RELIABILITY, EARTH, AND WORLD IN HEIDEGGER'S "THE ORIGIN OF THE WORK

Colapinto, Andrs
Philosophy Today; 2005; 49, ProQuest Central
pg. 161

RELIABILITY, EARTH, AND WORLD IN HEIDEGGER'S

"THE ORIGIN OF THE WORK OF ART"
Andres Colapinto
This brief essay will be narrow in focus, its
aim being to present a careful exposition of the
concept of "reliability" as it is treated in
Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art." 1
Since in this essay's famous discussion of a
painting of shoes by Van Gogh, Heidegger
maintains that it is the revelation of the "equipment-being" of the shoes that is the singular
achievement of the painting, and since, in tum,
this equipment-being is determined to be "reliability," it behooves us to secure a firm grasp of
what reliability is, in order to understand more
completely the nature of the disclosure effected by the painting. Too often, I think, reliability is understood, based on loose readings
of Being and Time, to be a sort of inconspicuousness that characterizes the being of equipment in its everyday use. Equipment, the story
goes, only becomes conspicuous in "breakdown" situations, where that "for which" it has
its being comes into view as what has suddenly
become impossible. Since being reliable
seems to be precisely "not breaking down," reliability is associated with a sort of "default"
inconspicuousness.
The "Origin," essay, however, clearly asks
us to think of reliability in a rather different
way. It would be very odd, I think, if Van
Gogh's painting of shoes, which supposedly
discloses to us the equipment being of a peasant woman's shoes (or Van Gogh's own shoes,
as the case may be), only offered to us, in this
disclosure, their inconspicuousness-something like a "not having been noticed before."
Surely, the very being of equipment is not exhausted by its inconspicuousness, but is rather
more fundamentally determined by something
else, and it is that which becomes
inconspicuous.
This would certainly make a great deal
more sense; and, indeed, Heidegger offers us,
in the "Origin" essay, a framework within
which to think of equipment-being on its own
terms, not merely as inconspicuousness. Even
before indicating that the being of equipment

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lies in its reliability, Heidegger gives this being

a different name-"protected belonging." At
the end of the much-discussed passage in
which Van Gogh's shoes "speak" of the tiresome tread and wordless joy of the peasant
woman, Heidegger writes that "This equipment belongs to the earth, and it is protected in
the world of the peasant woman. From out of
this protected belonging the equipment itself
rises to its resting-within-itself' (34; italics
mine). In the paragraphs that follow, this resting within itself is renamed "reliability" Reliability is that in which the "repose of equipment resting within itself [die Rube des in sich
ruhenden Zeuges] consists" (35). In this reliability, "we discern what equipment in truth
is" (ibid.). These two formulations, reliability
and protected belonging, point to the same
thing-that by which the equipment has its
self-sufficiency; that by which the equipment
can be as equipment; in other words, the
equipment-being of equipment.
So we must come to understand this affiliation between reliability and protected belonging. First, what is reliability? Heidegger is
clear about what it is not. He argues that while
the equipmental quality of equipment consists
in its usefulness, this usefulness itself rests in
"the abundance of an essential being of equipment" (34), which he calls reliability. Reliability, then, is to be distinguished from usefulness, as its more essential source. How are we
to understand this? How to understand
Heidegger's use of these two concepts-usefulness and reliability-and their relation to
each other?

Using and Relying in Everyday Speech

In order to understand the difference between "usefulness" and "reliability," I suggest
we need to pay attention to the words "using"
and "relying-on" as they occur in ordinary
speech. Heidegger of course does not adhere
strictly to the commonplace understanding of

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reliability, but meaningful observations can

still be made in this way. 2 One clear distinction
can be observed at first glance. Using is an action; relying-on is not. To use something is to
do something with it. The sentence, "He used
the frying pan to cook his meal," for example,
points to a localized action that was effected
with the thing in question. Relying-on, on the
other hand, is not a determinate action that can
"take place." I cannot easily ask "when did that
happen?" with respect to someone's relyingon something, as I can in the case of using. Relying-on seems rather to be a relation of some
sort. But does this mean it names something
outside the scope delimited by "use"?
This is not immediately clear, since we can
in fact speak of "use" in a way that also seems
to describe a non-localizable relation, as when
we say "Sam uses a computer to write papers."
This sentence does not describe one act, but
rather a disposition or commitment to behave
in a certain way in a specific circumstance. I
would argue, however, that this sentence is understood as roughly equivalent to, "If Sam
writes a paper then he will often use a computer to do so." Thus "use" as a state of affairs
is really structured around concrete instances
of use, which are determined to occur with
some regularity or probability. Could "relyingon" be an example of the same structure? If so,
it wouldn't really have a sense that exceeds the
scope of "using." For example, we might say
that "Sam relies on a computer to write papers"
is just a stronger version of a "use" sentence,
namely, "If Sam writes a paper then he necessarily does so using a computer." Here,
reliance is just necessary use.
This formulation, however, misses something essential to the concept of "relying-on,"
something that becomes more clear if we shift
to a consideration of reliance on people. This
is, admittedly, not the kind of reliability in
question in Heidegger's essay, but a detour
through this usage will still prove illuminating.
In English, we can say:
(I) She leaves the gardening to her brother.
and mean something close to:
(2) She relies on her brother to do the gardening.

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The idea ofleaving-to is perhaps more overtly

present in the intransitive German verb that is
translated as "to rely," namely, verlassen (auf
etwas); the transitive verb verlassen means, in
fact, to leave, relinquish, abandon, give up. In
any case, the English usage is instructive regardless of whether or not this subtlety is actually reflected in German etymology. Returning to the examples, expressions ( 1) and (2) are
similar, but not identical. Why? Because (2)
seems to entail (1), while ( 1) doesn't necessarily entail (2). Suppose that in this family, gardening is one choice among two privileges, the
other being driving. The sister does not care
much for gardening, nor does she enjoy the
fruits of her brother's labor. She simply lets
him exercise that privilege, and takes the other
option--driving-which her brother leaves to
her. Neither relies on the other, so (1) is true
without (2) being true. Leaving-to only means
relying-on when what is left to another is of
concern to oneself in some way; in this case,
when the well-being of the garden is of concern to the sister. We could then define relying-on as a leaving-to in which what is left-to
is a matter of one's concern. In other words,
the relation of relying-on is "having left what
concerns oneself to the stewardship of someone else."
This formulation cannot be carried over
completely to situations where we speak of relying on equipment. There is a sense of a transfer of responsibility in the former case that is
not present in the sense of equipment. I will return to this aspect of equipmentality below.
First, however, let us look at what can be preserved from the case of relying on other people. There we saw how the distinguishing mark
of relying-on is that there is a matter of one's
own concern at stake. Is relying-on in the case
of equipment also bound to this determination? Consider the following two sentences:
(3) Using a swizzle-stick, Jane swirled her
cocktail aimlessly.
(4) Relying on a swizzle-stick, Jane
swirled her cocktail aimlessly.
(4) should sound a bit strange-not ungrammatical, but difficult to interpret. Why is this?
Put simply, it makes little sense to say someone relied on something, and then say that

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what they relied on that thing for was done

aimlessly. The what-for of reliability must be
something this person is concerned with accomplishing. Since swirling one's cocktail
aimlessly cannot, almost by definition, be the
focus of one's concern, it cannot be something
for which you rely on something else. 3
A concern with the what-for of relying-on,
therefore, is what gives it a determination over
and above necessary using. In this sense relying-on equipment resembles the formulation
suggested for relying-on other people, namely,
the having left what concerns oneself to someone else. But what of the leaving-to? As I've
suggested, the transfer of responsibility that
this evokes does not seem easily applicable to
equipment. Equipment, for the most part, cannot take care of things on its own, as people do.
In fact, this distinction is visible in a divergence between sentences that describe
equipmental as opposed to personal relyingon. Observe (5)-(8). (5) entails (6) and not (7),
barring science-fiction scenarios, and (8) preserves the meaning of (5) ("*" here indicates
that a sentence is not entailed by the first in the
series):
(5) Sam relies on his glasses to see clearly.
(6) Sam sees clearly with his glasses.
(7) *Sam's glasses see clearly.
(8) To see clearly, Sam relies on his glasses.
On the other hand, (9)-(12) follow a different

pattern. (9) entails (11) and not (10), and (12)

does not preserve the meaning of (9).
(9) She relies on her brother to do the gardening
(10) *She does the gardening with her brother.
(11) Her brother does the gardening.
(12) *To do the gardening, she relies on her
brother.

Of course, we can imagine scenarios in

which the opposite pattern would hold for (9)(12); perhaps the sister has a disability such
that she requires her brother's help in order to
do the gardening. In this case (9) would have a
different meaning from the one I've assumed,
and we would see the same pattern as in
(5)-(8). It's harder, however, to imagine the
pattern switching for (5)-(8). That is, for
equipment like glasses, it is rarely the equipment that is doing the work. We could say
"Sam relies on his dishwasher to wash his
dishes" and understand that it is the dish-

washer that is washing the dishes, not Sam.

This raises interesting questions, suggesting
how a phenomenology of automated equipment would be different from a phenomenology of "normal" equipment. But the point I
want to make is just that for the kind of equipment Heidegger seems to have in mind, the
person who relies on it is the one who takes
care of the matter of concern, not the equipment relied upon. When we say we rely on
equipment, this means the equipment is integrally involved in the being-possible of our
own taking-care of something.
But we must ask: integrally involved in
which way? If there is no sense of leaving our
concerns in the stewardship of equipment like
eyeglasses or shoes, one still has the sense that
the possibilities towards which we are oriented
are held and maintained in or by equipment.
Transporting passengers by air, for example,
does not exist as a possibility apart from the existence of airplanes or other such vehicles.
What I mean is not that, without the right
equipment, certain actions are impossible, but
rather that they do not enter into the field of
possibility and impossibility without the existence--or imagined existence--of the equipment that will support it. In this way, then, our
concerns are "held" in the being of equipment.
In summary, we can make the following
three observations based on our intuitions
about relying-on: (i) first, that relying-on, as
opposed to using, always implies a positive
concern with that for which something (or
someone) is relied upon; (ii) that in the case of
equipment this concern is something taken
care of by oneself; and (iii) that equipment
maintains or makes possible the very possibilities for which we rely on it.

Protected Belonging
With these three observations, we can now
make sense of Heidegger's claim that the peasant woman's shoes are protected in her world,
and belong to the earth-and how these claims
are a way of describing the equipment's reliability. First let us look at "protection in the
world." The peasant woman has a world because "she dwells in the overtness of beings, of
the things that are" (45). This overtness is not a
mere recognizing of beings as beings, but a
disclosure grounded in the care-structure of

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Dasein as elaborated in Being and Time. This

much is clear in the present essay as well, since
world, Heidegger tells us, is the "ever-non-objective to which we are subject as long as the
paths of birth and death, blessing and curse
keep us transported into Being" (44). And
later: "As a world opens itself, it submits to the
decision of an historical humanity the question
of victory and defeat, blessing and curse, mastery and slavery" (63). World is the disclosure
of what matters for Dasein; the beings that appear in this world are, in turn, first grasped only
in so far as they are ultimately related to
Dasein's essential concerns.
One should immediately note the correspondence between this understanding of
world and what was said above about relyingon. Relying-on, I argued, does not just involve
an orientation towards a specific task (this
would just be "using"), but also involves a positive concern with this task as something to be
taken care of, and which one cares about (see
conclusions (i) and (ii), above). And the disclosed totality of one's concerns is precisely
what Heidegger calls "world." As the disclosure and dispensation of the paths available to
a historical humanity, the world is what imparts to equipment its being as being useful for
something. It is the "protection" of equipment
in a world that gives equipment the place and
purpose that is the source of its usefulness.
This protection (along with belonging to the
earth) appears in the equipment as its reliability. When thought of as protection in a world,
reliability should not be thought of as "abilityto-be-relied-upon," and certainly not as "inconspicuousness," but rather as a determination of the equipment's nature through its being relied upon for the essential concerns of
Dasein: something like "reliancefulness"
perhaps come closer to this idea.
Again-the protection of equipment in the
world appears in equipment as its reliability
("reliancefulness"). Or rather, it can thus appear, in a certain kind oflooking. This is in part
what Heidegger wants to demonstrate when he
turns to the painting and lets it speak. The very
"paths" whose opening is the world-blessing
and curse, birth and death-are what
Heidegger says speak from the shoes: anxiety
for food, the menace of death, trembling before the childbed, the joy of survival. The
shoes, Heidegger wants to say, only are what

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

they are as equipment-useful things-because there is a world of concerns, revealed to a

particular person through her moodful
situatedness, that makes the shoes useful in
some situations, not useful in others. We only
see the shoes as the being that they are when
we see, through them, the world that determines the concerns the peasant woman has appropriated as her own, concerns which she
must take care of herself.
So far, we have only addressed conclusions
(i) and (ii). With (iii), the idea that equipment
makes possible the very possibilities for which
we rely on it, we are led to a consideration of
earth. This becomes clear if we think of this
making-possible as a supporting. The idea of
supporting or withstanding is indeed affiliated
with our notion of reliability: a reliable buttress is one that will support the weight of a
wall, for example; a reliable hammer is one
that will withstand the repeated shocks of hammering. Such supporting and withstanding are
what make possible the acts achieved with
these tools-erecting sturdy walls, driving in
nails, etc.
Heidegger points precisely to such forces
when he first begins to explain what is meant
by earth. "The stone," he writes, "presses
downwards and manifests its heaviness" (46);
"Color shines and wants only to shine" (47).
The artwork "sets itself back onto the massiveness and heaviness of stone, into the firmness
and pliancy of wood, into the hardness and
luster of metal," and so on (46). For Heidegger,
earth is not "material" or "substance," or even
"qualities" like color. Earth is rather the
"earthly" forces that are manifest for Dasein,
not abstractly conceived forces but rather
forces encountered by humans as forces-an
encounter that can not be reduced by analyses
to "rational terms" (47).
Thus when Heidegger says that "earth comes forth and shelters" (46), it is firmness and
pliancy, for example, that come forth and shelter. "Upon it," he writes, "historical man
grounds his dwelling in the world" (46). Earth
as support, resistance, shining, etc. is the uponwhich of reliability, whose for-which, as we
have seen, is the concern dispensed by the
world. Now we can see how reliability is also a
belonging; the peasant's shoes belong to the
earth not because they are made of earthly materials, but because, in the stiffness, thickness

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and ruggedness that make them reliable,

they belong to the region of that on which the
world is supported.
World and earth, then, are both at the
heart of reliability. Thus if the "repose of
equipment resting within itself consists in
reliability" (35), this means the following:
the self-sufficiency of equipment-its ability to be itself for us, or perhaps more accurately its simple being itself for us-is
grounded in the unity of world and earth as
protected belonging. For a piece of equipment to be itself is, on the one hand, for it to
be a discrete something for us-to be directed in a particular way to the essential
concerns for which we use it-in other

words, to be protected by the world; and, on the

other hand, to be withdrawn from us and into its
impenetrable otherness-in other words, to belong to the earth. Already, in protected belonging, we sense what Heidegger later in the essay
calls the "conflict" of earth and world. This instigation of this conflict in the work is, in tum, the
way in which truth happens in the work (cf. 55). I
will not, however, explore here Heidegger's discussion of the happening of truth in art. My point
has simply been to point out the intimate connection of this conflict to reliability, a connection
that appears once the nature of reliability as
protected belonging-and not as inconspicuousness-is brought to view.

ENDNOTES
1. Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of

Art," in Poetry, Language, Thought, ed. Alfred

Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
2. I should point out, of course, that the German
word translated as "usefulness" in the essay is
dienlichkeit, derived from the verb dienen, which
means to serve, not to use. A better translation of
dienlichkeit would perhaps be serviceability.
However, in so far as serviceability means something like "suitableness for a particular use," the
contrast I will try to draw between "using" and
"relying-on" is, in my view, just as applicable to
the difference between dienlichkeit and

verlafllichkeit as to that between "usefulness" and

"reliability."
3. One might think it possible to construct a situation
in which someone is aimlessly swirling her cocktail with a purpose-perhaps to give the impression of nonchalance. Although it is debatable
whether in this case the swirling is really "aimless"
(since some sort of deception is at play), we could
still arguably utter (4) meaningfully. This would
only be possible, however, once aimless swirling
was conceived of as something of concern to the
agent.

SUNY Stony Brook, Stony Brook NY 11794-3750

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