P200,000.00, Philippine Currency
- His wife was also indicted before the same court for 7 counts of violation of BP 22 on account issuing
checks in favor of Jose despite knowledge of insufficiency of funds for payment for assorted pieces of
jewelry
- Jointly, the pouses were also charged with five counts of estafa
- IMPORTANT PLACES
1. At complainants residence in Cavite City, spouses received jewelry
2. Jose had residence at Ermita
3. Spouses had a place in Sta. Mesa they had transactions daw sa condo ni Jose in Ermita
- RTC: GUILTY transactions were sufficiently shown to have taken place in Cavite
- CA: affirmed lc decision with modification amended, Manuel was acquitted in one case
SUPREME COURT:
RE: ISSUE OF JURISDICTION In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are
convinced that the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had sufficiently shown
that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when
he was on approved leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that venue was
properly laid, it is now petitioners task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction involved was
entered into in Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations applies.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the transaction
happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience
alone unerringly suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded. The fact that
Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen
there. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can
sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner
and his wife to have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they
received pieces of jewelry from complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioners late wife
in all the transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts with banks in Manila or Makati likewise
cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions were not entered into in Cavite City.
RE: RECEIPT OF THE RING: Manuels defenses were untenable; belied by the testimony of his late wife
RE: EXTINGUISHMENTT OF CRIM. LIABLITY BECAUSE OF NOVATION The claim of petitioner

that the personal and real properties conveyed to complainant and/or to his family were more than sufficient to
cover or offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred has no basis. If it were true that the
properties delivered to complainant were sufficient, the latter would have caused the dismissal of all, not some
as in this instance, the cases against petitioner and his late wife. This, complainant did not do for the simple
reason that the properties conveyed to him were not enough to cover all the obligations incurred by petitioner
and his deceased wife. Complainant testified that the properties he received were in settlement of cases other
than the cases being tried herein.

COMPLAINT & INFORMATION

WITH WHOM, BY WHOM, AND AGAINST WHOM, FILED
DEL ROSARIO V. VDA. DE MERCADO
FACTS:
- W/N A WIDOW MAY BE CONSIDERED AS AN OFFENDED PARTY WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE APPLICABLE RULES OF COURT PROVISION, ENTITLED TO FLE A COMPLAINT FOR THE
MURDER OF HER HUSBAND? CFI LA UNION JUDGE FLORES SAID NO.
- The case herein is a petition for habeas corpus by petitioners on account of their alleged arbitrary and
unlawful confinement in the municipal jail lower court granted this
- Hence, this petition
SUPREME COURT:
It may well be that the indivisibility that was once thought to be an inherent attribute in a marital union is now
subject to qualifications. As human beings, husband and wife, individually, have rights, in certain cases even as
against each other. Hence, much we may postulate their separate identities, we cannot go so far as to hold that
the death of either does not vitally affect the interest of the survivor, sufficient in law if such death arose from a
criminal offense to give her the character of an offended party. To view it otherwise would be an affront to
reason. That is precisely one instance where the unity that marks the relationship of husband and wife calls for
the most emphatic affirmation.
More specifically, in the case before us, the injury to the widow cannot be disputed. Her right to consortium was
definitely put an end to. The loss of the material support to which she was entitled was equally evident. The
suffering she had to endure then as the survivor of the tragedy was unavoidable even if time could thereafter be
trusted to assuage the pain. It would show less than full regard then for the realities of the situation not to
reconsider her an offended party within the meaning of the Rules of Court provision. Certainly, it is not to be
interpreted in a manner that defies both logic and common sense, not to mention the deeply felt sentiment
associated with the relationship of such a close intimacy that unity rather than divisiveness is its distinctive
characteristic.
- Accused was a member of the police force
- No criminal complaint was filed before or after his death by the PC or the Chief of Police
FRANCISCO V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
- Eliseo Francisco was charged with estafa
- Petitioner Francisco was an employee of Bankard at the time the alleged crime occurred. He was
knowledgeable in computer programming, and held the position of Acquiring Chargeback Supervisor

was tasked to convert the Equicom reports sent through electronic mail from its original ARJ Text
Format to the Amipro Format used by Bankard. Petitioner Francisco was the only one assigned to
perform this task
Solidbank, one of the companies which issues credit cards, relayed to Bankard that there were four
questionable transactions reflected in Solidbank Mastercard Account No. 5464 9833 0005 1922 under
the name of petitioner Francisco
As a result of the fraudulent crediting of the amount of P663,144.56 to petitioner Franciscos Solidbank
credit card account, Bankard was made to pay the same to Solidbank in the course of the settlement of
transactions between the issuing banks from the time of the crediting of the amount to petitioner
Franciscos credit card account until the fraudulent credits were charged back to Solidbank on 27 August
1999. Solidbank again charged back Bankard for the said amount, from 4 September 1999 to 3 October
1999. Thus, during the time the amount was charged against Bankard, the latter was unable to use such
amount. Bankard was unable to recover the amount of P18,430.21 which petitioner Francisco
fraudulently credited to his AIG Visa Card
TC: GUILTY
CA: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION
Petitioner Francisco argues that the prosecution failed to present evidence that he was privy to the
business deal between Bankard and the credit card companies (Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa).

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED ORDER AND DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG
CITY, BRANCH 267, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF AN ELEMENT IN THE CRIME CHARGED FOR WHICH
PETITIONER WAS INDICTED?
SUPREME COURT: NO
The third element of estafa under Article 315(a) merely requires that the offended party must have relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. It does not require that the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means be intentionally directed to the offended party. Thus, in this case wherein a person pretended
to possess credit in order to defraud third persons (Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa), but the offended party
nevertheless relied on such fraudulent means and consequently suffered damage by virtue thereof, such person
is liable for estafa under Article 315(a), even though the fraudulent means was not intentionally directed to the
offended party. A person committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious act
are not intended by him.
In any case, the prosecution has successfully proven damage on the part of private complainant Bankard.
Petitioner Francisco further argues that Bankard had no personality to file the complaint, since the credit card
companies were the ones which really suffered damage in the case at bar. Thus, argued petitioner Francisco,
the third element of estafa under Article 315(a) was lacking: Stated otherwise, this element speaks of an
offended party which undoubtedly may only refer to Solidbank Mastercard and AIG Visa simply because it was
these two credit card companies that extended credit facilities to herein petitioner when the latter used his
credit cards.--> UNTENABLE
1. BANKARD ALSO SUFFERED DAMAGES
2. IT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR EITHER SOLIDBAN OR AIG VISA TO HAVE FILED THE
COMPLAINT Except in cases that cannot be prosecuted de officio, namely adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness,a complaint filed by the offended party is not necessary
for the institution of a criminal action. The Information filed by the prosecutor with the proper court is
sufficient.
-

A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of the People of the

Philippines. The participation of the private offended party is not essential to the prosecution of crimes,
except in the crimes stated above, or in the prosecution of the civil action deemed instituted with the
criminal action. A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor need not be
filed by the "offended party" but may be filed by any competent person, unless the offense subject
thereof cannot be prosecuted de oficio

BY WHOM PROSECUTED
BAGATUA V. REVILLA
FACTS:
-

A certain lot , now part of an estate, was originally owned by Bagatua

When he died, his wife executed a settlement of estate and donation of real property in favor of their
children

The children decided to subdivided the lot among themselves and enlisted the help of Pangilinan, a real
estate broker

In 1954, the Bagatuas together with their mother executed a public document stating that they sold and
conveyed ownership unto Pangilinan a part of said lot

Two years later, one of the children, acting on behalf of his sisters, accused Pangilinan of estafa with the
city attorney of QC for allegedly inducing them to sign papers putatively essential to the subdivision of
said lot

After the prelim. Investigation, the assistant city attorney, in a memo addressed to the city attorney,
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lac of merit granted

Complainants filed a mandamus with CFI quezon city seeing to compel the city attorney and asst. city
attorney to file the complaint respondents filed a mtion to dismiss, prosecutors job is not ministerial

CFI: SUSTAINED MOTION TO DISMISS; NO SHOWING THAT SAID PUBLIC OFFICIALS

ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION

Hence, respondent filed this petition

SUPREME COURT
Section 28-(h) of Republic Act No. 537, known as the Revised Charter of Quezon City, prescribes that:
(h) He (the City Attorney) shall cause to be investigated shall charges of crimes, misdemeanors,
and violations of ordinances and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made
against the persons accused. He or any of his Assistants may conduct such investigations by
taking oral evidence of reputable witnesses, and for this purpose may issue subpoena, summon
witnesses to appear and testify under oath before him
The Rules of Court also specifically provide that all criminal actions, either commenced by complaint or

information, shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal (Section 4, Rule 106, Rules of
Court), and from these legal mandates springs the principle that where the fiscal, after conducting a preliminary
investigation is convinced that the evidence is insufficient to establish, at least prima facie, the guilt of the
accused, he has the perfect authority to dismiss the same.
Under the aforesaid ruling, the fiscal or the city attorney, as prosecuting officer, is under no compulsion to file
the corresponding information based upon a complaint, where he is not convince that the evidence gathered or
presented would warrant the filing of an action in court. It is true that this authority involves the exercise of
discretion to a wide latitude and while it may invite the commission of abuses, yet it must also be recognized
that necessity demands that prosecuting officers should be given such authority if we are to avoid the courts
from being flooded with cases of doubtful merit or to unduly compel the fiscals to work against their
convictions.

ABELA V. HON. GOLEZ

FACTS:
-

Almabis filed with office of the fiscal Roxas City a coplaint for estafa against Anisco

After preliminary investigation, petitioner Abela dismissed the complaint for lack of merit

Almabis then filed an action for mandamus in the CFI Roxas City against Abela

Judge Golez issued such writ and compelled Abela to file the proper action for estafa

Hence, this petition

SUPREME COURT:
There is merit in the appeal. The public prosecutor is entitled to use his judgment and
discretion in the appreciation of evidence presented to him and, in the exercise
thereof, he may not be controlled by mandamus. Whether an information should be
filed in court is a matter address to the sound discretion of the fiscal according to
whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the fiscal can not be compelled to act in a distinct manner whether to
prosecute or not to prosecute and, instead, is allowed to stand on his opinion and conviction,
"reserving only to the Secretary, in any appropriate case when the latter believes public interest
impels that a different course of action should be taken, to temporarily relieve the fiscal of the
duty to act by designating somebody else to take his place solely and only for the purpose of
such particular case. ... Under Sections 1679 and 1689 of the Revised Administrative Code, in
any instance where a provincial or city fiscal fails, refuses or is unable, for any reason, to
investigate or prosecute a case and, in the opinion of the Secretary of Justice it is advisable in
the public interest to take a different course of action, the Secretary may either appoint as acting
provincial or city fiscal, to handle the investigation or prosecution exclusively and only for such
case, any practicing attorney or some competent officer of the Department of Justice or office of
any city or provincial fiscal, with complete authority to act therein in all respects as if he were the
provincial or city fiscal himself, or appoint any lawyer in the government service or not in the

government service, temporarily to assist such city or provincial fiscal in the discharge of his
duties, with the same complete authority to act independently of and for such city or provincial
fiscal, provided that no such appointment may be made without first hearing the fiscal concerned
and never after the corresponding information has already been filed with the court by the
corresponding city or provincial fiscal without the conformity of the latter, except when it can be
patently shown to the court having cognizance of the case that said fiscal is intent on prejudicing
the interest of justice. The same sphere of authority is true with the prosecutor directed and
authorized under Section 3 of Republic Act 3783, as amended and/or inserted by Republic Act
5184." (Estrella vs. Orendain Jr., 37 SCRA 640)
However, the matter of instituting an information should be distinguished from a motion by the
fiscal for the dismissal of a case already filed in court. The judge may properly deny the motion
where, judging from the record of the preliminary investigation, there appears to be sufficient
evidence to sustain the prosecution. This is, as it should be, because the case is already in court
and, therefore, within its discretion and control.
REMEDIES FOR COMPLAINANT IF FISCAL REFUSES OR FAILS TO FILE AN INFO:
-

the offended party may take up the matter with the Secretary of Justice who
may then take such measures as may be necessary in the interest of justice
under Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code

also file with the proper authorities or courts criminal and administrative
charges against the prosecuting officer

BERNABE V. BOLINAS
FACTS:

Estelita Bernabe, wife of Sedesias del Castillo, who died of injuries inflicted on his person
on the night of November 25, 1962, filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo (Civil Case No. 6323), seeking to compel the respondent Provincial Fiscal
of Iloilo to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 9624 of the same court, from
homicide to murder, with aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle. (filed when
case was remanded to the lower courts and widow filed for a motion for reinvestigation
fiscal reproduced the complaint for homicide IT HAPPENED DURING THE NIGHT DAW ASI,
the supposed witnesses could not have seen, as they alleged to have seen, the striking of
the head and stabbing of the neck of the victim by the accused

Respondents moved for the dismissal of the mandamus case. It was their contention that
from the affidavits of the witnesses for the government, there was no treachery attending
the stabbing and killing of the victim, for which reason they found that the offense
committed was only homicide.

SUPREME COURT:

With regard to the other issue of the propriety of the remedy of mandamus, it may be true that,
as appellees aver, it is a relief for official inaction. It is claimed that with the filing of the
information for homicide, appellees have already performed their duty and, therefore, there is no
cause of action against them. It must be remembered, however, that a prosecuting officer
is sworn, under his oath of office, not merely to file charges against an accused, but
to file the corresponding complaint or information in accordance with the facts and/or
evidence obtaining in a case. Considering the circumstances stated above, there was created
and imposed upon herein respondents-appellees a legal duty to file the information which, in
view of the declarations of the alleged eyewitnesses, should be for murder. Clearly, their failure
to do so rendered the respondents Fiscals subject to the writ of mandamus.

NOTE: The Court opined that the charge should be murder, and not homicide The supposed
eyewitnesses, Virgilio Palencia, Risalino Patanao, and Fernando Castromayor, unanimously
declared under oath that after the deceased was bumped, in all appearances, intentionally, by
the jeep in which the accused was riding, the latter jumped off the vehicle, struck Sedesias on
the head while prostrate on the ground, and then stabbed him twice in the neck. Under the
situation as declared by these witnesses, there can hardly be any doubt as to the helpless
condition of the victim when he received the injuries which caused his death. The fact that he
had seen the coming of the vehicle does not justify the conclusion that he could have been
prepared for the attack by the accused. The fact that the victim was bumped by the jeep seems
to indicate that he was not anticipating that he would be bumped or hit by it much less that
while he was lying on the ground, somebody would come around and inflict injuries on him.

PEOPLE V. LIGGAYU
THE PROSECUTION SHALL BE "UNDER THE DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF THE FISCAL"

FACTS:

Context: appeal by the offended parties from an order of dismissal of the case as against
Roy Franco

Member of the police force first charged Liggayu with homicide through reckless
imprudence for having run over and killed de Dyogi

Two weeks later, the husband of the victim, filed another complaint, charging Liggayu and
Franco

Justice of the peace Caloocan after prelim. Investigation remanded said case to the CFI

When the case reached the Court of First Instance, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the

case as against the accused Roy Franco granted

SUPREME COURT
There is no room for doubt that while General Orders No. 58 was in force, it was the right of the
offended party to be notified of the proceedings, including those on a motion of dismissal as to
one of the accused. To this effect are decisions of this Court in cases brought before the new
Rules took effect, like the case of People vs. Bataller, supra.
The situation seems to have been changed, however, because of the clear change in
the law. The right to appeal from an order of dismissal granted by the court on motion of the
fiscal may now be challenged under the theory that the right of an offended party to intervene is
subject to the fiscal's right of control. To permit an offended party to appeal from an order
dismissing a criminal case upon petition of the fiscal would be tantamount to giving said party as
much right to the direction and control of a criminal proceeding as that of the fiscal.
As a necessary corollary to this provision, we laid down the principle that even if the
offense is one where civil indemnity might rightly be claimed, if the criminal action is
dismissed by the court, on motion of the fiscal, on the ground of insufficiency of the
evidence, the offended party cannot appeal from the order of dismissal because
otherwise the prosecution of the offense would, in the last analysis, be thrown
beyond the direction and control of the fiscal.
However, appellants' objection is not directed against the unreasonableness of the fiscal's
decision or opinion on the evidence, but against the supposed absence of notice to the offended
party of the motion for dismissal, a technical unsubstantial objection. As the fiscal made an
actual investigation and, thereafter, decided that there was no sufficient evidence against Roy
Franco, notification of his motion to dismiss to the offended party would have served no purpose
and would be mere idle ceremony, as the fiscal is supposed to have direct control. The decision
of the fiscal that the evidence against the other accused is insufficient is not appealable, under
the doctrines pointed out in the cases of People vs. Lipana and People vs. Florendo, supra, as
inconsistent with the fiscal's control of the criminal action . (THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY STILL
INTERVENE, BUT SUCH IS NOW SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL OF THE FISCAL (RULE 106, SEC. 15)

STA. ROSA MINING CO. V. ASST. PROVINCIAL FISCAL ZABALA

FACTS:
-

Petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of scrap iron forming part of the

installations on its mining property against Garrido and Alapan with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Cam Norte

The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary
investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated August
26, 1974 recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed against private
respondents on a finding of prima facie case which resolution was approved by Provincial
Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. Private respondents sought reconsideration of the resolution but the
same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated October 14, 1974.

On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte
an Information dated October 17, 1987 docketed as Criminal Case No. 821, charging
private respondents with the crime of Attempted Theft.

In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents requested the Secretary of
Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated August 26,
1974 and October 14, 1974.

On November 6, 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal by telegram
to "Please elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido et al., review in five days
and defer all proceedings pending review."

The letter-request for review was opposed by petitioner in a letter to the Secretary of
Justice dated November 23, 1974 alleging, among other things, that an information for
Attempted Theft had already been filed against private respondents for which reason the
request for review has become a moot question as the Provincial Fiscal has lost jurisdiction
to dismiss the charge for attempted theft.

On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the
findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to
immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner sought reconsideration
of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the same in a letter dated
June 11, 1975.

A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but
the court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie evidence against
private respondents and set the case for trial on February 25, 1976.

Private respondents sought reconsideration of the court's ruling DENIED. Thereafter,

Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First Instance of Albay and respondent
Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte.

On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case DENIED
Whereupon, respondent fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case and
disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein.

Hence, this petition for mandamus.

SUPREME COURT:

After the case had already been filed in court, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without the
consent of the court, to dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending
further proceedings. The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court."
However, the matter of instituting an information should be distinguished from a motion by the
fiscal for the dismissal of a case already filed in court. The judge may properly deny the motion
where, judging from the record of the preliminary investigation, there appears to be sufficient
evidence to sustain the prosecution. This is, as it should be, because the case is already in court
and, therefore, within its discretion and control (Abela vs. Golez, 131 SCRA 12).
In the case at bar, the court below denied the fiscal's motion to dismiss on the ground
that there was a prima faciecase against private respondents. The question
presented for determination now is-after a case has been filed in court, can a fiscal
be compelled to prosecute the same, after his motion to dismiss it has been denied?
THE WRIT PRAYED FOR SHOULD ISSUE. Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the
fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to enable the court to arrive
at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not shirk
from his responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a private
prosecutor. At all times, the criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and control
(Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Otherwise, the entire proceedings wig be null and void (People
vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361). In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public
prosecutor to appear for the government since an offense is an outrage to the
sovereignty of the State."
The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the records of the case, directed
the prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed
pursuant to said directive is denied by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the
fiscal to prosecute the case HE IS OBLIGED BY LAW TO PROCEED AND PROSECUTE THE
CRIMINAL ACTION.

TAN, JR v GALLARDO
FACTS
- Solicitor General Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia Simpio-Diy and Solicitor
Eduardo L. Kilayko for respondents.
- Estanisloo A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro & Associate as private prosecutors.
- petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in the Criminal Case People of the
Philippines v Jorge Tan, Jr, Cesar Tan, Teofanis Bondoc, Osmundo Tolentino, Mariano Bartido and
Librado Sode for frustrated murder and Double Murder of the son and uncle of Mayor Inigo Larazzabal
- Judge Pedro Gallardo made the two life sentences to death penalty allegedly after meeting with Mayor
Larazzabal and receipt of other paraphernalia such as whisky and wine according to the court
stenographer
- Jan 14, 1976 - SolGen, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the
petition. They are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's
decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and
prejudice therefore, they interpose no objection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases
"for the rendition of a new decision by another trial judge."

Jan 30, 1976 - private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of
the respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case.
Feb 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the
"Comment" of the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the
instant proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence, without any personality to have any paper
of his entertained by this Tribunal
private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take part in the
proceedings, and to adapt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General.

ISSUES
1. WON private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt
a stand inconsistent with that of the latter
2. WON respondent Judge should be disqualified from further proceeding with the criminal cases
HELD
1. NO
- Ratio Private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and take a position inconsistent with that of
the Solicitor General.
- Reasoning
- Participation of the private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution
of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and
pleadings that may be required by this Court."
- To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never intended that the
private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the
Solicitor General.
- Since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the
representatives of the State should direct and control the prosecution.
o Suarez v Platon: the prosecuting officer "'is the representative not of, an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall he done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one."
o People v Esquivel: that there is an absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the
court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying
contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind
may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape
unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and
to the state."
- It is for the purpose of realizing the aforementioned objectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed
under the direction, control, and responsibility of the prosecuting officer.
- Role of the private prosecutors is to represent the offended party with respect to the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. This civil action is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil action or reserves to institute
it separately. Thus, "an offended party may intervene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney,
specially in case of offenses which cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party The
only exception to this is when the offended party waives his right to civil action or expressly reserves his
right to institute it after the termination of the case, in which case he lost his right to intervene upon the

theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. in any event, whether an offended
party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the
direction and control of the prosecuting official."
o Herrero v Diaz: "intervention of the offended party or his attorney is authorized by section 15 of
Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that all
criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the Fiscal."
- The position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that of the promotor fiscal because, as the
promotor fiscal alone is authorized to represent the public prosecution, or the People of the Philippine
Islands, in the prosecution of offenders, and to control the proceeding, and as it is discretionary with him
to institute and prosecute a criminal proceeding, being at liberty to commence it or not or to refrain from
prosecuting it or not, depending upon whether or not there is, in his opinion, sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, except when the case is pending in the
Court of First Instance, the continuation of the offended party's intervention depends upon the
continuation of the proceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from pressing the charge or
asks the competent Court of First Instance in which the case is pending for the dismissal thereof, and
said court grants the petition, the intervention of the person injured by the commission of the offense
ceases by virtue of the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Consequently, as the offended
party is not entitled to represent the People of the Philippine Islands in the prosecution of a public
offense, or to control the proceeding once it is commenced, and as his right to intervene therein is
subject to the promotor fiscal's right of control, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed
upon petition of the promoter fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his right to appeal from an
order overrruling a complaint or information, which right belongs exclusively to the promotor fiscal by
virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General Orders, No. 58. To permit a person injured by the
commission of an offense to appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First
Instance upon petition of the promoter fiscal, would be tantamount to giving said offended party of the
direction and control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the provisions of the above-cited section
107 of General Orders, No. 58.
- from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not
provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.
- Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings pending
either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the
Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General", provides:
SECTION 1. Function and Organization, (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. * * * The office of
the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(a) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the party.
(k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or
commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion, affects the welfare
of the people as the ends of justice may require. It is evident, therefore, that since the
Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the People of the Philippines
the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be
allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be
tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal proceedings,
contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.
2. It is already moot because the judge is no longer in the judicial service

DISPOSITION SC grants the petition and hereby remands the case to the trial court in order that another Judge
may hear anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence

FORM AND CONSTITUENT ALLEGATIONS

Section 9. Bill of particulars. The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the
alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired. (10a)
-

A defendant in a criminal case who believes that he is not sufficiently informed of

the crime with which he is charged and is not in a position to defend himself properly and
adequately could move for a bill of particulars or specifications

It is to allow the accused to prepare for his defense

The accused must move for a bill of particulars before arraignment, otherwise, the right is
deemed waived

It should specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details
desired

US V. LIM SAN

FACTS:
-

Lim San was convicted of the crime of attempted murder in the CFI Manila for having
assaulted Keng Kin with a bolo and inflicting upon him several wounds;

The witnesses revealed that the victim was just standing outside the limits of the street
with his dog, when Lim San suddenly leaped upon him with his bolo and committed the
acts complained of

Said crime was committed during the night; and the place where it happened was only
illuminated by a lamp suspended from the ceiling of a tienda directly across the street

SUPREME COURT:
-

THE CRIME IN THE CASE HEREIN IS NOT ATTEMPTED MURDER, RATHER, IT IS

FRUSTRATED MURDER
o

In the case at bar it appears clearly that the defendant believed that he had
performed all of the acts necessary to consummate the crime of murder, and,

therefore, of his own will, desisted from striking further blows. He believed that he
had killed Keng Kin. Death did not result for reasons entirely apart from the will of
the accused. This surely stamps the crime as frustrated murder.
o

the information in his case even reads, that the said accused then and there
performed all of the acts of execution which should constitute the crime of
assassination, but which did not constitute said crime by reason of the fact that
though said wounds were intended by the said accused to cause the death of the
said Keng Kin..

THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CRIME BY THE FISCALIN THE CAPTION OF

THE INFORMATION IS IMMATERIAL AND PURPOSELESS, AND THAT THE
FACTS STATED IN THE BODY OF THE PLEADING MUST DETERMINE THE
CRIME OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT STANDS CHARGED AND FOR WHICH HE
MUST BE TRIED

The defendant must his direct his attention to and should be most
interested to the facts alleged THE REAL QUESTION IS NOT DID HE COMMIT A
CRIME GIVEN IN THE LAW SOME TECHNICAL AND SPECIFIC NAME, BUT DID HE
PERFORM THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE BODY OF THE INFORMATION IN THE MANNER
THEREIN SET FORTH. IF HE DID, IT IS OF NO CONSEQUENCE TO HIM, EITHER AS A
MATTER OF PROCEDURE OR OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT, HOW THE LAW DENOMINATES
THE CRIME WHICH THOSE ACTS CONSTITUTE. THE DESIGNATION OF THE CRIME BY
NAME IN THE CAPTION OF THE INFORMATION FROM THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE
BODY OF THAT PLEADING IS A CONCLUSION OF LAW MADE BY THE FISCAL.

The issues raised by the pleadings in criminal actions, as well as in civil, are
primarily and really issues of fact and not of law. The issue to be tried in all criminal
cases should be one of fact, raised by the allegation of certain facts in the
information and a denial of those facts by the plea of not guilty on the part of the
defendant. There is no more reason why the defendant should be allowed to take
advantage of a misnomer of the action where the people are prosecuting than when
assailed civilly by a private individual.

The duty of the fiscal in framing an information is limited to a statement of the facts
which the accused has performed and the manner in which he performed them. It is
no part of his duties to give a technical name to the crime which is born of the facts
set forth, or draw an inference or conclusion as to how the courts will or will not
denominate the crime described by the facts. If the fiscal denominate or
characterize the crime and if that denomination binds the court, as it always does
under the doctrine were are criticizing, then it is clear that the fiscal has, by such
act, usurped the function of the court, inasmuch as he has thereby irrevocably
decided by his own fiat of what crime, if any, the defendant shall be convicted. This
is not only performing duties ministerial, but legislative and judicial as well.

US V. STARKS

PEOPLE v. TEVES
July 20, 1999 | Davide, C.J. | Automatic Review | Complaint and Information Form and Constituent
Allegations
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Godofredo Teves
SUMMARY: Godofredo Teves was charged with multiple rape of his 13 yr. old daughter. Four
informations of rape were filed against him with the accusatory portion for each informations containing
the same charge with the date as the only difference. His daughter, Cherry, narrated on the witness
stand the different instances when his father took advantage of her. Godofredo relied his defense to
rebut such narration on alibi and denial. The court convicted the accused of simple rape on two of the
cases filed against the latter but acquitted him on the other two due to the fact that it was not
corroborated by Cherrys testimony. The court, however, did not appreciate the qualifying circumstances
of minority and relationship to make the felony one of qualified rape since they were not alleged in the
information. Hence, the offense was that of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
DOCTRINE: For the qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, it must have been specifically pleaded in
the information. This is in conformity with the rule that the Constitution guarantees the right of every
person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation
against him.
FACTS:
1. Cherry Rose Teves filed complaint against
his father for multiple counts of rape
committed against her. These were
allegedly committed since 1993 up to the
1st, 3rd and 8th day of January 1995.
2. The provincial prosecutor of Cavite filed
four separate informations of rape against
Godofredo. Except for the dates, the
accusatory portions of the informations
were similar which emphasizes that
Godofredo take undue advantage over
the person of his own daughter who is
only thirteen years old.
3. The four cases were consolidated and
jointly tried. Upon arraignment, Godofredo
pleaded not guilty.
4. As his defense, Godofredo relied solely on
the basis of alibi and denial stating that
the testimony of his daughter is hollow
and totally unworthy of belief.
5. Cherry testified that on the day before
New Year of 1995 her father touched her
breast. On that same day she was raped
by her father. A week after that she was
also raped by her father while she was
taking a bath by asking her to pass the
tabo. And on another occasion she was
was raped by her father after asking her
brother to buy cigarettes. She testified
that her mother was a laundrywoman and
was away during those instances that her
father took advantage of her.
6. The trial court applied Sec. 335 of RPC as

amended by Sec. 11 of RA 7659 which

imposes death penalty when the victim is
below 18 yrs of age (she is only 13 yrs old
at that time) and the accused is the
parent.
7. Godofredo
contend
that
Cherrys
testimony
contained
uncertain
and
conflicting answers: 1) She failed to recall
the exact date and details of the rape
instances; 2) The testimony did not prove
force and intimidation; 3) The evidence
was purely speculative and conjectural; 4)
there is unreasonable delay in the filing of
the complaint (2 years).
ISSUE/S: (Main Issue in class is Issue #7)
1. WON Cherrys testimony is credible? YES
2. WON inconsistencies in tstimony weaken the
Case? NO
3. WON forcible carnal knowledge is proven?
YES
4. WON the delay in instituting the criminal
charge gives doubt to the guild of Godofredo?
NO
5. WON there is ill motive in the charge? NO
6. WON all the charges were sufficiently proven?
NO
7. WON death penalty is properly imposed? - NO
RULING: CA decision is REVERSED for Criminal
Cases 3872-95 and 3874-95 and accused is
ACQUITTED therein, and MODIFIED as to Criminal
Cases 3873-95 and 3875-95. As modified, said
accused is found GUILTY of the crime of rape and

sentenced to suffer penalty of reclusion perpetua.

RATIO:
1. When the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, appellate courts will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court,
considering that the latter is in a better
position to decide the question as it heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during
trial. The exceptions to the rule are when such
evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstance of
weight and substance which could affect the
result of the case. We sustain the trial courts
ruling as to the credibility of CHERRY and find
that
GODOFREDO
miserably
failed
to
demonstrate the existence of any of the
exceptions. Our review of CHERRYs testimony
has us fully convinced of her sincerity, candor
and truthfulness as to the fact of rape, to the
extent that the only issue to be resolved is the
number of times she was raped.
2. What must be borne in mind was that she was
merely fourteen (14) years old when she
testified; moreover, GODOFREDO did not
object to her testimony as to the time of the
commission of the crime. It is settled that the
precise time of the commission of rape is not
an essential element of the crime. We cannot
reasonably expect her to recount in detail her
humiliating experience since the accused is of
her own flesh and blood. The natural
vacillation of a daughter to publicly denounce
her father and to testify in an unfamiliar and
unfriendly environment on such a delicate
matter very well explain the minor lapses in
her testimony. We find no iota of evidence
showing that CHERRYs account was a result of
deliberate falsehood. Settled is the rule that
discrepancies and inconsistencies on minor
matters do not impair the essential integrity of
the prosecutions evidence as a whole nor
reflect
on
the
witness
honesty. Such
inconsistencies, which may be caused by the
natural fickleness of the memory, even tend to
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility
of the witness because they erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony.
3. In a rape committed by a father against his
daughter, the moral dominance and parental
influence that essentially flows from the
reverence and respect a child has toward their
parents which are ingrained and observed in
the minds of the Filipino children, substitute for
force
and
intimidation,
which
produce
reasonable fear in the child.
4. The delay in instituting the present criminal
prosecution likewise does not engender doubt
as to GODOFREDOs guilt, in light of the

established fact that CHERRY kept silent about

the incident because of GODOFREDOs death
threat. CHERRY, a young barrio lass and with a
simple and unsophisticated mind, cannot be
expected to have the fortitude and courage of
an adult, mature and experienced woman who
may
disregard
the
threat
and,
with
promptitude, condemn in the open the
shameful scandal wrought upon her by her
very own father. It is not uncommon that
young girls usually conceal for some time the
assault upon them because of the threats on
their lives.
5. There is absolutely no showing that CHERRY
was actuated by a sinister motive to falsely
charge and implicate her own father in a
serious crime. Briefly, if she did admit the
ignominy she had undergone, allowed her
private parts to be examined, exposed herself
to the trouble and inconvenience of a public
trial and endure the embarrassments and
humiliation which a public revelation of what
ought to be kept secret, she had nothing in
mind except to obtain justice.
6. It is clear to that the rapes that were duly
proved were those committed on: (a) New
Years day of 1995; (b) a week after said New
Years day; and (c) on 23 January 1995. There
is no factual basis for the rapes charged in the
information in Criminal
Case 3872-95,
allegedly committed sometime in the year
1993, and in the information in Criminal Case
3874-95, on 3 January 1995.
7. Pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659, the death
penalty may be imposed in rape cases under
the last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, when the rape is committed with
any of the seven attendant circumstances.
These seven attendant circumstances, given
that they alter the nature of the crime of rape
and thus increase the degree of the penalty,
are
in
the
nature
of
qualifying
circumstances. Plainly,
these
attendant
circumstances added by R.A. No. 7659 are not
mere
aggravating
circumstances,
which
merely increase the period of the penalty.
Hence, these qualifying circumstances must be
specifically pleaded in the information. The
Constitution guarantees the right of every
person accused in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him. This right finds amplification and
implementation in the different provisions of
the Rules of Court. The informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3873-95 and 3875-95 do
not sufficiently allege the twin special
qualifying circumstances of the victims age
and the relationship between the culprit and
the victim. What is emphasized in the
informations is that GODOFREDO took undue
advantage to the person of his own daughter.

To impose upon GODOFREDO the penalty of

death under these circumstances would be to
deprive him of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation. The penalty should thus only be

for simple rape, in each of the two cases,

which
is
punishable
by reclusion
perpetua under the second paragraph of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended

US V. CHAN TOCO
IF EXCEPTIONS ARE IN THE ENACTING CLAUSE, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO GIVE
THEM, IN ORDER THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE CRIME MAY IN ALL RESPECTS
CORRESPOND WITH THE STATUTE

FACTS:
-

Chan Toco was charged for violating section 4 of Act No. 1461 on account
of his smoing opium in the store of Liangco in Samar despite not being
duly registered and not possessing a certificate pursuant to said act

Counsel for the accused demurred to the information on the ground that it
failed to allege that the use of opium had not been prescribed as a
medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician; and in support of his
contention that the demurrer filed in the court was improperly overruled,
counsel for the appellant insists that the statutory offense defined in
section 4 of Act No. 1461, of which the appellant was convicted, was not
sufficiently alleged in the information, and a formidable array of
authorities have been cited holding that, where the enacting clause in a
statute describes an offense with certain exceptions, the exceptions
should be negative in the indictment, complaint or information

SUPREME COURT:
Where a statute defining an offense contains an exception in the enacting clause
of the statute which is so incorporated with the language defining the offense
that the ingredients of the offense cannot be accurately and clearly described if
the exception is omitted, the rules of good pleading require that an indictment
founded upon the statute must allege enough to show that the accused is not
within the exception; but if the language of the section defining the offense is so
entirely separable from the exception that the ingredients constituting the
offense may be accurately and clearly defined without any reference to the
exception, the pleader may safely omit any such reference.
Hence where one is charged with a violation of the general provisions of the
Opium Law, it is "more logical as well as more practical and convenient," if he did
in fact smoke opium under the advise of a physician, that he should set up this
fact by way of defense, than that the prosecution should be called upon to prove
that every smoker, charged with a violation of the law, does so without such
advice or prescription. Indeed, when it is considered that under the law any
person, in case of need and at any time, procure the advice of a physician to use
of opium or some of its derivatives, and that in the nature of things no public

record of prescription of this kind is or can be required to be kept, it is manifest

that it would not be wholly impracticable and absurd to impose on the
prosecution the burden of alleging and proving the fact that one using opium
does so without the advice of a physician. To prove beyond a reasonable doubt in
a particular case, that one using opium does so without the advice or
prescription of a physician would be in most cases practical impossibility without
the aid of the defendant himself, while the defendant charged with the illegal use
of opium should find little difficulty in establishing the fact that used it under the
advice and on the prescription of a physician, if in fact he did so .
DEMURRER WAS PROPERLY OVERRULED BY THE TRIAL COURT.

US V. DICHAO

FACTS:
-

Antonio Dichao was charged with rape

He allegedly had carnal knowledge of girl less than 12 years old

Said girl was allegedly his ward, and he forced himself unto her through
threats and corporal punishment

Said rape resulted to a child

Dichao filed a demurrer, alleging: That the facts therein set forth and
contained do not constitute a public offense. That the said criminal
complaint does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. That said
complaint is vague and ambiguous.

CFI: sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case

Hence, this appeal

SUPREME COURT
-

THE ORDER APPEALED FROM MUST BE AFFIRMED

The allegations of an information should, if possible, be sufficiently explicit and

certain as to time to inform the defendant of the date on which the criminal act is
alleged to have been committed. Unless the accused is informed of the day, or about
the day, he may be, to an extent, deprived of the opportunity to defend himself.

While section 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "except when
time is a material ingredient of an offense, the precise time of commission
need not be stated in a complaint or information, but the cat may be
alleged to have been committed at any time before the filing thereof," this
does not mean that the prosecuting officer may be careless about fixing
the date of the alleged crime, or that he may omit the date altogether, or
that he may make the allegation so indefinite as to amount to the same
thing. Where the exact date cannot fixed, or where the prosecuting officer
is not thoroughly satisfied that he can prove a precise date, he should
allege in the information that the crime was committed on or about a date
named. Under such allegation he is not required to prove any precise date
but may prove any date which is not so remote as to surprise and
prejudice the defendant. In case of surprise the court may allow an
amendment of information as to time and an adjournment to the accused,
if necessary, to meet the amendment.

The question whether the allegations of the information are sufficiently

definite as to time and question which arises on a variance between the
allegations and the proof are different in nature and legal effect, and are
decided on different principles.

In the case before us the statement of the time when the crime is
alleged to have been committed is so indefinite and uncertain
that it does not give the accused the information required by law.
To allege in an information that the accused committed rape on a
certain girl between October, 1910, and August, 1912, is too
indefinite to give the accused an opportunity to prepare his
defense, and that indefiniteness is not curd by setting out the
date when a child was born as a result of such crime. Section 7 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure does not warrant such pleading. Its
purpose is to permit the allegation of a date of the commission of the
crime as near to the actual date as the information of the prosecuting
officer will permit, and when that has been done by any date may be
prove which does not surprise and substantially prejudice the defense. It
does not authorize the total omission of a date of such an indefinite
allegation with reference thereto as amounts to the same thing.

STATE V. STOLLINGS

FACTS:

Wayne Stollings was indicted for driving while intoxicated

Defendant demurred to and moved to quash the indictment, and objected

and excepted to the action of the court in overruling the demurrer and
motion to quash

In addition to the conviction in Lincoln Country embraced in the

indictment, the prosecuting attorney filed information of three prior
convictions for the violation of the National Prohibition Act

Hence this petition to the SC, where the defendant urges several
assignments of error

SUPREME COURT
The instant indictment, in our opinion, sets forth four distinct statutory
offenses, that is driving or operating any vehicle, motor driven or otherwise,
upon any public road or street while (1) "intoxicated"; (2) "under the influence of
intoxicating liquor"; (3) "under the influence of drugs"; or (4) "and under the
influence of narcotics."
It is noted that in the Keller case the warrant charged that defendant
was "intoxicated and under the influence of intoxicating liquors, drugs or
narcotics".
The Court disapproved the decision in that case in so far as it justifies
the use of the disjunctive "or" between the words "drugs" and "narcotics", for the
reason that the Court does not feel justified in departing from the rule inherent in
our criminal practice that indictments should not set forth in the
disjunctive separate and distinct offenses. This rule has been applied
uniformly by this Court in every case, except the Keller case and those cases,
such as Cunninghamv. State, supra, in which the defendant was charged with the
sale at retail of "rum, wine, brandy, or other spirituous liquors" to be drunk in
defendant's house. The rule simply requires hat a defendant be distinctly
informed in the indictment of the crime or crimes for which he is to be
tried. It is, as suggested by this Court in the Dawson case, a "time-honored and
rudimentary rule of criminal pleading," It is consonant with justice that a person
should not be arraigned for criminal trial, in the absence of a warrant or
indictment fully informing him as to the crime with which he is charged. A
contrariwise rule would break down the constitutional safeguards which have
been wrapped around the citizenry of this State. We, therefore, are of the opinion
that the instant indictment does not meet the requirements of West Virginia
Constitution, Article III, Section 14.

GALLEGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
-

An information was filed in the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special

Prosecutor Punzalan-Castillo against Gallego et al. for violation of Sec. 3( e
) of RA 3019
o

Gave a score of 18 out of 20 to an examinees answer

notwithstanding the fact that said examinee wrote the Lords prayer

Petitioners filed a motion to quash the information against them on the ff.
grounds:
o

The facts alleged do not constitute an offense; or in the alternative,

The information charges more than one offense

MANILY CONTENDS THAT THE TERM UNWARRANTED IS AMBIGUOUS

Sandiganbayan sustained conviction and denied motion to quash

SUPREME COURT

Section 3(e) of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and
"gross inexcusable negligence merely describe the different modes by which the offense
penalized in Section 3(e) of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in
the same information does not mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses.
The information definitely states the names of the parties, the tune, place,
manner of commission and designation of the offense. The argument that failure
in the information to state the reasons why the benefits bestowed are
unwarranted renders it defective is without merit informations need only state
the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

considers a corrupt practice and makes unlawful the act of a public
officer in:
... or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,

administrative or judicial functions through manifest

partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence, ... (Section 3[e], Rep. Act 3019, as
amended.)
It is not all difficult to comprehend that what the afore-quoted penal
provisions penalizes is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private
party benefits, advantage or preference which are unjustified,
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Neither is the information defective. As held in the case of People vs. Buenviaje,
47 Phil.536, where the defendant was charged with violation of the Medical Law
and the information charged both illegal practice of medicine and illegally
advertising oneself as a doctor, it was held that "the information was not bad for
duplicity inasmuch as the acts charged were merely different means of
committing the same offense, notwithstanding the fact that they are prohibited
by separate sections of the statute."

PEOPLE V. YAP

FACTS:
-

Agapito Yap was charged with and was convicted of simple seduction
(Municipal Court in Misamis Occidenntal) of a woman over 12 but under 1
years old (means of deceit and false promise of marriage)

The accused moved to quash the information, claiming that it alleged

multiple acts of simple seduction, in addition to the offense of criminal
abortion such was duly heard fiscal agreed to eliminate the word
abortion from the information

Court then directed the amendment of the information

Hence this appeal by the prosecution

SUPREME COURT
Under the law, simple seduction is synonymous with loss of virginity; a

widow can be the victim of seduction. 3 Upon the other hand, the fact that there
should be different acts of intercourse, consented by the woman in reliance upon
the same promise of marriage would not mean separate offenses of seduction,
(cf. U.S. vs. Salud, 10 Phil. 208). Nowhere in the information does it appear
that every act of intercourse was the result of a separate act of deceit.
It is, therefore, incorrect to conclude that the information in this
case charged the accused of more than one offense. A reading thereof
would show that he was there being charged for the seduction of Catalina Babol,
with the clause "May 15, 1959 and for sometime subsequent thereto" serving as
the point of time against which the allegation that she was over 12 years, but
under 18 when the alleged criminal offense was committed, may be checked or
reckoned. Such recital of fact, forming the basis of the statement that the
accused had sexual relations with the offended party "several times", together
with the allegations of the subsequent pregnancy of the offended girl and the
expulsion of the foetus, constitute no more than the details of the entire incident
upon which the seduction charge was based. They partake of the nature of
particulars, with which the prosecution intends to inform the accused of
the matter it will prove at the trial; and this does not come within the
prohibition of the rules. Thus, in one case, an information that charge the
defendant with a specific crime set forth in various counts, each of which may
constitute a distinct offense, was allowed. The narration in the information of the
specific acts was considered a bill of particulars of facts upon which the inference
of the guilt of the accused of the crime charged may be based and,
consequently, was held not objectionable. The same thing may be said of the
information in the present case.

US V. LAHOYLAHOY
FACTS:
-

Accused were charged with robbery with multiple homicide

Stuff which they allegedly stole: the sum of P100, 5 bayones of palay,
4 bayones of dawa, and 1 trunk which contained various wearing apparel,
of the total value of P150, the property of Roman Estriba; (in consequence
thereof and on the occasion of the said robbery, the aforesaid accused
criminally and with known premeditation and treachery, killed Roman
Estriba, Rosa Galoso, Francisco Seran, and Juana)

CFI Iloilo found them guilty

NOTE:

According to the proof the person robbed was Juana; while the complaint
charges that the property taken belong to Roman Estriba. What is the
effect of this variance between the language of the complaint and the
proof? Subsection 5 of section 6 of General Orders No. 58 declares that a
complaint or information shall show, among others things, the names of
the persons against whom, or against whose property, the offense was
committed, if known. The complaint in this case therefore properly
contained an averment as to the ownership of the property; and upon
principle, in charging the crime of robbery committed upon the person, the
allegation of the owner's name is essential. But of course if his name
cannot be ascertained, it may be alleged that it is unknown.

From the fact that the name of the injured person may, in case of
necessity, be alleged as unknown it should not be inferred that the naming
of such person, when known, is of no importance. Where the name of the
injured party is necessary as matter of essential description of the crime
charged, the complaint must invest such person with individuality by
either naming him or alleging that his name is unknown. (Wharton,
Criminal Pleading and Practice, 9th ed., secs. 111, 112.) It is elementary
that in crimes against property, ownership must be alleged as matter
essential to the proper description of the offense.

To constitute larceny, robbery, embezzlement, obtaining money by false

pretenses, malicious mischief, etc., the property obtained must be that of
another, and indictments for such offenses must name the owner; and a
variance in this respect between the indictment and the proof will be fatal.
It is also necessary in order to identify the offense. (Clark's Criminal
Procedure, p. 227. See also page 338.)

SUPREME COURT
It is well recognized in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged
and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses
the defendant can be convicted of the other. The mere circumstance that the two
crimes are so related as to constitute one transaction in no way affects the
principles of pleading involved in the case. To permit a defendant to be
convicted upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof shows
that he robbed an entirely different person, when the first was not
present, is violative of the rudimentary principles of pleading; and in
addition, is subject to the criticism that the defendant is thereby placed
in a position where he could not be protected from a future prosecution
by a plea of former conviction or acquittal. If we should convict or acquit
these defendants today of the robbery which is alleged to have been committed
upon the property of Roman Estriba, it is perfectly clear that they could be
prosecuted tomorrow for robbery committed upon the property of Juana; and the

plea of former jeopardy would be of no avail.

It should be borne in mind that the plea of former conviction or acquittal,

or former jeopardy, is supposed to be proved by the pleadings and
judgment in the former case, supplemented only by proofs showing the
identity of the party, or parties. Courts are not accustomed to determine
the plea of former jeopardy by examining the proof to discover just what
facts may have been developed in the former case. (Henry vs. State, 33
Ala., 389; Grisham vs.State, 19 Tex. Cr. App., 504.) In fact it is not always
practicable or even possible to produce for inspection upon the trial of this
issue the evidence which was adduced in court at the trial of the former
case.

It is important to note that the complaint in this case is not defective in form, for
the charge is clear, direct, and unambiguous. No formal objection could possibly
be made by the defendants to this complaint; and their only course, if desirous of
making any defense, was to plead not guilty, as was done in this case. The
difficulty of the case arises from the facts adduced in evidence. Section 10,
General Orders No. 58, declares that no complaint is insufficient by reason of a
detect in matter of form which does not tend to prejudice a substantial right of
the defendant upon the merits. This provision has no application to such a case
as that now before us; and all arguments based upon the circumstance that the
defendants made no objection to the complaint in the Court of First Instance are
irrelevant to the matter in hand.

In the light of what has been said it is evident that, by reason of the lack of
conformity between the allegation and the proof respecting the
ownership of the property, it is impossible to convict the two accused of
the offense of robbery committed by them in this case; and therefore
they cannot be convicted of the complex offense of robbery with
homicide, penalized in subsection (1) of article 503 of the Penal Code. No such
difficulty exists, however, with respect to the quadruple homicide committed
upon the persons named in the complaint; and in conformity with the provisions
of article 87 of the Penal Code, the penalties corresponding to all these crimes
must be severely imposed. This court has already held in United
States vs. Balaba (37 Phil. Rep., 260), that where more than one offense (not
complex offenses) are charged in the complaint, and the accused fails to demur
or ask for a severance, the penalties corresponding to all of the offenses which
are charged and proved may be imposed. The doctrine announced in that case
applies with even greater propriety offenses in one complaint. (See sec. 11,
General Orders No. 58.)

PEOPLE V. FELICIANO
Facts:
On December 8, 1994, while seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating
lunch near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, they were
suddenly attacked with baseball bats and lead pipes by men believed to be members of
Scintilla Juris Fraternity. The assailants heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or
shirts and the commotion lasted about thirty (30) to forty-five (45) seconds. The victims were
brought to the UP Infirmary while the attackers fled. Dennis Venturina, one of the victims,
was transferred to St. Lukes Hospital that very night. He died on December 10. On the 11th,
an autopsy was conducted on his cadaver and the NBI medico-legal concluded that Venturina
died of traumatic head injuries.
An information for murder was filed against twelve members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity
with the RTC of Quezon City. Separate informations were also filed against them for the
attempted murder of 3 Sigma Rho fraternity members, and the frustrated murder of 2 Sigma
Rho fraternity members. Only 11 of the accused stood trial since one of the accused remained
at large.
In 2002, the trial court rendered its decision with the findings that only 5 of the twelve
accused were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were
sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The case against one
accused was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension.
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was brought to the
SC on automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of the Rules on Appeal, the case
was remanded to the Court of Appeals.
On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First Division of Five, affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, but downgraded the attempted murder case to slight
physical injuries. The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to the SC for review.
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against them violates their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
They argue that the prosecution should not have included the phrase wearing masks and/or
other forms of disguise in the information since they were presenting testimonial evidence
that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
Issue: Whether accused-appellants constitutional rights were violated when the information
against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off
Held:
No. Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase wearing masks
and/or other forms of disguise in the information does not violate their constitutional rights.
Every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to
state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as
such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of
wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.

(See Rule 110 <Prosecution of Offenses>, Section 6, Par. 1 and Sec. 8 of the Revised Rule of
Criminal Procedure)
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows
the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes. The
introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused
were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an
aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating
circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of
disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in
the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their
identity.
The appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in the
commission of the offense. The victims were eating lunch on campus and were not at a place
where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival
fraternity men. The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack using lead pipes and baseball
bats gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery,
therefore, was present in this case.
Further, the information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that
the act of one is the act of all. This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan
to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might
not have done so.
Five of the accused-appellants are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and
with the MODIFICATION that they be found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Attempted Murder .#
PEOPLE V. DELFIN
Facts:

On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)a 51-year-old

fisherman from Navotas Citywas killed after being gunned down at a store just
across his home.

On 13 March 2001, the Rael Delfin was formally charged with the murder of Emilio
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon.

Part of the information reads: That on or about the 27th day of November 2000, in
Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction ofthis Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot with the said weapon one EMILIO ENRIQUEZ, hitting the victim on his
chest, thereby inflicting upon the victim gunshot wound, which caused his immediate
death. CONTRARY TO LAW.4

RTC FOUND HIM GUILTY, CA AFFIRMED

In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Delfin assails the validity of the information

under which he was tried and convicted. He specifically points out to the discrepancy
between the date of the commission of the murder as alleged in the information i.e.,
"on or about the 27th day of November 2000" and the one actually established during
the trial i.e., 27 September 2000.

Delfin protests that the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of the
commission of the murder violated his right to be properly informed of the charge
against him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense
thereon.

Issue:

Whether or not the discrepancy on the date of the commission of the murder would
render the Information against Delfin invalid.

Held:

No. In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it
is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the
information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing
an accused, that the date of commission be approximated.

Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the
allegation in an information of a date of commission different from the one eventually
established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to
prosecution.

In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted
by the evidence presented during the trial or may even be corrected by a formal
amendment of the information.

The inaccurate allegation in the information is simply the product of a mere clerical
error. This is obvious from the fact that, while all its supporting documents point to
the murder as having been committed on the 27th of September 2000, the
informations mistake is limited only to the month when the crime was committed.
Such an error is evidently not fatal; it is deemed supplanted by the evidence presented
by the prosecution.

The Court sustains the information for murder, under which Delfin was tried and
convicted, as valid.