GUSTAVO F.

DALEN
2D

NATURAL RESOURCES
AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1. BENGUET CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES-MINES
ADJUDICATION BOARD and J.G. REALTY AND MINING
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163101
FACTS:
Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty
Agreement with Option to Purchase (RAWOP) , wherein J.G.
Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims
with a total area of 288.8656 hectares. The parties also
executed a Supplemental Agreement. The mining claims
were covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA) Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G.
Realty as claim-owner and Benguet as operator.
After some time, the Executive Vice-President of
Benguet, Antonio N. Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G.
Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims.
However, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan,
then sent a letter to the President of Benguet informing the
latter that it was terminating the RAWOP. The latter alleged
that petitioner violated some of the provisions of the RAWOP,
specifically on non-payment of royalties and non-fulfillment
of obligations stipulated therein.
J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP. POA issued a Decision,
cancelling the RAWOP and its Supplemental Agreement.
BENGUET was subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA
Application over the mineral claims. Subsequent MR was
denied. Said decision was upheld by DENR-MAB.
Hence this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner the filing of the petition with
the Supreme Court is proper.
HELD:
NO. the instant petition can be denied outright as
Benguet resorted to an improper Remedy.

The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No.

(RA) 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states, A
petition for review by certiorari and question of law may be
filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision of the
[MAB].
The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to
provide a uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and
final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a
verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body
has been defined as an organ of government, other than a
court or legislature, which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under
this definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasijudicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the
introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91among
these agencies areindicate that the enumeration is not
exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the existence of
other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not expressly
listed, should be deemed included therein.
The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts
dictates that direct resort from administrative agencies to
this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or
unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the
exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
Thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.
Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA
under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has become final and
executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be
denied.
2.
CELESTIAL
NICKEL
MINING
EXPLORATION
CORPORATION vs.
MACROASIA
CORPORATION(formerly
INFANTA
MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION), BLUE
RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION, and LEBACH MINING
CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 169080

FACTS:
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
Infanta Mineral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered
into a Mining Lease Contract V-1050.
Infantas corporate name was then changed to
Cobertson Holdings Corporation and subsequently to its
present name, Macroasia Corporation.
After sometime, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the
subject mining lease contracts and other mining claims of
Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease Contract
No. V-1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the
Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.
Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the
Director of Mines to seek cancellation of mining lease
contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia and another
entity, Lebach Mining Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas
in Brookes Point.
Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering
such areas contiguous to Infantas (now Macroasia) mining
lode claims.
Celestial also holds an MPSA with the
government which covers 2,835 hectares located at
Ipilan/Maasin, Brookes Point, Palawan and two pending
applications covering another 4,040 hectares in Barangay
Mainit also in Brookes Point.
Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasias lease
contracts.
Macroasia refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked
by Celestial.
Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and
findings of the field investigations, the POA granted the
petition of Celestial to cancel the Mining Lease Contracts of
Macroasia; and found the claims of the others indubitably
meritorious.
It gave Celestial the preferential right to
Macroasias mining areas.1 It upheld Blue Ridges petition,
but only as against the Mining Lease Contract areas of
1

Lebach, and the said leased areas were declared

automatically abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to
the aforesaid Lebachs areas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and
Macroasia appealed before the MAB.
Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the
required memorandum of appeal; thus, with respect to
Lebach, the above resolution became final and executory.
The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the
POA to cancel the Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia.
However, the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution
vacating its previous decision, holding that neither the POA
nor the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement
duly entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB further
held that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement
was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary.
Celestial and Blue Ridge made an appeal.
The CA Special12th Division
affirmed the MAB
Resolution which upheld the exclusive authority of the DENR
Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral
agreements. The CA also denied Celestials Motion for
Reconsideration.
While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridges
petition; reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the MAB;
and treated the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as
a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA
under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the power to
resolve mining disputes, which is the greater power,
necessarily includes the lesser power to cancel mining
agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who
has the jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and
privileges?
HELD:
YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has
jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and privileges.

After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279,

RA 7942 and its implementing rules and regulations,
executive issuances, and case law, we rule that the DENR
Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing
mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the
following reasons:
The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral
agreements emanates from his administrative authority,
supervision, management, and control over mineral
resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987.
It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages,
supervises, and regulates the use and development of all
mineral resources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction
over the management of all lands of public domain, which
covers mineral resources and deposits from said lands. It
has the power to oversee, supervise, and police our natural
resources which include mineral resources. Derived from the
broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary
under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to
approve mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or
cause to cancel said agreements.
Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of
the DENR Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend
cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the
authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the
cancellation of mineral agreements.
The DENR Secretarys power to cancel mining rights or
agreements through the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230,
Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation,
and termination of a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.
4. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. v. WMC
RESOURCES INTL. PTY. LTD., WMC PHILIPPINES, INC.
and SAGITTARIUS MINES, INC.
G.R. No. 162331 November 20, 2006
FACTS:
In 1995, the Philippine Government and WMC
Philippines executed a Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (Columbio FTAA) to the expoloration and
development of possible mineral resources in South

Cotabato,
Cotabato.

Sultan

Kudarat,

Davao

del

Sur,

and

North

The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining

claims held under various Mineral Production Sharing
Agreements (MPSA) by the Tampakan Companies. The
Option Agreement also provides for the grant of the right of
first refusal to the Tampakan Companies in case WMC
Philippines desires to dispose of its rights and interests in the
mining claims. In 2000, WMC Resources executed a Sale and
Purchase Agreement with Lepanto, however the Tampakan
Companies sought to exercise its right of first refusal. The
petitioner filed a case against WMC Philippines and the
Tampakan Companies. The case was dismissed.
In 2001, WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Shares of Stocks. The
DENR Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA.
The petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the
DENR Secretary with the Office of the President on several
grounds. One of which is that it violates Section 40 of the
Mining Act (RA No. 7942). The petition was dismissed. The
appeal before the CA was also dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 40 of RA No. 7942 should be
applied to the Columbio FTAA.
HELD:
No. Section 40 of RA No. 7942 should not be applied to
the Columbio FTAA. The Columbio FTAA was entered into by
the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines in March
1995, before the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 took effect on
April 1995. In the case at bar, there is an absence of either
an express declaration or an implication in the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law shall be
made to apply retroactively.
Furthermore, if petitioner was indeed of the mind
Section 40 of RA No. 7942 is applicable to the Columbio
FTAA, thus necessitating the approval of the President for
the validity of its transfer or assignment, it would seem
contradictory that petitioner sought the approval of the
DENR Secretary, and not that of the President, of its July
2000 Sale and Purchase Agreement with WMC Resources.
Hence, it may be glimpsed from the very act of petitioner
that it recognized that the provision of the Columbio FTAA
regarding the consent of the DENR Secretary with respect to
the transfer of said FTAA must be upheld.

Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995

requiring the approval of the President with respect to
assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if made applicable
retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would be tantamount to
an impairment of the obligations under said contract as it
would effectively restrict the right of the parties thereto to
assign or transfer their interests in the said FTAA.
Furthermore, if made to apply to the Columbio FTAA, it will
effectively modify the terms of the original contract and thus
impair the obligations of the parties thereto and restrict the
exercise of their vested rights under the original agreement.
The petition is denied.
G.R. No. 152644

February 10, 2006

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN

HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,

PAUL

REID

and

B.

- versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B.
Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive Officer,
Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining
Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation
(Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining in the
province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a
pit that discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac
and Makalupnit rivers.
The DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac,
Marinduque with violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5
and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of
the Philippines (PD 1067), Section 8 of PD No. 984 or the
National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), Section
108 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of

1995 (RA 7942), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Information on the following
grounds:
(1)
the Information were duplicitous as the
Department of Justice charged more than one offense
for a single act;
(2)
petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid
were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident
subject of the Information took place; and
(3)
the Informations contain allegations which
constitute legal excuse or justification.
MTC issued a Consolidated Order), granting partial
reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the
Information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC
maintained the Information for violation of RA 7942 and
Article 365 of the RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a
petition for certiorari with the RTC of Boac, Marinduque,
assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining
the Informations for violation of RA 7942. The RTC granted
public respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition.
Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it
quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD
984 and ordered those charges reinstated. RTC affirmed the
Consolidated Order in all other respects. Petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Petitioners
contended that since the acts complained of in the charges
for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are the very
same acts complained of in the charge for violation of
Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence,
petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of Article
365 of the RPC. The Court of Appeals affirmed RTCs ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one
should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the
charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property should stand.
HELD:

NO. The information filed by the petitioner should not be

quashed.
There is no duplicity of charges in the present case.
There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single
Information charges more than one offense. Under
Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a
ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the
filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in
preparing his defense.
Here, however, the prosecution
charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each
Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners
erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash
the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves
outright denial.
G.R. No. 163509
PICOP RESOURCES, INC.,petitioner,
- versus BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION
THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.

and

FACTS:
Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation
(CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines Operating
Agreement (Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw Mining
and Development Corporation (Banahaw Mining for brevity)
whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the
exploration, development, and eventual commercial
operation of CMMCIs eighteen (18) mining claims located in
Agusan del Sur.
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining
filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining
claims with the Bureau of Mines. So that Banahaw Mining
was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to
extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its
mining claims. Upon its expiration, the temporary permit was

subsequently renewed thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last

being on June 28, 1991.
Since a portion of Banahaw Minings mining claims was
located in petitioner PICOPs logging concession in Agusan
del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition
of each others right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP
allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining
claims. Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to
applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA for brevity).
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on
December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and
interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of
private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources
Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The transfer included
mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as
claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining
operating agreement with CMMCI.
Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim
owner, immediately approved the assignment made by
Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals,
thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the
new operator of its claims.
On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals
amended Banahaw Minings pending MPSA applications with
the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to
submit additional documents in support of the application.
Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and
Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary
were submitted, as required.
On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals
amended MPSA applications were published in accordance
with the requirements of the Mining Act of 1995.
On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines
Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII
an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent
Base Metals application.
After the submission of their
respective position paper, the Panel Arbitrator issued an
Order disapproving private respondent Base Metals MPSA on
the reasons that adverse claim was filed on time, that the

granting of the MPSA application on area subject of an IFMA

or PTLA which is covered by a Presidential Warranty, the
panel believes it cannot, unless the grantee consents
thereto, without the grantees consent, the area is
considered closed to mining location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2),
DAO No. 96-40) and that the mining location in forest or
timberland is allowed only if such forest or timberland is not
leased by the government to a qualified person or entity and
if it is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, in
addition to the area clearance to be issued by the agency
concerned before it is subjected to mining operation.
Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because
it is off tangent to mining. Both are extremes. They can not
exist at the same time. The other must necessarily stop
before the other operate.
Private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with
public respondent MAB, the latter rendered the assailed
decision setting aside the Panel Arbitrators order. The Court
of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB.
Hence this petition.
PICOP presents the following issues: (1) the 2,756 hectares
subject of Base Metals MPSA are closed to mining
operations except upon PICOPs written consent pursuant to
existing laws, rules and regulations and by virtue of the
Presidential Warranty; (2) its Presidential Warranty is
protected by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution;
and (3) it does not raise new issues in its petition.
PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining
operations as these are within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao
forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 of
then Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly also part
of permanent forest established under Republic Act No. 3092
(RA 3092), and overlaps the wilderness area where mining
applications are expressly prohibited under RA 7586. Hence,
the area is closed to mining operations under Sec. 19(f) of
RA 7942.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by

law, closed to mining activities
Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract
protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987
Constitution.
HELD:
Anent the first issue, the Court ruled that the area
covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, not closed to
mining activities.
There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by
Base Metals MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed forest
reserves.
Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of
the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does not
necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to
mining activities. Contrary to PICOPs obvious misreading of
our decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the
effect that mineral agreements are not allowed in the forest
reserve established under Proclamation 369, the Court in
that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended
by PD 1385, one can acquire mining rights within forest
reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve,
by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the Bureau
of Forest and Development and subsequently for a permit to
explore with the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences.
Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland
or forestty subject to existing rights and reservations.
Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in
forest lands which include the public forest, the permanent
forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations
With regard to the second issue, the Court do not subscribe
to PICOPs argument that the Presidential Warranty dated
September 25, 1968 is a contract protected by the nonimpairment clause of the 1987 Constitution. An examination
of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply
reassures PICOP of the governments commitment to uphold
the terms and conditions of its timber license and
guarantees PICOPs peaceful and adequate possession and
enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw
materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty

covers only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its
concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of
other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within
the concession.
The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a
contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. It is
merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify
PICOPs rights under its timber license.
Since timber
licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked.
G.R. No. 139548. December 22, 2000
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO G. BUMOLO et al., , respondents.
FACTS:
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining
claims in Pao, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from
February 02,1982 to October 12, 1982. Private respondents
Alberto G. Bumolo and others registered their mining claims
in the same area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September 1988,
which claims were subsequently converted into Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA).
On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option
Agreements over the mining.
Under the Agreements,
petitioner was granted the exclusive and irrevocable right to
explore the mining claims for three (3) years with provision
for extension.
On December 23, 1982 and March 26, 1987 petitioner filed
Prospecting Permit Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of
Forest Development, DENR, on the alleged ground that a
portion of the area covered by the mining claims was within
the Magat River Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of June
26, 1969 and with DAR on account of alleged coverage of
the other portion within the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino Civil
Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11 September 1975.

On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected

petitioners Prospecting Permit Application (PPA) on the
ground that the Memorandum of July 08, 1991 endorsed by
the Regional Technical Director for Mines revealed that the
area covered was outside government reservation; that the
prospect claim was in conflict with existing claims; and, that
the area had been extensively explored in the early 1980's.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive
Director Samuel Paragas recommended to the DENR
Secretary that petitioner's request for reconsideration be
denied; that the existing rights of mining claim holders be
respected; and, that the prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement applicants over subject
area be recognized.
As regards petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared
that it was issued a clearance to prospect for six (6) months
from December 11, 1995.
On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent
Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). Petitioner maintained that
subject area was within the Magat River Forest Reservation.
On June 11, 1998 the rejection of the PPA was affirmed
whereas the mining claims of respondents Alberto G. Bumolo
et al. that had been converted into a MPSA, subject to
compliance with R.A. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, were given
due course.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
denied petitioners motion .

Respondent MAB

ISSUE:
Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area
subject of the PPA was outside the Magat River Forest
Reservation.
HELD:
Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of
Regional Executive Director Paragas in denying petitioner's
PPA.
The disapproval of Marcoppers PPA moreover, did not
emanate from a single recommendation of the RTD for
Mines. Records would show that as early as May 31, 1989 x

x x the Bumolo group of PD 463 claims which Marcopper has

eventually surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30 group of
claims x x x x was confirmed by the Forest Engineering
Section of the region to be outside proclaimed watershed
areas, wilderness, national parks and existing government
reforestation projects x x x x
In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by
petitioner's PPA is outside the Magat River Forest
Reservation has been adequately established by the
following evidence: (a) confirmation as early as 31 May 1989
by the Forest Engineering Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan;
(b) the 8 July 1991 Memorandum Report of Regional
Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting provided by the
National Mapping and Resources Information Authority per
its 2 June 1995 indorsement of the maps to the office of the
Regional Executive Director.
Petitioner contests the
exclusion of the area subject of its PPA within the Magat
River Forest Reservation based merely on the alleged
"typographical error committed by somebody in the
Engineering Section of the DENR." Aside from the fact that
the allegation does not have anything to support it, the
aforementioned documents which the Regional Executive
Directors relied upon in denying the PPA had already settled
the issue.
Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for
the rejection of petitioner's PPA. As plotted by the Lands
Management Sector of DENR Region 2 contained in the
sketch plan of 11 November 1996 and as shown in the Land
Use map of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered
under the PPA is indeed outside any government reservation.

G.R. No. L-49109. December 1, 1987

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.
MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND
DIRECTOR OF MINES JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner , Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc., is a mining
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of fifty (50)
valid mining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, acquired under the provisions of the Act of the U.S.

Congress dated 1 July 1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for

short).
On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was
issued, requiring holders of subsisting and valid patentable
mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one (1)
year from the approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly
filed a mining lease application, but "under protest", on 13
October 1978, with a reservation annotated on the back of
its application that it is not waiving its rights over its mining
claims until the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall
have been passed upon by this Court.
On 10 October 1978, petitioner filed this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law to protect its rights (except by said petition). Petitioner
assails Presidential Decree No. 1214 as unconstitutional in
that it amounts to a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already
been declared as its own private and exclusive property in
final judgments. The respondents, on the other hand, allege
that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition as
it failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
constitutional.

Presidential

Decree

No.

1214

is

HELD:
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional.
It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as
owner, over lands of the public domain, of which petitioner's
mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the
nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It
may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree
does not cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill
of 1902, but only those claims over which their locators had
failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may
still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease

prescribed by Pres. Dec. No. 463, the Mineral Development

Resources Decree of 1974.
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV
of the 1973 Constitution.
Petition is dismissed.

G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and
others similarly situated; and THE HONORABLE ANTONIO
CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL
MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao),
respondents.
FACTS:
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated
in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve known as the
Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. Located at Mt. Diwata in the
municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del Norte,
the land has been embroiled in controversy since the mid80s due to the scramble over gold deposits found within its
bowels.
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation
(Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No.
133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the hotlycontested Diwalwal area.
Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991
Republic Act No. 7076, or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining
Act. The law established a Peoples Small-Scale Mining
Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR
and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB)
under the DENR Secretarys direct supervision and control.
The statute also authorized the PMRB to declare and set
aside small-scale mining areas subject to review by the
DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to small-scale
miners under certain conditions.

On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S.

Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No.
66, declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as nonforest land open to small-scale mining. The issuance was
made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Secretary
by Proclamation No. 369, which established the AgusanDavao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 which directs the DENR to study thoroughly
and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the
mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such
study shall include, but shall not be limited to, studying and
weighing the feasibility of entering into management
agreements or operating agreements, or both, with the
appropriate government instrumentalities or private entities,
or both, in carrying out the declared policy of rationalizing
the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; such
agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing
between the state and the said parties, including profitsharing arrangements with small-scale miners, as well as the
payment of royalties to indigenous cultural communities,
among others. The Undersecretary for Field Operations, as
well as the Undersecretary for Legal and Legislative Affairs
and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the Mines and
Geo-sciences Bureau are hereby ordered to undertake such
studies. x x x
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRBDavao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal
Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all the OTP
grantees. It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted
Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the direct
state utilization espoused therein would effectively impair
its vested rights under EP No. 133.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled that the
DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing
Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since the same was merely a
directive to conduct studies on the various options available
to the government for solving the Diwalwal conflict.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded
that the assailed memorandum order did not adopt the
direct state utilization scheme in resolving the Diwalwal
dispute.
Held:
We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the
challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state
utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The
terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was
directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and
nothing else. Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not
grant
any
management/operating
or
profit-sharing
agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that
matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to
undertake studies to determine its feasibility.
G.R. No. 69997. September 30, 1987
UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
GREGORIA BOLANOS, AUREA ARAOJO, GERVACIO ARAOJO,
MARIA BERNAL, FELIX DETECIO, JESUS ASUNCION, MELANIO
ASUNCION and BIENVENIDO ASUNCION, respondents.
FACTS:
On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted
mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay
Malobago, Rapu-Rapu, Albay to herein petitioners and other
private individuals.
Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos
Stilianopulos assigned their rights to their mining claims in
favor of the petitioner. The assignment of rights was
recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on
December 2, 1959.

The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July

20, 1962, were all recorded in the Office of the Mining
Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 and transcribed on
September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the Registry
of Deeds of Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of
Albay issued the respective original certificates of titles
pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in the names of John
Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.
Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, tree patents were
granted by the respondent Director of Lands and the
corresponding original certificates of titles were issued by
the Register of Deeds to private respondents.
All of the above patents covered portions of the lots covered
by the patents belonging to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and
cancellation of patents against the private respondents and
prayed that all the free patent titles issued in their favor for
properties over which original certificates of title had already
been issued in its favor be declared null and void.
The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
a) Whether or not the lands in question belong to the
public domain;
b) Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing
the complaint on the ground that the petitioner had no
personality to institute the same
HELD:
No.
Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides:
"All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be

limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or

associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which
is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of
the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease
for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case at
bar, we conclude that the issuance of the lode patents on
mineral claims by the President of the Philippines in 1962 in
favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract
or utilize the minerals which may be found on or under the
surface of the land. On the other hand, the issuance of the
free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979 in
favor of the private respondents granted to them the
ownership and the right to use the land for agricultural
purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right to
extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or
under the surface.
There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's stand that
it acquired the right to the mineral lands prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, thus, making such
acquisition outside its purview and scope.
Anent the second issue, the petitioner has no personality to
institute the action below for annulment and cancellation of
patents. The mineral lands over which it has a right to
extract minerals remained part of the inalienable lands of
the public domain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the
person acting in his stead can bring an action for reversion.
(Gr no. 179674)
PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,

versus
MINES
ADJUDICATION
BOARD-DEPARTMENT
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET
respondent.

OF
AL,

FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws engaged in the business of mining. On 31
March 2000, petitioners Application for Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA), for the exploration, development
and commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other
mineral deposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol,
Pangasinan, was approved and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was
issued in its favor.
Private respondent is also a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines and engaged in the
business of mining. Private respondent filed an Application
for Exploration Permit with MGB covering the same
properties covered by and during the subsistence of APSASF-000089 and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner. In turn,
petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition to the
Application for Exploration Permit of the private respondent.
It was allegedly filed with the Panel of Arbitrators on 30
August 2005 and was received by the latter on 5 September
2005.
Prior, however, to petitioners filing of its Verified
Protest/Opposition to the private respondents Application for
Exploration Permit, petitioners MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was
cancelled, a Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
The MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent.
Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu proprio the Verified
Protest/Opposition of petitioner. Petitioner elevated by
appeal to the MAB which was also dismissed.
The case was elevated to the Court of appeals but judgment
was rendered against the petitioner.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel,

deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private
respondent.

HELD:
NO. The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel,
deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 issued by MGB to private
respondent
Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the
jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators, thus:
Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. x x x. Within thirty (30)
working days, after the submission of the case by the parties
for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:
1. Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
2. Disputes involving mineral agreements or
permits;
3. Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and
claimholders/concessionaires; and
4. Disputes pending before the Bureau and the
Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act.
The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over
adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating to
applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not
over cancellation of mineral rights already granted
and existing.
As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration
permit, Section 28 of DAO NO. 96-40 explicitly provides:
Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration
Permit. The Director/concerned
Regional
Director may cancel the Exploration Permit
for
failure of the Permittee to comply with any of the
requirements and for
violation(s) of the terms
and conditions under which the Permit is issued.
For renewed Exploration Permits, the
Secretary upon the recommendation
of
the
Director shall cause the cancellation of the same.

According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96-40, Director means

the Director of the MGB Central Office, while Regional
Director means the Regional Director of any MGB Regional
Office. As the authority to issue an Exploration Permit is
vested in the MGB, then the same necessarily includes the
corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same.
Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke, or cancel EP No.
05-001 of private respondent is already lodged with the
MGB, and not with the Panel of Arbitrators.
.R. No. 164527
15
August 2007
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco
Chavez, filed an instant petition raising constitutional issues
on the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II
Builders, Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued
Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing
implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated
Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this
time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are
being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman
state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to
turn the dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus,
Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project
(SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer
Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of
private sectors as contractors in government projects.
Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to
SMDRP, among others. The same MO also established
EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of
the plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates
Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHAs venture partner
for SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from
which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. ThenPresident Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture
Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey
Mountain for eventual development into a low cost housing
complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to
fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and
reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The

latter together with the commercial area to be built on

Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling
components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the
Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement,
the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual
expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of
return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and
in the contract as of the date of such revocation,
cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon
by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase
II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the
dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for
the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase
II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for
the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after
evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now
ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional
work to be done to successfully implement the project. The
original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to
2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was
increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was
supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by
President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the
project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the
legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator
illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain
necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended,
to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a
Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to
terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this
time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures
and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over
by RBI.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted
the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public
domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as
claimed by petitioner
2.
Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the
power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and
submerged lands

3.

Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed

foreshore and submerged lands considered as alienable and
outside the commerce of man
4.
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands
when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer
needed for public use
5.
Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed
lands
6.
Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was
done by public bidding
7.
Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by
the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain
8.
Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all
information related to the SMDRP
9.
Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the
instant position
HELD:
1.
Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of
the National Government. This does not mean that it shall
be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal
reclamation project are approval by the President (which
were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of
PEA (which were seen as a part of its recommendations to
the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under
contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency
(NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim
lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727
and RA 7279).
2.
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the
DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in
the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the
members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the
project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the
DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over
the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the
abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the
reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of lands
of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.
3.
The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and
disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and
Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos.
4.
Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands
have been deemed to be no longer needed for public use as
stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be
disposed to qualified beneficiaries. Furthermore, these

lands have already been necessarily reclassified as

alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law.
5.
Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA
can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or
otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate.
6.
There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a
public bidding of the right to become its joint venture
partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted that
notices were published in national newspapers. The
bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards
Committee on May 18, 1992.
7.
RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a
contractor can be paid a portion as percentage of the
reclaimed land subject to the constitutional requirement
that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60%
Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition, when the
lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered
Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the power to
sell the same to any qualified person.
8.
This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino
people to information on matters of public concerned as
stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
9.
When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already
been terminated by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA.
The properties and rights in question after the passage of
around 10 years from the start of the projects
implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The
petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP
was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said
project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has
passed.
Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of
mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
ISSUES:

(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this

petition before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to
compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution
The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known
as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC. 4.
Recognition of Rights. Pursuant to the above-declared
principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby
sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to
guarantee their enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources
according to the principle of sustainable development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning,
implementation and monitoring of environmental policies
and programs and in the decision-making process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process
concerning development policies, plans and programs,
projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the
environment and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the
potential hazard of any activity, undertaking or project
and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in
the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate
release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous
substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may
need to exercise his or her rights effectively under this
Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies
to enjoin all activities in violation of environmental laws
and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup
of affected area, and to seek the imposition of penal
sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of
personal damages resulting from the adverse
environmental and public health impact of a project or
activity.

RULING:
(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing
to bring their case before this Court. Moreover, as held
previously, a party's standing before this Court is a
procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the
Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance
of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of
technicality under the principle of the transcendental
importance to the public, especially so if these cases
demand that they be settled promptly.
(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought
by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing.
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law
that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to
order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus
will not generally lie from one branch of government to a
coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is
inferior to the other.
It appears that more properly, the legislature should
provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex
environmental problems bared by herein petitioners
before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

Azucena Salalima vs. Employees Compensation Comm. and

Soc. Sec. System
G.R. No.-146360
Facts:
Petitioners husband Juancho Saldima was employed for
twenty nine years as a route helper and salesman for the
Meycauayan Plant of Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines Inc.
during the annual company medical examination, Juancho
was diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis. Later found him
to have cancer of the lungs and died after few months.

Azucena, the wife of Juancho is now claiming for the benefits

of her husband from the company and the SSS. RTC
dismissed the case. CA affirmed and this petition was
therefore filed.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to benefits provided by P.D.
626
Held:
SC answered in the affirmative. Because the facts of the
case showed that the cause of Juanchos death was his mere
work and that his medical history states that his stay at Coca
cola is a contributory to his sickness. SSS was ordered to pay
the claimant and the RTCs and CAs decisions were reversed
and set aside.
Social Justice Society, et. al. vs. Honorable Jose Atienza, Jr.
G.R. No. 156052
Facts:
Chevron is engaged in the business of importing, distributing
and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines while
Shell and Petron are engaged in the business of
manufacturing, refining and likewise importing and
marketing of petroleum products. Petitioners sought to
compel Mayor Tienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which
was enacted by Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila and
became effective upon approval by Mayor Atienza. This
ordinance reclassifies the area described from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners to cease and desist
from operating their business within 6 months. Among the
business is the Pandacan Terminal of the Oil companies. Oil
companies intervened in the issue attacking the validity of
the ordinance.
Issue:
Whether the ordinance approved by respondent is valid or
not

Held:
Valid. Because the tremendous event happened near the
area which many were put into danger, the Manila Municipal
Office shall do its ministerial duty to protect all property and
health of those people who lived in the vicinity and nearby
cities. The court ordered the transfer of Pandacan Terminal
within a non extendible period of 90 days. The life of the
people shall be the utmost priority of the government in
terms of its security, though the business will lose billions of
money, the municipality cannot sacrifice its people.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA
GR No. 110120
March 16, 1994
FACTS:
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open
dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as
required under Presidential Decree N o. 1586, and
clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act N o.
4850 and issued a CEASE and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the
City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the
dumpsite.
ISSUES:
1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the
authority to entertain the complaint against the
dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay
Camarin authorized by the City Government of
Caloocan?
2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a
"cease and desist" order?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides,
thus: Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority
shall have the following powers and functions: (d) Make,
alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of

pollution specifying the conditions and the time within

which such discontinuance must be accomplished
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB), except in cases w here the special law provides
for another forum
RULING:
1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this
regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative
agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory law s to carry out and make
effective the declared national policy of promoting and
accelerating the development and balanced growth of
the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of
Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila,
Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a
broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of
its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect
the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the
deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a
fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only
such powers as are expressly granted to it by law , it is
likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has
also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise
of its ex press powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its
express powers under its charter as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in
the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to
issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
G.R. No. 119619
HIZON et al. V. CA
December 13, 1996
FACTS:

Hizon et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for

supposedly fishing without the use of a poisonous substance
(sodium cyanide). A report that some fishing boats were
fishing by "muroami" led to the apprehension of such boat
(F/B Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The police
(PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force BantayDagat)
directed the boat captain to get random samples of the fish
from the fish cage for testing. The initial results tested the
fish positive for sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the
information against Hizon et al. However, a second set of fish
samples yielded a negative result on the sodium cyanide.
Notwithstanding this, the RTC found Hizon et al. guilty
and sentenced them to imprisonment and forfeiture of the
fishes. The CA affirmed this decision. Hizon et al., together
with the Solicitor general now question the admissibility of
the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless
search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of
petitioners.
ISSUES:
Whether Hizon et al., are guilty of illegal fishing with the
use of poisonous substances.
RULING:
Hizon et al. were charged with illegal fishing penalized
under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704. These provisions
create a presumption of guilt for possession of explosives or
poisonous substances. However, this presumption is merely
prima facie and the accused has the right to present
evidence to rebut this presumption.
In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing with
poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory
test on the four fish specimens. The apprehending officers
who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium
cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither
did they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the
fishermen or in the fish cage itself. Under the circumstances
of the case, however, this finding does not warrant the
infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or
even the same four specimens, were caught with the use of
sodium cyanide.
Heirs of Navarro v. IAC
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL

Facts:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for
foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen
(17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15,
1953. So was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased,
Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the
Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of
foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially the
application was denied, eventually however the grant was
given. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his
property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing
sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion
thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the accretion as the
riparian owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands,
represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an
opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his
predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the
subject property, the same being a portion of the public
domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the
Philippines. On November 10, 1975, the courta quorendered
judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land
and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the
subject of land registration proceedings. On appeal, the
respondent court reversed the findings of the courta quoand
granted the petition for registration of the subject property
but excluding certain areas. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by in the CA but the same was denied. Anchoring
their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code,
petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare
land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay
and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern
and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own
tract of land.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land
under the principle of accretion
Held:
The petitioners claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion
is only applicable to owners whose estates are adjacent to
rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The disputed
land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or

on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which

adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side.
As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code
but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The
disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay
being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed
property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, part of the public domain. As part of the public
domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses,
and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national
domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of
being appropriated by any private person, except through
express authorization granted in due form by a competent
authority."Only the executive and possibly the legislative
departments have the right and the power to make the
declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is
no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the
cause of establishment of special industries or for coast
guard services.Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the
executive or legislative department has already declared the
disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law
of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as
owners of the estates adjacent thereto.