October 12, 2016

Mr. Edward Smith

RichMo, Inc.,
1234, Sociego Street,
Sampaloc, Manila
Dear Mr. Smith:
Here is the opinion you requested.
The facts, as I gather from you and your documents are as follows:

1. Art. 279. Security of tenure.

In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee
except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
his actual reinstatement. (As amended by Section 34, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
(Labor Code, Art. 279)

2. Art. 282. Termination by employer.

An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
1. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer
or
representative
in
connection
with
his
work;
2. Gross

and

habitual

neglect

by

the

employee

of

his

duties;

3. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly
authorized
representative;
4. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or
any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and
5. Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
(Labor Code, Art. 282)

3. Art. 285. Termination by employee.

1. An employee may terminate without just cause the employee-employer relationship by
serving a written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance. The employer
upon whom no such notice was served may hold the employee liable for damages.
2. An employee may put an end to the relationship without serving any notice on the
employer
for
any
of
the
following
just
causes:
1. Serious insult by the employer or his representative on the honor and person of the
employee;
2. Inhuman and unbearable treatment accorded the employee by the employer or his
representative;
3. Commission of a crime or offense by the employer or his representative against the
person of the employee or any of the immediate members of his family; and
4. Other causes analogous to any of the foregoing.
(Labor Code, Art. 285)
4. In the case of Morales, January 25, 2012, it ruled that:
Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because "continued employment
is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a
diminution in pay" and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to
dismissal but made to appear as if it were not constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an
act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the

part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued
employment. In cases of a transfer of an employee, the rule is settled that the employer is
charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action are for valid and legitimate
grounds such as genuine business necessity and that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of
proof, the employees transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.
XXX
Admittedly, the right of employees to security of tenure does not give them vested rights
to their positions to the extent of depriving management of its prerogative to change their
assignments or to transfer them. By management prerogative is meant the right of an employer to
regulate all aspects of employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working
methods, processes to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of
their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers. Although jurisprudence
recognizes said management prerogative, it has been ruled that the exercise thereof, while
ordinarily not interfered with, is not absolute and is subject to limitations imposed by law,
collective bargaining agreement, and general principles of fair play and justice. Thus, an
employer may transfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation to another,
provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges, and
the action is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of
punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. Indeed, having the right should not be
confused with the manner in which that right is exercised. XXX (Morales v. Harbour Centre
Port Terminal, Inc., 680 Phil. 112 (2012) )
5. In the case of Hyatt Taxi Services, June 26, 2001, it ruled that:
XXX We have to make clarifications on this aspect by following the jurisprudence on
constructive dismissal whereby the Supreme Court held that constructive dismissal consists in

the act of quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or

unlikely as in the case of an offer involving demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.
XXX constructive dismissal does not always involve forthright dismissal or diminution in rank,
compensation, benefit and privileges. There may be constructive dismissal if an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the
employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued
employment.XXX
(Hyatt Taxi Services Inc vs Catinoy ,G.R. No. 143204 (2001)

4. In the case of Habana, November 16, 1998, it ruled that:

XXX Voluntary resignation is defined as the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in
a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency
of the service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employement. In
this case, as indicated in the various memoranda he received from his superiors, petitioner was
clearly having trouble performing his job, one which undeniably carries immense
responsibilities. Notable too was petitioners failure to see eye to eye with his immediate bosses,
first, Mr. Yokoo and then Mr. Okawa. Because of these difficulties, it was quite reasonable for
petitioner to think of, and eventually, relinquishing his position voluntarily (and get a fat sum as
severance pay in the bargain) instead of waiting to be fired.
Petitioner could not have been intimidated by private respondents to quit. In his 27 April
1990 memorandum, petitioner emphatically vowed not to resign despite private respondents
alleged acts of harassment. Surprisingly, however, after only a few days he did quit alleging that
he was forced and harassed to do so. If petitioner was adamant in his intention not to be coerced
into leaving, how could he suddenly be forced to resign. Petitioner glaringly contradicted
himself. His excuse is, thus, unbelievable and unjustifiable.XXX (Habana vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
121486 (1998))