THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.

BISHOP
VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728

January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front walls
of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA
RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with
a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic
Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the
law were classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted
against it form Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates
for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law
but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts power of review.

2.

Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC
EnBanc or any if its divisions.

3.

Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

4.

Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression.

5.

Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or contentneutral regulation.

6.

Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.

7.

Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence
or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act
of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the
manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the
fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no

constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting
the officialactions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does
not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that
the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case,
organ of government before a court may come into the picture.
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs
letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is
enough to curtail petitioners speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as
COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of
speech.
THIRD ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that
all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are
notcandidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have
the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizens expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,
being petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and
rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue, fostering informed and civic minded deliberation. On
the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction. The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the
subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation
includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of
the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this
court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Only
when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression.
There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to
post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect
anyone elses constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private

property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is
void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private
property. Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
SEVENTH ISSUE: No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the
face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is
to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion into account .
. . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed,
or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish.
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
1.

It has a secular legislative purpose;

2.

It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and

3.

It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.