What Is Porphyry's Isagoge

W HAT
IS
P ORPHYRY S I SAGOGE ?
RICCARDO CHIARADONNA
What is Porphyrys Isagoge ?*
1. B ARNES I SAGOGE
The way Jonathan Barnes (henceforth B.) suggests to read Porphyrys
Isagoge rests upon two main assumptions. The first assumption is that the
Isagoge was never designed as an introduction to Aristotles Categories 1 :
Porphyry himself indicates for what study the Introduction provides
preparatory material : not for a study of the Categories, but for a study of the
theory of predication, and the construction of definitions, and, in general,
matters connected with division and with proof (1.3-6). That is to say,
Porphyry presents his essay as a preparation for the study of logic 2 . B.s
second assumption is that the Isagoge apart from a few isolated exceptions
conveys no specifically Peripatetic (or Platonic, or Stoic) philosophical
ideas : if the work is Peripatetic, it is so only in the blandest of manners.
There is little in it that a Stoic could not accept and nothing that a Platonist
should not accept. It is written in the philosophical lingua franca of the
period 3 . According to B., therefore, Porphyrys short treatise is an elementary,
philosophically neutral introduction to the study of logic ; as such, the work
should not be seen as reflective of Porphyrys distinctive philosophical views :
Porphyrys philosophical notions need not be rehearsed here. Fortunately
*
The present article is a review of J. B ARNES , Porphyry. Introduction, Translation with an

Introduction and Commentary, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003. The volume contains an
introduction, translation and detailed commentary, as well as 15 additional notes, a series of
textual notes and a complete bibliography. A first draft of this paper was presented at a
seminar held at Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa. I would like to thank Francesco Del Punta,
Gabriele Galluzzo and the other participants of the seminar for their valuable suggestions. I am
also grateful to Sergio Knipe and Ada Bronowski, for their careful linguistic revision.
1
The view according to which Porphyrys elementary treatise is an introduction to Aristotles
Categories represents, in B.s words, the traditional interpretation of the Isagoge (B., p. XV).
The traditional interpretation was favoured by ancient commentators (cf. A MM ., in Isag., 20, 1521 ; 22, 23-24 ; 24, 16-17 ; B OETH ., In Isag.1, 146, 26-147, 3, etc.), as well as by most modern
scholars (cf. A. DE L IBERA , Porphyre. Isagoge, Texte grec et latin, traduction par A. de Libera et
A.-P. Segonds, Introduction et notes par A. de Libera, Vrin, Paris 1998, pp. XII-XXVII).
2
B., p. XV.
3
B., p. XIX.
so ; for, despite his vast learning and his unusual critical acuity, Porphyry had
a weakness for fudge 4 .
Did Porphyry truly regard elementary logic as an autonomous and neutral
subject that could (and should) be dealt with regardless of what ones deeper
philosophical views might be ? The plausibility of B.s overall interpretation
largely depends on the answer to such a question. The answer I wish here to
provide is a negative one, for Porphyry, I believe, does not conceive of elementary
logic as an autonomous and ontologically empty discipline. To my mind, B.s
influential reading of Porphyrys Isagoge its admirable scholarship and
philosophical acumen notwithstanding remains unconvincing.
At the very beginning of his treatise, Porphyry presents his celebrated
methodological caveat : Porphyry suggests that his exposition will be a brief
and introductory one, avoiding deeper enquiries and aiming suitably at the
more simple (tw' n me; n baqutev r wn aj p ecov m eno~ zhthmav t wn, tw' n d aJ p loustev r wn
summev t rw~ stocazov m eno~, Isag., 1, 8-9) :
For example, about genera and species whether they subsist, whether they
actually depend on bare thoughts alone, whether if they actually subsist they
are bodies or incorporeal and whether they are separable or are in perceptible
items and subsist about them these matters I shall decline to discuss, such
a subject being very deep and demanding another and a larger investigation.
Here I shall attempt to show you how the old masters and especially the
Peripatetics among them treated, from a logical point of view (logikwv t eron),
genera and species and the items before us 5 .
Two chief problems may be singled out here : (a) what is the meaning of
Porphyrys set of questions on genera and species ? (b) What is the meaning of
Porphyrys claim that he will not explore such deep matters, but confine himself
to a presentation of the theories of the old masters from a logical point of view ?
2. F ROM
A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW
Let us begin from (b). The general consensus is that Porphyrys logikwv t eron
means in a logical way, from a logical point of view. Such a reading can
4
B., p. XII.
P ORPH ., Isag., 1, 9-16 : auj t iv k a peri; tw' n genw' n te kai; eij d w' n to; me; n ei[ t e uJ f ev s thken ei[ t e kai; ej n
mov n ai~ yilai' ~ ej p inoiv a i~ kei' t ai ei[ t e kai; uJ f esthkov t a swv m atav ej s tin h] aj s wv m ata kai; pov t eron cwrista; h]
ej n toi' ~ aij s qhtoi' ~ kai; peri; tau' t a uJ f estw' t a, paraithv s omai lev g ein baqutav t h~ ou[ s h~ th' ~ toiauv t h~
pragmateiv a ~ kai; a[ l lh~ meiv z ono~ deomev n h~ ej x etav s ew~ : to ; d o{ p w~ peri; auj t w' n kai; tw' n prokeimev n wn
logikwv t eron oiJ palaioi; diev l abon kai; touv t wn mav l ista oiJ ej k tou' peripav t ou, nu' n soi peirav s omai
deiknuv n ai. The English translation of passages from Porphyrys Isagoge is that of B.
5
W HAT
IS
actually be traced back to the ancient Neoplatonic commentators on the

Isagoge (cf. Ammonius distinction between three methods of inquiry : the
logical, the physical and the theological) 6 ; it was also favoured by the two
most recent translators of Porphyrys treatise (de Libera, dune manire plus
logique ; B., from a logical point of view ) 7 . Boethius rendering of
logikwv t eron as probabiliter (indicating a dialectical, as opposed to scientific,
inquiry) has usually been rejected by modern scholars (with the exception of
Steven K. Strange) 8 .
If logikwv t eron, however, really means in a logical way vel similia, a
further question arises as to the meaning of the word logical. According to
B, the term logical refers to how we talk and think about genera etc. :
you discuss something logically or logikw' ~ insofar as you discuss how it is
spoken about or lev g etai 9 . Such a reading bears important consequences :
for theories about genera and species in the Isagoge do not refer to how things
are and should not be interpreted on the basis of Porphyrys ontology. B.
consistently minimizes the philosophical import of Porphyrys assertions :
these, he argues, reflect familiar doctrines and do not refer to specific
philosophical tenets and arguments 10 . According to B., most of Porphyrys
arguments in the Isagoge are actually mere commonplace, expressed in the
current philosophical parlance of the time. Porphyrys theories in the Isagoge,
therefore, are unrelated to his distinctive philosophical allegiance : Porphyry
was a Platonist. The Introduction is compatible with Platonism. But the
Introduction is not, and was designed not to be, a Platonist document 11 .
B. refers to Simplicius use of logikwv t eron at In Cat. 104, 10-14 (ad A RIST .,
Cat. 5, 3 b 10) 12 : Aristotle, according to Simplicius, discusses matters
logikwv t eron inasmuch as he discusses how they lev g etai :
Now, of what is said concerning substance not being in a subject is taken
from its relation to the things that are in a subject, and to signify a thissomething from the practice of predication (aj p o; th' ~ tou' kathgorei' s qai
sunhqeiv a ~). What the substance receiving such relations is itself, is not stated
Cf. A MM ., In Isag., 45, 1 ff.

Of the two, B.s rendering is the better : as is often the case, the Greek comparative adverb
is here used in a positive sense (cf. B., p. 35).
8
Cf. B OETH ., In Isag.2, 168, 9-169, 5 ; S. K. S TRANGE , Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic
Interpretation of the Categories, ANRW II 36.2, de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1987, pp. 954-974,
p. 961.
9
B., p. 36.
10
Cf. B., pp. 119, 275 etc.
11
B., p. 141.
12
B., p. 36 n. 59.
7
at all 13 . However, because the issue at hand is to divide how each thing is
predicated and in how many ways, for this reason <Aristotle> provides their
peculiar characteristics (ij d iwv m ata) as the predication occurs (kaqov s on hJ
kathgoriv a giv n etai), and because he is hunting for the peculiar characteristics of
the categories from a logical point of view (logikwv t eron), i.e. from speech (oi| o n
aj p o; tou' lev g esqai). After all, the study of signifying words cannot be otherwise
than insofar as they are spoken (h] kaqov s on lev g ontai) 14 .
In his extant short commentary on Categories, Porphyry points out that

Aristotles enquiry in that treatise does not focus on things as such, but rather
on words that signify things 15 . Accordingly, one should not look for deep
metaphysical theories in Categories. Porphyrys line of reasoning agrees with
Simplicius use of logikwv t eron in the passage quoted above ; it may also
contribute to explain Porphyrys method of enquiry in the Isagoge, a method
which avoids profound arguments and aims suitably at the more simple .
There is a further crucial, though mostly implicit, assumption behind B.s
interpretation : Porphyrys introductory investigation on things insofar as
they are spoken about and the more profound investigation on things as
they are represent two radically different and mutually independent fields
of enquiry. The former field simply bears no relation to the latter : Porphyry
the logician (= Porphyry L) focuses on things as spoken about , while
Porphyry the Platonic philosopher (= Porphyry P) focuses on things as they
are . When dealing with Porphyry L, one can (and should) forget about
Porphyry P. Sten Ebbesen, in his seminal works on Porphyrys logic, had
already followed a similar line of reasoning :
Porphyry assigned the little corner of the universe that interests most men as
a sphere of operation for Aristotelian logic on the condition that it must not
extend its field of operation to ontology proper which can be investigated only
in Platonic terms 16 .
Only one (important) difference exists between Ebbesens interpretation

and that of B. : while according to Ebbesen Porphyrys logic is Peripatetic,
13
Cf. Plotinus polemical remarks on this at VI 1 [42], 3, 19-23.

S IMPL ., In Cat., 104, 6-18 ; trans. F. A. J. DE H AAS, Simplicius. On Aristotle Categories 5-6,
Translated by F. A. J. de Haas and B. Fleet, Duckworth, London 2001, pp. 47-48 (translation quoted
here with slight alterations). De Haas renders logikwv t eron as in a more dialectical way .
15
Cf. P ORPH ., In Cat., 56, 34-57, 12 ; 58, 15-20 ; 91, 11-12 ; 91, 25-27. On Porphyrys semantics
cf. A. C. L LOYD , The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990, pp. 36-75.
16
S. EBBESEN, Porphyrys Legacy to Logic : A Reconstruction, in R. SORABJI ed., Aristotle Transformed.
The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, Duckworth, London 1990, pp. 141-171, p. 144.
14
W HAT
IS
according to B. it is philosophically neutral and compatible with different

(and even alternative) philosophical assumptions 17 .
The method of enquiry Porphyry adopts in his elementary writings indeed
avoids posing profound metaphysical questions, questions pertaining to
beings and their causes. In my view, however, this fact does not necessarily
imply that Porphyrys investigation on things as they are spoken about and
his investigation on things as they are are two separate and mutually
independent subjects. The use of the expression logical among ancient
commentators on Aristotle has recently been the focus of scholarly interest.
Myles Burnyeat has drawn attention to Simplicius distinction of three
meanings for logikw' ~ (S IMPL ., In Phys., 440, 19-441, 2) 18 . Simplicius suggests
that Aristotle, in talking of a logical puzzle at Phys., G, 3, 202a21-22, might
mean any of the following : 1) that the puzzle is based on reputable premises
(ej x ej n dov x wn proi> o u' s an) ; 2) that its persuasiveness is a matter of argument
alone, without support of empirical fact ; 3) that it proceeds from generalities
rather than from principles peculiar and appropriate to the subject. Simplicius
then cites Alexanders commentary in order to illustrate the contrast described
in 3). Burnyeat convincingly argues that the third meaning actually fits many
of the examples of the use of the term logical in Bonitzs Index Aristotelicus ;
among these, the comparative forms logikwtev r wn (scil. lov g wn) and logikwtev r a~
(scil. diatribh' ~ ) at Metaph., M, 5, 1080a10 and Eth. Eud., A, 8, 1217b17.
According to this meaning, logical discussion is abstract, general, and does
not make use of principles appropriate to the subject-matter (e.g. physics,
ethics, first philosophy). Burnyeat also singles out another meaning for
logical : the meaning favoured by Andronicus (since Andronicus had
recommended logic as initial training for students of Aristotles philosophy).
The study of logical works such as Categories and An. Post. prepare and
equip the reader to embark upon the sciences [] in the following works 19 .
17
I do not wish to discuss A. C. Lloyds complex interpretation of Porphyrys logic in any

detail here (see esp. L LOYD , Anatomy cit., pp. 53-56). Lloyd detects the presence of two
programmes in Porphyrys work : the first a conventional programme (explicating predicates by
reference to psychological, metaphysical or at any rate extra-logical elements) ; the second a
pure logicians programme, which does not include extra-logical elements. According to Lloyd,
Porphyrys Isagoge follows the second programme. As I aim to show, Lloyds conclusion is
incorrect : for only one programme (i.e. the conventional programme) is followed by Prophyry
and the Isagoge provides its most elementary version.
18
Cf. M. BURNYEAT, A Map of Metaphysics Zeta, Mathesis Publications, Pittsbugh 2001, pp. 19-21.
19
B URNYEAT , Map cit., p. 25. According to B URNYEAT , Map cit., p. 23 Simplicius (and
Alexanders) contrast between logical (understood in the third sense of the term) and nonlogical is unrelated to the contrast between linguistic and non-linguistic considerations. I do
not wish to dwell here on Burnyeats description of Aristotles use of logikw' ~ (Burnyeat rejects
Rosss interpretation of logikw' ~ at Metaph., Z, 4, 1029b13), but I do wish to suggest that, with
Burnyeats remarks are useful to understand Porphyrys logical method.

Both in the Isagoge and in In Cat., Porphyry argues that his research is of an
introductory and preliminary nature (cf. Isag., 1, 7-9 ; In Cat., 75, 29) ; as
Porphyry remarks in In Cat., he is not focussing on things as such but on
words which signify things . Porphyrys line of thought, then, appears to be
as follows. An inquiry on things qua things (peri; pragmav t wn h/ | prav g mata :
P ORPH ., In Cat., 57, 5) is not suitable for beginners : from a pedagogical point
of view, this must be preceded by a different introductory enquiry. The adverb
logikwv t eron at S IMPL ., In Cat., 104, 12 denotes this mode of research, which
does not focus on the principles appropriate to things ; rather, it starts from
a semantic analysis of language and focuses on words signifying things .
While one may well infer that such enquiry pertains to elementary logic, this
certainly does not entail that words signifying things and things as such
are two independent areas (the former pertaining to logic, the latter to
ontology). Porphyry clearly argues in favour of the opposite conclusion :
Q : But if the treatise is about significant expression, how is it that the whole
of his subsequent discussion was about things ?
A. Because words are like messengers that report to us about things, and they
get their generic differentiae from the things about which they report. Hence
it is necessary to begin the consideration of them from what makes their use
necessary, so that they may receive their difference in genus from the generic
differentiae of the things about which they report. So our inquiry is incidentally
concerned with the generic differentiae of beings, while primarily it is about
significant expressions, as I said 20 .
respect to the commentators, Burneyats conclusion is perhaps too peremptory. Simplicius, for
instance (In Cat., 104, 6 ff. quoted above) shows that logikwv t eron was connected to lev g esqai. It
may well be argued that logikwv t eron at In Cat., 104 expresses the first of the three meanings of
the term at In Phys. 440, 19 ff. (i.e. that of dialectical and this would also speak in favour of
Boethius rendering of logikwv t eron at Isag., 1, 15). The issue, nevertheless, deserves further
scrutiny. Simplicius remarks at In Cat., 104, 6 ff. do not point to any distinction between a
linguistic and a non linguistic sense of logikwv t eron ; rather, logikwv t eron is in itself connected
with the idea of being spoken (aj p o; tou' lev g esqai). I only wish to point out here (1) that the
opposition between a logical and a scientific inquiry was current among the ancient Aristotelian
commentators ; (2) that such a distinction does not point to any neutrality of logic, but only to
the preparatory character of logical inquiries.
20
P ORPH ., In Cat., 58, 21-29 : E. Alla; pw' ~ , eij peri; fwnw' n shmantikw' n ej s tin hJ pragmateiv a , ej n
toi' ~ eJ x h' peri; tw' n pragmav t wn oJ pa' ~ auj t w' / gegev n htai lov g o~ A. Oti aiJ fwnai; aj g gev l w/ ej o ikui' a i ta;
prav g mata aj g gev l lousin, aj p o; de; tw' n pragmav t wn, w| n aj g gev l lousi, ta; ~ diafora; ~ lambav n ousin: aj f w| n
toiv n un to; th' ~ creiv a ~ aj n agkai' o n e[ c ousin, tau' t a aj n agkai' o n qewrei' t ai, i{ n a kata; ta; ~ genika; ~ diafora; ~
w| n aj g gev l lousi kai; auj t ai; to; diav f oron lav b wsi to; kata; gev n o~. ej m piv p tousa toiv n un gev g onen hJ peri; tw' n
kata; gev n o~ diaforw' n zhv t hsi~ tw' n o[ n twn, prohgoumev n h dev ej s tin hJ peri; tw' n fwnw' n tw' n shmantikw' n , wJ ~
ei[ r htai. Trans. S. K. Strange, Porphyry. On Aristotle Categories, Translated by S. K. S TRANGE ,
Duckworth, London 1992.
W HAT
IS
According to Porphyry, words (both individual and general terms) stand

for (signify) things ; any discussion on how we speak about things is by no
means separate and independent from a discussion on how things are :
Since beings are comprehended by ten generic differentiae, the words that
indicate them have also come to be ten in genus, and are themselves also so
classified 21 . Porphyrys semantic theory, then, is based on a rigorous
isomorphism between language and reality (more on this later). There is
simply no reason to draw an opposition between things as conceptualised
and expressed in language and things as such 22 . While the act of dealing
with words that signify things comes first pedagogically, it is by no means
removed from that of dealing with the things signified.
Evidently, a preliminary discussion should leave aside fully developed
theories about beings and their principles : this, I believe, is the sense of
Porphyrys caveat at Isag. 1, 7 ff. This, however, does not entail that Porphyrys
logical discussions are philosophically neutral : what comes first in the order
of learning is not neutral, but merely more elementary ; ontology (as I will
argue) is not absent, but rather latent in Poprhyrys Isagoge and In Cat. : both
works provide an introductory, general and simplified treatment of questions,
the significance of which can fully be appreciated in a wider context involving
ontological and psychological doctrines. If we consider such preliminary
discussions in isolation, we may well gain the impression that logic and
ontology are two mutually independent disciplines. Porphyry, however,
certainly does not encourage us to do so ; rather, he points out that his logical
discussions are partial and preliminary : Porphyry never suggests that we
should isolate such introductions from what comes later in the order of
learning, and regard them as neutral and complete in themselves. Porphyry
rather suggests the opposite : that in order to gain a comprehensive picture of
what he is focusing on in the logical writings, one should look elsewhere :
21
P ORPH ., In Cat., 58, 12-14 : eij ~ dev k a toiv n un genika; ~ diafora; ~ perilhfqev n twn tw' n o[ n twn dev k a
kai; aiJ dhlou' s ai tau' t a fwnai; gegov n asi kata; gev n h kai; auj t ai; perilhfqei' s ai. Trans. Strange.
22
B. aims to distinguish Porphyrys account of predication from his semantics :
although the Porphyrean account of predication was conceived and presented in terms of a
certain set of semantic ideas, and although these ideas whether or not they are Aristotelian
are indeed laughably inept, nonetheless the account of predication is in fact independent of
the ideas. After all, the account amounts [] to no more than this : predicates are a sort of
significant expression. To that you may attach whatever theory of signification pleases you
or no theory at all (B ARNES , Truth [completa], Clarendon Press, Oxford 2007, pp. 116-117). I
disagree with this approach (and with the presentation of Porphyrys semantics in ibid. : The
thought or concept (scil. of animal) fortunately resembles animals or an animal. And so the word
animal signifies, derivatively, animals ).
What does it mean when you say that universals are said (scil. of a subject)
and accidents are (scil. in a subject) ? The matter is deep and too large for your
capacities ; for someone with the capacities of a beginner cannot know that
accidents, like substances, are, whereas universals are not in existence but are
merely said and are in thought. So let these things be left aside 23 .
It is extremely important to grasp the difference between (i) leaving

something aside (temporarily and for pedagogical reasons) and (ii) being
neutral with respect to a thing . In Porphyrys Isagoge and In Cat. there is no
trace of (ii) as a characterisation of the status of logic : there is simply no hint
in these works that elementary logic might be philosophically neutral.
Porphyrys logical discussion of universals in the Isagoge and in the short In
Cat. is indeed a simplified discussion : Porphyry avoids engaging with more
profound questions concerning the ontological status of general concepts,
insofar as such matters are too difficult for beginners. Nevertheless, Porphyrys
enquiry here is by no means neutral with respect to his fully developed theories
on universals and abstractions ; rather, in his elementary writings, Porphyry
provides a simplified and general treatment of questions which he only fully
addresses elsewhere. B.s assessment, therefore, should be reversed : the Isagoge
and In Cat. are elementary works, and, as such, are compatible with a
philosophically neutral reading ; but while the Isagoge is an elementary work,
it is not and never was designed to be a philosophically neutral treatise.
Any opposition between Porphyry L and Porphyry P, therefore, is unfounded.
Further evidence, in this respect, can be gained from the extant fragments,
preserved in Simplicius, of Porphyrys long commentary on Categories Ad
Gedalium. Suppose that Porphyry really did conceive of logic as a
philosophically and metaphysically neutral discipline : the difference between
an elementary and a complex logical work, then, would simply lie in their
degree of logical complexity. Its rather different, however : for the surviving
fragments of Porphyrys commentary include detailed discussions on physical
beings and their principles 24 . In other words, Porphyrys great commentary on
the Categories did not eschew the profound ontological questions that Porphyry
chose to avoid in his elementary works. Accordingly, if such detailed discussions
do not feature in the Isagoge and in the short In Cat., this is for merely
pedagogical reasons which have nothing to do with the ontological neutrality
of logic. A couple of examples should suffice to make this point clearer.
23
P ORPH ., In Cat., 75, 25-29 : tiv ga; r bouv l etai to; ta; me; n lev g esqai fav n ai se, ta; de; sumbebhkov t a
ei\ n ai baqu; ~ oJ lov g o~ kai; meiv z wn th' ~ sh' ~ e{ x ew~: o{ t i ga; r ta; me; n sumbebhkov t a ej s ti; n w{ s per kai; aiJ ouj s iv a i,
ta; de; kaqov l ou ti lev g esqai ouj k e[ s tin ej n uJ p av r xei, aj l la; mev c ri ej p inoiv a ~ lev g etai, ouj k e[ s ti th' ~ tw' n
eij s agomev n wn e{ x ew~ gnw' n ai. tau' t a me; n ou\ n pareiv s qw. Trans. in B., p. 37.
24
Cf. P ORPH . apud S IMPL ., In Cat., 48, 11-33 ; 78, 20-79, 5 ; 158, 27-33 = Frr. 55 ; 58 ; 67 Smith.
W HAT
IS
At the beginning of the chapter on quality, Porphyry provides two reasons

for the order chosen by Aristotle in his progressive discussion of quantity (ch.
6), relatives (ch. 7) and quality (ch. 8) in the Categories. The first reason is
pedagogical : Aristotles treatment of quality follows that of relatives because
many questions concerning relatives had previously emerged in his discussion
on quantity. The second reason briefly (and somewhat cryptically) has to do
with physical concepts :
And indeed, after magnitude, which is a quantity, and after the greater, which
belongs to the relatives, there arise the affections, such as hot, cold, dry, and
wet, which are qualifications 25 .
Logical as it may be, Porphyrys discussion in his short commentary on

the Categories includes a fleeting reference to ontological notions. Interestingly,
Simplicius In Cat. provides further details on Porphyrys treatment of this
matter in the lost commentary Ad Gedalium :
But Porphyry wants to defend Aristotles order. He says that Quality has its
origin in a combination of Quantity and the Relative just as others thought,
especially Empedocles, who showed that qualities originate from the
harmonious mixture of the elements. Plato too constituted form of such-andsuch a kind, which was determined in accordance with quality of such-andsuch a kind, both of the body and of the soul by means of the rations 3 :2, 2 :1,
4 :3, 9 :8 and other such rations which are observed in the case of the quantities
and in accordance with the relative 26 .
Simplicius words here should be read alongside those of an important

scholium, published by Sten Ebbesen in 1987 27 , which describes Alexander of
Aphrodisias and Porphyrys treatment of the relation between quantity,
relatives and quantity. As the scholium reveals, an allusion to Empedocles
was already present in Alexanders exegesis. The scholium also presents
25
P ORPH ., In Cat., 127, 7-9 : kai; ga; r dh; meta; to; mev g eqo~, o{ ej s ti posov n , kai; meta; to; mei' z on, o{ ej s ti
tw' n prov ~ ti, ej k fuv e tai ta; pav q h oi| o n qermov n , yucrov n , xhrov n , uJ g rov n , a{ ej s ti poiav . Trans. Strange.
26
S IMPL ., In Cat., 158, 27-33 = P ORPH . Fr. 67 Smith, trans. B. F LEET , Simplicius. On Aristotle
Categories 7-8, Duckworth, London 2002.
27
Ms. Laurentianus Plut. 72, 15 (13th century), f. 22. Cf. S. E BBESEN , Boethius as an
Aristotelian Scholar, in J. W IESNER ed., Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung, vol. 2, De Gruyter,
Berlin-New York 1987, pp. 286-311, p. 310 : The most likely origin of the scholium is a
commentary on the Categories, and it looks very much as if Simplicius and the scholiast are
actually reporting each one part of a passage from Ad Gedalium in which Porphyry related and
discusses Alexanders use of Empedocles to support Aristotles order of treating the categories .
10
Porphyrys views on the matter, views which appear to constitute an expanded

version of what is found in the short In Cat. : Porphyry here examines the
distinctions that exist between prime matter without form, body without
quality, three dimensionality (which belongs to quantity), the greater and the
lesser (which belong to relatives) and qualities. What emerges, then, is the
following picture : Alexanders lost commentary In Cat. included a physical
excursus on quantity, relative and quality in which Empedocles cosmology
was invoked in defence of Aristotles order of categories. Porphyry employs
Alexanders exegesis in his lost commentary Ad Gedalium, which discusses
physical notions such as prime matter and body without qualities. The
short In Cat. contains an abridged version of Porphyrys argument 28 , which
leaves out any allusion to Empedocles and simplifies the treatment of physics
(without suppressing it). The whole picture plainly contradicts the view
according to which Porphyrys short commentary on Aristotles Categories is
a work of elementary logic with no ontological import. Rather, one should
give full weight to Porphyrys assertion that Categories represents an
introduction to the physical part of philosophy []. For substance,
qualification, and so forth are the product of nature 29 . The short In Cat.
develops the relation between categories and physics in a general and
introductory way. Yet the commentary shows no trace of logic (as radically
opposed to ontology) : as I shall come to discuss, Porphyrys statement that
Aristotles Categories does not focus on beings as such, but on words signifying
things, is perfectly compatible with his emphasis on the import of the treatise
from the point of view of physics.
The Isagoge, however, is a more elementary work than the short In Cat.
(according to Porphyry, the study of the five items actually serves as an
introduction to the study of categories as well as of definitions, division
and proof). Porphyrys Isagoge, therefore, is more open than the short In Cat.
to a philosophically neutral reading. However, further problems arise. It
might be instructive to focus on Porphyrys allusion to the priority of species
at Isag., 17, 8-10 : Accidents subsist principally on individuals, whereas
genera and species are prior by nature to individual substances 30 . Three
readings of this passage are possible : 1) Porphyry being a Platonist, he is here
28
On the relation between the two commentaries, cf. R. C HIARADONNA , Review of C. L UNA ,
Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catgories dAristote. Chapitres 2-4, Les Belles Lettres, Paris
2001, Elenchos , 24, 2003, pp. 193-198.
29
P ORPH ., In Cat., 56, 29-31 : kai; mav l ista pro; tou' fusikou' a] n ei[ h mev r ou~ th' ~ filosofiv a ~ h] pro;
tw' n topikw' n : fuv s ew~ ga; r e[ r gon ouj s iv a , poio; n kai; ta; o{ m oia. Trans. Strange.
30
P ORPH ., Isag., 17, 8-10 : kai; ta; me; n sumbebhkov t a ej p i; tw' n aj t ov m wn prohgoumev n w~ uJ f iv s tatai, ta;
de; gev n h kai; ta; ei[ d h fuv s ei prov t era tw' n aj t ov m wn ouj s iw' n .
W HAT
IS
11
alluding to the distinctively Platonic metaphysical doctrine according to

which universal genera and species are intelligible, self subsistent entities
ontologically prior to sensible particulars (this is Giuseppe Girgentis view) 31 ;
2) as the doctrine of priority of genera and species vs individuals is not
exclusively Platonic (it was also embraced, among others, by Alexander of
Aphrodisias, who takes it to be uncontroversial, and Aristotelian), Porphyry
is here espousing a commonplace truth (B. reading of the passage runs
along these lines) 32 ; 3) the doctrine that genera and species are prior to
individuals neither refers to the ontological priority of intelligible Forms, nor
to a commonplace truth : rather, Porphyrys statement alludes (in the general
fashion to be expected in an elementary work) to a distinctive ontological
doctrine on the status of sensible entities and in re universals. This is an
originally Peripatetic doctrine that Porphyry adapted to his own Platonic
framework. Elsewhere I have argued in favour of this third view 33 : I will here
limit myself to a few points. Porphyrys statement in the Isagoge should be
read alongside what he says regarding the priority of genera and species vs
individuals in the short In Cat. Here Porphyry maintains that (i) if man is
removed, Socrates is co-removed, whereas individuals do not co-remove their
species : For man exists when Socrates does not, but Socrates does not exist
when man does not 34 (i.e. genera and species are prior to individuals, as
stated in the Isagoge) ; (ii) Aristotle is right in maintaining that individuals are
prime substances prior to genera and species, since the primacy of individuals
resides in them collectively rather than individually (the species man would
not exist if there were no individual man to instantiate it) ; (iii) individuals are
somehow causally responsible for the formation of the universal concepts
which are predicated of them :
You ought not to speak about a single man : you must recognise that individual
substance does not mean just one of the particulars, but rather all of the
particular men, from whom we conceive the man that is predicated in common,
and all the particular animals, through which we think the animal that is
predicated in common. These are the cause of the being of the common
31
G. G IRGENTI , Porfirio. Isagoge, Testo greco a fronte, Versione latina di Boezio, Rusconi,
Milano 1995, p. 28.
32
Cf. B., p. 273.
33
Cf. R. C HIARADONNA , Concetti generali, astrazioni e forme in Porfirio, in C. E RISMANN d., De
la logique lontologie. tudes sur la philosophie de Porphyre et son influence durant lAntiquit
tardive et le haut Moyen ge, Vrin, Paris, forthcoming ; R. C HIARADONNA, Porphyrys Views on the
Immanent Incorporeals, in G. K ARAMANOLIS , A. S HEPPARD eds., Studies on Porphyry, BICS Suppl.
98, Institute of Classical Studies, London 2007, pp. 35-49.
34
P ORPH ., In Cat., 90, 19-20, trans. Strange.
12
predicates. For it is not possible to think of ox or man or horse or animal in

general apart from the particulars. But it is from the perception of particulars
that we come to conceive of the common predicate, which we no longer think
as a this, but as a such, than if the particular animals are eliminated, what
is predicate in common of them will no longer exist either 35 .
This difficult passage has been the focus of much scholarly interest.
According to Sten Ebbesen, it represents an un-Platonic, conceptualist and
logical account of the genesis of general concepts ( there cannot be a clash
between Aristotelian logic and Platonic metaphysics as long as the logician
works within the confines of his art ) 36 . B.s reading of this passage is based
on the familiar story according to which it is by perceiving individual cats
that we come to form the concept of a cat : Porphyry suggests that it is these
individual cats who are prior to the species : primacy lies not with Cornelius,
not yet with the set of all cats, but with a privileged litter the litter
responsible for the formation of the concept of cat in general 37 . As I have
argued elsewhere, neither interpretation is truly persuasive. At In Cat., 75, 2631 Porphyry points out that he will not dwell on the profound thesis
according to which, while accidents exist in the same way as substances,
universals merely are in thought. I will leave Porphyrys statement about
accidents aside for the moment. It is plainly evident that the profound thesis
about universals hinted to at In Cat., 75, 26-31 coincides with the doctrine
expounded in more detail at In Cat., 90, 20-91, according to which universal
genera and species have a notional status (mev c ri ej p inoiv a ~ lev g etai, In Cat., 75,
28 ; ej p enohv q h, In Cat., 90, 33 ; ej n ohv s amen, In Cat., 90, 34 ; dianoiv a / , In Cat., 91, 3).
All this is extremely significant : for at In Cat. 75 Porphyry presents his
thesis on the conceptual genesis of universal concepts as neither a familiar
story (pace B.) nor a logical theory opposed to metaphysical speculations
about separate forms (pace Ebbesen). Rather, Porphyry argues that a complete treatment of post rem conceptual universals exceeds the boundaries of any
introductory and logical discussion on words signifying things. As I see it,
the reason for this must be sought in what Porphyry asserts elsewhere (i.e. in
35
P ORPH ., In Cat., 90, 30-91, 5 : dei' de; ouj k ej f eJ n o; ~ poiei' s qai to; n lov g on, aj l l eu\ eij d ev n ai, o{ t i ouj k
e[ s tin a[ t omo~ ouj s iv a oJ ei| ~ tw' n kata; mev r o~ aj l l oiJ kaq e{ k aston a[ n qrwpoi pav n te~, ej x w| n kai; oJ koinh' /
kathgorouv m eno~ a[ n qrwpo~ ej p enohv q h, kai; ta; kaqe{ k aston zw' / a , di a} to; koinh' / kathgorouv m enon ej n ohv s amen
zw' / o n. a} dh; kai; ai[ t ia toi' ~ koinh' / kathgoroumev n oi~ ej s ti; tou' ei\ n ai: para; ga; r ta; kaq e{ k aston ou[ t e bou' n
ou[ t e a[ n qrwpon ou[ t e i{ p pon ou[ t e o{ l w~ e[ s ti noh' s ai zw' / o n. eij de; aj p o; th' ~ tw' n kaq e{ k aston aij s qhv s ew~ ej p i;
to; koinh' / th' / dianoiv a / aj f iknouv m eqa, o{ p er ouj k ev t i tov d e ti noou' m en aj l la; toiov n de, eij ta; kaq e{ k aston
aj n aireqh' / zw' / a , ouj k ev t i ouj d e; to; koinh' / kathgorouv m enon kat auj t w' n e[ s tai. Trans. Strange.
36
Cf. E BBESEN , Porphyrys Legacy cit., p. 146.
37
B., p. 275.
W HAT
IS
13
non-introductory works such as the Sentences and the Commentary on Ptolemys

Harmonics) concerning immanent incorporeal entities and their abstractions.
According to Porphyry, concepts are abstractions of immanent incorporeal
forms torn off from matter and stored in the soul : then it (scil. imagination)
stores the form in the soul. This is the concept 38 . Such incorporeal immanent
entities do not exist independently from their sensible instantiations :
according to Porphyry, they are only incorporeal insofar as they are notionally
separated from bodies (cf. Sent. 42, p. 53, 6-9 Lamberz). Accordingly, they are
sharply distinguished from the status of Platonic, separate and incorporeal
substances such as the soul and transcendent Forms. Porphyrys statement,
then, regarding the different ontological status of accidents and individual
substances on the one hand, and of general concepts on the other (In Cat., 75,
26-31), becomes clear : accidents, as well as individual substances, exist in the
world and are perceived as such (we are directly acquainted with individual
substances, with their qualities, etc. etc.), whereas generalities are not the
objects of any direct acquaintance. The universal man as such does not exist
in the world ; rather, the immanent nature man is always instantiated by the
individual men by means of which it is perceived : the (universal) essence as
such is only grasped via the process of abstraction. The conception resulting
from this process of abstraction is the form, that exists in particulars, in so
far as this form is separated from matter by the soul.
Porphyrys assertions regarding the status of genera and species in the
Isagoge and in In Cat., therefore, might be viewed as partial, elementary and
simplified versions of this doctrine, the complete significance of which
emerges elsewhere (i.e. in Porphyrys non-introductory writings). Furthermore,
Porphyrys doctrine of immanent abstractable natures, as can be traced in his
extant writings, runs along the lines of Alexander of Aphrodisias theory of
abstractable forms 39 . This is neither a commonplace truth nor a theory bereft
38
P ORPH ., In Ptol. Harm., 14, 2-3 Dring : tov t e aj p ev q eto ej n th' / yuch' / to; ei\ d o~. kai; tou' t o h\ n hJ
e[ n noia (trans. Tarrant). On Porphyrys theory of knowledge in In Ptol. Harm., cf. I. M UELLER ,
Aristotles doctrine of abstraction in the Commentators, in S ORABJI , Aristotle Transformed cit., pp.
463-480, p. 479 ; H. T ARRANT , Thrasyllan Platonism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY) 1993,
pp. 120-131, G. K ARAMANOLIS , Plato and Aristotle in Agreement ? Platonists on Aristotle from
Antiochus to Porphyry, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2006, pp. 316-317. Further details in CHIARADONNA ,
Concetti generali cit. ; I D ., Porphyrys views cit. ; I D ., Platonismo e teoria della conoscenza stoica
tra II e III secolo d.C., in M. B ONAZZI , C. H ELMIG eds., Platonic Stoicism / Stoic Platonism, Peeters,
Leuven 2007, pp. 209-242 (excursus Porfirio e il criterio).
39
See esp. Alexanders much debated Quaest. I 3, p. 7, 20-8, 28 ; I 11a, p. 21, 12-22, 20 ; I 11
b, p. 22, 21-24, 22 Bruns. On Alexanders views on essences and universals, cf. (among several
contributions) M. T WEEDALE, Alexander of Aphrodisias Views on Universals, Phronesis , 24,
1984, pp. 279-303 ; R. W. S HARPLES , Alexander of Aphrodisias. Quaestiones 1.1-2.15, Translated by
R. W. Sharples, Duckworth, London 1992 ; M. R ASHED , Priorit de lei\ d o~ ou du gev n o~ entre
14
of ontological significance ; rather, it is a theory which regards the status of

physical entities, their immanent principles and their abstractions. I am
inclined to believe that Porphyry derived such a doctrine from the Peripatetic
tradition and fitted it to his Platonic framework. In his elementary writings,
Porphyry provides a partial, highly simplified version of the doctrine ; however,
he also explicitly points out that more remains to be said on the matter.
A further example pertains to the vexata quaestio of Porphyrys Stoicism in
the Isagoge. Specialists have sometimes detected the presence of distinctively
Stoic theories in the Isagoge 40 . While B. does not deny that Porphyry may have
adopted various Stoic notions and doctrines, he strongly opposes any
suggestion that there might be traces of Stoicism in Porphyrys most elementary
treatise : Here and there scholars have detected, say, a Stoic term and
inferred a Stoic influence. The inference is always invalid, and the detective
work usually amateur : some of the words which Porphyry uses had perhaps
been introduced into the philosophical domain by Stoic thinkers for Stoic
ends ; but by Porphyrys day such immigrants had been thoroughly integrated,
their remote origin forgotten 41 . B. often proves successful in his attempt to
reject specific claims of Stoic influence in Porphyrys Isagoge ; his arguments,
however, are not always convincing.
At Isag., 7, 19-24 Porphyry presents his famous theory of individual
predicates. The passage is a difficult and controversial one 42 ; yet it may safely
be inferred that Porphyry conceives of each individual as being composed of
a unique assemblage of proper features (a[ q roisma ij d iothv t wn). There appears
to be an overlap between Porphyrys theory and the Stoic ij d iv w ~ poiov n ;
however, B. rejects such conclusion : The two theories have their similarities.
But the Stoic theory makes no mention of sets of proper features, and it
concerns not individual predicates but proper names. Porphyry is not simply
reporting the Stoic theory ; and there is no cause to suppose that his theory
Andronicos et Alexandre. Vestiges arabes et grecs indits, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy , 14,
2004, pp. 9-63 ; R. S HARPLES , Alexander of Aphrodisias on Universals. Two Problematic Texts,
Phronesis , 50, 2005, pp. 43-55. For the parallel between Alexander and Porphyry, cf. S TRANGE ,
Plotinus, Porphyry cit., p. 962 n. 28 ; L. P. G ERSON , Aristotle and other Platonists, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca (NY) 2005, p. 85 ; R. S ORABJI , The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200600 AD. A Sourcebook, III, Logic and Metaphysics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY) 2005, pp.
130 and 157. Further details in C HIARADONNA, Concetti generali cit.
40
P. H ADOT , Porphyre et Victorinus, vol. 1, tudes Augustiniennes, Paris 1968, p. 232 n. 6
characterises the Isagoge as un extraordinaire mlange de notions platoniciennes,
aristotliciennes et stociennes ; see also D E L IBERA , Porphyre. Isagoge cit., pp. XXVII-XXX.
41
B., p. XIX.
42
On the Greek text, cf. B., p. 150 and F. A DEMOLLO , Sophroniscus son is approaching :
Porphyry, Isagoge 7.20-1, The Classical Quarterly , 54, 2004, pp. 322-325.
W HAT
IS
15
was elaborated on the basis of the Stoic theory 43 . While I fully agree with B.s
first assertion that Porphyry is not simply quoting a Stoic doctrine , I
believe that there are very good reasons to suppose that Porphyry did take into
account the Stoic theory of individuals. I will further attempt to elucidate this
point by following a line of reasoning similar to the one I previously adopted.
Porphyrys elementary writings provide a partial and simplified version of
theories which Porphyry expounds elsewhere (i.e. in his non-introductory
works) in detail. Both in the Isagoge and in the short In Cat. Porphyry regards
individuals as combinations (a[ q roisma, Isag., 7, 22 ; sundromhv , In Cat., 129, 10)
of proper features or qualities. In neither instance does Porphyry ever mention
the Stoics ; besides, as B. correctly notes, Porphyrys doctrine significantly
differs from Stoic ij d iv w ~ poiov n . Porphyry, however, certainly took account of the
Stoic notion of quality in his lost commentary on Aristotles Categories :
Simplicius records Porphyrys response to an aporia put forward by Lucius :
In response to this problem Porphyry said, Subject is twofold, not only
according to the Stoics, but also according to the earlier philosophers. For the
qualityless matter, which Aristotle called body in potentiality, is the first
meaning of subject, and secondly, what subsists commonly or peculiarly
qualified (o} koinw' ~ poio; n h] ij d iv w ~ uJ f iv s tatai) 44 .
Porphyry, then, fitted Aristotelian and Stoic notions about matter, qualities
and subjects within a single doctrinal framework. Not only did he adopt
current terms of Stoic origin, terms that by Porphyrys day were bereft of
distinctive philosophical connotations ; but, at least in some cases, he also
consciously made use of Stoic theories in his exegesis of Aristotles Categories
(cf. S IMPL ., In Cat., 2, 8). The passage quoted above suggests that Porphyry
integrated Aristotles theory of substance and the Stoic theory of matter and
quality the individual substance of Aristotles Categories being conceived,
then, as what subsists [] peculiarly qualified . While this passage does not
focus on individual predicates, it may safely be inferred that Porphyrys
theory of individuals as combinations of properties originated in this doctrinal
context 45 . Again, the Isagoge and the short In Cat. provide an elementary
version of Porphyrys theory of individually qualified substance ; a more
complete version of the theory was probably contained in the lost commentary
Ad Gedalium, which clarified Porphyrys allusion to Stoicism.
43
B., p. 316.
S IMPL ., In Cat., 48, 11-15 = Fr. 55 Smith. Trans. by F. A. J. de Haas, in S ORABJI , The
Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD. A Sourcebook, III cit., p. 115.
45
Cf. R. C HIARADONNA , La teoria dellindividuo in Porfirio e lij d iv w ~ poiov n stoico, Elenchos ,
21, 2000, pp. 303-331.
44
16
Porphyry adapts (and thereby modifies) a Stoic doctrine to fit a different

(and in our eyes largely incompatible) philosophical framework (a basically
Peripatetic analysis of sensible substances). B. posits a radical alternative :
either (i) Porphyry is quoting a Stoic theory without any alterations, or (ii) he
is simply ignoring Stoicism. By ruling out (i), B. infers (ii). B.s is certainly an
elegant procedure, but also a non sequitur : what we know about the reception
of Stoic theories among imperial and late antique authors often contradicts
the positing of any such radical alternative 46 . Indeed, countless instances are
known in which Stoic terms are adopted without any trace of their original
philosophical meaning ; but in many cases Stoic theories are neither faithfully
reported nor ignored. Rather, such doctrines are integrated in a different
philosophical framework : they are adapted and misunderstood ; in turn,
Stoic thought alters those doctrines by which it is assimilated. B.s scheme
fails to grasp the subtleties of such a complex process of interaction.
The very notion of a philosophical lingua franca is highly controversial.
The fact, for instance, that the same term or argument occurs in Porphyry and
in Galen, Sextus, Alexander and Grammatical texts does not in itself prove
that was not employed by Porphyry in a distinctive philosophical manner.
Some interpreters have sought to infer philosophical influences from
terminology. While B. is correct in rejecting a similar approach, his alternative hypothesis (that Porphyry adopted a neutral lingua franca in which terms
and arguments whatever their origin may have been had lost their
distinctive philosophical connotation) is equally unconvincing. It is certainly
wrong to posit Stoic influences on the mere basis of terms like uJ p ov s tasi~. Yet
the situation may vary : the mere fact that a commonly shared philosophical
terminology existed does not imply that different authors (or the same author
in different contexts) always made a use of a neutral lingua franca 47 . Rather,
one should seek to detect if (and where) current terms and arguments are used
in a philosophically distinctive way (and ascertain just what that way might
be). At Isag., 1, 10-11 for example, Porphyry raises the question of whether
genera and species subsist, or whether they depend on thought alone (ei[ t e
uJ f ev s thken ei[ t e kai; ej n mov n ai~ yilai' ~ ej p inoiv a i~ kei' t ai). B. points out that ej p iv n oia
is a quotidian term : the addition of bare and alone is merely pleonastic and
does not create a technical formula 48 . ej p iv n oia is a familiar term, employed by
46
Cf. C HIARADONNA , Platonismo e teoria della conoscenza stoica cit.

A. A. Longs remarks on the philosophical lingua franca of Imperial philosophy are more
nuanced, cf. A. A. LONG , Ptolemy On the Criterion. An Epistemology for the Practising Scientist, in
J. M. D ILLON , A. A L ONG eds., The Question of Eclecticism. Studies in Later Greek Philosophy,
University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1988, pp. 176-207, esp. pp. 182-183.
48
Cf. B., pp. 40-41.
47
W HAT
IS
17
authors of all kinds. While this is undoubtedly true, it does not rule out that
ej p iv n oia and cognate (quotidian) expressions may be used by Porphyry in a
distinctive philosophical sense. Porphyry employs ej p inoei' n and e[ n noia in
order to designate the mental abstraction of an immanent incorporeal entity
(In Ptol. Harm., 14, 3 Dring ; Sent. 42, p. 53, 2-3 Lamberz). Evidently, this
does not imply that Porphyry always bestows the two terms with this specific
philosophical meaning 49 . However, ej p iv n oia vel similia might possess a non
quotidian meaning of this kind in philosophically similar contexts, such as
P ORPH ., In Cat. 75, 26-31 and 90, 30-91, 5. Indeed, I believe that this is the
case : for in the above passages Porphyry is not alluding to quotidian or
commonplace ideas. Rather, Porphyry is here seeking to provide an elementary
account of a philosophically distinctive argument : that universal genera and
species are immanent natures thought of as universal when the soul extracts
them from matter. Accordingly, the expression bare thoughts alone at
Isag., 1, 10-11 is not a mere pleonasm : as I see it, the addition of mov n ai~ and
yilai' ~ serves to distinguish what depends on thought alone (e.g. the chimera,
or Stoic universals) from mental concepts with an objective correlatum, such
as the e[ n noia of in Ptol Harm., 14, 3 Dring or the result of the act of ej p inoei' n
at Sent. 42, p. 53, 2-3 Lamberz. At Isag., 1, 10-11 Porphyry, then, is here
raising the question of whether genera and species subsist (whatever the form
of their subsistence may be) or are mere mental fictions (like Stoic
universals) 50 . I do not venture to say that ej p iv n oia and yilh; ej p iv n oia acquire a
technical meaning in the passage in question 51 ; yet the elementary and
simplified character of Porphyrys allusion notwithstanding I would
definitely resist the conclusion that their use is necessarily neutral,
commonplace, familiar and quotidian.
Instead of piling up example on example, I would like to address a further
crucial problem : B. (like Ebbesen before him) accords a paramount importance
to the absence of any explicit allusion to Platonic ante rem forms in the
Isagoge. Porphyry was a Platonist ; as such, he might be expected to identify
49
To take an extreme example : one is a quotidian term, but this does not prevent it from
acquiring a distinctive philosophical meaning in Plotinus Enneads, where it designates the first
principle. Obviously, this does not entail that Plotinus exclusively employs the term one in the
above sense.
50
Cf. S TOB ., I, 136, 21-137, 6 (SVF I 65) ; D IOG . L ART ., VII 60-61. See A. A. L ONG , D. N. S EDLEY ,
The Hellenistic Philosophers, University Press, Cambridge 1987, pp. 179-183 (= L.-S. 30 A-I). Cf.
A. B RONOWSKI , The Stoic View on Universlas, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica
medievale , 18, 2007, pp. 71-87.
51
Accordingly, I agree with B.s criticism of my old (and now outdated) article Essence et
prdication chez Porphyre et Plotin, Revue des Sciences philosophiques et thologiques , 82,
1998, pp. 577-606 : cf. B., p. 40 n. 74.
18
genera and species with transcendent ideas. Yet the Isagoge does not mention
ideas, and Porphyrys short In Cat. expressly states that intelligible substances
fall outside the scope of inquiry of Categories (which focuses on words
signifying things and not on things as such) 52 . This apparently leads to
conclude that Porphyrys elementary logical works are metaphysically neutral :
that they belong to Porphyry L and have no connection with Porphyry P.
B. forcefully (and in my view successfully) argues against reading ante rem
forms into some passages from the Isagoge. So for instance, B. suggests that
despite the explicit mention of Plato at Isag., 6, 14, the common man alluded
to at Isag., 6, 21-22 is not directly to be identified with the transcendent idea
of man. No clear allusion to the intelligible metaphysical status of the
common man is here to be found ; and the term metousiva at Isag., 6, 21 does
not in itself convey the Platonic notion of participation between different
degrees of reality 53 . As noted above, the same holds true for the passage on the
priority of genera and species vs individuals at Isag., 17, 8-10. Does this mean
that the Isagoge is a neutral, ontologically empty treatise bereft of any
connection with Porphyrys Platonism ? In my view, the answer to the question
is definitely no. At Isag., 6, 13-23 Porphyry presents a synthetic sketch of
Platos division ; just before these lines (Isag., 5, 23-6, 5) he explains that each
single genus mirrors the structure of a genealogy in which the summum genus
plays the role of origin (ab uno relation). As I argued elsewhere, such theories
are not philosophically neutral : rather, they play a crucial role in Middle and
Neo-Platonic accounts of the hierarchy of beings 54 . This does not imply that
one should detect a direct allusion to the Platonic scala entis in the above
mentioned lines from the Isagoge : for Porphyry never mentions ideas in this
passage, and nothing suggests that the common man here is identical to the
transcendent idea of man (on the contrary, much evidence would lead to the
opposite conclusion). The least one can say, however, is that Platonism
cannot easily be suppressed from a Porphyrian passage that explicitly mentions
Plato. What I suggest is that Porphyrys remarks on genealogical genera and
52
Cf. P ORPH ., In Cat., 91, 19-27.

Cf. B., pp. 137-138.
54
For a particularly close reference, cf. Enn. VI 1 [42], 3, 3-5 : cf. R. C HIARADONNA , Sostanza
movimento analogia. Plotino critico di Aristotele, Biblipolis, Napoli 2002, pp. 227-271. See the
overview in J. M ANSFELD , Heresiography in Context. Hyppolitus Elenchos as a Source for Greek
Philosophy, Brill, Leiden 1992, pp. 78-109. Isag., 6, 13-23 may provide a hint of Porphyrys
treatment of division in his lost commentary on Platos Sophist : cf. B OETH ., De Div., 876D =
P ORPH ., fr. 169 Smith. Cf. P. M ORAUX , Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis
Alexander von Aphrodisias, I, Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im I. Jh. v. Chr., De Gruyter,
Berlin-New York 1973, pp. 120-131 ; J. M AGEE , Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii De divisione liber,
Critical Edition, Translation, Prolegomena, and Commentary, Brill, Leiden 1998, pp. 000-000.
53
W HAT
IS
19
division at Isag., 6 represent a partial and introductory account of doctrines

which can only fully be appreciated in the wider framework of the Platonic
hierarchy of beings 55 . Evidently enough, Porphyry does not render the
metaphysical background of his short account explicit : for the Isagoge is not
a treatise on division, but an elementary treatise on notions that are useful for
the study of division (among other things). This, however, does not imply the
absence of an underlying metaphysical background : nothing suggests that
Porphyry is aiming to strip the theories he is examining in these lines of the
Isagoge of all ontological significance. While, for the sake of simplicity,
Porphyry disregards the ontological framework behind such theories, this
has nothing to do with the supposed philosophical neutrality of such theories
with respect to Platonism.
To sum up : it is certainly true (as B. has brilliantly proven) that the
common items which Porphyry mentions in the Isagoge are not Platonic
forms ; yet this does not imply that such notions are philosophically neutral
and ontologically empty. Besides, according to (Neo)Platonic ontology, Forms
are neither universal nor common 56 (at least not primarily) : while B.
acknowledges this fact 57 , at the same time he implies that the absence of any
direct connection between common items and transcendent Forms in the
Isagoge is revealing of the ontological neutrality of the work. I disagree with
B.s conclusion : I believe that while it is true that common items are not
identical with ante rem forms, this does not entail that common items are
philosophically and ontologically neutral ; rather, common items have a
different ontological status, the analysis of which is one of the aims of
Porphyrys Platonic philosophy (although a different aim from the study of
transcendent entities). There is more to Neoplatonic ontology (ontologies
would be more correct) than what modern critics would usually admit, for
Neoplatonic ontology extends down to the physical world one should recall
that Porphyrys Platonic metaphysics include both transcendent and immanent
(or physical) incorporeal entities. According to Porphyry, words stand for
(signify) sensible objects ; general terms stand for general concepts that
depend on sensible objects. In his non-elementary works, Porphyry discusses
the nature of this relation (i.e. the ontological basis of his semantics) : our
55
Cf. R. C HIARADONNA , Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals and Synonymous Predication,
Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale , 18, 2007, pp. 123-140.
56
On the distinction between intelligible Forms and universals in Neoplatonism, cf. R.
S ORABJI , Universals Transformed : The First Thousand Years After Plato, in P. F. S TRAWSON , A.
C HAKRABARTI eds., Universals, Concepts And Qualities : New Essays on the Meaning of Predicates,
Ashgate, Aldeshot 2006, pp. 105-125.
57
Cf. B., p. 139.
20
(discursive) general concepts, Porphyry argues, are post rem abstractions of

immanent forms. Again, Porphyrys claim that intelligible substances lie
outside the scope of language (as stated at In Cat., 91, 19-27) and discursive
reasoning, is perfectly Neoplatonic : there is nothing un-Platonic or aPlatonic in Porphyrys reasoning here. The ontology behind universal genera
and species in Porphyry L, then, coincides not with the Porphyrian metaphysics
of transcendent forms, but with the Porphyrian (physical) ontology of immanent
forms. As noted above, Porphyry regards the Categories as a text specifically
aimed at preparing for the physical part of philosophy ; furthermore, what we
know of Porphyrys lost longer commentary Ad Gedalium confirms the
impression that Porphyry made much use of physical doctrines in his
interpretation of the Categories. Yet Porphyrys physical ontology is part of his
Platonism : accordingly, Porphyry L is by no means separate from Porphyry P.
2. P ORPHYRY S
SET OF QUESTIONS
WHAT DOES
P ORPHYRY S I SAGOGE
PREPARE FOR
The problem (a) raised above can now be addressed : what is the sense of
Porphyrys set of questions at Isag., 1, 9-12 ? Porphyry puts forward his list in
order to make clear what kind of questions he is not going to answer. As B.
puts it, He mentions one of the banished problems 58 . Instead of addressing
such issues, Porphyry aims to show how the old masters (and the Peripatetics
in particular) engaged with genera and species logically, as well as with
other issues discussed in the treatise. Specialists have at times made too
much of Porphyrys list in the attempt to detect various technicalities in his
set of questions. B. forcefully rejects such conclusions, and convincingly
refutes the idea that Porphyrys list represents a series of answers to a specific
question (the problem of universals). Rather, B. suggests that Porphyrys list
is a rough map of an area which Porphyry will not explore 59 . While B.s
pars destruens is compelling, his pars construens proves unpersuasive. However
rough it may be, Porphyrys map is neither random nor devoid of any
connection (pace B., p. 49 : some may wonder if Porphyry raised a problem
or rather a dust ).
Despite B.s doubts, internal connections can be traced in Porphyrys
catalogue of questions. Certainly, Porphyry does not render all connections
between his three sets of questions pedantically explicit. In the Isagoge one
finds no interrogation of the kind : Do genera and species subsist or depend
on things ? If they subsist, are they bodies or incorporeal ? If they are
58
59
B., p. 38.
B., p. 39.
W HAT
IS
21
incorporeal, are they separable or found in perceptible items ? 60 . Yet, pace B.,
it is clear that this must be the connection between Porphyrys set of questions :
the link between the first and second set, in particular, is signalled by
uJ f esthkov t a at Isag., 1, 11 ; as for the third pair, the fact that Porphyry might
here be alluding to incorporeal entities, while never expressly stated, clearly
emerges from the context. By contrast, B. remarks that some ancient authors
regarded features and qualities as bodies 61 . Porphyry, however, is not dealing
with qualities, but with genera and species. Indeed, the Stoics conceived of
qualities as bodies, but this has little to do with Porphyrys quest ; as for Stoic
universals, what best describes their status in Porphyrys list of questions is
the formula bare thoughts alone at Isag., 1, 10-11. Moreover, it seems
highly implausible for Porphyrys catalogue to include some kind of enigmatic
bodily genera and species which should either be separable or exist in
perceptible items and around them . The syntax of these lines further suggests
that Porphyrys third pair of questions is subordinate to aj s wv m ata in the second
pair. The syntactical structure of this passage is as follows : (I) the first pair of
questions draws an opposition between subsisting items and bare thoughts
alone ; (II) the second pair is subordinate to; uJ f ev s thken, i.e. the first and more
remote item of the first pair : this would not be clear, had Porphyry not added
uJ f esthkov t a at 1, 11 ; (III) the third pair is subordinate to aj s wv m ata, i.e. to the
second and closer item of the second pair : as this subordination plainly
emerges from the context itself, Porphyry had no need to render it explicit as
in the case of the second pair. B.s doubts, therefore, are unwarranted.
Porphyrys list of questions can be seen to provide a catalogue of 4 modes
of being : bare thoughts alone, bodies, separable incorporeals and immanent
incorporeals. For the sake of simplicity, Porphyry avoids discussing which of
these four modes of being reflects the status of genera and species.
What is the overall purpose of Porphyrys list of questions ? The answer to
this problem, in my view, is straightforward : the list provides a preliminary
(but by no means obscure or allusive) map of Porphyrys ontology, which
includes transcendent incorporeals, immanent incorporeals (along with their
abstractions, e[ n noiai or ej p iv n oiai), and bodies (cf. Sent. 1, 2, 3, 19 and 42) 62 .
60
B., p. 44 correctly remarks that the two clauses ej n toi' ~ aij s qhtoi' ~ kai; peri; tau' t a at Isag. 1,
12 are two expressions for the same thing .
61
Cf. B., p. 45.
62
R. Goulet in L. B RISSON ET ALII d., Porphyre. Sentences, tudes dintroduction, texte grec
et traduction franaise, commentaire, II, Vrin, Paris 2005, p. 504 (ad Sent. 19, p. 10, 6 Lamberz)
notes the connection between Porphyrys set of questions at Isag., 1 and the classification of
incorporeal entities at Sent. 19. For an overall account of Porphyrys ontology and metaphysics,
cf. M.-O. G OULET -C AZ , L. B RISSON , Le systme philosophique de Porphyre dans les Sentences, in
B RISSON , Porphyre. Sentences cit., I, pp. 31-138.
22
Fictional thoughts (yilai; ej p iv n oiai), I believe, are added to this catalogue for
the sake of completeness (before asking what kind of subsisting items genera
and species might be, it is necessary to envisage the possibility that they
might not exist at all). Perhaps, fictional thoughts also feature in the list
because a renowned philosophical school (that of the Stoics) maintained that
(universal) genera and species were mere mental creations. Assuredly, no
problem of universals lies at the basis of Porphyrys catalogue (although the
later tradition read Porphyrys list as a set of answers to such a problem) 63 .
Porphyrys list, however, certainly possesses a distinctive philosophical
meaning and is not mere dust. Porphyry is here beginning an elementary
treatise on a well-defined set of notions (genus, species, difference, property,
accident). In order to make it clear that his discussion will be of an elementary
and introductory sort, Porphyry explains, by way of example, that in naming
genera and species his treatise will refrain from elucidating the nature of such
objects. Porphyry also provides a list of possible solutions to the question of
what genera and species might be ; his list, therefore, is not a random one : it
rather constitutes a short catalogue of modes of being which includes (in a
preliminary and simplified, but by no means philosophically neutral way)
Porphyrys map of reality 64 .
But why should Porphyry choose to focus on these five items ? This
question leads to the title of the present paper : what is Porphyrys Isagoge ?
Why did Porphyry write this short treatise ? And just what does the Isagoge
prepare for ? It is worth quoting the opening lines of Porphyrys treatise :
It being necessary, Chrisaorius, even for a schooling in Aristotles predications,
to know what is a genus and what a difference and what a species and what a
property and what an accident and also for the presentation of definitions,
and generally for matters concerning division and proof, the study of which is
useful, I shall attempt, in making you a concise introduction, to rehearse,
briefly and in the manner of an introduction, what the older masters say 65 .
63
Cf. DE L IBERA , Porphyre. Isagoge cit., pp. LXII-LXXV.

If my interpretation proves correct, the traditional reading of Porphyrys five items as
quinque voces (for the history of which, cf. B., p. XII n. 14 ; DE L IBERA , Porphyre. Isagoge cit.,
pp. XLII-XLIII) is misleading.
65
P ORPH ., Isag., 1, 1-8 : Onto~ aj n agkaiv o u, Crusaov r ie, kai; eij ~ th; n tw' n para; Aristotev l ei
kathgoriw' n didaskaliv a n tou' gnw' n ai tiv gev n o~ kai; tiv diafora; tiv te ei\ d o~ kai; ti i[ d ion kai; tiv sumbebhkov ~ ,
ei[ ~ te th; n tw' n oJ r ismw' n aj p ov d osin kai; o{ l w~ eij ~ ta; peri; diairev s ew~ kai; aj p odeiv x ew~ crhsiv m h~ ou[ s h~ th' ~
touv t wn qewriv a ~, suv n tomov n soi parav d osin poiouv m eno~ peirav s omai dia; bracev w n w{ s per ej n eij s agwgh' ~
trov p w/ ta; para; toi' ~ presbutev r oi~ ej p elqei' n , tw' n me; n baqutev r wn aj p ecov m eno~ zhthmav t wn, tw' n d
aJ p loustev r wn summev t rw~ stocazov m eno~.
64
W HAT
IS
23
The text is not entirely clear : its syntax leaves some room for ambiguity. In
quoting the text, I chose to follow B.s translation66 . Th;n tw'n para; Aristotevlei
kathgoriw'n didaskalivan at Isag., 1, 1-2 may either refer to Aristotles treatise
Categories or to Aristotles theory of categories. From a certain point of view, this
makes little difference : for a schooling in Aristotles predications would no
doubt take the form of a reading of Aristotles Predications 67 . From a different
point of view, however, the issue of whether Porphyry is here alluding to
Aristotles treatise or not is significant : were Porphyry alluding to Aristotles
Categories at the very beginning of the Isagoge, this would lend support to the
hypothesis that Porphyrys treatise is an introduction to Aristotles Categories.
While no degree of certainty is possible in this regard, it seems to me that B. is
right in suppressing the capital letter. Porphyry, after all, is here presenting a set
of topics for the study of which his investigation on species, genera, difference,
property and accident represents a necessary (or necessary and useful)
background : Aristotles doctrine of categories, therefore, is listed as the first item
of a set which also includes (the doctrines of) definition, division and proof.
Since Antiquity, however, commentators have regarded the Isagoge as an
introduction to Aristotles Categories. As noted above, B. correctly argues
against such an interpretation 68 on the grounds that Porphyry portrays his
own work as being propaedeutic to the study of logic : Students of philosophy
in late antiquity generally started with logic ; and students of Platonic
philosophy started with Aristotelian logic and so with Aristotles Organon.
[] Porphyrys essay, written as an introduction to the study of logic, was
thereby and introduction to philosophy and hence thereby an introduction
to the Categories. But it is not an Introduction the the Categories 69 .
While B.s reading proves generally correct 70 , it remains unconvincing in
certain (significant) respects. B.s claim that students of Platonic philosophy
66
Cf. the excellent discussion at B., p. 25. The syntactical problems of these lines, however,
are irrelevant for the purposes of the present discussion.
67
B., p. 26.
68
Despite B.s authoritative refutation, the traditional interpretation of the Isagoge still
finds its champions : cf. S. B OBZIEN , Ancient Logic, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Summer 2007 Edition, E. N. Z ALTA ed., URL = <http ://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/
entries/logic-ancient/> : Two of the commentators deserve special mention in their own right :
Porphyry, for writing the Isagoge or Introduction (i.e. to Aristotles Categories), in which he
discusses the five notions of genus, species, differentia, property and accident as basic notions
one needs to know to understand the Categories .
69
B., p. XV.
70
On the Isagoge as an elementary introduction to logic (and, indirectly, to the whole of
philosophy), cf. [E LIAS ], In Isag., XXVI, 1-3 ; XXXVII, 12 Westerink (cf. B., p. XVI). Among
mondern scholars, cf. C. E VANGELIOU , Aristotles Doctrine of Predicables and Porphyrys Isagoge,
Journal of the History of Philosophy , 23, 1985, pp. 15-34.
24
started with Aristotles logic, and so with Aristotles Organon might be true,
but only of Platonist students after Porphyry. While later Neoplatonic schools
adopted a well-codified school curriculum which included Aristotles
treatises 71 , the study of Aristotles Organon was definitely not part of a
standard Platonic curriculum before the time of Porphyry 72 . What we know
of the Middle-Platonic reception of Aristotle in no way suggests that students
of Platonic schools started with Aristotles Organon. Significantly, Porphyry
appears to be the first Platonic commentator on Aristotles logical treatises
(and on Aristotles treatises tout court) 73 . Indeed, students of Peripatetic
philosophy generally started with Aristotles Organon ; but again, this was
neither a neutral nor a generally accepted practice before Porphyrys time.
Little is known about the study of logic in Middle Platonism ; some
evidence can be found in Alcinous Didaskalikos. The work contains an
important section on dialectic and its various parts ; significantly, Alcinous
lists are similar to Porphyrys list in the Isagoge. In one passage, Alcinous
mentions division, definition, induction and syllogism (Did., 3, 153, 30-32) ;
in another, division, definition, analysis, induction and syllogism (Did., 5,
156, 31-33) 74 . Alcinous, however, does not regard Aristotles Organon as a
guide for the study of logic. Alcinous treatment of logic is elementary and
probably based on handbooks ; most significantly, Alcinous does not mention
Aristotle. The Didaskalikos rather attributes the discovery of logical methods
71
Cf. I. H ADOT , Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catgories, fasc. I, par I. H ADOT , P. H ADOT , P.
H OFFMANN , C. L UNA , Leiden, Brill 1990, pp. 21-47, 63-93 and, more recently, C. DA NCONA , Il
neoplatonismo alessandrino : alcune linee della ricerca contemporanea, Adamantius , 11, 2005,
pp. 9-38. For the ongoing debate cf. the papers collected in C. DA NCONA ed., The Libraries of the
Neoplatonists, Brill, Leiden 2007.
72
Cf. DA NCONA , Neoplatonismo alessandrino cit., p. 23 : Sia la presenza di Aristotele nel
curriculum tardo-neoplatonico [] sia la crescente elaborazione dei modi di accesso ai testi
filosofici e scientifici autorevoli [] appaiono allo storico come caratteri distintivi del pensiero
post-plotiniano .
73
Cf. G. K ARAMANOLIS , Porphyry : The First Platonist Commentator on Aristotle, in P. A DAMSON ,
H. B ALTUSSEN , M. W. F. S TONE eds., Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin
Commentaries, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 83.1., London 2004, vol.
1, pp. 97-120.
74
Further parallels in J. W HITTAKER , Alcinoos. Enseignement des doctrines de Platon,
Introduction, texte tabli et comment par J. Whittaker, traduit par P. Louis, Les Belles Lettres,
Paris 1990, p. 80 n. 31 ; J. D ILLON , Alcinous. The Handbook of Platonism, Translated with an
Introduction and Commentary, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1993, pp. 58-59 ; 72-73. According to
E LIAS , In Isag., 36, 32-34, the Isagoge is useful for introducing student to (a) every branch of
philosophy, (b) dialectical methods, and (c) the theories on categories developed by Aristotle
and other philosophers. Concerning this passage see E VANGELIOU , Aristotles Doctrine of Predicables
and Porphyrys Isagoge cit., p. 29.
W HAT
IS
25
to Plato : an apparently widespread belief that was also shared by Galen (who
was not, at any rate stricto sensu, a Platonist) 75 . Accordingly, Alcinous claims
that Plato has outlined the ten categories in the Parmenides and elsewhere
(Did., 6, 159, 43). Alcinous, therefore, knows about the doctrine of categories,
but does not attribute it to Aristotle.
The reception of Aristotle in imperial Platonism before Porphyry is a
complex matter 76 . On the whole, it might be argued that Aristotelian or
Peripatetic doctrines were either (mostly tacitly) incorporated in Platonism
or vehemently rejected. Knowledge of Aristotles treatises appears to have
been limited 77 . The situation radically changed with Plotinus and Porphyry.
Plotinus has a solid knowledge of Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition : in
his treatises, he constantly alludes to Peripatetic doctrines and makes an
extensive use of Aristotles works. Plotinus attitude, however, was critical : as
I argued elsewhere, Plotinus aimed to prove that Aristotles theories are
wrought with problems and inner contradictions which can only be solved via
the adoption of Platonic philosophical tenets (i.e. by turning to intelligible
forms and their distinctive causality) 78 . Significantly, one of the most
important targets of Plotinus polemics is the theory of categories (Enn., VI
1-3 [42-44]). At the opening of the Isagoge, therefore, Porphyry pace Barnes
was not following a standard practice of the Platonic school ; rather, he was
laying the foundations of what became a Platonic school practice after him.
Porphyry, it may be inferred, was also tacitly reacting against his masters
anti-Aristotelian polemics. The difference between Porphyrys attitude towards
Aristotle and that of the previous Platonic tradition was already outlined by
Karl Praechter in his magisterial review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem
Graeca. It is worth quoting Praechters words :
From the fact that Plato on occasion made use of this or that form of
argument, it was taken as proof that he had also established this form
theoretically ; and in this manner they [scil. the Middle-Platonist authors, such
75
Cf. A LC ., Did., 6, 158, 17-18 and 39-40, 159, 43, etc. ; G ALEN , PHP, 9.9 = V.796-7 K. ;
Inst.Log. 15, 10 = 38, 1 ff. and 18, 2 = 45, 14ff. Kalbfleisch. Galens attitude, however, is far more
complex (Galen also composed extensive commentaries on Aristotles logical works). For an
overview of Galens contributions to logic, cf. J. B ARNES , Galen on Logic and Therapy, in F.
K UDLIEN , R. J. D URLING eds., Galens Method of Healing, Brill, Leiden 1991, pp. 50-102.
76
See G. K ARAMANOLIS , Plato and Aristotle in Agreement ? Platonists on Aristotle from
Antiochus to Porphyry, Clarendon Presso, Oxford 2006.
77
Here I disagree with K ARAMANOLIS , Plato and Aristotle in Agreement ? cit.
78
Cf. C HIARADONNA, Sostanza movimento analogia cit. ; I D ., Plotino e la corrente antiaristotelica
del platonismo imperiale : analogie e differenze, in M. B ONAZZI , V. C ELLUPRICA eds., Leredit
platonica : Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2005, pp. 235-274.
26
as the author of the Didaskalikos] succeeded, beginning with these few points,
in claiming essentially all of Aristotles logic as Platos. It is with this that
Porphyry broke. Now Aristotelian logic as such, and not covered in Platonic
colours, formed the basis for the study of philosophy in the schools of the
Neoplatonists as well, and thus the exegesis of Aristotle also came to hold an
extremely important place in the Platonic school, which it never lost 79 .
I do not wish to discuss the motivations (to my mind both philosophical

and ideological) behind Porphyrys attitude towards Aristotle 80 ; I only wish
to single out some of the notable features of Porphyrys Aristotelianism, in
order to shed light on the first lines of the Isagoge. Porphyry is a commentator
of Aristotles treatises, and this suffices radically to distinguish his work on
Aristotle from that of previous Platonists. Porphyry composed extensive
commentaries on Aristotles Categories, De interpretatione, Physics, etc. 81 . It
can safely be inferred that Porphyry aimed to integrate such treatises and
their doctrines into his universalizing Platonism 82 ; accordingly, it would be
wrong to suggest that Porphyrys integration of Aristotle into Platonism was
limited to logic and that it entailed an ontological neutralisation of Aristotelian
doctrine. Rather, Aristotles ontology was part of Porphyrys inclusive
Platonism, although Porphyry never suggested that Plato and Aristotle held
the same views 83 . All this obviously implies a process of modification,
simplification, etc. Porphyry, nevertheless, appears to have been sober in his
exegetical attempts, and never to have attempted to read Platonic or
Pythagorean theories into those of Aristotle. Porphyry instead aimed to
show that Platonism could naturally integrate Aristotles doctrines. A fragment
on principles surviving from Porphyrys lost In Phys. aptly illustrates his
attitude : Porphyry here points out that Aristotle had only considered the
immanent form, while Plato had also postulated the separate form, thus
establishing the paradigmatic principle 84 . The most interesting example of
79
K. P RAECHTER , Review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Byzantinische
Zeitschrift , 18, 1909, pp. 516-538, English translation in S ORABJI , Aristotle Transformed cit., pp.
31-54, esp. p. 35.
80
Cf. H. D. S AFFREY , Pourquoi Porphyre a-t-il dit Plotin ? Rponse provisoire, in L. B RISSON
ET ALII , La Vie de Plotin, II, Vrin, Paris 1992, pp. 31-57, reprinted in H. D. S AFFREY , Le
noplatonisme aprs Plotin, Vrin, Paris 2000, pp. 3-26 .
81
Cf. the complete list of Porphyrys exegetical works on Aristotles philosophy in K ARAMANOLIS,
Plato and Aristotle in Agreement ? cit., pp. 338-339.
82
On Porphyrys universalising Platonism, cf. D. J. OMEARA , Pythagoras Revived. Mathematics
and Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989, p. 27.
83
More details in K ARAMANOLIS , Plato and Aristotle in Agreement ? cit., pp. 245 ff.
84
P ORPH . apud S IMPL , In Phys., 10, 32-11, 2 Diels = fr. 120 Smith. Cf. K ARAMANOLIS , Plato and
Aristotle in Agreement ? cit., pp. 272-273. Parallels in J. M ANSFELD , Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, the
W HAT
IS
27
Porphyrys attempt to integrate Aristotle and Plato (or, rather, Peripatetic

and Platonist theories) is probably his epistemological excursus in the
Commentary on Ptolemys Harmonics : here an Aristotelising abstractionist
theory of knowledge and science is described as being propaedeutic to the
intellectual knowledge of true beings (which Porphyry describes by
paraphrasing Platos Seventh Letter) ; furthermore, Porphyrys account presents
abstraction as the first step in the (Platonic) process of recollection 85 .
Nothing of this was completely new : already Alcinous, for instance, had
conceived of induction (ej p agwghv ) as a means to awaken the inborn memory
of transcendent ideas 86 . Porphyry was indeed relying on a previous, prePlotinian method of blending Peripatetic tenets into Platonism ; yet Porphyry
developed and refined previous exegetical tendencies : his harmonisation of
Aristotle with Plato is based on a detailed acquaintance with both Aristotles
treatises and the Aristotelian commentary tradition. An endeavour of this
kind was new in the Platonic tradition.
The same holds true for Porphyrys views on definitions, genera and
species. C LEM . A LEX ., Strom., VIII records (Middle-)Platonic school doctrines 87 ,
and includes an interesting allusion to the status of objects of definition :
definitions are here said to pertain not to sensible things or ideas, but to
universal concepts (C LEM . A LEX ., VIII, 19, 2) which (as suggested by Jaap
Mansfeld) apparently derive from immanent forms 88 . Such a view appears
strikingly similar to the Porphyrian doctrine according to which universal
genera and species are post rem abstractions of immanent incorporeal natures.
Porphyry, however, does not simply quote a school theory, but engages in a
detailed exegesis of Aristotles Categories and Physics. In his In Ptol. Harm.,
Porphyry develops an elaborated account of definitions, and presents in re
forms as the primary objects of the oJ r ismov ~ ; physical entities are here
portrayed as the real correlatum of logical and epistemological notions. This
is by no means a commonplace or neutral view ; and the Aristotelising
Peripatetics, the Stoics, and Thales and his Followers On Causes (Ps.-Plutarchus Placita I 11
and Stobaeus Anthologium I 13), in A. B RANCACCI ed., Antichi e moderni nella filosofia di et
imperiale, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2001, pp. 17-68.
85
Cf. esp. P ORPH ., In Ptol. Harm., 14, 4-6 and 15, 1-6 Dring. Further details in the studies
mentioned above, n. 39.
86
Cf. A LCIN ., Did., 158, 1-4. Discussion and further references in C HIARADONNA , Platonismo e
teoria della conoscenza stoica cit.
87
Cf. M ANSFELD , Heresiography in Context cit., pp. 62-63 : The source our sources used by
Clement belong with the Middle Platonist scholastic literature ; what is more, his account has
preserved details deriving from the learned discussions of the first century BCE and the first two
centuries CE some of which can only be paralleled in Simplicius much later In Cat. .
88
Cf. M ANSFELD , Heresiography in Context cit., p. 63 n. 15.
28
character of Porphyrys treatment is revealed, among other things, by an

allusion to A RISTOT ., Metaph., H, 2, 1043a14-22 89 .
Let us now return to the opening lines of the Isagoge. Porphyry presents his
work as an elementary treatise on notions pertaining to the study of logic and
its various branches. The assertion that Porphyrys Isagoge represents an
introduction to the study of logic is perfectly true when properly understood.
It is crucial to note here that as far as imperial and late-antique authors were
concerned, the philosophical study of reasoning was not confined to the
ability to produce logically correct deductive inferences. In their view, logic
entailed more than this. Michael Frede, for instance, has aptly observed of the
internal complexity of Galens concept of rational method(s) that :
It involves the supposed ability of reason to determine the kinds of things there
are in the nature of things and their distinguishing marks by the method of
division, the ability to recognize similarities between things in a methodical way
which will allow one to determine the genera of things and the most general
truths about the various kinds of things, and the ability to define things, not just
names, but things as they essentially are in the nature of things 90 .
It is by no means surprising, therefore, that the surviving fragments of

Galens lost treatise On demonstration not only focus on syllogisms and
definitions, but also include large sections on epistemology, physics, biology,
etc. 91 Logical methods were by no means neutral : a commonly shared set of
terms, notions, theories and arguments certainly existed, but the way in
which different authors made use of it entailed well-defined philosophical
views on the nature of knowledge and reality. Alcinous logical and
epistemological sections, elementary as they may be, cannot be understood
outside the Platonist metaphysical framework of his work. Likewise, Galens
discussion of logical methods is directly related to his views on (medical)
89
Cf. P ORPH ., In Ptol. Harm., 11, 21-26 Dring. More details in C HIARADONNA , Platonismo e
teoria della conoscenza stoica cit.
90
Cf. M. F REDE , On Galens Epistemology, in V. N UTTON ed., Galen : Problems and Prospects,
University Press, Cambridge 1981, pp. 65-86, repr. in M. F REDE , Essays in Ancient Philosophy,
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987, pp. 278-298, p. 292. On the similarities between Galens conception
logic and the Middle Platonic tradition, cf. ibid. ; T. T IELEMAN , Galens Concept of Dialectic and
the Middle Platonist Background : The Argument of PHP Book II, in M. V EGETTI , S. G ASTALDI eds.,
Studi di storia della medicina antica e medievale in memoria di Paola Manuli, La Nuova Italia,
Florence 1996, pp. 49-65.
91
Cf. I. VON M LLER , ber Galens Werk vom Wissenschaftlichen Beweis, Abh. Bayer. Ak. d.
Wiss. Mnchen , 20, 1897, pp. 403-478 ; R. CHIARADONNA , Le trait de Galien Sur la dmonstration
et sa postrit tardo-antique, in R. C HIARADONNA , F. T RABATTONI eds., Physics and Philosophy of
Nature in Greek Neoplatonism, forthcoming.
W HAT
IS
29
knowledge and nature ; the same also holds true, among other, for Alexander of
Aphrodisias logic, which is part of his overall essentialist account of reality92 .
Logical methods, however, may also entail something less than the study
of valid argument forms. For all of their differences, Galen and Alexander of
Aphrodisias share the view that logic is useful. Both claim that the study of
logic is not to be pursued as such : rather, they argue, logic should only be
studied insofar as it is useful to construct proofs which, in turn, are useful for
science (or theoretical philosophy). In accordance with this utilitarian view,
perfectly valid arguments might be said to exist, the study of which is not part
of logic because they are not useful for knowledge 93 . Logic, therefore, is not
presented by these authors as an autonomous branch of human thought.
Evidently, the epistemological, physical or ontological background of any
logical method of enquiry is not always accorded the same prominence.
Complex works such as Galens lost treatise On demonstration or Porphyrys
lost Ad Gedalium certainly included large (and in our view extra-logical)
sections on physics and epistemology. Porphyrys Isagoge is designed to
provide a more elementary treatment of notions propaedeutic to the study of
logic. It is then by no means surprising that Porphyry does not engage in any
in-depth discussion on the ontological background of such notions. This,
however, as I have argued, by no means implies that a similar background is
missing : Porphyry is rather leaving it aside for the sake of simplicity.
Porphyrys non-elementary works show that his logical theories rest on a
well-defined ontological foundation, which mostly (though not exclusively) 94
pertains to Porphyrys Aristotelising analysis of the physical world and of its
immanent incorporeal principles.
3. C ONCLUSION : P ORPHYRY S
LOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LOGIC
Porphyrys Isagoge can be seen to serve as a preparation for the study of

logic or logical methods, following the footsteps of the old masters (the
Peripatetics in particular). Porphyrys discussion here is indeed of an
elementary, introductory and general sort ; in this respect, it possess a
logical character. The Isagoge might therefore be described as a logical
introduction to the study of logic. As I argued, the adverb logikwv t eron is likely
92
Cf. M. R ASHED , Essentialisme. Alexandre dAphrodise entre logique, physique et cosmologie,

De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2007.
93
I wish to refer here to the excellent discussion in J. B ARNES, Galen and the Utility of Logic, in
J. K OLLESCH, D. N ICKEL eds., Galen und das hellenistische Erbe, Steiner, Stuttgart 1993, pp. 33-51.
94
Concerning Stoic influences, cf. above. Platos division was also part of the ontological
background of Porphyrys logic, as Isag., 6, 13-23 clearly shows.
30
to allude to the introductory logical character of Porphyrys treatise : logic

is not explicitly mentioned as subject matter, but is implied in the list of
topics to which the Isagoge is propaedeutic. A non-introductory (and, in this
sense, non logical) treatment of the subject matter would require a detailed
discussion of the ontological and epistemological background of logic.
Porphyry provided a similar discussion in works such as the lost Ad Gedalium,
but avoided it in his most elementary treatise. Yet this does not imply that
Porphyrys Isagoge was regarded by its author as being philosophically
neutral. It is particularly difficult to accept B.s claim that if the work is
Peripatetic, it is so only in the blandest of manners 95 . The name of Aristotle
appears in the first line of the Isagoge ; a few lines below, Porphyry alludes to
Peripatetics. As noted above, this was by no means a self-evident and
commonplace choice for a Platonist of his time : Porphyrys insistence on the
Peripatetic character of his work should be read in the wider context of his
(philosophical and ideological) views on the harmonising of Plato and Aristotle.
The opening lines of Porphyrys most elementary work can thus be seen to
allude to the chief and most distinctive aspect of Porphyrys philosophical
project ; and whatever the value of this project may be, B.s suggestion that
Porphyrys philosophical notions need not be rehearsed here appears
unconvincing. Porphyry L and Porphyry P are not only the same person, but
also the same philosopher.
95
B., p. XIX.

What Is Porphyry's Isagoge

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What is Porphyrys Isagoge ?*

The present article is a review of J. B ARNES , Porphyry. Introduction, Translation with an

A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

actually be traced back to the ancient Neoplatonic commentators on the

Cf. A MM ., In Isag., 45, 1 ff.

In his extant short commentary on Categories, Porphyry points out that

Only one (important) difference exists between Ebbesens interpretation

Cf. Plotinus polemical remarks on this at VI 1 [42], 3, 19-23.

according to B. it is philosophically neutral and compatible with different

I do not wish to discuss A. C. Lloyds complex interpretation of Porphyrys logic in any

Burnyeats remarks are useful to understand Porphyrys logical method.

According to Porphyry, words (both individual and general terms) stand

It is extremely important to grasp the difference between (i) leaving

At the beginning of the chapter on quality, Porphyry provides two reasons

Logical as it may be, Porphyrys discussion in his short commentary on

Simplicius words here should be read alongside those of an important

Porphyrys views on the matter, views which appear to constitute an expanded

alluding to the distinctively Platonic metaphysical doctrine according to

predicates. For it is not possible to think of ox or man or horse or animal in

non-introductory works such as the Sentences and the Commentary on Ptolemys

of ontological significance ; rather, it is a theory which regards the status of

Porphyry adapts (and thereby modifies) a Stoic doctrine to fit a different

Cf. C HIARADONNA , Platonismo e teoria della conoscenza stoica cit.

Cf. P ORPH ., In Cat., 91, 19-27.

division at Isag., 6 represent a partial and introductory account of doctrines

(discursive) general concepts, Porphyry argues, are post rem abstractions of

Cf. DE L IBERA , Porphyre. Isagoge cit., pp. LXII-LXXV.

I do not wish to discuss the motivations (to my mind both philosophical

Porphyrys attempt to integrate Aristotle and Plato (or, rather, Peripatetic

character of Porphyrys treatment is revealed, among other things, by an

It is by no means surprising, therefore, that the surviving fragments of

LOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LOGIC

Porphyrys Isagoge can be seen to serve as a preparation for the study of

Cf. M. R ASHED , Essentialisme. Alexandre dAphrodise entre logique, physique et cosmologie,

to allude to the introductory logical character of Porphyrys treatise : logic

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