Page 1 of 178

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
1.

Santiago v. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188 (1970)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970

TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother, Mrs. Angelita C.
Santiago, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC,
ROMEO AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO, LUNA SARMAGO, AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD
FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR MARCELO,respondents-appellees.
Teodoro M. Santiago for petitioner-appellant.
Ramon C. Carag for respondent-apellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato dismissing, on a motion to dismiss,
its Civil Case No. 2012 for certiorari, injunction and damages on the ground that the complaint
therein states no cause of action, and from the subsequent order of the court a quo denying the
motion for the reconsideration of the said order of dismissal.
The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was commenced in the court below, appellant
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School
in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The
Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the
purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school Principal, Mrs.
Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita
Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named
committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and Teodoro C.
Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises were
thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago,
Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking
of honor students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named committee members along with the District
Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr.
is a sixth grader at the Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May
21st, 1965 with thehonor rank of third place, which is disputed; that the teachers of the school had

Page 1 of 178

Page 2 of 178
been made respondents as they compose the "Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor",
whose grave abuse of official discretion is the subject of suit, while the other defendants were
included as Principal, District Supervisor and Academic Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro
Santiago, Jr. had been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V of the Sero Elementary
School, while Patricia Ligat (second placer in the disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a
close rival of petitioner before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that Santiago, Jr. had
been prejudiced, while his closest rival had been so much benefited, by the circumstance that the
latter, Socorro Medina, was coached and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas
who became the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in the far lead Medina
obtained over the other pupil; that the committee referred to in this case had been illegally
constituted as the same was composed of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service
Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the committee to select the
honor students should be composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are direct and
circumstantial matters, which shall be proven during the trial, wherein respondents have exercised
grave abuse of discretion and irregularities, such as the changing of the final ratings on the grading
sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Ligat from 80% to 85%, and some teachers giving petitioner
a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI, which proves that there has already an intention to pull him to a
much lower rank at the end of the school year; that several district examinations outside of teachers'
daily units and other than periodical tests were given, ratings in which were heavily considered in the
determination of periodical ratings, whereas according to the Academic Supervisor and Acting
Division Superintendent of schools of the place such district examinations were not advisable; that
there was a unanimous agreement and understanding among the respondent teachers to insult and
prejudice the second and third honors by rating Socorro Medina with a perfect score, which is very
unnatural; that the words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and replaced
with the words "second place", which is an instance of the unjust and discriminating abuses
committed by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of honor pupils they made; that
petitioner personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and to
the Academic Supervisor, but said officials "passed the buck to each other" to delay his grievances,
and as to appeal to higher authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy
under the circumstances; and, that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and moral damages in
the amount of P10,000.00. They prayed the court, among others, to set aside the final list of honor
students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965, and, during the
pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and formally publishing and
proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was scheduled
to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for was denied by the lower court
in its order of May 20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then
already set on the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of the same would be shocking to
the school authorities, parents, and the community who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of
that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for
the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same protested list of honor students.
Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the petition within ten (10) days,
respondents moved for the dismissal of the case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a
motion to dismiss, on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even
assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court had already become
academic. This was opposed by petitioner.
In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents was granted, the court
reasoning thus:
The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being improper and for being
academic. In order to resolve the motion to dismiss, the Court has carefully

Page 2 of 178

Page 3 of 178
examined the petition to determine the sufficiency of the alleged cause of action
constituting the special civil action of certiorari.
The pertinent portions of the petition alleging 'grave abuse of discretion' are found in
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. These allegations may be substantially
summarized as follows: Paragraph 3 alleges that since grades one to six, the
students closely contending for class honors were Socorro Medina, Teodoro
Santiago, Jr., Dolores Dalican and Patricia Ligat.
Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V and VI); once second honor
(grade IV), and twice third place (grades II and III).
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once (grade IV); four times second place
(grades I, II, III, and V) and once third place (grade VI).
Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades II, III); once third place (grade I).
Patricia Ligat once third place (grade V); and once second place (grade VI).
That as now ranked in the graduation Ligat is given second place while Teodoro
Santiago, Jr., is given the third place only. This is the ranking now disputed by
petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.
Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in the summer of 1964 by Mrs.
Rosalinda Alpas who became her English teacher in the sixth grade; that as such,
Mrs. Alpas unjustly favored Socorro against her rivals.
Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the committee on honor
students are all grade six teachers while the Service Manual For Teachers provides
that the committee shall be composed of the teachers from the fifth and sixth grades.
Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and circumstantial evidence showing the
change of ratings of Socorro Medina and Patricia Ligat from 80% to 85% and the
intention to junk petitioner to a lower rank.
Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district examinations upon which ratings were
partly based were not advisable.
Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated Socorro Medina a perfect pupil which is
unnatural.
Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of the petitioner the word "First
Place" was erased and changed to "Second Place".
Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities but
they only 'passed the buck to each other.'
SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

Page 3 of 178

Page 4 of 178
'Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the
law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.'
'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.'
It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment or order complained of, together with all pleadings and
documents which are relevant thereto, as required by the second, paragraph of the
aforequoted rule. This violation renders the petition extremely indefinite and
uncertain. There is no written formal judgment or order of respondents that is
submitted for revision or correction of this Court. This violation is fatal to the petition.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEGLECTED
All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner personally appealed to the school
authorities who only 'passed the buck to each other.' This allegation does not show
that petitioner formally availed of and exhausted the administrative remedies of the
Department of Education. The petition implies that this is the first formal complaint of
petitioner against his teachers. The administrative agencies of the Department of
Education could have investigated the grievances of the petitioner with dispatch and
give effective remedies, but petitioner negligently abandoned them. Petitioner cannot
now claim that he lacked any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of teachers
refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to real grave abuse of discretion
that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of
jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of certiorari.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the petition
states no cause of action and should be, as it is hereby dismissed.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration
thereof, but the same proved to be futile, hence, this appeal.
Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition states no cause of action on the
grounds discussed by the court a quo in the appealed order above-quoted (1) that the petition
does not comply with the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it has not been
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto; (2) that administrative remedies were
not first exhausted; and (3) that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the teachers
who constituted the committee referred to. On the other hand, appellees maintain that the court
below did not err in dismissing the case on said grounds. Further, they argue in favor of the

Page 4 of 178

Page 5 of 178
questioned order of dismissal upon the additional ground that the "committee on the ratings of
students for honor" whose actions are here condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions" against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of
Rule 65.
The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if really the said committee of
teachers does not fall within the category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions contemplated by Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised by appellant may no
longer be necessary. To resolve this problem the following tests may be employed:
In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial function
is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is
the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order
that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following
circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving
rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board
or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations.
'Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in
general appear or are brought before the tribunal by notice or
process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is
rendered. It implies impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of
adverse claims, and is inconsistent with discretion on the one hand
for the tribunal must decide according to law and the rights of the
parties or with dictation on the other; for in the first instance it must
exercise its own judgment under the law, and not act under a
mandate from another power. ... The character of its action in a given
case must decide whether that action is judicial, ministerial, or
legislative, or whether it be simply that of a public agent of the
country or State, as in its varied jurisdictions it may by turns be each.'
(In Re Saline County Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in
Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service
Commission, 181 S. E. 836-837.)
'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are,
with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is
clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those
questions, he acts judicially.' (State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of
St. Louis County, et al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)
(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have
the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the
controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.
'The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition
which would be applicable to all cases. The term has been variously
defined as the authority to determine the rights of persons or property
by arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at the
instance of a party thereto; the authority exercised by that department
of government which is charged with the declaration of what the law

Page 5 of 178

Page 6 of 178
is and its construction so far as it is written law; the authority or power
vested in the judges or in the courts; the authority vested in some
court, officer, or persons to hear and determine when the rights of
persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject
matter of adjudication; the power belonging to or emanating from a
judge as such; the power conferred upon a public officer, involving
the exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of
questions of right in specific cases affecting the interest of persons or
property, as distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry
out the mandates of judicial power or the law; the power exercised by
courts in hearing and determining cases before them, or some matter
incidental thereto, and of which they have jurisdiction; the power of a
court to decide and pronounce a judgment; the power which
adjudicates upon and protects the rights and interests of individual
citizens, and to that end construes and applies the law. "Judicial
power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal
rights. It includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone
who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial
power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine
a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between the
parties.' (34 C.J. 1183-1184.) .
(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power
which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or
executive department.
... the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and
judicial functions is difficult to point out. What is a judicial function
does not depend solely upon the mental operation by which it is
performed or the importance of the act. In solving this question, due
regard must be had to the organic law of the state and the division of
power of government. In the discharge of executive and legislative
duties, the exercise of discretion and judgment of the highest order is
necessary, and matters of the greatest weight and importance are
dealt with. It is not enough to make a function judicial that it requires
discretion, deliberation, thought, and judgment. It must be the
exercise of discretion and judgment within that subdivision of the
sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least, which
does not belong to the legislative or executive department. If the
matter, in respect to which it is exercised, belongs to either of the two
last-named departments of government, it is not judicial. As to what is
judicial and what is not seems to be better indicated by the nature of
a thing, than its definition.' (Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co. Appt.
v. Town of Triadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N. S.) pp. 321, 328-329.)
[Emphasis supplied]1
'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not
impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and
there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in
connection with the law as to the right to the writ of certiorari. It is clear,
however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of
the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or
not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not

Page 6 of 178

Page 7 of 178
essential that the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial,
in the sense in which that word is used when applied to the courts of
justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the
officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their
public character. ...' "In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86
Minn. 301, 304), the following statements were made:

'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what
are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to
determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the
performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the
performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said
generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a
matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts
judicially.'2
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for
honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial
functions in the performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the decision
cited, it will be gleaned that before tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial
acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is
brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine
what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed
out by appellees,3 however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when
teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors,
such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically
vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been appraised by
appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees
allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the
performance of that committee's duties.
At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the seemingly one of first impression, is not
without substantial parallel. In the case of Felipe vs. Leuterio, etc., et al.,4 the issue presented for
determination was whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of
judges of an oratorical contest, and this Court declared that the judiciary has no power to reverse the
award of the board of judges of that contest and, for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests,
beauty contests and similar competitions. It was reasoned out thus:
For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and
colleges in this islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent
origin. Members of this court have taken part in them either as contestants in their
school days (In the College of Law, U.P. annual oratorical contest, first prize was
awarded to Justice Montemayor in 1914 and to Justice Labrador in 1916), or as
members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some few verdicts did not
reflect the audience's preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to
the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial intervention;
for it is unwritten law in such contests that the board's decision is final and
unappealable.

Page 7 of 178

Page 8 of 178
Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the
highest tenets of sportsmanship: finality of referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of
protest. The participants are supposed to join the competition to contribute to its
success by striving their utmost: the prizes are secondary.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because theirs was
merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a
demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed winners of the competition
by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.
Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We
found in American jurisprudence no litigation questioning the determination of the
board of judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period
affords some reason for doubting the existence of the right sought to be enforced,
especially where occasion for its assertion must have often arisen; and courts are
cautious before allowing it, being loath to establish a new legal principle not in
harmony with the generally accepted views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012.)
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge
reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first
instance are courts of general jurisdiction.
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at
the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at
most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. 'Wrong' as used in the aforesaid
principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has
no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of
referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances
of 'damnum absque injuria'. This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven,
it would be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the
individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the
other judges.
But even were We to assume for the moment, as the court below apparently did, that judicial
intervention might be sought in cases of this nature, still, We are inclined to sustain the order of
dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of appellant to comply with the requirements of
Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court's holding that appellant's failure to accompany his
petition with a copy of the judgment or order subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the provision
of that Rule but by precedents as well. In the case of Alajar, et al. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations,5 where it was claimed by therein petitioners that the respondent court had acted with grave
abuse of discretion in estimating certain rice harvests involved in the case in terms of cavans instead of
cans, allegedly in complete disregard of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in
Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No.
L-6191,6 and in ordering thereafter the division of the said rice harvests on the ratio of 70-30 in favor of
the tenants, this Court denied the petition for certiorari on the ground, among others, of failure on the part
of said petitioners to attach to their petition copies of the decisions allegedly violated. Speaking thru Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes then, this Court held:

Page 8 of 178

Page 9 of 178
The petition is patently without merit. In the first place, it is not even sufficient in form
and substance to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for. It charges
that the Court of Industrial Relations abused its discretion in disregarding the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No.
84 and of this Court in G.R. No. L-6191; yet it does not attach to the petition the
decisions allegedly violated by the Court below and point out which particular portion
or portions thereof have been disregarded by the respondent Court.
The same principle was applied in the more recent case of NAWASA vs. Municipality of Libmanan,
et al.,7 wherein this Court dismissed (by Resolution) the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority against the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and
the municipality of Libmanan. In the following language, this Court emphasized the importance of
complying with the said requirement of Rule 65:
While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the complaint filed by the respondent
municipality with the respondent court for recovery of property with damages (Civil
Case No. L-161) no copy thereof is attached to the petition.
Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the decision rendered by the
respondent court on December 10, 1965, but no copy thereof is attached to the
petition.
Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the order of default entered by the
respondent court and of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the case
above-mentioned, but no copy of the order of default is attached to its petition.
Bearing in mind that the petition under consideration was filed for the purpose of
enjoining the respondent court from executing the decision rendered in Civil Case
No. L-161, the importance of the missing pleadings is obvious.
Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of securing an order commanding the
respondent court to approve either the original or the amended record on appeal filed
petition, but no copy of either is attached to its petition.
In view of the foregoing, the petition under consideration is dismissed.
It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of the programme of the
graduation exercises held by the Sero Elementary School in the morning of the very day of that
graduation exercises, implying that he could not have attached then a copy thereof (to show the
decision of the committee of teachers in the ranking of students complained of) to his petition. The
stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such decision of the said committee of
teachers much earlier, as shown by the circumstance that according to him, even before the filing of
his petition with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally appealed the said
committee's decision with various higher authorities of the above-named school, who merely passed
the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition various other documents or
papers as the Service Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution of
their committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade I certificate which appellant
never bothered to attach to his petition. There could be no doubt then that he miserably failed to
comply with the requirement of Rule 65 above-mentioned. With this conclusion, it is no longer
necessary to pass upon the other two errors assigned by appellant.

Page 9 of 178

Page 10 of 178
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellant.
2.

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, 19 January 1999

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated
January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:
1.

The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the
exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be
construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;

2.

The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will
never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a
law.

3.

Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever
question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the
6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated
upon . . .

4.

Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the
judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power
of judicial review.

5.

At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the
repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
a.

The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing
the death penalty involving heinous crimes.

Page 10 of 178

Page 11 of 178
b.

The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the
law;

c.

The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and
that of Senator Pimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of
House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the
House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of
the House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to
immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113)
congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power
and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this
Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental
matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's
jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until
Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R.
No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this
Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this
reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby"
R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly,
she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is
properly represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its
jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously,
public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the
principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin
litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to

examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These
metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was
filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare
the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but
GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared
INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section
19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by
the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential,
hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and

Page 11 of 178

Page 12 of 178
counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing
Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules
and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately
amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippine.
Clerk of Court
By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP
Acting Chief
Judicial Records Office
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin
Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and
Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary
Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended
Rules and Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court
that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be
enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177
are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to
execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established
jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By
the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute
and enforce it. 3There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its

judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues
even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment;
the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has
become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution
unjust or impossible.5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the
petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of
First Instance, 6 viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced
and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction
has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto
for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty

Page 12 of 178

Page 13 of 178
in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of
the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by
having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which
are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are
absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the
person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a
capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be
requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at
the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King;
(2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state
this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that
after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of
the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought
to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to
order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the
execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and so to who
has jurisdiction to make the investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject
of substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and

in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether
civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded
the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law
and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred
on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears
repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it
reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner.
The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by
Congress.
1wphi1.nt

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction
to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant
of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In
accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated
on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the
process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil
cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules
of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its
independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that
popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our

Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the
1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the
power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

Page 13 of 178

Page 14 of 178
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re
Cunanan 10Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding

admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing
grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the
1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice
Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment promulgated by
this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." 12 The
venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By
its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution
reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More
completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving
to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced
the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

Page 14 of 178

Page 15 of 178
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest
intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public
respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power
conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and
supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and
executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no
less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide
him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated
execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof,
particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of
the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the
appropriate relief" state:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however,
herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to
stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives
herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his
statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee
that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to
ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of
vital information necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and
control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of
such Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No.
8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act
No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it
that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully
observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the
precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of executive

Page 15 of 178

Page 16 of 178
clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department)
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out
"without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive powers at
all times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant
reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People
v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon
with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even work to
the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and
the applicable statute as when the date at execution set by the President
would be earlier than that designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of
execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III
(Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development shall, be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest.
9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules
by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the
right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information.
Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the
people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary
act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the
Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State
policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that
whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the
duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue
of the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En
Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535
[1987].
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed
by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the
public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose
petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of
Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the
petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public
respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said
relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become
final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By

Page 16 of 178

Page 17 of 178
Public
respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which
reads:
granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function."

14

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President

may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The
provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and
remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to
grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their
finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and
these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after
his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is

generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from executing the death
sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death
sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve though its effects is the same the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict.
In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing
the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of
sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to
amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts
the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments
that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore
to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to
violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper
perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts.
Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He
invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999;
(b) that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law
authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be
granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other
senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they
would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital
punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are
demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume
session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session
on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five

(5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the
difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or
amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good
reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and
surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely
publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new

Page 17 of 178

Page 18 of 178
Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital
punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that
enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast,
the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to
verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was
impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to
judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The
suspension was temporary "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present
regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is
going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear
that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for
all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the
hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not
petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less
before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue
whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General,
cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death
penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
a.

The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death
penalty involving heinous crimes.

b.

The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;

c.

The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of
Senator Pimentel. 18

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House
of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately
implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11,
1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative
with minor, the House of Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an
overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at
this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to
ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these
developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment had
been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in
punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the

legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because
of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of their
postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a
democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when
anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very
purpose of the Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights to declare certain values transcendent,
beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice

Page 18 of 178

Page 19 of 178
than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to
be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the
rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair
and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated
by society. 21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in
its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable
provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.

3.

Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 Phil. 297 (1948)

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1612

February 26, 1948

JORGE B. VARGAS, petitioner,

vs.
EMILIO RILLORAZA, JOSE BERNABE, MANUEL ESCUDERO, Judges of the People's Court, and THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Manuel Lim and Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona for
respondents.
HILADO, J.:
Counsel for the defense, in a motion dated August 28, 1947, assails the constitutionality of section 14 of the
People's Court Act (Commonwealth Act No. 682) upon the following grounds:
(a) It provides for qualification of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in section
6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.
(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the
qualifications set forth in section 6, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.
(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure other than
impeachment, contrary to Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution.
(d) It deprives the Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to confirm
or reject appointments to the Supreme Court.
(e) It creates two Supreme Courts.

Page 19 of 178

Page 20 of 178
(f) it impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13, Article VIII of the
Philippine Constitution.
(g) It is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualification members of the Supreme Court who
rendered said public service during the Japanese occupation.
(h) It denies equal protection of the laws.
(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation.
(j) It amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV, of the Philippine
Constitution.
(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the "packing" of the Supreme Court in
certain cases, either by Congress or by the President.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the prosecution, opposes the motion and in support of his opposition submits
these propositions:
1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682.
2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not intended to provide an additional
qualification for members of the Supreme Court, much less does it amend section 6, Article VIII, of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed in section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution apply to permanent "appointees" not to temporary "designees."
4. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution is not applicable to temporary designations under section
14, Commonwealth Act No. 682.
5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of the Supreme Court affected to sit and
vote in the particular class of cases therein mentioned.
6. It does not create an additional "Special Supreme Court."
7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the Supreme Court but merely supplements the Rules of
Court.
8. It is not a bill of attainder.
9. It is not an ex post pacto law.
10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to the Justices of the Supreme Court affected
or the treason indicates concerned.
11. It does not amend any constitutional provision.
12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
This opposition is a reproduction by reference in the instant case of a similar pleading filed by the Solicitor
General in G.R. No. L-398, People vs. Sison, pursuant to the resolution of this Court in the instant case dated

Page 20 of 178

Page 21 of 178
October 30, 1947, granting the prayer of the Assistant Solicitor General that in the consideration of petitioner's
memorandum herein of September 27, 1947.
It will not be necessary for the purposes of this resolution to consider and decide all the legal questions thus
raised by these conflicting contentions of the parties.
For the purposes of the present resolution, the considerations presently to be set forth are deemed insufficient.
Article VIII, section 4, of the Constitution ordains that the Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
and ten Associate Justices and may sit either in banc or in two divisions unless otherwise provided by law.
Section 5 of the same Article provides, inter alia, that the members of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Section 6 of the same Article stipulates
that no person may be appointed member of the Supreme Court unless he has been five years a citizen of the
Philippines, is at least 40 years of age, and has for 10 years or more been a judge of a court of record or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. By virtue of section 9 of said Article, the members of the
Supreme Court, among other judicial officials, shall not hold office during good behavior, until they reach, the
age of 70 years, or become incapacitated, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
Section 13 of the same Article VIII, inter alia, enunciates procedure thereby repealed as statutes and are
declared rules of court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same, and to the
power of the Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement them. Art. XVI, section 2, provides that "all laws of the
Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and thereafter they shall
remain operative unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
Congress of the Philippines ..."
Before the adoption of the Constitution, the law on disqualification of judges was contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure, sections 8 and 608. If said sections should be considered as parts of the then existing adjective
legislation, Article VIII, section 13, of the constitution repealed them along with the others dealing with pleading,
practice and procedure, as statutes, and declared them rules of court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same, without prejudice to the power of the Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement them. In such case, when the Constitution so provided in said section 13, it sanctioned as rules of
court, among other provisions, those in said sections 8 and 609 of the former Code of Civil Procedure
concerning the disqualification of judges. If said sections should be deemed as pertaining to then existing
substantive legislation, then they were continued as laws or statutes by the aforecited provision of Article XVI,
section 2.
By virtue either of Article VIII, section 13, or Article XVI, section 2, of the constitution, therefore, the grounds for
disqualifying judges, which had been held to include justices of the Supreme Court (Jurado & Co, vs.
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, 1 Phil., 395) were those established in sections 8 and 608 of the
former Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court later promulgated the present Rules of Court wherein Rule
123 treats of the matter of disqualification of judicial officers. The provisions of said rule have been taken from
the above-cited sections 8 and 608 of the same former Code of Civil Procedure (see also II Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 2d ed., pp. 779-782). By reason of the fact that the aforementioned provisions of the
former Code of Civil Procedure were continued by the constitution itself, either as rules of court or as laws or
statutes a point we need not now decide there can be no question of unconstitutionality or repugnancy of
said provisions to the constitution as regards the disqualification of judicial officers. In other words, the framers
deemed it fit, right and proper that said provisions shall continue to govern the disqualification of judicial
officers.
Such question of unconstitutionality or repugnancy to the constitution, however, arises in relation to the
disqualification of certain members of the Supreme Court provided for in section 14 of the People's Court Act
which says:
SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the Philippine
Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in any
case brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in which the accused is a person who held
any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine
Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof.

Page 21 of 178

Page 22 of 178
If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds or disqualification of judges, in
Rule 126, section 1 of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability the
requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not
present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of
First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section one
hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justice of said Court, in order to form a quorum or
until a judgment in said case is reached.
We propose to approach this question from the following angles: (a) whether or not the Congress had power to
ass to the pre-existing grounds of disqualification of a Justice of the Supreme Court, that provided for in said
section 14; (b) whether or not a person may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court who has not been duly
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments pursuant to the constitution ,
even only as a "designee"; and (c) whether or not by the method of "designation" created by the aforecited
section 14 a Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judge, designated by the
President under the same section can constitutionally "sit temporarily as Justice" of the Supreme Court by
virtue thereof.
(a) We start with the principle, well known to the legal profession, that no act of the legislature repugnant to the
constitution can become law (In re Guaria, 24 Phil., 37, 45; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 175). To discover
whether the above quoted section 14 of the People's Court Act is repugnant to the constitution, one of the best
tests would be to compare the operation with the same section if the latter were to be allowed to produce its
effects. It is self evident that before the enactment of the oft-quoted section of the People's Court Act, it was not
only the power but the bounden duty of all members of the Supreme Court to sit in judgment in all treason
cases duly brought or appealed to the Court. That power and that duty arise from the above cited sections of
Article VIII of the Constitution, namely, section 4, providing how the court shall be composed and how it may sit,
section 9, ordaining that they shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become, incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, and the pertinent constitutional and statutory
provisions bearing on the jurisdiction, powers and responsibilities of the Supreme Court. Competently referring
to the instant case, if section 14 of the People's Court Act had not been inserted therein, there can be no
question that each and every member of this Court would have to sit in judgment in said case.
But if said section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court "who held any office or position under
the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic" would be disqualified
from sitting and voting in the instant case, because the accused herein is a person who likewise held an office
or position at least under the Philippine Executive Commission. In other words, what the constitution in this
respect ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the People's Court Act
would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. What the constitution directs the section prohibits. A clearer
case of repugnancy of fundamental law can hardly be imagined.
For repugnancy to result it is not necessary that there should be an actual removal of the disqualified Justice
from his office for, as above demonstrated, were it not for the challenged section 14 there would have been
anuninterrupted continuity in the tenure of the displaced Justice and in his exercise of the powers and
fulfillment of the duties appertaining to his office, saving only proper cases or disqualification under Rule 126.
What matters here is not only that the Justice affected continue to be a member of the Court and to enjoy the
emoluments as well as to exercise the other powers and fulfill the other duties of his office, but that he be left
unhampered to exercise all the powers and fulfill all the responsibilities of said office in all cases properly
coming before his Court under the constitution, again without prejudice to proper cases of disqualification under
Rule 126. Any statute enacted by the legislature which would impede him in this regard, in the words of this
Court in In re Guaria,supra, citing Marbury vs. Madison, supra, "simply can not become law."
It goes without saying that, whether the matter of disqualification of judicial officers belong to the realm of
adjective, or to that of substantive law, whatever modifications, change or innovation the legislature may
propose to introduce therein, must not in any way contravene the provisions of the constitution, nor be
repugnant to the genius of the governmental system established thereby. The tripartite system, the mutual
independence of the three departments in particular, the independence of the judiciary , the scheme of
checks and balances, are commonplaces in democratic governments like this Republic. No legislation may be
allowed which would destroy or tend to destroy any of them.

Page 22 of 178

Page 23 of 178
Under Article VIII, section 2 (4) of the Constitution the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its appellate
jurisdiction, among others, over those criminal cases where the penalty may be death or life imprisonment.
Pursuant to Article VIII, sections 4, 5, 6, and 9 of the Constitution the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may
only be exercised by the Chief Justice with the consent of the Commission of Appointments, sitting in banc or in
division, and in cases like those involving treason they must sit in banc. If according to section 4 of said Article
VIII, "the Supreme Court shall be composed" of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein referred to, its
jurisdiction can only be exercised by it as thus composed. To disqualify any of these constitutional component
members of the Court particularly, as in the instant case, a majority of them is nothing short of pro
tantodepriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a
judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. (Diehl vs. Crumb, 72 Okl., 108; 179 Pac., 44). And if that judge is the
one designated by the constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of
this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of
the court itself. It would seem evident that if the Congress could disqualify members of this Court to take part in
the hearing and determination of certain collaboration cases it could extend the disqualification to other cases.
The question is not one of degree or reasonableness. It affects the very heart of judicial independence.
Willoughby's United States Constitutional Law, under the topic of separation of powers, Volume 3, pages 16221624, says:
Upon the other hand, as we shall see, the courts have not hesitated to protect their own independence
from legislative control, not simply be refusing to give effect to retroactive declaratory statutes, or to
acts attempting the revision or reversal of judicial determination, but by refusing themselves to
entertain jurisdiction in cases in which they have not been given the power to enforce their decrees by
their own writs of execution. Thus, as already mentioned, they have refused to act where their
decisions have been subject to legislative or administrative revisions. Finally, even where the extent of
their jurisdiction, as to both parties litigant and subject-matter, has been subject to legislative control,
the courts have not permitted themselves to be deprived of the power necessary for maintaining the
dignity, the orderly course of their procedure, and the effectiveness of their writs.
In order that the court may perform its judicial functions with dignity and effectiveness, it is necessary
that it should possess certain powers. Among these is the right to issue certain writs, called extraordinary writs, such as mandamus, injunction, certiorari, prohibition, etc. and especially, to punish for
contempt any disobedience to its orders. The possession of these powers the courts have jealously
guarded, and in accordance with the constitutional doctrine of the separation and independence of the
three departments of government, have held, and undoubtedly will continue to hold, invalid any
attempt on the part of the legislature to deprive them by statute of any power the exercise of which
they deem essential to the proper performance of their judicial functions. The extent of their
jurisdiction, they argue, may be more or less within legislative control, but the possession of powers for
the efficient exercise of that jurisdiction, whether statutory or constitutional, which they do possess,
they cannot be deprived of.
It has already been pointed out that the jurisdiction of the inferior Federal courts and the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are wholly within the control of Congress, depending as they do upon
statutory grant. It has, however, been argued that while the extent of this jurisdiction is thus within the
control of the legislature, that body may not control the manner in which the jurisdiction which is
granted shall be exercised, at least to the extent of denying to the courts the authority to issue writs
and take other judicial action necessary for the proper and effective execution of their functions. In
other words, the argument is, that while jurisdiction is obtained by congressional grant, judicial power,
when once a court is established and given a jurisdiction, at once attaches by direct force of the
Constitution.
This position was especially argued by Senator Knox, Spooner and Culberson and contested by
Senator Bailey during the debate upon the Repburn Railway Rate Bill of 1906. The point at issue was
the constitutionality of the amendment offered by Senator Bailey providing that no rate or charge,
regulation or practice, prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, should be set aside or
suspended by any preliminary or interlocutory decree or order of a circuit court.

Page 23 of 178

Page 24 of 178
This position would seem to be well taken, and would apply to attempts upon the part of Congress to
specify the classes of statutes whose constitutionality may be questioned by the courts, or to declare
the number of justices of the Supreme Court who will be required to concur in order to render a
judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of an act of Congress.
In State vs. Morrill (16 Ark., 384), the Supreme Court of Arkansas declared:
The legislature may regulate the exercise of, but cannot abridge, the express or necessarily implied
powers granted to this court by the Constitution. If it could, it might encroach upon both the judicial and
executive departments, and draw to itself all the powers of government; and thereby destroy that
admirable system of checks and balances to be found in the organic framework of both the federal and
state institutions, and a favorite theory in the government of the American people . . . .
The members affected by the prohibition have heretofore disqualified themselves, partly because they
presumed the statute valid and partly because they would rather have no hand in the revision of the appeals,
for the purpose of avoiding even a breath of suspicion as to the impartiality of their actuations. However,
realizing upon a thorough analysis of the matter by counsel on both sides, the far-reaching implications which
the precedent might authorize, imperilling the independence of one coordinate branch of the Government, they
finally cast aside all reluctance to consider the point, and came out with practical unanimity to condemn any
legislation which impinges or might impinge upon the fundamental independents powers of the judicature.
Some of them have no quarrel with legislative authority to enumerate instances in which judges may not sit.
They would even concede that. But, they say, let the rules be promulgated before the event happens or
litigation arises. To promulgate them after, would enable the Congress in specific situations to order that Judge
X shall not decide the controversy between Y and Z or that Justice M shall not sit in the appeal of P.S. and so
on ad infinitum, and thus decisively influence the decision, for or against one party litigant. Such legislative
power might thus be wielded to interfere with the functions of the judiciary, depriving Philippine citizens of their
right of impartial awards from judges selected without any reference to the parties or interest to be affected.
Unnecessary to prove or impute sinister motives behind the statutory disqualification. Enough that recognition
of the power might give way to the operation of unworthy combinations or oppressive designs.
Let it not be argued that the Court is the same, only the membership being different. Because Article VIII,
sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other than the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is
enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court as in this case are replaced by
judges of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the constitution provides
for only oneSupreme Court.
From all that has been said above it results that the ground for disqualification added by section 14 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and
continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the organic law.
(b) In the face of the constitutional requirement (Art. VIII, section 5) that the members of the Supreme Court
should be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, we are of the
opinion that no person not so appointed may act as Justice of the Supreme Court and that the "designation"
authorized in section 14 of the People's Court Act to be made by the President of any Judge of First Instance,
Judge-at-large of First Instance or cadastral Judge can not possibly be a compliance with the provision
requiring that appointment. An additional disqualifying circumstance of the "designee" is the lack of confirmation
by or consent of the Commission on Appointments. Without intending the least reflection on the ability, learning,
and integrity of any such "designee", we are merely construing and applying the fundamental law of the land. A
Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judge, under section 149 of the Revised
Administrative Code, need not be at least forty years of age, nor have more than ten years or more been a
judge of a court of record or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines (as required by section 6 of Article
VIII of the Constitution), because under said section he need only have practiced law for a period of not less
than five years or have held during a like period within the Philippines an office requiring a lawyer's diploma. So
that it may happen that a "designee" under section 14 of the People's Court Act, sitting as a substitute Justice
of the Supreme Court in particular collaboration cases, and participating therein in the deliberations and

Page 24 of 178

Page 25 of 178
functions of the Supreme Court, like any regular Justice thereof, does not possess the required constitutional
qualifications of a regular member of said Court. Here again is another point of repugnancy between the
challenged section and the constitution. And if we consider the actual fact that only four of the present ten
Justices of this Court are not adversely affected by the disqualification established in section 14 of the People's
Court Act, we see that the "designees" constitute a majority when sitting with said four Justices, giving rise to
the result that, if the composed by them all should be considered as the Supreme Court, it would be composed
by four members appointed and confirmed pursuant to sections 4 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution and
six who have not been so appointed and confirmed. The situation would not be helped any by saying that such
composition of the Court is only temporary, for no temporary composition of the Supreme Court is authorized
by the constitution. This tribunal, as established under the organic law, is one of the permanent institutions of
the government. The clause "unless otherwise provided by law" found in said section 4 can not be construed to
authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the
Constitution, for however brief a time as may be imagined. In principle, what really matters is not the length or
shortness of the constitutional composition of the Court, but the very permanence an unalterability of that
composition so long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent and unaltered. We are furthermore
of opinion that said clause refers to the number of Justices who were to compose the Court upon its initial
organization under the Commonwealth, and the manner of its sitting; that is, that the Legislature, when
providing for the initial organization of the Supreme Court under the Commonwealth, was authorized to fix a
different number of Justices than eleven, and determine the manner of the Court's sitting differently from that
established in section 4 of Article VIII of the Constitution, but it was and is not empowered to alter the
qualifications of the Justices and the mode of their appointment, which are matters governed by sections 5 and
6 of said Article VIII wherein the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" does not ever exist, nor the
provision on who shall be the component members of the Court. Such a legislation was enacted in the form of
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, the pertinent provisions of which amended sections 133 and 134 of the
Revised Administrative Code. But after liberation, the Chief Executive, by Executive Order No. 40 (41 Off. Gaz.,
187) amended sections 133 and 134 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 3 and sections 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 259, and repealed all acts or parts of
acts inconsistent with the provisions of said executive order; and the same Chief Executive, by Executive Order
No. 86 (42 Off. Gaz., 15) further amended section 133 of the Revised Administrative Code, as thus previously
amended, also repealing all acts or parts of acts inconsistent therewith. Both by virtue of Executive Order no.
40 and Executive Order No. 86, the number of Justices of the Supreme Court, as originally fixed at eleven by
the Constitution, was restored.
(c) However temporary or brief may be the action or participation of a judge designated under section 14 of the
People's Court Act in a collaboration case of the class therein defined, there is no escaping the fact that he
would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the Supreme Court, as the appellate tribunal in such a
case, and if allowed to do so, his vote would count as much as that of any regular Justice of the Court. There
can be no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required by section 4 of Article VIII of the
Constitution to compose the Supreme Court indeed, a "temporary member" thereof would be a misnomer,
implying a position not contemplated by the constitution. Section 5 of the same Article VIII, in requiring the
members of the Supreme Court to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointment, makes it plainly indubitable that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices who are to compose the
Court and sit therein under section 4, have to be thus appointed and confirmed.
As already adverted to, a mere designation under section 14 of the People's Court Act does not satisfy the
Constitutional requirement of appointment, with the additional circumstance that as to such designation, the
Commission on Appointments is entirely dispensed with. We find absolutely nothing in the context which may
soundly be construed as authorizing, merely by legislation, any change in the constitutional composition of the
Supreme Court, or the performance of its functions by any but its constitutional members. On the other hand,
we have to go by the cardinal rule that "usually provisions of a constitution are mandatory rather than directory,
and mandatory provisions are binding on all department of the government." (16 C.J.S., 120).
The main reason for this rule is that in the Constitutions the sovereign itself speaks and is laying down
rules which, for the time at least, are to control alike the government and the governed. It is an
instrument of a solemn and permanent character, laying down fundamental maxims, and, ordinarily, is
not supposed to concern itself with mere rules or order in unessential matters (Baker vs. Moorhead,
174 N.W., 430, 431; 103 Neb. m, 811);

Page 25 of 178

Page 26 of 178
Court is loath to say that any language of the constitution is merely directory. Scopes vs. State, 289
S.W., 363, 366; 154 Tenn., 105; 53 A.L.R., 821). (Footnote 93, C.J.S., 120.)
Under sections 4 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, it is clear that the framers intended the Supreme Court
to function through the members who are therein defined: and by section 6 they determined who may be
appointed such members. This naturally excludes the intervention of any person or official who is not a member
of the Court in the performance of its functions; and it is self-evident that the "designees" spoken of in section
14 of the People's Court Act can not be such members in view of the fact that they have not
been appointed and confirmedas such pursuant to said sections 5 and 6.
Hence, we do not see the way clear to the proposition that the "designees" in such a case can constitutionally
"sit temporarily as Justices" of the Supreme Court.
By an act of the United States Congress dated February 6, 1905, it was provided in part as follows:
Temporary judges of the Supreme Court; ... Whenever by reason of temporary disability of any judge
of the Supreme Court or by reason of vacancies occurring therein, a quorum of the court shall not be
present for business the Governor General of the Philippine Islands is authorized to designate a judge
or judges of the court of First Instance in the islands to sit and act temporarily as judge or judges of the
Supreme Court in order to constitute a quorum of said Supreme Court for business. . . . .
As part of the membership of the Court believes that this provision is still in force by virtue of Article XVI,
section 2, of the Constitution, and should still be applied to cases of "temporary disability ... or vacancies
occurring" and preventing a quorum; while the other members are not prepared to subscribe to the same view,
for the reason that the designation" thereby authorized would be "inconsistent with this constitution," in the
word of the cited section, the same as the "designation" authorized by section 14 of the People's Court Act.
Anyway, we need not decide the point now.
This decision has been prepared before this date, and is being promulgated before the Court acts upon the
Solicitor General's motion to dismiss dates February 17, 1948, for the rulings contained herein.
For the foregoing consideration, it is declared and ordered: (a) that section 14 of the People's Court Act is
unconstitutional in the respects specified in the body of this resolution; and (b) that this case be dealt with
henceforward in pursuance of and in harmony with this resolution. So ordered.

4.

Kilosbayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 177721, 3 July 2007

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 177721

July 3, 2007

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, petitioners,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S.
ONG,respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

Page 26 of 178

Page 27 of 178
Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners are peoples and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes aimed at
protecting the peoples rights to self-governance and justice.
Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of releasing
presidential appointments including those of Supreme Court Justices.
Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in this Court.
Petitioners allege that:
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, announced
an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the
vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The
appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications.
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in
abeyance" by Malacaang in view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong.
There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the Office of the President.
On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent Executive Secretary stated that the
appointment is "still there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC)."
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary
is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his
own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as
Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ongs birth
on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No person shall be appointed
Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines." Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship." 1
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth his father was
finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a naturalborn Filipino citizen.
Petitioners further argue that respondent Ongs birth certificate speaks for itself and it states his nationality as
"Chinese" at birth. They invoke the Civil Code:
Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained." Therefore, the entry in Ongs birth
certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact that Ongs citizenship at birth
is Chinese.
Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order." Thus, as long as Ongs birth certificate is not changed by a judicial

Page 27 of 178

Page 28 of 178
order, the Judicial & Bar Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is stated in his birth
certificate.2
This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ongs new Identification Certificate
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated October 16, 1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino
and over the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that he is a natural-born Filipino.
They maintain that the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have the power or authority to alter
entries in a birth certificate; that respondent Ongs old Identification Certificate did not declare that he
is a natural-born Filipino; and that respondent Ongs remedy is an action to correct his citizenship as it
appears in his birth certificate.
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to respondent
Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and restrain
respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent and
restrain respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this
Court.
The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition.
Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment, essentially stating that the appointment of
respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to the
powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, thus:
SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed respondent Ong from among the list of
nominees who were duly screened by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8
of the Constitution. Said respondent further stated: "The appointment, however, was not released, but instead,
referred to the JBC for validation of respondent Ongs citizenship." 3 To date, however, the JBC has not received
the referral.
Supporting the Presidents action and respondent Ongs qualifications, respondent Executive Secretary
submits that:
1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed a person, duly nominated by
the JBC, which passed upon the appointees qualifications.
2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of Immigration and
affirmed by the Department of Justice, which have the authority and jurisdiction to make determination
on matters of citizenship.
3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen.
4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order.4
Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen;
that petitioners have no standing to file the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be addressed to the
JBC as the Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of those it recommends to judicial posts.
Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed to include the President who is an indispensable party as the one
who extended the appointment.

Page 28 of 178

Page 29 of 178
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born
on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen 5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that
these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria Santos
reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also
became a Filipino citizen;6 that respondent Ongs mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses
Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927; that, therefore, respondents
mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han
Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio
Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in
the naturalization.
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an
identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since
his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
Summarizing, his arguments are as follows:
I. PETITIONERS LACK OF STANDING AND INABILITY TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY
WHOSE OFFICIAL ACTION IS THE VERY ACT SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED CONSTITUTE
INSUPERABLE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND SHOULD
PREVENT THIS CASE FROM PROCEEDING FURTHER FOR DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER MARRIAGE TO
EUGENIO; and
B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 OF A FILIPINO MOTHER AND WHO
ELECTED FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP UPON REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY,
RESPONDENT ONG MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE IV, SECTIONS 1
AND 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG AS PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS CAN, IN
NO WAY, WITHOUT MORE, ESTABLISH WITH FINALITY THAT HE IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR
DISPROVE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE IS, IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, DESCENDED
FROM "INDIOS."
IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONG TO RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER
RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM AND ENJOY HIS
RIGHTFUL STATUS AS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO.
V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY
ADMINISTRATIVE JURIDICTION TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP
OF RESPONDENT ONG, AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION (I.E., IDENTIFICATION
CERTIFICATE NO. 113878) RECOGNIZING THAT RESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN
FILIPINO, THEREBY RENDERING NONEXISTENT ANY CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM
TO ASSUME THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.7
Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their standing to file this suit on the
strength of previous decisions of this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona8 and Kilosbayan,
Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is one of transcendental importance. They claim that the
Presidents appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is,
therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they

Page 29 of 178

Page 30 of 178
reiterate that respondent Ongs birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings
for the purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a
Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not make him a naturalborn Filipino citizen.
The petition has merit.
First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as peoples organizations and taxpayers
since the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the
qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. Standing has been
accorded and recognized in similar instances. 10
Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary party. This is not necessary since the
suit impleads the Executive Secretary who is the alter ego of the President and he has in fact spoken for her in
his Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from extending the appointment but
only the Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong from accepting the same.
Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ongs qualification for memberhip of this
Court. This case is a matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As
the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution, 11 the Court is
the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so.
Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?
On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ongs petition to be admitted to the
Philippine bar.
In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979,
under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the
Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a
minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of
his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth
certificate12 states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese
citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
Specifically, the following appears in the records:
PETITION
COMES now the undersigned petitioner and to this Honorable Court respectfully states:
1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino citizen and 26 years of age, having been born on
May 25, 1953, at SAN JUAN RIZAL, to spouses Eugenio Ong Han Seng and Dy Guiok Santos who
are citizens of the Philippines, as evidenced by the attached copy of his birth certificate marked as
Annex A (if born outside of wedlock, state so; or if Filipino citizen other than natural born, state how
and when citizenship was acquired and attach the necessary proofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio
Ong Han Seng (Father) See Attached documents Annex B, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4.
xxx
V E R I F I C AT I O N
Republic of the Philippines )

Page 30 of 178

Page 31 of 178
City of Manila ) S.S.
I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, depose and state: that I am the petitioner in the
foregoing petition; that the same was prepared by me and/or at my instance and that the allegations
contained therein are true to my knowledge.
(Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of August, 1979, City of Manila, Philippines,
affiant exhibiting his/her Residence Certificate No. A-___________, issued at ________________, on
__________________, 19__.
(Sgd.)
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1979
PTR No. 3114917
January 19, 1979, Pasig, MM
Doc. No. 98;
Page No. 10;
Book No. VIII;
Series of 1979.13
In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, wrote respondent Ong a letter dated
October 3, 1979 stating that in connection with his Petition for Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he has
to submit:
1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and
2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the Office of the Solicitor General.
Respondent Ong complied with these requirements.
It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court
allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The
alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot
amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along
with his father.
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register
can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change.
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,14 this Court held that:
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should
be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and
wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is
submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted. 15
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or
typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the

Page 31 of 178

Page 32 of 178
nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a
petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 16
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ongs ancestors, by
various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial
proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have
to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ongs mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in
the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well
as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions.17 Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept
an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be
prevented by injunction from doing so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against respondent Gregory S. Ong,
who is hereby ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully
completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.
This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

5.

Arturo de Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, 17 March 2010, supra.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC

G.R. No. 191002

April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191032
JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191057
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

Page 32 of 178

Page 33 of 178
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO
THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191149
JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.
PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF
PEOPLES LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR
CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter
in his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER;
BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY
GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG
DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG
NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN
KEN LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF
STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD
OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA
GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE
JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE LEON; AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.;Intervenors.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191342
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING
(IBPGovernor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191420
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding:

Page 33 of 178

Page 34 of 178
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and
the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit;
and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be
created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief
Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the
Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in
accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Motions for Reconsideration
Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342),
and Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), as well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesDavao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang
Bayan and others (BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines
(WTLOP); Marlou B. Ubano; Mitchell John L. Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello, et
al.), filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Also filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose belated intervention was allowed.
We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration, in the aforegiven
order:
Soriano
1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of whether or not the power to
designate the Chief Justice belonged to the Supreme Court en banc.
2. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed, because it sought a mere declaratory judgment
and did not involve a justiciable controversy.
3. All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations. The mere fact that the Chief
Justice sits as ex officio head of the JBC should not prevail over the more compelling state interest for
him to participate as a Member of the Court.
Tolentino and Inting
1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial
appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments.

Page 34 of 178

Page 35 of 178
2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the Court has made distinctions and has created
exemptions when none exists.
3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII, not in Article VIII, because it limits an
executive, not a judicial, power.
4. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is superfluous, and is powerless to vary
the terms of the clear prohibition.
5. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice Regalado. Thereby, the Court
has raised the Constitution to the level of a venerated text whose intent can only be divined by its
framers as to be outside the realm of understanding by the sovereign people that ratified it.
6. Valenzuela should not be reversed.
7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers, have the clear legal standing to question the illegal
composition of the JBC.
Philippine Bar Association
1. The Courts strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the basic principle that the Court
should not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than what is required by the precise facts of
the case.
2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward, the only duty of the Court is to
apply it. The provision expressly and clearly provides a general limitation on the appointing power of
the President in prohibiting the appointment of any person to any position in the Government without
any qualification and distinction.
3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional safeguard against midnight
appointments.
4. The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:- the prohibition against midnight
appointments, and the creation of the JBC. It is not within the authority of the Court to prefer one over
the other, for the Courts duty is to apply the safeguards as they are, not as the Court likes them to be.
5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of statutory construction in interpreting the
Constitution.
6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title, chapter or section headings, despite precedents
on statutory construction holding that such headings carried very little weight.
7. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight appointments, and the only exception is
that on temporary appointments to executive positions.
8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings for the nomination of the
candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno with a
view to submitting the list of nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo on or before May 17, 2010.
The Constitution grants the Court only the power of supervision over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot
tell the JBC what to do, how to do it, or when to do it, especially in the absence of a real and justiciable
case assailing any specific action or inaction of the JBC.
9. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has indulged in speculations.

Page 35 of 178

Page 36 of 178
10. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect, the Courts directing the JBC to
comply with the decision constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution and the commission of an
election offense.
11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously formulated
by the Court en banc.
12. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the incumbent
is indisposed. Thus, the appointment of the successor Chief Justice is not urgently necessary.
13. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt to prolong the
outgoing Presidents powers by means of proxies. The attempt of the incumbent President to appoint
the next Chief Justice is undeniably intended to perpetuate her power beyond her term of office.
IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.
1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applies to appointments
to the Judiciary. Hence, no cogent reason exists to warrant the reversal of the Valenzuela
pronouncement.
2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential appointments to the Constitutional
Commissions and the JBC with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Its phrase "other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution" is enough proof that the limitation
on the appointing power of the President extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14,
Section 15, and Section 16 of Article VII apply to all presidential appointments in the Executive and
Judicial Branches of the Government.
3. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting Chief
Justice in all cases.
Lim
1. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Courts exercise of judicial review.
2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Court
and to other appointments to the Judiciary.
3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of Article VII
against midnight appointments in the Judiciary.
Corvera
1. The Courts exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on midnight
appointments is based on an interpretation beyond the plain and unequivocal language of the
Constitution.
2. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover appointments in both the Executive and
Judicial Departments. The application of the principle of verba legis (ordinary meaning) would have
obviated dwelling on the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution. If there is
any ambiguity in Section 15, Article VII, the intent behind the provision, which is to prevent political
partisanship in all branches of the Government, should have controlled.
3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation based on
compartmentalization and physical arrangement, especially considering that the Constitution must be
interpreted as a whole.

Page 36 of 178

Page 37 of 178
4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the framers of the Constitution should
yield to the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.
5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is reasonable and in accord with
the Constitution.
BAYAN, et al.
1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present
a justiciable controversy. The issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication, considering that the
office of the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has yet to decide whether or not to
submit a list of nominees to the President.
2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of
Justice Regalado.
3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII, the Court has violated
the principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat (which mandates that the Constitution should be
interpreted as a whole, such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to fully give effect
to all). There is no conflict between the provisions; they complement each other.
4. The form and structure of the Constitutions titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship carry little
weight in statutory construction. The clear and plain language of Section 15, Article VII precludes
interpretation.
Tan, Jr.
1. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or controversy. The clash of legal rights and
interests in the present case are merely anticipated. Even if it is anticipated with certainty, no actual
vacancy in the position of the Chief Justice has yet occurred.
2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary runs
in conflict with long standing principles and doctrines of statutory construction. The provision admits
only one exception, temporary appointments in the Executive Department. Thus, the Court should not
distinguish, because the law itself makes no distinction.
3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the ban on
midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary. Hence, giving more weight to the
opinion of Justice Regalado to reverse the en banc decision in Valenzuela was unwarranted.
4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1), Article VIII. The 90-day mandate to fill
any vacancy lasts until August 15, 2010, or a month and a half after the end of the ban. The next
President has roughly the same time of 45 days as the incumbent President (i.e., 44 days) within
which to scrutinize and study the qualifications of the next Chief Justice. Thus, the JBC has more than
enough opportunity to examine the nominees without haste and political uncertainty.
1avvphi1

5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII is
suspended.
6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on or before May 17, 2010. The
directive to the JBC sanctions a culpable violation of the Constitution and constitutes an election
offense.
7. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief Justice, because the Court sits en
banc, even when it acts as the sole judge of all contests relative to the election, returns and

Page 37 of 178

Page 38 of 178
qualifications of the President and Vice-President. Fourteen other Members of the Court can validly
comprise the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
WTLOP
1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees for Chief
Justice to the President on or before May 17, 2010, and to continue its proceedings for the nomination
of the candidates, because it granted a relief not prayed for; imposed on the JBC a deadline not
provided by law or the Constitution; exercised control instead of mere supervision over the JBC; and
lacked sufficient votes to reverse Valenzuela.
2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the Court has ignored the basic principle of statutory
construction to the effect that the literal meaning of the law must be applied when it is clear and
unambiguous; and that we should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish.
3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948
already provides that the power and duties of the office devolve on the most senior Associate Justice
in case of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice.
Ubano
1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being clear and unequivocal, needs no interpretation
2. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety, not by resort to the organization and arrangement
of its provisions.
3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant, because Section 15, Article VII and the pertinent
records of the Constitutional Commission are clear and unambiguous.
4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President by May 17,
2010 at the latest, because no specific law requires the JBC to submit the list of nominees even before
the vacancy has occurred.
Boiser
1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only exemption from the ban on midnight appointments is the
temporary appointment to an executive position. The limitation is in keeping with the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution to place a restriction on the power of the outgoing Chief Executive to make
appointments.
2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on midnight appointments makes
the appointee beholden to the outgoing Chief Executive, and compromises the independence of the
Chief Justice by having the outgoing President be continually influential.
3. The Courts reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient reason violates the principle of stare
decisis.
Bello, et al.
1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of appointments an outgoing President is
prohibited from making within the prescribed period. Plain textual reading and the records of the
Constitutional Commission support the view that the ban on midnight appointments extends to judicial
appointments.

Page 38 of 178

Page 39 of 178
2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The subordinate subject to oversight must
first act not in accord with prescribed rules before the act can be redone to conform to the prescribed
rules.
3. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present
a justiciable controversy.
Pimentel
1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable, rational, and conformable to the
general intent of the Constitution as a limitation to the powers of Government and as a bastion for the
protection of the rights of the people. Thus, in harmonizing seemingly conflicting provisions of the
Constitution, the interpretation should always be one that protects the citizenry from an ever expanding
grant of authority to its representatives.
2. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a manner totally repugnant to
republican constitutional democracy, and is tantamount to a judicial amendment of the Constitution
without proper authority.
Comments
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in their respective comments, thus:
OSG
1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of its nominees for the position of
Chief Justice.
2. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief Justice.
3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary.
4. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of the Judiciary from the ban on
midnight appointments.
1awph!1

5. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as other
related matters.
JBC
1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not
yet decided at the time the petitions were filed whether the incumbent President has the power to
appoint the new Chief Justice, and because the JBC, having yet to interview the candidates, has not
submitted a short list to the President.
2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary for the
President to appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as bereft of constitutional and legal basis.
The statement undermines the independence of the JBC.
3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its constitutional mandate
and its implementing rules and regulations.

Page 39 of 178

Page 40 of 178
For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even if the OSG and the
JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do so. He states that the motions for reconsideration were
directed at the administrative matter he initiated and which the Court resolved. His comment asserts:
1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision and the
separate opinion.
2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Courts power of supervision over the JBC as
provided by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, as distinguished from the Courts adjudicatory
power under Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for judicial review are not required,
which was whyValenzuela was docketed as an administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself
has yet to take a position on when to submit the short list to the proper appointing authority, it has
effectively solicited the exercise by the Court of its power of supervision over the JBC.
3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the
Constitution.
4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent of Justice
Carpio Morales, as well as in some of the motions for reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15,
Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on nepotism).
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued,
not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010.
Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that
the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.1
The contention has no basis.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to
precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in
one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in
lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a
court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts,
because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not
the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. 2
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only
of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. 3 In a
hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of
co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the
innate authority to rule according to its best lights.4
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court,
especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after
re-examination, to call for a rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law
setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament. 6 But ours is not a
common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial
pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its

Page 40 of 178

Page 41 of 178
reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification
to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its
wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation.
They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en
banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in
division.7
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Constitutional
Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Section
15, Article VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional
Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13,
Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his or her
tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section
13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication,"8 such that the final version of the second paragraph of
Section 13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit:
Section 13. xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not
during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many principles of
statutory construction.
The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed reliance on
the principles of statutory construction.
For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the ban
on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis.
That is self-contradiction at its worst.
Another instance is the movants unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article
VIII, the express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein, despite
the silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would
generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and
Section 9 should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be
interpolated in them.9 Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail to
express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new words may alter the
thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or
without the omitted word or words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative intent
is in the language of the law itself.10
Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed:
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in

Page 41 of 178

Page 42 of 178
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the
purposes of any quarter.
Final Word
It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all
the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now
granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice.
The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.
The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to
the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present
Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the
Members of the Court could have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the
Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements were
mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by
such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So
must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.
SO ORDERED.

6.

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 78780, 23 July 1987

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 78780

July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Page 42 of 178

Page 43 of 178
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the
Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even
as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to
representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of
members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive
as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's
previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue
with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court as
well as from the salaries of all other members of the judiciary.
That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has deemed it best to
settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of
the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income
tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of Government"
in the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear,
specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of
Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax
applied to all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved
and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to
include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the
deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the
salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the
ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary
exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during
their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly
subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax
by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries
during their continuance in office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of
inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their continuance in
office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically stipulated:

Page 43 of 178

Page 44 of 178
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers,
shall be exempt from payment of income tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, for
which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of "nondiminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such
contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of
judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide otherwise, the
Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of _____________ and each Associate Justice
______________ pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners presented their
objections to the provision on tax exemption, thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices, does this not
violate the principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of the law? After
all, tax is levied not on the salary but on the combined income, such that when the judge receives a
salary and it is comingled with the other income, we tax the income, not the salary. Why do we have to
give special privileges to the salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase or decrease of
their salary during their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary and affecting the
independence of the judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but the special
privilege on taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in taxation and the
equal protection clause. 6
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion, for whom we have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the judicial
system as a whole with the whole armor of defense against the executive and legislative invasion of
their independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens outside, especially the humble government
employees, might say that in trying to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with the fortress of
privileges, an island of extra territoriality under the Republic of the Philippines, because a good number
of powers and rights accorded to the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest degree by
other employees of the government.

Page 44 of 178

Page 45 of 178
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity, which is, of
course, denied to the entire executive department and the legislative. 7
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos
proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to income
tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended the original draft
and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges is of far
greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries." Commissioner Rigos then
moved that the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in support of an
amendment to the amendment with the request for a modification of the amendment," as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying that it is not
enough to drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to income tax," because if that is all that the
Gentleman will do, then he will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs.
David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which excludes them from income
tax, but rather I would propose that the statement will read: "During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this
position, I would say that the argument seems to be that the justice and judges should not be
subjected to income tax because they already gave up the income from their practice. That is true also
of Cabinet members and all other employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many
people who have accepted employment in the government involving a reduction of income and yet are
still subject to income tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting
service in government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner Rustico F. de los
Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption, Commissioner Bernas announced:
During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent, Commissioner
Rigos, that his amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be DECREASED."But this is on the understanding that there will be a provision in the
Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which
says:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional
officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.
So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject
to tax.
When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax of salaries of
public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General Provisions. But at any
rate, when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the understanding that the doctrine in
Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved without objection.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that there will be a
provision under the Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note
that the salaries of officials of the government including constitutional officers shall not be exempt from
income tax? The amendment proposed herein and accepted by the Committee now reads as follows:
"During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor
subjected to income tax" is deleted.9

Page 45 of 178

Page 46 of 178
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it
was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in
adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is
but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. 10 The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people
in the adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 12
1avvphi1

Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced
hereunder:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of
Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment,
or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction
to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon
the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed
inEndencia vs. David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the
people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of
the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations
of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the
government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.
7.

Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 Phil. 297 (1948)

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1612

February 26, 1948

JORGE B. VARGAS, petitioner,

vs.
EMILIO RILLORAZA, JOSE BERNABE, MANUEL ESCUDERO, Judges of the People's Court, and THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Manuel Lim and Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona for
respondents.
HILADO, J.:

Page 46 of 178

Page 47 of 178
Counsel for the defense, in a motion dated August 28, 1947, assails the constitutionality of section 14 of the
People's Court Act (Commonwealth Act No. 682) upon the following grounds:
(a) It provides for qualification of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in section
6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.
(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the
qualifications set forth in section 6, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.
(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure other than
impeachment, contrary to Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution.
(d) It deprives the Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to confirm
or reject appointments to the Supreme Court.
(e) It creates two Supreme Courts.
(f) it impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13, Article VIII of the
Philippine Constitution.
(g) It is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualification members of the Supreme Court who
rendered said public service during the Japanese occupation.
(h) It denies equal protection of the laws.
(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation.
(j) It amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV, of the Philippine
Constitution.
(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the "packing" of the Supreme Court in
certain cases, either by Congress or by the President.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the prosecution, opposes the motion and in support of his opposition submits
these propositions:
1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682.
2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not intended to provide an additional
qualification for members of the Supreme Court, much less does it amend section 6, Article VIII, of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed in section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution apply to permanent "appointees" not to temporary "designees."
4. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution is not applicable to temporary designations under section
14, Commonwealth Act No. 682.
5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of the Supreme Court affected to sit and
vote in the particular class of cases therein mentioned.
6. It does not create an additional "Special Supreme Court."

Page 47 of 178

Page 48 of 178
7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the Supreme Court but merely supplements the Rules of
Court.
8. It is not a bill of attainder.
9. It is not an ex post pacto law.
10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to the Justices of the Supreme Court affected
or the treason indicates concerned.
11. It does not amend any constitutional provision.
12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
This opposition is a reproduction by reference in the instant case of a similar pleading filed by the Solicitor
General in G.R. No. L-398, People vs. Sison, pursuant to the resolution of this Court in the instant case dated
October 30, 1947, granting the prayer of the Assistant Solicitor General that in the consideration of petitioner's
memorandum herein of September 27, 1947.
It will not be necessary for the purposes of this resolution to consider and decide all the legal questions thus
raised by these conflicting contentions of the parties.
For the purposes of the present resolution, the considerations presently to be set forth are deemed insufficient.
Article VIII, section 4, of the Constitution ordains that the Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice
and ten Associate Justices and may sit either in banc or in two divisions unless otherwise provided by law.
Section 5 of the same Article provides, inter alia, that the members of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Section 6 of the same Article stipulates
that no person may be appointed member of the Supreme Court unless he has been five years a citizen of the
Philippines, is at least 40 years of age, and has for 10 years or more been a judge of a court of record or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. By virtue of section 9 of said Article, the members of the
Supreme Court, among other judicial officials, shall not hold office during good behavior, until they reach, the
age of 70 years, or become incapacitated, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.
Section 13 of the same Article VIII, inter alia, enunciates procedure thereby repealed as statutes and are
declared rules of court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same, and to the
power of the Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement them. Art. XVI, section 2, provides that "all laws of the
Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and thereafter they shall
remain operative unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
Congress of the Philippines ..."
Before the adoption of the Constitution, the law on disqualification of judges was contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure, sections 8 and 608. If said sections should be considered as parts of the then existing adjective
legislation, Article VIII, section 13, of the constitution repealed them along with the others dealing with pleading,
practice and procedure, as statutes, and declared them rules of court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same, without prejudice to the power of the Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement them. In such case, when the Constitution so provided in said section 13, it sanctioned as rules of
court, among other provisions, those in said sections 8 and 609 of the former Code of Civil Procedure
concerning the disqualification of judges. If said sections should be deemed as pertaining to then existing
substantive legislation, then they were continued as laws or statutes by the aforecited provision of Article XVI,
section 2.
By virtue either of Article VIII, section 13, or Article XVI, section 2, of the constitution, therefore, the grounds for
disqualifying judges, which had been held to include justices of the Supreme Court (Jurado & Co, vs.
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, 1 Phil., 395) were those established in sections 8 and 608 of the
former Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court later promulgated the present Rules of Court wherein Rule
123 treats of the matter of disqualification of judicial officers. The provisions of said rule have been taken from

Page 48 of 178

Page 49 of 178
the above-cited sections 8 and 608 of the same former Code of Civil Procedure (see also II Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 2d ed., pp. 779-782). By reason of the fact that the aforementioned provisions of the
former Code of Civil Procedure were continued by the constitution itself, either as rules of court or as laws or
statutes a point we need not now decide there can be no question of unconstitutionality or repugnancy of
said provisions to the constitution as regards the disqualification of judicial officers. In other words, the framers
deemed it fit, right and proper that said provisions shall continue to govern the disqualification of judicial
officers.
Such question of unconstitutionality or repugnancy to the constitution, however, arises in relation to the
disqualification of certain members of the Supreme Court provided for in section 14 of the People's Court Act
which says:
SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the Philippine
Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in any
case brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in which the accused is a person who held
any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine
Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof.
If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds or disqualification of judges, in
Rule 126, section 1 of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability the
requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not
present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of
First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section one
hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justice of said Court, in order to form a quorum or
until a judgment in said case is reached.
We propose to approach this question from the following angles: (a) whether or not the Congress had power to
ass to the pre-existing grounds of disqualification of a Justice of the Supreme Court, that provided for in said
section 14; (b) whether or not a person may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court who has not been duly
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments pursuant to the constitution ,
even only as a "designee"; and (c) whether or not by the method of "designation" created by the aforecited
section 14 a Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judge, designated by the
President under the same section can constitutionally "sit temporarily as Justice" of the Supreme Court by
virtue thereof.
(a) We start with the principle, well known to the legal profession, that no act of the legislature repugnant to the
constitution can become law (In re Guaria, 24 Phil., 37, 45; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 175). To discover
whether the above quoted section 14 of the People's Court Act is repugnant to the constitution, one of the best
tests would be to compare the operation with the same section if the latter were to be allowed to produce its
effects. It is self evident that before the enactment of the oft-quoted section of the People's Court Act, it was not
only the power but the bounden duty of all members of the Supreme Court to sit in judgment in all treason
cases duly brought or appealed to the Court. That power and that duty arise from the above cited sections of
Article VIII of the Constitution, namely, section 4, providing how the court shall be composed and how it may sit,
section 9, ordaining that they shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become, incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, and the pertinent constitutional and statutory
provisions bearing on the jurisdiction, powers and responsibilities of the Supreme Court. Competently referring
to the instant case, if section 14 of the People's Court Act had not been inserted therein, there can be no
question that each and every member of this Court would have to sit in judgment in said case.
But if said section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court "who held any office or position under
the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic" would be disqualified
from sitting and voting in the instant case, because the accused herein is a person who likewise held an office
or position at least under the Philippine Executive Commission. In other words, what the constitution in this
respect ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the People's Court Act
would prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling. What the constitution directs the section prohibits. A clearer
case of repugnancy of fundamental law can hardly be imagined.

Page 49 of 178

Page 50 of 178
For repugnancy to result it is not necessary that there should be an actual removal of the disqualified Justice
from his office for, as above demonstrated, were it not for the challenged section 14 there would have been
anuninterrupted continuity in the tenure of the displaced Justice and in his exercise of the powers and
fulfillment of the duties appertaining to his office, saving only proper cases or disqualification under Rule 126.
What matters here is not only that the Justice affected continue to be a member of the Court and to enjoy the
emoluments as well as to exercise the other powers and fulfill the other duties of his office, but that he be left
unhampered to exercise all the powers and fulfill all the responsibilities of said office in all cases properly
coming before his Court under the constitution, again without prejudice to proper cases of disqualification under
Rule 126. Any statute enacted by the legislature which would impede him in this regard, in the words of this
Court in In re Guaria,supra, citing Marbury vs. Madison, supra, "simply can not become law."
It goes without saying that, whether the matter of disqualification of judicial officers belong to the realm of
adjective, or to that of substantive law, whatever modifications, change or innovation the legislature may
propose to introduce therein, must not in any way contravene the provisions of the constitution, nor be
repugnant to the genius of the governmental system established thereby. The tripartite system, the mutual
independence of the three departments in particular, the independence of the judiciary , the scheme of
checks and balances, are commonplaces in democratic governments like this Republic. No legislation may be
allowed which would destroy or tend to destroy any of them.
Under Article VIII, section 2 (4) of the Constitution the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its appellate
jurisdiction, among others, over those criminal cases where the penalty may be death or life imprisonment.
Pursuant to Article VIII, sections 4, 5, 6, and 9 of the Constitution the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may
only be exercised by the Chief Justice with the consent of the Commission of Appointments, sitting in banc or in
division, and in cases like those involving treason they must sit in banc. If according to section 4 of said Article
VIII, "the Supreme Court shall be composed" of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein referred to, its
jurisdiction can only be exercised by it as thus composed. To disqualify any of these constitutional component
members of the Court particularly, as in the instant case, a majority of them is nothing short of pro
tantodepriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a
judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. (Diehl vs. Crumb, 72 Okl., 108; 179 Pac., 44). And if that judge is the
one designated by the constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of
this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of
the court itself. It would seem evident that if the Congress could disqualify members of this Court to take part in
the hearing and determination of certain collaboration cases it could extend the disqualification to other cases.
The question is not one of degree or reasonableness. It affects the very heart of judicial independence.
Willoughby's United States Constitutional Law, under the topic of separation of powers, Volume 3, pages 16221624, says:
Upon the other hand, as we shall see, the courts have not hesitated to protect their own independence
from legislative control, not simply be refusing to give effect to retroactive declaratory statutes, or to
acts attempting the revision or reversal of judicial determination, but by refusing themselves to
entertain jurisdiction in cases in which they have not been given the power to enforce their decrees by
their own writs of execution. Thus, as already mentioned, they have refused to act where their
decisions have been subject to legislative or administrative revisions. Finally, even where the extent of
their jurisdiction, as to both parties litigant and subject-matter, has been subject to legislative control,
the courts have not permitted themselves to be deprived of the power necessary for maintaining the
dignity, the orderly course of their procedure, and the effectiveness of their writs.
In order that the court may perform its judicial functions with dignity and effectiveness, it is necessary
that it should possess certain powers. Among these is the right to issue certain writs, called extraordinary writs, such as mandamus, injunction, certiorari, prohibition, etc. and especially, to punish for
contempt any disobedience to its orders. The possession of these powers the courts have jealously
guarded, and in accordance with the constitutional doctrine of the separation and independence of the
three departments of government, have held, and undoubtedly will continue to hold, invalid any
attempt on the part of the legislature to deprive them by statute of any power the exercise of which
they deem essential to the proper performance of their judicial functions. The extent of their
jurisdiction, they argue, may be more or less within legislative control, but the possession of powers for

Page 50 of 178

Page 51 of 178
the efficient exercise of that jurisdiction, whether statutory or constitutional, which they do possess,
they cannot be deprived of.
It has already been pointed out that the jurisdiction of the inferior Federal courts and the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are wholly within the control of Congress, depending as they do upon
statutory grant. It has, however, been argued that while the extent of this jurisdiction is thus within the
control of the legislature, that body may not control the manner in which the jurisdiction which is
granted shall be exercised, at least to the extent of denying to the courts the authority to issue writs
and take other judicial action necessary for the proper and effective execution of their functions. In
other words, the argument is, that while jurisdiction is obtained by congressional grant, judicial power,
when once a court is established and given a jurisdiction, at once attaches by direct force of the
Constitution.
This position was especially argued by Senator Knox, Spooner and Culberson and contested by
Senator Bailey during the debate upon the Repburn Railway Rate Bill of 1906. The point at issue was
the constitutionality of the amendment offered by Senator Bailey providing that no rate or charge,
regulation or practice, prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, should be set aside or
suspended by any preliminary or interlocutory decree or order of a circuit court.
This position would seem to be well taken, and would apply to attempts upon the part of Congress to
specify the classes of statutes whose constitutionality may be questioned by the courts, or to declare
the number of justices of the Supreme Court who will be required to concur in order to render a
judgment declaring the unconstitutionality of an act of Congress.
In State vs. Morrill (16 Ark., 384), the Supreme Court of Arkansas declared:
The legislature may regulate the exercise of, but cannot abridge, the express or necessarily implied
powers granted to this court by the Constitution. If it could, it might encroach upon both the judicial and
executive departments, and draw to itself all the powers of government; and thereby destroy that
admirable system of checks and balances to be found in the organic framework of both the federal and
state institutions, and a favorite theory in the government of the American people . . . .
The members affected by the prohibition have heretofore disqualified themselves, partly because they
presumed the statute valid and partly because they would rather have no hand in the revision of the appeals,
for the purpose of avoiding even a breath of suspicion as to the impartiality of their actuations. However,
realizing upon a thorough analysis of the matter by counsel on both sides, the far-reaching implications which
the precedent might authorize, imperilling the independence of one coordinate branch of the Government, they
finally cast aside all reluctance to consider the point, and came out with practical unanimity to condemn any
legislation which impinges or might impinge upon the fundamental independents powers of the judicature.
Some of them have no quarrel with legislative authority to enumerate instances in which judges may not sit.
They would even concede that. But, they say, let the rules be promulgated before the event happens or
litigation arises. To promulgate them after, would enable the Congress in specific situations to order that Judge
X shall not decide the controversy between Y and Z or that Justice M shall not sit in the appeal of P.S. and so
on ad infinitum, and thus decisively influence the decision, for or against one party litigant. Such legislative
power might thus be wielded to interfere with the functions of the judiciary, depriving Philippine citizens of their
right of impartial awards from judges selected without any reference to the parties or interest to be affected.
Unnecessary to prove or impute sinister motives behind the statutory disqualification. Enough that recognition
of the power might give way to the operation of unworthy combinations or oppressive designs.
Let it not be argued that the Court is the same, only the membership being different. Because Article VIII,
sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other than the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is
enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court as in this case are replaced by
judges of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the constitution provides
for only oneSupreme Court.

Page 51 of 178

Page 52 of 178
From all that has been said above it results that the ground for disqualification added by section 14 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and
continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the organic law.
(b) In the face of the constitutional requirement (Art. VIII, section 5) that the members of the Supreme Court
should be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, we are of the
opinion that no person not so appointed may act as Justice of the Supreme Court and that the "designation"
authorized in section 14 of the People's Court Act to be made by the President of any Judge of First Instance,
Judge-at-large of First Instance or cadastral Judge can not possibly be a compliance with the provision
requiring that appointment. An additional disqualifying circumstance of the "designee" is the lack of confirmation
by or consent of the Commission on Appointments. Without intending the least reflection on the ability, learning,
and integrity of any such "designee", we are merely construing and applying the fundamental law of the land. A
Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judge, under section 149 of the Revised
Administrative Code, need not be at least forty years of age, nor have more than ten years or more been a
judge of a court of record or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines (as required by section 6 of Article
VIII of the Constitution), because under said section he need only have practiced law for a period of not less
than five years or have held during a like period within the Philippines an office requiring a lawyer's diploma. So
that it may happen that a "designee" under section 14 of the People's Court Act, sitting as a substitute Justice
of the Supreme Court in particular collaboration cases, and participating therein in the deliberations and
functions of the Supreme Court, like any regular Justice thereof, does not possess the required constitutional
qualifications of a regular member of said Court. Here again is another point of repugnancy between the
challenged section and the constitution. And if we consider the actual fact that only four of the present ten
Justices of this Court are not adversely affected by the disqualification established in section 14 of the People's
Court Act, we see that the "designees" constitute a majority when sitting with said four Justices, giving rise to
the result that, if the composed by them all should be considered as the Supreme Court, it would be composed
by four members appointed and confirmed pursuant to sections 4 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution and
six who have not been so appointed and confirmed. The situation would not be helped any by saying that such
composition of the Court is only temporary, for no temporary composition of the Supreme Court is authorized
by the constitution. This tribunal, as established under the organic law, is one of the permanent institutions of
the government. The clause "unless otherwise provided by law" found in said section 4 can not be construed to
authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the
Constitution, for however brief a time as may be imagined. In principle, what really matters is not the length or
shortness of the constitutional composition of the Court, but the very permanence an unalterability of that
composition so long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent and unaltered. We are furthermore
of opinion that said clause refers to the number of Justices who were to compose the Court upon its initial
organization under the Commonwealth, and the manner of its sitting; that is, that the Legislature, when
providing for the initial organization of the Supreme Court under the Commonwealth, was authorized to fix a
different number of Justices than eleven, and determine the manner of the Court's sitting differently from that
established in section 4 of Article VIII of the Constitution, but it was and is not empowered to alter the
qualifications of the Justices and the mode of their appointment, which are matters governed by sections 5 and
6 of said Article VIII wherein the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" does not ever exist, nor the
provision on who shall be the component members of the Court. Such a legislation was enacted in the form of
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, the pertinent provisions of which amended sections 133 and 134 of the
Revised Administrative Code. But after liberation, the Chief Executive, by Executive Order No. 40 (41 Off. Gaz.,
187) amended sections 133 and 134 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 3 and sections 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 259, and repealed all acts or parts of
acts inconsistent with the provisions of said executive order; and the same Chief Executive, by Executive Order
No. 86 (42 Off. Gaz., 15) further amended section 133 of the Revised Administrative Code, as thus previously
amended, also repealing all acts or parts of acts inconsistent therewith. Both by virtue of Executive Order no.
40 and Executive Order No. 86, the number of Justices of the Supreme Court, as originally fixed at eleven by
the Constitution, was restored.
(c) However temporary or brief may be the action or participation of a judge designated under section 14 of the
People's Court Act in a collaboration case of the class therein defined, there is no escaping the fact that he
would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the Supreme Court, as the appellate tribunal in such a
case, and if allowed to do so, his vote would count as much as that of any regular Justice of the Court. There
can be no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required by section 4 of Article VIII of the
Constitution to compose the Supreme Court indeed, a "temporary member" thereof would be a misnomer,

Page 52 of 178

Page 53 of 178
implying a position not contemplated by the constitution. Section 5 of the same Article VIII, in requiring the
members of the Supreme Court to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointment, makes it plainly indubitable that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices who are to compose the
Court and sit therein under section 4, have to be thus appointed and confirmed.
As already adverted to, a mere designation under section 14 of the People's Court Act does not satisfy the
Constitutional requirement of appointment, with the additional circumstance that as to such designation, the
Commission on Appointments is entirely dispensed with. We find absolutely nothing in the context which may
soundly be construed as authorizing, merely by legislation, any change in the constitutional composition of the
Supreme Court, or the performance of its functions by any but its constitutional members. On the other hand,
we have to go by the cardinal rule that "usually provisions of a constitution are mandatory rather than directory,
and mandatory provisions are binding on all department of the government." (16 C.J.S., 120).
The main reason for this rule is that in the Constitutions the sovereign itself speaks and is laying down
rules which, for the time at least, are to control alike the government and the governed. It is an
instrument of a solemn and permanent character, laying down fundamental maxims, and, ordinarily, is
not supposed to concern itself with mere rules or order in unessential matters (Baker vs. Moorhead,
174 N.W., 430, 431; 103 Neb. m, 811);
Court is loath to say that any language of the constitution is merely directory. Scopes vs. State, 289
S.W., 363, 366; 154 Tenn., 105; 53 A.L.R., 821). (Footnote 93, C.J.S., 120.)
Under sections 4 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, it is clear that the framers intended the Supreme Court
to function through the members who are therein defined: and by section 6 they determined who may be
appointed such members. This naturally excludes the intervention of any person or official who is not a member
of the Court in the performance of its functions; and it is self-evident that the "designees" spoken of in section
14 of the People's Court Act can not be such members in view of the fact that they have not
been appointed and confirmedas such pursuant to said sections 5 and 6.
Hence, we do not see the way clear to the proposition that the "designees" in such a case can constitutionally
"sit temporarily as Justices" of the Supreme Court.
By an act of the United States Congress dated February 6, 1905, it was provided in part as follows:
Temporary judges of the Supreme Court; ... Whenever by reason of temporary disability of any judge
of the Supreme Court or by reason of vacancies occurring therein, a quorum of the court shall not be
present for business the Governor General of the Philippine Islands is authorized to designate a judge
or judges of the court of First Instance in the islands to sit and act temporarily as judge or judges of the
Supreme Court in order to constitute a quorum of said Supreme Court for business. . . . .
As part of the membership of the Court believes that this provision is still in force by virtue of Article XVI,
section 2, of the Constitution, and should still be applied to cases of "temporary disability ... or vacancies
occurring" and preventing a quorum; while the other members are not prepared to subscribe to the same view,
for the reason that the designation" thereby authorized would be "inconsistent with this constitution," in the
word of the cited section, the same as the "designation" authorized by section 14 of the People's Court Act.
Anyway, we need not decide the point now.
This decision has been prepared before this date, and is being promulgated before the Court acts upon the
Solicitor General's motion to dismiss dates February 17, 1948, for the rulings contained herein.
For the foregoing consideration, it is declared and ordered: (a) that section 14 of the People's Court Act is
unconstitutional in the respects specified in the body of this resolution; and (b) that this case be dealt with
henceforward in pursuance of and in harmony with this resolution. So ordered.

8.

De La Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294

Page 53 of 178

Page 54 of 178

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO
L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES
ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and
RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or legislative act in
an appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of
judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative
power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle of the

independence of the judiciary 2as protected and safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The
Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until
they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The
Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of
inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such
Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for
petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of
the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded,
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief
and/or for Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin

respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and respondent
Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to
bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of
the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization
shall be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito
P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of
this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize
the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the
judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed
on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the morning
and afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents were heard through counsel
but also the amici curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of
the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by

Page 54 of 178

Page 55 of 178
memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not
unconstitutional.
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is
concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus:

"The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be
considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this
excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack on
the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not protecting their
rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties
intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The
protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a wellordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in
substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have
convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply
demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works,foreshadowed by the very decision of People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully
discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we are prepared to take that step. Respondents,
however, would hark back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham with their
claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is
comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process
can act on it.' That is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United States. For as Chief
Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not
breached has definitely been lowered." 11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to
demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater
care in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid themselves open to the accusation of
reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was
organized.12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5

of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the
reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to
provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace
all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal
Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a Report was
submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee
on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its
appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what today is a basic and urgent
need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are problems, both grave and
pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from
Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say
that the people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a
greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means much
more so, the poorest and the humblest can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive
manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be manifest to all members of
the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected by the exercise of their functions. It
is to that task that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting
point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court, which
since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal
courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for more
efficient administration does not suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial
so stem it is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective on June
16, 1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two decades of this century are likely
to be attended with problems of even greater complexity and delicacy. New social interests are pressing

Page 55 of 178

Page 56 of 178
for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically underprivileged, have
found legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has
not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to the
mills of justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus
apparent. The national leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that
will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued national
progress." 15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been
repeatedly stressed and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it
to b "considered as simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of
sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its
implication goes further than economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the
democratization of social and economic opportunities, the substantiation of the true meaning of social
justice." 17 This process of modernization and change compels the government to extend its field of
activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the
poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social justice and protection
to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that
some measures deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds
of validity. Even if the question does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and
application. ... There could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves
would not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies
embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not conducive to progress in
development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital concern is the problem of clogged
dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined
efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube
Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time supervision of the courts was vested
in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and more cases has continued." 20 It is
understandable why. With the accelerated economic development, the growth of population, the
increasing urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve
controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the
Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of
the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage
before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as "both
pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of

such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after four generations. 22 The reference
was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of 1901, 23 amended in a significant way, only
twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935,
originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to
transact business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the establishment of
independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It continued the
existing system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the
Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal
Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously
increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a Presiding Justice
and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first
was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in
the same year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently
followed by the creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit
Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same qualifications, rank, compensation,
and privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance. 34
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues:

Page 56 of 178

Page 57 of 178
"Pursuant to the President's instructions, this proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the
guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the
attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures
which do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the
governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth in the Report be
not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to
appellate adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to
enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into one of the
innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was sponsored

by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was
referred. Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang
Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the sponsorship speech of Minister
Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Thus:
"On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the
President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was
drafted substantially in accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth
in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the government
and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public
hearings on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished
members of the bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position
papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly,
result in the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the
quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the
court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of
jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the
exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be
observed that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show
that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort
as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a
background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is
tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that
characterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate
body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias,
Jr. 38reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal

or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their
offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of
offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass
to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an
illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in
good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial Governor, 40 two
earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other branches
of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As
that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of
merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta
v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that
he, and not respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance
of Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the
Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he
received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the new legislation.
Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then National Assembly disapproved the

Page 57 of 178

Page 58 of 178
same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the Act insofar as it
resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His
petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice
Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to
preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure
guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among
other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila
and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the
fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of
the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the
security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of
the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide
actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49
Law. ed; 937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly
may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of
tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the
one hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a
legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the
rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise
where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and plain, and
that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose.
When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then.
I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was
considered a great public need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was
not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. Under these
circumstances, I am for sustaining the power of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be
sure, there was greater necessity for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new
government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine
Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision providing for the
vacation by the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is
engendered by its silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative
power." 45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta,
reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No.

4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of the government, including the courts of first instance. In
both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As
Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as
to Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first instance was provided for
expressly. It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the
same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the
legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged
statute creates an intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the
national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as
in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that
existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new
inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution.
Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was
for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears
mentioning that in Brillo v. Eage56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice Diokno,
citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de
Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado

Page 58 of 178

Page 59 of 178
extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspodiente.Mc Culley vs. State, 46
LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 aos de edad o se incapacite no priva al
Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless,
such well-established principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of
Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso
de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha cambiado el nombre con el cambio de
forma del gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove
that the challenged statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that
should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far as all inferior courts from
the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and
the Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such

cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of
this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the
President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and
the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration,
the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
the office." 60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to inquire further into the
allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free from
extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution adheres
even more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the 1935 Charter.
As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro M.
Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a concept, categorically spoke of
providing "an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public opinion,
will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by
vexatious interferences by other departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that social
group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil.62 Moreover, under
the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again the principle of separation of powers, to quote
from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through express
provision but by actual division." 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief
executive of the Republic of the Philippines." 65 Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all
the powers he possessed under the 1935 Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang
Pambansa provides otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The Executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution
created the position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was a provision for a
Prime Minister as the head of government exercising the executive power with the assistance of the
Cabinet69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments
though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of
certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially
presidential character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a
majority of the members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the Batasang
Pambansa and the creation of an Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and
not more than fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang
Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of government that is now operative. 72 What
is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise
undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation may be
necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is
understandable then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve
unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes,
there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches." 74

Page 59 of 178

Page 60 of 178
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the
security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.
There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this
Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to

discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." 76 Thus
it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was
vested with such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is
in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation
of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that
its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord
respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by
either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly
belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power, Rather what is
sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the
exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from
any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with
distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice
of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is
to be preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and
forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuez v.
Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the
Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling
is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar
that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a
way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a
proposition too plain to be committed. It commends itself for approval." 80 Nor would such a step be
unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts,
specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through
implementing orders, on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but
the spirit that informs it should not be ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section
44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality. 83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or harmonize
constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to
reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the
termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable
from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of
constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded
competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that
this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the
previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, "the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government,
the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes
makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic

utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed
by one of those insights for which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of government

Page 60 of 178

Page 61 of 178
powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the
postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is more truism
and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as observed by
Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical precision and divide
the branches into water-tight compartments' not only because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do
not establish and divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the more specific of them are
found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from
Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is
well-nigh unavodiable under the fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The constitutional
structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of governmental functions are recognized,
unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the same way that the
academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and
this is one of them, where, without this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a
case of power against power. That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the
allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the statute is
quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial
Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such
receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set
forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the

doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make
laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and
provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there
must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules
and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that
bind the executive and legislative departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of
policies as well as their implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency.
There is accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is
accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such
means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highlyrespected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of
modern government.'" 90 He warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to
much-needed legislation."91 Further on this point from the same opinion" "The spectre of the nondelegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative
chambers." 92 Another objection based on the absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a
"definite time frame limitation" is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this
provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the
effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which shall be the
basis of the implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately
succeeding section." 93 The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The provisions of
this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the
President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing
inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided
in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed

Page 61 of 178

Page 62 of 178
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity.
The incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No fear need be
entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their
being named anew, 97 in legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It
is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service, private
practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little more
time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment, it is not
from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will
characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice
Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a
law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle that to save a statute that could be done,
"there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer of
this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the firstnamed was the chairman and the other two, members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the
hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the
Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted.
They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative
body. 100 Their work was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for

reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could be no
possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over
interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted and
how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this
opinion that either the then Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the
Philippines 101consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is
not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: "In the twentieth
century the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of
conditions have been responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has been
the creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief
Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the
extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights,
to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either
expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The
Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust." 104 That is more

than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does
so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that
standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an
added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or
untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their
knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or
unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a significance
transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The
challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due
care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded in the national
consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence in thought and action necessarily
is rooted in one's mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary
of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given character and
fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during
good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one administration after
another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will be
nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord
Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised

Page 62 of 178

Page 63 of 178
to reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at the
cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes
[him] as a judge." So it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing the independence of the
judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 Theponencia of Justice Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who
have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are
permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent
and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of
government." 108 There is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow
that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of
Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with
independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that
less than good faith will attend the exercise be of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot
be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit of any administration. Well
and truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and justifiably
so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and
to fulfilling the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as
validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation
Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the Supreme Court, as the
guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department or the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 110 To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional
system, this Court remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is
dismissed. No costs.

9. Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992

10. Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992

CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in
his capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM,
in her capacity as National Treasurer, respondents.
A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA April 15, 1992
REQUEST OF RETIRED JUSTICES MANUEL P. BARCELONA, JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, JUAN O. REYES, JR.
and GUARDSON R. LOOD FOR READJUSTMENT OF THEIR MONTHLY PENSION.

Page 63 of 178

Page 64 of 178

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions in the General
Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving
monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 1797. They filed the instant
petition on their own behalf and in representation of all other retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals similarly situated.
Named respondents are Hon. Franklin Drilon the Executive Secretary, Hon. Guillermo Carague as Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management, and Hon. Rosalinda Cajucom, the Treasurer of the Philippines.
The respondents are sued in their official capacities, being officials of the Executive Department involved in the
implementation of the release of funds appropriated in the Annual Appropriations Law.
We treat the Comments of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as an Answer and decide the petition on its
merits.
The factual backdrop of this case is as follows:
On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices of the
Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in the
Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70) years or
who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during
the residue of his natural life the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.
Republic Act No. 910 was amended by Republic Act No. 1797 (approved on June 21, 1957) which provided
that:
Sec. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals is
increased or decreased, such increased or decreased salary shall, for purposes of this Act, be
deemed to be the salary or the retirement pension which a Justice who as of June twelve,
nineteen hundred fifty-four had ceased to be such to accept another position in the
Government or who retired was receiving at the time of his cessation in office. Provided, that
any benefits that have already accrued prior to such increase or decrease shall not be
affected thereby.
Identical retirement benefits were also given to the members of the Constitutional Commissions under Republic
Act No. 1568, as amended by Republic Act No. 3595. On November 12, 1974, on the occasion of the Armed
Forces Loyalty Day, President Marcos signed Presidential Decree 578 which extended similar retirement
benefits to the members of the Armed Forces giving them also the automatic readjustment features of Republic
Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595.
Two months later, however, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 on January 25, 1975 repealing
Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No. 1568 and
Presidential Decree No. 578) which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers
and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries.
Significantly, under Presidential Decree 1638 the automatic readjustment of the retirement pension of officers
and enlisted men was subsequently restored by President Marcos. A later decree Presidential Decree 1909

Page 64 of 178

Page 65 of 178
was also issued providing for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of the Armed Forces who
have retired prior to September 10, 1979.
While the adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces who number in the tens of
thousands was restored, that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are only a
handful and fairly advanced in years, was not.
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the Judiciary and the Constitutional
Commissions, Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of Republic Act
No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. Congress was under the impression that Presidential Decree 644
became law after it was published in the Official Gazette on April 7, 1977. In the explanatory note of House Bill
No. 16297 and Senate Bill No. 740, the legislature saw the need to reenact Republic Act Nos. 1797 and 3595
to restore said retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, in order to assure those serving in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional
Commissions adequate old age pensions even during the time when the purchasing power of the peso has
been diminished substantially by worldwide recession or inflation. This is underscored by the fact that the
petitioner retired Chief Justice, a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and the retired Presiding
Justice are presently receiving monthly pensions of P3,333.33, P2,666.66 and P2,333.33 respectively.
President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that according to her
"it would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce
strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act No. 6758 known as
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said that "the Government should not grant
distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy
preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service servants."
Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court of Appeals Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez,
Juan O. Reyes, Jr. and Guardson R. Lood filed a letter/petition dated April 22, 1991 which we treated as
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA. The petitioners asked this Court far a readjustment of their monthly
pensions in accordance with Republic Act No. 1797. They reasoned out that Presidential Decree 644 repealing
Republic Act No. 1797 did not become law as there was no valid publication pursuant to Taada v. Tuvera, (136
SCRA 27 [1985]) and 146 SCRA 446 [1986]). Presidential Decree 644 promulgated on January 24, 1975
appeared for the first time only in the supplemental issue of the Official Gazette, (Vol. 74, No. 14) purportedly
dated April 4, 1977 but published only on September 5, 1983. Since Presidential Decree 644 has no binding
force and effect of law, it therefore did not repeal Republic Act No. 1797.
In a Resolution dated November 28, 1991 the Court acted favorably on the request. The dispositive portion
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the requests of retired Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez, Juan
O. Reyes and Guardson Lood are GRANTED. It is hereby AUTHORIZED that their monthly
pensions be adjusted and paid on the basis of RA 1797 effective January 1, 1991 without
prejudice to the payment on their pension differentials corresponding to the previous years
upon the availability of funds for the purpose.
Pursuant to the above resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992
certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates due the retired
Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
The pertinent provisions in House Bill No. 34925 are as follows:
XXVIII. THE JUDICIARY
A. Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts.

Page 65 of 178

Page 66 of 178
For general administration, administration of personnel benefits, supervision of courts,
adjudication of constitutional questions appealed and other cases, operation and maintenance
of the Judicial and Bar Council in the Supreme Court, and the adjudication of regional court
cases, metropolitan court cases, municipal trial court cases in Cities, municipal circuit court
cases, municipal, court cases, Shari'a district court cases and Shari'a circuit court cases as
indicated hereunder P2,095,651,000
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions.
1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the appropriation for
the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court to augment any item of the Court's appropriations for: (a) printing of decisions and
publications of Philippine Reports; b) commutable terminal leaves of Justices and other
personnel of the Supreme Court and any payment of adjusted pension rates to retired
Justices entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA; (c) repair,
maintenance, improvement, and other operating expenses of the courts' books and
periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance and improvement of printing equipment; e) necessary
expenses for the employment of temporary employees, contractual and casual employees, for
judicial administration; f) maintenance and improvement of the Court's Electronic Data
Processing; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in international
conferences and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable transportation and
representation allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court
Administrator, Chief of Offices and other Court personnel in accordance with the rates
prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of attorneys-de-oficio; PROVIDED, that as mandated
by LOI No. 489 any increases in salary and allowances shall be subject to the usual
procedures and policies as provided for under P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws. (page
1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
4. Payment of Adjusted Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein appropriated
for payment of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the payment of pensions
at the adjusted rates to retired justices of the Supreme Court entitled thereto pursuant to the
ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A. (page 1071, General
Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
xxx xxx xxx
Activities and Purposes
1. General Administration and Support Services.
a. General administrative Services P 43,515,000
b. Payment of retirement gratuity
of national goverment officials
and employees P 206,717,000
c. Payment of terminal leave benefits to
officials and employees antitled thereto P 55,316,000
d. Payment of pension totired jude
and justice entitled thereto P 22,500,000
(page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992)
C. COURT OF APPEALS

Page 66 of 178

Page 67 of 178
For general administration, administration
of personnel benefit, benefits and the
adjudication of appealed and other cases
as indicated hereunder P114,615,000
Special Provisions.
1. Authority to Use Savings. Subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
in accordance with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, the Presiding Justice may be authorized to use any savings in any item of the
appropriation for the Court of Appeals for purposes of: (1) improving its compound and
facilities; and (2) for augmenting any deficiency in any item of its appropriation including its
extraordinary expenses and payment of adjusted pension rates to retired justices entitled
thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A. (page 1079, General
Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
2. Payment of adjustment Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein appropriated
for payment of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the payment of pensions
at the adjusted rates to retired justices of the Court of Appeals entitled thereto pursuant to the
Ruling of the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter No. 91-6-225-C.A. (page 1079 General
Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
XL. GENERAL FUND ADJUSTMENT
For general fund adjustment for
operational and special requirements
as indicated hereunder P500,000,000
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
1. Use of the Fund. This fund shall be used for:
xxx xxx xxx
1.3. Authorized overdrafts and/or valid unbooked obligations, including the
payment of back salaries and related personnel benefits arising from
decision of competent authority including the Supreme Court decision in
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A. and COA decision in No.
1704." (page 11649 Gen. Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
On January 15, 1992, the President vetoed the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 the
Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (General Appropriations Act,
FY 1992, page 1071) and the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 2, of the Special
Provisions for the Court of Appeals (page 1079) and the underlined portions of Section 1.3 of Article XLV of the
Special Provisions of the General Fund Adjustments (page 1164, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
The reason given for the veto of said provisions is that "the resolution of this Honorable Court in Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-CA pursuant to which the foregoing appropriations for the payment of the retired Justices
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have been enacted effectively nullified the veto of the President
on House Bill No. 16297, the bill which provided for the automatic increase in the retirement pensions of the
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions by
re-enacting Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. The President's veto of the aforesaid provisions
was further justified by reiterating the earlier reasons for vetoing House Bill No. 16297: "they would erode the

Page 67 of 178

Page 68 of 178
very foundation of our collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy and standardization
of compensation. We should not permit the grant of distinct privileges to select group of officials whose
retirement pensions under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of
our civil servants."
Hence, the instant petition filed by the petitioners with the assertions that:
1) The subject veto is not an item veto;
2) The veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers;
3) The veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the pensions due them;
4) The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.
Raising similar grounds, the petitioners in AM-91-8-225-CA, brought to the attention of this Court that the veto
constitutes no legal obstacle to the continued payment of the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Court's
resolution.
On February 14, 1992, the Court resolved to consolidate Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA with G.R. No.
103524.
The petitioners' contentions are well-taken.
I
It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional government such as ours, the rule of law must prevail. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons
including the highest official of this land must defer. From this cardinal postulate, it follows that the three
branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the
Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President nor the Judiciary
may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to
the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and
application to cases and controversies.
The Constitution expressly confers or the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees. As the
guardian of the Constitution we cannot shirk the duty of seeing to it that the officers in each branch of
government do not go beyond their constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire Government itself
or any of its branches does not violate the basic liberties of the people. The essence of this judicial duty was
emphatically explained by Justice Laurel in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139
[1936]) to wit:
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality
of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries it does not assert any superiority over the other department, it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. (Emphasis supplied)
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power.
But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not
absolute.

Page 68 of 178

Page 69 of 178
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
(Section 27(2), Article VI, Constitution)
The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she
cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In
the exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery of government and it can not veto the
entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into
law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided
the "item veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue
measure.
The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item
or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of the same item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452, 464 [1990])
We distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner:
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different.
An itemin a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the
bill (Bengzon,supra, at 916.) It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose
(Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E. 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281) The United States
Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 Ct. 252,
81 L. Ed, 312) declared "that an"tem" of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which
in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens
to be put into an appropriation bill." (id. at page 465)
We regret having to state that misimpressions or unfortunately wrong advice must have been the basis of the
disputed veto.
The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000.00 to enable the Government to
meet certain unavoidable obligations which may have been inadequately funded by the specific items for the
different branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of the government.
The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by Congress to insure
that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell due.
An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which were vetoed will readily
show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than all of an item
has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions.
Thus, the augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by transferring
savings from other items of appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives power to the Chief Justice to
transfer funds from one item to another. There is no specific appropriation of money involved.
In the same manner, the provision which states that in compliance with decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Commission on Audit, funds still undetermined in amount may be drawn from the general fund adjustment is
not an item. It is the "general fund adjustment" itself which is the item. This was not touched. It was not vetoed.
More ironic is the fact that misinformation led the Executive to believe that the items in the 1992 Appropriations
Act were being vetoed when, in fact, the veto struck something else.

Page 69 of 178

Page 70 of 178
What were really vetoed are:
(1) Republic Act No. 1797 enacted as early as June 21, 1957; and
(2) The Resolution of the Supreme Court dated November 28, 1991 in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA.
We need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no President may veto the provisions
of a law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his or her term of office. Neither may the President set aside or
reverse a final and executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto power.
A few background facts may be reiterated to fully explain the unhappy situation.
Republic Act No. 1797 provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices which privilege was extended
to retired members of Constitutional Commissions by Republic Act No. 3595.
On January 25, 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644 which repealed Republic Acts
1797 and 3595. Subsequently, automatic readjustment of pensions for retired Armed Forces officers and men
was surreptitiously restored through Presidential Decree Nos. 1638 and 1909.
It was the impression that Presidential Decree No. 644 had reduced the pensions of Justices and Constitutional
Commissioners which led Congress to restore the repealed provisions through House Bill No. 16297 in 1990.
When her finance and budget advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in the 1992
General Appropriations Act were simply an attempt to overcome her earlier 1990 veto, she issued the veto now
challenged in this petition.
It turns out, however, that P.D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P.D. No. 644 was not law, it follows that Rep.
Act No. 1797 was not repealed and continues to be effective up to the present. In the same way that it was
enforced from 1951 to 1975, so should it be enforced today.
House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The
veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1991 did not also produce any effect. Both were based on erroneous and nonexistent premises.
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992
General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her
power to accomplish.
Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1717 never achieved that purpose
because it was not properly published. It never became a law.
The case of Tada v. Tuvera (134 SCRA 27 [1985]and 146 SCRA 446 [1986]) specifically requires that "all laws
shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code." This was the Court's answer to the petition of
Senator Lorenzo Taada and other opposition leaders who challenged the validity of Marcos' decrees which,
while never published, were being enforced. Secret decrees are anathema in a free society.
In support of their request, the petitioners in Administrative Matter No. 91-9-225-CA secured certification from
Director Lucita C. Sanchez of the National Printing Office that the April 4, 1977 Supplement to the Official
Gazette was published only on September 5, 1983 and officially released on September 29, 1983.
On the issue of whether or not Presidential Decree 644 became law, the Court has already categorically
spoken in a definitive ruling on the matter, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

Page 70 of 178

Page 71 of 178
PD 644 was promulgated by President Marcos on January 24, 1975, but was not immediately
or soon thereafter published although preceding and subsequent decrees were duly published
in the Official Gazette. It now appears that it was intended as a secret decree "NOT FOR
PUBLICATION" as the notation on the face of the original copy thereof plainly indicates
(Annex B). It is also clear that the decree was published in the back-dated Supplement only
after it was challenged in the Taadacase as among the presidential decrees that had not
become effective for lack of the required publication. The petition was filed on May 7, 1983,
four months before the actual publication of the decree.
It took more than eight years to publish the decree after its promulgation in 1975. Moreover,
the publication was made in bad faith insofar as it purported to show that it was done in 1977
when the now demonstrated fact is that the April 4, 1977 supplement was actually published
and released only in September 1983. The belated publication was obviously intended to
refute the petitioner's claim in the Taada case and to support the Solicitor General's
submission that the petition had become moot and academic.
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that PD 644 never became a law because it was not validly published and that,
consequently, it did not have the effect of repealing RA 1797. The requesting Justices
(including Justice Lood, whose request for the upgrading of his pension was denied on
January 15, 1991) are therefore entitled to be paid their monthly pensions on the basis of the
latter measure, which remains unchanged to date.
The Supreme Court has spoken and it has done so with finality, logically and rightly so as to assure stability in
legal relations, and avoid confusion. (see Ver v. Quetullo, 163 SCRA 80 [1988]) Like other decisions of this
Court, the ruling and principles set out in the Court resolution constitute binding precedent. (Bulig-Bulig Kita
Kamaganak Association, et al. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., Regional Trial Court, etc., G.R. 847500 16 May 1989, En
Banc, Minute Resolution)
The challenged veto has far-reaching implications which the Court can not countenance as they undermine the
principle of separation of powers. The Executive has no authority to set aside and overrule a decision of the
Supreme Court.
We must emphasize that the Supreme Court did not enact Rep. Act No. 1797. It is not within its powers to pass
laws in the first place. Its duty is confined to interpreting or defining what the law is and whether or not it
violates a provision of the Constitution.
As early as 1953, Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. This law was amended by Republic Act 1797 in 1957. Funds necessary to pay
the retirement pensions under these statutes are deemed automatically appropriated every year.
Thus, Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds and savings
which may be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme Court Resolution. As long as
retirement laws remain in the statute book, there is an existing obligation on the part of the government to pay
the adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-91-8-225-CA.
Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating
unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no power to enact or
amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal existing laws. The President's power is
merely to execute the laws as passed by Congress.
II

Page 71 of 178

Page 72 of 178
There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The attempt to use the veto power to set
aside a Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches
upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
Sec. 3, Art. VIII mandates that:
Sec. 3 The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
We can not overstress the importance of and the need for an independent judiciary. The Court has on various
past occasions explained the significance of judicial independence. In the case of De la Llana v. Alba (112
SCRA 294 [1982]), it ruled:
It is a cardinal rule of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed
with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public
officials, it has to grant them either expressly or implicitly certain powers. These they exercise
not for their own benefit but for the body politic. . . .
A public office is a public trust. That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative.
The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his
functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. . . . It is an added guarantee that
justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward
consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their
knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of
base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a
significance transcending that of a purely personal right. (At pp. 338-339)
The exercise of the veto power in this case may be traced back to the efforts of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) to ignore or overlook the plain mandate of the Constitution on fiscal autonomy. The OSG
Comment reflects the same truncated view of the provision.
We have repeatedly in the past few years called the attention of DBM that not only does it allocate less than
one percent (1%) of the national budget annually for the 22,769 Justices, Judges, and court personnel all over
the country but it also examines with a fine-toothed come how we spend the funds appropriated by Congress
based on DBM recommendations.
The gist of our position papers and arguments before Congress is as follows:
The DBM requires the Supreme Court, with Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman to submit budget proposals in accordance with parameters it establishes. DBM
evaluates the proposals, asks each agency to defend its proposals during DBM budget
hearings, submits its own version of the proposals to Congress without informing the agency
of major alterations and mutilations inflicted on their proposals, and expects each agency to
defend in Congress proposals not of the agency's making.
After the general appropriations bill is passed by Congress and signed into law by the
President, the tight and officious control by DBM continues. For the release of appropriated
funds, the Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, and Ombudsman are instructed through
"guidelines", how to prepare Work and Financial Plans and requests for monthly allotments.
The DBM evaluates and approves these plans and requests and on the basis of its approval
authorizes the release of allotments with corresponding notices of cash allocation. These
notices specify the maximum withdrawals each month which the Supreme Court, the
Commissions and the Ombudsman may make from the servicing government bank. The
above agencies are also required to submit to DBM monthly, quarterly and year-end budget

Page 72 of 178

Page 73 of 178
accountability reports to indicate their performance, physical and financial operations and
income,
The DBM reserves to itself the power to review the accountability reports and when
importuned for needed funds, to release additional allotments to the agency. Since
DBM always prunes the budget proposals to below subsistence levels and since emergency
situations usually occur during the fiscal year, the Chief Justices, Chairmen of the
Commissions, and Ombudsman are compelled to make pilgrimages to DBM for additional
funds to tide their respective agencies over the emergency.
What is fiscal autonomy?
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission,
the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee on full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate
and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of
their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but
DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing
us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence end
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on
the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations
is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially
as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of
our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree
with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to
dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The
freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the
expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or
shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must
enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just
as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed.
Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court upheld the authority of the
President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. The Court stated that:
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And
once given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the
Constitutional Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and
resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way
endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or branch of government) and
not from one department (branch) to another.
The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:

Page 73 of 178

Page 74 of 178
Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting items for the
payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the abovestated
pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the
Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy."
III
Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions due them
pursuant to RA 1797.
The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with pensions have been enacted by
practically all the states in the United States (State ex rel. Murray v, Riley, 44 Del 505, 62 A2d 236), and
presumably in most countries of the world. Statutory provisions for the support of Judges or Justices on
retirement are founded on services rendered to the state. Where a judge has complied with the statutory
prerequisite for retirement with pay, his right to retire and draw salary becomes vested and may not, thereafter,
be revoked or impaired. (Gay v. Whitehurst, 44 So ad 430)
Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the purpose of which is to entice
competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative
security, not only those who have retained their vigor but, more so, those who have been incapacitated by
illness or accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Starting From the Sixth Year
of their Retirement and After the Expiration of the Initial Five-year Period of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315
[1990]).
As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals.
This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates. Through the
years, laws were enacted and jurisprudence expounded to afford retirees better benefits.
P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910 providing that the lump sum of 5
years gratuity to which the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were entitled was to be
computed on the basis of the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances
each Justice was receiving on the date of his resignation. The Supreme Court in a resolution dated October 4,
1990, stated that this law on gratuities covers the monthly pensions of retired Judges and Justices which
should include the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances the retiree
was receiving on the date of retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices, supra)
The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional officers are unduly favored is,
again, a misimpression.
Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted men number in the tens of thousands
while retired Justices are so few they can be immediately identified. Justices retire at age 70 while military men
retire at a much younger age some retired Generals left the military at age 50 or earlier. Yet the benefits in
Rep. Act No. 1797 are made to apply equally to both groups. Any ideas arising from an alleged violation of the
equal protection clause should first be directed to retirees in the military or civil service where the reason for the
retirement provision is not based on indubitable and constitutionally sanctioned grounds, not to a handful of
retired Justices whose retirement pensions are founded on constitutional reasons.

Page 74 of 178

Page 75 of 178
The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package of protections given by the
Constitution to guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary.
The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any institution given the power to
declare, in proper cases, that act of both the President and Congress are unconstitutional needs a high degree
of independence in the exercise of its functions. Our jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress. Neither may
it be increased without our advice and concurrence. Justices may not be removed until they reach age 70
except through impeachment. All courts and court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the
Supreme Court. The President may not appoint any Judge or Justice unless he or she has been nominated by
the Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme Court's supervision. Our salaries may not be
decreased during our continuance in office. We cannot be designated to any agency performing administrative
or quasi-judicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy. The Judiciary is not only independent of,
but also co-equal and coordinate with the Executive and Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and section 30,
Article VI, Constitution)
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices of this Court and the
ground that there should be no "grant of distinct privileges" or "preferential treatment" to retired Justices ignores
these provisions of the Constitution and, in effect, asks that these Constitutional provisions on special
protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The integrity of our entire constitutional system is premised to a large
extent on the independence of the Judiciary. All these provisions are intended to preserve that independence.
So are the laws on retirement benefits of Justices.
One last point.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that:
. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public funds, raised
from taxes on other citizens, will be paid off to select individuals who are already leading
private lives and have ceased performing public service. Said the United States Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller: "To lay with one hand the power of the government
on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow upon favored individuals . . . is
nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of law . . ." (Law Association V.
Topeka, 20 Wall. 655) (Comment, p. 16)
The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are unbecoming of an office
whose top officials are supposed to be, under their charter, learned in the law.
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Cecilia Muoz
Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals may no longer be in the active service. Still, the Solicitor General and all lawyers under him who
represent the government before the two courts and whose predecessors themselves appeared before these
retirees, should show some continuing esteem and good manners toward these Justices who are now in the
evening of their years.
All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To characterize them as engaging in
"robbery" is intemperate, abrasive, and disrespectful more so because the argument is unfounded.
If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry to state that the then quality of
research in that institution has severely deteriorated.
In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW Association v. Topeka but Citizen's
Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City (20 Wall. 655; 87 U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455
[1874]. Second, the case involved the validity of a statute authorizing cities and counties to issue bonds for the
purpose of building bridges, waterpower, and other public works to aid private railroads improve their services.
The law was declared void on the ground that the right of a municipality to impose a tax cannot be used for
private interests.

Page 75 of 178

Page 76 of 178
The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000 times since that ancient period.
Public use is now equated with public interest. Public money may now be used for slum clearance, low-cost
housing, squatter resettlement, urban and agrarian reform where only private persons are the immediate
beneficiaries. What was "robbery" in 1874 is now called "social justice." There is nothing about retirement
benefits in the cited case. Obviously, the OSG lawyers cited from an old textbook or encyclopedia which could
not even spell "loan" correctly. Good lawyers are expected to go to primary sources and to use only relevant
citations.
The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues in the Judiciary requesting
adjustments in their pensions just so they would be able to cope with the everyday living expenses not to
mention the high cost of medical bills that old age entails. As Justice Cruz aptly stated in Teodoro J. Santiago v.
COA, (G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991);
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is
to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina
to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service,
he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a
generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That
generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even
as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening
shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was
rewarded for it.
For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government can
not deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and
unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and subsisting. The
respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the
funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary. The resolution
in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated November 28, 1991 is likewise ordered to be implemented as
promulgated.
SO ORDERED.

11. Joya v. PCGG, G.R. No. 96541, 24 August 1993

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993

DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL, ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA, PROF. RICARTE M.
PURUGANAN, IRMA POTENCIANO, ADRIAN CRISTOBAL, INGRID SANTAMARIA, CORAZON FIEL,
AMBASSADOR E. AGUILAR CRUZ, FLORENCIO R. JACELA, JR., MAURO MALANG, FEDERICO
AGUILAR ALCUAZ, LUCRECIA R. URTULA, SUSANO GONZALES, STEVE SANTOS, EPHRAIM
SAMSON, SOLER SANTOS, ANG KIU KOK, KERIMA POLOTAN, LUCRECIA KASILAG, LIGAYA DAVID
PEREZ, VIRGILIO ALMARIO, LIWAYWAY A. ARCEO, CHARITO PLANAS, HELENA BENITEZ, ANNA
MARIA L. HARPER, ROSALINDA OROSA, SUSAN CALO MEDINA, PATRICIA RUIZ, BONNIE RUIZ,
NELSON NAVARRO, MANDY NAVASERO, ROMEO SALVADOR, JOSEPHINE DARANG, and PAZ VETO

Page 76 of 178

Page 77 of 178
PLANAS, petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in his
official capacity, and/or the Executive Secretary, and CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T. CAPARAS, respondents.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
All thirty-five (35) petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New
York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacaang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank.
The antecedents: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President
Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie's of
New York, or CHRISTIE'S) concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two (82) Old Masters
Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to
be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies.
On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction
off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. According to the agreement,
PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings then
found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in seventy-one (71) cartons in
the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified
by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement. 1
On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit (COA) through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted
to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August
1990 to the effect that: (a) the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment
Agreement was of doubtful legality; (b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG
had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the assets subject of auction were
historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law. 2
On 15 November 1990, PCGG through its new Chairman David M. Castro, wrote President Aquino defending
the Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of COA Chairman Domingo. 3 On the same date,

Director of National Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued a certification that the items subject of the
Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not
specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage. 4 Hence, this petition originally filed on 7 January
1991 by Dean Jose Joya, Carmen Guerrero Nakpil, Armida Siguion Reyna, Prof. Ricarte M. Puruganan,
Irma Potenciano, Adrian Cristobal, Ingrid Santamaria, Corazon Fiel, Ambassador E. Aguilar Cruz,
Florencio R. Jacela, Jr., Mauro Malang, Federico Aguilar Alcuaz, Lucrecia R. Urtula, Susano Gonzales,
Steve Santos, Ephraim Samson, Soler Santos, Ang Kiu Kok, Kerima Polotan, Lucrecia Kasilag, Ligaya
David Perez, Virgilio Almario and Liwayway A. Arceo.

Page 77 of 178

Page 78 of 178
After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our resolution denying the
application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that
petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been
impleaded.
On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86
were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury. 5
On 5 February 1991, on motion of petitioners, the following were joined as additional petitioners: Charito
Planas, Helena Benitez, Ana Maria L. Harper, Rosalinda Orosa, Susan Carlo Medina, Patricia Ruiz, Bonnie
Ruiz, Nelson Navarro, Mandy Navasero, Romeo Salvador, Josephine Darang and Paz Veto Planas.
On the other hand, Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in his capacity as former Executive Secretary, the incumbent
Executive Secretary, and Chairman Mateo A.T. Caparas were impleaded as additional respondents.
Petitioners raise the following issues: (a) whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition; (b)
whether the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the
nation" which is under the protection of the state pursuant to the 1987 Constitution and/or "cultural properties"
contemplated under R.A. 4846, otherwise known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act;"
(c) whether the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be disposed of through
the joint concurrence of the President and Congress;
(d) whether respondent, PCGG has the jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with Christie's of
New York for the sale of the artworks; (e) whether, PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other
statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items; and, (f) whether the petition has
become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above issues warrant resolution from this Court.
The issues being interrelated, they will be discussed jointly hereunder. However, before proceeding, we wish to
emphasize that we admire and commend petitioners' zealous concern to keep and preserve within the country
great works of art by well-known old masters. Indeed, the value of art cannot be gainsaid. For, by serving as a
creative medium through which man can express his innermost thoughts and unbridled emotions while, at the
same time, reflecting his deep-seated ideals, art has become a true expression of beauty, joy, and life itself.
Such artistic creations give us insights into the artists' cultural heritage the historic past of the nation and the
era to which they belong in their triumphant, glorious, as well as troubled and turbulent years. It must be for
this reason that the framers of the 1987 Constitution mandated in Art. XIV, Sec. 14, that is the solemn duty of
the state to "foster the preservation, enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a Filipino national culture based on
the principle of unity in diversity in a climate of free artistic and intellectual expression." And, in urging this Court
to grant their petition, petitioners invoke this policy of the state on the protection of the arts.
But, the altruistic and noble purpose of the petition notwithstanding, there is that basic legal question which
must first be resolved: whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise
its power of judicial review over this case.
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely:
that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the
question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 6 But the most important are the first two

(2) requisites.
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court as party-plaintiff in an
action. 7 This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be

prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in
the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will
exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial

Page 78 of 178

Page 79 of 178
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. 8Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a
desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. 9
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as
when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a
public right recognized by the Constitution, 10 and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental

act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

11

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive
Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The
Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national and
important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and silverware
are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as great works
of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been
deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution. 12
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the
paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts.
The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R.
Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the
members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings
when they were placed on exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts
from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion
personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these
paintings and silverware were taken from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred
to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should
not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government
without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these
properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition
and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose
authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution.
Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become
publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged
unauthorized disposition.
Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria
for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 13 this Court laid down the rule that a writ of

mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty
of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the
fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek
is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the
continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is
unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to
challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the
governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure
of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a

Page 79 of 178

Page 80 of 178
Obviously, petitioners are
not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public
properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were
acquired from private sources and not with public money.
misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.

14

Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that this case should be resolved by this
Court as an exception to the rule on moot and academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings and
silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and
importance of the issues raised by the petition deserve this Court's attention. They submit that the resolution by
the Court of the issues in this case will establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of
the nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as a whole. 15
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy one which
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the
case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a
court of justice. 16 A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, 17 such as the

case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials
from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is long
past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.
At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is
involved.18 We find however that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation

of the rule.
Section 2 of R.A. 4846, as amended by P.D. 374, declares it to be the policy of the state to preserve and
protect the important cultural properties and national cultural treasures of the nation and to safeguard their
intrinsic value. As to what kind of artistic and cultural properties are considered by the State as involving public
interest which should therefore be protected, the answer can be gleaned from reading of the reasons behind
the enactment of R.A. 4846:
WHEREAS, the National Museum has the difficult task, under existing laws and regulations, of
preserving and protecting the cultural properties of the nation;
WHEREAS, inumerable sites all over the country have since been excavated for cultural
relics, which have passed on to private hands, representing priceless cultural treasure that
properly belongs to the Filipino people as their heritage;
WHEREAS, it is perhaps impossible now to find an area in the Philippines, whether
government or private property, which has not been disturbed by commercially-minded
diggers and collectors, literally destroying part of our historic past;
WHEREAS, because of this the Philippines has been charged as incapable of preserving and
protecting her cultural legacies;
WHEREAS, the commercialization of Philippine relics from the contact period, the Neolithic
Age, and the Paleolithic Age, has reached a point perilously placing beyond reach of savants
the study and reconstruction of Philippine prehistory; and
WHEREAS, it is believed that more stringent regulation on movement and a limited form of
registration of important cultural properties and of designated national cultural treasures is
necessary, and that regardless of the item, any cultural property exported or sold locally must
be registered with the National Museum to control the deplorable situation regarding our
national cultural properties and to implement the Cultural Properties Law (emphasis supplied).

Page 80 of 178

Page 81 of 178
Clearly, the cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state are classified as the
"important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures." "Important cultural properties" are cultural
properties which have been singled out from among the innumerable cultural properties as having exceptional
historical cultural significance to the Philippines but are not sufficiently outstanding to merit the classification of
national cultural treasures. 19 On the other hand, a "national cultural treasures" is a unique object found

locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant
and important to this country and nation. 20 This Court takes note of the certification issued by the Director
of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do not constitute protected
cultural properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National
Museum.
We agree with the certification of the Director of the Museum. Under the law, it is the Director of the Museum
who is authorized to undertake the inventory, registration, designation or classification, with the aid of
competent experts, of important cultural properties and national cultural treasures. 21 Findings of

administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities because of their
acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. 22
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds no compelling reason to grant the petition. Petitioners have failed to
show that respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG exercised their functions with grave abuse of discretion
or in excess of their jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

12. Macasiano v. NHA, G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 107921 July 1, 1993

POLICE GENERAL LEVY MACASIANO (Ret.), in his capacity as the consultant of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Task Force on Demolition and/or in his personal capacity as
taxpayer,petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD and NATIONAL
MAPPING RESOURCES INFORMATION AUTHORITY, respondents.
RESOLUTION

Page 81 of 178

Page 82 of 178
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279,
otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on his
being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of
Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain
(executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being
a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy
that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said
sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried
out in the past." 1 As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are

properly and lawfully disbursed." 2

Republic Act No. 7279 was approved on 24 March 1992 and published in the 4 May 1992 issue of the Official
Gazette. 3 The challenged provisions therein read as follows:
SEC. 28. Eviction and Demolition. Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be
discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorlines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks and playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless
citizens, the following shall be mandatory:
(1) Notice upon the affected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of
eviction or demolition;
(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of resettlement with the duly designated
representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas
where they are to be relocated;
(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or
demolition;
(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to
Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise;
(6) no use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of
concrete materials;
(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first
line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases
of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless

Page 82 of 178

Page 83 of 178
citizens, relocations shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the
National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within fortyfive(45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said
order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the
said period financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily
wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local
government concerned.
The Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to carry out the above provision.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 44. Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition. There shall be a moratorium on the
eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their houses or dwelling units for
a period of three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the moratorium shall
not apply to those persons who have constructed their structures after the effectivity of this Act
and for cases enumerated in Section 28 hereof.
Petitioner maintains that the said provisions are unconstitutional because:
(a) They deprive the government, and more so, private property owners of their property
without due process of law and without compensation;
(b) They reward, instead of punish, what this Honorable Court has categorically declared as
unlawful acts;
(c) They violate the prohibition against legislation that" takes away one's property to be given
to plain interlopers;
(d) They sweep overbroadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the State; and
(e) They encroach upon the judicial power to its valid judgments and orders. 4
On 10 December 1992, we required the respondents to comment on the petition.
In its Comment 5 filed on 15 January 1993, respondent National Mapping and Resource Information

Authority alleges that the implementation of the assailed sections of the Act does not belong to or fall
within its jurisdiction. It disagrees with the petitioner's stand that the said sections are unconstitutional and
avers that Section 28 merely provides for the "humanitarian approach" towards less privileged, citizens
and does not in fact prohibit but merely discourages eviction or demolition, while Section 44 only covers
program beneficiaries.
On 15 January 1993, the Realty Owners Association of the Philippines, Inc. filed a motion to
intervene 6 alleging that it has a legal interest in the success of the petition and is in full accord with it. This

Court required the parties to comment thereon.

On 16 February 1993, the Office of the Government Corporate (OGCC) filed a comment 7 for the respondent

National Housing Authority (NHA) informing this Court that "in a letter of respondent NHA addressed to
the office of the undersigned counsel, dated 29 January 1993, . . ., the former categorically expressed as
its official stand on the instant petition that Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279 are indeed
unconstitutional," and that "after a circumspect evaluation of petition. We find no cogent reason not to

Page 83 of 178

Page 84 of 178
support the position heretofore taken by respondent NHA." Said office then prays that the instant petition
be given due course.
On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintains that, the instant petition
is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases
involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or controversy with litigants
asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the
petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted
upon" and that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He
argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.
Up to this time, no comment has been submitted by the parties on the motion to intervene. Considering,
however, that the issues are clear and simple enough, this Court dispenses with the need for a comment on the
said motion, denies the same and, after deliberating on the issues said and the arguments adduced by the
parties in the petition and comments, declares this petition to be without merit.
It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is
necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. 8 To

reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a)
the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional
question must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the decision of the case. 9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. 10
It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no
actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is
filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his
rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged
sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine
actual controversies arising between adverse litigants." 11
In reality, his petition is one for declaratory relief as he prays therein that, "his rights as well as those of private
landowners be clearly defined and his duties under the Constitution and the pertinent laws be dearly stated with
respect to the demolition of illegal structures on public and private lands." 12 Even so, it is still not viable since

among the essential requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are controversy, (a) there must be a
justiciable controversy,(b)the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse and (c)
the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy. 13 Furthermore, an action
for declaratory relief does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only
questions of law are involved. 14 True, we have said that such a petition may be treated as one for
prohibition 15 or mandamus 16 if it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be
resolved; but the exercise of such discretion presupposes, at the outset, that the petition is otherwise
viable or meritorious.
The petitioner is not likewise a "proper party." As a consultant of the DPWH under the "Contract for
Consultancy . . .," he is not vested with any authority to demolish obstructions and encroachments on
properties of the public domain, much less on private lands. The consultancy contract limits his duties to the
following: "(a) to organize and train selected DPWH personnel for the different Engineering Districts in the NCR
in the techniques and methods of removing/demolishing illegal structures/stalls, etc. as well as in crowd control,
self-defense and security procedures . . .; (b) to provide advice to the Secretary and other DPWH officials
regarding prioritization of areas to be cleared of obstructions and encroachments; (c) to conduct field inspection
from time to time of areas recommend for clearing; (d) to provide advice in developing appropriate standards
and techniques in cost effective implementation of the removal and demolition of obstructions and
encroachments . . .; and (e) to develop operational procedures that will institutionalize demolition

Page 84 of 178

Page 85 of 178
processes." 17 Moreover, the consultancy contract expired on 31 December 1992 and the petitioner has not

manifested that he obtained a renewal or extension thereof.

Nor does the petitioner claim that he is an owner of an urban property whose enjoyment and use would be
affected by the challenged provisions of R.A. No. 7279.
Although the petitioner likewise anchors his locus standi on the fact that he is a taxpayer, it does not mean,
however, that in each and every instance where such a ground is invoked, this Court is left with no alternative
except to hear the parties. In Tan vs. Macapagal, 18 we clarified that "as far as a taxpayer's suit s concerned,

this Court is not devoid of the discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained."
We do not, as well, find an indubitable ground for the constitutional challenge. As this Court said through Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Garcia vs. Executive Secretary. 19
On the merits, We find that the constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show
that there is an indubitable ground for it, not to say even a necessity to resolve it. The policy of
the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the
political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the
contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the
Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
We cannot end this resolution without a few words on the comment of the OGCC for public respondent
National Housing Authority wherein the OGCC merely adopted the stand of the officer-in-charge of the Legal
Department of the said Authority that the challenged sections of R.A. No. 7279 are unconstitutional. On its own,
the OGCC did not even attempt to reason out why this petition should be granted or denied. It has obviously
treated this case without the circumspection and seriousness expected of it especially in the light of the
functions, duties and responsibilities of the NHA under the challenged Act. The OGCC should not have
cursorily adopted the opinion of the officer-in-charge who acted on his own and who, apparently, did not even
refer his opinion to the Board of Directors of the NHA.
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

13. Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, 7 March 1995

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

Page 85 of 178

Page 86 of 178
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A.
No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang,
Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a
resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they
assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of
Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for
local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years
following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill;
and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen.
Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which

Page 86 of 178

Page 87 of 178
shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila
Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by
the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities
of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig;
and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency
or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction
between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government
Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with
technical descriptions. 2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot
be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a
local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra
vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in
the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought
to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be
spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description
made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of
the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add,
subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section
2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed
City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the
consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort
Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of
government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have
ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes

and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which
will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government
unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as
an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar
circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the
submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the
requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities
should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" was made in order
to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other
words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment
of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of
a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with
neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent
behind the law has been sufficiently served.

Page 87 of 178

Page 88 of 178
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed
technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply.
To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to
defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest
intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It
seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at
the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on
the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the
letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave,
instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not
be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute
when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141;
Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active
instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the
case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section
51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have
already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new
corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise
continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by
the city government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of
Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3)consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate

Page 88 of 178

Page 89 of 178
existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and
disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the
incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms.
They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming
elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his
previous three-year consecutive term asmunicipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that
said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can
challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of
many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would
be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue
which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except
Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No.
7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall
thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)
existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the
Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be
with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second
district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in

the title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that

reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a
new city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only
be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each
local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province
created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The
intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever
whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section
5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati

Page 89 of 178

Page 90 of 178
stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in
Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit.,
we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to
impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror,
fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
SO ORDERED.

14. Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, 14 August 2000

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 140835

August 14, 2000

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman, PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORMS; HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary; COMMISSION ON AUDIT; ROBERTO
AVENTAJADO, as Presidential Consultant on Council of Economic Advisers/Economic Affairs;
ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser for/on Political Affairs; VERONICA IGNACIO-JONES, as
Presidential Assistant/ Appointment Secretary (In charge of appointments), respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission
on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from
acting as such, and to enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their advice and
recommendations. In addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit
expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Finally, petitioner prays
for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain matters.
On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity as Chairman of the
PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The rest of the respondents, who are being represented in this case
by the Solicitor General, filed their Comment with this Court on March 7, 2000. Petitioner then filed a
Consolidated Reply on April 24, 2000, whereupon this case was considered submitted for decision.

Page 90 of 178

Page 91 of 178
I. Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on
November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order "to study and recommend
proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the
same."1 Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds. First, he contends that it is a
public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.2 Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating
such a body the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the Constitution the
amendment of the fundamental charter.3
It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot and academic. We
agree.
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead.4 Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its task on
or before June 30, 1999.5 However, on February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O.
No. 70), which extended the time frame for the completion of the commissions work, viz
SECTION 6. Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Time Frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and complete the same on or
before 31 December 1999. The Commission shall submit its report and recommendations to the President
within fifteen (15) working days from 31 December 1999.
The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the
President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it. 6 Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist,
having lost its raison detre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to
resolve.
The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for
by petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such. 7 Clearly, prohibition is
an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that
prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.8 At this point,
any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond
the permissible scope of judicial power.
In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioners lack of standing constitutes another obstacle to the
successful invocation of judicial power insofar as the PCCR is concerned.
The question in standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 9 In assailing the constitutionality of
E.O. Nos. 43 and 70, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.10 A citizen acquires standing only
if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.11 In Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,12 we denied standing to petitioners
who were assailing a lease agreement between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation, stating that,
in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept. 22, 1987, standing was denied
to a petitioner who sought to declare a form of lottery known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid because, as the
Court held,
Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3) minor children. But nowhere in his
petition does petitioner claim that his rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have been directly and
personally injured by the operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. The interest of the person assailing the

Page 91 of 178

Page 92 of 178
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained or in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he
is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.
We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and the present petitioners. Petitioners do not
in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard
for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required to maintain an action under
Rule 3, d 2.
Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining
any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which
can claim any "injury" in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the
legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR.
Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges
have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a
result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to
seek judicial redress as a citizen.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public
funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. 13 , Thus payers action is
properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.14 This was our
ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines
(TELEBAP) and GMA Network, Inc. questioned the validity of section 92 of B.P. No. 881 (otherwise knows as
the "Omnibus Election Code") requiring radio and television stations to give free air time to the Commission on
Elections during the campaign period.15 The Court held that petitioner TELEBAP did not have any interest as a
taxpayer since the assailed law did not involve the taxing or spending power of Congress. 16
Many other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to taxpayers upon whether or not the case
involved a disbursement of public funds by the legislature. In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,17 the
petitioners therein were allowed to bring a taxpayers suit to question several presidential decrees promulgated
by then President Marcos in his legislative capacity calling for a national referendum, with the Court explaining
that
...[i]t is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute Presidential Decrees are of such nature may
be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers,
laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds. The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries an appropriation of Five
Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the
sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in
the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate
the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds.
In still another case, the Court held that petitioners the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., a non-profit
civic organization - had standing as taxpayers to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar
as it provides for retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leaves to Senators and
Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses of Congress. 18 And in Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works,19 the Court allowed petitioner to maintain a taxpayers suit assailing the constitutional soundness of
Republic Act No. 920 appropriating P85,000 for the construction, repair and improvement of feeder roads within
private property. All these cases involved the disbursement of public funds by means of a law.
Meanwhile, in Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron,20 the Court declared that the trial
court was wrong in allowing respondent Ravanzo to bring an action for injunction in his capacity as a taxpayer
in order to question the legality of the contract of lease covering the public market entered into between the City
of Dagupan and petitioner. The Court declared that Ravanzo did not possess the requisite standing to bring

Page 92 of 178

Page 93 of 178
such taxpayers suit since "[o]n its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the lease contract entered into
between petitioner and the City shows that no public funds have been or will be used in the construction of the
market building."
Coming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No.
70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is "appropriated" for its operational expenses "to
be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President." The relevant provision states Appropriations. The initial amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated for the
operational expenses of the Commission to be sourced from funds of the Office of the President, subject to the
usual accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Additional amounts shall be released to the Commission
upon submission of requirements for expenditures.
The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no an
appropriation at all. "In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation
made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be
used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. " 21 The funds used for the PCCR were taken
from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer
funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of article VI of the Constitution.
In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will
entertain a taxpayers suit.22 In the case at bar, there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but
rather, he must establish that he has a "personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 23 In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real
party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the
avails of the suit.24 Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.
II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants
The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the presidential consultants. Petitioner alleges that in 1995 and
1996, the President created seventy (70) positions in the Office of the President and appointed to said positions
twenty (20) presidential consultants, twenty-two (22) presidential advisers, and twenty-eight (28) presidential
assistants.25 Petitioner asserts that, as in the case of the PCCR, the President does not have the power to
create these positions.26
Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner does not have the personality to raise
this issue before the Court. First of all, he has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining
any injury as a result of the appointment of such presidential advisers. Secondly, petitioner has not alleged the
necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular
issue. Unlike the PCCR which was created by virtue of an executive order, petitioner does not allege by what
official act, whether it be by means of an executive order, administrative order, memorandum order, or
otherwise, the President attempted to "create" the positions of presidential advisers, consultants and
assistants. Thus, it is unclear what act of the President petitioner is assailing. In support of his allegation,
petitioner merely annexed a copy of the Philippine Government Directory (Annex "C") listing the names and
positions of such presidential consultants, advisers and assistants to his petition. However, appointment is
obviously not synonymous with creation. It would be improvident for this Court to entertain this issue given the
insufficient nature of the allegations in the Petition.
III. Right to Information
Finally, petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora to
answer his letter (Annex "D") dated October 4, 1999 requesting for the names of executive officials holding

Page 93 of 178

Page 94 of 178
multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles
seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacanang. 27
The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which provides that
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Under both the 197328 and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any
citizen before the courts. This was our ruling in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,29 wherein the Court
classified the right to information as a public right and "when a [m]andamus proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen,
and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right." However, Congress may provide for
reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Such limitations were embodied in Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise knows as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,"
which took effect on March 25, 1989. This law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public
officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from
receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within
reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.30
Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v. Dimaano31 that "[t]he
incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nations problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decisionmaking if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information
is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times." The information to which
the public is entitled to are those concerning "matters of public concern", a term which "embrace[s] a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates
to or affects the public."32
1wphi1

Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, has a
constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioners letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of
public concern that is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public property. With regard
to petitioners request for copies of the appointment papers of certain officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to
allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly
conduct of official business.33
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish
petitioner with the information requested.
SO ORDERED.

15. Maceda v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, 22 April 1993

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Page 94 of 178

Page 95 of 178

G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.

BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE
OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES;
REASON. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said cases despite this
Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his
official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees with
the first part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to
offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140
of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO
PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT; REASON. However,
We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING COMPLAINT
AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer
the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates
reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a
determination . . . In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS PERSONNEL;
REASON. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to
submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera
in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension
of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet
been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order
is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a

Page 95 of 178

Page 96 of 178
judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be
made first to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks
the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991
denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated
November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counteraffidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon
A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated
February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or
determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when
in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal
cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified
his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the
months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days
to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in
Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties,
which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the
Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all
inferior courts.
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap
that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies
his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal
Code for his felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and
court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, 3
for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory
powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of
the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has
the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the
three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as
suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4

Page 96 of 178

Page 97 of 178
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the question before Us
is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him,
report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less
resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the
resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination
whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the
complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate
action.
SO ORDERED.

16. Fuentes v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 124295

October 23, 2001

JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II, MARIVIC A.
TRABAJO-DARAY, ANTONIO E. VALENZUELA in his capacity as the Director for Fact Finding and
Intelligence of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, and MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR.,
in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition1 for certiorari assailing the propriety of the Ombudsman's action investigating petitioner
for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e). 2
On August 23, 1995, we promulgated a decision in Administrative Matter No. RTJ-94-1270. 3 The antecedent
facts are as follows:
"x x x [P]ursuant to the government's plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the Republic of
the Philippines (represented by DPWH) filed an expropriation case against the owners of the
properties affected by the project, namely, defendants Tessie Amadeo, Reynaldo Lao and Rev. Alfonso
Galo. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 22,052-93 and presided by Judge Renato A.
Fuentes.
"The government won the expropriation case. x x x
"As of May 19, 1994, the DPWH still owed the defendants-lot owners, the total sum of P15,510,415.00
broken down as follows:
Dr. Reynaldo Lao

P 489,000.00

Page 97 of 178

Page 98 of 178

Tessie P. Amadeo

P 1,094,200.00

Rev. Alfonso Galo

P 13,927,215.00

"In an order dated April 5, 1994, the lower court granted Tessie Amadeo's motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. The Order was received by DPWH
(Regional XI) through its Legal Officer, Atty. Warelito Cartagena. DPWH's counsel, the Office of the
Solicitor General, received its copy of the order only on May 10, 1994.
"On April 6, 1994, Clerk of Court Rogelio Fabro issued the corresponding Writ of Execution. On April
15, 1994, the writ was served by respondent Sheriff Paralisan to the DPWH-Region XI (Legal
Services) through William Nagar.
"On May 3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy, addressed to the Regional
Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties subject of the levy as 'All scrap iron/junks
found in the premises of the Department of Public Works and Highways depot at Panacan, Davao
City'x x x.
"The auction sale pushed through on May 18, 1994 at the DPWH depot in Panacan, Davao City. Alex
Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. x x x Sheriff Paralisan issued the corresponding certificate of
sale in favor of Alex Bacquial. x x x
"Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to withdraw the
auctioned properties on May 19, 1994. They were, however, prevented from doing so by the custodian
of the subject DPWH properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo, Regional Equipment Engineer, Regional
Equipment Services, DPWH depot in Panacan, Davao City. Engr. Alejo claimed that his office was
totally unaware of the auction sale, and informed the sheriff that many of the properties within the
holding area of the depot were still serviceable and were due for repair and rehabilitation.
"On May 20, 1994, Alex Bacquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for the issuance of a 'break through'
order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned properties. The motion was granted by
Judge Fuentes on the same date.
"On May 21, 1994, Alex Bacquial and Sheriff Paralisan returned to the depot, armed with the lower
court's order."4
Thus, Bacquial succeeded in hauling off the scrap iron/junk equipment in the depot, including the repairable
equipment within the DPWH depot. He hauled equipment from the depot for five successive days until the
lower court issued another order temporarily suspending the writ of execution it earlier issued in the
expropriation case and directing Bacquial not to implement the writ.5
However, on June 21, 1994, the lower court issued another order upholding the validity of the writ of execution
issued in favor of the defendants in Special Civil Case No. 22, 052-93. 6
On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of Davao City and Engineer
Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff
Norberto Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of an administrative case against the
sheriff and other persons responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. Also, on
September 21, 1994, the Department of Public Works and Highways, through the Solicitor General, filed an
administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, in violation of Article IX, Section 36 (b) of P. D. No. 807.7

Page 98 of 178

Page 99 of 178
After considering the foregoing facts, on August 23, 1995, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent NORBERTO PARALISAN, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court (Branch
XVII), Davao City, is declared guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, in violation
of Section 36 (b), Article IX of PD 807. Accordingly, respondent sheriff is DISMISSED from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment
in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. The office of the Court Administrator is directed to conduct an investigation on Judge
Renato Fuentes and to charge him if the result of the investigation so warrants. The Office of the
Solicitor General is likewise ordered to take appropriate action to recover the value of the serviceable
or repairable equipment which were unlawfully hauled by Alex Bacquial." 8 (italics ours)
On January 15, 1996, Director Antonio E. Valenzuela (hereafter, Valenzuela) of the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao recommended that petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes be charged before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme
Court with acts unbecoming of a judge.9
On January 22, 1996, Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a
criminal complaint10 charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e).
On February 6, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through Graft Investigation Officer II Marivic A.
Trabajo-Daray issued an order directing petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit within ten days. 11
On February 22, 1996, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss
complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court. 12
On March 15, 1996, Graft Investigation Officer Marivic A. Trabajo-Daray denied the motion of petitioner.13
Hence, this petition.14
The issue is whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his
official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an
administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint against petitioner for violation
of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he conducted an investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus,
he encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel.
The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation because the Supreme
Court is not in possession of any record which would verify the propriety of the issuance of the questioned
order and writ. Moreover, the Court Administrator has not filed any administrative case against petitioner judge
that would pose similar issues on the present inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
We grant the petition.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
"Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by

Page 99 of 178

Page 100 of 178

the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases." 15
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Section 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions.- The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary."16 (underscoring ours)
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office
against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the
case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over
all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk.17
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the
doctrine of separation of powers.18
Petitioner's questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of execution
were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack
or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under the given
circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is
tasked to supervise the courts. "No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or
investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order
or decision--whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal
or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts
alone."19
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Ombudsman is directed to dismiss the case and refer the
complaint against petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

17. Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil 640 (1948)

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2068

October 20, 1948

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent.

Page 100 of 178

Page 101 of 178

E. M. Banzali for petitioner.
Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent.

TUASON, J.:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded
to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine
the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was
issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this
proceeding.
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of
his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation,
the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon
which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so
that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law."
The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was
sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present
evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason
of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the
respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the
accused's motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano,
G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the
accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary
investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that
section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said
that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation,
there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of
action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses
to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of
arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the
witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination
be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done
away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair
trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority and denied
even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to
compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

18. In re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 (1954)

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Page 101 of 178

Page 102 of 178

EN BANC
Resolution

March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No.
972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the
bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50
per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties
of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the
examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained
an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In
1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and
feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful
candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in
Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the
passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the
views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and
submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not
override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the
vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President
allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was
enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTYFIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twentyseven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in
any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen
hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations;
seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent
in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below
fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
member of the Philippine Bar:Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half
or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such

Page 102 of 178

Page 103 of 178

subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking
its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also
invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply
the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to
individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not
they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If
they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should
be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners,
properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act
No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law,
the following statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168,
classified as follows:
1946

(August)

206

121

18

1946

(November)

477

228

43

1947

749

340

1948

899

409

11

1949

1,218

532

164

1950

1,316

893

26

1951

2,068

879

196

1952

2,738

1,033

426

1953

2,555

968

284

12,230

5,421

1,168

TOTAL

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either
motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act.
These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing
average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous
examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by
Republic Act No. 972.

Page 103 of 178

Page 104 of 178

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604
have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions
for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had
presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No.
972, although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the
hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No.
972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar
who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The
valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura
Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General,
Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario,
Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel
for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of
petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal
researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The
question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting,
the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as
possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which
students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law
soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed
that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from
"insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal
in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and
efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal
preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To
approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission
is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading
materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises had also
published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published
continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law
books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set
of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of
new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

Page 104 of 178

Page 105 of 178

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the
resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out
from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from
which has been directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the
United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial
history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in
which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the
cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the
President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law
respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the
disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a
favorable precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked
the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of
law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7,
1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New
York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any
elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void.
They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of
twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning
and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with
the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was
evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions
which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the
section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the
admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection
with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right
in the inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that
the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power
of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether
the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession
of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence
of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does
not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the
country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of
Appeals said of the object of the law:

Page 105 of 178

Page 106 of 178

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students
in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the
institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a diploma of being
graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with
the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the
ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period
of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the
mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court.
It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We
cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit
requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that
the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before
granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to
make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing
else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present
condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has
simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen.
Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction
over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of
admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a
judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and
exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly
"constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to
repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to
our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at
law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1)
previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a
judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A
comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon
(1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to
practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

Page 106 of 178

Page 107 of 178

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English
speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the
extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has
been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a
judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it
stands alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In
so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the
Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such
qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further
exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which
properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the
discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the
form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel.
Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of
justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the
powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it
was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any other department of
government, the courts cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty
thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the
courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of
its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and
bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the
English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our
Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of
1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as
was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid
of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who
should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate
that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an
essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the
judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and
coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally
exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the
Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any
manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our
constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and independent of one
another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing
inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the

Page 107 of 178

Page 108 of 178

judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the
absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the
public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law
in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum
standard and limit the class from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative
qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing
additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial
functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by
them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that
the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative
functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the
practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq.
82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law
by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre,
19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565;Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53,
19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S.
D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it
having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the
judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon
any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and
always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications
may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of
that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from
the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It
is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose
opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin,
242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He
becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end
of justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation
was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common
law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without
exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other
proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious
by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate
department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to
determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work,
and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not
possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of
common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one
of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession
by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

Page 108 of 178

Page 109 of 178

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are
officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal
learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain this
evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the
highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their
application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the
statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional
character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the
requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct
causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for
professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has
been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial
power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by
the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper
22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers
whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment
may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly
considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a
judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to
practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. Re
Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the
court. A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of
Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the
province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions
occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial
power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative
action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of
the government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction
of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their
judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what
particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70
per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the
disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during
the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor

Page 109 of 178

Page 110 of 178

executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated
by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of
the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. Constitution of the
Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule
on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter
and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the
Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress
substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution
does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the
existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession
requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to
the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be
exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which
the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution
on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the
existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal,
amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the
inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the
legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession,
and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise
within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining
the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration
of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria took examination and failed by a few
points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the
position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government
appointed Guaria and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his
license without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to
the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial
fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Page 110 of 178

Page 111 of 178

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is
hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty
of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the
passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States,
the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate
judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General,
prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila,
provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be
licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion
before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he
received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was
examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in
the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of
the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he
presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law
in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of
right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the
Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of
provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and
in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a
proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain
candidates without examination. It is contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively
required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's
claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of
Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the
Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the
commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with
particular emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this
statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been
made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had
reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their
appointment.

Page 111 of 178

Page 112 of 178

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never
had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as
provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications
at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license
to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time
he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave
evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive,
with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government
service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the
above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by
general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which
will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his
right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by
general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal
defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and
unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of
that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4,
1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had
studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they
commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was
unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law
schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the
application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The
amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the
following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in
regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a
law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said rules". In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31,
1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly
issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law
studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such
years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and
accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any
student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part
in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be
admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the
rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed,

Page 112 of 178

Page 113 of 178

confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of
legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the
constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the
courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence
which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to
practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4,
section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an
officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to
collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil
process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No
doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the
law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must
be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the
subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People,
155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis
for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has
resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination,
making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the
legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and
plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such
practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes First, those presenting diplomas
issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law
for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office,
who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court,
and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission.
As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different
conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a
diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made allsufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law
resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly
not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years
as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years
in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would
complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a
diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed
course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is
utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the
subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges
upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to
reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class
legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe
ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as
attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all.
Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen
callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233,
32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful
calling, business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon
all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a

Page 113 of 178

Page 114 of 178

distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like
conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great
learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate"
acquired in them that is, the right to continue their prosecution is often of great value to the
possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property
can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly situated and
possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper
qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously
considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at the time
of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this
general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel.
Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material
that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite
learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of
the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its
favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the
practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the United
States during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled
therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as
"World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the
time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly
violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey,
178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest
upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must
be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional
prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and
artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based
on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it
does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must
be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the
situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities
and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a
clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not
generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a
general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent
in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a
minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of
the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has
been given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated,
were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact
does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952,

Page 114 of 178

Page 115 of 178

1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions
justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one
concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that
it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946
to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain
the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who
had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who
obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the
Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had
been done cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ?
Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done
by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those
candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or
defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of
the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general
average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in
the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated,
but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the
Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the
power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was
to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress,
because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty
been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect
of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when
a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already
different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in
the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case,
however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946
to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section
21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is
inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of
Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary
methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the
Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal
defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and
therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952,
and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in
the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the
opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the
Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment
on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this
Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may
revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

Page 115 of 178

Page 116 of 178

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate
acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this
Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary
and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and
may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to
facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students
inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution
enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to
1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned
discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since
the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who
subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of
the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b)
all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in
force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to
1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average
of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having
passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall
be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates
that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

19. Javellana v. DILG, G.R. No.102549, 10 Aug.1992

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Page 116 of 178

Page 117 of 178

G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992
EDWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LUIS T. SANTOS,
SECRETARY, respondents.
Reyes, Lozada and Sabado for petitioner.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage in the practice of his
profession while employed in the Government.
Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5,
1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1)
violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in
relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,"
and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.
Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian
Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without
securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required
by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same
department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case
against City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with
Damages" putting him in public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil
cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 80-38 which provides:
MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-38
TO ALL: PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS, CITY AND MUNICIPALITY MAYORS, KLGCD
REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND ALL CONCERNED
SUBJECT: AMENDING MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-18 ON SANGGUNIAN
SESSIONS,PER DIEMS, ALLOWANCES, STAFFING AND OTHER RELATED
MATTERS
In view of the issuance or Circular No. 5-A by the Joint Commission on Local Government
Personnel Administration which affects certain provisions of MC 80-18, there is a need to
amend said Memorandum Circular to substantially conform to the pertinent provisions of
Circular No. 9-A.
xxx xxx xxx
C. Practice of Profession
The Secretary (now Minister) of Justice in an Opinion No. 46 Series of 1973 stated inter
alia that "members of local legislative bodies, other than the provincial governors or the
mayors, do not keep regular office hours." "They merely attend meetings or sessions of the
provincial board or the city or municipal council" and that provincial board members are not

Page 117 of 178

Page 118 of 178

even required "to have an office in the provincial building." Consequently, they are not
therefore to required to report daily as other regular government employees do, except when
they are delegated to perform certain administrative functions in the interest of public service
by the Governor or Mayor as the case may be. For this reason, they may, therefore, be
allowed to practice their professions provided that in so doing an authority . . . first be secured
from the Regional Directors pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 74-58, provided, however,
that no government personnel, property, equipment or supplies shall be utilized in the practice
of their professions. While being authorized to practice their professions, they should as much
as possible attend regularly any and all sessions, which are not very often, of their
Sanggunians for which they were elected as members by their constituents except in very
extreme cases, e.g., doctors who are called upon to save a life. For this purpose it is desired
that they always keep a calendar of the dates of the sessions, regular or special of their
Sanggunians so that conflicts of attending court cases in the case of lawyers and Sanggunian
sessions can be avoided.
As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their profession shall always
be subject to the restrictions provided for in Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all cases, the
practice of any profession should be favorably recommended by the Sanggunian concerned
as a body and by the provincial governors, city or municipal mayors, as the case may be.
(Emphasis ours, pp. 28-30,Rollo.)
On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in which the complainant,
Engineer Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor Javellana, presented their respective evidence.
Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice of law
for the reasons stated in his letter-request. On the same date, Secretary Santos replied as follows:
1st Indorsement
September 10, 1990
Respectfully returned to Councilor Erwin B. Javellana, Bago City, his within letter dated
September 10, 1990, requesting for a permit to continue his practice of law for reasons therein
stated, with this information that, as represented and consistent with law, we interpose no
objection thereto, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions.
LUIS T.
SANTO
S
Secretar
y.
(p. 60, Rollo.)
On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth
guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective officials as follows:
TO: All Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, Regional Directors
and All Concerned.
SUBJECT: Practice of Profession and Private Employment of Local Elective
Officials
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees), states, in part, that "In addition to acts and omission of public
officials . . . now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute

Page 118 of 178

Page 119 of 178

prohibited acts and transactions of any public officials . . . and are hereby declared to be
unlawful: . . . (b) Public Officials. . . during their incumbency shall not: (1) . . . accept
employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in
any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly
allowed by law; (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions: . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Under Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Office of the President dated September 4,
1986, the authority to grant any permission, to accept private employment in any capacity and
to exercise profession, to any government official shall be granted by the head of the Ministry
(Department) or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules, which provides,in part, that:
No officer shall engage directly in any . . . vocation or profession . . . without
a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, that this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers . . . whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to
engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office should be
fixed by the Chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in anyway
the efficiency of the officer or employee . . . subject to any additional
conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each particular
case in the interest of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of
the Civil Service Commission.
Conformably with the foregoing, the following guidelines are to be observed in the grant of
permission to the practice of profession and to the acceptance of private employment of local
elective officials, to wit:
1) The permission shall be granted by the Secretary of Local Government;
2) Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
government in conformity with Sections 141, 171 and 203 of the Local
Government Code (BP 337), are prohibited to engage in the practice of their
profession and to accept private employment during their incumbency:
3) Other local elective officials may be allowed to practice their profession or
engage in private employment on a limited basis at the discretion of the
Secretary of Local Government, subject to existing laws and to the following
conditions:
a) That the time so devoted outside of office hours should
be fixed by the local chief executive concerned to the end
that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officials
concerned;
b) That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies
shall be utilized in the pursuit of one's profession or private
employment;

Page 119 of 178

Page 120 of 178

c) That no conflict of interests between the practice of
profession or engagement in private employment and the
official duties of the concerned official shall arise thereby;
d) Such other conditions that the Secretary deems
necessary to impose on each particular case, in the interest
of public service. (Emphasis supplied, pp. 31-32, Rollo.)
On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground
mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme
Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.
In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana's motion to dismiss was denied by the public respondents. His motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20, 1991.
Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law,
Section 90 of which provides:
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach
in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are
members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government
is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of
the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in
relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an
official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only
on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary
compensation therefrom. (Emphasis ours.)
Administrative Case No. C-10-90 was again set for hearing on November 26, 1991. Javellana thereupon filed
this petition for certiorari praying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the
new Local Government Code (RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null void because:
(1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx

Page 120 of 178

Page 121 of 178

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts andquasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and medical professions for only
sanggunian members who are lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their profession while
dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians, morticians and others are not so restricted (RA 7160, Sec.
90 [b-1]).
In due time, the Solicitor General filed his Comment on the petition and the petitioner submitted a Reply. After
deliberating on the pleadings of the parties, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative
authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction
(Santiago vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 192 SCRA 199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166 SCRA 657). With
respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative charge against him.
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of
their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office
is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer
Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which
petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a
judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting
them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular
No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the
private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the
circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The
Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public
officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their
profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all
provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides
that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of
all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

20. In re Judge Mariano, 166 SCRA 246 (1988)

21. Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, 19 August 1999

Page 121 of 178

Page 122 of 178

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 131457 April 24, 1998

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA,
MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-beneficiaries in front of the
Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide
attention that even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers' "cause."
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision

1
of the Office of the President (OP), issued through then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from
agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona, to issue the so-called "Win-Win" Resolution 2 on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already
become final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of
forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

But, did the "Win-Win" Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to annul and set aside the
"Win-Win" Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian
Reform from implementing the said Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the "Win-Win" Resolution issued
by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the same subject matter, which had already
become final and executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be stated as follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property
is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 3 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte
Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and
Grower's Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the
entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million. 4

Page 122 of 178

Page 123 of 178

4. NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ
of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the
Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives "to desist from pursuing any
activity or activities" concerning the subject land "until further orders." 5
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum, dated May
21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to
conduct summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC
objected to these moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March
31, 1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on
the valuation of the subject property.
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR Regional
Director and Land Bank "to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated March 31, 1992;" (b) nullifying
the DAR Regional Director's memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the summary proceedings conducted
pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank "to return the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDC's subject
Property to the DAR until further orders." 6
7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in the name of
petitioner NQSRMDC. 7
8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O.
Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6, 8 dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the
Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.

9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29, 1996, pertinent
portions of which we quote:
Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24
converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from
agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors
who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.
Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the
classification of five percent (5%) of their agricultural land area and provide for the manner of
their utilization or disposition.
On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said
Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed
by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial
Development Association).
Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the basis of a
Joint Committee Report submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform
and Socio-Economic Committee approved, on 1 February 1994, the said Ordinance now
docketed as Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC
(project proponent) is supposed to have the following components:
1. Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes following: Institute for Continuing
Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute
for Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports
Development Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;

Page 123 of 178

Page 124 of 178

2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn starch,
various corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice; cassava
processing for starch, alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products
such as juices; processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold
storage and ice plant; cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and abattoir
needing about 67 hectares;
3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-back
riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and
4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants,
dormitories and a housing project covering an area of 20 hectares.
The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted by the
Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship projects.
The same was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial Development Council of
Bukidnon; the municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office
(Region X) of the DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate on June 5,
1995); the Executive Director, signing "By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ," Office of the
President Mindanao; the Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D.
Clemente.
In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office, Bagontaas
Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed
NO. OBJECTION to the proposed conversion "as long as the development cost of the
irrigation systems thereat which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the
developer . . . ." Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San
Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the land in
question "as it will provide more economic benefits to the community in terms of outside
investments that will come and employment opportunities that will be generated by the
projects to be put up . . . .
On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the Kisolan
Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office
and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected barangay rallied behind their
respective officials in endorsing the project.
Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994,
the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the
conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the
same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all
qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds:
1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;
2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);
3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable;
4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries;
5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-industrial project
has no reference to Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and
E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993.

Page 124 of 178

Page 125 of 178

A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by applicant
but the same was denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995). 9
10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director "to proceed with the compulsory acquisition
and distribution of the property." 10
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed" the order of denial to the Office of the President and
prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the
people of Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretary's order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, 12 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for Mindanao,
after conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a memorandum 13 to the President favorably endorsing the
project with a recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application of the province for the conversion
of the land.

14. Also, in a memorandum 14 to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), recommended the conversion of the subject land to industrial/institutional use with
a request that the President "hold the implementation of the DAR order to distribute the land in question."

15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a Resolution

15
ordering the
parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. At the hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR, through the
Solicitor General, manifested before the said court that the DAR was merely "in the processing stage of the applications of farmersclaimants" and has agreed to respect status quo pending the resolution of the petition. 16

16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres,
issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretary's decision,
the pertinent portions of which read:
After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-a-vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof by
Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant application for conversion by the
Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in
question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment
and bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the
municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not
even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.
Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation
facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there
is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the property (as a
right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land
itself, subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years,
planted with pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.
On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition
(NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not
applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor
of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the
subject property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the
expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until
April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and the Land Bank of the Philippines, both
in Butuan City, to "desist from pursuing any activity or activities covering petitioner's land.

Page 125 of 178

Page 126 of 178

On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has already
contributed substantially to the land reform program of the government, as follows: 300
hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70's and another 400 hectares in the nearby
Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten(10) years ago, for which they have not received
"just compensation" up to this time.
Neither can the assertion that "there is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries' hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries
to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.
Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for
agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy
to local government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the
language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other
interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in
their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide
for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities.
WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in view of
the favorable recommendations of the various government agencies abovementioned, the
subject Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian
Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby
APPROVED. 17
17. On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
18. On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC and the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the
former donated four (4) hectares from the subject land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High
School.18
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that the title
over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and
the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation,
caused the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 19 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25,
1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137
farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 20 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.

19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint

21
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon
(Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141
others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997 22 and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19,
1997, 23 restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.

20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order

24
was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DAR's motion
for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March
29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.

21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the
President.
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by some
alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from
further trying the RTC case.

Page 126 of 178

Page 127 of 178

23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR
Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons
claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for intervention (styled as
Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the
conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside. 25
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance
within the framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by
Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend possible solutions to the
problem. 26
25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers' protest by issuing the so-called
"Win/Win" Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, through
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. NQSRMDC's application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the
approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as
recommended by the Department of Agriculture.
2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an irrigation canal
and found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in
accordance with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to
said portion from the highway provided in the portion fronting the highway. For this purpose,
the DAR and other concerned government agencies are directed to immediately conduct the
segregation survey of the area, valuation of the property and generation of titles in the name
of the identified farmer-beneficiaries.
3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and meticulously
determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite payment of just
compensation to NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered by the CARP, including
other lands previously surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.
5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full assistance to the Department
of Agrarian Reform in the implementation of this Order.
We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10, 1997
without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this
time.
SO ORDERED. 27
A copy of the "Win-Win" Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B.
Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997 28 and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present
petition forcertiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.

On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene

29
was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel,
claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were "previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the
144-hectare" property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed 30 by the petitioners.

Page 127 of 178

Page 128 of 178

In seeking the nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the President
was prompted to issue the said resolution "after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmerbeneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to
come up with this purely political decision to appease the 'farmers,' by reviving and modifying the Decision of
29 March 1996which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997. . . ." 31 Thus, petitioners
further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona "committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his
jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. . . ." 32 They availed of this extraordinary writ
of certiorari "because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 33 They never filed a motion for
reconsideration of the subject Resolution "because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek a
reconsideration. . . ." 34

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be dismissed outright
on the following grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the Court of
Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution before filing
the present petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident on the motion for
intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to
draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. 35 On the
other hand, anerror of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. 36 This error is correctable
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. 37

It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial
agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, 38 including the Office of the President, 39 may be taken to the Court of Appeals by
filing a verified petition for review 40 within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution,
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. 42

41

whether the appeal

However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that
the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is "patently illegal" 43 and was issued with
"grave abuse of discretion" and "beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Corona's) jurisdiction" 44 when said resolution substantially
modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here
involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to
annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly
done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:

Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
xxx xxx xxx
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases cases in which the act of the
lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. 45

Page 128 of 178

Page 129 of 178

The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act "may file a
verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court." The proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in
Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in
the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or
these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)
Under the above-qouted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original
concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, 46 prohibition 47 and mandamus. 48 But the jurisdiction of these three (3)
courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless
otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People
vs. Cuaresma, et. al., 49 through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:

. . . . This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as

prohibition, mandamus,quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is
shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may
issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this
Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate
Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14,
1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial
Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted)
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial
policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: 50 Uy vs. Contreras,
et. al., 51 Torres vs. Arranz,52 Bercero vs. De Guzman, 53 and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. 54 As we have further stated in Cuaresma:

. . . . A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's
docket.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of
speedy justice 55 and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution.
Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the
Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.

That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched, in
our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 56

Page 129 of 178

Page 130 of 178

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and
again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego
a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties
involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed to file a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the
said motion is not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity, 57 as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a petition
forcertiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with the Court of Appeals; (b) a
complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil
Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition,
constitute forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies
not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation
commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in
order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative
ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the court in which
the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been
laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), . . . and that is, forum shopping
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No.
86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, ofauter
action pendant. 58
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for
determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the
petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretary's order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and
distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the
annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was
based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's title, used
documents which were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title
was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its
title. The present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed

Page 130 of 178

Page 131 of 178

"Win-Win" Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long
after the previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed by alleged farmerbeneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion, movants contend that they are the
farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove this, they attached as
Annex "I" in their motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made
pursuant to the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which directs the DAR
"to carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries." However,
a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are those purportedly "Found Qualified and
Recommended for Approval." In other words, movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest. 59 Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as intimated earlier, null and
void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be
substantially modified by the "Win-Win" Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in
Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise
provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save
in exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours).
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of March 29,
1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office
had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of
the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1)
motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second
motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the
second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering
that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29,
1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially
modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard
of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 60 we held:

Page 131 of 178

Page 132 of 178

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had
long become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is wellestablished in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies,
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and
binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v.
Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R.
No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res judicata which forbids the
reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting
within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes
v. Castro, supra at 503].
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body
must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes
once and for all. 61 This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would no end to litigations. Utmost respect
and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such
principle must immediately be struck down.

Therefore, the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after
it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street 62 in a
1918 case, 63 is "a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head." 64

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated November 7, 1997,
issued by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The
Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

22. People v. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, 16 January 2003

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 115236-37

January 16, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BRYAN FERDINAND DY y LA MADRID and GIOVAN BERNARDINO y GARCIA, accused-appellants.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino filed separate motions for reconsideration of
our Decision1 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, finding them
guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.

Page 132 of 178

Page 133 of 178

In his motion, accused-appellant Dy submits that our decision should have been merely recommendatory, in
view of the provision of Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (d) of the Constitution which provides that the Supreme Court
sittingen banc has jurisdiction over "[a]ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher." He contends that Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 which provides that death penalty cases shall be
within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc is incongruous and incompatible with the aforementioned
constitutional provision.
The contention is misleading. Under Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en
banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. At present, it is made up of three
divisions. However, the divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered as separate and distinct
courts. Actions considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same
Tribunal. The divisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but as divisions of one and the
same court.2
Accused-appellant Dy further contends that: (1) the sexual intercourse between him and complainant Mobley
was consensual; (2) there is no evidence of rape except for Mobleys bare claim; (3) there is no conclusive
evidence that Mobley and Tennican were drugged which caused them to black out and become unaware of
what was happening to them; (4) Bernardino did not commit acts of lasciviousness; and (5) there is no
conclusive proof of conspiracy between the two accused-appellants.
The issues raised by accused-appellant Dy have been exhaustively considered and discussed in our Decision
and there is no need to reassess them or reconsider our stand.
Bernardino, on the other hand, alleges that: (1) accused-appellants were not accorded their right to a fair,
unbiased resolution of the preliminary investigation when the reviewing prosecutor unilaterally reversed the
findings of the three-man investigating panel that recommended the dismissal of the charges against them; (2)
the right to be arraigned is not among the rights that are susceptible to waiver or estoppel, thus the lack of
arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their participation in the trial; (3) the erroneous decision of the trial
judge to hold an expedited trial effectively deprived them of proper preparation for and presentation of an
adequate defense; (4) the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to establish his guilt with
moral certainty; (5) the trial court erroneously allowed accused-appellant Dy to remain at liberty even after
promulgation of judgment on the strength of the same bail bond posted by him during trial, while denying
accused-appellant Bernardinos petition for bail; (6) the legal doctrines cited in our Decision do not apply in this
case since the premises upon which these principles lie are not present herein; and (7) as a matter of equity,
the significant delay in the resolution of this appeal should at least merit our attention to the peculiar effects of
the decision in this case particularly as regards accused-appellant Bernardino.
We find that the points raised by Bernardino on matters of substance and procedure have likewise been
extensively discussed in our Decision.
However, two points raised by accused-appellant Bernardino must be clarified.
First, the allegation that there was no valid arraignment is misleading and betrays a lack of comprehension
regarding the procedural requirements of arraignment in the context of the constitutional right of an accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In our decision, we stated:
Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived.
Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of "not guilty" in
their behalf. However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense can not hold hostage
the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or information.
Second, Bernardino argues that the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar are not on all fours with the
doctrine that findings of fact of the trial court are best left undisturbed on appeal; and that no woman would
concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private parts and subject herself to trial and ridicule if
she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. He claims

Page 133 of 178

Page 134 of 178

that we should have disregarded the findings of the trial court for the reason that the haste with which the trial
was conducted necessarily casts a cloud of doubt over the validity of the proceedings; that the conflicting
findings of the investigating panel and the reviewing prosecutor should have alerted us to varying
interpretations of the facts at hand; and that there was no independent proof that complainant was drugged
aside from self-serving documents relied upon by medical experts who did not examine complainant.
The records show that the proceedings were not hastily conducted. While the proceedings might have been of
short duration than usual, they were nevertheless conducted with due regard to the right of each party to due
process. The trial court should even be commended for conducting a speedy trial, which should be the rule,
rather than the exception. What is of prime consideration is not the speed by which the trial was conducted but
the manner by which the procedural and substantial requirements were complied with. The records show that
these requirements were adequately met.
We do not see any irregularity in the conflicting findings of the investigating panel vis--vis those of the
reviewing prosecutor. It is the prerogative of the reviewing prosecutor to overturn the findings of the
investigating panel depending on how he appreciates the evidence.
Bernardino further claims that the principle that no woman would concoct a story of defloration is largely an
interpretation rooted in the Philippine context where in a number of cases, we have taken judicial notice of the
Filipinas inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and
virtue. We do not agree. The outrage and cry for justice of rape victims are universal and are not limited to or
the exclusive prerogatives of any one race or culture.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand
Dy and Giovan Bernardino are DENIED WITH FINALITY.
Let a warrant of arrest be issued against accused-appellant Bryan Ferdinand Dy. In this connection, the
National Bureau of Investigation is DIRECTED to serve the warrant of arrest against him, to make a report
thereon and submit the same to this Court within five (5) days after serving the same.
SO ORDERED.

23. People v. Ebio, G.R. No. 147750, 29 Sept. 2004

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 147750

September 29, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
GERRY EBIO Y HERMIDA, appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A. PREFACE
On October 14, 2002, appellant Gerry Ebio was convicted by this Court of qualified rape and sentenced to
suffer the death penalty.1 The Public Attorneys Office moved for reconsideration on the ground that the Court

Page 134 of 178

Page 135 of 178

lacked a quorum when the case was deliberated as it appears that the Decision was signed only by seven (7)
justices.2 In a Resolution dated September 7, 2004, the Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration, ruling as
follows:
xxx
There is no question that the Courts Decision in this case was concurred in by majority of the
members of the Court who actually took part in the deliberations. It was in fact unanimously signed by
the seven Justices who were present during the deliberations. The issue now is whether the seven
constitute a quorum of the 14-member Court.
The term "quorum" has been defined as "that number of members of the body which, when legally assembled
in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business, or, in other words, that number that
makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass a law or ordinance or do any other valid corporate act." 3 The
question of the number of judges necessary to authorize the transaction of business by a court is as a general
rule to be determined from the Constitution or statutory provisions creating and regulating the courts, and as a
general rule a majority of the members of a court is a "quorum" for the transaction of business and the decision
of cases.4
The Constitution is clear on the quorum when the Court meets by Division. There should be at least three
members present for the Division to conduct its business. This may be deduced from paragraph 3 of Section 4
Article VIII. There is no similar pronouncement, however, when the Court meets en banc. The second
paragraph of Article VIII Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution does not expressly state the number of Justices
required to be present to constitute a quorum of the Court en banc. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution
are also silent on what constitutes a quorum when the Court is composed of only fourteen members. In case of
doubt in a criminal case, especially where the death penalty is imposed, the doubt should be resolved in favor
of the accused.
Thus, in this case, considering that the life of the accused is at stake, we deem it wise to resubmit the case to
the Court en banc for re-deliberation.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves to RECALL the Decision dated October 14, 2002 and RESUBMIT the
case to the Court en banc for RE-DELIBERATION.
The case at bar is now the subject of re-deliberation by the Court.
B. FACTS
The appellant, GERRY EBIO, was charged with rape before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
The private complainant is his 11-year old daughter, DORY EBIO. The Information5 dated May 2, 2000 reads:
The undersigned Government Prosecutor, upon the complaint of DORY EBIO, accuses GERRY EBIO
y HERMIDA, a resident of Tughan, Juban, Sorsogon, of the crime of STATUTORY RAPE defined and
penalized under the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7610 (Anti-Child Abuse Act), and further
amended by RA 7659 (Death Penalty for Heinous Crimes) and RA 8353, otherwise known as the AntiRape Law of 1997, committed as follows:
That sometime in (sic) April 21, 2000 at more or less (sic) 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Barangay Tughan, Municipality of Juban, Province of Sorsogon, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with force and intimidation, with lewd
designs and taking advantage of his moral ascendancy and the tender age of the child, did
then and there, willfully/unlawfully and feloniously, had (sic) carnal knowledge of DORY
EBIO, his own 11-year old daughter, against her will and without her valid consent, to her
damage and prejudice.

Page 135 of 178

Page 136 of 178

The offense is aggravated by relationship, the accused being the natural ascendant of the
private offended victim.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
May 1, 2000. Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Philippines.
NO BAIL RECOMMENDED
(SGD.) REGINA COELI F. GABITO
Prosecutor II
Officer In-Charge
When arraigned on June 8, 2000, the appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pled "not guilty." 6 However, at
the first hearing of the case on January 11, 2001, the appellant, through counsel, withdrew his plea of "not
guilty" and changed it to "guilty." To avoid an improvident plea, the trial court inquired on the voluntariness of his
plea, informed him of the meaning of his admission of the crime charged and the penalty for it. The appellant,
however, persisted on his plea of guilty,7 thus, a new Certificate of Arraignment,8 dated January 11, 2000, was
issued. On the same day, the evidence for the prosecution was received.
The prosecution evidence shows that the private complainant, Dory Ebio, is the daughter of spouses Cristina
Daquio and appellant Gerry Ebio.9 The private complainant is the third in a brood of six (6) children.10 She was
born on March 24, 1989, as shown in her Certificate of Live Birth. 11
The Ebios are residents of Tughan, Juban, Sorsogon. Their house has one bedroom where Cristina and Gerry
sleep, together with private complainants youngest sister. The private complainant, her other sisters and their
grandmother sleep in the sala.
The private complainant testified that in the evening of April 21, 2000, she was preparing to sleep in the sala.
Her three (3) younger sisters and their grandmother were also in the sala, sleeping. Her elder sister, Donna,
their aunt and their cousin, went to church earlier that night, while her mother, Cristina, was in Manila together
with her sister, Dina. The appellant was not yet home at that time.
The appellant arrived in their house at about 10:00 p.m. He proceeded to the room and fixed the bed.
Thereafter, he approached the private complainant and told her to transfer to the bedroom because they were
already crowded in the sala. She obeyed him because she was afraid he would scold her. The appellant was
drunk.
Armed with a six-inch long bladed instrument, the appellant ordered her to undress and threatened to kill her if
she would not comply. Afraid of the threat, she took off her shorts and panty. Appellant also took off his shorts,
mounted her and had carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain and cried. The private complainant was silent
during the sexual assault because he threatened to kill her if she would talk or shout. After the assault, she put
on her shorts and panty and again lay down. She remained inside the room, crying.
The following day, April 22, the private complainant reported the incident to her grandmother. Her grandmother
accompanied her to the police authorities. She executed a sworn statement 12 and a written complaint,13 both
dated April 27, 2000, charging the appellant with rape.
The private complainant revealed that the April 21, 2000 incident was the third occasion that she was raped by
the appellant. The first two (2) defilements happened when she was ten (10) years old. She was then a Grade
II elementary pupil. She related the incidents to her mother who told her that they would file a complaint against
the appellant. However, they were not able to report the matter to the police.
The private complainant was brought to Dr. Erlinda B. Olondriz-Orense, Municipal Health Officer of Sorsogon,
for medical examination. The lady doctors findings are as follows: 14

Page 136 of 178

Page 137 of 178

To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that I have examined Dory Ebio, 11 years old, resident of Tughan, Juban, Sorsogon.
Findings:
- labia majora and minora in close contact
- Internal exam. - vaginal wall admits one finger with resistance
- With healed hymenal lacerations at 4 o'clock and 6 o'clock (positions)
ERLINDA B. OLONDRIZ-ORENSE, M.D.,CFP
Municipal Health Officer
Juban, Sorsogon
Leonisa Ebio, 12 years old, cousin of the private complainant, lives with the Ebios in Tughan, Juban,
Sorsogon. She testified that in the evening of April 21, 2000, after going to church, she returned to the house of
the Ebios to sleep. She was about to sleep when she heard someone crying inside the room of her Tiyo Gerry,
the appellant, and Tiya Cristy. Curious, she slowly entered the room. She saw the appellant on top of the
private complainant. Both were naked and the appellant was raping the private complainant. Afraid that the
appellant might kill her, she retreated and went back to sleep. She did not relate the incident to anyone out of
fear.
Cristina Ebio testified that she is legally married to the appellant. The victim is their daughter. Dory was born
on March 24, 1989. On April 27, 2000, she (Cristina) was in Manila for a medical check-up. She received a
phone call from a relative, informing her that the appellant had raped their daughter. She cried and immediately
headed back to Sorsogon.
Upon reaching their town, she proceeded to the municipal building where she found the private complainant.
They both cried when they met. The private complainant told her about the April 21, 2000 rape incident.
Cristina claimed that she confronted the appellant about the rape committed on April 21, 2000. He admitted the
dastardly act and explained that he was drunk at the time.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense opted not to present any evidence. Hence, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.
On February 19, 2001, the trial court rendered its judgment, finding the appellant guilty of qualified rape. The
appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death and ordered to pay the private complainant the amounts
ofP75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The dispositive portion of the
decision15 reads:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Gerry Ebio y Hermida GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of RAPE under R.A. 7610 as amended by R.A. 7659 and further
amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the ANTI-RAPE LAW of 1997, and accordingly sentences
him with the penalty of DEATH under Art. 266-8 of R.A. 8353; and to pay the victim civil indemnity
of P75,000,00 and moral damages of P50,000,00.
Considering however the open repentance of the accused in Court in accepting the crime he has
done, this Court is recommending to Her Excellency, the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
thru the Department of Justice, an EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY as the penalty imposed to (sic) the
accused is to the Court excessive if we are to administer justice in a manner that is fair and just but
compassionate and merciful as well.

Page 137 of 178

Page 138 of 178

SO ORDERED.
Given this 19th day of February 2001 at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Philippines.
(SGD.) JOSE L. MADRID
Judge
Hence, the automatic review of the case.
The Appellants Brief assigns a single error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED ON (sic) CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE HIS IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY.
C. RULING
We again affirm the judgment of conviction.
Appellant contends that his plea of guilty was improvident because the trial court did not strictly observe
Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The rule provides that when an accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the courts should perform the following tasks: (1) it shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea, and (2) it shall require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. Thereafter, the trial court will allow the
accused to present evidence, if he so desires.
It is alleged that the appellant did not fully understand the consequences of his plea because when the
appellant was re-arraigned on January 11, 2001, the trial court told the appellant that he would be sentenced to
"reclusion perpetua to death" if he pled guilty. Allegedly, the penalty could not have been understood by the
appellant.
Appellant is clutching on straws. He was convicted on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution
and not on his guilty plea. The private complainant testified as follows: 16
Prosecutor Bonto:
Q: Dory, do you remember where were you on April 21, 2000 at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening?
A: I was in our house, sir.
Q: Where is your house situated?
A: At Tugjan, (sic) Juban, Sorsogon.
Q: Who is (sic) your companion then at that time?
A: My three (3) sisters and my grandmother.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q: Now, what was your grandmother doing at that time?

A: She was sleeping.

Page 138 of 178

Page 139 of 178

Q: Where?
A: In the sala.
Q: How many rooms are there in your house?
A: Only one, Your Honor.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q: Who were then at home when Donna and your cousin and aunt went to church?
A: My grandmother and my three (3) other sisters.
Q: And your three other sisters were younger than you are?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were they doing at that time?
A: They were sleeping.
Q: What were you doing at that time?
A: I was lying.
Q: While you were lying, do you recall of any unusual incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly tell us?
A: That night, my father has just arrived from Casiguran.
Q: When your father arrived, what did he do, if any?
A: He went inside the room and fixed the bed.
Q: After he fixed the bed, what did he do if any?
A: Then, my father went to me and told me to transfer in their room since that place where I was lying
is crowded.
Q: Why was it already crowded, who were with you?
A: My sister who is next to me.
Q: Did you accede to the request of your father for you to transfer inside his room?
A: Yes, sir because I was afraid he (would) scold me.
Q: When you were already inside the room of your father, would you tell us what happened next?

Page 139 of 178

Page 140 of 178

A: Then, I lied (sic) down.
Q: When you lied (sic) down, what happened next?
A: Then, I saw him holding a bladed instrument and he ordered me to undress.
Q: Did you undress?
A: Yes, sir because I was so afraid then.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q: What exactly did your father tell you when your father told you to undress?
A: He ordered me to undress and he threatened me.
Q: How did your father threaten you?
A: He ordered me to undress and according to him if I will not undress, he will kill me.
Q: So, what exactly did you remove from your body when you were ordered to do so?
A: My short(s) and my panty.
Q: When you were (sic) already undressed, after removing your short(s) and panty, what happened
next?
A: He mounted me. He lied on top of me and he used my womanhood.
Q: Now, you said he used your womanhood, how did your father use you?
A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: Could you recall how long was it?
A: Not so long, I cannot recall, sir.
Court:
Q: What did you feel?
A: I felt pain.
Prosecutor Bonto:
Q: Now, Dory, when your father was abusing you, what did you do?
A: I remained silent.
Q: Why did you remain silent?
A: Because according to my father if I will talk or shout, I will be killed by him.

Page 140 of 178

Page 141 of 178

Q: But you (did) not cry when you felt pain?
A: I cried.
Q: And then, after your father abused you, what happened next?
A: He stood up and wore his short(s).
Q: While he was raping you, did he remove his short pants?
A: No, he has already removed his short(s).
Court:
Q: He was already nude?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Who removed your short(s) and panty?
A: I was the one.
Q: Why did you remove your short(s) and panty?
A: Because I was threatened by my father.
Proceed.
Prosecutor Bonto:
Q: And then, after he ravished you, he wore his short pants?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do? .
A: And I also wore my short(s).
Q: After wearing again your short(s), what again happened?
A: I lied (sic) down and I cried.
Q: In what room did you proceed after being abused by your father?
A: Inside the room.
Q: Did you not leave the room of your father?
A: Nor, sir, but I was crying.
It is highly improbable for a daughter to go out in public to falsely accuse her father of rape if it were
not true. It is against human nature for a girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself as well as

Page 141 of 178

Page 142 of 178

her family to a lifetime of dishonor, especially when her charge could mean the death of her own
father.17
Leonisa Ebio corroborated Dorys story of defilement. Leonisa testified as follows: 18
Prosecutor Bonto:
Q: Kindly tell us again your age?
A: I am 12 years old.
Q: Are you still studying?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What grade are you in now?
A: I am in Grade VI.
Q: Do you recall where were you on April 21, 2000 at past 10:00 o'clock?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell us where were you then?
A: I was in the church.
Q: Until what time did you stay in the church?
A: We stayed there only for a short period of time.
Q: From the church, where did you proceed?
A: We went home.
Q: Where is your house located?
A: At Tugjan (sic), Juban.
Q: Upon reaching your house, what did you find, if any?
A: I heard somebody crying.
Q: Who was that whom you heard, crying?
A: Dory, sir.
Q: Are you referring to Dory Ebio, who is the victim in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do when you heard Dory crying?

Page 142 of 178

Page 143 of 178

A: I slowly went inside.
Q: Inside what?
A: Inside the room.
Q: What did you find out? Whose room was that?
A: That is the room of Tiyo Gerry and Tiya Cristy.
Q: What did you find out, what did you see when you went slowly in the room?
A: I saw Tiyo Gerry on top of Dory.
Q: Now, you mentioned Tiyo Gerry, look around the courtroom and tell us if he is inside the courtroom?
A: (witness pointing to a man who stood and identified himself to be the same Gerry Ebio the witness
is referring to).
Q: Actually, what was Gerry doing, when he was on top of Dory?
A: He was abusing Dory.
Court:
Q: What do you mean by he was abusing Dory?
A: She was being raped by Gerry.
Prosecutor Bonto:
Q: What was Gerry wearing at that time if he was wearing anything?
A: He was wearing short(s).
Court:
Q: Do you mean to say what you saw was that, Gerry was wearing shorts?
A: None, Your Honor.
Q: Was he wearing anything?
A: None, Your Honor.
Q: Do you mean to say he was naked?
A: Yes, Your, Honor.
Q: How about Dory?
A: She was also naked.

Page 143 of 178

Page 144 of 178

Q: Why can you say that there were persons inside the room, was there a light?
A: There was a light coming from the kitchen.
Court:
Proceed.
Prosecutor Bonto:
Q: What was your reaction upon seeing Gerry abusing Dory?
A: None, sir.
Q: Why did you not do anything?
A: I was afraid, sir.
Q: You were afraid of whom?
A: Because I might be killed.
Q: Be killed by whom?
A: By Tiyo Gerry.
Q: Why, did he threaten you?
A: No, sir.
Q: Now, after seeing that Gerry was abusing Dory, where did you proceed?
A: I went to the place where I was sleeping.
Q: Did you not relate the incident which you witnessed to anybody after?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A Because I was afraid.
No further questions, Your Honor.
Court:
Q: With whom are you afraid?
A: I am afraid of Tiyo Gerry.
Prosecutor Bonto:

Page 144 of 178

Page 145 of 178

For the record, Your Honor please, the witness is starting to cry...
The rape is also supported by the medical findings of Dr. Olondriz-Orense. The lady doctor revealed
that the hymen of the private complainant has healed lacerations at 4 oclock and 6 oclock positions.
She explained that the lacerations could have been inflicted 5 or 6 days before the examination on
April 27, 2000. Her opinion is consistent with the private complainants claim that she was raped on the
21st of that month.19
We now review the penalty imposed.
Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that "the complaint or information shall
state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense,
and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it."
The first qualifying circumstance is the age of the victim.
The Information alleged that the private complainant was only 11 years old at the time she was raped. The
prosecution submitted as proof of her age the following evidence: (1) the private complainants birth certificate,
marked as Exh. "B," and (2) her testimony that she was born on March 24, 1989, duly corroborated by her
mother, Cristina Ebio. No contrary evidence was submitted by the appellant. Needless to state, the age of the
private complainant was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Similarly, the relationship of the offender to the victim was also duly established. The marriage of the appellant
with Cristina Ebio in 1985 is evidenced by their Marriage Contract. 20 They had six (6) children, all girls. The
victim is their third child.
The private complainants minority and her relationship to the appellant having been duly alleged and proven,
the death penalty was correctly meted by the trial court.
As regards the damages, in addition to the civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the victim,
exemplary damages should be awarded to deter fathers with perverse tendencies and aberrant sexual
behavior from sexually abusing their daughters.21
After re-deliberation, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 51, in Criminal Case No.
2000-5132, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape under Republic Act No. 8353,
otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and sentencing him to suffer the Death 22 Penalty,
is AFFIRMED. The civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the victim in the amounts of P75,000.00
and P50,000.00, respectively, are also AFFIRMED. In addition, the appellant is ordered to pay the victim the
sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,
upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of executive clemency.
SO ORDERED.

24. Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1956)

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Page 145 of 178

Page 146 of 178

G.R. No. L-21438

September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00
by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare
between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with
interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys'
fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against
petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes
on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to
Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced
plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the
seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and,
according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager],
they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"
(Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the
plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of
Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues
properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate
court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in
the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete
findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7

Page 146 of 178

Page 147 of 178

A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely
insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of
justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the
other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the
facts"which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the Court
draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not
confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant
its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the
evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed,
"the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to
believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the
Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were based
entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's
side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not
recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated
party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate,
the legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an
issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written statement of the
ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A
question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter
the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support
its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket.
But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the
parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific
flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class
seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of
Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had
confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly
that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no
guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the
first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at
every station for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We
cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion
to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of
first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in

Page 147 of 178

Page 148 of 178

keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets
it issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his
testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness,
Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although
plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in
Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over
written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses,
and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for
a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such
confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by
defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount
refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of
the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the
Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of error and
all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So
also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction
because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are
in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground
or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the
fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of
the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline
aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal
agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a
rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to
achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is
desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the
covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of
Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first
class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of
distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do

Page 148 of 178

Page 149 of 178

we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to
provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in
Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was
he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right
to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there
must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; 31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding
of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable
consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said
contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on
defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point
up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok,
defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments
and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has
been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at
Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments
brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on
his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff
suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of
P30,000.00. 33
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class
passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when
petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when
petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was
already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in
the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set
forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the
action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on
guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso
was oustedby petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the
fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore,
unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for

Page 149 of 178

Page 150 of 178

moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to
conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the
defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his
consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the
court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which
notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of
the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even
refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this
evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to
testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. Hence,
if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had
already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the one to suffer the
consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the
presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by defendant's
employees, the manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely
ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what
happened there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain
the meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed
for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of the
Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger has
arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a "better right"
to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline did not
prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat that
the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first class"
ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the
defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by
deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and, under the
circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the Manager of the
defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of
the plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because the said Manager wanted to
accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man". 38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not use the
term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager

Page 150 of 178

Page 151 of 178

not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his
arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to
the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been
established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different
from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of
the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in
bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to
the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown
out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying to, again using the
words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager)
wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any
"better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and
for which the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him. 40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled
in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21
of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of
Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. 43And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly
with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a
tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was
worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she
was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in
origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case,
"Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare
to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point
he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger
which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme
Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.
1awphl.nt

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we
have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier
a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

Page 151 of 178

Page 152 of 178

7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the flight
attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We
will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to
accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything there because I am
protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I
stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have
recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me because it was recorded in
French "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be
the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook
reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused
to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not
think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come
within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then,
in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement
and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the
notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has
been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have
been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no
such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent
Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages. 54

Page 152 of 178

Page 153 of 178

9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment
for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised as
it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees.
The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the
same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

25. Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85082, 25 Feb. 1991

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 85082

February 25, 1991

SPOUSES PASTOR VALDEZ and VIRGINIA VALDEZ, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND FELICIDAD VIERNES, FRANCISCO ANTE, AND ANTONIO
ANTE,respondents.
Sumulong Law Offices for petitioners.
Antonio A. Ante for respondents Ante.
Jose A. Rico for respondent Viernes.

GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a case of double sale of real property where both vendees registered the sales with the Register of
Deeds and each produced their respective owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title to the property.
Spouses Francisco Ante and Manuela Ante were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at 20th
Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City, with an area of approximately 625.70 square meters as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 141582 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Said spouses executed a
special power of attorney in favor of their son, Antonio Ante, a lawyer, authorizing him to execute any document
conveying by way of mortgage or sale a portion or the whole of said property, to receive payment and dispose
of the same as he may deem fit and proper under the premises.
1

Antonio Ante offered to sell the lot to Eliseo Viernes, who was occupying the same with the permission of Ante.
Viernes, however, turned down the offer as he did not have money. Antonio Ante then told Viernes that he will
instead sell the property to Pastor Valdez and Virginia Valdez.
2

Page 153 of 178

Page 154 of 178

Antonio Ante had the said lot subdivided into Lot A with an area of 280 square meters and Lot B with an area or
345.70 square meters, each lot having its corresponding technical description.
On June 15, 1980, Antonio Ante, as attorney in fact, executed a deed of sale of Lot A in favor of spouses Pastor
Valdez and Virginia Valdez, for and in consideration of the amount of P112,000.00
3

On February 12, 1987, in the same capacity, Antonio Ante sold to said Valdez spouses, Lot B for the amount of
P138,000.00.
4

The Valdez spouses demanded from Antonio Ante the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
141582 covering said two (2) lots. Ante promised them that he will deliver the title to them in a few days.
In the meanwhile petitioners started fencing the whole lot with cement hollow blocks in the presence of spouses
Eliseo and Felicidad Viernes. Except for the gate, it took them two weeks to finish fencing the whole lot. On
said occasion the Viernes spouses were informed by the Valdez spouses that they were fencing the same as
they purchased the land from Antonio Ante.
As Ante failed to deliver the owner's duplicate certificate of title demanded by the Valdez spouses, the latter
filed their affidavit of adverse claim over the subject lot with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on
September 6, 1982 as the vendees of the property.
5

Upon inquiries made, the Valdez spouses learned that Antonio Ante had delivered the owner's duplicate
certificate of title as a collateral to one Dr. Camilo Garma of Purdue Street., Cubao Quezon City to secure his
rentals in arrears in the amount of P9,000.00. On September 13, 1983, upon the prodding of the Valdez
spouses, Antonio Ante wrote to Dr. & Mrs. Garma to request them to entrust the owner's duplicate copy of the
title of the questioned lot to the Valdez spouses with the assurance that Ante will pay his indebtedness to
them. The Garma spouses turned over to the Valdez spouses the said owner's duplicate certificate of title after
said Valdez spouses paid for the obligation of Antonio Ante to the Garma spouses.
6

The Valdez spouses then proceeded to register the two deeds of sale dated June 15, 1980 and February 12,
1981 with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City by presenting the owner's duplicate copy of the title. They
were, however, informed that the said owner's duplicate certificate of title had been declared null and void per
order of Judge Tutaan dated November 10, 1982. They also found out that spouses Francisco and Manuela
Ante earlier filed a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title and to declare null and
void the lost owner's duplicate certificate of title.
7

The Valdez spouses also discovered that the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. 141582 and in lieu thereof
issued TCT No. 293889 in the name of Felicidad Viernes on the basis of a deed of assignment of the same
property dated February 17, 1982 executed by Antonio Ante in her favor.
When Virginia Valdez inquired from Antonio Ante why he executed the said deed of assignment when he had
previously sold the same lot to them, Ante replied that they could sue him in court.
Thus, the Valdezes filed their adverse claim over the lot covered by TCT No. 293889 in the name of Felicidad
Viernes. They filed the complaint in Barangay office of San Roque, Quezon City against Felicidad Viernes but
as no amicable settlement was reached, the Valdezes filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City seeking among others, that the order dated November 10, 1982 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City authorizing the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title in the name of Francisca Ante be
declared null any void; that the deed of assignment dated February 17, 1982 executed by Antonio Ante in favor
of Felicidad Viernes be cancelled and revoked; that TCT No. 293889 in the name of Felicidad Viernes in the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City be cancelled and declared null and void; that the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City be ordered to reinstate, revalidate and give full force and effect to the owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. 141582 in the name of spouses Francisco and Manuela Ante and declare petitioners as the true and
lawful owners of the property; ordering respondents Viernes and all persons claiming right under them to
vacate the property, and to pay damages and costs to petitioners.

Page 154 of 178

Page 155 of 178

After trial on the merits before which the Antes were declared in default, a decision was rendered by the trial
court on April 9, 1986, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the complaint is dismissed as against defendants Vierneses, and defendants Antes are
hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff, as prayed for in their complaint, as follows:
Defendant Antes are hereby ordered to pay actual damages in the amount of P250,000.00 to plaintiffs.
Defendants Antes are hereby ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages in the amount of
P15,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00.
Defendants Antes, are hereby ordered to pay P5,000.00 for attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.

Not satisfied therewith the Valdezes interposed an appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals wherein in due
course a decision was rendered on September 12, 1988, affirming in toto the appealed decision, with costs
against the appellants.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Valdezes wherein the following issues are raised:
1. Whether the Order dated November 10, 1983 declaring as null and void the Owner's copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141582 and ordering the issuance of a new Owner's copy of said title
should be set aside having been secured fraudulently and in bad faith by Francisco Ante and Antonio
Ante who had already sold the property to the spouses Pastor and Virginia Valdez and who knew fully
well that the said Owner's copy of said title has never been lost.
2. As between plaintiff-spouses Pastor and Virginia Valdez, petitioners in this case and defendant
Felicidad Viernes, one of the private respondents, who is entitled to the subject lot?
3. Who is entitled to damages?

The petition is impressed with merit.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith.
From the aforesaid provision of the law, it is clear that if movable property is sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith.
However, should the subject of the sale be immovable property, the ownership shall vest in the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the registry of property. Should none of the vendees inscribe the
sale in the Registry of Property, then the ownership of the subject real property shall pertain to the person who
in good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.

Page 155 of 178

Page 156 of 178

In this case, Lot A of the subject property was sold to the petitioners by Antonio Ante, as attorney-in-fact, on
June 15, 1980, while Lot B was sold by the same attorney-in-fact to petitioners on February 12, 1981. Since
the owner's copy of TCT No. 141582 was not delivered in due time to the petitioners by Antonio Ante despite
his promise to deliver the same in a few days, petitioners registered their notice of adverse claim over the said
property on September 6, 1982 with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City wherein it was duly annotated as
follows:
10

PE-3004/T-141582 Affidavit of Adverse Claim

Filed under sworn statement of Pastor Valdez & Virginia C. Valdez claiming that they are the vendees
of the property described herein, but the title was not delivered (Doc. 253, Page 51, Bk. I of the Not.
Pub. of Q. City, Prudencio W. Valido)
Date of Instrument August 19, 1982
Date of Inscription Sept. 6, 1982

11

However, earlier, that is on February 17, 1982, a Deed of Assignment of the same property was executed by
Antonio Ante in favor of respondent Felicidad Viernes. Ante filed a petition for the issuance of another owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 with the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground that the
owner's duplicate copy had been lost. The petition was granted in an order dated November 10, 1983 declaring
null and void the lost owner's duplicate copy of the title and ordering the issuance of a new owner's duplicate
copy of the title in favor of the Antes. Said owner's duplicate copy was delivered by Ante to respondent Viernes
who thereafter together with the Deed of Assignment presented the same to the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City for registration on November 11, 1982. Thus, on the basis thereof, TCT No. 141582 was cancelled and
TCT No. 293889 was issued in the name of respondent Felicidad Viernes.
12

Petitioners again filed an adverse claim this time on the property covered by TCT No. 293889 in the name of
respondent Viernes.
From the foregoing set of facts there can be no question that the sale of the subject lot to petitioners was made
long before the execution of the Deed of Assignment of said lot to respondent Viernes and that petitioners
annotated their adverse claim as vendees of the property as early as September 6, 1982 with the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. On the other hand the deed of Assignment in favor of Viernes of the said lot was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City only on November 11, 1982 whereby a new title was
issued in the name of Viernes as above stated.
The rule is clear that a prior right is accorded to the vendee who first recorded his right in good faith over an
immovable property. In this case, the petitioners acquired subject lot in good faith and for valuable
consideration from the Antes and as such owners petitioners fenced the property taking possession thereof.
Thus, when petitioners annotated their adverse claim in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City they thereby
established a superior right to the property in question as against respondent Viernes.
13

14

On the other hand, respondent Viernes cannot claim good faith in the purchase of the subject lot and the
subsequent registration of the Deed of Assignment in her favor. Even before the petitioners purchased the lot
from the Antes respondent Viernes' husband was first given the option to purchase the same by Antonio Ante
but he declined because he had no money and so he was informed that it would be sold to petitioners. After
petitioners purchased the lot they immediately fenced the same with the knowledge and without objection of
respondent Viernes and her husband and they were informed by the petitioners about their purchase of the
same. Moreover, when petitioners annotated their adverse claim as vendees of the property with the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City, it was effectively a notice to the whole world including respondent Viernes.
Respondent Ante obviously in collusion with respondent Viernes sold the same property to Viernes which was
earlier sold to petitioners, by virtue of a subsequent Deed of Assignment. It was fraudulently made to appear
that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 was lost through a petition filed with the trial court to nullify
the said owner's duplicate copy and for the issuance of another owner's duplicate copy.

Page 156 of 178

Page 157 of 178

Unfortunately, such fraud was unmasked as early as July 14, 1981 when respondent Francisco Ante, in Civil
Case No. 29617, filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to require
Paz Garma of 8 Purdue Street, Cubao, Quezon City to produce before the court on July 16, 1981 at 2:00
o'clock p.m. at the scheduled pre-trial of the case, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 issued by the
Register of Deeds in the name of the Antes as the same was entrusted to Paz Garma as a realtor for the
proposed sale of the property which did not materialize. Respondent Viernes admitted in her answer dated
January 7, 1984 that she knew of the filing in court of said urgent motion and that the branch clerk of court
issued the correspondingsubpoena. Thus, respondent Ante, as well as respondent Viernes, knew that the
owner's duplicate copy of certificate of title No. 141582 was never lost, consequently the filing of the petition in
court for the issuance of a new one was attended with fraud and gross misrepresentation.
15

16

As a matter of fact, as hereinabove discussed, upon the urging of petitioners, respondent Antonio Ante wrote to
the Garma spouses to entrust the TCT to petitioners on September 30, 1983 and when petitioners paid the
standing account of Ante to the Garmas said owner's duplicate copy was delivered by the Garmas to the
petitioners. The bad faith of respondents Viernes and Ante is obvious.
17

Further, even while the notice of adverse claim of September 6, 1982 filed by the petitioners on TCT No.
141582 in the Register of Deeds was still existing and had not been cancelled, on November 11, 1982 the
Register of Deeds nevertheless cancelled said TCT and issued a new title in favor of respondent Viernes. The
annotation was not even carried over nor was it ordered cancelled under the new title issued to respondent
Viernes. The Register of Deeds and/or his subordinates apparently yielded to the fraudulent design of
respondents Viernes and Ante.
An examination of the decision of the trial court dated April 9, 1986 shows that there are no findings of facts to
serve as basis for its conclusions. Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates as follows:
18

No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court also provides clearly as follows:
Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments. All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing
personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is the reason why this Court, through Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988, reminded all
judges "to make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the
case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions
without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced."
Of course, when a petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court is denied due
course, or is otherwise denied, it is not necessary that such findings of facts be made. However, the denial
must state the legal basis thereof.
In the present case, the three-paged decision of the trial court contained in the first two pages a statement of
the allegations of the pleadings of the parties and enumerates the witnesses presented and the exhibits
marked during the trial. Thereafter, the trial court arrived at the following conclusion:
After considering the evidence on record, this Court finds that plaintiff have failed to prove their case
as against defendant Felicidad Viernes, but proved their case against defaulted defendants Antes. The
Court finds that there is no sufficient proof of knowledge or bad faith on the part of defendant
Vierneses, and on the basis of existing jurisprudence, a third person who in good faith purchases and

Page 157 of 178

Page 158 of 178

registers a property cannot be deprived of his title as against plaintiff who had previously purchased
same property but failed to register the same.
19

This is not what is contemplated under the Constitution and the Rules as a clear and distinct statement of the
facts on the basis of which the decision is rendered. The foregoing one paragraph statement constitute a mere
conclusion of facts and of law arrived at by the trial court without stating the facts which serve as the basis
thereof. Indeed the conclusion of fact therein that petitioners had not registered the sale to them is traversed by
the records which show on the contrary, petitioners earlier registered the sale to them. The court statement in
the decision that a party has proven his case while the other has not, is not the findings of facts contemplated
by the Constitution and the rules to be clearly and distinctly stated.
Unfortunately, the appellate court overlooked this fatal defect in the appealed decision. It merely adopted the
alleged findings of facts of the trial court. Although it made some findings on how the deed of assignment in
favor of respondent Viernes came about, it is far from complete and is hardly a substantial compliance with the
mandate aforestated.
1wphi1

As it is now, this Court has before it a challenged decision that failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts on
which it is predicated. This Court has said again and again that it is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the
factual findings of the lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive. But as it is, in this case, the
Court has to wade through the records and make its own findings of facts, rather than further delay the
disposition of the case by remanding the records for further proceedings.
Hence, the appealed decision should be struck down.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision of the appellate court dated September 12,
1988 is hereby SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring the order of the trial court dated
November 10, 1982 null and void and reinstating the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582 in the
possession of the petitioners; declaring the petitioners to have the superior right to the property in question and
to be the true and lawful owners of the same; directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT No.
293889 in the name of respondent Felicidad Viernes and to issue a new title in favor of petitioners spouses
Pastor and Virginia Valdez upon the presentation of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 141582; directing
respondent Felicidad Viernes and other persons claiming rights under her residing in the premises of the land
in question to vacate the same immediately and to remove whatever improvement she has placed in the
premises; and ordering private respondents to jointly and severally pay the petitioners the amounts of
P15,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. The docket
fees for the amount of damages and attorney's fees awarded to the petitioners, if not yet duly paid, shall
constitute a prior lien in favor of the government, before the satisfaction of the judgment in favor of the
petitioners. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

26. People v. Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, 23 Jan. 2003

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 143468-71

January 24, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FREDDIE LIZADA @ FREDIE LIZADA, accused-appellant.

Page 158 of 178

Page 159 of 178

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, finding accusedappellant Freddie Lizada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of qualified rape and meting on him
the death penalty for each count.
I. The Charges
Accused-appellant2 was charged with four (4) counts of qualified rape under four separate Informations. The
accusatory portion of each of the four Informations reads:
"That sometime in August 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd designs,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation
upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing and
touching her private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and
trying to insert his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said
ANALIA ORILLOSA y AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

That on or about November 5, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and
intimidation upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her,
kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top
of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the
said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

That on or about October 22, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and
intimidation upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her,
kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top
of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the
said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

That on or about September 15, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and
intimidation upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, by then and there embracing her,
kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter removing her skirt and panty, placing himself on top
of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the
said ANALIA ORILLOSA Y AGOO, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law."3
The four (4) Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390, 99-171391, 99-171392 and 99171393, respectively.

Page 159 of 178

Page 160 of 178

Accused-appellant was arraigned on April 15, 1999, assisted by counsel de parte and entered a plea of not
guilty to each of the charges.4 A joint trial then ensued.
II. Evidence of the Prosecution5
Ricardo Orillosa and his wife, Rose Orillosa, natives of San Isidro, Bohol, had three (3) children, namely:
Analia, who was born on December 18, 1985; 6 Jepsy, who was 11 years old, and Rossel, who was nine years
old. However, the couple decided to part ways and live separately. Rose left Bohol and settled in Manila with
her young children. She worked as a waitress to make both ends meet.
In 1994, Rose met accused-appellant. They decided to live together as husband and wife at No. 1252 Jose
Abad Santos Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila. In 1996, Rose resigned from her job as a waitress. She secured
a loan, bought a truck and used it for her business.
In the meantime, Rose secured a loan anew and used the proceeds thereof to put up a video shop in her
house. She sold Avon products from house to house to augment her income. Whenever she was out of their
house, Rossel and Analia took turns in tending the video shop and attending to customers.
Sometime in 1996, Analia was in her room when accused-appellant entered. He laid on top of her, removed her
T-shirt and underwear. He then inserted his finger in her vagina. He removed his finger and inserted his penis
in her vagina. Momentarily, she felt a sticky substance coming out from his penis. She also felt pain in her sex
organ. Satiated, accused-appellant dismounted but threatened to kill her if she divulged to anyone what he did
to her. Accused-appellant then returned to his room. The incident lasted less than one hour. Petrified by the
threats on her life, Analia kept to herself what happened to her.7
Sometime in August 1997, accused-appellant entered again the room of Analia, placed himself on top of her
and held her legs and arms. He then inserted his finger into her sex organ ("fininger niya ako"). Satiated,
accused-appellant left the room. During the period from 1996 to 1998, accused-appellant sexually abused
private complainant two times a week.
On November 5, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Analia was in the sala of their house studying her assignments.
Accused-appellant was also in the sala. Rossel tended the video shop while his mother was away. Analia went
into her room and lay down in bed. She did not lock the door of the room because her brother might enter any
time. She wanted to sleep but found it difficult to do so. Accused-appellant went to his room next to the room of
Analia. He, however, entered the room of Analia. He was wearing a pair of short pants and was naked from
waist up. Analia did not mind accused-appellant entering her room because she knew that her brother, Rossel
was around. However, accused-appellant sat on the side of her bed, placed himself on top of her, held her
hands and legs and fondled her breasts. She struggled to extricate herself. Accused-appellant removed her
panty and touched her sex organ. Accused-appellant inserted his finger into her vagina, extricated it and then
inserted his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant ejaculated. Analia felt pain in her sex organ. Momentarily,
Rossel passed by the room of Analia after drinking water from the refrigerator, and peeped through the door.
He saw accused-appellant on top of Analia. Accused-appellant saw Rossel and dismounted. Accused-appellant
berated Rossel and ordered him to go to his room and sleep. Rossel did. Accused-appellant then left the room.
Analia likewise left the room, went out of the house and stayed outside for one hour. Rose arrived home at 6:00
p.m. However, Analia did not divulge to her mother what accused-appellant had just done to her.
On November 9, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., Rose left the house. Accused-appellant was in the sala of the house
watching television. Analia tended the video shop. However, accused-appellant told Analia to go to the sala.
She refused, as nobody would tend the video shop. This infuriated accused-appellant who threatened to slap
and kick her.
Analia ignored the invectives and threats of accused-appellant and stayed in the video shop. When Rose
returned, a heated argument ensued between accused-appellant and Analia. Rose sided with her paramour
and hit Analia. This prompted Analia to shout. "Ayoko na, ayoko na." Shortly thereafter, Rose and Analia left the
house on board the motorcycle driven by her mother in going to Don Bosco Street, Moriones, Tondo, Manila, to
retrieve some tapes which had not yet been returned. When Rose inquired from her daughter what she meant

Page 160 of 178

Page 161 of 178

by her statement, "ayoko na, ayoko na," she told her mother that accused-appellant had been touching the
sensitive parts of her body and that he had been on top of her. Rose was shocked and incensed. The two
proceeded to Kagawad Danilo Santos to have accused-appellant placed under arrest. On November 10, 1998,
the two proceeded to the Western Police District where Analia gave her Affidavit-Complaint to PO1 Carmelita
Nocum in the presence of SPO2 Fe H. Avindante. She related to the police investigator that accused-appellant
had touched her breasts and arms in August, 1998, September 15, 1998, October 22, 1998 and on November
5, 1998, at 3:00 p.m. Analia then submitted herself to genitalia examination by Dr. Armie Umil, a medico-legal
officer of the NBI. The medico-legal officer interviewed Analia, told him that she was raped in May, 1997 at 3:00
p.m. and November 5, 1998 at 3:00 p.m.8
Dr. Umil prepared and signed a report on "Living Case No. MO-98-1265" which contained her findings during
her examination on Analia, thus:
"xxx

xxx

xxx

Fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject. Breasts, developed,

hemispherical, firm. , brown, 3.0 cms. in diameter. Nipples brown, protruding, 0.7 cms. in diameter.
No extragenital physical injuries noted.
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette, tense. Vetibular
mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact. Hymenal orifice measures, 1.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal
walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.
CONCLUSIONS:
1). No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of
examination.
2). Hymen, intact and its orifice small (1.5 cms. in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an
average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury." 9
Subsequently, Analia told her mother that "mabuti na lang iyong panghihipo lang ang sinabi ko." When
Rose inquired from her daughter what she meant by her statement, Analia revealed to her mother that
accused-appellant had sexually abused her. On December 15, 1998, Analia executed a "Dagdag na
Salaysay ng Paghahabla" and charged accused-appellant with rape.10
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant
Accused-appellant testified in his defense. He declared that after a month of courtship, he and Rose agreed in
1994 to live together as husband and wife. He was then a utility worker with the Navotas Branch of the
Philippine Banking Corporation. Rose, on the other hand, was a waitress at the Golden Bird beer house at
Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Accused-appellant denied having raped Analia. He claimed that he loved the children of Rose as if they were
his own children. He took care of them, as in fact he cooked and prepared their food before they arrived home
from school. At times, he ironed their school uniforms and bathed them, except Analia who was already big.
Analia was hard-headed because she disobeyed him whenever he ordered her to do some errands. Because
of Analia's misbehavior, accused-appellant and Rose oftentimes quarreled. Rose even demanded that
accused-appellant leave their house. Another irritant in his and Rose's lives were the frequent visits of the
relatives of her husband.

Page 161 of 178

Page 162 of 178

Sometime in 1997, accused-appellant was retrenched from his employment and received a separation pay of
P9,000.00 which he used to put up the VHS Rental and Karaoke from which he earned a monthly income of
P25,000.00. While living together, accused-appellant and Rose acquired two colored television sets, two VHS
Hi-fi recorders, one VHS player, one washing machine, one scooter motor, two VHS rewinders, one sala set,
one compact disc player and many other properties.
Accused-appellant ventured that Rose coached her children Analia and Rossel to testify against him and used
them to fabricate charges against him because Rose wanted to manage their business and take control of all
the properties they acquired during their coverture. Also, Rose was so exasperated because he had no job.
IV. The Verdict
On May 29, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, defined and penalized in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, and meted on him the death penalty for each count. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
"From all the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the Court concludes that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him in these four (4) cases, convicts him
thereof, and sentences him to DEATH PENALTY in each and every case as provided for in the seventh
paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED."11
V. Assigned Errors of the Trial Court
Accused-appellant assailed the decision of the court a quo and averred in his brief that:
"THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MAKING A FINDING OF FACT IN ITS DECISION
AND SUCH FAILURE IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR."12
xxx

xxx

xxx

"THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF FOUR (4)

COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.13
VI. Findings of the Court
On the first assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that the decision of the trial court is null and void
as it failed to comply with the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1,
Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. He avers that the court a quo made no findings of
facts in its decision. The trial court merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and
those of accused-appellant and his witnesses, and forthwith set forth the decretal portion of said decision. The
trial court even failed to state in said decision the factual and legal basis for the imposition of the supreme
penalty of death on him. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that there should be no mechanical
reliance on the constitutional provision. Trial courts may well-nigh synthesize and simplify their decisions
considering that courts are harassed by crowded dockets and time constraints. Even if the trial court did not
elucidate the grounds as the legal basis for the penalties imposed, nevertheless the decision is valid. In any
event, the Solicitor General contends that despite the infirmity of the decision, there is no need to remand the
case to the trial court for compliance with the constitutional requirement as the Court may resolve the case on
its merits to avoid delay in the final disposition of the case and afford accused-appellant his right to a speedy
trial.

Page 162 of 178

Page 163 of 178

The contention of accused-appellant is well-taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14 of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based." This requirement is reiterated and implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which reads:
"SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment. The judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly
a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is
based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the
acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the
commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
action has been reserved or waived."14
The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading the decision on how it was reached
by the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties and the relevant facts, of the opinion it has
formed on the issues, and of the applicable laws. The parties must be assured from a reading of the decision of
the trial court that they were accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial and responsible judge. 15 More
substantial reasons for the requirement are:
"For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if
permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For another,
the decision if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its merits and persuade
it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal. A third
reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law on which they are based,
especially those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that can
serve as useful references and even as precedents in the resolution of future controversies." 16
The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had been proved and its conclusions culled
therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues and the factual and legal basis for its resolution. 17 Trial courts
should not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties and come out with its
decretal conclusion.
In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the Constitution and the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and of accusedappellant on direct and cross examinations and merely made referral to the documentary evidence of the
parties then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty of four
(4) counts of rape and sentenced him to death, on each count.
The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution based on their evidence, the
issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual and legal issues, as well as the legal and factual
bases for convicting accused-appellant of each of the crimes charged. The trial court rendered judgment
against accused-appellant with the court declaration in the decretal portion of its decision that it did so based
on the evidence of the prosecution. The trial court swallowed hook, line and sinker the evidence of the
prosecution. It failed to explain in its decision why it believed and gave probative weight to the evidence of the
prosecution. Reading the decision of the trial court, one is apt to conclude that the trial court ignored the
evidence of accused-appellant. The trial court did not even bother specifying the factual and legal bases for its
imposition of the supreme penalty of death on accused-appellant for each count of rape. The trial court merely
cited seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The decision of the trial court is a good
example of what a decision, envisaged in the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, should
not be.

Page 163 of 178

Page 164 of 178

The Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of the infirmity of the decision of the trial
court, for compliance with the constitutional provision. However, to avert further delay in the disposition of the
cases, the Court decided to resolve the cases on their merits considering that all the records as well as the
evidence adduced during the trial had been elevated to the Court. 18 The parties filed their respective briefs
articulating their respective stances on the factual and legal issues.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy but
to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent; (2) considering the nature of things, and only two
persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
great caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and not be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. 19 By the very nature of the crime of rape,
conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's testimony because of the
fact that usually only the participants can testify as to its occurrence. However, if the accused raises a sufficient
doubt as to any material element of the crime, and the prosecution is unable to overcome it with its evidence,
the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt and
hence, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
Anent the second assignment of error, we will resolve the same for convenience, as follows:
Re: CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 99-171392 and 99-171393 (covering the crime of rape committed on or
about October 22, 1998 and on or about September 15, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution failed to adduce the requisite quantum of evidence that he raped
the private complainant precisely on September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998. Moreover, the medical
findings of Dr. Armie Umil show that the hymen of the private complainant was intact and its orifice so small as
to preclude complete penetration by an average size adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing
any genital injury. The physical evidence belies private complainant's claim of having been deflowered by
accused-appellant on four different occasions. The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, contends that the
prosecution through the private complainant proved the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime charged on
both counts.
The contention of accused-appellant does not persuade the Court. The private complainant testified that since
1996, when she was only eleven years old, until 1998, for two times a week, accused-appellant used to place
himself on top of her and despite her tenacious resistance, touched her arms, legs and sex organ and inserted
his finger and penis into her vagina. In the process, he ejaculated. Accused-appellant threatened to kill her if
she divulged to anyone what he did to her.20 Although private complainant did not testify that she was raped on
September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998, nevertheless accused-appellant may be convicted for two counts
of rape, in light of the testimony of private complainant.
It bears stressing that under the two Informations, the rape incidents are alleged to have been committed "on or
about September 15, 1998" and "on or about October 22, 1998." The words "on or about" envisage a period,
months or even two or four years before September 15, 1998 or October 22, 1998. The prosecution may prove
that the crime charged was committed on or about September 15, 1998 and on or about October 22, 1998.
In People vs. Gianan,21 this Court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant of five (5) counts of rape, four of
which were committed in December 1992 (two counts) and one each in March and April, 1993 and in
November, 1995 and one count of acts of lasciviousness committed in December 1992, on a criminal complaint
for multiple rape, viz:
"That sometime in November 1995, and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of
his own twelve (12) year old daughter, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have repeated carnal knowledge of Myra M. Gianan, against
her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice." 22

Page 164 of 178

Page 165 of 178

On the contention of accused-appellant in said case that his conviction for rape in December 1992 was so
remote from the date (November 1995) alleged in the Information, so that the latter could no longer be
considered as being "as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed" as provided under Section
11, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court held:
"Accused-appellant nevertheless argues that his conviction for rape in December 1992 is so remote
from the date (November 1995) alleged in the information, so that the latter could no longer be
considered as being "as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed" as provided
under Rule 110, 11.
This contention is also untenable. In People v. Garcia, this Court upheld a conviction for ten counts of
rape based on an information which alleged that the accused committed multiple rape "from November
1990 up to July 21, 1994," a time difference of almost four years which is longer than that involved in
the case at bar. In any case, as earlier stated, accused-appellant's failure to raise a timely objection
based on this ground constitutes a waiver of his right to object." 23
Moreover, when the private complainant testified on how accused-appellant defiled her two times a week from
1996 until 1998, accused-appellant raised nary a whimper of protest. Accused-appellant even rigorously crossexamined the private complainant on her testimony on direct examination. The presentation by the prosecution,
without objection on the part of accused-appellant, of evidence of rape committed two times a week from 1996
until 1998 (which includes September 15, 1998 and October 22, 1998) to prove the charges lodged against him
constituted a waiver by accused-appellant of his right to object to any perceived infirmity in, and in the
amendment of, the aforesaid Informations to conform to the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The barefaced fact that private complainant remained a virgin up to 1998 does not preclude her having been
repeatedly sexually abused by accused-appellant. The private complainant being of tender age, it is possible
that the penetration of the male organ went only as deep as her labia. Whether or not the hymen of private
complainant was still intact has no substantial bearing on accused-appellant's commission of the crime. 24 Even,
the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ or the mere entry of the penis into the aperture
constitutes consummated rape. It is sufficient that there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of
the pudendum.25 InPeople vs. Baculi, cited in People vs. Gabayron,26 we held that there could be a finding of
rape even if despite repeated intercourse over a period of four years, the complainant still retained an intact
hymen without injury. In these cases, the private complainant testified that the penis of accused-appellant
gained entry into her vagina:
"Fiscal Carisma
(continuing)
After your underwear was removed by the accused, what happened next?
Witness:
He laid himself on top of me, sir.
Q

What did he do while he was on top of you?

He inserted his finger (Finenger nya ako, ipinatong nya yong ano nya)

Q
Can you please describe more specifically what is this and I quote "Pinatong nya yong ano
nya" and where did he place it?
A

His organ, sir.

Where did he place his organ?

Page 165 of 178

Page 166 of 178

A

In my organ, sir. (sa ari ko po.)

At this very juncture madam witness, what did you feel?

A
I felt pain, sir, and I also felt that there was a sticky substance that was coming out,
sir."27(Emphasis supplied)
We agree with accused-appellant that he is guilty only of two counts of simple rape, instead of qualified rape.
The evidence on record shows that accused-appellant is the common-law husband of Rose, the mother of
private complainant. The private complainant, as of October 1998, was still 13 years old, and under Article 335
as amended by Republic Act 7659, the minority of the private complainant, concurring with the fact that
accused-appellant is the common-law husband of the victim's mother, is a special qualifying circumstance
warranting the imposition of the death penalty.28 However, said circumstance was not alleged in the
Informations as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which was given
retroactive effect by this Court because it is favorable to the accused. 29 Hence, even if the prosecution proved
the special qualifying circumstance of minority of private complainant and relationship, the accused-appellant
being the common-law husband of her mother, accused-appellant is guilty only of simple rape. Under the given
law, the penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua. Conformably with current jurisprudence, accusedappellant is liable to private complainant for civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, or a total of P200,000.00.
Re: Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390 and 99-171391 (covering the crime committed on or about August
1998 and November 5, 1998)
Accused-appellant avers that (a) the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-171390 is defective because the
date of the offense "on or about August 1998" alleged therein is too indefinite, in violation of Rule 110, Section
11 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads:
"Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the
offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission. (11a)"30
Accused-appellant further asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that he raped private complainant in
August 1998. Hence, he argues, he should be acquitted of said charge. The Office of the Solicitor General, for
its part, argued that the date "on or about August 1998" is sufficiently definite. After all, the date of the
commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. The prosecution adduced conclusive
proof that accused-appellant raped private complainant on or about August 1998, as gleaned from her
testimony during the trial.
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant. It bears stressing that the precise date of the
commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact
date when the rape was committed does not render the Information defective. The reason for this is
that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the private complainant under any of the
circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Significantly,
accused-appellant did not even bother to file a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 116, Section 9
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure before he was arraigned. Indeed, accused-appellant was
duly arraigned under the Information and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge without any plaint
on the sufficiency of the Information. Accused-appellant even adduced his evidence after the
prosecution had rested its case. It was only on appeal to this Court that accused-appellant questioned
for the first time the sufficiency of the Information filed against him. It is now too late in the day for him
to do so. Moreover, inPeople vs. Salalima,31 this Court held that:
"Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the
information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was
raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge

Page 166 of 178

Page 167 of 178

under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it
is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was
committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were
committed "before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter,"
"sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about
and sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, although the indictments did not state with particularity the dates when the sexual assaults
took place, we believe that the allegations therein that the acts were committed "sometime during the
month of March 1996 or thereabout," "sometime during the month of April 1996 or thereabout,"
"sometime during the month of May 1996 or thereabout" substantially apprised appellant of the crimes
he was charged with since all the elements of rape were stated in the informations. As such, appellant
cannot complain that he was deprived of the right to be informed of the nature of the cases filed
against him. Accordingly, appellant's assertion that he was deprived of the opportunity to prepare for
his defense has no leg to stand on."
The prosecution proved through the testimony of private complainant that accused-appellant raped her two
times a week in 1998. As in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393, accused-appellant is guilty only of
simple rape.
As to the crime of rape subject of Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant avers that he is not
criminally liable of rape. We agree with accused-appellant. The collective testimony of private complainant and
her younger brother Rossel was that on November 5, 1998, accused-appellant who was wearing a pair of short
pants but naked from waist up, entered the bedroom of private complainant, went on top of her, held her hands,
removed her panty, mashed her breasts and touched her sex organ. However, accused-appellant saw Rossel
peeping through the door and dismounted. He berated Rossel for peeping and ordered him to go back to his
room and to sleep. Accused-appellant then left the room of the private complainant. The testimony of private
complainant on direct examination reads:
"Fiscal Carisma:
Q

In between 1996 and August 1997?

Yes, sir, sometimes two (2) times a week.

In November of 1998, do you recall of any unusual experience that happened to you again?

Yes, sir.

What was this unusual experience of yours?

He laid himself on top of me, sir.

You said "he" whom are you referring to?

Freedie Lizada Jakosalem, sir.

The same person you pointed to earlier?

Yes, sir.

Q
You said he placed himself on top of you in November, 1998, what did he do while he was on
top of you?

Page 167 of 178

Page 168 of 178

A

He's smashing my breast and he was also touching my arms and my legs, sir.

What else if any madam witness?

He was also touching my sex organ, sir.

What else, if any?

Atty. Estorco:
May we take note of the same objection your honor, the prosecution
Court:
Same ruling. Let the complainant continue considering that she is crying and still young.
Witness:
None else, sir.
Fiscal Carisma:
With what part of his body did he touch your sex organ?
Atty. Estorco:
Your Honor, that is
Court:
May answer.
Fiscal Carisma:
I will re-propound the question, your honor.
You said that he touched your sex organ, will you tell the court with what part of his body, did
he touch your sex organ?
Witness:
With his hands, sir.
Q
What about after November 1998 was this the last incident, this unusual thing that you
experienced from the hands of the accused was this that last time, the one you narrated in November
1998?
A

Yes, sir."32

On cross-examination, the private complainant testified, thus:

"Atty. Balaba:

Page 168 of 178

Page 169 of 178

Q

Who was that somebody who entered the room?

My stepfather Freedie Lizada, sir.

He was fully dressed at that time, during the time, is that correct?

Yes, sir, he was dressed then, sir.

And he had his pants on, is that correct?

He was wearing a short pants, sir.

Was it a T-shirt that he had, at that time or a polo shirt?

He was not wearing any shirt then, sir, he was naked.

When you realized that somebody was entering the room were you not afraid?

No, sir, I was not afraid.

Q
What happened when you realized that somebody entered the room, and the one who entered
was your stepfather, Freedie Lizada?
A
I did not mind him entering the room because I know that my brother was around but suddenly I
felt that somebody was holding me.
Q

He was holding you, where were you when he held you?

I was in the bed, sir, lying down.

You were lying down?

Yes, sir.

What part of the body did the accused Freedie Lizada touched you?

My two arms, my legs and my breast, sir.

Q
Do you mean to tell us that he was holding your two arms and at the same time your legs, is
that what you are trying to tell us?
A

He held me first in my arms and then my legs, sir.

He held you first by your arms, is that what you are trying to tell us?

Fiscal Carisma:
Already answered your honor, he held the arms and then the legs.
Court:
Already answered.

Page 169 of 178

Page 170 of 178

Atty. Balaba:
Q

Your honor, I am just trying to

Court:
Proceed.
Atty. Balaba:
Q

He held your arms with his two hands?

Only with one hand, sir.

Which hand were you touched?

I do not know which hand, sir.

Which arm of yours was held by Freedie Lizada?

I could not recall, sir.

Which side of your body was Freedie Lizada at that time?

I cannot recall, sir.

What was the position of Freedie Lizada when he held your arms?

He was sitting on our bed, sir.

Which side of your bed was Freedie Lizada sitting on?

I do not know, sir. I cannot recall.

Atty. Balaba:
Can we take a recess your honor?
Court:
How long will it take you to finish your cross?
Atty. Balaba:
We will confront the witness with so many things your honor.
Court:
Yes, that's why I am asking you how long will it take you to finish your cross?
Atty. Balaba:

Page 170 of 178

Page 171 of 178

About another hour, sir.
Court:
So we will be finished by 11:15, proceed.
Atty. Balaba:
You cannot also remember which leg was held by Freedie Lizada?
A

I cannot recall, sir.

When this happened, did you not shout for help?

A
I did not ask for help, I was motioning to resist him, so that he would go out, sir. I was struggling
to free myself from him, sir.
Q

And you were not able to extricate yourself from him?

I was not able to extricate myself, sir.

Q
You were struggling with one arm of Lizada holding your arm, and the other hand was holding
your leg, is that what you are trying to tell us?
A

No, sir, it's not like that.

Q
Could you tell us, what happened, you did not shout for help and you were trying to extricate
yourself, what happened?
A

He suddenly went out of the room, sir.

Now, he went

Court:
You did not shout during that time?
A

No, your honor."33

Rossel, the nine-year old brother of the private complainant corroborated in part his sister's testimony. He
testified on direct examination, thus:
"Fiscal Carisma: (continuing)
Q

Now, on November 2, 1998 do you recall where you were at about 3:00 o'clock?

I was outside our house, sir.

Q
Where was your house again, Mr. witness, at that time? Where was your house at that date,
time and place? At that date and time?
A

1252 Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila, sir.

Page 171 of 178

Page 172 of 178

Court:
Q

The same address?

A.

Yes, sir.

Fiscal Carisma:
Q

On that date, time and place, do your recall where your sister Anna Lea Orillosa was?

Yes, sir.

Where was she?

She was sleeping, sir.

Q
Now, on that date, time and place you said you were outside your house, did you stay the
whole afternoon outside your house?
A

No, sir.

Where did you go next?

Inside, sir.

For what purpose did you get inside your house?

Because I was thirsty, sir.

So you went to the fridge to get some water?

Yes, sir.

And what happened as you went inside your house to get some water?

A
I saw my stepfather removing the panty of my sister and he touched her and then he laid on top
of her, sir.
Q

Do you see your stepfather inside the courtroom now?

Yes, sir.

Will you point to him?

He is the one, sir.

Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a male person who when asked answers to the name Freedie Lizada.
Fiscal Carisma:

Page 172 of 178

Page 173 of 178

Q
This thing that your father was that your stepfather did to your elder sister, did you see this
before or after you went to the fridge to get some water?
A

I already got water then, sir.

What did you do as you saw this thing being done by your stepfather to your elder sister?

I was just looking at them when he saw me, sir.

Who, you saw who? You are referring to the accused Freedie Lizada?

Yes, sir.

So, what did you do as you were seen by your stepfather?

A
He scolded me, he shouted at me, he told me something and after that he went to the other
room and slept, sir."34
Rossel testified on cross-examination, thus:
"Q

So you got thirsty, is that correct, and went inside the house?

Yes, sir.

And you took a glass of water from the refrigerator?

Yes, sir.

And it was at this time that you saw the accused Freedie Lizada touching your sister?

Yes, sir.

Where was this refrigerator located?

In front of the room where my sister sleeps, sir.

So the door of your sister's room was open?

Yes, sir.

Q
And okay, you said your sister was sleeping. What was the position of your sister when you
said the accused removed her panty?
A

She was lying straight, but she was resisting, sir.

Were you noticed by your sister at that time?

No, sir.

And your sister did not call for help at that time?

No, sir.

Page 173 of 178

Page 174 of 178

Q
And all this time you saw the accused doing this, from the refrigerator where you were taking a
glass of water?
A

Yes, sir.

Did you not say something to the accused?

No, sir, I was just looking.

Q
So your sister was lying down when the accused removed her panty, is that what you are trying
to tell us?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And where was the and the accused saw you when he was removing the panty of your
sister?
A

Not yet, sir, but after a while he looked at the refrigerator because he might be thirsty.

Q
So you said the accused was touching your sister. What part of her body was touched by
the accused?
A

Here, sir.

Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing at the lower portion of the body.
Atty. Balaba:
Q

You saw with what hand was the accused touching your sister?

Yes, sir.

What hand was he touching your sister?

This hand, sir.

Court Interpreter:
Witness raising his right hand.
Atty. Balaba:
Q
And which part of your sister's body was the accused touching with his right hand? Your sister's
body was the accused touching with his right hand?
A

Her right leg, sir.

How about his left hand, what was the accused doing with his left hand?

Removing her panty, sir.

Page 174 of 178

Page 175 of 178

Q

Removing her?

Panty, sir.

Which hand of your sister was being removed with the left hand of the accused?

Court:
Which?
Atty. Balaba:
Which hand, which hand?
Fiscal Carisma:
The question is vague, your honor.
Atty. Balaba:
Because he said that removing the hand
Fiscal Carisma:
He said removing the panty.
Atty. Balaba:
Is that panty? I'm sorry.
Q

So, the accused was touching with his right hand the left thigh of your sister

Fiscal Carisma:
The right thigh.
Atty. Balaba:
Q
Rather the right thigh of your sister and with his left hand removing the panty, is that what you
are telling to tell us?
A

Yes, sir.

And your sister all the time was trying to was struggling to get free, is that not correct?

Yes, sir, she was resisting. (witness demonstrating)

She was struggling was the accused able to remove the panty?

Yes, sir.

And all the time you were there looking with the glass of water in your hand?

Page 175 of 178

Page 176 of 178

A

Yes, sir."35

In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no introduction of the penis of accused-appellant into the
aperture or within the pudendum of the vagina of private complainant. Hence, accused-appellant is not
criminally liable for consummated rape.36
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of consummated acts of
lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code or attempted rape under Article 335 of the said
Code, as amended in relation to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. In light of the
evidence on record, we believe that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of
lasciviousness.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
"Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon
other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall
be punished by prision correccional."37
For an accused to be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence
of the following essential elements:
"1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness.
2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age." 38
"Lewd" is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation
to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.39
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
"There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
"1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance."40
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

Page 176 of 178

Page 177 of 178

"(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed."41
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance
of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. 42 The raison d'etre for the law
requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts
of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent.
It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has
been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say
with certainty what the intent of the accused is. 43 It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate
step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a
direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." 44 The act done need
not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a
causal relation to the intended crime.45 In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense.46
Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should be distinguished from preparatory acts which consist
of devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of a desired object or end. 47 One perpetrating
preparatory acts is not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if the preparatory acts constitute a
consummated felony under the law, the malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense. 48 The Supreme
Court of Spain, in its decision of March 21, 1892, declared that for overt acts to constitute an attempted
offense, it is necessary that their objective be known and established or such that acts be of such nature that
they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and
finality to serve as ground for designation of the offense.49
There is persuasive authority that in offenses not consummated as the material damage is wanting, the nature
of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained but the same must be inferred from the nature
of the acts executed (accion medio).50 Hence, it is necessary that the acts of the accused must be such that, by
their nature, by the facts to which they are related, by circumstances of the persons performing the same, and
b the things connected therewith, that they are aimed at the consummation of the offense. This Court
emphasized in People vs. Lamahang51 that:
"The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are
supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it
is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the mind be able to cause a
particular injury."52
If the malefactor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his spontaneous desistance, he is not
guilty of an attempted felony.53 The law does not punish him for his attempt to commit a felony.54 The rationale of
the law, as explained by Viada:
"La Ley, en efecto, no hiere sino a pesar suyo; prefiere impedir el crimen que castigarlo. Si el autor de la
tentativa, despues de haber comenzado a ejecutar el delito por actos exteriores, se detiene, por un sentimiento
libre y espontaneo, en el borde del abismo, salvo esta. Es un llamamiento al remordimiento, a la conciencia,
una gracia un perdon que concede la Ley al arrepentimiento voluntario." 55
As aptly elaborated on by Wharton:
"First, the character of an attempt is lost when its execution is voluntarily abandoned. There is no
conceivable overt act to which the abandoned purpose could be attached. Secondly, the policy of the
law requires that the offender, so long as he is capable of arresting an evil plan, should be encouraged
to do so, by saving him harmless in case of such retreat before it is possible for any evil consequences

Page 177 of 178

Page 178 of 178

to ensue. Neither society, nor any private person, has been injured by his act. There is no damage,
therefore, to redress. To punish him after retreat and abandonment would be to destroy the motive for
retreat and abandonment."56
It must be borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him from criminal
liability for the intended crime but it does not exempt him from the crime committed by him before his
desistance.57
In light of the facts established by the prosecution, we believe that accused-appellant intended to have carnal
knowledge of private complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by the prosecution were not
mere preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the execution of
rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accused-appellant
desisted from performing all the acts of execution however his desistance was not spontaneous as he was
impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused-appellant is
guilty only of attempted rape.58 In a case of similar factual backdrop as this case, we held:
"Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and taking into account Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the
appellant can only be convicted of attempted rape. He commenced the commission of rape by
removing his clothes, undressing and kissing his victim and lying on top of her. However, he failed to
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other
than his own spontaneous desistance, i.e., by the timely arrival of the victim's brother. Thus, his penis
merely touched Mary Joy's private organ. Accordingly, as the crime committed by the appellant is
attempted rape, the penalty to be imposed on him should be an indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum."
The penalty for attempted rape is prision mayor which is two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua.59 Accusedappellant should be meted an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which should be taken from prision
correccional which has a range of from six months and one day to six years and the maximum of which shall be
taken from the medium period of prision mayor which has a range of from eight years and one day to ten years,
without any modifying circumstance. Accused-appellant is also liable to private complainant for moral damages
in the amount of P25,000.00.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, is SET
ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-171390, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also hereby ordered to pay private complainant Analia Orillosa the
amounts of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and P50,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty of attempted rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended in relation to Article 6 of the said Code and is hereby meted an
indeterminate penalty of from six years of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum to ten years
ofprision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay private
complainant Analia Orillosa the amount of P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; and,
3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171392 and 99-171393, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape, defined in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to
pay to private complainant Analia Orillosa the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and the amount
of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages for each count, or a total amount of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

Page 178 of 178