Page, J. - Peace Education. Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations

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Peace Education
Exploring Ethical
and Philosophical Foundations
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Peace Education
Exploring Ethical
and Philosophical Foundations
'
by
James Page
Southern Cross University, Australia
IAP
INFORMATION AGE PUBLISHING, INC.

Charlotte, NC
www.infoagepub.com
We are weak t da in ideal matters because intelligence

!
zs dzvorced from aspiration.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Page,James Smith (195:1- ).

Peace education: exploring ethical and philosophical foundations
James Page, with a foreword by Koichiro Mats!lllra.
-John Dewey (1934,
by
p. em.
Includes b ibliographical references.
ISBN 978-!-59311-889-1 (pbk.) -ISBN 978-1-59311-890-7 (hardcover)
1. Peace-Smdy and teaching-Moral and ethica l aspects. 2. Virtue ethics.

3. Consequential is! ethics. 4. Conservative political ethics.
6. Ethics of care.
JZ5534.P34 2008
I.
Title.
5.
Aesthetic ethics.
303.6'607!-dc22
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproducedJstored in a

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photocopying, microfilming, r ecording or otherwise, without written permission
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Printed in the United States of America
IIi
Art as Experience,
LW.l2:201)
CONTENTS
Acknowledgment s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
P ref ace
xv
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
.
I. I
1 .2
. .
The Cur re n t Status of P eace Educati on
..
The Problem of Peace Education

1.1.1
1.1.2
1 . 1. 3
Curren t. Literature a n d Development.

.
.
Peace Education and International Instruments
Institutional Stat.lls of Peace Education
.
.
1 .2.3
.. ..
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
The P.-ohlernat.ic Nature o f Peace Education .

.
The Dearth o f a Philosophical Rationale for Peace
Education
.
.
.
.
. . . . . . . . . . .
Research M et hods and Assumpt ions
. .
. . . .
. ..
..
. . . . .
.
.
. . . . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . .
. .
.
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..
.
.
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
. . . . .
.
.
. . . .
. . . . .
. .
.
. .
.
20
21
22
18
18
23
.. . 23
.
13
15
. 17
.
.
. 15
.
.
. . .
. ..
.
I
I
2.2. 1 Religion, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education

2.2.2 Plato, Vi rtue Ethics, and Peace Education .
.
.
.
ClassicalV irtue Ethics and P eace Educati on .
. . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
.
.
.
2. 1 . 1 Reasons for Revival
.
.
.
2 . 1 . 2 Demarcation
.
.
.
2. 1 .3 The Appeal of Virtue Eth ics for Education
2 . 1.4 Preview
.
.
. . . . .
The Revival ofVi rt ue Et hi cs
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
Virtue Ethics and Peace Education
m.
.
.
I
\
.
.
The Nature of the Investigation

The Rehabilitation o f Prt>judice
and Preunderstanding
.
.
1 . 4.3 Limitations of Investigation
1 .4.4 Overview of the Investigation
2.2
.
.
1.4.1
1 . 4.2
.
.
..
.
. 2
.. .
.
8
.
10
.
10
. .
.
12
.
. . . . . . . . .
2.I
. . .
. . . . .
.
.
Peace Researc h , Peace Education, and Peace Advocacy
St at ement of P roblem .
1.3. 1
1 . 3.2
. . . .
. . .
. .
1.4
Cri ti cal Is sues in P eace Research and Education

1 .2 . 1 . Difficulties with Def i n i ng Peace .
.
1 . 2.2 Understanding Peace Research
.
.
. . . .
1 .3
23
. 24
25
25
26
26
28
l
i
.I
Jj
viii
Contents
CONTENTS
.
29
4
34
2.2.3 Aristotle, Virtue E thics, and Peace Education . . . .

2.2. 4 Augustine, Vi rtue Eth ics, and Peace Education . . . . . . . .
.
2.2.5 Thomas Aquinas, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Educauon . . . .
.
2.3
Postclassical Virtue E thics and Peace Education
. . . . . . . . . 36
2.3. 1 Desiderius Erasmus, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education . . . 36
2.3.2 Benedictus de Spinoza, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education . . 37
2.3.3 David Hume, V irtue Ethics, and Peace Educatio n . . . . . . . . . 4 0
2.3. 4 Immanuel Kant, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education . . . . .
40
42
. . . . .
Modern Virtue Ethics and Peace Education I. . .
.
3.4
2.4
2 . 4 . 1 Nicolai Hartman n , Vi rtue Ethics, and Peace Education . .

2. 4 . 2 Joh n Dewey, V i rtue Ethics, and Peace Educatio n . . . . . . . .
2. 4.3 Gandh i , Virtue E t h ics, and Peace Education . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . 4 . 4 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Virtue Eth ics, and Peace Education . .
.
2.5
Modern Virtue Ethics and Peace Education II . .
. . .
2.5. 1 Martin Luther King, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education . .
2.5.2 El izabet h Anscom be, Vi rtue Ethics, and Peace Educat ion .
2.5.3 Alasdair Mci n tyre , Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education . . .
2.5. 4 Rosali nd Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education .
2.5.5 Popular Virtue E t hics and Peace Education . . . . . . .
2.5.6 The Virtues of Civility and Co-Operation . . . . . . .
Radical Ch ristian Vi rille Ethics and Peace Education . . . . .
- 7
2 .!:J.
.
2.6
Summation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :
2.6. 1
Strengths and vVeaknesses of Virtue Eth ics

.
(and Peace E ducatlon )
..... .
. . . . . .
Recapitulation . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . .
2.6.2
3.1.1
3 . 1 .2
3 . 1 .3
3. 1 . 4
3.2
Consequential ism Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reasons for t h e Rise of Consequentiali s m . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Consequentialism and the Notion of the Future . . . . . . . . .
.
Prevtew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Early Consequentialism and Peace Education . . . . . . . . .
3 .2 . 1 Francis Hutcheson, Conseque ntialism, and Peace
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.2 David Hume, Consequentialism, and Peace Education . . . . .
3.2.3 Jeremy Benth a m , Consequentialism, and Peace Educa ion
3.2. 4 John Stuart M i l l , Consequentialisrn, and Peace Ed1 cat1on .
3.2.5 Marx-Engels, C onsequentialisrn, and Peace Educallon . . .
. .
3.3
Modern Consequentialism and Peace Education . . . . . . .

.
3.3. 1
3.3.2
Ric\:lard Hare, Consequentialism, and Peace Education .

Social Reconstn1ctionism, Consequential ism , and Peace
. . .
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Critical Lite racy, Cri tical Pedagogy, and Peace Education
Richard Peters, Consequential ism, and Peace Education .
Nonviolence, Consequehtialisrn, a n d Peace Education . . .
.
3.3.3
3.3. 4
3.3.5
!:l9
4 . 1.1
4 . 1.2
4 . 1 .3
. . .
. . . . . .
. . . . .
. .
. .
. . . . . . . . . .
. 91
4 .2 . 1 Plato, Conservative Politics Ethics, and Peace Education . . . 91

4 . 2.2 Aristotle, Conservative Political Ethics, and Peace Education . 93
4 . 2.3 Christianity, Conservative Political Ethics, and Peace
Education . .
.
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
. . .
Post-Classical Conservative Political Ethics

and Peace Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
and Peace Education

......
... . . .
David Hurne, Conservative Political Ethics,
. ..
.
. . . . 95
4 . 3.2
and Peace Education . . .

...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Edmund B u rke-, Conservative Political Ethics,
4 . 3.3
. . .
. . . . . .
95
. . . .
Thomas Hobbes, Conservative Political Ethics,
4 . 3. 1
. .
97
. .
and Peace Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
. . . .
. . . . . . . . . 99
Modern Conservative Political E thics and Peace Education .

.
4.5
101
4 . 4.4
and Peace Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Roger Scruton, Conservative Political Ethics,
4 . 4 .5
and Peace Education . . .

. . . .
. . . . . . .
Rudolph Rummel, Conservative Political Ethics,
.
. .
4 . 4 .6
4 . 4 .7
. 73
. . 112
. . 114
. . 115
1 16
.
.
. 116
. 117
. 119
. .
. . . .
The Revival o f Aesthetic Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 1 19
. . . . .
Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education .

5.1
. . . . . . . 111
and Peace Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . .

Kenneth Boulding and Conservative Peace Theory. . . . . .
Conservative Political Ethics and the Culture of Peace . . .
Summation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
4 . 5 . 1 Strengths and Weaknesses of Conservative Political
Ethics (and Peace Education) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 .5.2 Recapitulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
. . . . . . .
. .
65
. 66
67
. 69
71
. . . . . 89
Classical Conservative Political E thics and Peace Education .
76
. . 80
. . 81
. . . 83
. .
61
. 62
63
64
. 65
Conservative Political Theory and Ethics .

.... ...
. . . . 89
Intellectual Political Conservatism . . . .
. . . . . . .. . . . .
. 90
Preview
91
61
. 73
Michael Oakeshott, Conservative Political Eth i cs

and Peace Education . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4 . 4 .2 Anthony Qui n ton, Conservative Political Eth ics,
and Peace Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4 . 4 .3 Russell Kirk, Conservative Political Ethics,
.
.
.
.
The Revival of Conservative Poli tical Ethics . . . . . . .
4. 4.1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4
57
and Peace Education . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4 . 3. 4 G. W. F. Hegel, Conservative Political Ethics,
57
. .
. .
. . 56
. .
. .
!:l!:l
Consequentialist Ethics and Peace Education .

. . . . . .
3 . 1 The Origins o f Consequentialism . . . .
.
. .
. . . .
. .
4.3
. . 49
. 0
c)1
. . 53
49
44
45
. . .
4.2
42
. 43
Strengths and Weaknesses of Conseque n tialism . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4

Recapitulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Conservative Political Ethics and Peace Education. . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.1
3. 4 . 1
3. 4 .2
Summation .
ix
.
.
5.1.1
5. 1 .2
5 . 1 .3
Reasons for the Revival. .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 19
Demarcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .....
. . 121
Preview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
. . . . . . 121
.
. .
. .
. .
. .
. . .
CONTENTS
5.2
5.3
Contents
Classical Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education
.
.
1 22
Classicism, Aesthetic Ethics, a n d Peace Education
. .
1 22
Plato, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
.
.
1 22
H ebrew Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education .
1 23
Buddhism, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Educat.ion
124
C h ristianity, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
. 126
Augusti ne, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education . .
. . . 1 27
Thomas Aqu i n as, Aesthetic E t h ics, and Peace Educatio n . 1 29
Islam, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
. .
. . 130
. .131
Postclassical Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education .
5.3. 1 Desiderius Erasmus, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace
Education
. .
.
. . . . .
.. . .. . . .
13 1
5.3.2 David Hume, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education . .
1 34
5.3.3 Adam Smith, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education .
. . . 1 36
5.2.1
5.2.2
5.2.3
5.2.4
5.2.5
5.2.6
5.2.7
5.2. 8
. . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . . .
. .
. . . . . . .
. . .
.
.
.
. . . . . .
.
. .
.
. .
. .
Modern Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education
. . .
.
.
. .
.
. .
.
. .
. .
.
5.5. 1 Soren Kierkegaard, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
5.5.2 Deweyan Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education . . . .
.
5.5.3 Albert Schweitzer, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education .
5.5.4 Language, Beauty, Imagin ation, and Peace Educat.ion .
5.5.5 Aesthetic Ethics and a Culture of Peace . . . . .
.
.
. ..
.
Summation
.
. .
.
. .
." . . . . . . . .
5 . 6. 1
. . . . . . . .
6.2
The Emergence of Care Ethics
6. 1 . 1
6. 1 .2
6. 1 .3
Origins of Care Ethics . .

Cri tics of Care Ethics . .
Preview . . .
. ... . .
. .
. . .
.
.
..
. .
. . . .
. .
. .
. .
. .
. . . . .
1 57
1 59
1 59
. . . . . 1 59
.
. 161
. . . . 164
.
. . . .
. .
. .
1 65
1 65
. 1 66
.
. . 1 66
1 67
1 69
.
1 70
. . .
.
.
. . . .
1 47
149
151
. 1 53
. 1 56
. . . 157
. 158
:- . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
. . .
.
.
. . .
. .
Precursors to Care Ethics and Peace Education .
6. 2 . 1 Aesara o f Lucania, Care Ethics, and Peace Education .
6.2.2 Religio n , Care Ethics, and Peace Education
. .
.
6.2.3 Augustine, Care Ethics, and Peace Education . .
.
6.2.4 Thomas Aquinas, Care Eth ics, and Peace Education
6.2..5 Existentialism, Care Ethics, and Peace Education
6.2.6 Heideggerian Care Ethics and Peace Education . . . . .
.
The Ethics o f Care and Peace Education

6. 1
Strengths and weaknesses of Aesthetic Ethics

(and Peace Education) . .
. . . .
.
. . .
Recapitulation . .
. .
. .
...
. .
.
5.6.2
1 47
. . .
. . . . . . . . .
6.3
Critical !sues in Care Ethics and Peace Education
. . .
.
6.3.1 Care Ethics as Feminist Ethics
6.3.2 Care as a Virtue .
.
. .
. . . .
6.3.3 Care Ethics as Situation Ethics .
.
.
6 . 3.4 Sara Ruddick, Care Ethics, and Peace Education .
6.3.5 Joseph Ku nkel, Care Ethics, and Peace Education
. . . . . . .
. . .
. . . . . . . . .
.
. . . .
. . . . . .
. . . .
.
. . .
. . .
. . . . .
. .
.
. .
. . .
. .
.
.
.
.
. .
. . . . . . .
. . . .
. . . . . . . . .
1 72
172
1 74
175
176
17 8
. .
. . .
. .
. . . . .
.
.
. . . .
. . .
. .
.
. .
. .
. . . .
. 1 82
1 83
. .
. .
. .
Recapitulation and Reflection .

.
.
.
Metaph i losophical Considerations . . .
.
.
.
Why Not Peace Education as an Educational Duty?
Implications of Investigation
.
. .
.
7 .2 . 1 T h e Need fo r a Holistic and Integrative Approach
to Peace Education . .
.
. .
. . .
7.2.2 Pedagogical Implications of the Investigation . .
.
7 . 2 . 3 D i rections for Future Research . . .
. . .
7. 1 . 1
7.1.2
7.1 .3
. . .
. . .
Appendixes
. .
. .
Appendix 1 : Abbreviations
.
Appendix 2 : Citation Method .
.
. . .
. .
. . . . . . . .
. .
1 85
1 85
. . .
. . . . . .
. . .
188
. 188
1 89
. . . . . . .
. .
. .
1 85
1 86
1 87
188
. .
. . . . . . .
1 80
1 81
. . 182
. . . .
1 45
. 1 46
. .
1 80
7.2
Kant's Peace Works . . . . .

. .
.
How Anti-Aesthetic is Kant Really?
Review of Investigation .
Conclusions . .
7.1
. . . . .
. .
Kantian Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education . , . . . . . . .. 1 39

5.4. 1 Kant's An ti-Aesthetic Ethics
. . . . . . . . ....
. .
. . 1 39
5.4.2
5.4.3
. . . . . .
. .
5.6
6.5
. . . . .
Partnership, Relationshi p , a n d Rights

. ..
Caring, Healing, and Peace Education
. . .
Summation
. .
.
.
.
6.5. 1 Strengths and Weaknesses of Care Ethics
(and Peace Educatio n) . .
. .
.
.
6.5.2 Recapitu lation . .
.
. . .
. . .
. . . . .
6.4. 1
6.4.2
. . .
The Application of Care Ethics to Peace Education .
6.4
. . . . . . . .
5.5
. . . . . . . .
. . . .
5.4
. . .
xi
. . .
. .
. .
. .
. . 191
. .
191
191
References
. .
Name Index
217
Subject Index .
. .
223
195
About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . 231
ACKN OWLEDGMENTS
'
,,
This monograph has its ongms in a doctoral thesis completed through

Southern Cwss University, New South Wales, Australia. I would therefore
like to acknowledge the work and patie n t encouragement of my supervi
sors, Dr. John Barrie and Professor Martin Hayden and the markers for the
thesis, Professor Michael Macklin, D r. Michael Furtado and Dr. Robin
Burns. Many of the ideas for the study arose out of the opportunity to serve
with the I nternational Year for the Culture of Peace Taskforce with
UNESCO, and for this opportunity I thank Professor Di Bretherton and
UNESCO itself. I also thank the Directors of the Insti tute for Educational
Research, Sydney, Australia, for the encouragement of the Award for Out
standing Educational Achievement for this study
During the writing of the study, I was also fortunate to be able to assist
in the teaching of peace and conflict s tudies at Sou thern Cross Univer
sity, and much from this experience has c o n tributed to the shape of this
study. For this opportunity I must thank Professor Elisabeth Porter.
Numerous o ther individuals provided advice and comments which h ave
assisted wi th the current study, including D r. Margaret Baxley, Dr. Monika
Betzler, Professor Roland Bleiker, D r. Elise Boulding, Dr. Joachim James
Callej a, Professor John Cooper, Professor N i ls Petter Gleditsch, Dr. llan
Gur-Ze 'ev, Professor Jan Narveson, Enno Obendiek, Professor Andrew
Parkin, Professor Jens Saugstad, Professor Keith Skamp, Professor Paul
Standish, D r. Henrick Syse, Professor Stuart Rees, Professor Paul Thorn,
Dr. Hans Trapman and Dr. Thomas Weber.
I thank the Director-General of UNESCO , Mr. Koi:chiro Matsuura, for
generously providing the Foreword for this study. I also thank the staff of
the UNESCO Secretariat for facilitating this.
A summary version of this study has been published with the Interna
tional Review of Education, under the title "Peace Education: Exploring
Some Philosophical Foundations," volume 50, issue 1 , 2004, pages 3-1 5 .
Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and Philosoj;hical Foundations, pages xiii-xiv
Copyright 2008 by Information Age Publish i ng

All rights of reproduction in any form reseved.
xiii
xiv
Peace Educa tion: Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
Material from Chapter
of this study is also published under the title "The
United Nations and Peace Education," Chapter
9 in The Encyclopedia of
Peace Education, pages 75-83, e dited by Monisha Bajaj and published this
year by Information Age Publishing. Finally I w ould like to thank Dr.
Dominica Bartlett, for her continuous personal encouragement, and also

for her input and suggestions for the study itself.
Dr. James Page
PREFACE
One of the great ironies of peace education is that no-one seems to be

openly opposed to the notion of the importance of peace. Peace is some
thing which we seemingly all aspire to, both within ourselves and in our rela
tionships with each other. Yet despite this, the idea of educating individuals
to
the attainment of p eace is far more contentious. Peace education often
connotes indoctrination. Or at the very least peace education is dismissed as

political correctness. This study aims to address this problem, through pro
viding a developed philosophical rationale for peace education. Perhaps
more accurately, the study develops some philosophical rationales for peace
education, as the study examines five possible rationales.
It is noteworthy that the dearth ofa philosophical rational for peace edu
cation is also evident within the growing critical literature on peace educa
tion. This is despite the fact that peace education courses and peace research
centers have been expanding around the world and despite the fact that the
! .
importance of peace education is now widely recognized in United Nations

declarations and instruments. One of the reasons for this dearth may be that
those committed to peace education assume that the reasons why we should
be so committed are quite obvious. This may be so, and yet it is still impor
tant to develop an articulate rationale or rationales for this educational
endeavor. Without such an articulation any endeavor, including peace edu
cation, will be limited and stunted, as well as being open to external criticism
as not constituting a valid .educational enterprise.
Chapter
of the study entails an outline of how peace education has
developed and how the authority for peace education has developed
within international instruments. I outline some of the key difficulties for
peace education and peace research, such as the problem of defining both
Peace Ed1Lcation: Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations,

pages xv-xvii
.
Copyright
2008 by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
XV
xvi
pe ace and pe ace e ducation and the de ar th of philosophical r ationale or

philosophy of pe ace e ducation. P hilos ophical re se ar ch is ver y i ntangible by
its nature , although at this stage I do atte mpt to e xplain the diale ctical and
her me ne utic me thodology adop te d in this study, as we ll as outlining the
fi ve e thical tr aditions that the s tudy inve stigate s as pote n tial are as of sup
por t for pe ace e ducation.
Chapter s 2 thr ough 6 in volve an examination of the five e thical tr adi
tions se le cte d for the study. Wit h vir tue e thics, I sugge st that pe ace may be
inter pre te d as a vir tue an d/ or v ir tue may be inter pre te d as pe ace ful ne ss,
and pe ace education as e du catio n in that vir tue . With conse que n tialist e th
ics, I sugge st that pe ace e ducatio n ma y be inter pre te d as e ducation regar d
ing the conse que nce s of our ac tion and inaction , both as individuals and
colle ctivitie s. With conserv ative political e thics, I sugge st pe ace e ducation
may be inter pre te d as e mphas izing the impor tance of the e volution of
social institutions and the impor tance of or dere d and lawful social change .
With ae sthe tic e thics I s ugge st pe ace may be inter pre te d as some thing
be autiful and valuable in itse lf, and pe ace e ducation as e mphasizing the
impor tance of that be auty and value. With care e thics, I sugge s t care may
be inter pre te d as a core e le me nt in pe ace , and pe ace e ducation as e ncour
aging tr ust and e ngagemen t wit h the other .
Obviously one m ight we ll se le ct other e thical tr aditions. Howe ver the se
seem to. be the offer the maj or poten tial suppor t for pe ace e ducation. The
other qual ifi cation which nee ds to be m ade is that e ach of the se e thical tr a
ditions in the mse lve s can only been see n as offer ing par tial suppor t for
pe ace education. This pe rhaps re flec ts the situation that pe ace and indee d
pe ace e ducation are highly complex conce p ts . I have tr ie d not to be come
too en tangle d with de fin i tional issue s-the appr oach cen ter s ve ry much
upon the ke y contr ibutor s to e ach of the e thical or philosophical tr adi
tion s , asse ssme nt of the wor k of these ke y contr ibutor s , and how the wor k
of the se contr ibutor s m igh t possibly pr ovide suppor t for a philosophy or
r ationale for pe ace e ducation.
Chapter 7 involve s an e xami natio n of some of the r am ifications of the
study, including the tantaliz i ng pr omise of cr i tical re alism and why I have
not se le cted duty as a foundation for pe ace e ducation. P ut simply, cr itical
re alism pr ovide s a pote ntial res olution to the pr oble m of mor al te lativism
and duty is pr oble matic as it is often duty which motivate s pe ople to war.
One of the pr oble ms ide ntified with pe ace e ducation at the ope ning of the
study is that pe ace e ducation te nds to remain unde fine d-or at le ast so
inclusive that it lacks me an ing. What I also atte mpt to do in the concluding
chapter is to pr ovide a ten tative defi nition of what pe ace e ducation me ans
accor ding to e ach of the tr adi tions.
The book use s numbere d se ctions and sub -se ctions. There is an ar gu
me nt that any liter ar y wor k should s tan d by itse lf and that the use of such
......
. ;
Preface
xvii
de vice s as numbere d se ctions and sub-se ctions interr upts the flow of
a te xt,
and thus interr upts also the conne ction be twee n wr i ter and re ader. Num
bere d se ctions and sub- subse ctions are ofte n associate d with scie n
tific
repor ts, although it i s also not uncomm on to find numbere d se
ctions and
sub-se ctions in philosop hical te xts. The advantage of such de vice
s is that
they assist the re ader to acce ss a se ction or se ctions that might be of spe
cial
intere st, and also facilitate s a univer sal me thod of citation, in the
e ve nt that
the study is subse que n tly re publishe d. On balance I found the case for
se c
tions and subse ctions to be str onger .
One of the common re sponse s that I re ce ive d to this wor k was
that the
tone was ver y cautious and that pe ace e ducation was so impor tant
that I
ought to be de clar ing the impor tance of this ve nture more ope nly
. Ye t this
cautious tone is de liber ate . Ye s, it is impor tant that individuals and
socie ty
ought to be committe d to pe ace. Ye t one of the pr oble ms
with pe ace
re se ar ch and e ducation is that an e le me nt of pre aching te nds
to infe ct the
e nter pr ise . There fore what I have atte mpte d to do is to be
care ful and
de liber ate about asser tions, and to atte mp t to consider the counterpr opo
sitions and we akne sse s to the argu me nts that I pr opound . More
over , as is
ine vi table with all philoso phical re se ar ch, all conclus ions must
be pr ovi
sional and there must always re main fur ther wor k to be
under take n.
De spite this, I hope the e thical and philosop hical r ationale
s de ve lope d i n
this study will constitu te an e ffe ctive contr ibu ti o n t o the impor
tant and
ongoing task of pe ace e ducation .
Dr. James Page
.,
FOREWORD
I'
.. \.,,
Peace education is of fundamental importance to the mission of the

UNESCO and the United Nations.
The United Nations system arose from a resolve to avoid the destruction
and despair that conflict and war generate. As the opening words of the
Preamble to the United Nations Charter forcefully proclaims: "We the peo
ples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war."
Within the United Nations, UNESCO is the lead agency for implement
ing peace education. Our role is perhaps best summed up in the opening
words to UNESCO's Constitution, which states eloquently that "since wars
begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of
peace must be constructed". Building a culture of peace throughout the
world is a complex social process which involves long-term social and cul
tural changes. Education at all levels is integral to this.
The present study by James Page provides a timely exposition of what
might be argued to be a philosophy of peace education. It provides an
overview of different philosophical approaches, and from diverse cultural
perspectives, of peace education throughout the world. As such it offers an
important addition to the emerging literature on peace education and the
culture of peace, as well as an important commentary on the peace mission
of UNESCO.
Kolchiro Matsuura
Director-General of UNESCO
Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations, page
Copyright 2008 by Information Age Publishing

xix
xix
CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEM
OF PEACE EDUCATION
"
1.1
1.1.1
"I;.
The Current Status of Peace Education
Current literature
and
Development
It seems reasonable to say that peace education is now officially

accepted as an important aspect of social education. Over the past three
decades there has been a growing corpus of criticalliterature within this
field, including substantial works by Elise Boulding ( 1 988) , Birgit Brock
Utne ( 1 989) , Robin Bums and Robert Aspeslaugh ( 1 996) , Linda Forcey
and Ian Harris ( 1999),Johan Galtung (EPR1 , EPR6, 1 9 8 3 ) , Haim Gordon
and Leonard Grob ( 1987) , Magnus Haavelsrud ( 1 975, 1 9 8 1 , 1 996) , Ian
Harris ( 1 988) , Ian Harris and Mary Morrison (2003), David Hicks ( 1 988) ,
Frank Hutchinson ( 1996) , T homas Lasley ( 1 994) , Susanne Lin ( 1 999) ,
Mary O'Reilly ( 1 993) , Amiran Raviv, Louis Oppenheimer and Daniel Bar
Tal ( 1 999) , Betty Reardon ( 1 989) , Bety Reardon and Alicia Cabezudo
(2002) , and David Smith and Terrance Carson ( 1 998 ) . In general terms,
one can say that peace education has evolved from concerns about making
an educational response to the problem of war and social justice. However,
it is noteworthy that the scope of peace education has been growing and
changing in recent years, and is becoming progressivel y more inclusive in
scope.
In general terms, one can suggest that there has been a threefold devel
opment of peace education, prompted by a general evolution of thinking
Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations, pages
I,
1.
. ..
Copyright
1-22
'
,.
Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
and reflection on peace education, and reflected also by developments in

United Nations thinking on peace education. The fundamental concern of
peace education is education to prevent the suffering and wastage of war
fare within the modern era. A secondary level of development i n peace
education is linkage of peace education with cognate social concerns, such
as development education, education for international understanding,
human rights education, futures education, and environmental education.
A third level of development in peace education is what one might call the
interpersonal and intrapersonal aspects of peace education, dealing with
self-understanding and how we ought to react with each other at a personal
level. The development of the focus of peace education in these diverse
ways ought not to be regarded as unexpected, given the broad focus of
peace research, and indeed given the arguably ambiguous nature of the
concept of peace itself.
One of the curious aspects of peace education is that there is no abso
lute formulation of what constitutes peace education. Magnus Haavelsrud
suggests that since peace and education are both abstractions, it is thus not
surpdsing that it is difficult to find widespread agreement as to what peace
education actually is (2008, p . 60) . One of the many i nclusive formulations
for peace education comes from Ian Harris and John Synott (2002, p.4) ,
who have described peace education as "teaching encounters" that draw
out from people l) their desire for pea.ce, 2) nonviolent alternatives for
managing conflict, and 3) skills for critical analysis of the structural
arrangements that produce and legitimate injustice and i nequality. Johan
Galtung (2008) argues that peace education ought to include discussion
both about direct violence and about the structural violence. However Gal
tung also emphasizes that for peace education it is crucial that form takes
priority over content. How o n e teaches is just as important as what one
teaches. How we should understand peace education is explored i n the fol
lowing sections.
1.1.2
Peace Education
and
International Instruments
It is important to examine what we might call the fundamental interna

tional recognition of peace education within United Nations declarations
and instruments, given that, in dealing with peace, much importance is
ascribed to such international declarations and instruments. Of course, the
United Nations (UN) is a global intergovernmental organization estab
lished by Charter on October 24, 1 945, with the general aims of maintain
ing international peace and encouraging international co-operation. The
UN refers to the overarching organization, although specialist UN agen
cies and forums have been e s tablished to further specific objectives. With
The Problem
of
Peace
Education
some exceptions, UN declarations and instruments constitute so-called soft

law, which is to say that they work through the power of moral persuasion.
Since international peace and co-operatio n are central to the founding
plinciples of the UN, it is logical that, within the official declarations and
instruments of the UN, one ought to find formulations regarding peace
education.
The Charter of the UN specifically outlines the purpose of the organiza
tion as preventing future war. Peace education is one crucial means by
which this aim can be fulfilled. The Preamble to the Charter contains a ref
erence to "re-affirming faith in the . . . dignity and worth of the human per
son" and "establishing conditions" under which justice and respect for
international obligations can be maintained. It is difficult to see the tasks
of establishing or re-affirming faith in the dignity of the human person or
establishing respect for international obligations as not i nvolving educa
tion. The other fundamental recognition of peace education lies within
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 26 declares: "Educa
tion shall be directed . . . to the strengthening of respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and
friendship . . . and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the
main tenance of peace."
The agency within the UN system that has pre-eminent responsibility for
education and educational policy is the United Nations Educational, Scien
tific and Cultural Organization ( UNESCO ) , and thus it would be expected
that this international organization would h ave the most to say about peace
education. In fact, peace education is central to the constitutional mandate
of UNESCO: the Preamble to i ts Constitution ( 1 945) commences by not
ing that, as war begins in the minds of i ndividuals, so too the defences
against war should be constructed in the minds of individuals. Indeed,
most of the declarations within the Preamble deal expressly with either
building peace or preventing war. UNESCO shares with other United
Nations organizations a fundamental commitment to international peace,
but is unique in its mandate to operate through the mediums of education,
science and culture. If we ignore the Preamble, it could be argued that the
commitment of UNESCO to peace education within its 1 945 Constitution
is only implied. However since that time there have been a number of
more explicit commitments by UNESCO to peace education, namely i n
1 974, 1 980, 1 995, and, most recently through the UNESCO commitment
to the "culture of peace" programs, which will be discussed in further
detail below.
The commitment of the United Nations to peace education is also
reflected in the instmments on the rights of the child. The 1 959 (UNGA)
Declaration of the Rights of the Child might be summarized as emphasizing the
right that children have to protection and education. Principle 7 expressly
,, .
11
states that a child has the right to an education that will develop a sense of
moral and social responsibility. As a corollary of this, one could argue that
a child has the right to peace education. In the same vein, the 1 989 Conven
tion on the Rights of the Child, at Article 29. 1 (d) , indicates that the education
of the child shall be directed to "the preparation of the child for responsi
ble life in a free society, i n the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance,
equality of the sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national
and religious groups and person of indigenous origin." Given the impor
tance of peace and peace education for children, it is not surprising that
peace education figures promi nently in promotional literature from the
United Nations' Children's Fund (UNICEF) , although UNICEF's emphasis
on peace education mostly concerns post-conflict situations. It is also not
surprising that in 1 996, UNICEF adopted peace education as part of its
anti-war agenda.
One of the general observations one might make regarding UN interna
tional instruments dealin g with peace education is that they have become
gradually more assertive in terms of rights and expectations. This is evident
with the 2002 document A World Fit for Children, which was adopted unani
mously by the UN General Assembly. In Article 5, "a world fit for children"
is described as one of sustain a ble development "founded upon principles
of democracy, equality, non-discrimination, peace and social justice, and
the universality, indivisibility, i n terdependence and interrelatedness of all
human rights, including the right to development." Much of the document
focuses upon the right of children to protection from harm and violence.
However, an important section deals with the challenge of providing qual
i ty education. Within Article 40, the signatories to this document indicate
that they will implement a range of strategies and actions, including, at
point 40.7, strategies and actions which will "ensure that education pro
grams and materials reflec t fully the promotion and protection of human
rights and the values of peac e , tolerance and gender equality, using every
opportunity presented b y the International Decade for a Culture of Peace
and Non-Violence for the C h ildren of the World, 200 1 -2 0 1 0." Clearly this
is a forthright commitment.
The United Nations has long held a commitment to disarmament edu
cation, generally perceived to be an element within peace education. In
1 978, the Tenth General Session of the United Nations General Assembly
was devoted entirely to the d isarmament, and is thus generally known as
the Special Session on D isarmament I or simply SSOD I. Articles 1 06 and
1 07 of the Final Document spe c ifically urged governments and international
organizations to develop programs in disarmament and peace education at
all levels, and indicated that disarmament education ought to be included
within formal curricula. In 1 980, UNESCO convened the World Congress
on Disarmament Education, as promised in the previous SSOD I. The Final
Document and RepoTt of the Congress is noteworthy in that disarmamen t edu

cation is posited as being an essential component of peace education,
involving how to think, rather than what to think, and is also linked with
developmen t and equity issues. Importantly, the Final Document and Report
indicated that the commitmen t to disarmamen t education should be man
ifest throughout curricula at all levels of education.
In 1982 the United Nations General Assembly held the Special Session
on Disarmamen t II ( SSOD II) , the centerpiece for which was the World
Disarmamen t Campaign, lasting from 1982 to 1 992. The World Disarma
ment Campaign might be described as an exercise to mobilize popular
support for disarmamen t and was thus linked very much to the efforts of
the peace movement and of the work of non-governm e n t organizations.
The Campaign might be also described as an effort in n on-formal peace
education, in that the aim was to educate people about the importance of
disarmamen t, although the mechanism for doing this was generally out
side of formal educational i nstitutions. Edith Ballantyne and Felicity Hill
(200 1 ) have suggested that it is an open question as to whether the Cam
paign was successful. Maj o r limitations were a lack of funding and the
inherent problems with saying anything that might i mply specific criti
cism of UN member states. One could argue that the Campaign was not a
success, in that the disarmamen t of the following decade was minimal.
However, one could also argue that the pressure leading to the end of the
Cold War was part of the general consciousness-raising engendered by
the Campaign.
In 1 992 the World Disarmamen t Campaign was convened into a perma
nent organization, namely the United Nations Disarmamen t Programme,
which was perhaps a tacit admission of failure. If the Campaign had been
truly successful, then the process of creating a permanent agency would
hardly have been necessary. Nevertheless, throughout the 1 990s, the Gen
eral Assembly made periodic statements on the importance of disarma
ment education. In 2000, the United Nations General Assembly called for
the Secretary-General, with the assistance of experts, to produce a study on
disarmament and non-proliferation education. In 2002, the study was pre
sented and accepted by the General Assembly. The resulting document,
The United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education, is a
further important internation al document, confirming the international
commitmen t to peace education. Notably, the document gives a piescrip
tive definition and list of the objectives of disarmame nt and non-prolifera
tion education, within Articles 6-1 0 . The authors summarize the province
of such education in Article 20, in that such education is "a base of theoret
ical and practical knowledge, [which] allows individuals to choose for
themselves values that reject violence, resolve conflicts p eacefully and sus
tain a culture of peace."
'
; : : ....... .
r!:
One of the interesting developments in the thinking of the UN has

been the meshing of peace education and human rights education. The
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the 1993 World Conference
on Human Rights in Vienna, at Part 2, paragraphs 78-82, sees peace edu
cation as being part of human rights education and human rights educa
tion as crucial for world peace. The Vienna Conference was organized by
the United Nations and the Declaratio n subsequently published by the
General Assembly. More recen tly, peace educators such as Betty Reardon
( 1 997, 2000) have warmed to this idea of peace education as a right.
Indeed, if peace is a human right, it is n o t something that we merely hope
for, but rather, as Douglas Roche forcefully puts it, something we demand
(2003) . Further, peace education, in this perspective, also becomes what
we ought to demand as a right, rather than an altruistic addition to the
educational endeavour.
The conception of peace education as a human right thus flows very
much from seeing peace itself as a human right. The UN enunciated this
view in a brief yet powerful document, Declaration on the Right of Peoples to
Peace, UNGA Resolution 39/ 1 1 , adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on November 1 2, 1 984. Interestingly, most western nations
abstained from voting on this resolution and on a similar resolution, two
years later, expressing a right to development. Nevertheless, the above Dec
laration still has the status of being an officially adopted instrument of the
United Nations. The connection between the right of peace and right to
peace education is quite a straightforward one. If peace is to be regarded
as a right, then people therefore should have the right to be educated and
informed about that right, as any particular right is rendered meaningless
if individuals and societies are not informed that they have it.
Within UN programs on education for tolerance there are also numer
ous commitments to peace education. The year 1995 was designated as the
United Nations Year for Tolerance, with UNESCO as the lead agency. The
UNESCO Declaration of Principles on Tolerance ( 1 995) and the UN General
Assembly FoUow-up to the United Nations Year for Tolerance ( 1 996) make it
clear that tolerance is an essential requirement for peace. Article 1 of the
UNESCO document goes so far as to describe tolerance as the virtue which
makes peace possible and which contributes to the replacement of a cul
ture of violence by a culture of peace. The UNESCO document also makes
specific reference within Article 4 to .t he importance of education. Educa
tion is the most effective means for preventing intolerance and the initial
step is informing people what their rights and freedoms are. Education for
tolerance should encourage development of independent judgment, criti
cal thinking and ethical reasoning skills. Interestingly, Article 4.4 involves a
pledge by the signatories to improve teacher training, curricula, textbooks,
lessons and educational materials, "with a view to educating caring and
responsible citizens open to o ther cultures, able to appreciate the value of

freedom, respectful of human dignity and differences, and able to prevent
conflicts or resolve them by non-violent means." As such, the above state
ment serves as a useful summary of the aims of peace education.
The emergence of the emphasis on a culture of peace and education for
a culture of peace is part of a wider realization that the attainment of peace
is not merely an institutional problem but rather one that requires the sub
tle elements of cul tural change. The formal commitment of the UN
towards a culture of peace can be best understood through a remarkable
and ambitious document, the Declaration and Programme ofA ction on a Cul
ture of Peace, UNGA Resolution 53/243, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on September 13, 1999. In overview, this instrument
reflects the trend to a more i ntegrated understanding of both peace and
peace education, encompassing direct, stntctural and cultural peace. The
document also acknowledges that peace must be something that emerges
from popular sources, rather than being imposed from above. In other
words, there needs to be a movement for a culture of peace.
The year 2000 was designated by the UN as the International Year for a
Culture of Peace and this commitment has been extended with the recog
nition of the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Vio
lence for the Children of the World (2001-20 1 0 ) . UNESCO has been the
lead agency for the programs associated with a culture of peace. Article A/
4 of the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace indicates
that education is one of the principal means to build a culture of peace
and Article B/9 contains specific actions for fostering a culture of peace
through education. Such actions include involving children in activities for
instilling the values and goals of a culture of peace, revision of curricula
and textbooks with consideration to previous declarations of UNESCO on
peace, ensuring equality of access for women , re-invigorating international
educational co-operation, encouraging and strengthening efforts by actors
involved in developing values and skills conducive to a culture of peace,
encouraging the relevant entities of the United Nations system, and
expanding initiatives promoting a culture of peace in institutions of higher
education.
Overall, it does seem reasonable to contend that the commitment of the
United Nations to peace education has been an evolving one. In some ways
this reflects the evolving awareness of the nature of peace and the peace
process itself. The United Nations tends to operate upon a very statocratic
paradigm (Galtung, 1 986, p. 6) . This is not surprising, given that it is an
intergovernmental organization, and peace is often understood only in its
limited format as the absence of violence between nation-states. It is evi
dent, however, that there has been a gradual increase in awareness of the
importance of civil and social processes in the encouragement of peace
and of the importance of the e ncouragement of a culture of peace. Teach

ing peace involves encouraging a culture of peace. What makes the com
mitment of the United Nations so important now is largely a matter of
symbolism, although this symbolism is nevertheless extremely important,
as the commitmen t of the United Nations to peace education does imply
some external legitimacy to peace education . Within a world system of
nation-states, legitimacy still derives from nation-states, and by extension
from the intergovernmental organization that represents nation-states.
Such is still nevertheless an external legitimacy, and it begs the question of
what internal legitimacy there is to peace education. This is part of the
quest of this particular research study.
1.1.3
, .
:: ......
:
I
I
I.
Institutional Status of Peace Education
The institutional status of peace education is somewhat more complex

than the international status. It seems fair to describe peace education as a
field rather than a discipline as such. There are many programs in peace
education within courses in teacher education within universities. More
over peace education is one of the areas of concern of the International
Peace Research Association, through the Peace Education Commission.
The journal of Peace Education, an international j ournal associated with
IPRA, has recently commen ced publication. Peace education also has
strong popular support from peace and human rights groups. Yet an over
arching problem confronti n g peace education and peace research is a
dearth of specific commitment at governmental levels. The very fact that
peace is assumed to be something that everyon e is i n favor of means that
there is a tendency to think that peace education is something to which we
need not be specifically and e xpressly committed. Even more than this, the
seemingly self-evident nature of the proposition that peace is important
means that we tend not to have any critical analysis of the nature and ratio
nale for peace education.
One of the i n teresting ways to assess peace education is to examine the
relationship of peace education to the broader field of peace research .
Peace research suffers from t h e same disciplinary problem as peace educa
tion , in that as a field rather than a discipline as such, the field suffers or is
perceived to suffer from a Jack of established theoretical and methodologi
cal foundation . Yet, despite this, there is considerable interest in peace
research. UNESCO, at last count (2000) , has information on 580 university
peace research and training centers throughout the world. Interestingly,
UNESCO links the notions of peace research and training. There are a
range of cognate notions for peace research, including peace studies, pax
ology, irenology, polemology, conflictology, conflict management and con-
flict resolutio n studies. Some of the above terms serve as synonyms for
peace research , although it is important to note that peace research consti
tutes more than security research (Galtung , 1 980, p. 29 ) . Peace research
involves understa nding the conditions not merely for the absence of war,
but the condition s for positive peace. We can apply this to peace educatio n,
and suggest that peace education involves not merely teaching about war
and its avoidanc e, but also teaching and encouraging positive peace, that
is, developin g co-operative and harmoni ous relations hip between individu
als and groups.
A simple working definitio n of peace research is research into the con
ditions of peace. As such, it is a normative study, recogniz ing that peace
is
advantageous for individuals and humank ind. In some ways peace educa
tion can be thought of as applied peace research, in that through peace
education one hopes to put into practice the goal of peace research
, that
is, the minimiz ation of direct and structural violence , and the creation of a
more peaceful society. However, in a sense, all peace research can be
con
sidered to be peace educatio n, as the aim of peace research is to educate
others into more p eaceful practices and understandings. In any case,
peace
research is not disinterested research. Thus the task of understanding
peace education can be also thought of as the task of understa nding
peace
research and the notion of peace. This too becomes evident in this investi
gation, for when we examine the applied e thics of peace educatio n,
we are
really also examini ng the e thics of peace research as such. We are
also
examining the very difficult notion of peace.
One tradition al focus of peace research has been on the history of peace
plans, and such peace plans demonstrate the interrela tionship between
peace education and peace research. It is n o t within the scope of this
inves
tigation to examine the peace plans that have been developed and
pub
lished througho ut history. It is sufficien t to point out that these plans
are a
subtle form of peace educatio n, in that the aim of the plans is to change
opinion and thinking towards accepting specific behaviou rs and/
or forms
of governance that will lead to perpetual peace. Most of these peace
plans
were Europea n based, although this reflects the situation that the
problem
confron ting the formulators of peace plans was war between Europea
n
monarchs. Thus it was logical that the solution should be some
form of
confederation or arbitration system between European monarch
s. The
plans were also quite a deliberate attempt to direct thinking towards
a par
ticular direction-otherwise they would not have been publishe
d. The
same argumen t could be made with the work of both governm
ental and
non-governmental organizations working for peace. Their work
is one of
changing and educatin g public opinion. Thus it is possible to
argue that
there is nothing new in the concept of peace educatio n as such.
What is
10
,.
,, .
new is the application of this to formal education and to institutions of for

mal education.
The relationship between peace education and peace research is also
exhibited in the conceptual orientation of both fields towards the complex
notion of peace i tself. Put simply, peace can be understood in a very lim
ited sense as denoting the absence or cessation of armed hostilities
between nation-states (negative peace) or a s tate of co-operation (positive
peace) . Ultimately neither definition is completely satisfactory. Under
standing peace as merely the absence of overt violence is too limiting-this
does not include the existence of structural violence. Understanding peace
as constituting a state of co-operation is also unsatisfactory, and this can be
endless in what i t encapsulates. These divergent understandings of peace
are sometimes described as being the traditional and critical conceptions
of peace. I t should be noted that there is nothing new in a wide i n terpreta
tion of peace. Peace is often linked with j ustice. The debate over the defini
tion of peace is also not merely a philosophical debate as such. Concerns
over national and social injustice (structural violence) have been a com
mon cause of the call to war in the modern era.
1.2
1 .2.1
Critical Issues in Peace Research and Education

Difficulties with Defining Peace
Clearly, the most influential writer and researcher within peace research
has been the social scientistJohan Galtung, often described as the founder
of peace research (Weber, 2004, p. 3 1 ) . Gal tung approached the problem
of peace through looking at the concept of violence, and through describ
ing both direct and indirect/structural violence (EPR1 : 109-134,
EPR3 : 1 05-1 32, EPR4:437-481 , EPR6:298-31 0 ) . Put simply, direct violence
is where we do harm to others. Indirect violence is where we allow harm to
happen to others, or allow structures to exist or continue which mean that
individuals cannot reach their full potentiaL From this, Galtung has
derived distinct though interrelated categories of peace: a) direct peace,
where no person or agency is engaged in direct violence against another
person or agency; b) structural peace, where there are just and equitable
stmctures in society; and c) cultural peace, where there is a milieu of
understanding and co-operation ( 1996, 1 997) . The inclusion of cultural
peace is noteworthy, as it represents a tren d towards the importance of cul
tural understandings of peace, highly significant for any discussion of
peace education, as well as an appreciation of the importance of intraper
sonal as well as interpersonal dimensions of peace. Gal tung also makes a
Ill .!'
11
disti nction between positive and negative peace, the former denoting
active co-operation and the latter denoting passive absence of violence.
The work of Gal tung is highly systematized and has been highly influen
tial in peace research. However, it is not without problems. If one adopts an
integrated or extended view of peace, the problem is that almost any
behavior can be deemed a concern for peace research and education. One
can see this in the evolving concerns of the many university centers puta
tively committed to peace research and education. The concerns of such
peace centers now include indigenous rights and the critiques of economic
rationalism. This is not to say that such issues are unimportant. Yet these
are not normally considered to be peace issues as such. The problem with
the Galtungian p aradigm is that structural violence can be interpreted
extremely broadly. Kenneth Boulding, although supportive of peace
research, wryly suggested that structural violence arguably includes any
thing thatJohan Galtung did not like ( 19 77, p. 84) . Peter Lawler has simi
larly critiqued the lack of precision in the Galtungian paradigm ( 1995, pp.
227,278 ) . The danger of peace becoming an all-inclusive concept is even
more acute with the notions of cultu ral peace and cultural violence. The
danger of the i n tegrated concept of peace is, simply put, that it can
become very trite.
The problem of an omnibus definition of peace thus arises from the
extremely general definition of violence by Johan Gal tung. At one s tage
Galtung writes that violence includes "avoidable insults to basic human
needs, more generally to life, lowering the general level of need satisfac
tion below what is potentially possible" ( 1 996, p. 197). One might well
argue that structural violence can include anything that lowers our stan
dard of living below that which we might otherwise expect. At the same
time it seems impossible to limit violence (and thus the scope of peace
research) to direct violence. Violence must include both sins of omission
and sins of commission. For instance, technically most of the deaths during
the Holocaust were not from shooting or gassing, but rather from starva
tion. Those responsible could have done something but failed to do so.
This has quite d ramatic implications, as i t means that avoidable global
deaths from starvation are just as morally reprehensible as direct killings in
war. It means that both are validly the concern of peace research and edu
cation. Ultimately it does seem that it is impossible to separate peace from
justice and thus it is unavoidable that one must deal with some form of an
integrated concept of peace.
There is arguably some confusion as to whether peace research consti
tutes a discipline, a field or an interdisciplinary movement Does peace
research entail an established body of theory, an established methodology
and an established critical literature? The answer to such a question is that
12
the above elements of a discipline are in a process of formation at this

stage. However it is also fair to point out that the theoretical and method
ological integrity of peace research is no less acceptable than is the case for
established disciplines within the social sciences, each of which, within a
postmodernist cultural context, struggles to establish a credible discourse.
Indeed it may well be that the notion of peace, problematic though it may
be, may well serve as an organizing concept for other disciplines.
1 .2 . 2
''
''
Understanding Peace Research
What then is the core rationale for peace research? The core rationale is
that the essence of conventional analysis into history, international rela
tions, and human affairs tends not to state clearly a vision of what human
society should be. Conventional analysis (tacitly) assumes that war and pii
vation are i nevitable and unchangeable, and that peace is therefore unat
tainable. Peace research aim s to counter this, and by way of analysis
demonstrate that war and privation are not inevitable, and that peace is
attainable. One may say that conventional social research and analysis
tends to be anti-utopian. By way of contrast, peace research is pointedly
utopian, although it is nevertheless a grounded utopianism. Peace
research is also normative, suggesting there is a specific state of affairs that
.can and ought to be attained by humankind. If this sounds highly didactic,
this is no accident. The relatio nship of peace research to peace education
is very difficult to avoid. Through evidence and argumentation, the aim of
peace research is to convince others of the possibilities of lasting peace,
which might be also described as the fundamental rationale behind peace
education.
Any discussion of peace research ought also to include identification of
the distinction between peace research and international relations. The
distinction works upon a number of levels. Firstly, the focus of interna
tional relations tends to be on the notion of the nation-state as a central
colligatory concept, whereas peace research operates on the notion of the
individual person. One might add that it is the seemingly dissolving nature
of the nation-state that enge n ders such a ciisis of confidence within con
temporary international relations theory. The core organizing concept of
the discipline of international relations is no longer of central significance
in the modern world, and thus it is very difficult to determine a coherent
discourse for international relations theory. Secondly the focus of interna
tional relations theory tends to be realist, whereas peace research is norma
tive. International relations t heory tends to avoid any utopian theory of
what should be, although this is precisely at the core of peace research.
This is not to deny the fact tha t there is a strong strand of self-styled idealist
The Problem
of Peace Education
13
international relations researc h. However the very fac t that

this i s but one
strand within such theory reflects the difficulties of i n ternatio
nal relations
theory. It seems far simpler to assert that the aim of a particu lar
study is the
establishment of peace and to work from that basis.
One of the ways to demon strate the focus of peace research
is through
contrast with defense and s trategic studies. Generally
much greater
resources are directed towards defense and strategic studies,
as such stud
ies are considered important for the continued existenc e of a
particular
nation-state, and thus worthy of national expend iture. In
general terms
one can say that the approa ch of defense and s trategic studies
is technical
rather than ciitical. In other words, war is regarded as an inevitab
ility, and
the focus of defense and s trategic studies is directed towards
the question
of how wars can be more effec tively waged. Defense and strategi
c studies
tend to be more narrow in focus, excluding issues such as
stn1ctural vio
lence against peoples. Defense and strategic studies also tend
to have a par
ticular rather than universal focus. The focus is upon how "we"
can better
wage war in the future; the "we" constituting the particul ar nation
or strate
gic group that the individual belongs to. The compar ison with
defense and
strategic studies also highligh ts the controversial issue of the
impartiality of
peace research . One could well argue that both peace
research and
defense and strategic studies are equally partial and value-la
den. The value
assump tion with defense and strategic studies is that war is a
worthwhile or
at least necessary activity and ought to be support ed, wherea
s the value
assumption in peace research is the opposite.
1 .2.3
Peace Research, Peace Education and Peace Advocacy
The issue of the partial and value-laden nature of peace researc

h raises
the further issue of differen tiating peace research from peace
advocacy.
What J1lakes this such a conten tious issue is that much of
the impetu s for
peace research comes from groups or movem ents advocat ing
peace. More
over it is precisely this issue that raises questions as to the
academ ic legiti
macy of peace research . The distinction between peace researc
h and peace
advocacy is important but not simple. Peace advocacy can
be though t of as
unsubstantiated opposition to war and support for peace.
This is not to say
that there may not be substan ce to the opposition to war
and suppor t for
peace. However, within peace advocacy this substan tiation
is not devel
oped. Peace research, like peace advocacy, is a normative
endeavor, that is,
an endeavor opposed to war and supportive of peace.
The differen ce, how
ever, is that peace research involves providi ng evidenc
e and suppor t for
such contentions. The suppor t may be empirical
or dialect ical. However
14
,.
.1 :
::
. ..
...
' ,j ..
Ji
the important poi n t is that peace research goes beyond mere assertion and
advocacy.
The issue of peace advocacy becomes even more problematic when one
looks at peace education. It is natural to ask whether peace education
should be considered indoctrination, and thus whether it constitutes a
valid educational endeavor. In other words, one could allege that peace
education is merely peace advocacy transported into educational institu
tions. The answer to this question is in part addressed through the sub
stance of the study, in that through this study we seek to enunciate ethical
philosophical foundations for peace education. However, in preliminary
terms, a methodological comment might be made. One of the emphases
within most philosophy of e ducation is that any educational program
should respect the autonomy of the individual to form his/her own ideas.
This is a strong strand within the writing of Richard S tanley Peters. The way
one respects the autonomy of the learner, however, is not to avoid contro
versial questions. Indeed the opposite is the case. One respects the auton
omy of the student through examining controversial issues and through
being as open as possible regarding the possible differing responses to
these controversial issues. It is interesting that one of the themes within the
writing ofJohan Galtung is the existence of alternatives, specifically, alter
natives to individual and group violence, and alternatives to a world of
social and structural i njustice ( 1 984) . In some ways, peace education can
be thought of i n this way. In a world that generally sees war and injustice as
inevitable, simply suggesting to the student that there are indeed alterna
tives may open up unrealized possibilities.
The importance of presenting differing viewpoints on controversial
issues to students has a further pedagogical dimension. One could argue
that not only is presenting differing viewpoints valid in terms of a philoso
phy of education, but that i t is also necessary. Without being presented
with alternatives, students are indeed only exposed to a very limited world
view. The dominant culture tends to be one that suggests that violence is
inevitable and that violence is how things are achieved. The dominant cul
ture also tends to suggest that structural injustice is also inevitable. One
can argue that unless students are given an alternative to this, then what
passes for education i tself is a form of indoctrination. The task for peace
education is therefore, i n simple terms, to suggest that there can be a
peaceful future, one reliant not upon violence or the threat of violence for .
the resolution of conflict and a just future. The question is not so much
whether we should be indoctrinating our students, but what range of doc
trines should we be presenting to them.
One of the i nteresting ways to examine peace education is within a
social and curriculum context. We have already noted that throughout
history, peace writers h ave suggested plans for peace and/ or suggested
15
that society be re-ordered to be a society oriented towards peace. We have

noted that this is a form of nascent peace education. What makes peace
education different within the modern era is that there is a purposeful
intention to encourage i ndividuals to think about peace and that this be
put into practice within formal education programs and within formal
educational institutions. In some ways, one can say that the evolution of
peace education has mirrored the evolution of formal mass education.
One might say that p reviously peace education has been informal. How
ever in the modem era it has become more formal. Moreover, the support
for peace education represents a trend wherein formal education is seen
as the solution for social problems. In this case, the social problem is that
of mass warfare and social injustice, and peace education is the supposed
answer to the problem. Peace education is not alone in this regard. There
are now numerous 'educations ' that have been established or that h ave
been supported, with the aim of solving social problems. Drug and alco
hol education is perhaps the best known. As Stephen Marks has pointed
out ( 1 983) , such programs, although laudable, risk the problem of curric
ulum overload. Even if we ignore this technical problem, such innovative
'educations' ate often u nderpinned by an instrumentalist view of educa
tion, that education is an instrument in the hands of social planners to
cure social ills.
1 .3
1.3.1
Statement of Problem
The Problematic Nature of Peace Education
There are many dimensions to what might be called the problematic of

peace education. It is difficult to avoid the perception that peace education
involves some implicit criticism of the existing social order. This operates
in at least two ways. The fact that we might be encouraging students to love
peace and hate war ( Galtung, 1983) implies that previous generations have
failed in this regard. Moreover, peace education also implies criticism of
existing structures of social injustice. One of the arguable aims of educa
tion is to inculcate the young into the values of a society, what might be
described as the enculturation function of education. However in some
ways it can be claimed that implicit within any p rogram of peace education
is an assumption that those values are specious. It is implicit within any pur
poseful program of peace education that the existing social values are very
m JCh the values of a culture of violence rather than a culture of peace. If
thts were not the case, then it would not be necessary to have a deliberate
or purposeful peace education as such. The issue of the controversial
nature of peace education is a complex one, as it rests upon what should
16
be considered radical and conservative. However, a t least at surface level,

peace education represents an implicit challenge to authoity, an
regard peace education is open to criticism fro m estabhshe
within society with a vested c ommitment to the status quo. It
IS
in this
mte ests
p recisely
this vulnerability of peace education which suggests it is important for the

rationale for peace education to be clearly articulate d .
T h e related problem for peace education is the hortative tendency
within much peace education. It is difficult to avoid the tendency for
peace education to involve what is perceived to be a elf-rig teou preach
_
ing against the wrongs of society, and an exhortatiOn to mdlVIduals to
aspire to better. Such appeals are ultimately alienati n g and ou te - ro
;
ductive, precisely because such appeals merely repeat that wh1ch mdlVldu
als already know. It can be argued that merely telling people what they
already know is extremely disempowering, in that the appeal itself reveals
that the person making the appeal has no real answer or answers to the
problems under discussio n , in this case direct and structural violence. In a
sense, the effect of peace education can be merely a re-statement of the
problems of human failure, a re-statement that only re-enforces a sense of
the inevitability of violence. The recent emphasis on the importance of
encouraging a culture of peac e , one that is embedded in human atitudes
and behaviors, is arguably a response t6 the proble m that exhortatiOns to
peace can be quite coun terproductive. Education for a ct lture of peace is
not telling people what to do and what not to do. Education for a culture
of peace emphasizes an integrative approach to peace, involving attitudes,
values and behaviors.
The notion of a culture of peace itself opens u p some of the complexi
ties involved in peace education. The challenge within encouraging a cul
ture of peace is that conflict serves and has always served as a logocentric
mechanism within human societies. Put simply, we derive meaning from
conflict. Conflict is the basis of much of our entertainment, both popular
and traditional. One could even argue that conflict is an important ele
ment within human sexuality, in that in interaction between the sexes
there is a sense of conflict, whose energy is often released through orgasm.
The connection betwee n war and sexuality is a profound one, developed
powerfully in the work of Wilhelm Reich and illustrated through the Rei
chian appeal to m ake love rather than war. Of course, from a peace educa
tional perspective, we might well differentiate conflict fro m violence, and
argue that whereas conflict is an important element within human culture,
violence is not. However the nexus between conflict and violence is not
one that is readily broken. The violent resolution of conflict is something
that is deeply embedded within cultural patterns, which are subsequently
repeated in both p ersonal life and in political life. Ultimately we tend not
only to gain meaning from conflict, but meaning from violence. How we
17
can resolve this proble m is some thing that this investigation

attempts to
address, through articula ting a foundation for peace educati
on.
One of the further ways of clarifyin g the problem
atic of peace educati on
is through the notion of the epideictic nature of peace.
It is p recisely
because peace seems such a self-evidently desirable
state that peace tends
to be used in a rhetorical rather than a critical sense.
It is noteworthy that
even appeals for war within the modern era are general
ly phrased in terms
of the necessity of protec ting peace or phrased within
a discourse that indi
cates war as lamentably inevitable. Everyone presum
ably is in favor of
peace. What this means for peace education is that
there tends not to be
any rigorous or critical s crutiny of why we ought to h
ave peace educati on.
The argume nt for peace education tends to be xioma
tic. There are two
a reas where this is problem atic. Firstly, peace tends

to remain undefin ed.
In reality peace is a difficul t and content ious concep
t, and exactly what
conditi on we are suppos edly educating fo r remain
s undefin ed. Secondly,
even if we do accept peace as a desirable state, then
it does not necessarily
follow that we ought to be commi tted to peace educat
ion. Peace education
as such may well be counte rproduc tive to the attainm
ent and encourage
ment of peace itself This also suggests the import
ance of articulating the
foundations for peace educat ion.
1 .3.2
The Dearth of a Philosophical Rationale for Peace Education
The problematic of peace education might also

be framed thus: the cur
rent philosophical approa ch to peace educat
ion is a fideisti c one. In other
words, it is taken for granted that it is import
ant to believe in peace and
important to believe in peace education. Such
an approach may be under
standable, but does not serve to provide any
fundam ental educational
rationale fo r peace educat ion. It seems there
is a lingering lacuna within
the cri tical literature and official pronou nceme
nts co1cer ning peace edu
cation, namely, the failure to develop and expoun
d philosophical founda
tions for peace education. Johan Galtung is
one writer who has identifi ed
this lacuna . Galtun g refers to dephilo sophiz
ing within peace researc h, that
is, me rely "collec ting researc h experi ence withou
t having a satisfactory def
inition ad a concep tual framework and a deduct
ive theory " ( EPR, 1 : 1 71 ) .
The diagnosis from Johan Gal tung regardi ng
peace education i s very simi
lar. Galtung contends that a theory as such
for peace education has yet to
be developed and that the need for
such a theory clearly exists ( EPR,
1 :334-339) . Nigel Blake reached a similar conclu sion,
ending an essay
dealing with peace educat ion and nationa
l security with a call for philo
sophical work on peace educat ion, as the need
for such work was "urgent"
( 1 985, p. 38) .
18
...
........
I'
The comments by Galtung and Blake are now dated, although the prob
lem of a lack of an articulated ethical or philosophical rationale founda
tion for peace education remains. Joachim James Calleja ( 1 991 ) has
attempted to locate a basis for peace education in the Kantian notion of
duty, although there some se1ious problems with using duty as a basis for
peace education. Ilan Gur-Ze ' ev (200 1 ) writes of the lack of theoretical
coherence or philosophical elaboration for peace education, although he
wryly suggests (200 1 , p. 351 ) that this lack of theoretical coherence or
philosophical elaboration for peace education is not always viewed as a bad
thing, as "at times philosophical work is understood as unnecessary, artifi
cial, or even dangerous for this educational cause." GUJZe'ev develops a
critique of peace education as a justification or rationalization of what is
often a violent status quo, what he calls hegemonic violence. The very fact
that Gur-Ze 'ev makes such a critique underscores the importance of
exploring the philosophical foundations for peace education. It may well
be that a commitment to peace and to peace education is a fideistic con
cern. However this does not m ean that we ought not to be pursuing a con
temporary task of fides quaerens intellectum. with regard to this particular
educational endeavor.
The aim of this study may therefore be stated simply: to investiga.te and
enunciate ethico.philosoph.ical foundations for peace education. In general terms,
the investigation is based upon the notion that the action of any profes
sion needs to be guided by professional ethics. Professional ethics implies
that a profession is guided by principles rather than external mandates,
which in turn implies that the principles need to be enunciated. One
might also say that what is being attempted is an applied ethics of peace
education, in that principles from ethical systems are applied to the prob
lem of articulating a fou ndation or rationale for peace education.
Although ethical systems are being investigated, the approach to the inves
tigation is a philosophical one, and thus the investigation is described as
ethico-philosophical.
1.4
1 .4. 1
Research Methods and Assumptions
The Nature of the Investigation
Berte!! Oilman ( 1 993, p . 1 2) usefully describes all research as being

either dialectical or non-dialectical. The method utilized in this study is
dialectical rather than nondialectical, in that the investigation involves
examining ideas and counter ideas, rather than examining empirical data
as such. What one ought to do and what educators ought to be involved in
is not a matter of measuring data, at least not in the endeavour of this
19
i nvestigation. The study also arguably i s a postfoundationalist one, to bor

row a term from ]. Wen tzel van Huyssteen ( 1 997, 1 998) . For this investiga
tion, I would like to suggest that postfoundationalism denotes rejection of
an assumed or given authority for a specific action o r belief, but rather
arguing, i n dialectical fashion, for a rationale for a specific action or
belief. Postfoundationalism contrasts with foundationalism, which posits
an assumed or irreducible authority for belief or action, and anti-founda
tionalism, which posits there can never by any authority for action or
belief. In this case we are seeking to develop a rationale or foundations for
peace education.
The examination of possible ethical bases for peace education inevitably
also involves not merely peace education, but also the contentious notion
of peace, for ultimately i t is difficult to separate the two. If one is referring
to establishing peace, then i nherently this involves teaching peace. One
could argue that almost all discourse about peace, except that which is
openly dismissive of peace, is a form of peace education. Teaching peace
also inherently involves discussion on what constitutes peace. Thus this
investigation centres upon exploring the e thical or philosophical basis for
peace education, but in so doing, it is impossible not to move subtly into
the exploration of the ethical and philosophical bases for peace. Thus, in
discussing possible ethical foundations for peace education, we also enter
into discussion on the ethical n ature and foundations for peace itself.
The investigation concentrates upon an examination of the work of
selected contributors to five major ethical traditions, particularly looking at
the strengths and weaknesses of the respective e thical traditions and the
strengths and weaknesses of the work of the maj or contributors to those
ethical traditions, all within the perspective of how the ethical traditions
and the contributors to those ethical traditions might assist with the posit
ing of ethico-philosophical foundations for peace education. The process
of exploring ethical traditions through the work of the m ajor contributors
has been advocated by Martha Nussbaum ( 1 999) , who argues that this is
t e only way one can engage in discourse over the meaning of ethical tradi
tiOns. It could be argued that this process and this investigation involve a
co-pting of the work of contributors to ethical traditions to support the
notwns of peace and peace education. Yet peace research (and education)
is a normative science and the assumption within this investigation is that a
bias towards peace is not something that ought to be declaimed. The inves
tigation thus involves what might be called a committed exegesis of the
contributors to various ethical traditions.
20
1 .4.2
,,,'
iI
I\'
1 .,
j l
.I
The Rehabilitation of Prjudice and Preunderstanding
There is arguably some support for such a committed exegesis approach

in dialogical hermeneutics, especially as developed by hermeneutician
Hans-Georg Gadamer. Put i n summary form, Gadamer asserts that lan
guage and tradition are closely linked, and that one cannot examine lan
guage (and concepts) without examining tradition. There needs to be a
dialogue between the two. Gadamer further suggests that in the interpreta
tion of any tradition, the subjective commitment of the interpreter needs
to be acknowledged rather than hidden. Thus, for Gadamer, the horizon
of meaning for any text cannot be limited by what the writer had in mind
or the understanding of the person to whom t?e text was originally
addressed ( 1 :398) . All interpretation is a matter of Uberhellung or highlight
ing ( 1 :404 ) . The hermeneutics of Gadamer are cenual in the contempo
rary rehabilitation of prejudice and rehabilitation of subjective
commitment. In this investigation, the subjective commitment is towards
peace. What we are doing is examining ethical traditions and highlighting
those aspects within the ethical traditions which can provide support for
peace education .
The hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer are complemented by the
hermeneutics of his fellow student, Rudolf Bultmann . Bultmann 1elied
very much on the work of Martin Heidegger, although Bultmann's enunci
ation of hermeneutics does seem the more coherent than that of Heideg
ger. Bultmann wrote as a theologian, concerned mainly with New
Testament interpretation, although his hermeneutics have a wider applica
tion. In an important essay, originally published in 1 957 ( 1 965 ) , Bultmann
asks the key question of whether presupposition less exegesis is possible.
Bultmann answers yes and n o-yes, in the sense that one can and indeed
must exegete without presupposing the results of the exegesis, and no, in
the sense that one can never approach a text without specific questions or
without a speci.fic way of raising questions ( 1965, p. 1 42 ) . The questions for
this specific investigation are: a) what does the specific writer within the
ethical tradition have to say about peace and, b) how can the writing of the
specific writer and the ethical tradition which he/she represents support
peace education? Later in the essay, Bultmann develops the idea of the
importance of questions through the notion of historical pre-understand
ing ( Von1erstandnis) , namely, amongst other things, that understanding is
engagement, and we cannot approach history or historical texts without
some notion of the subject matter of history and the nature of humankind
(1965, pp. 1 46, 1 47) . Understanding must be existential. In this investiga
tion, my approach to the writers and traditions under examination is based
upon an understanding of the importance of peace.
1 .4.3
21
Limitations of Investigation
O n e i nteresting way to elucidate the method of this investigation is to

ask whether the investigation is one within philosophy or the philosophy
of-education. The answer is both, although only in an understanding of
philosophy as an applied science. John Dewey articulated this well when
he deliberately equated philosophy with the philosophy-of-education
( MW9:33l-342) , suggesting that philosophy may be described as a gen
eral theory of education (338) and that philosophy substantially origi
nated in response to educational questions (339 ) . Thus it is en tirely
appropriate that within this investigation into an educational endeavour
we should be seeking philosophical fou ndations. This is also e ntirely in
accord with the pragmatist emphasis within the work of John Dewey.
Indeed a philosophical orientation towards practical issues was central to
what Dewey called the recovery of philosophy, which would only happen
when philosophy ceased to be a device for dealing with problems of phi
losophers and became a method for dealing with the problems of human
ity (MW1 0:42 ) . In this investigation we are dealing with the specific
human problem of peace and war, and how education might contribute to
addressin g this problem.
This investigation concentrates substantially upon what might be called
an occidental philosophical tradition. The weakness of this approach is
that not merely is a large area of human wisdom overlooked, but that the
oriental philosophical tradition is an increasingly important area of inspi
ration for peace research, especially within notions of i ntrapersonal peace.
Various writers cited within this study have, at times, decried the rationalis
tic orientation of the occidental tradition. The occidental philosophical
tradition has gained prominence for historical reasons, related to imperial
ism and the emergence of a global culture. It remains the case, however,
that the o ccidental philosophical tradition represents a common discourse
for philosophy and ethics. It is unavoidable that any attempt at articulating
a philosophical basis for peace education must do so in terms of this com
mon discourse. Moreover, it is inevitable that the sources for the particular
philosophical bases for peace education will be highly selective, even
within the occidental tradition. This too is unavoidable, otherwise the
investigation might well be an infinite one.
Finally, the investigation is integrative rather than analytical in nature.
By this I mean that it is not within the scope of this investigation to provide
a detailed analysis of the specific contributors to the ethical traditions.
Thus the book is not an investigation into specific philosophers as such.
Nor is the investigation intended to be a p hilosophical treatise, as a philo
sophical treatise would be counter to the purpose of the book, which is
applied in nature. In most cases there is no attempt to examine in detail
22
the critical i nterpretative literature concerning the specific philosophers

examined, except where there is critical i nterpretative literature that deals
with issues of peace and peace education. Rather, the book aims to draw
together themes within the writing of specific philosophers, and from this
to attempt to articulate possible foundations for peace education, using
ethical traditions as a focus for this process of articulation.
C HAPTER 2
1 .4.4
Overview of the Investigation
The five ethical traditions selected for examination in this book are a)
virtue ethics, b ) consequentiaJist ethics, c ) conservative political ethics, d )
aesthetic ethics, and e) the ethics o f care. In each case, I attempt to define
and contextualize the ethical tradition, and give some reasons for promi
nence of the tradition. The discussion on each of the above tradi tions fol
lows a chronological pattern, with a necessarily arbitrary dividing line
between classical, postclassical and modern contributors to each tradition.
The exception is the chapter on care ethics, which, due to the recent
nature of this tradition, needs to focus more on debates within care ethics.
I examine the work of these contributors to the relevant traditions, exam
ining how the work of the contributor may/may not assist in providing an
ethical rationale for peace education. In each case, I further attempt to dis
cuss some of the weaknesses of each tradition, and the problems in apply
ing the specific ethical tradition as a source for an ethical rationale for
peace education. After examining each of the five ethical traditions, I then
attempt to formulate some conclusions regarding the task of establishing
ethico-philosophical foundations for peace education and some directions
for future research .
VIRTUE ETHICS
AND PEACE ED UCATION
The Revival of Virtue Ethics
2.1
Reasons for revival
2.1.1
Virtue ethics has been undergoing something of a renaissance in recent

decades, and there is now an established corpus of critical literature deal
ing with contemp ary virtue ethics, with recent con tributions by philoso
pers such as Ph1hppa Foot ( 1 998 ) , Rosalind Hursthouse ( 1999 ) , and
Michael Slote ( 1 997) . When we speak of the revival of virtue e thics, it is
instructive to realize that in many regards classical ethics was virtue ethics.
Wha_t has happe_ned in recent decades is a revival and reworking of this
classical emphasIs on vir ue ethics. One useful summ'l.f}' of what we might
_
ethics has been put forward by Rosalind Hursthouse.
understand by VIrtue
Hurst ourse sug?ests ( 1 999, p. 25) that virtue ethics is characterized as: a)
_
an ethics which Is agent-centered rather than act-centered, b) concerned
with Being 1ather than Doing, c) addressing itself to the question "What
sort of person should I be?" d) taking certain aretaic concepts as basic,
such as !?oo , excellence, virtue, rather than deontic ones, such as right,
duty, obligation, and e) rejecting the idea that ethics is codifiable in rules
or rinciples that can provide specific action guidance. Interestingly,
Hm s h use suggests that each of the above alone is not a complete
descnpt10n, although there is some truth in each of them .
Peace Education: ExplmingEthical and PhilosojJitical Fou ndations, pages 23-59
Copynght 2008 by Information Age Publishing

All ngh ts of reproduction in any form reserved.
23
24
If one looks at the above dimensions of virtue ethics, one can unde1
stand why there has been such a renewed interest in virtue ethics. In a
sense, the renewal of interest i n virtue ethics reflects a widespread disillu
sionment with what has become known as the Enlightenment PrQject, a
project that suggested that human improvement and even utopia could be
achieved through rationality a n d social programs. Moreover, it is not too
difficult to see how virtue ethic s offers an alternative to the alienation of
contemporary society. Within virtue ethics the individual person and who
that person is remains important. The individual person is not important
merely for what they do. Virtue ethics can thus be an extremely empowe1
ing form of ethics, and it is no accident that forms of virtue e thics have had
a wide impact in popular l i terature and in new age thinking and literature.
Often the popular or new age l iterature will not identify itself as being vir
tue ethics as such. However such an ethical approach nevertheless mani
fests the agent-centered aspects of virtue ethics: what is centrally important
is who we are.
. '
2.1.2
. :
,..
Demarcation
If we look closely at the Hursthouse summary of virtue ethics, it is not

too difficult to see that a clear defining line between virtue ethics and
other ethical forms is not always apparent, a position also recently argued
by Martha Nussbaum ( 1 999) . Jan Steutel and David Carr ( 1 999, pp. 3-1 8)
have written, similarly, of the grey area between virtue ethics and u tilitari
anism, through character or trait utilitarianism. Often , when we speak of
virtue, we may really be referring to character traits that have a useful or
utilitarian value. This finds a sharp focus when we examin e virtues condu
cive to peace or indeed peace i tself as a virtue. One can well argue that
such virtues are highly utilitarian. A commitment to peace and a peaceful
life will produce the best consequences for the majority of persons. How
ever this might not always be evident at the time. Similarly one can argue
that virtue is that which has an aesthetic appeal for character. Perhaps the
resolution of this definitional problem is to suggest that, in virtue ethics,
the focus or priority lies in the intrinsic value of the virtues and their value
in upholding the integ1ity of the person who practices these virtues. The
social or aesthetic value of such virtues is a secondary concern.
There is also a definitional problem when we seek to identify specific vi1
tue ethicists, for many ethicists do not necessarily fi t into virtue and non
virtue categories. The deonto1ogical ethics of Immanuel Kant is often con
trasted with virtue ethics. However one can argue that both au tonomous
moral consciousness and commitment to duty, two central Kantian themes,
constitute virtues. John Teehan ( 1 995) and Suzanne Rice ( 1 996) refer to a
Virtue Eth ics and Peace Educ

ation
25
. Deweyan virtue ethi cs, whi ch emp

.
hasizes the uni t of hou ght
and actw , a
unit y which finds a focu s in the
con cep t of hab i O t ers, sue

h as Jenmfer
Welch mann ( 1 995)
.
' con test this interpretation
of Dewe La
K
rg as famously crit icize d the relativism of virtue ethi

c in t
h
Jst c ooses the virtues (or bag of
virtues) that he/ she li es ( 1 98
1 p. 1 84) .
owever, one can argue that und
.
erpinning Kohlberg 's work IS
an assump
tion that just ice is a virtue. Koh lber
.
g wrote ab out SIX
stages of moral devel.
.
opme nt ( 1 .984) . However, m
tere
stm
gly,
accordin g to the Kohlb
.
erg
parad1gm of moral dev
t o n e pass s t rough t h e util
itarian stage
of moral developmen t t
a stage, wh1 ch IS one of orie
1
.
.
ntation to unive1s a ethical consiste
ncy, or universal just ice. The
fina l stage of
.
I
very m u h an i nternalized one
, as opp osed to the ex

]
e precedmg stages. Thus disc
ussion high ligh ts the fact that
.
u lfIma teIy It may well be diffi cult
to excl ude enti rely any eth" .
.
.
fo
1
ar t a virtue ethi cist , for the
simp le reason that it is im
.
bl
d t e Importance of the inte
grity of the age nt in ethi cal reas
oning.
!e::::::\
_
1:: i
{" :::
k
' .
:::
::7 ; b
2.1.3
: : :
The Appeal of Virtue Ethics

for Education
It is not too diffi cult to see how

virtue ethi cs has an allu rin g
.
.
appeal for
educatwnal wnt
.
.
ers and theo rists There 1s
a trach. twnal
and
logi
1 con nec twn. An impo rtant aspe ct of
edu cati on for much of hum
.
an
st
e n th mcu lcatio? of aspe cts
of character that the soci ety
deem o
m eJ-nt y worthwhile . The re
are also widespread soci al con
cerns ove

se e
al
l y
v
i n rea es in v
s
l g
.
a
v
r e
t
'
m t
t to ethi cal co duc t. The solu
tion for
e u
p
1 op) an edu catwn that
will enc ourage the developmen
.
t
of cha c ter and VIrtues. The
.
con cern is not
r I
l s o e an d one
not me :ely li i ed to phi loso
phe rs writing fr
t
g
e all e d a VJr
tue e th 1cs pos Jtw Ri h r
.
d Rorty IS
a prag atis phi loso phe r who
.
positions himself ve
uc i the
i ues. In
s 1 979 work
o
y Isavows
t e use of the word 'edu cati
on' ' but rather suggests we
use the word 'edifi
,
cati on' (p. 360 ) Rorty s reas
.
.
.
on for his chorce IS that the
word 'edu cati on'
does
t
t
process of oral buildi ng of
the indivi dual
.
that 0
1
111 t h e e d ucatwn
al process.
.
: ; ;: :r Ye : ; : :r::
! ! :::
:;
;' :
/:
;
r;: :h : r:r :

/Jzosophy and thei:::;:o; ;:71
:
.
2.1. 4
Preview
t th Is. sag to .ou_tJin: a possible virtue e thics basis for
It is appropr a t
peace educatio .
e emp asJs wJthm VIrtue ethi

cs is on the importance
26
Virtue Ethics and Peace E ducation
Peace Education Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
of the development of character and virtue. There are two di ensio s to

_
.
this development. One is arguably a form of character uul!tana Jsm,
although nevertheless centered on the emphasis within virtue ethics of
the importance of the development of c haracter or virtue. If we agree that
education is concerned with the development of character, then an
important element of character developm e n t is to develop and nc ourage
_
a
harmonious and co-operative relations between individuals. SJmJlarly,
fundamental aim of education should be to develop the character and
personality that will value harmonious and co-operative relations between
individuals. The second dimension involves virtue ethics as an agent-cen
tred ethics. If we agree that ethics is concerned with the person as a mo1al
agent, then the moral integrity of the agent is a prime con ern. Peace
education ought to be one way wherein the educator emphas1zes and re
enforces the importance of the moral i ntegrity of the individual, both in
the sense that the educator e ncourages the moral integrity of the person
being taught, and in the sense that in so doing the educator is also acting
in a morally integral manner.
2.2
2.2.1
e Educ ation
Class ical Virtu e Ethics and Peac
Religion, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
ethic s is that there are stron g

One of the impo rtant elements of virtue
ous ethic s. In some ways, these
conn ectio ns between virtu e e thics and religi
ess represents both a stren gth
conn ectio ns or that there is a connectedn
ethic al approach of virtue ethic s
and weakness of virtue ethic s, in that the
lity. Both religious ethic s and
mora
us
can be deem ed to be a form o f religio
idualistic, namely, consti
indiv
y
highl
being
as
virtue ethic s can be criticized
good peo le, howe:er pro lem
tuting ethic al systems based upon being
_
scope of th1s d1scu ss1on to g1ve a
atic that migh t be. It is not within the
religions. However it is suffic ient
detailed accou nt of virtue ethics in world
of character cnducive to p eace
ties
to say that, i n each case, peace or quali
_
ethics, there 1s an emphas1s on
cian
Confu
in
are extremely impo rtant . With
ty,
chari
of
s
the five specific virtue
internal harmony of character, through
rly
simila
is
ethics
hist
rity. Budd
righte ousne ss, prope rty, wisdom and since
Buddhism there IS a stron g
in
With
n.
perso
inner
the
ds
towar
oriented
the individual refus ing to
of
e
rtanc
ethic of n on-harrri and on the impo
is the list of the six p ara
such
as
es
virtu
to
rt
hate. The Budd hist coun terpa
lity, patie nce, courage, edita
mis or perfe ction s of character: love, mora
religion that is often perceiVed to
tion and knowledge. With Islam , a world
of beneficence.
be legali stic, there is a powe r ful tradit ion
\.
I I
27
h re are some special external and i nternal reasons for examining

.
Chnsnanny and the ethics ofJesus i n any assessment of virtue ethics. From
an external perspective, much of the historical developmnt of virtue eth
ics has come through the western i n tellectual tradition, and is thus framed
within the context of Christian theology. However in recent years there has
also been a close focus on the teaching of Jesus from a virtue e thics per
spective and something of a revival of theological interest in virtue e thics.
Joseph Kotva ( 1 996) sees a theological foundation for virtue ethics as being
found within Christology, and particularly within the notion that the signif
icance of the teaching and work ofJesus came from who he was . Moreover,
the teaching of Jesus, especially as indicated in the Gospel of Matthew,
emphasizes the inner quality of the individual person and the fact that he/
she gains significance through the love of God. This is taken up within the
writings of Paul, although given somewhat o f a more particularist interpre
tation, that is, virtue is seen as something i nherent within the member of
the Christian community. Paul's listing of the gifts of the spirit (Galatians,
5:22,23) reads very much like a listing of virtues, although it is listing of vir
tues/ gifts, that are pneumatic, and thus according to the Pauline paradigm
limited to those within the Christian commu n i ty.
One of the themes within the teaching of Gandhi is that violence is the
negation of the true message ofJesus (CW 2 8 : 22, CW 68:2) . As Dale Brown
wryly comments, Christians are the only people who are not aware that
Jesus was committed to nonviolence ( 1 986, p. ix) . One of the central rea
sons for this is that the life-death of Jesus for Christians is so interwoven
with soteriological significance that i t is difficult to see the obvious within
the life and teaching. It is not within the scope of this discussion to give a
detailed exposition of the recent theological development of the nonvio
lence within the teaching and life-death ofJesus. Perhaps the theologian to
have developed this theme most forcefully has been John Howard Yoder, in
his influential 1 972 book The Politics ofJesus. More recen tly this theme has
been developed by theologians such as Stanley Hauerwas. It is sufficient to
say that the confrontational nonviolence that was evident in the teaching
of Jesus and in his dealings with i ndividuals and authority can be traced
also in the attitude ofJesus to his own death. Again, the soteriological con
cerns have tended to cloud the ethical. Even the central Christian symbol
of the Eucharist, when Jesus invited his followers to remember and partici
pate in his sacrifice, can be argued as a challenge to join him in commit
ent to no violence. It is only after the event that this challenge was
mterpreted m terms of a salvation theology, where the Eucharist was seen
as a call to participate in personal salvation.
Peace may be regarded, in a theological sense, as a resurrection virtue.
One of the notable aspects of the Gospel of John is the extent to which
peace is regarded as a virtue of o r resulting from the resurrection ofJesus.
28
In both the pre-resurrection and post-resurrection discourses, Jesus prom

ises peace to his followers (John 1 4:27-3 1 , 1 6: 2 3, 20: 1 9-26, 24: 1 9-2 1 a ) .
The distinction between the pre-resurrection and post-resurrection dis
courses is a tenuous one, as the Johanine Gospel as a whole is a post-resur
rection creation. It is true that the peace referred to is a gift, although the
nature of the gift is tha t it does comprise an excellence of character. Within
Johanine theology peace is also internal, a calmness of character in the
midst of social turmoil. Moreover the peace promised by Jesus in the pas
chal and resurrection narratives ought not to be separated from the social
teaching ofjesus. Within the social teaching ofJesus, the status quo of the
pax Romana (imperial Roman peace) is rejected in favour of the revolution
ary basileia lou Theou (reign of God}. The inner peace that is an important
element of the Johanine theology complements the social change that
Jesus advocates.
2.2.2
Plato, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
The source of virtue ethics is often claimed to be Aristotle, s o much so

that virtue ethics is sometimes simply referred to as Aristotelian ethics.
However in many ways Aristotle was working on the basis of the Platonic
understanding of how one ought to live. Within Plato's Politeia or Republic,
Socrates answers the challenge of Thrasymachus as to how the just person
ought to live. The answer from Socrates is deceptively simple: the just per
son ought to live virtuously. In Book 4 of Politeia, Socrates develops this
idea into four basic or cardina l virtues, those of wisdom, courage, temper
ance and justice, a taxonomy which subsequently has become extremely
influential in formal aretaics, at least within the western tradition. For
Socrates (and Plato) the exercise of these virtues promoted the harmony
of the soul. It is n o t difficult to see a connection between the concept of
peace and the above virtues, and also to see a connection between the
notion of inner peace and the harmony of the soul. Moreover the inner
harmony was reflected in social harmony. Exactly whether one can learn or
acquire virtue is a recurrent question for Plato, as can be seen in the works
Meno and Protagoras. One possible difficulty for establishing the Platonic
conception of virtue as a source for any modern virtue ethics and for a
modern virtue ethics of peace is that Plato generally sees virtue as innate
rather than acquired by practice. Virtue is knowledge. Yet even this does
not exclude the process of education for establishing virtue.
One of the interesting debates within Plato's Protagoras is whether politi
cal virtue (or what is generally translated as civic virtue) can be taught. As
with all Platonic dialogues, the extent to which Plato's view coincides with
those of Socrates is not ' completely clear. At an important stage in discus-
I
I
\. ,
29
sian with Protagoras, Socrates expresses his doubt that civic

virtue can be
taugh t (31 9a-320c) . The reason he gives is that Atheni an
society does not
function this way. Socrates explains that when Atheni ans
mee t at Assembly,
they seek expert opinio n in all matters except those pertain
ing to the state.
The reason is that all matters , apart from those of the state,
are understood
as being capable of being taught and learned ( 3 1 9 c ) . This also
works on an
individual level. The best and wisest of teachers do not impart
their politi
cal wisdom to others ( 3 1 9e ) . The interesting point about
this Socratic
objection is that this is not the way society needs to operate
. Peace educa
tion can be unders tood as the transmission of civic virtue to
others, that is,
teaching excelle nce i n the way we ought to deal with each
other, includi ng
matters dealing with the state. Indeed , it is notable that Socrate
s seems not
completely convinc ed of his assertion that civic virtue cannot
be taugh t and
learned. Protagoras, in his extended speech ( 320c-3
28d) , given in
response to the challen ge from Socrates, asserts that we
indirec tly teach
civic virtue through out life, through laws and punish ment.
The only con
tentious issue therefore is exactly what kind of virtue we teach.
2.2.3
Aristotle, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
The influen ce of Aristotelian virtue ethics has been traditio

nally medi
ated through the work of Thoma s Aquinas, although in recent
times virtue
ethicists have been re-emphasizing the work of Aristotle
himself. It is not
within the scope of this discussion to give a detailed accoun
t of Aristotelian
aretaics, or the science of excellence of character. Howev
er it will suffice to
say that the concer n of Aristotle was essen tially metaet
hical: he was con
cerned with establishing a method for ethics. The aretaics
of Aristotle are
mostly contain ed within the teachings which were later collecte
d under the
title Nicomachean Ethics. Within this collecti on, Aristot le
defines the prob
lem of virtue (Book 1 ) , develops the notion and examp
les of moral virtue,
or excellences of charac ter (Books 2-5 ) , develops the 1iotion
of intellec tual
virtue, or excelle nces of the mind (Book 6) , discuss es the
notion of moral
weakness (Book 7) , discuss es fliends hip, as a further instanc
e of moral vir
tue or excellence of charac ter (Books 8-9) , and conclu des
with the impo r
tance of happiness and training for virtue (Book 1 0 ) .
The centrality of
Aristotle foi' virtue ethics means that there is somew hat of
a hermen eutical
problem in dealing with Aristotle. This is exacer bated by
the fact that his
writings appear contra dictory in places and by the fact
that the writings we
have are collecti ons of teachings by his student s.
There are a numbe r of ways wherein a reading of Aristot
le can be taken
to support the notion of peace education. The most immed
iate is through
the notion of virtue itself, includi ng the notion of the
unity of the virtues.
30
, ...
,,.
I . " , I
Virtue Eth ics and Peace Education
Peace Education : Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
Aristotle suggests that the question of how we ought to live is one of charac
ter-who we are. This is not an abstract notion , as who we are turns on a
practical question-what we do. What we do establishes who we are, but
the essential issue, paradoxically, in how we ought to live is one of charac
ter. The notion of the unity of virtue/ s is a notion which Aristotle holds i n
common with Plato, although Aristotle takes a particularly praxiological
approach, suggesting we canno t practice any one of the virtues without the
other. It is a notion which finds resonance in the in tegrated notion of
peace. One cannot practice peace without practicing justice, that is, one
cannot claim to be acting in peace if, as an individual or within a collectiv
ity, one's actions are not also just.
For Aristotle, the goal or telos of life was eudemonia. This is perhaps
simplistically thought of as h appiness, although John Cooper suggests a
more thorough translation is human flourishing ( 1 975, p. 89) . Aristotle
himself refers to eudemonia as "living well and doing well" (NE, I :4) ,
although Alasdair Macintyre expands this by suggesting eudemonia as "liv
ing well and doing well at being well" ( 1 985, p. 1 48 ) . Moral virtue is how we
arrive at eudemonia, and Aristotle suggests (NE, 2:6) that moral virtues are
states of character which make a person good and enable a person to do
good. Moral virtue involves feeling, choosing and acting well, and is differ
entiated from i ntellectual virtue, which merely involves how to do things.
Interestingly, the notions of human flourishing and moral virtue are not all
that different from the concept of a culture of peace. Article I of the
United Nations Declaration and Programme o Action on a Culture o Peace
(UNGA, 1 999) indicates that a culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes,
traditions and modes of behavior and ways of life. It is difficult to interpret
the notion of human flourishing as anything other than the establishment
of a culture of peace. Moreove i-,just as moraJ virtue requires feeling, choos
ing, and acting, so too the culture of peace involves a range of values, atti
tudes, traditions, and modes of behaviour and life.
The doctrine of the mean or the meson is arguably the best known ele
ment of Aristotelian ethics. In a crucial discussion (NE, 2:6), Aristotle
attempts to define what he means by excellence of character. He suggests
that excellence is of the genus of a settled state or disposition (hexis) , and
then proceeds to differentiate excellence fro m other forms of settled states
or disposition. Aristotle argue s that what differentiates excellence from
other forms of settled states or disposition is a commitment to the mean
between excess and deficiency. Aristotle then gives a tentative definition of
virtue, at the end of the chapter as: a) a purposive or deliberate disposi
tion, b) a disposition to a mean that is relative to us, and c) determined by
rational principle, such as that which the prudent person would commit to.
Aristotle expands upon this notion of virtue further, in discussing both the
moral and intellectual virtues. Indeed, within the notion of virtue as ratio-
31
nal and deliberative and yet a disposition, one fi nds the potential founda
tion for an Aristotelian approach to moral education, and specifically
peace education.
Aristotle proceeds to apply the doctrine of the meson to a range of par
ticular virtues, discussing the excess, mean and deficiency within each
field. What is noticeable is that in each case the mean could be described
in varying degrees, as virtues conducive to peace. Aristotle identifies, a
NE, 2:7, the following as means: andreia (courage) , sophrosune ( temper
ance or judgment ) , eleutheriotes (liberality) , megaloprepeia (magnifi
cence) , megalopsuchia (magnanimity) , p h ilotimia-aphilotimia (an
unnamed mean between a lack of ambition and over-ambition) , praotes
(patience) , aletheia ( truthfulness) , eutrapelia (wittiness ) , philia (amiabil
i ty) , and nemesis (righteous indignation) . Within NE, 5, Aristotle also
examines dikaisone Uustice) as a virtue, describing this as the complete
virtue in 5. 1 . The idea of the mean contributing to peace is perhaps a
counterintuitive idea, as peace is often thought of as an absolute, or at
least as something that requires absolute commitment. Indeed, the per
ceived absolute nature of the concept of peace and the perceived absolute
demands upon behavior are two of the maj o r impediments towards an
adequate conceptualization of education for peace. Aristotelian virtues
provide one practical response to this problem, p ractical precisely because
the virtues are so oriented to practice and to the agent of the action.
The discussion of andreia by Aristotle is, significantly, an extended one,
and indeed it is a virtue that Aristotle returns to o n a number of occasions.
It is almost as if there is something about this particular virtue that troubles
Aristotle. Aristotle contrasts andreia (courage) with the excess of thrasutes
(rashness) and the deficiency of deilia (cowardice ) , and also discusses at
some length the dispositions that resemble courage. What makes the virtue
of andreia of particular relevance is that courage is often perceived as
being a particularly military virtue. Indeed, at 3:6, Aristotle specifically
states that the circumstances wherein courage is most called upon are cir
cumstances wherein the individual is challenged with death, and the cir
cumstance wherein this most commonly occurs is war. How then should
one reconcile moral education that encourages andreia with a conception
of peace education? One way is to argue that war-making is, certainly in the
nuclear age, a form thrasutes or rashness. Conversely, in a time of war,
when aggressive patriotism becomes the dominant social ideology, i t takes
a great deal of andreia or courage to remain opposed to this dominant
social ideology. Put simply, a commitment to peace may demand a great
deal of personal courage.
Of course, one can argue that there is a degree of subjectivity in deter
mining exactly what is an excess and deficiency, and this can be seen with
the thrasutes-andreia-deilia continuum. In time of war, the person advocat-
32
Peace Education. Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
ing peace may well accuse the person advocating war as being disposed to
the vice of thrasutes or rashness. However the person advocatmg war may
well accuse the person advocating peace of being disposed to the vice of
deilia or cowardice. At NE 2.8, Aristotle anticipates this situation, by sug
gesting that it is a natural tendency for the rash individual to call _ th rave
individual a coward and similarly for the coward to call the brave mdlVldual
rash. However it is precisely the difficulty in determini ng the mean that
makes the virtue of practical wisdom so necessary. Viewed in this regard,
then, one could argue that moral education , and particularly peace educa
tion, crucially involves education in practical wisdom. One needs to deter
mine what is ras h , what is brave and what is cowardly. Interestingly,
Aristotle concludes his extended discussion of andreia, at 3:9, by suggest
ing that the more virtue an individual possesses, the more the i nclivi ual
will be distressed at the thought of impending death during battle. Ansto
tle then suggests that perhaps the best professional soldiers are not individ
uals such as these, that is, individuals who possess virtue, but rather those
who have nothing apart from their lives to lose, and are therefore ready to
sell their lives for petty gain. I t is a hint that Aristotle is moving to the con
clusion that andreia ough t n o t be properly considered a military virtue.
Another solution to the problem of the perception of andreia as a mili
tary virtue is to suggest a more moderi1 rendeling of andreia, namely as
assertivene ss. One of the enduring problems in discussing ethical issues
associated with peace is that peace is associated with passivity. Pacifism in
particular is commonly associated with passivity. However I want to suggest
that an arguable contemporary reading of andreia is that this represents a
disposition of assertivene ss, one that is a meson between _the excess_ of
aggression and the deficiency of passivity. The idea of andreia as assertive
ns finds a modern expression within the theory of nonviolen t resistance,
a stance which does involve assertivene ss and confrontation with the practi
tioner of violence. Ultimately one can say that the temptation is to see vio
lence i tself as a field wherein there is a deficiency and an excess. Much of
the common acceptance of violence, be this at an individual or social level,
is implicitly founded upon such an assumption. Our level of commitme nt
to violence is deemed morally acceptable , as it is less than others (whom we
call violent persons or aggressive nations) and more than others (whom we
might call unwilling to commit to the protection of the selves ad the
weak) . However there is nothing within the recorded teachmgs of Anstotle
which would support such an interpietation. There is no virtue of violence
as such within the teaching of Aristotle.
We have seen how Aristotle defines a virtue as hexis, or a settled state or
disposition . Within Book 7 of Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses what
is sometimes known as the enkratic/akratic problem in ethics. These two
words are sometime s defined as continent and incontinen t, although the
33
translation is not all that helpful. Put simply, our actions tend to be either
enkratic (we act in a virtuous manner by resisting unruly desire or emo
tions) or akratic (we act in a non-virtuo us manner, despite knowing we
should ) . The solution that Aristotle suggests is that our moral behaviour
should be a matter of hexis, or settled disposition or state, wherein we act
in a certain way because of our habit of so doing. In other words, we do
something because it is natural for us to do so, not out of obligation or
duty. It is this in temalistic morality that sets virtue ethics apart from deon
tological ethics, and indeed marks virtue e thics as a non-deontological eth
ics. Agam, the emphasis on hexis is very similar to the emphasis within ilie
recent integrative notions of peace, such as enunciated within the notion
of the culture of peace. We have seen that, within the notion of the culture
of r_eace, peace is construed as a set of values, attitudes, behaviors and ways
of hfe. In modem parlance, we might suggest that hexis could be trans
lated as life-style, and, in true virtue ethics fashion, the culture of peace
suggests that peace be construed as a life-style.
Within Aristotelian ethics it is excellence of character that contributes to
eudemonia ( human flourishing) , and this excellence of character is some
thing that one commits to and cultivates through habit. Excellenc e of char
act r is neverheles something that is determine d, at least i n part, through
rational consideratiOn. Thus, after a discussion of the excellence s of char
acter or moral virtues in NE 2-5, i t is entirely appropriate that there should
be a discussion on the excellence s of the mind or intellectua l virtues in NE
6. Herein lies the clue to at least one of the Aristotelian bases to moral edu
cation, namely, that through cultivated prudence (phronesis ) one can
determine what the mean m virtue is within any field of human endeavour,
ai: d thereby develop a commitm ent to such a virtue. Prudence or practical
wisdom (phronesis ) is crucial in understan ding what the mean is. Virtue is
therefore both a matter of practice, emphasize d by Aristotle in NE I , and a
matter of habit and contempl ation, emphasized by Aristotle in NE 1 0. At
NE 1 0. 9, AI-istotle suggests that the state should have a role in educating a
person in virtue, as it is importan t to establish a commitm ent to the virtues
thrugh habit Indeed, the most powerful argument in support of the
notion of the educable nature of the virtues is what we might call the Aris
totelian Project itself. If the virtues are not educable, then Aristotle would
not have committed his time within the Academy to such a venture. Fur
ther, implicit within the suggestio n that it is possible to educate the i ndivid
ual into the virtues is also the possibility that one can educate for peace.
_The above has been what might be called a reading of virtue ethics of
Anstotle from the perspective of peace education . It is however relevant to
enquire of the attitude of Aristotle towards war and peace. The answer
must be that on this point there is a degree of ambivalence within
the work
of Aristotle. At NE 1 0.7, Aristotle refers to warfare as being pre-emin
ent i n
34
of
nobility and grandeur in the practical activities. In the discussion
However,
.
examples
military
uses
Aristotle
virtue,
a
as
andreia or courage
elsewhere, Aristotle seems to eschew any statemen t of the virtuous nature
of battle itself. Indeed, at NE 10.7, Aristotle refers to war in a very instru
mentalist manner, that is, w e m ake war in order to enjoy peace. War is not
war
virtuous of itself. Indeed, Aristotle states that nobody c hooses to make
person
a
that
say
to
on
goes
and
war,
making
of
sake
the
for
it
or provokes
would be regarded as a bloodthirsty monster if that person made friends
into enemies in order to bring about battles and slaughter. The blood
thirsty monster is hardly the description of a virtuous i ndividual.
2.2.4
....,. .
:
'
... '
Augustine, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
For Saint Augustine of H ippo, love was the ordering principle behind all
virtues. Augustine contrasts caritas, or love of eternal things, with cupiditas,
the love of temporal things. One is marked by humility and subjection to
God, and the other by p ride and the thought that a person does not need
God. In his work on Christian ethics, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de mori
bus Manichaeromm (The Catholic Way of Life and the Manichean Way of
Life), at 1 . 1 5.25, Augustine wrote of love as being the essential and motivat
ing factor in each of the classical virtues. Augustine followed Ambrose, and
added the so-called theological virtues of faith, hope and love to the four
classical or moral virtues. However, all the virtue ethics of Augustine were
particularistic, that is, virtues were enj oyed only by the Christian commu
nity, and the pagan world o nly enjoyed or practiced imitations of these vir
tues. Virtue is a result of searching after God (De moribus, at 1 .6.9/ 1 0 ) . It is
a view of the world classically celebrated in De civitate Dei (City of God) ,
with a sharp distinction between the divine/Christian world, the civitas Dei,
and the secular world, the ci<1itas terrana. Augustine writes at 1 9.25 that the
virtues are really vices when not referred to God. In terms of virtue ethics,
this may seem a weakness, in that virtue ethics is thereby limited to a spe
cific faith community. However at the same time, such a view does mean
that one can advocate a much more radical virtue ethics. We shall see that
this idea has been taken up by more recent Christian virtue ethicists.
2.2.5
Thomas Aquinas, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
It was substantially through the writing of Saint Thomas Aquinas that

the ideas of Aristotle gain e d influence within western thought, and thus it
is logical that in examining virtue ethics and peace education that we
should examine the virtue ethics of Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas can be
thought of as applying an Aristotelian perspective to the work of August-
35
ine, although a t the same time Aquinas was veq reluc tant to Ciiticize the
work of Augustine, and frequently cites Augustine as an authority. Overall
it seems fair to say that Thomistic virtue ethics is more rationalistic and uni
versalist than Augustinian, as the practice of the virtues is something that is
not necessarily linked with faith and not necessarily limited to a believing
community. For Aquinas the master virtue is very much practical wisdom,
and it follows from this that the practice of virtues is not necessarily limited
to the believing community. One of the impacts of Thomistic virtue ethics
is that virtue ethics became less closely linked with theology as such, and
the medieval predilection for categorization of the varieties of virtues can
be traced to the work of Aquinas. Indeed, the Protestant Reformation can
be viewed in some regards as a revolt against an autonomous virtue ethics,
and a move to re-establish the theological or fideistic nature of virtue eth
ics. It is no accident that a close reading of Augustine was so important i n
the life o f Martin Luther, for the latter represented to Luther a via antique,
in contrast with the via rnodema implicit in Thomistic virtue ethics .
Thomas Aquinas does not explicitly identify peace as a virtue, although
he did believe that the issue was i mportant enough to discuss within Summa
Theologica (2/2, Q29 ) . Aquinas addresses four points or articles of inquiry:
a) Is peace the same as concord? b) Do all things seek it? c) Is peace a con
sequence of caritas (love) ? and d) Is peace a virtue? The formal conclusion
from Aquinas is that peace is not a virtue of itself, but a good that results
from caritas. However, in the replies for both of the initial two articles,
Aquinas does seem to indicate an undei-standing of peace that goes close
to the Aristotelian conception of a virtue. Within Article I , Aquinas indi
cates that peace i nvolves more than concord between individuals (social
peace); rather it also involves an element of inner harmony (inner peace ) .
Within Article 2 , Aquinas suggests that even those involved in war and dis
sension do so to seek a form of peace. Peace i nvolves a union of the appe
tites. There is a pedect peace which is union with God, although in the
world there is an imperfect peace, which is subj ec t to disjunction. Within
Article 3, Aquinas suggests that peace is both a work ofjustice (indirectly)
and charity (directly) . However it is charity which, by its nature, produces
peace. Within Article 4, Aquinas indicates that Matthew 5:9, Mark 9:49, and
Galatians 5:20 all suggest that peace is a virtue. However Aquinas holds
himself back from this identification, indicating, rather, that peace is a
result of the virtue of charity.
Aquinas thus sees peace as involving the elements of a) direct peace o r
the absence o f fighting, b ) structural peace or the presence o fj ustice, and
c) cultural or inner peace. The Thomistic conception of peace, as a multi
layered entity, can be seen as a surprisingly modern conception, albeit
expressed in theological terms. In Summa Theologica 2/2 Question 29,
Aquinas is also aware of some of the contradictions within peace. Thus
36
even those who seek war and dissen

within Article 3, Aquinas suggests that
lastin g peac e, or at least a peace
most
a
sion do so with a view to achieving
The issue of war and peace is taken
more favorable to their own interests.
i
as Aquinas famo usly provides cond
up in 2/2 Ques tion 40, where Thom
war,
in
ion
cipat
parti
nas does allow
tions for participation in war. Aqui
t
s upon this parti cipat ion. The thrus
ation
limit
t
stric
very
ides
prov
although
in
strive
to
t
ough
we
h
whic
to
,
state
e
of the Summa is that peace is a divin
a
Aqui nas does not iden tity peace as
caritas towards each othe1: Alth ough
oach
appr
an
as
theless can be seen
virtue as such , peac e educ ation never
ethic s.
virtue
c
misti
Tho
ly
cular
supporting a parti
2.3
2.3.1
'
r :
Peac e Edu catio n

Postclas sica l V i rtu e Ethi cs and
Peace Education
Desiderius Erasmus, Virtue Ethics, and
telain aretaics, one of the ostensibly

As noted in the discu ssion o n Aristo
ach to peace is the virtue of cour

diffic ult virtues for a virtues ethics appro
ry virtue. The significance of the
milita
a
as
age, in that courage is often seen
us for peac e education will be
Renaissance hum anist Desid erius Erasm
it is noteworthy that within the 1 503
explored in a later chap ter. However
dbook of the Christian Soldi er) ,
work Enchiridion militis christiani (Han
rsion of the military understanding
Desiderius Erasmus does sugges t a subve
military imagery to describe the
uses
us
of courage. Within Enchiridon, Erasm
much a coun tercu ltural manifesto,
Christian life-and yet Enchiridon is very
s.
to rejec t the dominant social value
suggesting that the Chris tian ought
erally
e
ple
"Peo
that
)
1
(CWE, 66.9
?
Regarding courage, Erasm us writes
nt
(jortem el animosmn) one who IS VIOle
us
ageo
cour
and
g
stron
as
ibe
descr
test
sligh
the
at
r
ange
with
es
seeth
who
,
and u ncontrolled (jerox et impotentis)
deed for evil deed ." Erasmus rejec ts
injury and returns abuse for abuse, evil
Rather, he suggests being able to
this understanding of courage as false.
ge . Thus E rasmus sees true courage
repay good for evil as cons tituti ng coura
nts such as conq uest of one's own
and magnanimity as involving eleme
to those who wish harm to oneself and
spirit, being since rely well disposed
behave badly to onseself.
who
those
being able to behave well to
of actions whic h Erasmus regards
types
the
ine
It is interesting to exam
g
ge. This inclu des exhibiting darin
as not being repre senta tive of coura
with
ers
dang
all
to
elf
ones
exposing
against the enemy, scali ng walls , and
us suggests that the above seemingly
Erasm
)
1
9
66.
,
(CWE
life
for
d
no regar
gladiator could acco mpli sh. It is a
any
courageous actions are things that
p of the time , for whom the domi
significant statemen t for the readershi
been contained withi n traditions of
nant versions of courage woul d have
.
37
knig ly courage and c hivalry. The gladiator reference implies that actions
of mi!Itary prowess ought to be regarded as acquired technical skills, rather
than moral dispositions as such. In effect, within Enchi-ridion, Erasmus is
himself engaging in peace education and providing an indication of what a
virtue ethic_s basis for peace education might be, namely, a re-interpreta
.
_
tion of traditiOnal
understandings of virtues such as courage.
2.3.2
Benedictus de Spinoza, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
The idea of p ace as a virtue was perhaps most explicitly discussed by

_ philosopher Benedictus (or Baruch ) de Spinoza. The ethics
_
the ra uonalist
_
of Spmoza are located within a tradition of n aturalistic and religious
humamsm, although his writing was considered to be sufficiently unortho
dox to wanat epulsion from his Jewish community and to warrant post
hum?us publicatiOn of much of his work. The Ethica of Spinoza, although
published osthumously in 1677, was one of his earlier writings, and thus i t
I S appropn_ate t o commence any discussion o f virtue ethics and Spinoza
throng _this work. The work is in five parts, dealing respectively with God,
the Ongm and Nature of the Mind, the Oiigin and Nature of the Emo
tions, Human Bondae and Human F1eedom. In 1 697, Pierre Bayle
.
fam usly escnbed Spmoza as a moral atheist ( 1 826) , although this is con
_
tenuous giVen t e Importance
of the love of God in the work of Spinoza.
_
What Spmoza 1d cl arly reject, however, was a supernaturalist religion and
a Slpernat ralist ethics, espousing rather a naturalistic religion and a natu
.
ralistic ethics. Spinoza celebrates the importance of natural human emo
tion and desire, and the power of rationality to control and bo-uide those
human emotions and desires.
The structure of Ethica superficially does not have an immediate con
ne tion with virtue ethics as such. However, in celebrating the power of
.
ra tw ality to control uman _emotions and desires, and in emphasizing
_
piactJce through conation, Spmoza stands within a virtue ethics tradition.
One could say that Spinoza de-theologizes virtue ethics, at least in a super
_ that he places virtue ethics on a much more humanistic
natural sense, 111
and psychological basis. In Ethica, Part 4: Proposition 24, Spinoza suggests
that to act absolutely in obedience to virtue is to act in one's self-interest. In
Part 4: Definitions, Spinoza defines virtue as meaning the power or the
nature or essence of a person. The virtue ethics tradition within the
thought of Spinoza is perhaps evident most clearly in the conclusion of the
work, and espe ially within the final Proposition (Part 5: Proposition 42) of
Ethzca. Here Spmoza declared that "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue
:
but virtue itself' and then we do not rejoice because "we control our lusts'
but because we rejoice in blessedness "we control our lusts." The religious
38
Foundations
g Ethical and Philosophical
Peace Education: Explorin
.
blessedness
th e eth tcs of Spi noz. a.' as
in
with
t
dimension is certainly .predsen
- and 42 .
. . e te:ms, in Part 5. Pmposmons 36
is certainly described certetst
but
,
igation out of eelthmgs no out of obl
However the agent does rdain
.
don e are inherently
ng
ebration , and out of rega that those t mgs b et
worthwhile.
. .m Et1uca ts th at the person who
ements wnh
One of the interesting stat
e h as possible to
e of Je. aso. n stnv_ es as rouwith
"lives according to the gm drsanctow
love" (Part 4:
Illffi [h er_] self .
repay the hatred . . . of otheralistic ards
t reason and
tha
a
o
txt of Spm ;
Proposition 46) . The natuinstance,conSpm
4
rt
(;a
s
e
Propositio."n
sugg
nature are consistent. Fm demands nothoza

nature
mg tha t .s o PP osed to pnn
son
1 8 . Note 1) that "rea
np. le
ce
pea
n
.
.
) has developed a Spm oza.
988
1
(
.
et
Smg
t
Bren
this,
From
atcIs him or herself
.
ture to. rep_ ay hatre d. tows bec
that each person stnves bY nawar
e we act conSmg g: : of m aus
with love. Why then is there ests ?that
oral education is
t . P n
sugg
.
trary to our. nature, and
enthal
.
- . M chael Ros
.
accoT<dance wlth our natme
to emphasize the actm.g .. rpte
Etl :cs
.
tn
h
wit
,
at
h
t
n w. h en he suggests the master v1r
. tue
- 1 ) takes a similar mterancetatto
(900
eed
ind
d
an
e,
virtu
a
as
tole
Spinoza is suggesting suggestt. g tole
master virtue is the parcea;:::
One of the problei_ns _of
:
r nt people, then toleranpl ,
that IS , If we :vte al:e in tole
?o of virtue,
rant of intolerant peo s
IS ltkely to be over com e, al
.
ce. Spinoza
a ce. the vinue of toleran
then we ourselves. have ceasmedistoa PIreso
the Kantian
es
pat
f
an
at
luuon th
resolution of thIS proble a soo. ety gove
and a socilaw
of
rule
the
y
b
d
.
trt
peaceful republic, namely,expression of oplmon.
ety which allows for free
ously in
ohllcu.s was P ubl ishe d ano nym
. ety 0 ne of
Spinoza's Tractatus Theologe uo-P
soo
auc
ocr
of t 1 ant and dem is taken up with. estab1 670 and is a powerful del)ens
of the wor o/at muchloof .itSpioza declares at the
the remarkable aspectsbeing
_s ::e'\:0 \hh P t our obj ect has been to
lishi ng philosophy as
commencem. ent of Chap teltheology and to sh w that the latter allows freeseparate ph !osophy. fr-omevery m. d. . dua1, 0 6.. 1 ) Spinoza ach ieves th1s by
dom to philosophlse for atural bass fm- . . : n The remaining four
expounding a non-supern an exposl_t.ton oI;': olitical philosophy of
ters of the work are that tt IS not possible to prevent individuals
chap
.
. 1 he indicates . . . and therefore the most sueSpmoza, whe1e1
from holding and expreschingallothetwsr opmlons
d S inoza concludes the
cessful society is that whtfre dom o;u t t nxression is something
work by suggestmg that ted . thou detriment to public peace. , but
be gian
.
which not merely canfreedo
oza
m is inde ;1:t;sa:-y :::;:t:mSous
the granting of stch
e
t
pro_poses Amsteiarr: as at:::t:am, toward the conclusion of the final
sooety. The descnptlon ly an idealized
. one, espeoa. 11y given that Spinoza
chapter ( 4:2 1 ) , is arguab
111
:;
J.n
ctt
ICI
,,
ts
!VI
WI .
39
no longer lived there, although it still serves as an example of the pacific

society Spinoza was attempting to support and the pacific society resulting
from the practice of the virtue of tolerance.
Virtue is not immediately evident as a theme within Tractatu.s Theologico
Politicns, although there are indications that Spinoza implicitly works
within virtue ethics, moreove1- a virtue ethics which emphasizes the impor
tance of peace. In Chapter 1 6, Spinoza discusses the problem of human
behaviour and the necessity of the state. He indicates that the problem of
acquiring the habit of virtue is that it takes so long that the greater part of
person's life has passed before virtue is acquired ( 4 : 1 6, p . 238) . It is a sub
tle indication that the assumed basis Spinoza is working from is one of vir
tue ethics. He then proceeds to indicate that for a peaceful society, in such
citcumstances, there needs to be an external authority to which individu
als will accede. Spinoza writes that "there is nobody who does not desire to
live in safety free from fear, as far as is possible. But this cannot come
about as long as eve1-y individual is permitted to do just as (the individual)
pleases . . " (4: 1 6, p. 239 ) . Spinoza then suggests the ideal and natural
form of the state is the democratic one. The important point about the
argument put by Spinoza, however, is that there is an implicit recognition
that the possession of a virtuous disposition by the members of a society is
something which naturally ought to lead to a peaceful society. The justifi
cation of the state within the thought of Spinoza is similar to that
advanced by Thomas Hobbes, whose writing Spinoza had read, although,
unlike Hobbes, Spinoza does acknowledge the virtuous disposition to
peace and he does acknowledge the democratic state as the most natural
form of the state.
Within the Tractatus Theofogico-Politicus, Spinoza argues the importance
of interpreting the Scriptures within the historical context. Thus it is appo
site that we should apply this principle to the task of interpreting the Trac
tatus Theologico-Politicus itself. For Spinoza, the historical context was that of
seemingly endless religious war, intolerance and cruelty, generated at least
in part by doctrinal differences. One of the key indicators of the impor
tance of this historical context for the work is to be found in the final chap
ter, wherein Spinoza writes with unusual passion about the way that
Christians have persecuted each other. This chapter sheds some light on
what might be considered the detached and rationalistic deism of Spinoza,
as well as his desire to decouple philosophy from religion, or at least from
passionate religion. Similarly, he seeks to decouple ethics from the notion
of ought and to replace this with what one does. As with more recent virtue
ethicists, it seems that Spinoza observed and was motivated by the violence
that often develops from dogma.
In comparison with his other works, Spinoza's unfinished Tractatus Politi
cus is much more reflective than argumentative in tone. Spinoza examines
.
40
various forms of govern ment, and conclud es that a democracy is the natu
ral and superior form of government Chapter 5, entitled 'Of the Best State
of a Domini on', is significant for virtue ethics and for a virtue ethics
approach to peace. At 5:2, Spi noza declare s that the purpos e of the civil
state is nothing more than peace and security of life. Importantly, Spinoza
then indicate s that individu als are not born for citizenship, but must be
made so. One develop s the virtues that assist one to participate in demo
cratic society. Even more significantly, in the subsequent paragraph, at 5:3,
Spinoza indicates that a society where the subjects are hindered from tak
ing up arms should be considered not at war, rather than being at peace.is
He then explain s this by declaring peace is "not mere absence of war, butthe
a virtue that springs from force of character." Spinoza thus represents an
ethicist who expressly and pre-eminently identifies peace as a virtue. It is
identification which is in accordance with the mystical and even pantheist
emphasis within the writing of Spinoza.
'
Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Founda tions
2.3.3
David Hume, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
The work of David Hume was written very much in an intellectual con
text where ethics was still automatically assumed to denote virtue ethics
and it is thus not surplising that David Hume has much to say about vir
tue/s. Yet it is problematic to describe Hume as an authentic virtue ethicist
per se, as the notion of moral virtue within his work is extremely wide.
Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature ( 1 739/ 40) represents his most widely
studied work, although he subsequently published shorter versions of the
epistemological and ethical arguments of the Treatse,
i
as, respectively,
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding ( 1 748) and Enquiry Concerning the

Principles of Morals ( 1 75 1 ) . In Book 2 of A Treatise on Human Nature, and
even more clearly in Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume pre
sents a view of virtue that could be claimed to be both utilitarian and aes
thetic. Hume argues that when a character trait is agreeable and useful to
its possessor, and agreeable and useful to others, then we deem this to be a
virtue. Within the ethics of Hume the distinction between virtue and conse
quentialist ethics becomes blurred. It is sufficient to indicate that David
Hume does highlight the virtues of sympathy and benevolence, virtues
undoubtedly important in furthering the cause of peace, and virtues that
one ought to encourage within any programme of peace education.
2 .3.4
Immanuel Kant, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
What makes the notion of Kantian virtue ethics so relevant to the dis
cussion of virtue ethics and peace education is the contribution of Immana
-- - - ---
41
uel Kant to theories of peace. It is appropriate to examine the writing of

Kant on peace from two sources, the 1 79 5 essay Zum ewigen Friede (Pe1petual
Peace) and the 1 797 work Metaph;vsik. der Sitten ( MetajJh)'sic of Marais) . The
essay by Kant on perpetual peace was an important contribution to theo
ries of peace, and in many ways a visionary essay. Within this essay Kant
advances a set of six Preliminary and three Definitive Articles to establish
perpetual peace between nations. Within the work of the metaphysics of
morals, Kant discusses the doctrine of private right and public right.
Within the discussion on public right, Kant suggests (AA:6:352) that peace
is not so much a matter of philanthropic principle, but rather a matter of
rights. The very fact that Kant should be writing of the right to peace and
of the prospect of perpetual peace places him within a narrow but signifi
cant band of writers.
The relationship of Kant to virtue ethics is a complex one. John Casey
suggests ( 1 990, p. 49 ) that the "systematic study of virtues dropped out of
modern moral philosophy essentially because of the influence . of Kant."
Nevertheless, there is ongoing debate as to whether it is possible to refer to
a Kantian virtue ethics. The strongest evidence against the notion of Kan
tian virtue ethics comes from within the 1 785 work Gmndlegu.ng wr l'vf.eta
physik der Sitten (Foundation for the Metaphysic of Marais) , where Kant
famously suggests that only action from moral duty possesses any moral
worth. Kant expressly states that qualities such as moderation in emotions,
self-control and calm deliberation (a refei-ence to Aristotelian virtues) have
no intrinsic value of their own, and indeed coolness may make a villain
only far more dangerous (AA:4:394) . Kant develops a principle of inclina
tion, suggesting that an action can only be deemed to be of moral worth if
undertaken wholly out of duty, and not out of any peisonal inclination or
even any counter inclination. Kant uses the example of a prudent shop
keeper, who does not overcharge inexperienced customers (AA:4:397) ,
suggesting that in such an instance the prudent shopkeeper is not acting
out of duty, as it is in his/her interests to ensure there is confidence that a
fair price will be charged. The action of charging a fair price is therefore
not a moral duty but a matter of personal interest.
What might be called the non-inclinational morality of Kant can be seen
in his writing on war and peace. It is true that within the plans for world
peace that Kant does refer to a sense or feeling of world citizenship. Yet the
peace plans of Kant are of a distinctly judicial and obligatory nature. We
ought to strive for peace out of duty rather than inclininion. Indeed one
might argue that Kant holds an extremely pessimistic view of human
nature. Interestingly, within Gnmdlegu.ng, after discussing the importance
of moral action from duty rather than inclination, Kant refers to the Gos
pel commands to love our neighbors and love our enemies (AA:4:399) ,
quite an important text for those seeking to encourage an ethics of peace.
-----
42
Kant pointedly remarks that these commands should be understood only

through a perspective of a morality of duty, suggesting that "love as an incli
nation cannot be commanded" (AA:4:399 ) . From a Kantian perspective,
the command to love one's enemies is demonstration that morality is a
matter of duty.
The case for a Kantian virtue ethics is perhaps a more subtle one than
the case against. Within the 1 79 7 work Metaphysik der Sitten, Part Two deals
with Tugendlehre or the doctrine of virtue. One could argue that this cover
age is very much Kant responding to the ethical milieu of the time, namely,
one where ethics was assumed to involve personal virtue, and that any dis
cussion of ethics ought to deal with this. Kant goes to some length to deny
that specific qualities have any intrinsic worth (AA:6:49 4 ) . H owever this
does not mean that he is not i m plicitly working upon the assumption of an
overarching virtue. Indeed it is arguable that, within the work of Kant, duty
(Pjlict) or the autonomous respo nse to categorical imperative or good will
can be regarded as overarching virtue. Duty includes the duty (in response
to the command of God) to love one's enemies. Autonomous good will is
that which makes us human. Within the discussion on the doctrine of vir
tue, Kant seems to be at pains to distance himself from traditional virtue
ethics. He re-interprets virtue to mean the strength of an i ndividual's max
ims in fulfilling his/her duty (AA:6:394) and further that the supreme
principle of virtue is to act in accordance with a maxim of ends that can be
a universal law for all. Kant frames his virtue in terms of inner law, and in
this regard also Kant is workin g from a virtue ethics basis.
',,
2.4
2.4.1
Modern Virtue Ethics and Peace Education
Nicolai Hartmann, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
The contemporary revival of virtue ethics has a number of antecedents

or forerunners, of whom Nicolai Hartmann is prominent. In his influential
Ethik., published originally in 1 926, Hartmann provides a systematic exposi
tion of virtues as ontologically objective values, a synthesis between
extremes which one discovers through experience. Much of the initial
chapters of the work ( 1-25) is based upon a refutation of existing ethical
systems, including utilitarianism (9,10) and Kantian ethics ( 1 1 - 1 3 ) . Hart
mann then proceeds to discuss the nature of values and virtues (26-64) ,
with a final discourse on human freedom ( 65-85) . For Hartmann a virtue
is a specific form of a moral value (43 ) , and he discusses them in three
groups: a) justice, wisdom, courage and self-control; b) agape , truthfulness
and uprightness, fidelity, trust and faith, modesty, and the values of social
43
intercourse; and c) love of the remote, radiant virtue, personality and per
sonal love.
Within the work of Nicolai Hartmann there is very little about peace and
peacefulness as such. Yet, as biographer Wolfgang Harich poin ts out (2000,
pp. 8-12 ) , Hartmann's ethical system was formed very much out of his
experiences as a soldier in Russia during World War One and from the sub
sequent defeat of Germany. Hartmann's rejection of the notion of duty, or
ethics from a notion of what one ought to do, either from religious or
other conviction, needs to be seen i n the context that it was this ethical sys
tem that gave rise, substantially, to the ethical justification for war. One
fought for one's country as it was the thing one ought to do, that is, one's
duty. It is the notion of duty that can impel a person or a group of persons
to do monstrous things. It is thus not surprising that Hartmann expends
much time in recasting the deontological ethics of Kant and refocusing
attention upon objective values/virtues. The values/virtues of Hartmann
were an attempt to develop an ethical system not linked with war.
2.4.2
If
II
John Dewey, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
John Dewey was another philosopher profoundly influenced by World

War One. However the role ofJohn Dewey as a peace advocate is not well
celebrated. Charles Howlett describes Dewey as a liberal peace educator,
although concedes that the commitment of Dewey to this endeavor is not
well recognized ( 1 987, p. 446 ) . Dewey's personal commitment to peace
can be illustrated through his commitment to education for democracy,
t rugh his opp sition to military education on campus, and also through
h1s mvolvement m the 1 920s campaign to outlaw war, culminating in the
KellogBriand Pact of 1 928. The commitment of Dewey to this outlawry
c ampa1gn, however, was not a deviation from his commitment to pragma
.
usm.
Dewey knew that a mere declaration outlawing war would not achieve
pace. As Howlett puts it, "the success of outlawry, Dewey knew only too
well, depended on educating people as to their moral responsibilities in
the world. The process of education must show cause why the acceptance
of war as an i nstitutionalized way oflife was the major obstacle to world and
social reform" ( 1 987, p. 445 ) . For Dewey, a declaration outlawing war could
serve as an impetus for peace education. Circumstances worked against
that possibility at the time, although Howlett suggests that the failure was
also due to the limited nature of the Deweyan program, in that it tended to
be anti-war rather than p ro-peace.
Dewey does not commonly refer to virtue or virtue ethics. In his 1 908
Ethics there is a chapter on the cardinal virtues ( MW5:359-38 0 ) , wherein
( MW5:359) Dewey defines virtues as "habits of c.haracter whose effect is to
44
,. . .... .
, ;
sustain and spread the rational and common good." Moreover Dewey's
1922 work Human Nature and Conduct can be taken as a study in virtue eth
ics, written under the psychological impact of the recent world war. It is
noteworthy that one of the motivations of Dewey was to write a book on
morality which was in accord with his view of human nature. The work dis
cusses habit in conduct, impulse in conduct and intelligence in conduct,
although throughout the book the idea of habit, or virtue, is central.
Dewey's description of habit involves a human activity, one which is estab
lished through purposive action, and yet having been established will oper
ate without such purposive action. D ewey suggests that attitude o r
disposition might function as synonyms for that which w e otherwise know
as habit (rvfWl 4 : 3 1 ) . One of the most interesting aspects of the book is the
conclusion, where Dewey describes habit/virtue as something we do which
is worthwhile in i tself ( MW 1 4: 1 93-203) and where he refers to the social
nature of morality ( MW 1 4:21 6-227) . Can peace, what we might describe as
the action of in teracting harmoniously and co-operatively with others, be
regarded as a habit, and one which may be encouraged through educa
tion? Such interaction does comply with the conditions of morality as sug
gested by Dewey.
2.4.3
Gandhi, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
One interesting aspect of a virtue ethics approach to peace education is

that this approach has much in common with the notion of intrapersonal
peace, especially as developed within Gandhian non-violence. Within his
life and teachings, Mohandas Gandhi continually emphasized the imp01
tance of nonviolence based upon the inner commitment of the actor to
truth. Indeed, the struggle for nonviolence is described within Gandhian
thought as truth-force or satyagraha ( 1 940, p. 235 ) . Peace is not so much an
entity or commodity to be obtained, nor even a set of actions or state of
affairs, but rather a way of life on the part of the individual so committed.
Similarly virtue ethics emphasizes not action as such, but rather the state of
the actor. It is significant that virtue ethics is often described as agent-based
ethics: within both virtue ethics and within Gandhian theory of nonvio
lence it is who you ate which is of importance. What we do derives its
importance from who we are.
Underlying Gandhian thought is the principle of ahimsa, or non-injury
to another being. Gandhi taught that ahimsa or nonviolence was a social as
well as a personal virtue , and one to b e cultivated like other virtues (CW
68:278) . Ahimsa was indeed only one of the virtues that Gandhi claimed to
be continually cultivating, the o thers comprising what Gandhi identified as
the virtue of non-possession or aparigraha and the virtue of celibacy or brah-
45
macharya ( 1 940, p. 204 ) , although ahimsa functions very much as a master

virtue within Gandhian thought. One of the interesting aspects of ahimsa is
that the existence of social order itself was evidence of ahim.sa, as such a
social order marked a progression from himsa, or the principle of violence,
towards the ahimsa, or the principle of non-harm to others, including the
environment. Gandhi indicates that all of living involves some himsa, or
destruction of life ( 1 940, p. 257 ) . However, a person_ can grow constantly in
self-restraint and compassion a) if the motivation of the person is compas
sion, and b ) if the person shuns as far as possible the destruction of o ther
creatures. One is inclined to say that, in Aristotelian terms, ahim.sa i nvolves
a settled disposition towards nonviolence.
Within his own comments on education and his work with the Tolstoy
Farm, Gandhi does not mention virtue or training in virtue as such ( 1 940,
pp. 245-250) . There is also very little on virtue within the notion of basic
education as developed by Gandhi ( 1 951 ) . However the notion of virtue
remains a pervasive one in the educational thought of Gandhi, especially
with the emphasis on moral and spiritual training and through the empha
sis on the development of character ( 1 998) . Spiritual training was some
thing which was done through example and such training was a matter of
practice. Within Gandhian educational thought, it was not so much the
content of a program which was important, but rather the example of the
teacher involved. Put simply, within Gandhian thought a virtue ( be this
nonviolence or truth-force) is something which someone does. Gandhi's
life also elucidates this, in his own commitment to the virtues he outlines.
It is indeed significant that he only writes sparsely of nonviolence and
truth-force as virtues, and yet his life reflects ample commitment to these
virtues. The Gandhian teaching of virtue is that virtue needs to be personi
fied, a view which anticipated the more recent emphases within the culture
of peace movement (UNGA, 1 999) .
2.4.4
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
What we might call the theologico-ethics of theologian Dietrich Bonhoe

ffer are significant for virtue ethics and peace education for a number of
reasons. Bonhoeffer was an admirer of Gandhi, and echoes of Gandhi can
be seen in much of the work of Bonhoeffer: Bonhoeffer was also a deeply
committed peace activist, as witnessed by his involvement in the ecumenical
peace movement and in his opposition to the Nazi Regime. This peace com
mitment was not a simple one, and involved a transition from a commit
ment to nonviolence to active involvement in the conspiracy to assassinate
the political leader of Germany. Nevertheless, the involvement of Bonhoef
fer in the assassination plot against Adolf Hi tler came only after he believed
46
that all avenues of nonviolent resistance had been exhausted. We now can
say that not all the nonviolent avenues of protest against Hitler wer n fact
exhausted. However from the perspective of Bonhoeffer, the deoswn to
become involved in the violent opposition to Hitler was a last resort.
The ethic of peace as espoused by Dietrich Bonhoeffer can perhaps e
best seen in the 1 937 work Nachfolge (The Cost of Discipleship) , wherem
Bonhoeffer presents a powerful neo-orthodox vision of ethics based upon
a community of believers and upon the radical call of God in the person of
Jesus. In the commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, Bonhoeffer writes
that the followers of Jesus have been called to peace, that they renounce
violence, that they quietly suffer in the face of hatred and wrong, and so
doing overcome evil with good and establish peace in the midst of war and
hate (DBW.4:99-1 10) . Similarly, in commenting on Matthew 5:38-42, Bon
hoeffer suggests that the Christian community ought to follow a principle
of nonviolence, that is, enduring rather than resorting to retaliation and
violence, whilst at the same time naming evil for what it is
(DBW.4: 1 34-1 39) . One arguable criticism of such an ethics is that it is ve1-y
particularistic-it is self-proclaimedly applicable only to a limited band of
_
believers. However at the same time it is a powerfully countercultural ethiC,
and it is precisely because such an ethic does not seek conformity r accep
tance with a wider community that it can stand apart from the ethical stan
dards of a wider community.
The ethics of D ietrich Bonhoeffer are certainly strongly theocentric and
strongly Christocentric. All that one is called to do is to act in response to
the call of God in Jesus Christ. Yet there is an arguable virtue ethics theme
running throughout the work of Bonhoeffer, even if a somewhat ounter
cultural or particularistic virtue e thics. In Naclifolge, Bonhoeffer outlmes the
particular virtues that characterize the Christian com mnity, such a single
minded obedience, discipleshi p , truthfulness , forgtveness, nonvwlence ,
and simplicity of life. The Christocentiic theme is also ve1-y eviden_t in the
collection of lectures from the illegal seminary at Finkenwalde , published as
Ethik, wherein Bonhoeffer suggests that ethics is a matter of response to the
divine command in Jesus. Yet within Ethik too there are strong aretaic
themes. Bonhoeffer writes of e thics as formation (DBW.6:62-9 0) and sug
gests that what is worse than doing evil is being evil (DBW.6:62 ) . Bonhoeffe_r
regularly critiques the virtues that have failed (within the context of c nsoh
dation of the Third Reic h ) , although it is significant that he does find It nec
essary to do so. Moreover, Bonhoeffer is dismissive of defined ethical action
for specific consequences or causes (DBW.6:355-364) . Ethics for Bonho f
_
fer is very much a matter of who we are, and what one does anses from this.
Bonhoefferian ethics are clearly agent-cen tered ethics.
It is significant that, after the involvement in the assassination plot
against H itler, Bonhoeffer fel t compelled to write an important (unfin-
fr
I
I
'
47
ished) essay on what it means to tell the truth, Was heisst die Wahrheit sagen ?,
wherein Bonhoeffer gives an ethical justification for not telling all of the
truth when dealing with a ruthless opponent (DBW. l6:61 9-2 1 9 ) . The ruth
less opponent he is referring to is the Nazi Regime, and in particular the
Gestapo who are interrogating him. From a modern viewpoint it would
seem that to lie when dealing with a regime of terror would be quite unim
portant. Yet what is especially significant is that Bonhoeffer finds it neces
sary to explain how failure to disclose all to such a regime is consistent with
the virtue of truthfulness. The subtext of the unfinished essay by Bonhoef
fer is that virtue is important. As he writes in the earlier essay, it is more
important to be a truthful person than to always tell the truth (DBW.6:62 ) .
Other aspects of Bonhoeffer's Was heisst die Wahrheit sagen ? reveal much
of what might be called a contemporary basis for what it means to learn a
virtue. The opening sentence of the essay places telling the truth within a
pedagogical context, that is, telling the truth is something we are told we
must do as soon as we learn to speak, although the important question is
exactly what does this mean. Bonhoeffer explains that telling the truth is
something which must be learnt, through appreciation of real situations
and reflection upon those situations. He further suggests that telling the
truth is not something that happens automatically from an upright charac
ter. Rather it is acquired. Bonhoeffer's famous example is of a student who
is asked by a schoolteacher, in front of the class, whether it is true that his
father often comes home drunk. The student, in fidelity to his family,
answers in the negative. Bonhoeffer concludes that technically the student
lies, yet the student is also being true to his family and his father. The stu
dent needs to learn how to answer in a way that will guard the confidential
ity of the family secret and yet at the same time conform to the rules of the
school. Telling the truth, in the Bonhoefferian sense, might be described
as being true to the relationship circles we find ourselves in, and learning
to be true to those relationship circles. We might paraphrase Bonhoeffer
by suggesting that virtue is learning responsibility.
In Bonhoeffe1's final papers and correspondence, there is an assump
tion that virtue remains a basis for ethics. The fragmental")' essay 'Nach zehn
]ah:ren ' (DBW.8 : 1 9-39) was written ve1-y much as a reflection upon the fail
ure of the German Confessing Church, the failure of attempts to assassi
nate Hitler, the destruction of Germany and the seeming failure of the
peace movement. As in Ethik, Bonhoeffer describes how individual virtues
have failed, including reasonableness, conscience, ethical fanaticism, duty
and private virtue. Yet he posits a yet unrecognized virtue, that of civil cour
age, that is, willingness to confront those in power, as a virtue to counter
balance the virtue of social obedience and sacrifice (DBW.8:23,24).
Bonhoeffer commences his discussion on civil courage by asking: what lies
beneath the complaint regarding the lack of civil courage? The complaint
48
, , ...
is an intensely personal one for Bonhoeffer, given the widespread failure of

his contemporaries to confront the evil of Nazism. Interestingly, Bonhoef
fer goes on to discuss a range of other virtues and vices, such as folly, con
tempt for humanity, immanen t righteousness, confidence, a sense of
quality, sympathy, suffering, and optimism. The response of Bonhoeffer to
the problem of extreme violence is not one of rejecting virtues as such, but
rather one of establishing or re-establishing contemporary virtues.
Civil courage is relevant for peace education for a number of reasons,
reasons which generally become clear when we reflect upon the context in
which Dietrich Bonhoeffer found himself. Put simply, fascist society was a
society where there were very powerful institutional, cultural, social and
moral forces exalting a culture of violence. One could argue that there are
similar powerful forces underpinning a culture of violence i n contempo
rary societies. The most com m o n manifestation of these powerful forces is
through the phenomenon of patriotism, wherein the individual who pro
poses peace is deemed to be l acking moral integrity and commitment.
Moreover, in time of war the.s e powerful forces may also be manifested
through state coercion and even state terror, for the reason that the state
finds difficulty coping with thos e who indicate that war may not be neces
sary. Those who advocate peace are deemed to be highly subversive. Thus
encouraging civil courage is arguably an important element within peace
education. As with telling the truth, civil courage is not something which
arises automatically from the upright person. It is something which is
acquired, through reflection o n responsibilities and with confidence in
one's own ability. As with other virtues, it is something which e merges from
practice.
There is a final turn in the last papers and correspondence of Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, which in retrospect is not all that discontinuous within his
previous work. One of the notions that Bonhoeffer posits is the need for a
religion less/worldly Christianity (DBW.8:401-406,526-538) . Bonhoeffer
suggests the working hypothesis of an all-powerful divinity, who personally
controls all things, is now out 'of date and accordingly we s h ould live etsi
Deus non daretur, that is, as if the divinity does not exist. ( DBW.8:532 ) . Bon
hoeffer has reached this position as a reflection upon the advances of sci
ence, and also as a reflection o n the course of history. Rathe r than an all
powerful divinity, Bonhoeffer s uggests a suffering divinity revealed in the
form ofJesus. In what might be called a postchristian or postconstantinian
virtue ethics, Bonhoeffer suggests identification with the suffering and
powerless as a means of identifying with Jesus. Should the ethic of identify
ing with the suffering and powerless be considered a virtue? If we consider
this to be a settled disposition, then the answer must be affirmative. In the
case of Bonhoeffer, his work i n assisting with the escape ofJews and strug
gle against Hitler is indicative that this identification with the powerless
Virtue Ethics a n d Peace Education
49
was such a settled disposition. This suggests we should consider such an

identification important for peace education, in that peace education is
centrally concerned with support for the powerless and the suffering.
2.5
2.5. 1
Mod ern Virtu e Ethic s and Peac

e Educ atio n 11
Martin Luther King, Virtue Ethics,

and Peace Education
The writing, speeches and life of Martin

Luther King form one of the
central sources for nonv iolen ce and peace
making, and the notion of suf
fe g, and n parti cular undeserved suffering,
is also prom inent in the

_
tin
"': and hfe of King. In the conte xt of the struggles and suffering of the
CIVll nghts ovem ent in the United States,
and working very much upon
te Gandh1an understan ding of nonviolenc

e and the example of Jesus,
King asserted the key propo sition that unde
rserved suffer ing is redemptive
( 1 998, p. 231 ) . Should unde rserved suffer
ing, that is, suffer ing endu red as
a result of comm itmen t to n onvio lence , be
therefore consi dered a virtue?
Undeserved suffering was a cruci al eleme
nt of direc t action led by Ring, in
th t the underserved suffer ing of the protesters
4ighl ighted the irtiustice of

unjust laws: undeserved suffering through
nonviolent direc t action aimed
t deliberately c eat ng crisis and tension which
force d comm unity atten

:
tl n onto a specific Issue of social irtiustice
( 1 998, pp. 1 90, 1 9 1 ) . The com
mitm ent to nonVIolenc e, and speci fically
to undeserved suffering, was also
very much a settled dispo sition . For Marti
n Luther King, so cruci al was i t
that there b e a specific a n d settled comm
itmen t to nonv iolen ce, that work
shops and self-analysis were used prior to
direct actio n, wherein the propo
nents were encouraged to ask themselves
whether they were able to accept
blows without retali ating and wheth er they
could endure the ordeal of
imprisonment ( 1 998, p. 1 90 ) .
The notion o f underserved suffering as a
virtue i s a difficult notio n. Cer
tainly it does seem that King was encouragin
g a willingness to endure unde
served suffering as a settled disposition or
virtue. One problem is that if we
make suffering a virtue , i t is very easy for
this to becom e an ethic which
encou rages acquiescence in the face of
violence. For instance, a woman
who suffers from domestic violence migh
t be advise d that undeserved suf
fe ing is a virtue, and through this be advise
d to stay i n th violent relation
sh p. Many religious systems operate on

just such a rationale, a criticism
raised by feminist theologians Rita Brock

and Rebecca Parker (200 1 ) . Yet
o e can argue that the undeserved suffer
ing as outlin ed by Martin Luther
Ki g represents assertive rather than

acquiescent suffering. The whole
pomt of the undeserved suffering which

King described and experienced
so
2 .5.3
was that this was visited upon those who suffered precisely because they did
protest against the oppression and stru tural viole1:ce they expenenced.
Peace education can be seen as encouragmg such a virtue.
2.5.2
Ethics, and Peace Education

Elizabeth Anscombe, Virtue
dealing with the contemp

One of the most frequently cited works in
_ beth Ansc mbe m
essay by Eliza
?
rary revival of virtue ethics is the influential
ombe pos1 three
Ansc
y.'
soph
Philo
l
Mora
ern
'Mod
led
1 958 simply entit
moral philosophy untl such
thess, nam ely: a) it is not profitable to do
olo, b) t e n tlons of
psych
of
y
soph
time as we have an adequate philo
from ethical 1scusswn , an
moral duty and obligation shou ld be removed
rs on oral philosophy a1_e o
_
c) differences between modern English write
there s a gap ?etween Ansto
little importance. She further poin ts out that
_
conotle the
. , p 1 ) ' in that w1thm Anst
1 osophy ( 1958
. .
tie an d mod e1-n ph"l
has been
ation
oblig
usage
ern
mod
in
but
ns,
centration is upon perso
, PP 5,
1958
(
es
ar
ombe
extern alize d, as something required by law. Ansc
_ ? emp ha
nte
mhe
an
h
wi
ity,
Christian
6) that this is due to the influ ence of

It is a cnuque of the pact of
sis therein on compliance with the Tora h.
! H_artmann and Nletzsch: .
Christianity that finds reson ance in the :'ork
philosophy of p:ychology ,
The intriguing phrase within the essay IS the
est w have t a philosophy of
and Anscombe seems to imply that the near
areta!CS of Anstotle.
the
n
.
psychology is indeed to be foun d withi
sugge_sts that the pmblemauc
essay
e
omb
It is signi fican t that the Ansc
Elizabeth Anscome 1s the
nature of modern consequentialist ethics (and
led when one exammes th
philosopher who popularizes the term) is revea
blem ths.
omb
Ansc
: P?s_es the pr
issues of individual and mass viole nce.
be consid
eve1
1dual
md1v
cent
inno
an
of
when can the deliberate killing
nscome
that
? ! e example
ered licit or permissible or even obligatolj
oty fro
a
save
can
ldual
ives is wheie the killing of an innocent mdlV
herself IS
mbe
nsco
from
nse
uclear anni hilation. The enigmatic respo
be only
om
Ansc
JUSt.
be
r
ev
can
but
fied,

that such a killing may be justi
not
does
and
,
s m the essay
indicates what is wrong with mora lity and ethic
_ . It also need s o
ctive
corre
as a
indicate in an s ecific way what is need ed
) has argued forcefully
1981
(
be
om
Ansc
here
elsew
at
t
nize
be recog
te fct that she has defin
favor of a just war tradition. However, given
_
be JUStified, and giVen her p1e
the problem as being the way violence .can
ken aspe t of the Ascombe
dilection for an internalized ethic , the unsp
of nonviOlen ce, 01 what we
ethiC
ed
argument is the need for an internaliz
ce.
might call a virtue of nonviolen
,, , ..
;,, , .
JK
I
I
i
51
Alasdair Mcintyre, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
The background of the contemporary philosophical revival of virtue

ethics has been very much a disillusionment with the rationalistic approach
to ethics that underpins much of the dominant consequentialist approach
to ethics, as will be outlined in the next chapter of this investigation. One
of the most influential scholarly works in contemporary virtue ethics has
been Alasdair Macintyre's ( 1 985) After Virtue. The subtle influence of this
work has been to shift the discussion within virtue ethics from virtues to vir
tue. The approach of Macintyre has been to attempt to establish why we
need a virtue ethics. This work is an essentially historical overview of ethics,
wherein Macintyre reveals his own reliance on ancient and medieval virtue
ethics, and in particular upon Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Macintyre is
concerned with the relativism implicit within contemporary ethics, and
particularly within what he terms emotivist ethics. He remains aware that
the charge of relativism can be made against virtue ethics, in that there can
be a range of virtues according to various cultures, but the resolution of
the problem, as outlined by Macintyre in Chapter 8, is to define virtue in
terms of practice. Thus a virtue is an acquired human quality that facilitates
a practice and the lack of which makes it difficult to achieve the practice. It
can be argued that Macintyre transfers the relativism implied within virtue
ethics on to the practices that a virtue facilitates.
One of the interesting questions one can pose of the Macintyre argu
ment for virtue is whether this supports or diminishes an ethical argument
for peace education. The key lies in examining what Macintyre means by
practice, and the definition he provides is that a practice is "any coherent
and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appro
priate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the
ends and goods involved, are systematically extended" ( 1 985, p. 1 87) . An
obvious question is whether war as such complies with the Macintyre defi
nition of practice, and thus whether virtues can serve war.
In a limited sense, war clearly does satisfy the practice criterion. War is a
complex and established co-operative practice, and indeed one could
argue that, within modern societies, war is probably the most complex and
established of all co-operative practices. Yet, in an extended sense, war does
not comply with this definition. War generally involves co-operation within
a limited group (comrades and allies) and excludes co-operation with
those outside the limited group ( the enemy) . Moreover, exactly what are
the goods appropriate to war and whether one can refer to standards of
excellence in the activity of war-making remain contestable issues. The way
52
ns
al and Philosophical Foundatio
Peace Education : Exploring Ethic
practice
ort war is to avoid iden tifying the
virtue ethics is often used to supp
0 ) , the
(200
re
whe
else
ed
argu
have
I
As
.
.
that is relevant to the und ertaking
guge
la
Ic
ive, usi g echical and her

language of war is notoriously evas
r on
cnte
ctice
the
se. In this situati?n,
to mask the reality of the ente rpri
m
allo
or
g
killm
y,
simp
t
releva t. Pu
as outlined by Mac intyre is highly
.
diess
ad
t
phle
pam
f
bne
a
m
,
ngly
. Interesti
.
others to die is not co-o pera tion
s the
m is a virtue, acln tyre conclude
iotis
patr
ther
whe
of
issue
the
ing
d1sse t
s this by suggestmg that thoe who
affirmative, although he qualifie
the v1rto
ed
mitt
com
ntry are those truly
from immoral actions by thei r cou
r
tue of patriotism ( 1 984) .
a
to
r
retu
a
for
?
als
but
ty,
ali
-base d mor
Mac intyre argues for a practice
.
ly hnk ed
ality and soci ety are mhe rent

Mor
.
ality
mor
ased
ity-b
mun
com
reltes to
re
lnt
Mac
of
logy
tele
l
socia
the
e
.
( 1 985, p. 1 23) . In this sens
ue will do,
.
society. In d1scussng what vlft.
what we might call a peaceful
de th
mclu
fore
ther
will
es
virtu
of
ue
alog
"cat
the
that
ests
Macintyre sugg
commumkind of hou seho lds and kmd of
virtues required to sust ain the
( 1 985,
.
"
can seek for the good together
ties in which men and wom en
It
ever
How
on
us
.
is arguably an ambiguo
219) . The notion of "the good"
r than the estabhshmnt of a
othe
hing
anyt
g
bein
as
this
is difficult to see
l urthe virtues ultimatey hav a socia
peaceful soci ety. For Mac intyre,
e.mg 1
as
Aristotelian em has1s on vrtues
the
of
ent
inisc
rem
e
them
a
,
pose
ethi CIS ,
. As is the case With othe r Irtue
essentially relationa l in nature
xphcte
c
mdi
he
ce as a virtue nor does
Macintyre does not men tion pea
i ult
d1ff
IS
1t
,
ever
':'
Ho
ern.
eace is his conc
itly that the establishm ent of p
ig
work
ps
ou
g
m
susta
can
h
whic
that
.
not to see the stated conc ern for
artie
the
erlying motivating factor w1thm
together for peace as a m ajor und
ulation of virtue ethic s.
nee
re has developed the theme of the
In mor e rece nt writ ing, Mac inty
his
ugh
altho
'
e
peac
n
ti
he does not men
.
for virtues ( 1999 ) In this too,
an
hum
of
oety
so
a
IS,
that
ety,
eful soci
.
concern is very much for a peac
nden t
depe
ly
ntial
esse
are
we
that
is
re
.
flourishing. The key [01- Mac inty
nal
atio
good. Equally, however, we are also
beings, reliant on the com mon
Th
1ls.
enta
good
out what the com mon
beings, and capable of wor king
rathei,
we igno re otr own need s, but
that
n
mea
not
s
com mon good doe
a bal
have
to
need
we
life,
an
hum
nature of
because of the inte rdep end ent
ter
mat
a
be
ism, and this balance needs to
ance between egoi sm and altru
l
Mac
s,
Thu
.
h as for social phil osop hers
of concern for educators as muc
s
[egm
e
grat
inte
nd
n "is to tra sfo

tyre writes that the task of edu catio
the
both
rds
towa
n
auo
mclm
desires into an
.
tic and altruistic ] impulse s and
slf
good s, so that we b.ecome .neither
al
vidu
indi
our
and
good
com mon
sts
egm
er
h
other-than-se f-re.garmg, neit .
rather-than-other-regarding nor
to
cted
dire
are
ons
passions and mchnau
nor altruists, but those whose
lnMac
The
.
60)
1
P
of othe rs" ( 1 999,
what is both our good and the good
tl
' . ,. .
l:f
t
fl
t
f
53
tyrean emphasis on balance between an excess of egoism and altruism is

highly Aristotelian, and the telos of this education is the peaceful society.
2.5 .4
Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education
Rosalind Hursthouse is a more recent leading exponent of virtue ethics.

In On Virtue Ethics, one of the central concerns of Hursthouse ( 1 999) is
that what we deem a virtue can seem extremely relative. What one culture
deems to be a virtue might not be such to another culture. The resolution
of this metaethical problem for Hursthouse is to suggest a naturalistic
morality, that is, a virtue is a particular character trait, the exercise of which
aids in the preservation or survival of the species. Hursthouse equates
eudemonia or flourishing with the preservation of the species. It is a c rite
rion for virtue ethics which wanders towards a trait-consequentialism, that
is, the character traits which ought to be encouraged are those which have
the greatest good for the greatest number. However, the connection is not
quite so straightforward. Hursthouse argues that virtues do benefit their
possessor, and that virtues have an evolutionary history. The commitment
of the individual to action ought to be one of a settled disposition to spe
cific ( internal) excellences of character.
It is not too difficult for a reading of Rosalind Hursthouse to emphasize
the importance of peace, and by extension peace education. Within On Vi-r
tue, Hursthouse concludes with a chapter that e ngages the issue of whether
there is any objective basis to ethics, or whether ethics is merely a subjective
enterprise; and she finishes the chapter with a passionate disnission of the
importance of hope, suggesting that human history can be read as either a
dismal history or it can be read as justifying the belief that human nature is
at best harmonious ( 1 999, p. 263 ) . Hope, suggests Hursthouse, is a self-val
idating virtue, in that it is a necessary condition of practice ( 1 999, p. 265) . I
believe it possible to identify the hope of Hursthouse as a hope for peace,
although she does not use this word as such . She w1ites that "the practice of
ethical thought, as we know it, has to be based on the assumption that
human beings, as a species, are capable of harmony, both within them
selves and with each other" (1 999, p. 265) . The master virtue for Rosalind
Hursthouse is hope, and the objective of that hope is to establish a harmo
nious or peaceful society. It is an emphasis which finds much resonance
within peace research and education, especially with the eschatological
emphasis within much peace research and education on future possibilities
and imagining the future.
54
2.5.5
Popular Virtue Ethics and Peace Education
One of the interesting aspects of virtue ethics has been the extent to
which the scholarly interest has been reflected in the interest within popu
lar literature and within popular cult1.1re. The kindness movement, with
the popular e njoinment to prac tice random acts of kindness and senseless
acts of beauty ( Conari Press Editors, 1993) , does reflect a virtue ethics sen
timent, in that there is no measured or rational basis for the action. The
only basis can be that acts of k indness and beauty are intrinsically worth
while actions. Moreover, in recent decades there have been numerous best
selling texts encouraging the reader to act i n a manner that is integral to
his/her personhood. Robert Bellah does not refer to virtue ethics as such
(1986) , although his language o f "habits" and " the heart" is indicative of
virtue. Stephanie Dowrick ( 1 997) argues that forgiveness is an essential vir
tue, independent of whether the person being forgiven needs that forgive
ness and independent of the social consequences, but merely because it i s
a humanizing and empowering action for a n i ndividual t o be- engaged in.
Wayne Dyer (200 1 ) argues that there is an inner solution to external prob
lems, through acting in a virtuous manner, based in part upon the Fran
ciscan ideal. It is easy to critique such approaches as simplistic. However
the power of such ethical systems, if we could call them that, is precisely
that they are simple, and therefore readily apprehensible by the individual.
We have already discussed writers who have identified-directly or indi
rectly-peace as a virtue. However in addition to this we can identify what
we might deem peace virtues. Thus peace education can be understood as
encouraging the virtues that will support and value harmonious and co
operative relations between i n dividuals. Linda Kavelin-Popov has listed 52
virtues ( 1 997, p. 52) , includi n g assertiveness, caring, compassion, confi
dence, consideration, flexibility, forgiveness, friendliness, generosity, gen
tleness, helpfulness, honesty, humility, idealism, j ustice, kindness, Jove,
mercy, moderation, patience, respect, service, tact, tolerance, trust, truth
fulness and unity. It is not too difficult to see how these could be under
stood as peace virtues, that is, virtues conducive to peace. In addition to
this, Kavelin-Popov identifies peacefulness as a virtue in itself. Similarly,
Michele Borba (2001 ) lists peacefulness as a virtue, within the context of
the building of moral intelligence. Significantly, Borba suggests that peace
fulness is something which is learned. Linda Kavelin-Popov has an entic
ingly simple definition of virtue, in that a virtue is the best we can be and
educating for virtues is therefore bringing out the best we can be. It is a
phrase that is not dissimilar to the emphasis in Hursthouse on looking to
human potential for the future.
The idea of developing a taxonomy or catalogue of virtues, something
which many popular writers now attempt, was indeed popular within medi-
55
eva! virtue ethics. Aristotle refers to a catalogue of virtues in NE 2:7. How

ever i f we examine taxonomies of virtue, we can also identify virtues that
could be designated as peace virtues, that is, virtues, when exercised, con
tribute to peace. Interestingly enough, within the above understand ing of
peace virtues we slide subtly towards a character trait utilitarian under
standing, that is, we imply that a particular character trait or disposition is
useful because it results in the e ncouragem ent of co-operative and harmo
nious relations. As previously indicated, there is a gray area between virtue
ethics and character trait utilitarianis m, and perhaps too much can be
made of the differences between the two. From an educational perspective ,
if we claim respect for others and active n onviolence as virtues, then it fol
lows, from a virtues ethics approach to education, that education should
aim to encourage and develop those virtues.
2.5.6
The Virtues of Civility and Co-Operation
One of the popular contempor ary virtues is that of civility. John Rawls
lists civility as amongst the so-called political virtues, namely, civility, toler
ance, reasonableness and fairness, all of which are crucial to co-existenc e
in a situation of cultural diversity ( 1 993, p . 1 94) . Edward Shils writes
extensively of the virtue of civility, as a belief which affirms the possibility
of the common good, respect for institutions and personal restrain t
( 1 997, p . 4 ) . Within the work o f both o f the above, the assump tion i s that
we ought to be working towards a peaceful and tolerant society. This is a
social goal, and the establishme nt of specific virtues is a means to achiev
ing that goal. It is interesting to see civility as a synonym for peacefulne ss,
in that the notion of civility does connote respect for tolerance, respect
for institutions and personal restraint, all of which are important compo
nents of a peaceful society. Michael Meyer has recently (2000) argued that
there are two separate conception s of civility, namely those of liberal civil
ity and the civility of etiquette. We might c haracterize these two forms as
political and personal civility. H owever the point of virtue ethics is that,
properly understood , there is n o dichotomy. The way one ought to behave
within the public or political sphere ought to be consistent with one's
internalized personal ethics.
Matthew Ridley is a writer on virtue whose work also suggests social con
nections between virtue and peace. The book The Origin of Virtue ( 1 996) is
written largely from an evolutionary perspective, although the interesting
aspect of the book is that Ridley focuses on the question: how is society pos
sible? By society, Ridley means not merely a social aggregation, but a system
of co-operation amongst individuals. The key to establishing such co-opera
tion, according to Ridley, is trust ( 1 996, p. 265) , and the key in establishing
56
such trust is to encourage more local-level transactional contact between

individuals. The idea that transactional contact will of itself lead to trust is a
complex one, and it is not too difficult to see where this can fail. However
the approach of Ridley towards establishing a co-operative society is one
consistent with virtue ethics. A virtue is an established disposition, and we
establish a disposition through practice. In this case the practice is local
level transactional contact, which establishes the virtue of trust, and which
in turn leads to a co-operative and peaceful society.
2.5.7
,. '
A favorite epigram for Stanley Hauerwas is on a Menno

nite poster,
which simply states: "A Modest Proposal for Peace-Let
the Christians of
the World Agree that They Will Not Kill Each Other" (1996,
p. 44) , and
this epigram sums up how basic the idea of virtue is to Hauer
wasian peace
ethics. If one decon structs the above sentim ent, it is reflect
ive of a virtue
ethics approa ch to peace. It is an agent center ed ethics,
in that it refers
only to the action s of those who call themselves Christians,
rather than to
the general comm unity. It also reflects a consci ous and settled
dispos ition,
in this case, a comm itment not to kill fellow C hristians. How
is such a virtue
ethics approach releva nt to the general comm unity?
In a sense that is the
wrong questio n, in that it assum es an Enligh tenme nt
universalist moral ity.
The point of virtue ethics is that one takes responsibility
for one's own
actions, regardless of the belief stance one happens
to operate from.
The peace virtue ethics of Stanley Hauerwas are arguab
ly representative
of a ra Ical tren in Christian reflect ion. John Milban
k is a theologian
whose mterpretatwn of virtue, outline d in the 1990
work Theology and
Soczal Theory: B eyond Secular Reason, is not far removed from
that of H auw
eras. Significantly, Milban k regards his own schoo l of
thought as being rad
ical orthodoxy, radical in its social and politic al implic
ations, yet orthod ox
in that Milba regards his own strand as repres
enting or recovering
_
authentic Chnst.tan theology. Milban k suggests that
there are two strands
of virtue, one based upon an ontology of violen ce,
and the other based
tpon an ontology of peace. As a Christian theologian, Milbank
is suppo rt. tve of the latter, based upon the life-history of Jesus.
James Wetzel ( 2004)
has perceptively pointe d out that Milban k's m ajor
work, Theology and Social
Theory, could be regarded as a postmodern De civitate Dei,
in that Milban k,
with Augus tine, rej ects non-Christian virtue . As
with Hauerwas, the virtue
ethics of Milbank are open to the accusation of
particularism, yet, at the
same time, it is this particularism which liberates
Milbank, and leaves him
free to posit a virtue of nonvio lence.
Radical Christian Virtue EtlJ.jcs and Peace Education
One influential and prolific writer who has taken a theological

approach to virtue ethics, o1 rather, a virtue ethics approach to theology, is
Stanley Hauerwas. What makes the work of Hauerwas especially significant
for a virtue ethics approach to peace education is that Hauerwas develops a
specifically Christian virtue of nonviolence. The context of this Christian
ethic of nonviolence is the history of Jesus of Nazareth, and this ethic of
nonviolence is expressed through a Christian community and through the
notion of the narrative self ( 1974, p. 74; 1981 , pp. l l l -1 52) . The idea of
the narrative self is a particularly powerful one, and one that represents a
central idea throughout virtue ethics. Put simply, the idea is that what we
do is not a matter of measuring consequences as such, but rather an ongo
ing reflection of our s tory, of who we are. This is a particularly empowering
exposition of virtue ethics.
One of the curious aspects of Hauerwasian virtue ethics is the paradoxi
cal mixture of naturalistic and evangelical theological ethics, reflecting
Hauerwas' own journey as a Mennonite theologian teaching with Catholic
educational institutions. The e mphasis on virtue itself represents a natural
istic theological ethics, reminiscent of classical and scholastic theology.
However the point of departure for Hauerwas is that the virtue of nonvio
lence stands in contrast to the nationalistic values of the general commu
nity, and in particular the nationalistic virtues prevalent within the USA
(Stanley Hauerwas & Charles Pinches, 1 997, pp. 1 49-1 65). O ne might
claim that the approach of Haue1was to virtue i s limited and particularistic.
The virtue of nonviolence as e spoused by Hauerwas is one that the Chris
tian community is called to practice. It is a position strangely reminiscent
of Augustine, for whom virtue can only truly be held by the believer. How
ever, at the same time, there is a powerful countercultural element within
the ethics of Hauerwas, wherein the Christian community stands apart
from the nationalistic and militaristic values of the contemporary society,
and, in standing apan from that society, represen ts a radical alternative.
'
2.6
2.6. 1
r
I
Summation
Strengths and Weaknesses of Virtue Ethics

(and Peace Education)
The power of a virtue ethics approach to peace

and to peace educa tion
_
that It does involv e a revival of the impor tance
of personal integrity and
thereby provides an empowering ethica l ration
ale for peace education. We
can see this through the parable of Jim and the
twenty Indian s, as related
by Bernard Willia ms (1 973, pp. 98-1 1 8 ) . Withi
n this parable, a travele r,
.
IS
57
58
Jim, visits a village in South America. There he discovers that the loal mili
tary commander has taken 20 local Indians hostage, and plans kill them
to discourage any future acts of dissent or rebellion. The military com
mander, however, recognizes Jim as an honored visitor, and as such offers
Jim the opportunity to kill one prisoner himself, in which case_ the military
commander will spare the lives of the remaining 1 9 hostages. Jim therefore
has to decide between his own action of killing one Indian and the conse
quences of his inaction, which will be that man more Indians will be
killed. What makes this such a telling parable IS that 1t_ sums up the
dilemma of violence, in that even though it is generally recognized that vio
lence is morally abhorrent, failing to engage in some violence may well
result in greater overall violence. How does the individual . maintain his(
her integrity in such a situation? The power of the virtue ethcs approach IS
that it enables the individual to make a decision. In the particular case, the
virtue ethics option is for Jim to act according to his own settled disposi
_ the
tion, that is, one of commitment towards nonviolence. Rather than k1ll
sole token Indian, Jim tells the military commander of his commitment.
The military commander may well then kill all of the captvs.' although
this is not the fault ofJim. UltimatelyJim has ethical responsibility only for
his own actions, and he has acted accordingly.
One of the themes of the discussion in this chapter has been the para
dox that. virtue is intrinsically directed towards peace, and yet virtue can be
co-opted for violent means. Kenneth Boulding a written _ of the sacrifice
_
trap, wherein if we make a sacrifice for a cause, 1t 1s very difficult t adm1t
that this sacrifice was in vain ( 1989, p. 63) . Indeed the more ternble the
sacrifice as is the case with modern warfare, the more we tend to virtuize
the sacrifice. Thus, the notion of virtue can be used to support military
endeavor and to continue the commitment to war and violence. Grady
Scott Das writes of the fragility of virtue, and suggests the brutal irony is
that the conduct of war demands "the firmest and most self-disciplined
exercise of the virtues" ( 1 992, p. 87) . Jean Bethke Elshtain has written of
the fusion of the idea of the good citizen and the warrior into a notion of
armed civic virtue ( 1 987, 1988). It is no accident that militaristic societies
are often those with the strongest rhetoric about the importance of virtue.
One further story illustrates the moral ambiguity of virtue. John Glenn
Gray relates the story of a German soldier in the Netherlands during rid
_
War II, who refuses to serve in a squad executing noncombatant CIVIlians
( 1970, pp. 185,186) . The dissident soldier is summarily curtmartialed,
placed with the civilians whom he refused to execute, and IS h1msel! shot
with them. One interpretation of what has happened IS_ Ifolade by Michel
Walzer, who, commenting upon this story, describes the d1ssentmg sold1:r
as an individual of extraordinary nobility ( 1 992, p. 314) . Grady Scott Davis,
however, takes a differing view (1992, pp. 87, 88) . He suggests, comment-
59
ing upon the same story, that the person who refuses to kill others is only
regarded as noble or virtuous from a debased perspective, one which sees
the killing of others as being ordinary. Davis suggests that war, in essence,
debases virtue-although we might suggest, more specifically, that war and
the way war uses vii-tues reveals our own lack of a committed virtue of peace
and nonviolence.
2.6.2
Recapitulation
Within this discussion of peace education and virtue ethics, we have

highlighted a range of ways that peace and nonviolence can be regarded as
virtues and the way that the notions of virtue can be regarded as support
ing education for peace. There are some weaknesses in virtue ethics, and
in using this as a basis of peace education, in that virtue can be easily used
also to support violence. One answer may be to make education for the vir
tue of peace more explicit. Overall, howeve1 the value of the virtue ethics
approach to peace and peace education is that it does re-enforce the
importance of personal integrity and the autonomy of the individual. This
is particularly important in a world of overwhelming direct, structural and
cultural violence. In addition, the virtue ethics approach is also powerfully
linked to practice. We develop the virtue of peace by doing peace, and this
then becomes a settled disposition. Despite some weaknesses of the virtue
ethics approach to peace, it is an approach that is practical, and ultimately
lends itself to an integrative approach to peace.
C HA PTE R 3
CON SEQUENTI A LI ST ETH ICS

AND PEACE EDUCATION
3.1
3.1 . 1
The Origins of Consequential ism
Consequentialism Defined
Consequentialism is a useful term for a type of theory that suggests that

morality and ethics should be concerned fundamentally with consequences
of actions. Technically, the term originates with Elisabeth Anscombe ( 1 958 ) ,
although the theory that morality and ethics should be concerned with con
sidering consequences predates this. Samuel Scheffler ( 1 988, p. 1) suggests
that consequentialism be understood as "a moral doctrine which says that
the right act in any given situation is the one that will produce the best over
all outcome, as judged from an impersonal standpoint which gives equal
weight to the interests of everyone." Utilitarianism may be regarded as one
of the sub-categories of consequentialism, although it is commonplace and
useful to think of utilitarianism as a synonym for consequentialism. This
investigation uses the terms interchangeably. Since consequentia1ism is
directed towards encouraging actions that will produce a better world, the
implications for peace and peace education are seemingly quite clear. Peace
education aims at producing a better world, that is, a peaceful world. Conse
quentialism has also been important i n the formation of public policy, i n
areas such a s policies to do with mass formal education. However, the weak
nesses of consequentialism also constitute pointers to some weaknesses
within peace theory and peace education.
Peace Education: Expwring Ethical and Phiwsophical Foundations, pages

Copyrigh t
2008
by Information Age Publishing
All rights of reproduction i n any form reserved.
61-87
61
62
Consequentialist Ethics and Peace Education
Peace Education . Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
It is useful to take an overview of some of the sub-categories within con

sequentialism, sub-categories which have evolved in many ways in response
to the internal difficulties of consequentialism. Act-consequen tialism sug
gests that the choice of actions should be determine d by the action that
produces the greatest good for the great number of people. Rule-conse
quentialism suggests that morality and ethics should still be concerned
with consequences, although it suggests that the focus should be on rules
of behaviour rather than specific acts. Indirect act conseque ntialism sug
gests that although the correct action is that which is for the greatest good,
it may not be possible to calculate this. Motive conseque ntialism suggests
that an action is right if the motive is optimific, that is, aiming to produce
the best possible conseque nces. It is also possible to categorize consequen
tialism through the qui bono criterion-exactly who benefits from a specific
action. Egoistic consequentialism suggests that morality and ethics should
be concerned with the consequences of an action for the agent of the
action. Altruistic conseque ntialism suggests that morality and ethics should
be concerned with the conseque nces of the action for everyone other than
the agent. Universal conseque ntialism suggests that morality and ethics
should be concerned with the consequences of an action for everyone.
The above difference s are arguably rather artificial. It is difficult to
examine whether strict egoistic consequentialism can logically exist, since
the individual person only can exist within a communi ty. Thus, even if one
is guided by the good of actions for oneself, then this principle ultimately
involves working for the good also of others, as the continued existence of
one's self in a universe bereft of all company is meaningle ss. The self
defeating nature of egoistic consequentialism has applicatio ns for peace
issues. It is often suggested tha t pronouncements and programs about
peace are unworkab le, as individuals are guided by egoism, in effect, by
egoistic consequentialism. However, the interdepe ndent nature of the glo
bal society means that it is impossible not to factor into consequences what
will happen to others, even if the paradigm one is working from is an egois
tic one. In other words, war a nd injustice ultimately produce a world that is
detrimental to the interests a n d well-being of even the most egoistic of
individuals. Thus, even if we do contend that we work from a theory of ego
istic consequentialism, the implications of this are that we ought neverthe
less to work and educate for peace.
3.1 .2
Reasons for the Rise o f Consequentialism
Before examining specific writers within the consequentialist tradition,

it is useful to consider the reasons for the rise of consequentialist ethics
and the predominance of consequentialism in the formation of public pol-
63
icy. I want to suggest two reasons, and these reasons apply to most varieties
of consequentialism. One reason is the rise of democratic theory, especially
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centures. The idea that moral
ity and ethics should be determined by considerations of the greatest good
for the greatest number ( to use a primary formulation of utilitarianism) is
linked to the rise of democratic theory. Without the rise of democratic the
ory, there would be no reason to consider actions based upon what is sup
posedly good for the greatest number. The universal appeal of
consequentialist ethics is reflected within the scope of peace education.
Peace education suggests that the aim of education should not be merely
the personal advancement of an individual, through preparation for a
vocation or profession, and nor should education be directed towards the
advancement of a particular nation. Education rather should be directed
towards the universal betterment of humankind.
Secondly, I would suggest that consequentialist ethics are also related to
the rise of the scientific society, for the concept of the greatest good
assumes that there is some empirical way of determining exactly what the
greatest good is. One of the ramifications of this is that the consequences
that consequentialist ethics identifies are usually material in nature. The
consequences are not what will happen to us after we die and nor are con
sequentialist ethics generally concerned with the character of the agent.
The consequences relate to specific human suffering and well-being,
expressed materially. Such a view has its limitations, although it neverthe
less constitutes a powerful ethical system. Likewise, there is a strong argu
ment that peace education is motivated very much by a concern for the
measurable and material consequences of our current behaviour. Put sim
ply, peace education is concerned with the suffering that will be the conse
quence of a continued commitment to a status quo that does not challenge
war and structural violence. Implicit within peace education is the assump
tion that material suffering will accrue from a failure to address, in a pur
poseful way, the challenge of educating people to work for peace.
3.1.3
Consequentialism and the Notion of the Future
One of the keys to the i n tersection of consequentialism and peace edu

cation is the notion of the future, which often figures prominently in both
consequentialist and peace education discourse. Given the utopian and
eschatological elements within the concept of peace, it is not surprising
that future-oriented themes are so strong. The future is an important ele
ment within the peace education technique of imagining peaceful futures.
Sometimes in peace education the notion of the future is implied, as is the
case when peace education literature or international instruments use the
64
imperative voice. Thus when a writer or agency indicates that "we must" or
"peace education should" there is an implied appeal to the future, in that
because of implied future consequences there is a stated imperative to edu
cate now in a certain way. The negative future consequences that peace
e ducation seeks to avoid are future war and global privation. The positive
consequences that peace education seeks to encourage are a world of cre
ative and co-operative harmony.
The intersection between future-oriented consequentialism and peace
e ducation can be illustrated through a specific question which Colman
McCarthy alludes to in his recent work on peace education. McCarthy
quotes a student who posed the question in an essay: why is it that we are
violent but not illiterate? (2002, p. xx) . The answer the student gives is that
this situation exists because we are taught to read, but we are not taught
peace. Thus, the decision to teach/not teach reading has future conse
quences, if the i ndividual does not have the ability to read. So too, the deci
sion to teach/not teach peace has future consequences, in that the
understanding of the individual is limited if there is no understanding of
violence and nonviolence. What makes peace education even more neces
sary, according to M cCarthy, is that the overwhelming message of our cul
ture is that violence is the way to achieve ends. Teaching peace does not
necessarily ensure a future peaceful world, any more than teaching reading
will necessarily mean that adults will read. However, it does provide the
potential for a future peaceful world.
3 . 1 .4
Preview
It is arguable that a consequentialist ethical basis for peace education is

the most obvious, as most peace writing and international instruments
dealing with peace education implicitly work upon such a consequentialist
foundation. The basis for a consequentialist ethics approach to peace edu
cation is relatively simple: what we teach and how we teach has an effect in
forming the society and the world in which we live. This proposition is
rarely articulated, although in some ways is quite self-evident. If there were
not some implied hope of betterment in the process of education and
teaching, then we would not be expending personal and social effort in
formal education and teaching. Conversely, what we fail to teach and our
failure in how we teach also has a n impact in developing the quality of soci
ety and the quality of the world in which we live. It is important, therefore,
to teach , both through content and example, that there are alternatives to
conflict and injustice. In particular, it is important to teach of the suffering
engendered by war and social injustice. If what we teach has consequences,
then it follows that one of the aims of education ought to be to encourage
65
students to think about the type of world and society we would want to
have, and to empower students to create such a society and world.
3 .2
3.2.1
Early Consequential ism and Peace Education
Francis Hutcheson, Consequentialism, and Peace Education
As consequentialism is a modern philosophy, it is to be expected that

our starting point will be with the recent past. One of the early influential
writers within the consequentialist tradition was Francis Hutcheson.
Hutcheson is perhaps best described as a proto-utilitarian philosopher, in
that utilitarian ideas are still in the process of formation within his writing.
Within his 1 725 work An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and
Virtue, Hutcheson develops one of the earliest formulations of utilitarian
ism. He writes (at 2:3:8) that when comparing the moral quality of actions,
one should examine the number of persons to whom happiness from that
action will accrue. Virtue is thus a matter of how much happiness the
action in questions produces. Hutcheson writes . . . "that Action is best,
which procures the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers; and that
worst, which, in like manner, occasions misery. " Within the above discus
sion, Hutcheson does concede that the importance of the persons for
whom happiness accrues may compensate for the lack of numbers. Never
theless, the principle that Hutcheson proposes at this point is a surprisingly
modern one.
The Hutschesonian principle of happiness may seem a distinctly n aive
notion to the modern reader. However this is perhaps more a commen tary
on the failure of utopian experiments within the modern era. One of the
key ideas within peace research, and especially within the Galtungian para
digm, is that o f the minimization of violence. Galtung suggests that we
should work to minimize all avoidable violence, including direct, indirect
and cultural violence. The appeal of peace research is also that this mini
mization of violence should also be universal. There is no one special
group (such as one's own nation) for whom this minimization of violence
should be applicable. Peace education is very much linked with this idea of
the minimization of violence, for one of the universal aims of peace educa
tion is the minimization of future violence.
The ethics of Francis Hutcheson is best developed within the posthu
mously published A System. of Moral Philosophy: In Three Books ( l 755 ) .
Hutcheson has much to say on the importance o f happiness and o f m axi
mizing happiness, and that this should be for all of humankind. Moreover,
it is noteworthy that Hutcheson has much to say about war and peace.
66
Indeed A System of Moral Philosophy commences with comments on human

nature and happiness (Book One), examines contractual and daily life
(Book Two) , and concludes w i th civil polity (Book Three) , including the
laws of war and peace. Within the chapter simply entitled 'The Laws of
Peace and War' (3: 1 0 ) , one finds a particularly modern and utilitarian atti
tudes towards what we would now call international law. Hutcheson sug
gests that war is "the state of those who by violence defend or prosecute
their rights" (3: 1 0: 1 ) . He concedes war may be necessary, although sug
gests that i t is the interests of all parties for this to be governed by law. For
instance, i t is to the mutual advantage of combatants not to engage in the
slaughter of noncombatants ( 3: 1 0:5) , to recognize the right of neutrality
and the rights of refugees (3: 1 0:9) , to acknowledge treaties (3: 1 0: 10 ) , and
to recognize the rights of ambassadors (3: 1 0 : 1 2-14) . So too with peace
generally-there is no obligation to be committed to peace. Such a com
mitment, however, is advantageous or useful to all.
3.2.2
David Hume, Consequentialism, and Peace Education
Another philosopher whom we might describe as a proto-utilitarian is

David Hume. Within the 1 739/1 740 work A Treatise of Human Nature, and
particularly within Book III of this work, Hume develops the idea that
morality is based upon that which we instinctively know is of use. Hume
argues that moral distinctions are not derived from reason, but rather from
moral sense, and that moral sense is formed by that which we believe to be
of utility. In a Section entitled "Of the natural virtues and vices" (3:3:1 at
632 ) , he writes that "approbation of moral qualities most certainly is not
derived from reason, or the comparison of ideas, but proceeds entirely
from moral taste, and from certain sentiments of pleasure or disgust, which
arise upon the contemplation and view of particular qualities or charac
ters." Hume discusses at some length the key social virtues of benevolence
and justice, and argues that both of these have their origins in the useful
ness of such virtues. The noti o n of utility is present in A Treatise of Human
Nature, although it is within the more popular 1 7 5 1 work An Inquiry Con
cem.ing the Principles of Human Morals, the so-called Second Inquiry, that this
idea is made more explicit by David Hume. Here he develops two princi
ples, a) that which civilized people call good and obligatory is what is
apprehended and found agreeable, and b) that which is found agreeable is
found so because it is found to be of use. Hume concludes Section IV, "Of
Political Society" , by suggesting that "Common i nterest and utility beget
infallibly a standard of right and wrong among the parties concerned."
(EPM:4: 1 7 1 ) .
67
It is noteworthy that whe n Hume makes the statement about common

interest and utility, the context is a discussion of war and peace, and the
parties concerned are potentially combative. I would suggest that common
interest and utility might form a Humean ethical basis for peace education,
in that common interest and utility should be regarded as a guide to a pro
fessional ethical consideration of what ought to be considered as educa
tional objectives. Common interest is relevant in that, i rrespective of the
social context of education , there is clearly an interest of all educators in
survival . Utility is relevant i n that it is useful for our survival to teach deci
sion-makers and citizens of the future the importance of making decisions
that will support peace and work against war. It is interesting that, in the
following Section V of the Second Inquiry, Hume proposes that which is
useful does gain our approbation precisely because we believe it does serve
our interests. Peace education is likewise useful precisely and simply
because there is a reasonable belief that it does serve common interests.
3.2.3
Jeremy Bentham, Consequentialism, and Peace Education
The consequentialism of Jeremy Bentham is significant not merely for

the ideas he popularized, but also for his commitment to social and politi
cal reform. Within his 1 789 work An Introduction to Principles of Morals and
Legisla tion Bentham develops the notion that both m orality and public pol
icy ought to be governed by the principle of utility, that is, the action that
will produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Within the
opening chapter ( 1 : 1 ) , Bentham explains that nature has placed human
kind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure,
and "It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to
determine what we shall do." Our actions ought to be governed by maxi
mizing pleasure and minimizing pain, not merely for ourselves, but for the
maximum number of people. Bentham's system could best be described as
an act-utilitarianism, as he developed a felicific calculus, whereby he sug
gested that it was possible, with a series of calculations, to determine the
happiness produced by any specific action.
One of the interesting notions of Jeremy Bentham is that of the sanc
tion. He describes sanctions (Introduction, 3:2) as that which binds us to a
rule of law or to conduct. There are four sanctions that guide us-physical,
political, moral (or popular) and religious. Bentham gives examples of
each form of sanction (3:4) . If a person's house burns down due to a can
dle being left burning, that is a physical sanction. If the burning takes place
by the sentence of a political magistrate, it is a political sanction. If the
burning takes place through the judgment of God, then the sanction is
religious. However, if the burning takes place due to the want of any assis,
68
f
l
tance by a neighbor, due to some dislike of the owner's moral character,

then the event which takes place is said to have occurred due to a moral or
popular sanction. Bentham also writes extensively of sympathy and antipa
thy-it is not all that clear whether Bentham regards sympathy as another
sanction , so for our purposes we will concentrate upon four sanctions.
It is significant that Jeremy Bentham describes the moral sanction as
constituting also a popular one, and it is not difficult to see the potential
connection between Bentham's popular sanction and peace education. At
the conclusion of the Chapter 3, dealing with sanctions, Bentham asks rhe
torically (3: 1 2 ) "Does the politic al sanction exert an influence over the
conduct of [ hu] mankind?" The response from Bentham is i n the affirma
tive, although he also suggests that the popular sanction does the same.
The aim of Bentham's system is to encourage a maximization of decisions
that produce happiness and to accomplish this through social reforms.
Given that war and social i njustice produce extensive suffering (pain rather
than happiness ) , it is not difficult to see that one of the important counters
to war-making and participatory behavior in war is the moral or popular
sanction. The way to develop that sanction is through education. If it is a
valid objective of society to m aximize happiness and to minimize pain,
then it is also quite a valid obj e ctive of society to encourage and develop
that social sanction ( through education) that will also work to maximize
happiness and minimize pain. It is not difficult to place peace education as
part of Bentham's moral or popular sanction against the pain and suffering
of war and structural injustice.
The application of Benthami te ideas to the issue of peace finds a partic
ular focus on the peace writings of Jeremy Bentham, and especially his
essay 'A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace,' written in 1 789 and
published posthumously. The writings by Bentham within the field of inter
national law and peace are not well known, due in part to controversial
editing. However, there is a logical connection between Bentham's utilitar
ianism and his peace writing. Within the above essay, Bentham proposes a
reduction in European military and naval speiiding, self-government for
colonies, open international relations, and the establishment of a Euro
pean Court. What is noteworthy in the above essay is the repeated appeal
to "utility" and the "interests" of European nations. What does Bentham
mean by this? Simply that the consequences of war are disastrous. Thus he
writes at the commencement o f the essay, " . . . the wisest, nay, even the least
wise, are wise enough to ascribe the chief of their suffering to that cause,"
that is, to war. The peace plan by Jeremy Bentham arguably constitutes a
form of peace education in itself, wherein Bentham attempts to educate
public opinion towards action which will produce universal and perma
nent peace. There is a subtle acknowledgment of this educative function of
his writings, when Bentham indicates (in the Preface to the Plan) that even
lf
r
i
II
f
r
Ii
Consequentialist Ethics and Peace
Education
69
if the world was not ready for his proposal, there

was never thele ss a need
for his ideas to be discussed:
3.2.4
John Stuart Mill, Consequentialism , and Peace

Education
Jo n Stuart Mill is best know n as the pre-e

mine nt liberal philo sophe r of
the mneteenth centu ry and his 1861 woik Utilita
rianism represents a fur
t er devel opme nt ro
the work of Benth am. Mill is some times
catego
_
n ed s a rule-utilitanan, altho ugh I would
suggest that n egative rule
.
ut l tar an might be a bette r category. Mill works
on the assum ption that
uuli anan th eory not er Jy i mplie s the maxim
izatio
n of happ iness, but
_
_
the p revention
or mitigatiO n of unhappine ss" ( 1 887, p.
1 8 ) . Mill further
suggests that "To do as one would be done
by, and to Jove one's neigh bour
_
as onese lf, constltt te the Ideal perfe ction of
utilitarian mora lity" ( 1887,
P 25) However, Mill soon makes the
claim that, although it is the business
:
of ethics to tell us what our duties are, no system
of duties requi res that the
o e moti_ :e of what we do shall be a feelin
g of duty ( 1 887, p . 26) . Indee d,
nmety-nme hundredths of all our action
s are done from other m otives
and rightly so done , if the mle of duty does
not conde mn them . " Thus th
ethica l utilitarianism of Mill m ight be summ
arized as do what you want as
long as you do not harm other s, and as long
as the rule of doing good to
others does not conde mn your consc ience
. This is in accor dance with a
strong the me within arguably Mill's major work,
On Liberty, publi shed 1859,
_
and especially
Chapter 4, entitled "Of the Limits to the Auth
ority of Society
Over the Individual."
John Stuart Mill also wrote much on the
importance of educ ation and
'
espec ally liberal educa tion. Chapter 3 of
On Liberty is conce rned with
extolh ng the value of free e p ression of
divergent opini on, and, through
_
_
ut this chapter, Mill
e p a Izes the impo rtance of educa tion in
encou rag
_
mg th expressiOn of mdiVI dual opini on.
Simil arly, within Utilitarianism,
_
educatiOn fulfils n Impo rtant role. John
Stuart Mill comm ences Chapter 3
_
of Ullhtanamsm With a dramatic flour ish:
"The question is often asked, and
_ regard to
properly so, m
any suppo sed moral stand ard-Wha t is
its sanc
tion? What are the motives to obey i t?
Or more speci fically, what is the
source of its ob i ation? When ce .does
it derive its bindi ng force ?" We
_
migh
t say that this Is also very m uch a central quest
ion withi n disco urse on
peace and war. We may well agree that war
is destructive and peace desir
able, and indeed this has been attested
to throughout the twentieth cen
tury. However, what is the sanct ion again
st war? What are the motives to
obey this sanction? What is the sourc e
of obligation to such obed ience ?
When ce does the bindi ng force come from?
70
. ...
John Stuart Mill answers his own questions by suggesting there are two
sanctions that impel a person to act in accordance with the p rinciple of
utility. The external sanction is the desire for approval and fear of disap
proval, b e this from fellow human beings or from God. The i n ternal, and
most important sanction, is tha t of feeling or conscience. Importantly,
Mill suggests that it is natural f01 us to feel at least some feeling for the
good of others, as we are all social animals. He also argues that this feel
ing for others is something that can be nurtured and cultivated, through
education. Within the notion of the cultivatable inner sanction for the
good of others there is at least s ome ethical basis for peace education. We
can contend, with Mill, that as social creatures we have at least some feel
ing for o thers. We can further contend, with Mill, that this feeling for the
general good (and the preve ntion of harm to others) may b e cultivated
through education. In panicular, we can argue that we can cultivate a
concern for the prevention and mitigation of harm to others occasioned
by war and social injustice. With Mill, some persuasive arguments for
peace education emerge .
James Mill and John Stuart Mill (father and son ) wrote further on the
importance of political and i nternational education. James Mill in 1 824
argued that political education was the key-stone in liberal education
( 1 93 1 , p. 72) , although he did not elaborate on what he meant by political
education. John Stuart Mill in 1 867 expounded in more detail on the idea
of international education, or, more technically, education in interna
tional law ( 1 93 1 , pp. 1 80, 1 8 1 ) , which John Stuart Mill argued should form
a part of all liberal education. John Stuart Mill claims that education in
international law ought to be u niversal, extending to every citizen and not
merely to diplomats and lawyers, and that international law is e thical
rather than legal in nature, involving a set of morals that are accepted as
authoritative by civilized states. John Stuart Mill also sees that the scope of
such ethics is changing, as consciences of nations become more enlight
ened and as needs change. Clearly, the scope of such so-called education
in i nternational law was very much in concert with the aims of most pro
grams o f peace education, involving education in the importance of the
application of maxims of honesty and humanity to the i ntercourse of
states ( 1 93 1 , p. 1 80) .
It is noteworthy that, if one looks closely at the rationale for John Stuart
Mill's p roposals for universal education in international law, the rationale
is very much a utilitarian one. John Stuart Mill suggests that moral mles
between nations were introduced by moral sentiments of humankind or by
general interests, with the purpose of mitigating the crimes and suffering
of a state of war and to restrain governments and nations from unjust or
dishonest conduct towards one another in time of peace ( 1 93 1 , p. 1 80 ) . He
further suggests that since there are numerous relations between nations,
71
then a knowledge o f the estab lished

rules o f intern ation al morality is
essen tial to the duty of every natio n, and
therefore of every person in it
who hel s to make u th natio n, and whose
voice and feelin g form a part
of what IS publi c opm10n ( 1 9 3 1 , pp. 1 80,

1 81 ) . It is noteworthy that Mill is
not merely advocating a unive rsal educa
tion, educating individuals as to
t e ':ay the world is. Rather, h e is advocating
a unive rsal norm ative educa
tion m to what ought to happen withi n the
intern
ational spher e, in what h e
_
_
terms m
ternationa
l morality. Inter natio nal morality provides
a useful sum
mary of one important aspec t of peace
education, name ly, what ought to
_
happ en m relations between natio ns, to
mitigate suffer ing and to maximize felicity.
Withi n the discou rse on in terna tional Jaw,
John Stuart Mill posits that
.
_
mter latioi al law is a set of n ral rules accep
ted
:
by civiliz ed states . Perha ps
:
as a I eflect iOn upon the fragili ty of the civiliz
ed state, he concl udes his dis
ottrse by emph asizin g that the indiv idual
citizen has both an obligation to
_
_
_
actiO n a d ai obhga IOn to be mfor
med. Mill famo usly writes, "Let not any
:
one pac1fy h1s consc 1ence by the delus ion
that he can do no harm if h e
takes n o par , and forms n o opini on . Bad
m e n [sic] need nothi ng more to
con pass their ends, than that good men
:
should look on and do nothi ng.
He IS n t a good man who, witho ut a prote
st, allows wron g to be comm it
td 111 h1s name , and with the mean s which

he helps to suppl y, because he
will not troub le hi_ self to use his mind
o
n
the subject. It depe nds upon
_
the habit of attendmg to and looki ng into
publi c transaction s, and on the
degre e of information and solid judgm ent
respe cting them that exists in
he comm unity, wheth er the cond uct of the
natio n as a natio n, both withi n
Itself and towards others, shall be selfis h,
corru pt, and tyran nical, or ratio
n ! and enligh tened , j ust and noble " ( 1 93
1 , p. 1 8 1 ) The activist and com
mi tted nature of peace educa tion finds
a
prece dent in the appeal from
_
.Jo n S uart Mtll for education on intern
ational mora lity, and in his appeal
f01 an mformed and committed citize nry.
3.2. 5
Marx-Engels, Consequentialism, and Peace

Education
It is interesting to question wheth er the

work of Karl Marx devolved
from utilitarian assumption s. Derek Allen
( 1 973 ) , Adam Schaff ( 1 963) ,
an
fred Schm idt ( 1 971 ) have supported the
conce pt of a Marxian utili
tanam sm, altho ugh this suggestion has
been contested by writers such as
Grg B enkert ( 1 98 1 ) . The fac t that Karl

Marx engaged in criticism of
UtiiJtan msm oes not neces sarily mean
that there are not utilitarian prin
Ciples withm his program for revol ution ,just

as denu nciat ion of bourgeois
_
morality
by Marx does not necessarily mean there
are no- stron g moral and
72
, ..;:.. :
ethical underpinnings in the work of Marx. I want to suggest two argu

ments in support of the idea of Marxian utilitarianism.
The first argume n t is the nature of the project for world revolution,
perhaps most clearly presented in the 1 847 work Manifest der Kommunistis
chen PaTtie ( Communist Manifesto ) , co-authored with Friedrich Engels.
What makes the program for world revolution an arguably utilitarian pro
gram is that it championed the most populous class-the working class. It
is arguable that Marx was implicitly working on the assumption that soci
ety ought to be organized to o p timize the happiness of the greatest num
ber of people. The second a rgument concerns the calculated nature
whereby Karl Marx seeks to demonstrate that world revolution can
improve the material happiness of the majority of humankind, specifically
developed within the scope of the three-volume Das Kapital, 1 867, 1 885,
and 1 894, co-authored with Friedrich Engels. The method of calculating
surplus value, as engaged by Marx, is reminiscen t of the scientific method
ofJeremy Bentham, with his felicific calculus of any act. It is arguable that
in his program of revolution Marx applies the felicific calculus to the orga
nization of society as a whole.
The value of the Marxist critique of society for peace research lies in the
identification of the peacelessness implicit within an u njust social order.
This is articulated within Marxism through the concepts of class struggle
and class warfare, and through the Marxist rejection of an unjust status
quo. Within Manifest, Marx and Engels famously declared all history to be a
history of class struggle (MEW, 4:462 ) . This finds a correlation in the peace
research notions of structural violence and the importance of working to
overcome structural violence. The integrative notion of peace is that peace
involves both direct peace (the absence of armed conflict) and indirect
peace (the existence of just and equitable social structures) . The problem
in Marxist theory is the arguable toleration of violence in order to achieve
world revolution and i n order to achieve the classless society. The classless
society is a peaceful and just one (MEW, 4:48 1 ,48 2) , wherein all classes will
disappear. Yet the means of achieving such a peaceful and classless society
is through forcible overthrow (gewaltsamen Umsturz) of the existing social
order (MEW, 4:493) .
The toleration of violence in order to achieve the desired outcome of
the classless society can be seen in itself as an indication of the consequen
tialist ethics of Marxism, in that violence is understood ( tacitly) as an e thi
cal action to achieve the best possible outcome for the greatest number.
The problem with this is that once the goal is defined as the achievement
of a classless society, then it is difficult to control the violence, as this is
allowable in the achievement of the goal. Thus Marxism highlights one of
the weaknesses of consequentialist ethics, namely, the latent doctrinaire
and potentially murderous aspects of such ethics. The Marxian perspective
Consequential ist Eth ics and Peace Education
73
correctly recognizes that peace is more than absenc

e of war between
nation-states-peace involves a condition ofjustice . The
point of departure
for those commi tted to peace is how that just society
is attained and
whethe r one contem plates the use of violenc e to achiev
e that society.
3.3
3.3.1
Modern Consequentialism and Peace Education
Richard Hare, Consequentialism, and Peace Education
One of the more influen tial conseq uential ist/util itarian

ethicists i n
recent time has been Richard Mervyn Hare. T h e approa
ch o f Hare t o eth
cs is centred upon l anguage and method, and this has
been presented i n
Its most develop ed form in the 1 981 work Moml Thinkin
g: Its Levels, Method
and Point. In this work, Richard Hare propos es a two level
version of utili
trianism, ':orking on the basis that moral statements are
always prescrip
tive, that IS, such statem en ts indicate what we
ought to do, and
universizable, that is, such statements must be applica
ble to all. Level 1
involves intuitive thinkin g, and involves the applica tion
of prima facie prin
ciples of ethics. This is in effect a rule-utili tarianis m, and
Hare rightly sug
gests that we do this often, since in everyday life we do
not have the time to
calculate the consequences of specific actions , and since
in everyday life we
also often act under pressu re. Level 2 involves critical
thinkin g, and under
his I_llethod Hare suggests that actions should be assesse
d critically and
.
ndJVrdually, espeCia lly where there are conflic ting princip les. This level is,
111 effect, a modifi ed version of act-util
itarian ism, involvi ng a system of what
Hare called the maximization of overall preference fulfillm
ent.
The work of Richar d Hare is wide-ranging, dealing
with language and
ethodl gical issue . However Hare also dealt with issues in applied eth
ICs, and It IS not too difficu lt to see concerns about issues
of peace, war and
violence recurring in his philoso phical work. One of
the early radio broad
casts by Hare in 1 955, 'Ethics and Politics: Can I Be
Blamed for Obeying
Orders? ', dealt with the issue of what should citizen s do
when their govern
ments act immorally. In his philosophical autobiograph
y, Hare wrote of
growing up in the shadow of war (2002, p. 275 ) . Within
the 1 963 work Free
dom and Reason, he attempted to show that there can
be a reason ed
approach to dealing with violenc e and fanatic ism. I n
a 1 966 lecture in Aus
tralia, published simply under the title Peace, he addres
sed the question of
the problem of what he called the crisis of war. The
lecture comme nces
with an acknowledgme nt of the proble m of global violenc
e and the need
to find a philoso phical solutio n. At the end of the lecture
, his conclusion is
a typically utilitarian one: " . . . the only cause that can
engage the wills of
74
clear-thinking people who are trying to do what they ought to do, is the ser
vice of [hu] mankind as a whole-or, if that be impossible, of the great
number of them." ( 1 966, p. 1 7) .
The answer to the problem of violence for Richard Hare was therefore
very much a rational and utilitarian one. He championed the importance
of reason, clear-thinking and cdtical thinking in coming to resolutiOns to
moral problems. In the essay 'Philosophy and Conflict' ( 1 998, P295-305) , Hare indicates that in resolving conflict we have a clear choice
to resort to either rhetoric or reason. Philosophy can provide a tool for
the reasollable resolution of disputes by clarifying wfi'at people mean, and
thereby facilitating communication. The assumption underlying the out
look of Hare on violence is, sim ply put, that reason, clear-thinking and
critical thinking can solve conflict. Peace education is arguably one way
'
that individuals can be encouraged to resort to reason, clear-thinking and
critical thinking in dealing with conflict, be this on a personal or interna
tional leveL
The commitment of Richard Hare to the rational resolution of conflict
seems to imply support for the notion that education should be directed
towards the encouragement of peace. Moreover Richard Hare does make
more specific statements to support this notion. Within Moral Thinh ng, he
declares: "It is certainly a good thing to implant in ourselves and 111 our
children a moral antipathy to killing and other fmms of violence. A sound
critical thinker would select prima facie principles with some such content,
and a wise utili tarian educator would seek to inculcate them" ( 1 0.2, p. 73) .
Within the essay 'Philosophy and Practice: Issues in War and Peace,' pub
lished with the 1 989 collection Essa-ys on Political Morality ( l 989b, pp.
62-78) , Hare declares that "We are owadays brought up to abhor vio
lence. This was not always the case, nor is it so in all cultures. But I take it
for granted that critical thinking would justify this upbringing in our
present circumstances. That people think like this leads to th r b mg less
violence in our life , and that is a very good thing . . . . A WISe utthtanan edu
cator would seek to inculcate i nto [his/her] charges both these kinds of
intuitions: that is, both that whi c h condemns violence, and that which bids
us protect the weak, especially our own dependants" ( 1 989b, p " 6 8 } - I is
_
noteworthy that Hare makes reference in both instances to the . utthtanan
educator' seeking to inculcate such principles. The reason for this is that
killing and other forms of violence are detrimental to human happiness.
Any discussion of the moral p hilosophy of Richard Hare would not be
complete without reference to the rejection of pacifism within the work
(and life) of Hare. The Hare c ritique was also a very personal one, as dur
ing the rise of Nazism, Hare made a personal choice to reject pac ifism and
_
volunteer for the Royal Artillery. He was eventually captured at Smgapore,
and spent three years in captivity under the Japanese. It is not too difficult
i:
75
to see the impact of this unavoidably searing experie nce

in the outloo k of
Hare-he mentions in a discuss ion of pacifism that "I
speak from experi
ence of my own feelings when I was attracted by pacifism
" ( 1 989b, p. 69) ,
and later, in his philoso phical autobiography, Hare nomin
ates his decision
on whether to become a pacifist as being the central
motivation for his
conseq uent study of moral philosophy (2002, p. 275 ) . There
is no doubt
ing the depth of sinceri ty with Hare; although there are some
subtle incon
sistencies in the two-level structure of moral thinkin g he
proposes and in
his critique of pacifism.
Hare suggests that there are fundam ental intuitive moral
principles of
loyalty and nonviolence, that is, we have a natural desire
to care for our
loved ones and a natural aversion to harmin g others. Yet,
in time of war,
these two desires come into conflic t, and i t is then that
we need to employ
second-level critical thinking. H are suggests that, faced
with the alterna
tives of non-confrontation and confrontation with a force
of organiz ed and
aggressive violence, such as was the case with Nazism, critical
moral think
ing will tell us that the moral choice is to become commi
tted to violenc e to
defeat that force. He writes, in Moral Thinking, that
a pacifist is "usually
somebody who has got hold of an i ntuitive princip le forbidd
ing violence
and clings to it regardless of what other equally import
ant princip les this
compe ls him to disobey. [The pacifist] solves the conflict
of princip les, not
by critical thought, but by elevating one princip le, quite
irrationally, over
all others" ( 1 0.2, p. 1 74) . Hare goes on to say that the dispute
between pac
ifists and non-pacifists cannot be resolved at an intuitive
level, but rather at
the level of critical thinkin g. Ultimately Hare sees pacifism
as a form of
fanatic ism, a form of fanatic ism motivated by good intuitio
ns and good
intentio ns, but fanaticism neverth eless.
My own critique of Hare on the issue of pacifism is that
he assume s that
critical thought is unprob lematic . Indeed , when one
examines the think
ing of Hare on the issue of respon ses to violenc e, Hare
is paradoxically
functio ning on an intuitive rather than a critical level. By
this, I mean that
in response to the threat of organiz ed violence a critical
person will prop
erly look at all possible respon ses, let us say responses
A, B, C, D, and E.
However, under the pressure of decision-making, a person
is pressured
into thinkin g only of the option s A and B, and, indeed
, these cease to be
option s, and become alternatives. Thus, when dealing
with the problem of
organized violence, Hare presen ts the stark alterna tives
of doing nothin g
or commi tting to violenc e to defeat a threatening foe.
This represe nts a
reduction of options. Even when dealing with unprin
cipled violenc e such
as Nazism (which was determ inative in the formatio n
of personal philoso
phy for Hare) there were alternatives to the implied
passivity of pacifism.
These include d active nonviolence, principled negotia
tion, support for
concerted action with the Soviet Union , support for action
to reverse the
/<
:;;ECA mm:,l
.
/ ,.:}'-..
r.
nLi tn" iTT:\

-' ' . -,
NAC!O;.
..1<'

I
76
Peace Education : Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
foreign pol
national grievances that gave rise to Nazism, and an assertive
suggests
Hare
of
e
languag
the
icy, that is, not o n e of appeasement. Even
e
languag
The
level.
critical
a
than
rather
that he is working o n an intuitive
non
of
politics
the
n
o
se
discour
within
utilized
not
of pacifism is genera lly
cence. Hare
violent resistan ce-pre cisely because it does imply acquies
responses to
possible
only
the
are
violence
and
cence
acquies
that
assumes
chooses a
he
an,
organized violence , and thus, naturally, as a good utilitari
he was
Hare,
for
ically
Paradox
e.
commitment to military (violent ) resistanc
realize
not
did
he
h
althoug
g,
reasonin
moral
of
working on the wrong level
of philos
this. It is somewh at ironic that Hare once wrote that the majority
ists-he
ntuition
crypto-i
were
world
g
speakin
Englishthe
within
ophers
101).
inconec tly did not include himself in this category ( l 989a, p.
reject paci
I t is interesting that Hare's own account o f his decision to
of his own
instance
an
was
this
fism tends to support the contention that
raphy,
autobiog
phical
philoso
2002
his
In
category of first-level thinking.
Munich
the
of
news
the
when
Scotland
in
away
was
Hare explains that he
whether to
crisis was broadca st, and that "I gave myself 24 hours to decide
(2002,
answer"
be a pacifist, and after much agonizin g came to a negative
within
decision
a
reach
p. 276) . Why did h e decide that he needed to
to do so,
twenty-four hours? There was surely no logical and rational need
al
emotion
of
degree
some
imder
made
decision
and this is suggestive of a
sugges
not
is
It
level.
intuitive
an
on
made
decision
a
least
pressure, or at
it was an
tive, notwithstanding that Hare agonized over the decision , that
upon
based
instance of Harean second-level thinking, that is, a decision
critical thinking.
philos
Thus far, we h ave examined specific tonsequ entialist /utilitarian
pro
can
hers
philosop
these
of
work
the
r
eithe
ophers, and examin ed how
phers
philoso
these
how
or
n
educatio
peace
for
dation
n
vide an ethical fou
to exam
explicitly supported peace educatio n. However it is also possible
tradi
these
how
ine specific tradition s within education theory, so as to see
nal
educatio
these
how
and
tions work on c onseque ntialist assumpt ions,
n.
educatio
peace
for
support
ethical
traditions can also be taken to provide
3.3.2
Social Reconstructionism, Consequentialism , and Peace

Education
reform
Social reconstr uctionis m has been a major twentiet h century
ing the
movement, evide n t mainly in American educatio nal theory, advocat
through
lly
specifica
and
resolution of social problem s through educati on,
work of three
curriculum reform. Within this i nvestigation we examine the
namely John
,
tradition
this
within
g
standin
writers who are 1egarde d as
examinbefore
r,
Howeve
d.
Bramel
re
Theodo
and
,
Dewey, George Counts
Ii
I
I
77
ing this work, it is useful to examine some assumptions within social recon
structionism: a) there is an ideal society that we ought to be working
towards; b) education is a social action that has consequences, depending
on how we educate; and c) we ought to be directing education to develop
that ideal society. In summary, social reconstructionism i nvolves a norma
tive view of education, one consistent with peace education. The connec
tion with issues of peace and social j ustice is not too difficult to locate: a)
the ideal society that we ought to be working towards is one of peace and
justice, b) education is a social action that has consequences in orienting
studen ts towards the possibili ties for peace, depending upon how we edu
cate; and c) we ought therefore to be directing energy towards education
to encourage peace.
The relationship between social constructionism and peace education
can possibly be seen most clearly in the writings ofJohn Dewey, although
thus interpreting John Dewey is a hazardous en terprise, not the least so
because of the extensive nature of his writings and because he seems to say
different things at different times. "Utilitarian" and "utilitarianism" tend to
be used in a denigrating sense by Dewey, especially in view of his n on-utili
tarian theme that education is an end in itself. Nevertheless it can be
argued that the ethical underpinning forJohn Dewey's view of education is
deeply consequentialist/utilitarian, in his view of education as important
in creating a new society. This view can be seen in Article V of the bl"ief
1 897 work My Pedagogic Creed, the 1 897 work Ethical Principles Underlying
Educal!on, the 1 9 1 5 work (completed with Evelyn Dewey) Schools of Tommc
row, the 1 9 1 6 work Democracy and Education., especially Chapter 9, and in
1 922 work Reconstruction in Philosophy, especially Chapter 8. The new society
that Dewey seeks to create is a democratic one, based on co-operation. The
method of creating this new society is also democratic, in that Dewey con
sistently champions a democratically-oriented educational method as the
means for attaining such a society.
Within the programmatic 1 9 1 6 work Democracy and Education., John
Dewey does not refer to peace education as such, al though he does see
education as crucial in support for democracy, and the democratic society
is a peaceful one. Toward the conclusion of the book, Dewey writes of three
specific aims of education (MW9: 1 25- l 30 ) , n amely, industrial compe
tence, civic efficiency or good citizenship, and cultivation of culture. The
notion of civic efficiency raises the question of efficient for what? The Dew
ern answer is that the society such an education seeks to support is a par
_
tiCipatory and co-operative society, or, a peaceful society. What Dewey calls
education for civic efficiency is not different from more modem under
standings of peace education, especially given the context of the book and
thmst of Deweyan thought. The Deweyan p rogram for democratic educa
tion centered upon the teaching of geography and history, and on the
78
Foundations
Ethical and Philosophical
Peace Educatio n: Exploring
;
;
or chauvinistic per spe c.

b' ects not from a nati ona list
f th 0
h
e s of war
s to
perspective eek ing solu tion
r th er 1
,
l
per auo n a n d peace (MW
and con flict and seek ing co-o
and p u hsh ed
.
cy and Education was wntten
ocra
Dem
o acci den t that
I
onc e : s
al
t
cen
a
ally
s n atur
time of global war, an d thu
dur
con
me
at
of
ce
rren
recu
a
enti ng
.
education can assist in prev
hmg e . eduteac
of
task
.
the
t
tha
is
ch
roa
.
pro
. blem WIth the Deweyan app. . . .
e t of the mdw1dual
d
1
cation is very reli ant u po 1
ften at risk. This is
h 0
teac her or sch oo1 , and as
st
h 11 gt
e
l
inv
gram
pro
Deweyan
-e
especially the case whe n the
s
p
n
.
.
.
es and whe n th ere can
mg natw nar1St perspectiv
.
a particular nati ona listi c para
to teach m ccordance with
.
upon teachers
tne of
al
l
'
f
e
t
h
1at
Wl
s.
etle
.
.
libe ral- dem ocratic soo
d1gm, even m suppoedly
nce
. . .
D eey h'Ighlights is the imp orta
s
atlve
lmtl
on
cati
.
the pea ce edu
h
teac
tard
egt
sat
.
peace edu cati on, orde_r to
of com mitlTients of stat es to
tco
ents
rum
of recent inte rnational mst
ers . This is exactly the value
IS
o
ent
cem
men
com
as outl ined at the
ting states to peace education,
l y unknown , m one sens e,
ents are Ie 1at'vel
rum
inst
such
that
.
study. The fact
tds for teac hents prov id potential safegua
does not matter. These inst rum
peace education.
.
ers and scho ols to com mit to
, an d n d eed
tic soci ety in the work of D:wey
The notion of the democra
. .
the time of
.
sts, seems now dated. Sm.ce
of othe r sooal reconstrucuonl
from both
,
d
1ze
d'
an
pag
pro
n
.
cracy h as bee
Dewey the con cep t of demo
c l
c
t
c
the
d
ee
d
n
I
.
rces
sou
alist
apit
ral-c
libe
and
_
sociali t
_
_
ena I t
dJSQ'l
" nse d Imp
ist or h' b eral) was one tha t has
ly anti
lute
reso
was
ey
Dew
_
L 945 Perio d.
superpowers dun ng the post
.
ocracy
dem
f
o
view
1St
d.
gan
opa
.
a poh ucal-pr
.
Impe rial ist in his outlook, and
dem ocnbe
desc
to
ed
tend
he
er
Rath '
h'
would hve b :en repugnant to
ting associated
hys l term s. such as constitu
a
met
ost
alm
tn
s
ume
at
racy
ard Ror ty, a
Rich
(MW 9 . 93)
.
- n
ated exp ene
living and conj oint commmtc
said that
has
ey
De
'
with
n
much m com
pragtnat'IS t philosopher w1 th
e useful
mor
in
ld
wor
the
ribe
n ted to desc
s
those s
suggest
Rorty
what?" ,
t
questio n "useful for
e P
terms.
future
er
bett
a
.
excep t " useful to create
Deweyans have noth mg to say
t this
wha
y
l
xact
e
of
mng
s on to say that the defi
( 1999
J
: p 2 7 ) . Rorty goe
he H
from
w
kno
we
r,
ev
How
.
not poss ible

fut:l W l.lld be like. is simply
m
lmp
an
was
a wor ld . free from vwlence. It
work of Dewey th at It would be
a wor ld.
such
te
crea
to
on
cati
.
tant aspe ct of the work of. edu
. .
.
nts 1s nota.
mg of George Sylvester Cou
.
. '
The soci al reconstructtomst wnt
equenttal 1st b asts an d
cons
th
t
h
o
l
t
u
b
ion,
ble for its clar ity and pass

licat ion Dare the
a rly I entl e - T e 1932 pub
concerns for peace can be cle_
co iltion of three addresses,
Is a pamp
School Build a New Social Order_
espau of the Great Dep ress ion.
ence an
give n in the depths of the vwl
:::
;:: ,;
. .
: :; ;: : ;:: :
ofJohn
: ::
; :e
Joh n
::: :
:!: l
: J:: :
II
79
Counts wrote ( 1978, p. 26) "That teachers should deliberately reach for
power and then make the most of their conquest is my firm conviction . "
Teachers should be open about influencing t h e "social attitudes, ideals and
behavior" of the coming generation. The motivation for this appeal from
Counts was very much based inj ustice and peace. He wrote that "If there is
to be n o break in our tradition of violence , if a bold and realistic program
of education is not forthcoming, we can only anticipate a struggle of
increasing bitterness, terminating in revolution and destruction" ( 1978, p.
49) . The new social order that Counts envisaged was one which would
move away from violence. Implicit within his program is the assumption
that what teachers and educators do does have consequences in shaping a
future world. It is therefore the responsible course of action that teachers
should commit themselves to creating a new social order, one of j ustice
and one which marked a break in the tradition of violence.
Theodore Brameld was another of the more vocal proponents of social
reconstructionism. Brameld emphasized the importance of culture in pro
ducing change and the importance of education in the creation of a world
civilization ( 1 965, pp. 1 03--- 1 1 9 ) . The necessity for such a development was
the prospect of nuclear annihilation ( 1 965, p. 1 05 ) . Brameld suggests that
social reconstructionism was utopian and partialist in nature, although it
was a d efensible partiality ( 1971 , p. 468) . The objective of the Brameldian
philosophy of education was a global democratic society, <;me of peaceful
co-existence of differing viewpoints. Underlying the philosophy of Bra
meld, h owever, is a u tilitarian ethic: schools ought to educate to encourage
the welfare and wellbeing of all, not j ust a limited elite, and not just the
welfare and wellbeing of those being educated. Often this utilitarian con
cept of education was articulated in terms of education supporting democ
racy ( 1950, p. 223 ) . In the utopian commitment to a peaceful future and in
the consequentialist commitment of education to that cause, Brameld
anticipated many of the central concerns of peace education.
One of the criticisms that may be leveled at social reconstructionism (and
peace education) is that an educational progtam aimed at changing society
is overtly political and thus not appropriate for education. However advo
cates of such approaches can claim that the nature of such programs are not
so much political, as moral. Thus, when we say there is a danger of nuclear
war and that we need to teach about iliis danger, the assumption within such
a proposition is a consequentialist ethical one, namely, that by teaching
young people about nuclear war they might in the future make political deci
sions to move away from reliance on nuclear weapons and perhaps also
become committed to nuclear disarmament. The content of such programs
of education may well be political, and may well have political ramifications.
The foundation for such programs, nevertheless, remains moral.
80
3.3.3
Education
Critical Literacy, Critical Pedagogy, and Peace
have been taken up by

Many of the themes of social reconstructionism
the scope of this
within
not
is
It
y.
literac
l
critica
more recent proponents of
of critical literacy, althou gh it
investigation to give a survey of the program
l literacy rests stmng ly upon
is suffic ient for our purposes to say that critica
educator Paulo Freire . The
the writing and pedagogy of the Brazi lian
education for critica l liter
of
am
essential quest ion to ask abou t the progr
tion so impor tant? Or,
educa
such
is
y
h
111
is
acy, from an ethica l stand point ,
oppression (to use
from
tion
libera
is
why
way,
er
to put the quest ion anoth
answer is that, within pro
a comm on Freirian theme ) so important? The
that there is an ideal soci
grams for cdtica l literacy, there is an assum ption
specifically, there is an
more
ety that we ough t to be working towards, and,
gh critica l literacy.
throu
ating
facilit
ideal society that we ought to be
ption that teach
assum
the
is
y
literac
l
critica
Impli cit within the program of
a libera ting or a
either
be
can
tion
educa
that
es,
ing does have conse quenc
dialogical meth ods) an either
domesticating force. Education (throu gh
t the existing status quo. The
encou rage stude nts to quest ion or to accep
one. Such an ethics advo
ialist
ethics behin d critical literacy is a conse quent
st welfare, towards cre
greate
the
ng
cates utilizi ng education towards creati
be directed towards
to
ought
and
be
can
ating a new society. Educa tion
social libera tion.

pt and practi ce of critica l
There is an additi onal releva nce for the conce
on comm itmen t to creati ng a
literacy to peace educa tion, beyond a comm
y is understanding and demys
better future . A key eleme nt in critica l literac
unica te. In this case, mil
comm
tions
tifying the codes through which institu
own code that tends to
their
with
te
unica
itary and state institutions comm
processes of war and interna
mystify exactly what is happe ning within the
be war within military and
tional relatio ns. The discourse used to descri
language avoids the reality that
strategic studies is highly techn ocratic: such
ns, as argued strongly by
perso
war involves the killing and maiming of
s also tends to avoid
politic
of
age
langu
l
Elaine Scany ( 1 985 ) . The officia
is not too difficu lt to
It
ion.
privat
of
es
realiti
the
the realities of confli ct and
or techn ocratic language for
see the reason ing behind the use of obtuse
realities of violen t confli ct,
confli ct. Such language tends to mystify the
more palatable to the pub
ct
thereby makin g comm itmen t to violen t confli
in that armed confli ct in
ely,
pectiv
lic. This discourse even w01ks retros
as a chess game. One sim
,
terms
al
erson
nonp
in
teview tends to be viewed
stify the language surro undin g
ple function of peace educa tion is to demy
tion consti tutes a comp onent
war and confli ct. In this sense peace educa
within the overall task of critica l literacy.
ated with transforma tional
The idea of a critical pedagogy is often associ
within the scope of this
not
is
It
x.
Girou
y
educa tion, as advocated by Henr
Conseque ntialist Ethics and Peace Education
81
iscusion to gi\:e a comprehensive analysis of the work of Giroux, which at
t1mes 1s repetitive d cliched. The ideas of Giroux are informed very

much by erman critical theory as well as Freirean critical theory, and cen
ters u on 1deas of the recovery of the subjective, resistance, critique, and,
_ 1 ecently, the encouragement of authentic modes of cultural expres
Ole
SIOn. There IS a connecti n to peace and peace education through the con
cept of tolerance of different modalities of expression and differing
.
opmwns. However the most telling concept within the work of Giroux rel
evant to consequentialism and relevant to peace education, is that o the
teacher as the transformative intellectual (Aronowitz & Giroux 1 985
36, 37) The concept of the teacher as the transfonnative i telle t
assums a) that there is a desirable future common social good, and b ) that
_ the means of attaining that common social good. It is impossi
educatiOn IS
ble for education not to be political.
0 1e of th ways of examil:ing Giroux's critical pedagogy is through
ext I nal and ernal perspectives on such a pedagogy. From an external
_
P I pectJve, cnt1cal pedagogy implies that those involved are prepared to
C! It! que the status uo and to e nvisage alternative futures. From an i nter
.
? al perspect_ve, cnucal
pedagogy implies that the student will have a voice
111 the learm g e perience t at he/she engages in. One of the positive
aspects of Guoux s program IS the emphasis on the empowerment of the
mdivldual, through the recovery of his/her self-expressiOn. Cu1 ture ought
.
not to be 1 egred as somethmg that is mediated to the individual and
_
wh1ch the mdlVldul assively accepts. Culture ought to be regarded as
.
somethmg that the mdlVIdual participates i n and creates. Without such cul
tural autonomy there can be no challenge to the dominant culture of vio
le e tha t exists in the world. These external and internal aspects of
ntcl ped gogy are indeed part of the whole. It is precisely because the
mdlV!dual IS emp?wered within the learning process, that he/she is
empowered to cnt1que the status quo and to envisage alternative futures.
Thus the classroom ought to function as a microcosm of the peaceful soci
ety one seeks to institute.
3.3.4
Richard Peters, Consequentialism, and Peace Education
It may seem m usual to claim the support of Richard Stanley Peters for
_ eth1cs
_ of education . Indeed, the important 1 966 work
any consequent1ahst
can be taken as a n on-consequentialist Kantian exposi
tion of educatwn. Peters does not mention social reconstructionism
although the context of the book is the debate over the purposes of educa
1
Lion.
can be taken as a refutation of the cent Ia] SOCia
.
.
reconstructwmst assertion that education should be overtly directed
!lues and Eductwn
Et/ucs and Education
82
towards the external goal of creating a better society. After all, Peters does
develop the idea that education has an intrinsic value, as an initiation into
worthwhile activities. Yet, I believe one can argue that Peters supports a
consequentialist approach to education, although one perhaps more sub-
tle than the sometimes suident appeal of the social reconstructionists.
Within the opening chapter of the monograph, he concedes that it is
implicit within the notion of education that one is working towards per
sonal if not social betterment. Within the concluding chapter of the mono
graph, he engages the issue of democracy and education, suggesting that i t
is important a person be initiated into the practices and uaditions of
democracy. The means may change with Peters. Ultimately, however, he
too believes, despite his protestations to the contrary, that education has a
specific purpose-otherwise, there would be no need to discuss the rela
tionship between democracy and education.
The discussion by Peters on the normative aspect of education, at the
commencement of Ethics and Education, is paradoxically a possible guide to
how a consequentialist ethics of education may provide some philosophical
support for peace education. Peters writes that education "implies that
something worthwhile is being or has been intentionally transmitted in a
morally acceptable manner" ( 1 966, p. 25) . The key to understanding this
statement is the important q ualification that Peters makes, namely, that
that which is being transmitted (in this instance we might say an under
standing of the importance of co-operative and harmonious relationships
between individuals and groups) ought to be transmitted in a morally
acceptable manner. Exactly what is a morally acceptable manner is
summed up in the notion of autonomy. Education involves respect for the
autonomy of the individual person, and it is this that sets education apart
from mere training. Richard Stanley Peters, through his writings; is not
averse to education with the aim of creating a more peaceful world. He is
however very cautious as to how that is translated into specific educational
aims and/or practices . .
3.3.5
tion
Nonviolenc e, Consequentialism, and Peace Educa
identifiable conne ction

It is not surpri sing that there should be an
that consequential
given
tion,
between conse quentialism and peace educa
within the western
pt
attem
ical
histor
the
of
ist assum ptions under lie much
limitin g war. The
and
ng
standi
under
for
basis
tradition to p rovide a moral
those of proportionality and
historical criteria for jus ad bellum, especially
ia forjus in bellum, espec ially
prospects for succe ss, and the historical criter
to limit innoc ent casua lties,
is,
that war must be waged discrim inately, that
decision to judge the ethiaking
war-m
all look to the conse quenc es of the
83
cal nature of the decision. The requirements of proportionality and proba

ble success mean that the anticipated good consequences of going to war
cannot be outweighed by the bad caused within the war or as a result of the
war. The prospects for success criterion means that there ought to be rea
sonable prospects for success. Without all of these criteria being satisfied,
war cannot be considered just.
Within the tradition of nonviolence there is also a strong element of
consequentialist ethics. Nicholas Gier ( 2004, pp. 1 46-149) asks whether
nonviolence ought to be regarded as an 'enabling' virtue, in effect, a qual
ity of character with certain consequences. It is true that much of the
teaching from nonviolent proponents, such as Mohandas Gandhi and Mar
tin Luther King, is strongly agent-centred: the peace-maker must be the
peace that he/she wishes to establish. The reason for this, however, is that
this form of resistance works: nonviolence has utility value. It was thus that
Gandhi wrote that overcoming violence with counter-violence would pot
be successful ( 1 971 ) . The consequence o f counterviolence is the escalation
of violence. Gandhi's answer to violence was nonviolence. Gandhi does not
use the language of consequentialist or utilitarian ethics as such. Yet an
important element within the nonviolence tradition is that nonviolence
ought to be adopted due to its utility. The popular hagiographical image
that is applied to the pioneers of nonviolence is something that has been
applied by others. It is not within the essence of nonviolene as such. Gan
dhi himself saw his approach as being practical and utilitarian.
The consequentialist theme within the teaching of Martin Luther King
can be discerned in his final book, VV11.ere Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Co11;,
mu.nity ?, p t lished the year before his assassination and reflecting his grow
mg opposition to the wat in Vietnam. The book itself is an exercise i n
peace education, both in the sense that i t advocates peace education, a ,ev
olution in values ( 1 968, p. I l l ) , and in the sense that it seeks to educate
about the importance of peace. King argues for the need for a commit
ment to addressing global poverty and the need for an understanding of
the communality of humankind, as inhabiting a world household . .King
argues that the choice is between nonviolent coexistence and violent c
annihilation ( 1 968, p. 1 9 1 ) , and that visi ting violence upon violence c an
never be effective, as the results or consequences of violence are even m o re
violence. The answer to violence, according to King, is love ( 1 968, pp. 62,
63) . Yet much of the rationale behind the employment of such an ethic is a
c?nsequentialist one, in that the consequences of failing to commit to non
VIOlence and of continuing the violence of exploitation, militarism and rac
ism will be disastrous.
he consequentialist theme can be discerned in much contemporary
from a peace perspective. Adam Curle ( 1 995, pp. 9-2 1 ) sees the
wntmg
origins of violence in the myth that possessing something can produce
r
84
inner happiness o r contentm ent. That which one might want to possess
could be material, such as in the case of goods or territory, or it may be a
condition , such as in the case of attaining revenge. The conseque nce of
using violence to obtain inner happiness or contentm ent is inevitably dis
appointm ent, and yet the power of the myth is such that the temptation to
violence remains. The obverse of this is an examinat ion of the conse
quences of nonviolen ce, somethin g made more difficult due to the power
ful popular cultural image of nonviolence as being noble yet ineffective.
Many are involved in the exercise to counter this cultural image and have
written of the effective conseque nce of the use of nonviolen t resistance
this century, with Gene Sharp ( 1 973), Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall
( 2000) as prominen t. Each of the above are, in effect, engaged in an infor
mal process of peace education , informing their respective readerships of
the negative conseque nces of violence or the effective consequences of
nonviolen ce.
3.4
3.4.1
Summation
Strengths and Weaknesses of Consequentialism
It is not within the scope of this disci1ssion to give a detailed review of

the recent criticisms of conseque ntialism. It is instructive, however, to note
that the critiques of conseque n tialism often use examples involving vio
lence. The problem of conseque ntialism can be neatly summarized by sug
gesting that it is a doctrine that demands too much, the problem of
overdemandingness , and a doctrine that demands too little, the problem
of underdem andingness. As James Wood Bailey puts it, consequentialism
can be both a horrible and an alienating doctrine ( 1 997, pp. 1 43-1 47) .
Conseque ntialism demands too much in that it is theoretically an
unbounded ethical paradigm. If our actions are to be determined by the
greatest good of the greatest number, then this leaves little scope for self
interest or even for consideration of those close to us. From the perspec
tive of a commitm ent to world peace, one may claim this is precisely what is
needed. We need to encourage a global perspective. The appeal to war
rests often upon self-interest or at least upon a limited national interest.
However, technically, if our actions are to be determined by strict conse
quentialist criteria, this would leave little room for genuine self-conce rn
and for concern and action for those close to us. Conseque ntialism is argu
ably an unrealistic paradigm, especially for peace and peace education.
The paradox of conseque ntialism is that it is possible to argue that, as an
ethical system, it also demands too little. Good ends can be used to justify
85
any means. If the Ciiteria of ethical judgm e n t is the universal good, then
under such a system it is quite permissible to contemplate violence against
an individual to achieve the justifiable ends of the good of the whole.
Indeed, the vast panorama of mass killing within recent modern history,
sometimes known as democide, can be argued as the practical outworking
of such consequentialist ethics. Once one justifies the killing of one inno
cent person in producing a future utopian society, then one can easily jus
tify the killing of a million. War itself can be justified from the same basis.
One can argue that war as an institution is directed towards creating a bet
ter society for the future, be that in democratic or national definitions.
Once one establishes that one is prosecuting war to achieve a better society,
then anything becomes permissible. This can be the death of one individ
ual or the obliteration of whole cities. Bernard Williams puts the situation
quite succinctly when he suggests ( 1 973, p . 9 3 ) that consequentialism has
no limitations.
The Dilemma of the Guest's Privilege, as related by Bernard Williams
and discussed in the earlier chapter on virtue ethics, also gives a useful
insight into the problems of consequentialism for issues of peace and vio
lence ( 1 973, p. 98) . The guest, Jim, has the choice of personally shooting
one hostage or witnessing twenty hostages shot. Jim may well hesitate,
although, as Bernard Williams explains, "The men against the wall, and the
other villages, u nderstand the situation, and are obviously begging him to
accept. What should he do?" (99 ) . Williams goes on to suggest that, from a
consequentialist rationality, the answer is simple. Jim should go ahead and
shoot one of the prisoners. That way, only o n e person dies, rather than the
whole group being shot.
Williams, in my opinion, rightly suggests that the problem with the con
sequentialist solution to the above dilemma ignores the effect of the action
upon the integrity ofJim and ignores also the precedence effect. By killing
even one captive, Jim becomes complicit in the action of violence, and thus
has compromised his own integrity. The fact that nineteen captives have
been saved does not change this compromise of integrity. Moreover, the
killing of the one prisoner has also served to legitimate violence. P1ior to
Jim's decision to kill the one captive, there was only one actor committed
to violence-the military commander. Now, with Jim's decision to kill the
one captive, admittedly from a motive to save the remaining nineteen,
there are two actors committed to violence. O ne could argue that what Wil
liams sees as the consequentialist solution ( killing one captive) , is flawed
both from an internal perspective, that is, fro m the personal perspective of
the person involved, and from an external perspective, from the wider
social ramifications, that is, beyond the scenario played out.
The scenario of the twenty captives provides an interesting insight into
the complexities of consequentialism. However I want to suggest that a
86
wider interpretation of consequentialism is needed, or at lest one th t

.
takes into consideration cultural factors as well as isolated actions. Wnhm
the above scenario of the twenty captives, a ful l understanding of the con
sequences of the action would perhaps suggest, contrary to wha Williams
proposes, that the correct consequentialist action is to refuse to kill the sol
i tal)' captive, i ndicating to the military commander exactly why one refuses
to do so, and allowing the twenty to be killed, albeit under protest. Interest
ingly enough, the nature of the protest to the military commander would
also be consequential-explaining to the military comm nde1 that t e
consequences of violence (shooting the twenty risoners wtll not be doctl
.
ity, but the l i kelihood of counter-violence and 111surrect10n. he action of
not killing the captive is the action which, under t ese orcumstances,
would best re-enforce a culture of peace, and thus ultimately result 111 the
greatest good for the greatest number. In effect th agent would be engag
.
ing in an action of peace education. In engagmg 111 peace e ucatJon, :ve
are doing just such an action of explanation, namely, explammg that VIO
lence tends to produce furthe r violence, that is, a cycle of violence.
One of the ways of thinking about a consequentialist rationale for peace
education is to see peace education as demystifying the rhetoric surround
ing war and inj ustice, and in pointing out the true co nsequences of the
. .
.
_
forces which lead to organized violence. O ne of the msights of Rhemholcl
:.
,..,
_)
Niehbur, especially in his 1 932 work Moral Man and Irnm.oral Society, is the
ambiguous nature of patriotism. Patriotism on an individ i l level is an
.
admirable quality. This may well involve the desire of an mdivi ual to ght
and protect his/her family and friends. However, on the wtder soCietal
level this quality becomes clestmctive, as it involves a will ngness to destroy
others, against whom the individual has no personal gnevance, and who
are most probably operating from the same desire to rotect fa ily a d
.
friends. Peace education can therefore be thought of as mformmg mdivid
uals as to the social conseque nces of beliefs which on an individual level
may well seem innocuous and even laudable.
Ultimately, one of the strongest arguments for a consequentialist ethics
undergirding of peace education is the realization that th re are educa
tional consequences from violence. Violence produces vwlence. Thus
peace education can be thought of as a countervailing endeavor to th e
.
intrinsic educative force of violence. One powerful Illustration of thts
comes from John Keegan's discussion of the psychology of Ado f Hitler.
.
Keegan asks how was it that Hitler could so disregard the fate of millwns of
his own soldiers, let alone the millions whom he regarded as subhuman or
unworthy of life . The answer from Keegan is stark: the experience of Hitler
during World War One had trained him for this. Keegan writes
p. 3 1 0 ) that "the human connection between the holocaust of the Ftrst
World War and the holocaust of the concentration camps must seem uncle-
(19? 9,
87
niable to anyone who can confront the visual evidence." War conditions
individuals to killing. In extreme circumstances, war conditions i ndividuals
to industrialized killing. Therefore, if violence itself constitutes a form of
education for further violence, such a situation requires a concerted and
deliberate education for peace to break that cycle of violence.
3.4
.2
Recapitulation
In conclusio n, consequentialism, as with other rationales for peace educa

tion, does have its limitations. Taken in isolation, consequentialism involves
the temptation towards an acceptance of violence in order to initiate peace.
Usually this acceptance of violence is only deemed to be minimal, yet such
acceptance can i tself be normative. Nevertheless, conseque ntialism as an
eth
ical system represents a powerful ethical basis for peace education . Put sim
ply, if we want to avoid the disastrous and painful consequences of violence
and injustice in the future, we need to educate for peace now. Indeed, when
we say that there is a danger of war in the future and that we need to teach
about this danger, the assumption within such a proposition is a conseque
n
tialist one, namely, that by teaching persons about war they might in the
future make political decisions to move away from war. Interestingly, the con
sequentia list approach to peace education finds links in other approaches
to
curriculum and education, such as social reconstructionism, critical l iteracy
and critical pedagogy. Overall, the conseque ntialist approach to peace edu
cation can be summed up in that if there is a social danger, then we have
a
responsib ility to educate about this danger, so that future generations might
be able to do something about the danger. Within limitations, conseque ntial
ism offers a powerful rationale for teaching peace.
C HAPTE R 4
CON SERVATIVE
POLITICAL ETHICS
AND PEACE EDUCATION
4. 1
4. 1 . 1
... ;
. .
The Revival of Conservative Political Ethics
Conservative Political Theory and Ethics
Another recent philosophical revival has been in conservative political

thought, exemplified through writers such as Michael Oakeshott ( 1 962) ,
Anthony Quinton ( 1 978) and Roger Scruton ( 1 980, 2002) . Conservative
political thought can be regarded as commencing as a self-conscious entity
only after the French Revolution, as a reaction to the challenges of the Rev
olution and as a reaction to the French Enlightenment. The recent nature
of conservative political thought as such is somewhat imnic, given the fact
that conservatism emphasizes continuity with the past. It can be argued
that prior to the Reformation all thought was conservative, in that the pos
sibility of radical change could not be seriously entertained. Furthermore,
the leaders of the Protestant Reformation did not plan radical c hange as
such; the original protest of the Reformation was simply that, a protest
against perceived corrupt practices within the Catholic Church, and the
desire was to reform the Church rather than to create new churches. In the
mid to late twentieth century there has been a revival in what might be
called intellectual conservatism, although admittedly not with the high
profile which other political ideologies e nj oy. As conservative wdters such
Peace Education: ExjJloring Ethical rmd Philosophical Foundations, pages 89-1 1 7

89
90
Peace Education Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
as Roger Scruton ( 1 980, p. 26) have pointed out, the overwhelming disad
vantage of conservatism is that it does not have an explicit or obvious idealistic appeal.
One interesting semantic point in discussing conservative political thought
is the extent to which one may validly refer at all to conservative political the
ory and conservative political ethics. The notion of conservative political the
ory as such is an extremely problematic one, as conservative political thought
tends to be extremely antagonistic to theory. Within conservative political
thinking, the emphasis is that how we act should be governed by expetience
rather than theory as such. It is possible to make too much of this atheoretical
nature of conservatism. Clearly once one says that one will avoid all theory,
then, paradoxically, that very assertion becomes a theory in itself. Technically,
one cannot avoid ideology completely. Thus, it is possible to refer to conser
vative political theory, although in most i nstances writers within the tradi
tion refer to conservative political thought. How then is it possible to refer
to conservative political ethics? Although conservative writers suggest that
we should link political behaviot with the past and that we should avoid
rationalism in politics, conservative political writers, nevertheless, do make
some normative claims about human behavior. This normative behaviour is
otherwise known as ethics, and thus it is quite valid to refer to a conserva
tive political ethics, as the ethics reflecting the emphases within conserva
tive political thought or theory.
4.1 .2
Intellectual Political Conservatism
In any discussion on political conservatism, an important and necessary

distinction is between popular and i n tellectual political conservatism.
Sometimes a distinction between the established paleo-conservatism and
more recent neo-conservatism i s drawn, although the popular versus intel
lectual distinction seems to be the more useful. Popular political conserva
tism is perhaps best represented by American political conservatism,
although there are representations of this within the writing of other coun
tries. Simply, popular conservative political thought is that which empha
sizes nationalism and a high degree of military preparedness, and even a
willingness to commit to mili tary action. Popular conservative political
thought also involves a commitment to the status quo in matters of the di
tribution of resources, and to the issue of social inequality. My argument ts
that in this regard there is a marked difference between conservative popu
lar thought and conservative i ntellectual thought. There is a sup rficial
commonality through the notion of p reserving connectedness With the
past, although I would argue that, properly understood, conservatism does
not involve a commitment to the status quo or indeed a commitment to
Conservative Political Ethics and Peace Education
91
the maintenance o f the advantages o f a privileged class. Further, I would

argue that conservatism does not entail a commitment to militarism.
Indeed, even the name itself would suggest a political outlook that is averse
to war. One can hardly be committed to conserving the social order and
continuity if one is committed to war.
4.1.3
Preview
There is something at least superficially counter-intuitive about the sug

gestion that conservative political ethics form or might form an ethico
philosophical foundation for peace education, or that peace education
might be based upon conservative politi cal ethics. Yet such an apparent
contradiction dissipates when one examines what constitutes i ntellectual
political conservatism and its e thical implications. The themes that emerge
when one examines major contributors to conservative political theory are
the importance of social order and an aversion to precipitous social
change. With each of the contributors to conservative political theory, the
implications for a conservative political ethics and for peace education is
assessed. One of the key areas to be examined in conservative peace theory.
It is of course highly appropriate that, in any discussion on conservatism,
one should be engaged in assessing the thought of individuals from the
past, as continuity with the past and reliance of tradition is a key aspect of
conservative thought. I conclude with an evaluation of the strengths and
weaknesses of conservative political ethics for peace education, and some
observations on the commonality between peace education and conserva
tive political ethics.
4.2
4.2.1
Classica l Conservative Politica l Ethics and Peace

E ducatio n
Plato, Conservative Politics Ethics, and Peace Education
The role of Plato as an originator of thought within the western tradi

tion is such that it is impossible to engage in any thorough discussion of
conservatism without an analysis of the i n fluence of Plato. The conserva
tive emphasis on order and a strong state, albeit a state with limitations,
can be discerned in Politeia and also in Laws. The theory of forms (Politeia,
5:476-480, 7:521-525, and 10:596a-597e) can be seen as reflecting or
even anticipating the conservative emphasis on the importance of connec
tion with the past and with traditional ideas, as such ideas are representa
tive of unchanging truth. In a sense, peace can be thought of as a form or
92
Peace Education . Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
ideal. We are peaceful in that we participate or contribute to the realiza

tion of that form or ideal. However, like so many conservative philoso
phers, there is a hidden or implicit agenda of social idealism within the
work of Plato. Plato writes of an ideal society with three classes: a) the
guardians or rulers, b) the auxiliaries or policy/military, and c ) the pro
ducers or farmers and workers. It is true that the Platonic ideal is static, in
that one is born into one of the above classes. However, Plato nevertheless
does engage in a normative p rescription for society and the state, with
such a normative state providing for at least an internally peaceful or "har
monious" society o r polis.
Plato was not a pacifist. Leon Craig writes of a "subtle ambience of war"
pervading Politeia ( 1 994, p. 22) . Yet peace is arguably a central concern for
Plato, and much of the enthusiasm of Plato for order and stability can be
explained through his own experience of the breakdown of Athenian soci
ety, and the impact of the Peloponnesian Wars. The central concern in the
Politeia can be iden tified as justice, and indeed within Book 1 there are a
number of definitions of justice. On a closer reading, however, it is argu
able that the concern f01- justice translates into a concern for peace. For
instance, Polemarchus gives a conventional definition of j ustice as doing
good to friends and harm to enemies ( 1 : 332c-333e ) . Thrasymachus
( l :343b-344a) describes the vir tue of doing injustice, using the analogy of
shepherds to rulers. He argues that those who do injustice are always
advantaged, and yet doing justice is always praised. Thrasymachus con
cludes his speech by indicating ( 1 :344c) that "it is not fearing to do injus
tice, but fearing that they will undergo it, which makes individuals give
injustice hard names . . . .injustice, when in sufficient degree, is mightier,
freer and a greater thing than justice. Justice is the good of the stronger,
and i 1ustice is what does good to oneself." As Julia Annas comments
( 1 98 1 , p. 45) , the remaindei- of PolitRia, from this passage onwards, is
devoted to arguing that the view that it pays to be unjust is foolish.
It is quite significant that, w i thin Politeia, Socrates rejects the view ofjus
tice as expressed by Thrasymachus and Polemarchus. The centrality of self
interest which underpins the views ofjustice as expressed by both interloc
utors is quite crucial also to consideration of the issue of peace. There is a
strong element of Realpolitik to both views. Plato (through Socrates)
counters the self-oriented eth i cs of both Thrasymachus and Polemarchus
by arguing that co-operation works, through the institution of the ordered
and harmonious city, that is, the peaceful society. It is, however, a society
that is still in a state of continued antagonism towards other societies. It is
noteworthy that Plato sees education, and specifically philosophical educa
tion for the guardian class, as crucial for maintenance of the harmonious
city. From a con temporary perspective, one could suggest that the co-ope1
ative internal world of the c ity-state which Socrates maps out could be
93
extended to global boundaries. The philosophical education which

Socrates describes can be taken as equivalent to peace education, albeit a
limited version, in that within peace education the importance of under
standing and co-operation is central.
4.2.2
Aristotle, Conservative Political Ethics, and Peace Education
The contribution of Aristotle to conservatism is somewhat different to
hat o Jato. Authority for Plato is rational, whereas for Aristotle auth01ity
empmcal. Thus, we learn about ethics not so much from the sophists, but
rather from habit or doing. Herein lies the conservative emphasis on prac
tice, on the experience of the past in j udging moral and political issues, and
the aversion to theorizing. However the aversion to theorizing is not a total
istic one-like most conservative intellectuals, Aristotle, paradoxically, theo
tizes about the limitations of theory. In the disjointed Metaphysics, and
especially Book 1 , Aristotle emphasizes that it is fro m experience (empeiria)
that individuals develop knowledge/skill (episteme) and artistry ( techne). It is
an epistemology which contrasts with notions which suggest knowledge is a
matter of discovering existing patterns. Within Books 7-9, Aristotle seems to
reject the idea of a universal substance, suggesting rather that each thing or
object has an essence of itself. It is an anti-idealistic epistemo logy which res
OlUtes with many conservatives.
The political philosoph y of Aristotle is perhaps best reflected in his Poli
tics, and here too it is not difficult to discern the conservative emphasis on
experience and moderati on. In Book 1 : 1 and 1 :2, Aristotle suggests that
governme nt is not a human invention , but an outgrowth of association
between individuals and groups. The implication of this is that the state
does not exist for itself, but rather for the bettermen t of the lives of the
inhabitants of the state, and this is a point Aristotle makes quite explicitly
(3:9 ) . In Book 4: 1 , Aristotle emphasizes that wha t is importan t is not
merely that which is importan t in the abstract; but rather, that which can
be attained. Overall, Aristotle is concerned, as is the case with conserva
tives, with practicality and stability. For example, in Book 2, h e criticizes tyr
anny, oligarchy and democracy as being extreme forms of governme nt, in
Book 4: 1 1 , he argues that the best and most stable states are those with
a
large middle class, in Book 5, he discusses how to avoid conflict and insur
rection, as challenges to social stability.
It is, however, not true to say that Aristotle is without a vision for a future
society. Books 7 and 8 of Politics, although admittedly unfinishe d writing,
do describe the ideal city-state and the importan c e of education of the
young. Aristotle returns to his theme that education in the habits of moral
excellenc e (7: 1 5, 1 7 ) is extremely important for the young. Within Politics,
IS
94
Aristotle also endorses a theory of just war, suggesting that the end or
proper aim of war is to establish peace, just as the ai of toil is _leisure
_ not a VIrtuous
(7:14,1 5) . In other words, war may be necessary, but It IS
_ wold.
activity in itself. This was quite a radical position in the anCient
Moreover, Aristotle also criticizes the idea of military conquest, observmg
that military states are only safe whilst at war, but fail when they ha':'e
acquired their empire. From this observation, Aristotle suggest hat legJ
lators should direct all military and other resources to the proVIsiOn of lei
sure and the establishment of peace.
95
to the history of military conquest by substantially Christianized nations. It

is for this reason that the conservative principle of connectedness with the
past is so important, not merely connectedness with the past of nations, but
with the history ofJesus.
4.3
Post-Classical Conservative Political Ethics

and Peace Education
4.2.3
Christianity, Conservative Political Ethics, and Peace

Education
From the perspective of conservative political ethics, it is interesting and

challenging to examine the teaching and life of Jesus of Nazareth, the
intersection of this with conservatism, and the implications of this for
peace. I want to suggest three elements _ of th_e t:aching of Jesus which
might be held to contribute to conservative pnnCtple: a) the reh_ ace of
_ for
Jesus on the Torah, b) the reliance ofjesus upon trad11_ nal _rabbm1c
_
mulae and roles, and c) the rejection by Jesus of pohucal msurrecuon.
Each of the above deserves some brief explanation. Within the teaching of
Jesus, the claim is often made tha t he did not come to destroy the T?rah,
but to fulfill the Torah. Much of the teaching of Jesus may be sa1d to
involve a radical re-interpretation of the Torah, although the focus ofJesus
is still the Torah. Jesus also fulfills a rabbinic role. He teaches i syna
gogues, teaches crowds, and engages in a peripatetic lifestyle. e IS even
.
addressed as Rabbi. Finally,Jesus avoids any endorsement of pohucal msur
rection, as envisaged by the Zealots. Indeed, it was argubly_ impatiene
with Jesus' reluctance to advocate uprising which was a mouvaung faco r m
_
his betrayal. It is true that Jesus was Zxecuted by the Romans for sed1t10n,
although there was very little substantial evidence for this charge.
. " on
The teaching of Jesus provides an instance of exactly how radteal
_
servative" principles can be, in the sense that principles reflectmg co ttnu
ity with the past can be challenging to existing power strucures. Jt_ hm the
.
life and teaching of Jesus one can identify key conservative pnnc1ples
of
continuity with the past and aversion to violent political change. Yet at he
same time the teaching ofJesus was extraordinarily radical and threatenmg
to his contemporaries: Put simply, the life and teaching of Jesus was po
foundly nonviolent, something which tends to be obscured by the soteo
logical emphasis on the life and teaching ofjesus by the post-reurrecuon
followers ofjesus. As indicated in the previous chapter, te nonvwence of
_
Jesus tends not to be recognized or understood by Chnsuans,
poss1bly due
4.3.1
Thomas Hobbes, Conservative Political Ethics, and Peace

Education
Thomas Hobbes is perhaps the best known English political philoso

pher, and one who in many ways sums up the linkage between conservative
political theory and peace. The political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is
located in two prima1-y works, De Cive ( 1 642) and Leviathan ( 1 651 ) ,
although the argument i n both of these works is substantially anticipated
by the shorter Elements of Law, Natuml and Politic ( 1 640) . Within these
works the attainment and maintenance of peace is the essential and promi
nent theme. The historical context of Hobbes was one of civil war, and thus
it is not surprising that he should see the quest for peace as being a central
philosophical theme and it is not surprising that Hobbes should espouse a
statist response to the problem of peacelessness. In De Cive 1 : 1 2 , Hobbes
declares that the situation of humans without a civil society (state) is one of
perpetual war and in 1 : 1 3 that it is in the interests of humanity (so that
pleasure and beauty of life are not destroyed) that war be avoided. It is
therefore entirely reasonable that we should seek peace, 1 : 1 5 . The theme
of the peacelessness of humanity without the state is echoed in Leviathan
13, and especially in famous and often-quoted passage of 1 3:9 where Hob
bes lists the destructive consequences of war.
The Hobbesian peace is therefore a peace of the cessation of constant
war through the power of an overarching authority, and as such this repre
sents a common theme in conservative political ethics. Elements of conse1
vative political ethics within the work of Hobbes can be seen in his
pessimistic view of human nature (in De Ci11e 1 : 7 ) , the importance of civil
authority (throughout De Cive 8 ) , the importance of parental authority
(throughout De Cive 9) , the danger of sedition (throughout De Cive 1 2 ) ,
and the danger of eloquence without wisdom (De Cive 1 2: 1 2) . Each of the
above constitute important conservative themes, repeatedly taken up by
conservative writers since Hobbes. Although Hobbes does emphasize
authority, it is, -nevertheless, authority which is necessary for the preserva
tion of peace. The theme is further developed in Lmiathau,
r
although in
96
ons
Peace Education : Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundati
4.3.2
s and political
this larger work the concen tration is upon wider religiou
1 war,
h CIVI
Enghs
Thomas Hobbes makes it clear in his own history of the
of
caus
the
that
679,
1
known under the title of Behemoth and published in
pollt!cal
The
s.
religiou
and
the civil war in Enrrland were both political
n g was forced to rely upon Parliame nt for ance and
c ause was that the
their a llegiance o the King. The rehgwus aus
realize
not
did
the people
Cathol ICs, P1es y
was allegedly subversive doctrine and practice by Roman
_
assists exp lai n
war
civil
/
terians and Indepen dents. Concern s over religious
_ _
forth a naturalistic
the structure of Leviathan. Parts I and II of Leviathan set
bbes
for society.
1-ather than the convent ional theological explanat ion
innately eg Isticall
maintains that it is precisely because individuals act
by cedmg m
that, in social life, it is rational for individuals to seek peace
that the vu
argues
Hobbes
tly,
Importan
vidual sovereignty to the monarc h.
s personal
toward
oriented
are
they
as
,
c
egoisti
ly
tues are essential
_
argum g that a
nature
in
al
ogi
theo
are
IV
and
III
Parts
n.
p reservatio
:
_
ce, With ob d1
that is required for i ndividua l salvation IS faith and bed1en
by the sovere1gn.
ence to the sovereign and form of worship as establish ed
ar.
of
e
tim
a
in
peace
for
tion
It was a practical prescrip
.
_
_
bemg rega1 ed
The paradox of Thomas Hobbes is that des tte h1s work
Situ
e
also
a
he c
as providing the foundat ion for the armed nation-st ate,
the
wh1ch
m
ways
r
fou
ated as a philosop her of peace. I wish to suggest
recent
more
with
t
n
e
congru
be
to
deemed
work of Hobbes might be
Hob es ro
understandings of peace and a culture of peace: a) Thomas
arm d confliCt, m a
vides a concrete and physical answer to the problem of
_
thmk of peace m
c ontext of medieval scholasti cism which had tended to
_
gly modern mtegra
ataractic terms, b) Thomas Hobbes provides a surprisin
n Chapter 1 3,
Lematha
in
on
descripti
us
o
fam
his
in
tive notion of peace,
_
her IS not aetna
when
time
a
mere!
than
more
of
consists
peace
that
of ch l
p10cess
fighting, c) through the notion of felicity, as a dynamic
l
potentia
the
ug
thr
d)
and
,
1
1
lenge, as indicated in Leviathan Chapter
_
IS a h ghly co
pomt
last
The
ent.
governm
world
for world peace through
ass tmpuon of his
tested one, given that Thomas Hobbes works within the
_
10n, and th at a
age that the nation/s tate is the ultimat fo m of orgamza
_
I w uld a1gue
owevei,
H
e.
constant state of war among nations IS mevltabl
an
to
nty
sovereig
of
ceding
through
peace,
an
that the principle of Hobbesi
_
T o
scale.
!
glob
a
o
ally
potet
apply
to
also
ought
overarching power,
providmg a ratiomas Hobbes is exempla r of conservative politics ethiCs
themes.
Kl
J:l
nale for peace.
:v
97
David Hume, Conservative Political Ethics, and Peace

Education
David Hume is important for conservative thought as the empiricist phi

losopher who emphasizes skepticism towards rationality and reliance upon
sense experience. The work of David Hume is sometimes described as
being part of the Scottish Enlightenment, although his work can be seen as
a reaction to more rationalistic Enlightenment ideas. The threefold divi
sion of A Treatise of Human Nature examines human understanding, pas
sions, and morals, and the emphasis is anything but rationalistic. The sub
title of the Treatise, namely, An A ttempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of
Reasoning into Moral Subjects could arguably serve as a summary of the work.
Hume develops a theory that ideas, including ideas of causation, are based
upon experience. He then develops the idea that humans are essentially
creatures of habit whose m en tal states are determined by passion (feeling)
rather than reason , and whose beliefs are formed by association and cus
tom, rather than reflection . Moral lives are thus the p roduct of feeling,
trained by convention. In addition to epistemological and ethical writings,
D avid Hume also wrote
most popular work,
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion ( 1 779) and his

History of England ( 1754-63) . The work on religion is
very much a defence of e mpiricist theism, that belief in God can be based
upon evidence from the natural world. It is also no co-incidence that David
Hume should commit himself to wiiting a history of England. History is
indeed the accumulated experience of humankind, and we learn from
experience rather than rationality.
As is often the case with influential writers, there is an arguable gap

between Hume and Humeans. Hume identified a modified role for rea
son , although it was nevertheless an important role. The implications of
Humean skepticism towards rationalism and universalism are numerous,
not the least so for peace and peace research . The ei-a of David Hume was
an era of extensive peace plans, and such plans have continued into the
recent modern era. However, from the perspec tive of Humean conserva
tism, such peace plans represent an approach to peace that is based upon
rationality rather than experience. The problem with rationality, paradoxi
cally, is the feeling of certitude that accompanies such rationality. It is this
sense of certitude that can m ove i ndividuals to engage in violence for what,
at least rationally, are ideals of peace. In a sense, Hume's doctrine of rea
son anticipates an integrative notion of peace, that is, peace must involve
behaviors, attitudes and values. Peace is not a plan, although peace can
include this.
98
/ Conservative Political
4.3.3
Edmund Burke, Conservative Political Ethics, and Peace

Education
Edmund Burke ( 1 729-97) i s the writer whose work is perhaps most

closely associated with intellectual conservatism. Indeed it can be argued
that prior to the work of Burke there was no such thing as a self-conscious
conservatism. The work most associated with Burkean conservatism as such
is the 1 790 work Reflections on the Revolution in France, wherein he presents
the rational case against violent change. The record of Edmund Burke is
not an entirely consistent one, although it can be argued he was generally
an advocate of liberty. His sympathies were with the American colonists
and he also advocated the cause of the oppressed Irish. Yet he opposed the
French i nsurrectionists. The difference is that in the case of the American
insurrectionists (and to a lesser extent the Irish) the individuals were rely
ing upon their common law rights. The French insunectionists, however,
were inventing rights. In some of his writings, notably the 1 79 5 Letters on a
Regicide Peace, Burke urged the c ontinuation of war against the newly sta
lished 1epublican state of France . Yet the concern of Edmund Burke m his
opposition to the French Revolution was in the violent implications of the
Jacobinist revolt, both in terms of the violent overthrow of government and
in terms of the internal destruction of order.
It is difficult to develop a systematic exegesis of Reflections on the Reoolu
tion in France, as it does form a political pamphlet rather than treatise, writ
ten to counter the arguments of politicians and opinion leaders in
England who were sympath e tic to the French Revolution. However i t does
.
seem reasonable to say that one of the central themes to the work IS the
maintenance of peace and the avoidance of violence. The way peace is
attained is through constitutionality and through tradition , through the
gradualism of constitutional change, through custom and experience
rather than abstraction, through a political identity based upon the local
and actual, rather than a deracinated cosmopolitan ideal. Importantly,
Edmund Burke does allow for change ( 1 969, p. 32) and implies some
revolt may be necessary ( 1 969 , p. 60) . The problem for Burke is that he
does not exactly indicate when such revolt becomes necessary. One might
also argue that, at least in Burke's description of the situation in France,
there in little awareness of structural injustice. Tom Paine, in his 1 791 The
Rights of Man: Being an Answer to
j\1-r
B1irke 's Attack on the French Revolution,
does not use the language of structural injustice, and yet this is the essence
of his critique when he accuses Burke of being unsympathetic to wide
spread suffering in pre-revolutionary France. The life-work of Edmund
Burke suggests that he was not unsympathetic to the suffering of the com
mon person. The point of his anti-insurrectionist position, h owever, is that
II
.I
Ethics and Peace Education
99
.
.
.
.
.
.
th e destructwn o f 1aw and CIVI 1 soCiety,
w h ICh accompam. es msurrectio
n,
results in even . ore suffering.
/
The int;j eacies of developin g a contemporary understan ding of conservatism i ,.-illustrated quite clearly when one examines the treatmen t of the
notion
i' of natural human rights by Edmund Burke. What makes this rele
varf for issues of peace is that peace is increasingly linked with the concept
of human rights, both as a human right itself and in concert with human
rights generally. In Reflections, Burke is quite scathing of the idea of natural
rights, and in particular of the revolutionary idea of droits de l'homme et du
citoyen, as declared by the National Assembly of France in 1 789. Burke is
keen to emphasize that rights cannot be simply declared, but must emerge
through years of common law practice. Moreover, what complicates the
current situation is that there is now a tradition of human rights, one
which has gradually built up through the state recognitio n of treaties and
declaratio ns recognizin g human rights. The U niversal Declaration of
Human Rights is an instrume nt, which has gradually evolved as a recog
nized standard of human rights. So too, in future years, formal instrumen ts
such as the Declaration and Program of Culture of Peace may evolve as an
accepted standard of practice, as I have argued elsewhere ( 200 1 ) . The cur
rent emphasis on human rights, including peace as a human right, is com
pletely consistent with Burkean conservat ism.
4.3.4
G. W. F. Hegel, Conservative Political Ethics, and Peace

Education
It is difficult to deal with conservative political ethics without dealing

with the influence of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. There are a num
ber of aspects of the work of Hegel which are important for conservatism.
One is the contextualization of the individual within the social fabric.
Within the 1 820 work Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht
und Staatswissensch.aft im Grundrisse (Foundations of the Philosophy of
Right: Natural Right and Political Sciences in Outline) , Hegel argues that
the identity of the individual is only made possible through a social net
work. The key for Hegel is reciprocity, and this is extended through the
family into the public world. The state is not a structure to be imposed
upon a populace, but rather the apparatus of the s tate (and in particular
the constitution) is something which emerges from the ongoing and col
lective self-identity of a nation. It is noteworthy that in Part 3 of Grundlin
ien, the discourse on the family ( 1 58-18 1 ) and civil society (182-256)
precedes the discourse on the state (257-360 ) . So too, the state is
dependent upon and subject to the institutions of civil society and the
family. The closing paragraphs of Grundlinien carry some infamy for the
1 00
Peac;e Education: Exploring Ethical and PhilOsophical Foundations
exposition of the nation as the highest embodent of the human idea,

and the idea that states are and ought to be autonom us. However what is
often forgo tten is that Hegel argues the state to be an ' olution of and
dependent upon more basic s tructures. I t is an idea similar to the conser
vative theme of the organic unity of society.
The conservative heritage of Hegel is also reflected in his philosophical
method. There is a curious discontinuity between content and method in
the work of Hegel, in that the content is quasi-idealist and the method
quasi-empiricist. Hegel espouses the importance of Idea and Absolute
Spirit/Mind, and in this regard he is rightly categorized as idealist. Yet, the
philosophical method of Hegel is almost empirical in nature. He often
works through historical eras, describing the main c haracteristics of the
respective eras, and then drawing conclusions from the analysis. I t is a
philosophical method sometimes described as logico-historical, but it is
still a method which reflects the conservative emphasis that ideas should
follow htlman experience. Hegel begins his work with logic, but maintains
that logic is never unmediated. Logic is always historically conditioned.
Thus, in aesthetics, Hegel works from a history of aesthetics. In his phe
nomenology, he works from a history of human consciousness . I n his phi
losophy of right, he works, at least in part, from the evolution of human
law. Hegel works on the assumption that what can be said about anything
ought to be based upon collected human experience. This is very much a
foundational conservative position.

One of the keys to understanding Hegel, as with Edmund Burke, is
appreciation of the importance of the French Revolution. Joachim Ritter
writes (1982, p. 42) that "For Hegel, the French Revolution is that event
around which all the determinations of philosophy in relation to its time
are clustered, with philosophy marking out the problem through attacks
on and defenses of the Revolution. Conversely, there is no philosophy that
is a philosophy of revolution to such a degree and so profoundly, in its
innermost drive, as that of Hegel." Ritter suggests that Hegel was deeply
attracted to the ideals of the French Revolution, but deeply repelled by the
violence and tyranny that the Revolution brought forth. One can see this
quite clearly in the 1 807 Phiinomologie des Geistes, and particularly in the sec
tion within Chapter 6, Die absolute Freiheit und der Schrecke (582-595 ) ,
wherein Hegel places the Revolution within the context o f terror. The solu
tion to this anarchic terror is collectivist and statist morality; the anarchy of
revolution is replaced with the Jaw (Recht) of the state, as developed most
clearly in Grundliniim.
It is not within the scope of this discussion to enter into a detailed analy
sis of the complex issue of the attitude of Hegel towards war and peace.
There is much within the closing sections of Grundlinien which would jus
tify the twentieth century understandin g of Hegel as a martial and even
I
I
1 01
bel licist philosopher. However, the irony of much of the Hegelian in terpre
tation which situates Hegel as a proponen t of war, notably by Karl Popper
( 1 966, pp. 27-80) and John Dewey (MW8: 1 35-204) , is this itself arose out
of anti-German sentiment this century during or immediately after respec
tive world wars. Hegel does expressly indicate that war establishes identity
in nations and conversely that perpetual peace, even if possible, would be a
factor promoting moral degeneration (324 ) . Stephen Smith ( 1 983) has
suggested it is not quite clear whether the statements by Hegel about war
are prescriptive or merely descriptive. Rena to Christi ( 1 989) refers to the
mixture of conservatism and liberalism within Hegel. I would suggest that
the pb.ilosophy o f Hegel is strongly evolutionary, and he sees the end result
of this evolution as being the state. Within the context of revolutionary
Europe, H egel i ntetprets the state to denote the nation-state. I suggest,
however, that it is entirely consistent with the evolutionary principle within
the work of Hegel that the state may also be thought of evolving towards a
world-state, a world-state which can be seen as an enduring solution to the
problem of the phenomeno n of national war. The evolution of the world
state is something which would be entirely consistent with the principles of
conservatism.
4.4
Modern Conservative Political Ethics

and Peace Education
4.4.1
Michael Oakeshott, Conservative Political Ethics and Peace

Education
One of the more prominent twentieth century writers in the intellectual

conservative tradition has been Michael Oakeshott, and especially through
the influence of the 1 962 collection of essays enti tied Rationalism in Politics
and Other Essays. Oakeshott has been particularly influential in the emer
gence of educational philosophy, notably through his influence on the
work of Richard Stanley Peters. As a startin g point, i t is useful to look at the
essay 'Rationalism in Politics,' an essay, which, i n general terms, re-visits the
empiricism-rationalism debate. Oakeshott commences by stipulating that
the rationalism h e is concerned with is essentially an invention of the mod
ern period and h e indicates a range of aspects of the general character and
disposition of rationalists/rationalism, including independence of mind,
thought free from authority save the authority of reason , and an indepen
dence of thought ( 1 962, p. 1 ) . There is something of an irony in this
description, as Oakeshott's own work arguably evinces all the alleged char
acteristics of rationalism. One could make a similar observation about
1
1 02
Oakeshott's critique of rationalism as believing that politics is a matter of

problem-solving and the problem of the felt need ( 1 962, p. 4) . Oakeshott
himself has arguably set about solving the particular problem of the intel
lectual domination of political and intellectual life by a rationalisti c philos
ophy. Similarly, Oakeshott's critique of the uniformity of rationalism is
problematical ( 1 962, p. 5 ) . Oakshott himself assumes a uniform mode of
rationalism , often referring in undifferen tiated manner to rationalism and
the rationalist. It is a uniquely rationalistic way of critiquing rationalism .
Despite these contradicti ons, the positive contribution of Oakeshott is
that he does provide a useful critique of the separation of means and ends
in modern thought. Oakeshott suggests that within the rationalist thought,
the conduct of affairs is perceived to be a matter only of solving problems
( 1 962, p. 4) . Thus, he argues, there is an implicit assertion within rational
ism that ulti mately there is no knowledge which is not technical knowledge
( 1 962, p. 1 1 ) and that all problems are ultimately administrative problems
( 1 962, p. 23) . Another way of putting this is to say that rationalist philoso
phy only looks at the instrumental question of how we should be doing
something . A more complete philosophy ought to be looking at the deeper
ontological questions of identity and meaning, questions that can only be
answered through connection with the past and acknowled gment of the
familiar. According to Oakeshott, one of the results of the dominance of
rationalism is that the life of a society loses its rhythm and continuity and
becomes a succession of problems and crises ( 1 962, p . 3 ) . The irony of this
Joss is that it is precisely through the rhythm and continuity of a society that
the resolution to problems and crises can often be found.

The relevance of the Oakeshottian perspective to peace and peace
education can be summarize d i n that peace should properly not be seen
as a problem to which there is some rational plan or solution, but rather
as a commitme nt to a way of life which is an end in itself. The non-ratio
nalist approach to peace is summed up on the Gandhian theme that
there is no way to peace, peace is the way. In other words, there is no last
ing plan for peace, but rather a lived everyday commitme nt to this entity.
It is noteworthy that when Oakeshott identifies the failed proj ects of the
politics of rationalism, namely societies, conventions and plans ( 1 962, p.
6) , the examples he lists are c onventionally regarded as important for
world peace. It is not so much that Oakeshott is necessarily opposed to
proposals for peace as such. However, what does make such proposals
problemat ic is that they have no grounding in everyday experience . The
importance of everyday experience , of actions, behaviors and values, is
precisely what is emphasized within the modern notion of the culture of
peace, and through what Elise Boulding calls the "everydayn ess"' of war
and peace ( 1 996) .
1 03
There is a further aspect to Oakshottian conservatism that has wide

implications for. peace and peace education. In the essay 'On Being Con
servative,' Oakeshott attempts to delineate the conservative disposition,
and to develop from this some general principles of conservatism. Oake
shott summarizes the conservative disposition as being a disposition
appropriate to a person who a) is acutely aware of having something to
lose which he/she has learned to care for, and b) is in some degree rich in
opportunities for eoyment, but not so rich that the person can be indif
ferent to loss (p. 1 69 ) . Oakeshott continues: "To be conservative, then, is
to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to p refer the tried to the untried,
fac t to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded,
the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the conve
nient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss" (p. 1 69 ) . What
Oakeshott has provided in general terms is a rationale for why the
recourse to war is contrary to the conservative disposition. The recourse to
war involves the unknown and u ntried, simply as there is no certainty of
outcome. War involves a quest for superabundance, through conquest,
over against satisfaction with that which is sufficient. War i nvolves a quest
for a utopian state of affairs.
The risk-taking nature of the decision to go to war has been investigated
in a range of contemporary studies on war causation. Geoffrey Blainey
( 1 988) suggests that war occurs when two sides cannot agree as to the likely
outcome of war. If there is certainty about the outcome, then there will be
no war. Similarly, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita ( 1980, 1981 ) , with David Lal
man ( 1 99 2 ) , have articulated the risk-taking element of commitment to
war, in terms of the expected utility theory of war. Leaders commit to war
because they believe there will be some use or benefit from this action.
However, there is no certainty that commitment to such an action will be of
benefit. Indeed the evidence fro m human experience is that commitment
to war has been universally disastrous, equally for the victors and the
defeated. An adherence to conservative principles, including avoidance of
risk and connectedness with the past, ought to 'encourage leaders not to
commit to war. More recently, Andrew Milton and Patrick O 'Neil have
referred to this risk aversion as constituting a conservative peace (2000,
2002 ) . Paradoxically enough, the commitment to war is the one action
which is most contrary to most conservative principles. The irony of this is
that political parties which deem themselves conservative are most often
supportive of strong military preparedness and of a willingness to take mil
itary action.
The risk-taking nature of war can also be extended to policies of military
and nuclear deterrence. The weakness of deterrence theory lies in its in
built uncertainty: it is based upon a conjectural situation, namely, that if a
would-be aggressor were to attempt invasion, the invader would be met
1 04
Peace Education. xploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
with punishing force. However, there is no way of determining how effec

tive the threat of force is until it is tested. Thus we have the paradox that we
only know that deterrence theory works when it breaks down. In other
words, it is only when deterrence has broken down, and a state of war has
eventuated, that we know whether the threat to engage militarily with an
aggressor was real or not. Kenneth Boulding suggested that although
deterrence provides short- term security, the result is long-term instability,
as the very existence of a threat invites a potential aggressor to test that
threat. Fm Boulding, a peace based upon a system of military deterrence
systems is essentially an unstable p eace ( 1 978) . He further argued that we
n eed a stable peace of mutual co-operation and trust, and it would be diffi
cult to see stability as anything other than one of the corner values of the
conservative disposition.
Michael Oakeshott arguably provides a further underpinning for pur
p oseful peace education through his notion of what I call the continuity of
radical ideas. Oakeshott cites the 1 789 Declaration des droits de l 'hom.me et du
citoyen (Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen) as a pertinent
illustration ( 1 962, p. 1 20) . Oakeshott argues that the content of the Decla
ration reveals a familiarity with a n d reliance on English common law. He
writes of the ideology of human rights that "this ideology no more existed
in advance of political practice than a cookery book exists in advance of
knowing how to cook" ( 1 962, p. 1 20) . It is noteworthy that the discussion
on the precedents to the Declaration is found in an essay by Oakeshott
based upon a lecture simply en titled 'Political Education ' ( 1 962 , pp.
1 1 1 -1 36) . Oakeshott argues that politics cannot begin in ideological activ
i ty ( 1 962, p. 1 23) . However, ideological activity can nevertheless give voice
to the aspirations arising out of practice. Peace is one such area where
there has been an established practice, in terms of established techniques
of international and intergroup co-operation, and in terms of techniques
of nonviolence. Peace education is thus not an ideology without prece
dent. It is the articulation of practice, something entirely consistent with
the conservative view of political education, as articulated by Michael
Oakeshott.
Within the definition of politics by Michael Oakeshott one can find fur
ther support for peace education. Oakeshott defines politics as "the activity
of attending to the general arrangements of a set of people whom chance
or choice have brought together" ( 1962, p. 1 1 2 ) . He then makes important
comments regarding this definition. It is an attending to arrangements
rather than making arrangements as such. It is also a universal activity.
Most importantly, however, "attending to the arrangements o f a society is
an activity which, like any other, has to be learned" ( 1 962, p. 1 1 3) . Oake
shott goes on to say that knowledge about attending to arrangements of a
community is essentially learning the traditions of the community and
C onservative Political Ethics a n d Peace Education
1 OS
indeed learni g the tradition s of other commu nities. He does

not actually
define attendmg to the arrange ments further. Yet I believe it is

fair to infer
hat attendig to the arrangements of a community i nvolves participating
111 co-operat1ve and harmon ious relation
s within a commu nity, otherwise
the commu nity would cease to exist. Oakeshott certainly never
uses the lan
guage of peace education or even that of peace. However the
idea of learn
ing about attending to the social arrangements is a concept consiste
nt with
the notion of peace educatio n.
4.4.2
Anthony Quinton, Conservative Political Ethics, and Peace

Education
The problem of whether to refer to conservative theory as such

finds a
focus in the work of Anthony Quinton , and particularly within
the 1 978
work The Politics ofImperfection: The Religious and Secular Tradition
s of Conser
vatism. zn England from Hooker to Oaheshott. Quinton argues that the roots
of
conservatism can be traced beyond Edmund Burke to Richard

Hooker
and particularly to the eight volume work OJ The Laws ofEcclesias
tical Polity
The title of Quinton 's book is a good summary in itself, in that
Quinton
argues conservatism is essentia lly a recogni tion of the moral
and intellec
t:Jal limitations of humankind. Richard Hooker takes a religiou
s perspec
t:lve on this, although Anthony Quinton argues that this recogni
tion does
not necessarily need to be religious. Quinton does not argue
for a conser
vative theory as such nor for a conservative disposition; he does,
neverthe
less, posit three specific princip les of conservatism ( 1 978,
pp. 1 6-- 1 8 ) :
traditio nalism, organici sm and political skepticism. Q(iirlton
argues that
human imperfection means the individual should belong to a
society held
together by traditional customs and institutions and that the
stability and
content ment of the individual is depend ent upon the stability
and content
ment of the society to which the individual belongs ( 1 978, p.
18) .
Peace is admittedly difficult to define, as has been indicate d
in the open
ing chapter of this study. However, it would be difficult not to
concede that
the concerns articulated by Anthony Quinton , namely, the impo'
rtance of
belonging to a society and of social and individual stability and
content ment
are fundamental characteristics for any understanding of peace.
The argu
ment of Quinton is that in order to achieve that stability and
contentment,
or what we might designate as peace, our human limitatio
ns or moral
imperfections demand that we rely upon the corporate whole
and upon tra
dition. This is precisely the argume nt that underscores much
of the evolv
ing tradition which we know as international law. It is interest
ing that the
organic nature of tradition within the work of Quinton is quite
reminiscent
of the notion of the organic whole in the work of Friedrich Hegel.
Quinton ,
1 06
at one stage ( 1978, p. 18) , suggests that his organicist theory is not "neces
sarily" linked to Hegel-however, the implication is that it may.
One of the key and interesting aspects of conservatism , according to
Anthony Quinton, is an explicit openness to change. Quinton quite delib
erately differentiates conservatism from both reaction and immobilism
( 1 978, pp. 1 9-22 ) . Reaction is attempting to return to a past era and immo
bilism is opposition to all change. It is an important distinction, as what
passes for conservatism at both a popular and party-political level of often
either reaction or immobilism . Quinton states that politically i nduced
change in society should be continuous and gradual ( 1 978, p. 1 8 ) , but,
importantly, within the Quintonian vision, change is a necessity rather than
an option. The key question is what sort of change, and Quinton suggests
that, in seeking change, conservatism "does not want to burden govern
ments with further functions that do not contribute directly to the end of
maintaining social peace" ( 1 978, p. 20). Conservatism is opposed to totali
tarian government and to absolute power of any one person or institution,
the reason being that totalitarian governments and absolute power are
destructive of social peace.
Conservatism is often contrasted with utopianism, although in the Quin
tonian perspective the distinction is perhaps not as marked as might be
imagined. Implicit within the above statement by Quinton on governments
and social peace ( 1 978, p. 20) is the assumption that governments ought to
be concerned with peace. The issue then becomes one of how this ought to
be accomplished. One might well argue politico-legal means, through
agreements and arrangements between governments, as well as through
the encouragement of individual commitment to peace. N evertheless the
involvement of both individual and government in the pursuit of social
peace is a logical extension of Quintonian conservatism. What is necessary
is that the social change envisaged be based upon existing institutions and
existing social values. It should be gradual and continuous with that which
has gone before.
Anthony Quinton does not i ndicate exactly what he means by social
peace, although more recently he has written on the importance of pru
dence for the social order ( 1 9 89 ) . One suspects that by social peace Quin
ton means social cohesion within the nation-state, and that the term is not
meant necessarily to include i n ternational peace. Traditionally the role of
the government ( the state) has been to maintain internal order and con
versely the realm of international relations is perceived to be one of anar
chy. However the implications o f the Quintonian notion of social peace, in
concert with his notion of change, are far-reaching. The nature of total
war, especially in the nuclear age, means that it is increasingly difficult to
separate social peace from international peace. Global war between nation
states must now result in social annihilation. Even with small-scale war it is
1 07
difficult to separate social from international peace, given that in modern

conflict the great proportio n of casualties now tends to be civilian. Thus a
commitme nt to social peace, which is at the core of conservatis m, inelucta
bly compels governme nt to become involved in issues of international
peace. A commitment to social peace also implies that governme nt will
encourage citizens both to a commitment to peace at a local level and to
encouraging the aims and objectives of international peace. This is what we
might otherwise designate as peace education , and i t is an endeavor thus
entirely consistent with conservative political ethics, as articulated by
Anthony Quinton.
The Quintonia n imperative for change, albeit bounded by principles of
tradition, organic unity and skepticism , finds resonance in the notion of
rooted or grounded utopianism . Utopianism is generally regarded as alien
to conservatism, as the change to the envisioned society is a priori in nature.
Grounded or rooted utopianism is not so aprioristic, but rather founded
upon a developing global civil society and an emerging global ethic of
peace. More recently, Richard Falk has defined such utopianism as "a hori
zon of hope and aspiration that currently appears beyond reach, yet is sup
ported by a series of developm ents, which, if sustained and developed, will
alter our sense of what is possible in the political domain" ( 1 999, p. 59) .
Falk refers specifically to the norms of nonviolence in the past decade, with
the fall of the Soviet Union, the re-unification of Germany, and the demise
of apartheid. Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall (2000) have extensively
listed the achievements of n onviolence this century. The poin t of the
grounded utopianism of Falk is that it is a posteriori, based upon the experi
ence of nonviolen ce; or as Falk himself puts it ( 1 999, p. 61 ) , grounded or
rooted utopianism "rests upon the solid evidence of grass-roots globalism. "
The work of Richard Falk is instructive from a conservative perspective, in
that he has long advocated peace through world order, that is, peace from
a politico-legal perspective, working from existing national and interna
tional institutions. The grounded utopianism of Richard Falk intersects
neatly with Quintonian conservatism, and especially with the Quintonian
principles of traditional ism, organicism and skepticism . It is thus appropri
ate to examine these principles more closely.
Anthony Quinton suggests that the principle of traditionalism is
expressed in attachmen t to, or reverence f01-, established customs and tra
ditions ( 1 978, p. 1 6 ) . One of the problematic aspects of this formulation is
that it begs the question of which customs and traditions does one adhere
to. For instance, one can think of the established just war and pacifist tradi
tions. Even the just war tradition, through seeking limited conditions
under which war can be justified, assumes that war should normally not be
considered morally acceptabl e. Religious tradition is another potential
area of potential support for peace. It is true that religious differences
1 08
between peoples can be argued to be an important cause of war and con

flict. However, one of the commonalities in world religions is the espousal
of peace. Advocacy of peace through peace education can be thus argued
to reflect much of this traditional emphasis within world religions. Even
the recou rse to war is n o t necessarily established custom. The notion of war
as an established custom is usually expressed through the discourse of inev
itability-war has occurred in the past and thus i t will be inevitable i n the
future. Howeve r there is a strong counter custom o f c o-operation of peo
1 09
cal attitude towards the utopian prospects of peace. However, one of the
interesting aspects of a thoroughgoing political skepticism is that this is
ultim tely self-critical. Thus, a thoroughgoing skepticism is not merely

skeptical of the prospects of universal world peace and international order,
but is at the same time skeptical of any doctrine that assumes that such a
prospect is
ecessarily unattainable. The
true skeptic is always questioning,
and thus ultimately open to any prospect, including the prospect of peace.
ples and of nonviolence. The n otion of war as an established custom also

ignores the nationalistic n ature of modern war, and the fac t that modern
nationalistic war, and indeed nationalism itself, is widely regarded as a
modern invention (UNESCO,
1 989) . It is not true to assen that war, at least
modem war, is an inevitable part of human tradition.

The second o f the Quinton principles is organicism, "which takes soci
ety to be a uni tary, natural growth, an organized living whole, not a
mechanical aggregate . "
( 1 978, p. 1 6 ) . Quinton goes on to suggest that
inherited institutions and customs, endearing individuals to their social

nature, constitute an organic society. Quinton suggests that institutions are
not disposable, although, if we recall Quinton's i m perative for change, we
must conclude that i nstitutions must be deemed as being open to transfor
mation. According to Quinton, the organic nature of society explains why
radical c hange tends to fail , in that "radical innovation will have no instinc
( 1 978,
1 8 ) . Much of the emphasis within the doctrine of the organic nature of
tive emotional roots in the nature of those on whom it is imposed"

p.
society is reflected in the recent emphasis on developing a culture of

peace. Within the notion of the culture of peace, peace is not something
that can be decreed as such, but rather something which must be devel
oped within the culture of a society. Peace education is one key element
wherein the culture of peace can be developed.
The third of the Quinton principles is political skepticism. Anthony
Quinton does not develop this, except to suggest that political skepticism is
an obvious and direct applicatio n of the thesis of the moral and intellectual
imperfection of humanity
( 1 978, p. 1 7 ) . Skepticism, as used by Quinton,
does not mean a questioning of the possibility of knowledge, but rather a

questioning or critical attitude towards the truth of political doctrines.
Thus, skepticism and dogmatism are often contrasted. From the perspec
tive of peace and peace education, it is no accident that the no ti n of s ep

.
ticism is strongly linked to th e notion of toleration. Thus It 1s entirely
consistent that the ht1manist peace advocate Desiderius Erasmus was also a
strong advocate of skepticism and tolerance. One of the implications of
emphasizing political skepticism is that we will also emphasize the educa
tional value of tolerance. It is tme that skepticism can also be taken as a
critical attitude towards the prospects of human improvement, and a criti-
4.4.3
Russell .Kirk , Conservative Political Ethic

s, and Peace
Education
Russell Kirk is perh aps the best-k

nown Ame rican conse rvative think
er of
the recent mode rn era. The conse
rvatism of Russell Kirk does demo
nstrate
the contrast betwe en European
and American c o nservative thoug
ht, but
his writing migh t also be taken
as exemplar of i ntellectual conse
rvatism.
Kirk follows other s by carefully avoid
ing refer ence to conse rvative theor
y as
such, although he is well known
for enun ciatin g a series of conse
rvative
canon s ( 1 953, 1 982 ) . Kirk subsequen
tly re-develop ed these canons as
con
servative princ iples ( 1 993) , name
ly: a) belie f in an endu ring mora
l order ;
b) p reference for conve ntion , custo
m and social con tinui ty; c) belief in
the
p rincip le of presc riptio n ; d) the
princ iple of prud ence ; e) the impo
rtance
of diversity and variety in institution
s; f) the princ iple of human impe
rfect
ability; g) the impo rtanc e of priva
te prop erty; h ) the volun tary natur
e of
communi y; i) belie f i n the need for
restrain t upon power and human
.
pas
swn; andj ) the need for recon ciling
perm anen ce and change in societ
y. A
close analysis would suggest that
there is some possi ble contradicti
on
within the abov e princ iples as devel
oped by Kirk, altho ugh they do
never
theless serve as a usefu l articulation
of princ iples undergirding conse
rva
tive political ethic s.
There is much in Kirki an conse rvativ
e princ iples which underscores
or
could be taken to unde rscore the
notion of educ ation for peace . One
can
argue that peace educ ation is unde
rpinn ed by an endu ring or transc
en
dent moral order, name ly, the mora
l respo nsibil i ty n o t to kill and to
live in
justice. Moreover, war is arguably
the ultimate destroyer of social conti
nuity
and of social instit ution s. There
is much in ancie n t religious tradi
tions
which exhorts the importance of
peace, and war-m aking is argua
bly the
antithesis of prud ence. Moreover,
it would be diffic ult not to descr
ibe pru
.
dence as a VIrtue
of peac e, and thus any educ ation
e ncou ragin g pmde nce
(both personal and socia l) could
not be an tipath etic to conse rvativ
e politi
cal e thics.
rk sum arizes conse rvatism as
"the love of orde r" ( 1 982, p.
.
xxxVJ ) . War 1s the ultimate hum an
activity of disor der, since the stated
aim
110
l Foundations
g Ethical and Philosop hica
Peace Educatio n: Explorin
t seeks to avoid or
Thusl education tha
of war IS. destruct.wn of th\neogical
this disposition.
with
nt
y consiste
is
tism is e %t r:e;
d ::::::: ples of consferva
dam en t pr p
. Ki k suggests that a uns irre
atic for. pea. ce educauon
deemably from certain
.ial
an nature suffer
hum
.
.
servausm IS a belief that
ent
pot
a
e
.
hav
.
ays
alw
ll
WI
Jd
11
k
n
uma
h
at
h
t
IS
this
y
faults. One read.mg fenti
obverse is that humanit
.
al for war' a1thoug. hothe
to
for . 1ence and a pot
IS
nt
poi
difficult
for peace anld' h aimm enany. The
does have the potential
this mean that the
Does
can
e
b
a
at ' 11Tedeem .
understand exact1Y whuld
ent potential
ed
to the suppos violress
human response shoo beh to qtuesce
these tenred
or
ress
add
t t to
f hum n
to viouse
reco
the
e
aus
bec
:ely
i : ;i
: . :. :t
enCies.
men
mit
.
com
human nature that the e a t to
e
s
e
;atg 7n::s a;: destructive
a ::n :o
ence ough::: ;::
creative alternatives torestsucmgh vwl
Y what are the supspeculate upo. n exac tlpre
strenuously. It iS mtefaults oftohum
by Samuel
ank.md E I dence Osen( 1ted
deemable
posed u-re
) suggests
989
ESC
. d'
. gme
ssman (1996) , and UN
Marsha11 ( 194 7) ' Dave Gro
Ima
ly
ular
pop
is
as
.aII viol ent
atm
as
.
not
are
that human bem. gs not necessan1 an iiedeemable fault of humankind.
and that violence IS summaIze e olitical philosophy of Russell Kirk as
. . ngIY of the American heritage
It is reasonable to sell Kirk wn.tesP admm
'
being natwnarIStic. Rus
necessarily
.
. cy. H owevel , this did not
oCia
dem
of
en
.
.
.
mg
and of Am. erica as. . a hav
d
r
.
ega
. sm, as .IS often assumed m discussiOn
litranslate mto mihtanver,
qua
o
ly
high
a
was
nat1 onaI.Ism of R Jssell Kirk
.
consei vausm. Mo reol chathe
Rus
,
d
.
Mm
twe
e-n,a
s
.
h.IS 1953 work The Con
fied one. In the fina on ptether ofnee
inst
aga
and
ility
hum
nal
atio
sell Kirk caufIOnedtmg
. tedd States ncan
.
impose their institutions
"
Um
the
ges
. to not
imperialism, sug . h ave as go d a cI a1m
) and
1.espect" (1953 P 424bei
h
1C
h
w
s
.
.
ng
.
upon culture
o
as
s
m"
am
.
ei!c
. d "prestlmptuous mnovatlng Am
d
further cnt. l.. CIe
Col
the
.
of
st
mid
the
In
.
)
425
( 1953
equally menacmg as con;mumsm ke
1994
stfeent. Before his deathrin ,
i s e
o
:l; - :s :i :i:f the idteolg:ldn:e01a:: l;
.
desire P
.
porICy, espeCially. the
mto
eign
es
.
.
ntn
cou
e
forc
to
ire
des
the
f
o
l
a
cnu
hly
hl?
through the world, military fOIce an in interventionist war, and highly
. rests, sueh as in Gulf War I
democracy through. ted by commerCial Inte
critical of war mouva
.
.
erican foreign
.
Am
' pnnnple was prudece' and
.
.
( 1 993 . 2 1 6 ) . Kirk s key
e.
C!pl
pnn
e
atw
p;lic;, fhen and now, violated this key conserv
VIO
-.
101
- '
111
4.4.4
Roger Scruton, Conservative Political Ethics, and Peace

Education
111
Roger Scruton is one of the more recent advocates of a conservative posi

tion in philosophical politics, with perhaps his most important contribution
being the work The Meaning of Con.senmtism, w1itten in 1 980 and revised in
2002. Within this work peace and the pursuit of peace are not mentioned
directly, although one can nevertheless argue that these represent strong
concerns within the conservatism presented by Scruton. Scruton argues that
the conservative is committed to the preservation and upkeep of an underly
ing social orde1: Scruton w1ites (2002, p. 1 0 ) : "To put it briefly, conservatism
arises directly from the sense that one belongs to some continuing, and pre
existing social order, and that this fact is all-important in determining what
to do." The social order may be embodied in any number of organizations,
although conservatism recognizes the "entanglement" of the individual and
society. Further, Scruton refers to the importance of social unity (2002, p.
1 5 ) and that a conservativ attitude demands the persistence of a civic order
(2002:17). Social unity here could be taken to denote social homogeneity,
although the context tends not to support such a reading. It seems, rather,
that social unity connotes a common respect for justice, as is implied by the
reference to civic order. Civic order can be argued to be an important consti
tutive element to peace. In encouraging peace education, we are encourag
ing education that will support and encourage the maintenance of the civil
order which is so important for society, and which is so important in the
social system advanced by Scruton. Towards the conclusion of the earlier edi
tion, Scruton makes reference to the "order which domestic peace requires"
( 1 980, p. 189). Order is but one element of peace, although as Scruton cor
rectly indicates, it is a necessary one.
One important theme in the work of Roger Scruton is the desire to con
serve-however this this does not necessarily preclude change. Scruton
writes that "the desire to conserve is compatible with all manner of change,
provided only that change is also continuity" (2002, p. 1 1 ) . Scruton does
not necessarily reject global and political change. Writing specifically with
reference to the United Nations and foreign affairs policy, he suggests that
" to change this world requires long and careful tactics. But change it we
must. Only then, will the public life of our nation be restored to the order
which domestic peace requires" ( 1 980, p. 1 89 ) . It is interesting that this
statement on the imperative of global change was edited out of the recent
revised edition, although it still stands as a useful indicator of an intellectu
ally informed conservative attitude towards peace. The focus of Roger
Scruton is towards harmony on a family and domestic level. This does not,
however, exclude a commitment to social change at an international level.
1 12
be this at domes
Peace education is one means to establish such harmony,
level.
ional
internat
tic or at
as provid
If one cites the conservative p olitical ethics of Roger Scruton
issue t at
the
address
to
ry
ing suppm-t for peace educati on, it is necess
studies
world
related
and
studies
peace
Scruton is on record as a critic of
not a
are
studies
such
that
ing
suggest
,
85)
9
1
( 1984 with Carolyn Cox,
of
danger
the
i
thre
that
and
ur
ndeavo
e
tual
intellec
of
proper field
be
to
need
atiOns
indoctrination in such studies . However, some qualific
the criticism by
made about such criticism by Scruto n. On a technical level,
than peace
rather
such,
as
studies
peace
Scruton is actually directed toward
and still
la,
curricu
studies
peace
specific
of
critical
be
educati on. One can
er, on a more
Moreov
on.
educati
peace
of
aim
overall
the
of
tive
suppor
.
educau r:
general interpretative level, even if the opposition to peace
the possibility
Scruton was a general one, this would not necessarily negate
tion for
founda
a
as
validly
taken
be
can
phy
that his own political philoso
of a
etation
interpr
the
us,
s
remind
ralisrn
ctu
poststru
As
on.
peace educati
re
elsewhe
ed
express
particular text is n o t necessaiily bounde d by the views
by the author ofthe text in que s tion.
s best d m?n
The complex view of Roger Scruton on peace is perhap
that sooahsm
s
suggest
Scruton
.
socialism
of
strated through his critique
to vari
appeal
an
through
d
disguise
is
which
power
of
constitutes a pursuit
a
conserv
typifies
ous ideals (2002, p. 1 5 ) . It is a highly skeptical view that
it
that
is
m
socialis
of
ge
advanta
tism . Scruton points out that the i ntellectual
6)
1
p.
(2002,
identify
readily
people
can align itself with ideals with which
persons and cul
The crux of his critique of socialis m is the violence, against
writes: "That a
ton
Scm
on.
revoluti
ofname
the
in
ted
commit
is
ture, which
the willful
involve
may
socialist revolution may cost million s of lives, that it
tion of
elimina
the
,
culture
a
of
murder of an entire class, the destruction
on the
stigma
t
slightes
the
not
leave
will
art,
of
learning and the desecration
taken
have
who
people
the
on
or
actions
its
s
glorifie
it
doctrines with which
t to see that
difficul
is
it
case,
the
being
This
.
)
6
1
p.
(2002,
them"
in
part
For Scruton , an
Roger Scn1ton is actually oppose d to the notion of peace.
about the
educate
and
inform
to
is
ion
important elemen t of peace educat
order of
social
for
nce
importa
the
and
ion,
revolut
violent nature of socialist
through
does
he
effect,
in
which,
past,
the
with
ity
continu
our
recognizing
above
the
larly
The Meaning of Consenmtism. Thus his writing, and particu
on.
educati
book, can be argued to be an exercise in peace
?Y
4.4.5
Rudolph Rummel, Conservative Political Ethics, and Peace

Education
The conservative critique of the violence inherent within socialism is

well represented also through the writing of Rudolph Rummel, although
1 13
strictly speaking Rummel's c1itique is directed against state power gener

ally. Indeed Rummel might best be described as libertarian rather than
conservative as such. Nevertheless, there is a strong element of opposition
to absolute power within the peace theory of Rudolph Rummel ( 1 994,
1 995, 1 997a, & l 997b) which is very similar to the emphasis within conser
vative political ethics. Rummel shares the conservative idea that reformist
zeal can prompt governments to believe that the ends j ustifies the means,
the means being in this case the m urder of citizens. Rummel is a political
scientist, and thus there is no well developed political philosophy as such in
his work. He suggests that modern history has been dominated by
democide, that is, mass killing perpetrated by governments, either through
genocide or politicide. The genocide-politicide distinction was developed
by Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr, who suggested ( 1 988, p. 360) that geno
cide and politicicle are "the promotion and execution of policies by a state
or its agents which result in the deaths of a substantial proportion of the
group." Genocide involves killing because individuals belong to a specific
group, identified by ethnicity, religion or nationality, whereas politicide
involves killing because individuals belong to a. specific class or because of
the opposition or potential opposition by such individuals to a regime.
Rudolph Rummel estimates some 1 70 million deaths by government
and some 38 million deaths by war in the twentieth century, making
democide a far more serious killer than war. Most of the governments
involved in democide have been totalitarian, and of these the majority
communist, and thus an important element in encouraging peace, for
Rummel, is encouraging liberal democracy. His central dictum is that
power kills and absolute power kills absolutely. Peace education then
becomes, for Rummel, a process of making clear the linkage between total
itarian government and democide and of encouraging support for liberal
democracy, through both publications and the Internet,
in order to
.
develop a more peaceful world.
The paradigm advanced by Rudolph Rummel has both strengths and
weaknesses. An important aspect of peace theory is that peace is more than
the absence of war, and thus factors such as whether a society is involved in
the systematic killing of its own citizens is relevant to the promotion of
peace. War tends to be a focus for study because it tends to be more easily
defined and because there is an inherent narrative to war, involving a pro
tagonist and antagonist. By contrast, there is often no ready narrative to
mass killings by government. Logically, peace research and education
ought to be concerned with all aspects of encouraging a more peaceful
and less violent society. In this regard Rudolph Rummel seems on strong
ground, in that he is concerned with the elimination of what is arguably
the major source of violence in the past century, mass killings by govern
ments (democide ) .
1 14
Conservative Political Ethics a n d Peace E ducation
The weakness of Rummel's peace theory is that he tends to ignore the

context of democide, especially the social context of structural violence
and the historical context of war which tends to give rise to totalitarian gov
ernments. Rummel labels government as a killer, and yet structural vio
lence is most often the result o f laissez-faire capitalism and the dearth of
government. The 1 1 million c hi ldren who die each year of preventable
causes (UNICEF, 2004) die substantially because there is no global govern
ment to ensure a redistribution of resources which would prevent such
deaths. Further, Rummel tends to overlook the relationship o f totalitarian
ism and democide to war. Totalitarianism and democide have in both cases
arisen in circumstances of war, . i ncluding war between capitalist democra
cies, as with World War One which gave rise to the Armenian Genocide
and to the Russian Revolution. I t can be argued that an adequate theory of
global violence therefore needs to consider not merely the role of govern
ment, but the role of the lack of government.
4.4.6
Kenneth Boulding and Conservative Peace Theory
Within peace resealch there is a strand of what is sometimes known as

conservative peace theory, perhaps most notably represented in the work
of Kenneth Boulding, and such conservative peace theory elucidates some
of the ways that conservative political theory may support the notion of
peace education. Kenneth Boulding once described himself n o t as a "dan
gerous radical", but rather as a "dangerous conservative" (Tracy Mott,
2000, p. F437) . In his 1977 critique ofGaltungian peace research, Kenneth
Boulding registers a number of objections against the work of Johan Gal
tung, including a concentratio n on redistribution over production, an
obsession with equality, and support for liberationism. Each o f the above
concerns reflects an importan t theme within conservative political
thought. Conservatism is by nature cautious in supporting a commitme t
to programs of wealth redistrib ution, concentrating rathe r upon economiC
growth. The obsession with equality within the work of Galtung can be
argued to be socialist in nature and destructive of an organic status quo.
Finally, conservative political theory would rather commit to gradual
reform, rather than embrace change through liberationism, that is,
through revolutionary political movements.
Yet the interesting element of the critique of Galtung's work by Ken
neth Boulding is that Boulding still places himself within the peace
research and education movement. This operates at two levels . One is that
he still indicates that he is in agreement with peace research as a norma
tive science. Like Galtung, Kenneth Boulding is committed to social
change, in order to make the earth a less violent place. Boulding argues
115
that knowledge ought to be used to further that purpose. The point of

departure is that Boulding believes in gradual change. The o ther interest
ing level at which Boulding operates is that the critique i tself is an exam
ple of the Gandhian approach of critiquing a person's argument without
attacking the person. Boulding is quite thorough and assertive in criticiz
ing the views ofjohan Galtung. However there is a deliberate avoidance of
any attack on the person of Gal tung. Indeed Boulding is supportive of the
work of the person he is critiquing.
We have already explored the concept of stable peace as an important
conservative theme within the work of Kenneth Boulding ( 1 978) . Yet he
conservative peace research of Kenneth Boulding can also be seen in his
paradigm of power ( 1 989 ) . Boulding suggests there are three types of
power, namely, destructive, economic and integrative, and within each of
these types of power there can be both positive and negative uses of that
power. The important poin t of this paradigm is the recognition that
exchange and trade are positive uses of economic power: i t is a peace para
digm open to the beneficial potentialities of capitalism for humankind.
The key type of power is i ntegrative power, and Boulding suggests that peo
ple can be brought together either through love and persuasion (peaceful
force) or through coercion ( military force) . An important role of educa- .
tion is to encourage people as to the possibilities of positive integrative
power, that is, the power of peaceful persuasion.
4.4.7
Conservative Political Ethics and the Culture of Peace
The above discussion has suggested that there are many aspects of con
servative political ethics which may be seen as supporting peace education.
This can also be seen in the recent official UN formulations on a culture of
peace, Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace (UNGA,
1 999) . The language of the formulation assumes a gradual acceptance of a
Culture of peace, rather than the imposition of peace. Indeed, the lan
guage of the formulation, defining a culture of peace as a set of values, atti
tudes, traditions and modes of behavior, is predicated upon an evolving
_
consciOusness, based upon respecting, promoting, establishing, and
encouraging. These are educational words. It is noteworthy Article 2 of the
formulation indicates that a culture of peace is based upon "full respect"
for the sovereignty of the state and non-interference in domestic matters.
Respect for the sovereignty of the state is an important principle for con
servatives, although this is balanced by the emphasis within the formula
tion for respect by states for in ternational and human rights. A culture of
peace is therefore not something which is mandated to states o r individu
als, but is rather an emerging complex of awareness and actions. Thus Arti-
1 16
Peace Educa tion. Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
cle 4 of the formulation declares that education is one of the plinciple

means of building a culture of peace. This is en tirely in accord with a con
servative political ethics. Change can never be imposed as such. It can only
be promoted, encouraged and established.
4.5
4.5.1
Summation
Strengths and Weaknesses of Conservative Political Ethics

It can therefore be strongly argued that peace education and conserva

tive political ethics have common concerns. Peace can be understood as
the existence of social order and violence is that which opposes social
order. Thus both those committed to peace education and those with a
commitment to conservative political ethics have a common interest i n
emphasizing the importance o f the evolution o f social institutions and
social norms, and the importance of order and lawful social change. The
key is that the social order be a just social order. If peace is the presence of
justice, then it follows that the social institutions underpinning the social
order ought also to be committed to peace and j ustice.
One of the central problems for conservative political ethics is that con
servative theory is often understood as represen ting opposition to social
change and by implication support for what is often an u njust status quo.
Yet, as has been argued within this investigation, properly understood,
conservative political ethics does not represent a position necessarily
opposed to change. Conservative political ethics does not necessarily
denote acquiescence to an m-uust or violent status quo, and indeed such
acquiescence is counter to the evolution of principles which are central to
an informed conservative political ethics. Properly understood, a conser
vative political ethics is not supportive of structural violence. However,
such a position is rightfully cautious of the manner of c hange, precisely
because other than ordered change can easily undo the social fabric upon
which social (and indeed i nternational) peace relies. A conservative polit
ical ethics rightly asserts that the most enduring change is that where
there is continuity with the past.
The other enduring problem is the linkage, in the popular imagination,
between conservatism and militarism. However, as has been argued in this
chapter, this linkage represen ts a misunderstanding of the true nature and
implications of intellectual conservatism . The framing of positions is
important. As I have argued elsewhere ( 2003) , it is more appropriate to
refer to those willing to engage i n military conquest as militarists or imperi-
Conservative Poli tica l

Ethics and Peace Educati
on
I
I
I
1 17
. alists, rather tha n con

.
servatives or neo -con ser
vatives. Those pol itic al
ers who claim the ma ntle
lead.
of con servatism
.
r and engage m
ml. ltta
do not und ers tan d the
ry
con
.
qu
est
.
nature and Imp Ica tw
s of the con servative
tion . Properly und erst
dis pos iood , con servatiVe poh
.
t' ca1 eth.Ics IS
sup por tive of
peace, and rep res ents an
. .
eth ical undei-?Ir
,or effo
d
mg
;
rts to educate in support of pea ce. Th e task
of exp I am mg the re
.
I a t'Ions h Ips
'
mformed con servatism
between an
and the cause of pea ce
. .
ca
n
be seen as an ele me nt
Withm the ong oin g task
.
of peace ecluca tw n.
4.5. 2
Recapitulation
t can be stro ngl y arg ued

.
that peace edu cat wn
and con servati.ve pol itic
ethiCs are und eroird ed
al
by com mo n con cer ns
o
.
Pea ce can be un derstoo
th e existence of soc ial
d
as
.
ordeJ an d VIO 1enc e as
i:h a t whIC
h opposes social
order. Thus both tho se
com mitted to peace edu
cat ion and tho se com mit
ted to conservative pol itic
.
al etl1tcs have a com mo
n 111
t erest m em pha sizi
the evo luti on of soc ial ins
ng
titu tio ns an d nor ms and
the i mportance of ord
'
an d orderly soc ial cha
er
.
nge . p eace fu1 social
cha nge gen eraIIY ( aI thoug
aIways) means ord erly soc
h not
ial
ch ange, and both pea c
.
e advacates and con servattves share a com mo n
.
i n tei.est m
peaceful soc ial ch ange.
p eace edu cati on
can be seen as o n e me
.
ans of e mp h asizmg
.
the imp ortance of soc 1a
. I ord er
an d peaceful soc ial cha
nge .
7r
I
C HAPT E R 5
AESTHETIC ETHICS
A N D PEACE ED UCAT I O N
5.1
5.1.1
The Revival of Aesthetic Eth ics
Reasons for the Revival
The fourth philosophical basis for peace education explored within this
i nvestigation is aesthetic ethics. Traditionally, aesthetic ethics is most often
contrasted with moral e thics, substantially due to the influential Kantian
i nsistence that moral action must be counter-inclinational-the moral act
i s only that act which is performed with regard to duty alone, and not out
o f sympathy. However, i n recent years the separation between the moral
and the aesthetic has been challenged, and many writers have agued for a
rehabilitation of the unity of aesthetics and ethics. The proponents of such
a rehabilitation include Heesoon Bai ( 1 997, 2001 ) , Marcus Diiwell ( 1 999 ) ,
Ma1cia Eaton ( 1 989, 1 992, 200 1 ) , Josef Friichtl ( 1 99 6 ) , Andre Leverklihn
( 2000) , Martin See! ( 1 996) , and Jean-Pierre Wils ( 1 990) , although argu
ably there are numerous precursor elements to an aesthetic ethics within
the work of many writers. Even with writers who do not propose an aesthet
ics ethics as such, there a1e often hints at such a nexus. Roger Scruton
( 1 982) writes of what he calls normativity as being an important element
within aesthetics. Aesthetic e thics in a modern sense generally refers to
actions based upon judgments about what is beautiful or desirable, or in a
more general sense, about what is considered to be of value. The line
between discourse on aesthetic judgmen ts and value judgments is a
Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and Philoso[>hiwl Foundations, pages 1 1 9- 1 58

119
1 20
Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education
b lun-ed one: when we talk about aesthetics it is conceivable we are also talking about values and what we consider valuable and worthwhile.
.
It is interesting to speculate, in very general terms, on some of the possi
ble reasons for the revival in aesthetic ethics. One of the fundamen tal rea
sons may be a J-e action against deontological ethics, and a move towards a
more natural and naturalistic ethics. Richard Shusterman suggests that the
move towards aesthetic ethics is a result of the perceived failure of tradi
tional e thical systems; the erosion of faith in traditional ethics leaves a hor
-ror vacui which aesthetic ethics rushes to fill ( 1 988, pp. 337,338) . The
phenomenon of war itself is witness to how destructive ethic] no ions of
duty can be. Another reason for the resurgence of an esthetiC eth1cs my
be the diminutio n of the Christian hegemony in ethical and moral dis
course. Western Christianity has traditionally emphasized the legaljudicial
notion s of guil t and duty, although, as I will argue, there is a sub umed
.
emphasis within the Judea-Christian tradition upon an aesthetic ethiCs.
Perhaps one of the most in teresting factors in the resurgence of an aes
thetic ethics may well be an increasing planetary awareness, enco1raged
developments such as space exploration. It is difficult, whe n lookmf? at piC
.
.
tures of earth taken from the moon, especially the ICOI11C Earthnse and
Blue E arth photographs of 1 968 and 1 972 respectively, n o t to be struck by a
sense of awe, or the numinous, at the uniqueness and beauty of the planet
earth. Denis Cosgrove refers to the quasi-mantric status of such representa
tions ( 1 994, p. 2 76). Peter Singer (2002, p. 201 ) makes the point that sace
exploration has enabled a human being to see the earth, for the first tim e
. .
not fro m a poin t on it, and thus, literally, to see one world. Moreover, 1t IS
not too difficult to be struck with a sense that our ethical actions ought to
be shaped with a mind to that beauty. The aesthetic power of the earth
image is perhaps best reflected in the words of Ap llo XIV astr naut Edgar
Mitchell when h e reported in 1 9 7 1 : "It was a beautiful, harmomous, peace
ful-looking planet, blue with white clouds, and one that gave you a deep
.
sense of home, of being, of identity. It is what I prefer to call mstant global
consciousness . " Leslie Sklair, who cites the above words ( 1 999, p. 1 54 ) ,
goes o n to point out that beneath the clouds o n plane earth, war and
human misery continue. The implication is that the beatltlful planet ought
to be also marked by harmony in relations.
Globalization is arguably another factor encouragin g planetary con
sciousness, an d th!'Ough this an aesthetic ethics. Globalization can of
course denote many things. It can refer to the dominance of global corpo
rations and the triumph of the global market place. Yet another level to
globalization is the growth of a global culture of ethical concern, and one
of the ways this culture of ethical concern is expressed is through the glo
bal p henomenon of popular and rock music. It is not within the scope of
this book to discuss in detail the ethical underpinnings of contemporary
?Y
121
music. I t is sufficient to say, however, that there is a strong case to support

the suggestion that there is an aesthetic ethical foundation, with a common
expression .of a desire for a more beautiful and enj oyable world. It is also
no accident, for our discussion of the linkages between aesthetic ethics and
peace education, that so many popular and rock songs are so strongly
linked with the peace movement.
5.1.2
Demarcation
There are some uses of the phrase "aesthetic ethics" which are not
included within the discussion in this investigation. Richard Rorty (1989} ,
Richard Shusterman ( 1 999a) and Michel Foucault ( 1 986, 1 997, 1 998) have
all used this or similar phraseology to denote a commitment to self or per
sonal development, with the self or the human body as the object of aes
thetic attention. The Nietzschean idea of eternal recun-ence is not too
distant from such an emphasis. However, in this investigation, the under
standing of aesthetic ethics is based rather on the attractiveness of ethical
actions themselves. This might seem a tenuous distinction, and yet the weak
ness of a self-oriented aesthetic ethics is hinted at by Richard Shusterman
himself ( 1 988, p. 338) when he points out the ethical importance, within
postmodern societies, of popular celebrities-identified, significantly, and
with some deep irony, as "beautiful people." The problem with a self
directed aesthetics is that it soon becomes narcissistic and/or superficial.
Within international relations theory, there has been recent debate over
a so-called aesthetic turn in such theory, with exponents such as Vivienne
Jabri ( 1998) and Roland Bleiker ( 200 1 ) . On the surface, seeking an aes
thetic basis for international relations theory would seem to hold much i n
common with the investigation o f a n aesthetic basis for peace education.
However, the understanding of an aesthetics within the above two authors
is very different from an aesthetic ethics. Jabri understands aesthetics to
denote a repersonalization of morality and Bleiker understands aesthetics
as a heuristic device. The above are relevant for the general interest in the
importance of aesthetics for theory, although not directly relevant for our
i nvestigation of an aesthetic ethics basis for peace education.
5.1.3
Preview
The investigation into the aesthetic ethics foundation for peace educa
tion examines the subsumed undercurrent of aesthetic ethics, and the
implication of this for peace education. The investigation examines the
work of selected specific writers or sources where there is an implied o r
explicit unity o f aesthetics and ethics, and the implication of this for peace
1 22
anue l
s specifically at the work of Imm
educ ation . The inves tigat ion look
con
the
in
ial
cruc
be
to
is unde rstoo d
Kant , prec isely beca use his influ ence
exam
also
ion
tigat
nves
i
The
s.
and ethic
temporary separation of aesth etics
for an
on
inati
imag
and
ty,
beau
age,
ines the impo rtanc e of the langu
ation .
ethic s rationale for peace educ
u nder stand ing of an aesthetic
and
for
case
the
ly,
exam ine., dialo gical
Thro ugho ut the discu ssion , we
.
ation
peac e educ
again st an aesth etic e thics basis for
5.2
and Peace Educati on

Clas sica l Aes thet ic Ethics
5.2.1
e Education
Classicism, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peac
s can be expressed is through the

One of the ways an aesth etic ethic
in
ethic s, an impo rtant notio n with
notio n of the unity of aesth etic and
of
ness
ctive
attra
the
that
idea
i n the
class icist Gree k thou ght, espe cially
aesth etic
tially
essen
are
acts
us
vicio
of
virtuous acts and the repu lsiveness
ical notio n of symmetry, whic h was
in natu re. This can be seen in the class
k
ical beau ty. For exam ple, the Gree
appl ied to both behaviou r and phys
ia
eutele
larly,
Simi
.
good
or
r beautiful
notio n of the kalon means eithe
and
also canied connotati ons of taste
but
ality,
frug
r
o
omy
econ
ted
deno
s f
work
ical
leave out. With in the class
judgmen t, that is, know ing what to
etic
aesth
an
of
ents
see the core elem
both Plato and Arist otle, one can
tate
city-s
ideal
an
of
n
visio
to outli ne a
ethic s. With in Politeia, Plato seek s
.
Ethics, Arist otle seeks to outli ne his
hean
omac
Nich
n
i
with
and
ty,
socie
or
l
socia
is
s
idua l. One system of ethic
visio n of the ideal actio ns of the indiv
both the com mon emp hasis is aes
in
but
,
listic
idua
and the other is i ndiv
thetic.
5:2.2
it m Ist be a city/society of war, in order to defend the land necessary to

provide or the needs of the luxurious, he says that there are arguments for
n agamst war but declines to enter into the arguments. Socrates then
mdicates that a guardian-elite is necessary to protect the city, and elabo
ates on the educatiOI: necesry for the guardian class. Plato is normally
mterpreted as supportmg a military and timocratic state, although as David
Ro chmk contends (2003) , Plato's own support for such a state is far fro m
traightforward. I t is m ore than with p assing interest that h e does offer an
Ideal alternative to the warlike state.
There are range of a ditional factors within the work of Plato sugges
.
_
tive of aesthet c ethiCs.
It IS noteworthy, on a basic level, that the setting of
rr:any f the dial gues of Plato is aesthetic, with the dialogists engaging i n
_
discussion either
m a garden or at a meal. Within Politeia, Socrates develo ps
a t eory of the beauty of forms, of which all reality is but a reflection o r
p oJ CtiO n of a1 ultimate beauty Withi n ( The) Symposium, and specifically
_
Withm Dwtoma
s Speech , as retold by Socrates, the priestess Diotoma dis
cusses love and beaut , and importantly within the discussion regards good
ness nd beauty as m terchangeable. Diotoma then explains the Scala
Amons or the steps of love, namely, physical beauty, moral beauty, intellec
t al beauty and beauty itself. Beauty itself is an eternal form, which can n o t
die, unlike t h e individual. The notion of Platonic love has been idealized
(and Christianized) as being somewha t unbodily love. However this is n o t
what is p1esented i n the Speech of D i otama. All commences with physical
love, nd we move from there to the l ove of the beauty in practices and
behavior, through to beauty in concept and finally to an acknowledgeme n t
of beauty i tself.
Plato, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
Hebrew Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education
5.2.3
It is worthwhile to examine more c losely the attempt by Plato in Politeia

to set forth a kallipolis or beautiful/ideal society o r city. What is arguably
the aesthetic method of Plato can be seen within the "description of the two
cities within Book 2 of Politeia. Socrates constructs visual images of two cit
ies or communities. City 1 is a primitive city, one of self-sufficiency and sim
ple life-style, whereas City 2 is the feverish or luxurious city, o ne of
_
specialization of labor and of luxuries. Socrates does not deny the objeC
tion from Glaucon that the primitive city is a community of pigs and yet he
still refers to it as a healthy society. Similarly, Socrates mentions that some
prefer a more specialized diet and the luxuries of a complex society. When
Socrates mentions that the implications of the luxurious city /society is that
1 23
The issue of whether one can refer to a Hebrew aesthetic ethics, and
thereby a Judea-Christian aesthetic ethics, is a complex one. There is a
strong tradition that action should be i n response to the demands ofYah
weh, irrespective of whether the demands of Yahweh seem to be attractive
or of value. Indeed, many of the narratives of the Hebrew Scriptures refer
to preosely such o edience, an obedience which acts contrary to senti
ent or value. This IS a strong theme in the history of Israel, as presented
m t e Torah, of w at might be called a counter-aesthetic understanding o f
ethics. The n arrative of the Yahweh's call for Abraham to sacrifice Isaac
(Genesis 22: 1-19) is a useful i ndicator o f this. Yet, at the same time there
re sp cific elements ofYahwism that u n derpin an aesthetic ethics. ahweh
IS a deity of t n pproachable radical transcendence, without an image and
whose name IS meffable. As the deity is unapproachable, the focus is trans-
1 24
e (Genes is
ferred to the creatio n. Thus, in the Priestly Creation Narrativ
of the cre
each
with
n,
creatio
of
beauty
the
on
sis
empha
n
a
is
1 -2 :4) , there
saw that i t
God
ation days being conclud ed with a formula ic comme nt that
accoun t,
this
within
used
s
was good. Import antly, the word tab or good, a
.. ,
Peace Education.- Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
means both good and beautiful.

ent within
The elemen t of an aesthetic ethics arguably is most promin
Neviim .
the
in
d
reflecte
as
and
Israel,
ancient
of
t
the prophetic m ovemen
through
either
appeal,
ic
aesthet
upon
based
was
t
prophe
the
The call of
t was also aes
means of an audible call or vision . The message of the prophe
a vision
and/or
eh
ofYahw
thetic, based upon a vision of the transce ndence
pres
the
by
erized
charact
society
ic
of future messianic society, a messian
Micah
9-25,
1
65:
2:4,
(Isaiah
war
of
absence
ence of shalomi c peace and
of Israel char
4:3) . The Ketuvim represents a stage in the religious history
ces of neigh
influen
the
and
liturgy
of
ance
import
g
growin
the
by
acterized
is on the
emphas
boring religion s. Within the Psalms one can discern an
forms a
This
.
Yahweh
of
beauty of creatio n and the beauty of the worship
sis
empha
logical
deonto
a
be
to
ed
balance to what is generally perceiv
of
duty
a
based
action
ethical
is,
that
,
religion
within much of the Hebrew
.
eh
ofYahw
d
comman
absolute
obedience to the
inclusive one,
The idea of messian ic/shalo mic peace is an extremely
of a culture
anticipa ting m any of the aspects of the contem porary notion
but the
war,
of
absence
the
of peace. Shalom ic peace indicates not merely
ah
Jeremi
-4,
43:1
6:3-5,
1
(Isaiah
y
presenc e ofjustice and personal integrit
Hebrew
the
within
ned
envisio
was
which
ing
2 3:5,6) . Peace is also someth
ns for messi
traditions, that is, the writers wrote about the future conditio
in the Ketu
d
reflecte
is
peace
of
vision
the
of
ance
import
The
anic peace.
is no vision
there
vim, wherein the dramatic suggestion is made that where
ic/shal o
messian
of
y
imager
that the people perish (Proverbs 1 9 : 1 8) . The
es to
continu
shares,
plough
into
med
mic peace, and spears being transfor
more
but,
,
activists
and
ents
movem
peace
for
y
p rovide a powerful imager
nt for the
than this, it is indicative of how an imagined future is importa
activation of peace.
5.2.4
Buddhism, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
Buddhism is an important source both for aesthetic ethics and for peace
politics. Within Buddhism there is an important tradition of ahimsa or non
violence, and Buddhism is also an important source for much contempo
rary writing on peace and peacemaking, such as in the work of Joanna
Macy. The aesthetic ethics of Buddhism might be summarized in that there
is deliverance through an appreciation of beauty and that there is deliver
ance through detachment from desire and passion. Indeed, the centtal
1 25
goal of Buddhism, namely enlightenment, can be understood in aesthetic

terms. Nirvana, the ultimate state that Buddhism encourages the individ
ual to journey towards, is one of bliss or pure beauty (Sangharakshi ta,
1985, p. 240) . However, it is not a beauty possessed by the individual, or a
beauty that can be possessed at all. It is a beauty which can only be contem
plated. Rather, enlightenment is a matter of disengaged consciousness, o f
abandonment of sensuality, yet a t the same time enlightenment i s a matter
of heightened awareness (MN . 1 0 ) .
The aesthetic ethics o f Buddhism c a n b e argued to b e reflected i n t h e
structure of the Four Noble Tru ths o r Ariya-Sacca, namely: a ) t h e Du.kkh.a
Sacca, or the Noble Truth of Suffering, b) the Sumada1'a Sacca, or the Noble
Truth of the O rigin of Suffering, c) he Nirodha Sacrt, the Noble Truth of
the Cessation of Suffeiing, and d) Magga Sacca, the Noble Truth of the E n d
o f Suffering, that i s , through the Eightfold Path (SN:56. 1 l ) The essence o f
suffering i s i n craving or tanha, including sensual craving, craving for exist
ence, and c raving for self-annihilation. True enlightenment is found
through the cessation of craving, something which is achievable through
the middle way espoused by Gautama Buddha, and summarized through
the Eightfold Path. The idea of renunciation of sensual craving could sug
gest Buddhism as an anti-aesthetic religion, although the dialectic within
Buddhism is much more complex.
One means of understanding the dialectic within Buddhist aesthetics
and aesthetic ethics is through the notions of su.bha and sobhnna, generally
translated as beauty and the beautiful, or consciousness of the beautiful. I t
is true the Buddhist sc1iptures (AN 1 :2 ) warn of the beautiful o r attractive
object of desire which may become a n inducement to arousal of sense
desire or hamacchanda. However, equal ly, the scriptures (AN 8:66) also
refer to the third of the eight li berations as reflection upon the beau tiful.
Lovingkindness and respect for beauty are described as providing support
for each o ther (VM: 9 . 1 20 ) . The forma tions which are included under the
notion of association with beau tiful consciousness include faith, mindful
ness, conscience, non-greed, non-hate , tranquility, proficiency, and recti
tude (VM: Table II) . The way that the individual achieves the consciousness
of the beautiful is through absorption or meditation (jhana) , wherein one
leaves concentration upon the particula r, but moves to a universal appreci
ation of the beauty of all things. The technique of lmsina is a means to
attain absorption through concentrating upon a specific oject, al though,
paradoxically, . the purpose of the medi tation is to tnnscend consciousness
of the specific object, and to progress to a universal consciousness. Bud
dhism marks a particular ethical outlook which links contemplation o f
beauty with a commitment to nonviolence.
-""'
-.,.,
/r-:,.\f'
Pc[J.<"n
: ! J1i!!JJr A '. . .
; -.w- '.t
t:
,........,
A
... . -'-i/0,
'-IJ/--:
""<'
- : _-::;- :: .
j
./
126
5.2.5
5.2.6
Christianity, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
thetic
Just as the possibil ity of describing a Hebrew foundt on for ae
Ifically
spe
a
g
descnbm
of
t
ethics is a complex one, so too is the prospec
_
l fig
h1stonca
the
at
looks
one
If
ethics.
Christian foundat ion for aesthetic
that
uation
the
reflect
ity
complex
this
then
h,
Nazaret
ure of Jesus of
o the
wns.
tradit
ic
prophet
and
rabbinic
jor
ma
in
himself
ed
position
Jesus
_
- ,
traditiOn
extent that Jesus did represent a restatem ent of the prophetic
Gd, the
especially with what is arguably the vision of the comig reign of
be
might
God
of
reign
coming
the
of
teaching
this
then
basileia tou Theou,
birds
the
consider
to
s
follower
his
exhorted
Jesus
ethics.
aesthetic
as
read
Yahweh
of the air and the lilies of the field as exemplars of the care of
unde r
to
es
:
ti
narr
creative
used
lly
(Matthew 6 ) . Moreover, Jesus continua
_
aesthetiC
n
Chnsti
a
of
ent
developm
any
makes
score his teaching . What
regarded
ethics difficult is that the post-resurrection Jesus is one who IS
:u h , and
with supreme authority by the immediate post-resurrection ch
et
indeed through out most of the history of the church. Thus, Chnstian
IS only m
It
Chnst.
of
d
comman
the
to
ng
ics is understo od as respondi
_
ed, begm
recent times that this top-down Christology has been challeng
_
be mterning with Dietrich Bonhoeffer, through the view that Jesus should
preted as the powerles s one.

.
.
.
of
The idea of an aestheti c ethics also finds expressiOn m the notiOn
.
disciples
the
to
o
fJesus
call
the
through
d
expresse
as
,
ofJesus
the appeal
_ g character, and why
Why did the follower s ofJesus find him an appealm
r?
have o thers through out history found Jesus an appealing characte
d
suggeste
famously
g,
Forschnn
u
Leben.-Jes
Das
Albert Schweitzer, in his work
al
qt
Jesus
in
sees
One
one.
logical
a
not
was
appeal
this
of
that the nature
_
r, which
ities that are endurin g. There is an aesthetic appeal of h1s characte _
m sug
ll'Se,
:
co
Of
.
)
642
p.
we appreciate o n ly through experience ( 1 95 1 ,
re
we
logical,
than
r
rath
aesthetic
is
gesting that the appeal of Jesus
_
h
wh1c
1chotomy
a
sthetiC,
logical-ae
the
of
y
moving into the dichotom
_
aesthetiC
an
of
logic
the
of
Part
e
.
overcom
to
hope
would
thics
e
aesthetic
c haracter
ethics ofJesus, therefor e, would be to ask exactly what is it in_ his
of the
eness
attractiv
the
that
be
would
which is so attractiv e. My response
nt
nonviole
yet
assertive
his
from
part,
in
least
at
character ofJesus springs,
r of
characte
the
of
element
This
.
authority
and
als
individu
with
dealings
the resur
Jesus tends, to some extent, to be subsume d i n the doctri1: e ?:
e church.
pnmlt!v
the
for
nt
importa
so
rection, which was understandably
r and
characte
the
from
support
draw
well
may
Yet an aestheti c ethics
.
ica!Jesus
histo
the
of
teaching
1 27
Augustine, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
If the subject of Christian aesthetic ethics is a complex one, then the

subject of Augustinian aesthetic ethics i s even more complex. The work of
Saint Augustine of Hippo might seem an unlikely source for an aesthetic
ethics, in that one important theme within the work of Augustine is identi
fication of sinfulness with sexuality, summarized in the concept of concupi
scence. In so doing, Augustine was reflecting existing emphases within
much patristic theology, emphases withi n the writing of Paul, and empha
ses within much Gnostic thought. The licentious context of the final
decades of the Roman Empire is also an important factor in interpreting
Augustine in this regard. However, what makes the writing of Augustine
significant in this respect is his influence upon European thought and
upon later writers. Indeed it is possible to argue that the separation of eth
ics from aesthetics within western thought was substantially due to the
influence of Augustine. There is, nevertheless, something unconvincing
about the denunciation of earthly desire in the work of Augustine. Kim
Power ( 1 995) refers to the "veiled desire " within Augustine. Augustine is a
deeply passionate writer, and it is difficult not to gain a sense of denial
within his rejection of sexual passion.
There are, nevertheless, elements within the work of Augustine which
entail elements of an aesthetic ethics. Throughout his writings, although
especially within Confessio (Confession s ) , written around CE" 397-400 ,
Augustine is very much a writer of the heart, suggesting that our actions
ought to be guided by the desire of the heart. Augustine commences Con
fessio at 1 . 1 with the famous statement that our hearts only find rest with
God. Within Confessio 7.5 and 7.7, Augustine reveals the struggle to deter
mine what is good and what is evil as cen tral to his conversion experience.
At 7. 1 0, Augustine describes his experie nc e of God as one of seeing his
inward soul, with the help of God, the "Immutable Light." Then in 7. 1 2 to
7. 1 6 Augustine affirms all of creation as good, even if a corrupted version
of goodness. Indeed, in 7. 1 2 Augustine argues that the corruption of
things could not take place if the original were not good. Further, in 7 . 1 3 ,
Augustine describes evil a s a lack of harmony. T h e aesthetic theme and aes
thetic theology is taken up again in Confessio 1 0.27 and 1 3.2, where August
ine argues that one finds ultimate beauty in the personal experience of
God and the beauty of God as shown in the beauty of creation. Augustine
does not say that the experience of the beauty of God ought to determine
our actions, although it is difficult not to conclude that such a proposition
is implied.
The theme of an aesthetic theology is also evident within De Natura Boni
Contra Manichaeos (Concerning the Nature of Good, Against the Manichae
ans ) , written by Augustine around CE 405, and a work that summarizes
1 28
much of his earlier polemical writing. Augustine commences the book by

arguing that God is the highest good and that all good comes from God
(Chapter 1 ) . Importantly, Augustine further argues ( Chapter 3) that mea
sure, form and order c o nstitute good, and that without these elements
there is no good, and that evil is a corruption of measure, form or order
(Chapter 4). Technically, Augustine is putting forward an aesthetic rather
than a moral interpretation of how good is to be defined, and, as such, pro
vides a foundation for an aesthetic ethics. The context of the work, the
need for polemic against the Manicheans, is noteworthy, in that the Man
ichaeans developed a dualistic system of good and evil, a dualism that
Augustine rejects as incompatible with the doctrine of the sovereignty of
God. In developing what has since been known as the privative notion of
evil, Augustine is not e n tirely original, in that elements of this can be
argued from Plato. Yet the i mportance of Augustine is that this privative
notion of evil becomes Christianized and thereby achieves a prominent
place within European thought.
The foundations of an Augustinian aesthetic ethics c.. 11 also be found in
De civitate Dei (City of G od ) , written CE 4 1 5, and i n the Enrichidion (Hand
book) , written CE 42 1 . The theme of the goodness of c reation is taken up
within De civitate Dei: at 1 2.5, Augustine writes that "all nature's substances
are good; because they exist and therefore have their own mode and kind
of being, and, in their fashion , a peace and harmony among themselves."
At 1 2.7, Augustine suggests that "one should not try to find an efficient
cause for an evil/wrong choice. (Evil] is not a matter of efficiency, but of
deficiency; the evil will i tself is not effective but defe c tive." Interestingly,
Augustine uses a sensory analogy to desoibe attempting to uncover effi
cient causes for wrong-doing: he suggests that we are aware through our
perception of darkness and silence, through eyes and ears, yet the absence
of light and sound is not an e ntity in itself. Similarly, within Enrichidion, at
4. 1 2 , Augustine declares that all of nature is good, since the founder of all
nature is supremely good . The important qualification is that the goodness
of creation can be diminished. At 4. 1 3, Augustine suggests that evil is based
upon good, "there is nothing to be called evil if there is no good", and at
4 . 1 4 Augustine indicates that evil is the corruption and opposite of good.
What makes De civilate Dei important for consideration is not merely the
theme of aesthetic ethics , which is generally developed within the Augus
tinian corpus, but the way this is related. to peace and war. The context of
the work is the destructiveness of war, especially within the final years of the
Roman Empire. Importantly, Augustine works upon a visual theme, envi
sioning two cities, one temporal and one heavenly. It is true that the earthly
city is one of physical desire, reflecting the denigration of the body that
one often finds within the w01k of Augustine. However, equally, the juxta
position of the two cities does present an aesthetic-ethical representation
1 29
of what should be. At the beginning of the crucial Book 1 9 ( 1 9. 1 ) , Augus t

ine writes; "It is clear to m e that my next task is to discuss the appointed
ends of these two cities, the earthly and heavenly." The earthly city is there
upon described as one of war and the heavenly city is one of peace and har
mony, a theme developed further in Book 22. In 1 9. 1 1 , Augustine
describes the bliss of everlasting peace, the fulfillment of the saints. This is
not, however, an enti rely otherworldly view of peace. In 1 9 . 1 2, Augustin e
posits a theory of the u niversal desire for peace, o n e that anticipates m o re
modern statements such as the Seville Declaration (UNESCO, 1 989) . In
1 9. 1 3, Augustine uses the aesthetic analogy of a person whose rational and
nonrational aspects of character are a t peace to describe the peace of the
universe, a tranquilitas ordinis.
It is true that Augustine does indicate that the Christian may b e
required to participate within war-making, although this i s only b y way of
concession to the reality that Christians exist within a fallen and imperfect
world. Moreover, there are i mportant restrictions put on this participati o n .
Most exegesis of Augustine concentrates upon h i s supposed legitimation o f
war. However his legitimation o f war, i f we might momentarily designate i t
such, is a very reluctant and qualified one. Overall, writing in a context o f
the destructiveness o f wa1 the aesthetic vision presented b y Augustine i s of
the ideal city, one migh t say ideal society, as being one of peace. In support
ing peace education, there is room for arguing that one is only advocatin g
the aesthetic-ethical vision o f Augustine.
5.2. 7
Thomas Aquinas, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
Although one would not normally cegard Thomas Aquinas as a propo

nent of aesthetic ethics, there are elements within his work that arguably
might support such an ethics, especially with regards to peace. Umberto
Ecco comments that an outlook of pancalism, a conception of the beauty
of all things, underpins the work of Aquinas and indeed all medieval
thought ( 1 988, p. 25) . Aquinas inherits the Augustinian equation of moral
and aesthetic concern, for i nstance, writing in Quaestiones Di.sputatae de Veri
tate (On the Disputed Questions of Truth) at Question 22, 1 ad 22 that
"anyone who desires the good, by that very fact desires the beautiful" ( Unde
quicumque appetite bonum, appetic hoc ipso pulcrlmm) . Significantly, Aquinas,
within this Question, furthe1 links desire for beauty, goodness and peace
together.
A recognition of the goodness of the desire for that which is beautiful
extends to Aquinas' comme n ts on peace within Summa Theologica. At 2/2
Q29, in each of the Replies to Articles l , 2 and 3, Aquinas underscores that
peace involves more than concord bet\veen individuals, but rather includes
1 30
a desire for an inner peace. In Thomistic terms, peace is orectic in nature.

In Reply to Article
tranquillitas ordinis
1 , he cites with approval Augustine's statement pax est
and suggests that this denotes peace in that a person's
desires or appetites are in harmony. In the Reply to Article
2, he indicates
that there is a universal desire for peace and that there will only be true
peace where good is desired. In the Reply to Article
3, he states that peace
implies two kinds of union, a bringing of all one's own desires or appetites
to an ordered unity, and the union between one's own desires and those of
another pe1son. Overall, one of the remarkable aspects of the discourse by
Thomas Aquinas on peace is that desire and appetite figure so promi
nen tly. Peace is not merely something to be achieved; peace is something
131
igration of Islam has become even m o re acute within the contemporary

context of terrorism and the rhetoric o f the clash of civilizations.
Thus, any discussion of the aesthetic e thics of Islam and the p o tential
support of Islam for peace education must remain cautious. Yet th ere is
considerable evidence that Islam ought not merely to be thought of as a
universalizing religion, but also as a religion of peace. The standard Islamic
greeting is As-salamu Alaykum. or "peace be with you", and Islam itself is a
42:37-43) , reconciliati o n
4 : 1 28 ) and non-compulsion i n religion (Al-Baqarah 2:256) are
cognate word for peace. Forgiveness ( Al-Shura,

(Al-Nisa,
praised or at least endorsed in Islam. T here is a strong tradition ofjust war
One of the i n teresting comments for an understanding of aesthetics and
22:39,40) or in
2: 1 90 ) . There are verses seemingly
supporting violence, such as Al-Baraat, 9:5 and 9:29, the so-called Sword
peace education is to be found within the discussion on the sin of cruelty
Verses, although context is always impo rtant. Reuven Firestone makes the
desired.
in Islam, although only in response to persecution (AI-Hajj ,

response to aggression (AI-Baqarah,
( m1.delitate) in Summa
Theologica,
at
2.2, Ql 59. Aquinas notes that the con
point that both Judaism and Islam emerged in environments where tribal
(2006, p. 3 1 3). What is note
cept of cruelty is derived from crudity o r rawness. Thus, things well-pre
communities regularly battled with each other
pared and cooked we find pleasant and agreeable (sauvem. et dulcem.) ,
(ho-rrib lem. et
asperum) . It is an aesthetic analogy for a moral position. We find cruelty
worthy are the limitations placed upon participation in conflict, limi tations
whereas when the same is raw, we find it harsh and horrible
that are not dissimilar to those within the Christian doctrine of the just war.
unacceptable because it tastes harsh and horrible. Within the same ques
of Allah and the attributes of Allah. Within Arabic societies, a name sum
tion, Aquinas discusses savagery (saeoitia) and ferocity (jerita te) . Aquinas
differen tiates these from cruelty, although he addresses the origins of such
behaviour, which attributes to evil custom/habit
corrupted n a ture
(ex cormptione naturae) .
(ex mala consutudine)
or
Naturally, we do not desire that
which is cruel or ferocious, although we do so only when habitated to this.
With regard to aesthetic ethics, Islam extols the beauty and excellence
marizes the character of an individual and the attributes of Allah are tradi
tionally summed up in the
99 beautiful names of Allah. Allah is one God

20:8; and Al
although the names of Allah are the most beautiful (Tah-Ha

Hashr,
59:24) . The names of Allah are various, although amongst these

59:23 ) .
names is as Salam, the author and bestower of peace (AI-Hashr,
It is an assessm e n t of moral behaviour similar to that later developed by
Moreover, the other names are general ly not inconsistent with ethics that
Deside1ius Erasmus and Adam Smith.
would support a peaceful society. The followers of lslam are called upon to
5.2.8
rate from those who violate the sanc ti ty of the divi ne names (Al-Araf,
invoke Allah by these names ( Al-Araf,
7: 1 80) . The perfection of Allah as described within the beautiful names i s
Islam, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
The idea of wri ting of an aesthetic ethics of lslam is a complex o n e , as is
the general task of writing on Islam. Edward Said
7 . 1 80; Bani-Israil, 1 7: 1 1 0 ) and sepa
that perfection that the followers o f Allah seek to emulate i n th eir lives.
( 1979) rightfully c hal
lenged the generalizing tendencies in writing on Islam. As with other

world religions, Islam has numerous sub-groupings and at times divergen t
traditions. T h e period o f authorship o f the surahs, Meccan o r Medinan, is
also important in i n terpretation. Said also criticized scholarship that had
no "self-knowledge", specifically about the degree to which Islam has been
the subject o f domination and demonization by Christendom
( 1 979, p.
302) . Edward Said suggests, interestin gly, that i t is the special relationship
of Islam to both Christianity and Judaism ( 1 979, p. 260) , in that all three
religions have so much in common, that has engendered much of the
de traction o f Islam within European scholarship. The problem of the den-
5.3
5.3. 1
Postclassical Aesthetic Eth i c s and Peace Education
Desiderius Erasmus, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
Erasmus Desiderius is one of the foremost of Renaissance humanists,
and, given the nature of the Renaissanc e , it is not en tirely unexpected that
within his work one may find a s trong aes thetic emphasis. Within the work
of Erasmus one can find a delight in the beauty of language and the beauty
of learning, as well as descriptions of the inheren t nobility and beauty o f
1 32
Peace Education. Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations
humanity. In his adages and colloquies, as well as in works such as Copia,

one sees the delight of Erasmus in extensive essays dealing with the impor
tance of language and learning, as well as the enjoyment of daily life and
sympathy with the ordinary person. Indeed, in his own introduction to the
popular adages, Erasmus suggests that the advantage of the proverb is that
authority and beauty is added to style (CWE, 3 1 : 1 7) . He sees a beauty in
relationships, and equates beauty with that which is valuable ( CWE,
1 3: 1 58-1 6 1 ) . He writes in simple yet at times passionate and powerful lan
guage about the lives of ordinary people, with a strong sense of humor and
irony. He employs strong Renaissance motifs, often describing friends talk
ing in a garden or through describing meals and banquets, an emphasis
one can also find in the work of Shakespeare, who almost certainly was a
reader of Erasmus. The overall theme is delight in life. What Erasmus
tends to avoid is scholastic speculation, and indeed, within his work, one
can find a denunciation of the emptiness of scholastic speculation
(AE:328, CWE 27:297) .
Erasmus is often perceived as an ethical optimist/naturalist, although
there is a strong element of the aesthetic in his work; life is something of
beauty and it is natural to celebrate and enjoy this. There is little sense of
the moral "ought" in the work of Erasmus; rather it is an essential and nat
ural element of humanity to live in concord. Ais Geoffrey Bantock suggests,
for Erasmus, humanita.s implied tranquillita.s ( 1 980. p. 57) . Roland Bainton
writes that the educational ideal of Erasmus rested upon this idea of
humanitas, a view of the inherent dignity of humankind, due to the fact
that humans are sentient creatures, not only communicating, but bestow
ing names. Human persons should therefore act towards each other "with
a civility, strive to maintain concord, and avoid dissension" ( 1 969, p. 42) ,
and, i f strife does arrive, differences should be resolved "by the arbitre
ment of reason" ( 1 969, p . 42) . The explanation for this is that in so doing
we are acting in accord with true and deepest human nature.
There are many works by Erasmus wherein he advocates peace. The aes
thetic element within the peace advocacy of Erasmus is well expressed
within the 1 5 1 6 work Institutio principis christiani (Education of a Christian
Prince) , wherein Erasmus champions the importance of the "arts of peace"
for a ruler (CW.27:253-260) . The naturalistic and aesthetic emphasis on
peace is evident within the Oratio de pace et discordia (Oration on Peace and
Discord) (LB 8:545-552 ) , wherein Erasmus writes: "Nature herself has
placed certain seeds of peace i n our souls, by which we are borne towards
love and concord. For if we all s tudiously follow the impulses of nature, we
are eager for living together i n companionship, we pursue friendships, we
love nearness and the n eed for others, and we rejoice in familiar society"
(LB 8: 547AB) . Obviously if peace is natural, then Erasmus must explain
the existence of violence, and within the famous adagium Dulce bell11.1n inex-
Aesthetic Ethics a n d Peace E ducation
133
pertis (Sweet is war to those who have not experienced

it) , Erasmus does
just this.
Dulce bellum inexpertsi presen ts a strong and clear statem
ent of an aes
thetic ethics found ation for peace. The aesthe
tic eleme nt within the
adagium is elegantly summ ed within the title: the
concer n of Erasmus is
with that "h ich is consid ered beautiful, although
: .
the reality is that war is
not so. Wrthm the text of the adagiu m (AE:31 7-356)
, Erasmus twice con
trasts the beauty of peace with the ugliness of war,
althou gh significantly
Erasmus also hin es uch of his argument on
the inhere nt nobility and
?
beaut of hu ii_Jamty, m that the human individ
ual
alone has the unique
_
c pacny for fnend sh1p,
for reason, and for love. It is this adagium which
gives 1s the aesthetic imagery of a kiss as the union
of souls, and the eye as
the wmdow of the soul (AE:32 0 ) . War is then quite
alien to what makes a
person human, and yet Erasmus must conten d
with the social pheno me
non of war. Erasm s s l es this p roblem by develo
ping an evolutionary the
ory of war, wherem It rs sugges ted that from the

primitive necessity of
_
defend mg
the human group from wild animals, the person
of aggression
tends to be regarded as a hero. What then emerges
from this is a culture o f
violen ce, although Erasm us does not u s e this phrase
, which is at odds with
t e inherent nature of human i ty. Yet the real anger
and rage of Erasmus is
direct ed not so much at those who engage in war,
but rather those who
encou rge war, and i n particu lar those of the Christ
ian faith who ought to
recogmze the example and teachi ng o f Christ
towards peace . The most
trench ant criticism of Erasm us is agains t those who
encou rage a culture o f
violen ce.
It is worthwhile to pursue the i mplications of the
Erasmian aesthetics of
peace nd war for eace educa tion. Put s imply, one
implic ation is that peace
educa tion should mvolve what Erasmus was doing,

that is, acknowledging
the appeal of war, but equally pointing out that
this
appeal masks the
_
destructrveness and suffering e ngendered by war.
This Erasmian theme is
sometimes reflected in more mode rn work, such as
Glenn Gray's influential
study, The amon: Reflections on Men in Battle. Gray
was a philosopher, and
wrote a phrlosoph1c and person al reflection of his
experiences as an Ameri
can intelligence officer in France during World War
Two. He writes exten
sively of the aesthetic appea l of war and violen
ce ( 1970, pp. 25-58,
2 1 5-21 8)-yt concludes that n othing can atone
for the irtlustice, suffering
and dadation of warfare. Moreover, Gray goes
further than merely demy
tologlZing wr. He also suggests that the love of war
reflects an emptiness of
_
life, and that, rf there rs
to be a no-war future, then an answer to the empti
ness of human existe ce needs to be found ( 1 970,
pp. 58, 2 1 5-242 ) . Gray
suggests th t the crural el ment in the elimination
of war is the rediscovery
_
of an artistic
love of life. It rs very much an Erasmian vision, where
in an aes-
_w
1 34
the tic regard for the dignity of the human person and ertioyment of life, and
a revulsion against war, are all part of a unified whole.
5.3.2
tion
David Hume, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Educa
is curious. The work

The contribution of David Hume to aesthetic ethics
vative politic ethics ,
conser
of
oint
standp
a
from
d
of Hume can be assesse
y been explored in this
conse quent ialism and virtue e thics, as has alread
ethics eleme nt to the
tic
.
investigation. There is, however, a strong aesthe
not widely recogn ized
is
which
nt
work of David Hume , an aesthetic eleme
The aesthetic ethics of
in either aesthetic ethics or i n Hume an criticism.
reliance on the earlier
a
from
also
and
icism
Hume derives from his empir
of moral sense and
theory
a
asized
emph
which
eson,
work of Franc is Hutch
of moral sci
system
ped a
an idea of virtue as beauty. David Hume develo
sen iment ,
by
ated
domin
was
ences which emphasized that the i ndividual
e the
outsid
edge
knowl
f
o
y
validit
the
passio n and appetite. Hume denied
.
.
t e
from
denve
must
th1cs
e
and
ity
moral
too
so
exper ience of the senses ;
sees moral and aesthetiC
experience of the senses. For this reason , Hume
beauty as keenly inter-related.
. .
ethics can be seen w1th1n
The arguably aesthetic orient ation of Hume 's
ising the three books,
the structure of A Treatise of Human Nature, compr
. ' In each, the impor
Morals
'On
and
'On Under standi ng,' 'On Passio n,'
ated or expou nded.
anticip
either
is
sion
tance of the aesthetic dimen
standi ng, Hume
under
with
deals
which
,
l
Book
of
Towards the end
to reason , ' and there
includ es a section entitle d ' Of skepticism with regard
act of the sensitive,
a
rly
puts the hypot hesis that belief is "more prope
.
a cruoal stteent,
IS
It
.
)
1
.4.
1
(
s"
rather than cogitative part of our nature
sh that moral ity IS also
as much of the remainder of the work seeks to establi
of huma n n ature.
part
tive
cogita
the
than
rather
ve
an act of the sensiti
to analyze the origin s of
Within Book 2, dealing with passio ns, Hume seeks
pain that we as? ciate
or
re
passions (2 . 1 . 1 ) , as an expression of the pleasu
oted expslti? n of
oft-qu
the
ns
with object s or others . Book 2 also contai
Hume Id1caes
in
where
,
(2.3.3)
ality
the priority of passion over ration
3, dealin g With
Book
n.
passio
of
t
servan
the
be
that reason should always
as those of
such
virtues,
mmals, develo ps a theory of moral ity that sees the
upon the
ions
reflect
tic
justice , respec t for authority, benev olence , as aesthe
circum stances of o thers (especi ally 3.3. 1 ) .
also be discer ned in

The theme of the aesthe tic nature of ethics can
Principles of Momls,
the
ning
Concer
y
Enquir
ry,
David Hume 's Second Enqui
The structure of
se.
Treati
eai'lier
the
of
n
versio
ible
access
written as a more
c social vir
specifi
of
sion
the work involves an overview of moral ity, a discus
pon a
thereu
and
nce,
allegia
tues such as benevolence , justice , and political
,.
'
1 35
discussion of why specific qualities please us. An interesting summation of

moral philosophy is provided by Hume (EPM: 1 : 1 36) when he suggests that
"the end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty; and, by proper
representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue, beget corre
spondent habits, and engage us to avoi d the one, and embrace the other."
How do we apprehend the beauty of vir tue? It is something we feel. Shortly
thereafter, Hume suggests that the situation of some actions being worthy
of approbation and others worthy of censure depends "on some internal
sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species"
(EPM: l : l 37) . Interestingly, Hume employs the analogy of the appreciation
of beauty in art, to suggest that just as there are some kinds of artistic
beauty which require reasoning, so too, often moral beauty makes
demands of intellectual faculties, in order to have a suitable influence o n
the human mind (EPM: l : 1 37) .
Given the importance of feeling in the moral science of David Hume, i t
i s n o t surprising that Hume also wrote a number o f essays dealing with the
problems of aesthetic appreciation. Of these, the 1 757 essay 'On the Stan
dard of Taste' is perhaps the most important. Herein David Hume deals
with aesthetics, although significantly he also subtly slides into questions of
ethics. The essay commences with an archetypical empirical observation
that "The great variety of Taste, as well as of opinion, which prevails in the
world, is too obvious not to have fallen under every one's observation"
(SE: 1 33 ) , and further "we are apt to call barbarous whatever departs widely
from our own taste and apprehension" (SE: l34) . Hume then discusses
"those who found morality on sentiment" (SE: 1 34 ) , which surely must
include himself, and hints, with reservations, at an ethical universalism
when he indicates that "writers of all nations and all ages concur i n
applauding justice, humanity, magnanimity, prudence, veracity; and i n
blaming opposite qualities." (SE: 134) . Hume declares that "Whoever rec
ommends any moral virtues, really does no more than is implied in the
terms themselves" (SE: 1 36) , in that the terms themselves imply a degree o f
blame o r appmbation, although the reason why the terms imply such
blame or approbation is that they do reflect, at least to some extent, a uni
versal moral sensibility, or as Dabney Townsend argues (2000 ) , a uniformity
of human nature.
David Hume does not use the termino logy of aesthetic ethics, although
it is still valid to enquire as to whether within the work of Hume one can
discern an implied universal aesthetic ethics of peace. The social virtues of
justice and benevolence are really central to the contemporary integrative
notion of peace, in that benevolence involves a disposition against the kill
ing and suffering of others, and justice involves a commitment to social jus
tice and the diminution of structural violence. What makes David Hume
relevant is his suggestion that we act out of benevolence and justice
l
I
1 36
towards others, because to do such things is inherently beautiful o r that

such are inherently actions of moral beauty. Put simply, it feels good to do
good. It is not uncommon for people to be cynical of altruism, and cyni
cism is especially directed to those who engage in what is criticized as feel
good altruism. The work of Hume meets such an accusation head-on,
affirming that altruism is indeed linked to selfish sentiment and enjoy
ment, and affirming that indeed there can be no other motivation for
altruism. The emphasis within the work of Hume is that there is nothing
wrong with such enjoyment of acts of beauty.
5.3.3
Adam Smith, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
Adam Smith is best known as an economist, although, for aesthetic eth

ics, his 1 759 work The Theory of Moral Sentiments is most significant. The
treatise is an extensive one, dealing in seven parts with how sympathy
works. It is not within the scope of this book to give a full discussion of the
development of the concept by Adam Smith, although it is sufficient to say
that sympathy or fellow-feeling involves both sensory and imaginative facul
ties. Smith suggests that humankind is naturally sympathetic, based upon
our imagination of the situations of others. Sympathy for Smith does not
mean pity but rather a pleasure at the e njoyment of others and displeasure
at their pain ( l / 1 /2, 1 0-1 3 ) . Sympathy is paradoxically a selfish principle
.and, acGording to Smith, this is exactly why it works. As Fonna Forman
Barzilai comments (2000) , the Smithian view is that self-interest is central
to international peace, and this motif of the beneficial effect of self-interest
is developed by Adam Smith in both his ethical treatise, The Theory of Moral
Sentiments, and in his later economic treatise, the 1 776 work Wealth of
Nations.
One of the cen tral debates in the i nterpretation of Adam Smith is the
seeming contrast between his ethical and political theory, of the apparent
altruism of Theory of Moral Sentiments and the apparent egoism of Wealth of
Nations. The idea that there i s a contrast, however, reflects a misunder
standing of how Adam Smith describes sympathy in Theory. Sympathy is
essentially egoistic. Sympathy is something that we enjoy and which results
in beneficence. Smith writes in Part O ne ( l / 2/4, 52) , in discussing social
passions, that "Generosity, humanity, kindness compassion, mutual friend
ship and esteem, all the social and benevolent affections, when expressed
in the countenance or behavior, even towards those who are not peculiarly
connected with ourselves, please the indifferent spectator upon almost
every occasion. " Similarly, in Wealth of Nations, Smith presents a view extol
ling pleasure, self-advancem ent and e nlightened self-centeredness. Smith
argues that it is through self-in terest, and particularly through u nfettered
1 37
capitalism and international trade, that international peace will dawn.

Both Smith's ethical and political theory emphasizes the importance of
pleasure within the individual.
An interesting aspect of what we might call the aesthetic ethics of Adam
Smith is the importance of justice, especially as developed in Part Two of
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, wherein Smith discusses what he calls merit
and demerit, and feelings of approbation and disapprobation. Smith
argues that it is natural and proper that we should feel approbation
towards those who have done good and misapprobation towards those who
have done evil; indeed one cannot have genuine feelings of sympathy for a
person who has suffered deliberate inj u ry unless one feel some disapproba
tion towards the perpetrator of the suffering (2. 1 . 1-5, 94-1 1 1 ) . It is
because of this that justice and benefice are interdependent virtues
(2.2. 1 -3, 1 1 2-1 35) . Smith also raises the problem of fortune, in that we
tend to feel attached to objects/ persons/ circumstances to which we have
become habituated. Smith argues that fortune tends to diminish a sense of
merit and demerit, that is, through habituation, we are less likely to feel
approbation or disapprobation towards others (2.3. 1 -3, 133- 1 57 ) . It is an
important qualification for any system of aesthetic ethics, and one which
Smith takes up later.
One problem for any system of aesthetic ethics; and for the application
of such ethics towards peace, is the Schadenfreude issue. Put simply, if we say
that ethics should be based upon natural feeling for our fellow human
beings, then how do we in tegrate Schaderfreude, or seemingly malicious
pleasure at the misfortune of others, into such a system? There are hints
to a possible resolution of this proble m of the malicious ertioyment at the
suffering of others within the notions o f approbation and disapprobation
as advanced by Adam Smith. Smith suggests we feel a sense of approbation
towards those who act justly and a sense o f disapprobation towards those
who act unjustly. John Portman (2000) has suggested that the enjoyme n t
o f Schadenfreude is n o t a n arbitrary one-rather it i s directed against those
who we feel have acted unjustly, or who are i n some ways are deserving o f
a feeling of disapprobation. Schadenfreude i s thus an outworking o f our
feelings for j ustice. Smith did not use the notion of Schadenfreude, as
indeed it had not been appropriated i n to the English language during h i s
time . It is reasonable to conjecture that Adam Smith would have regarded
this emotion as being entirely natural and entirely proper, as an outwork
ing of our natural feelings of disapprobation towards those who have
unjustly prospered.
A key metaphor that Adam Smith uses is that of the spectator and it is a
metaphor that is very useful for an understanding of aesthetic ethics. More
over, this is an especially sensory metaphor-we do not think of what we
should do, we see another and from this feel what we should do. One of the
138
seeming paradoxes of the spectator is that it is only the impartial spectator

who can truly empathize with the suffering of the other. Adam Smith writes
in Part Three (at 3.0.3, 2 1 7) that "the propriety of our moral sentiments is
never so apt to be corrupted as when the indulgent and partial spectator is
at hand, while the indiffere n t and impartial one is at a great distance."
Interestingly, for the application of aesthetic ethics for peace, the example
that Adam Smith uses to describe the partial and impartial spectator is that
of nations at war (3.0.3, 2 1 7-21 2) . Smith argues that when two nations are
at variance, the citizen of each pays little attention to the sentiments which
foreign nations might hold regarding his/her individual conduct. The
overwhelming ambition is to obtain the approbation of fellow-citizens,
and, as the citizens are all animated by the same hostile passions, a citizen
can never please his/her fellow citizens so much as by enraging and
offending their common e nemy. The process of war is in fact a failure in
the process of observation by the impartial spectator.
Part Five of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is sub-titled 'Of the Influence
of Custom and Fashion upon the Sen timents of Moral Approbation and
Disapprobabtion', and, within the two chapters of the Part, Adam Smith
deals with a fundamental obj ection to aesthetic ethics, and especially to
the application of an aesthetic ethics to peace. In Chapter I (5.0. 1 ,
2 8 1 -289 ) , Adam Smith suggests that what is beautiful is substantially
determined by what is useful, although this does not entirely describe vari
ations in what is beautiful. In Chapter 2 (5.0.2, 290-305 ) , he explores the
influence of custom and fashion on moral sentiment, and addresses the
issue of how what to us are obvious barbarities can be considered morally
acceptable to the perpetrators of those barbarities. This is an important
objection to aesthetic ethics, and especially the application of aesthetic
ethics to peace.
The particular barbarous practice Adam Smith focuses on is infanticide,
and Smith introduces this by asking rhetorically "Can there by greater bar
barity, for example, than to hurt an infant?-its helplessness, its innocence,
its amiableness, call forth the compassion even of an enemy . . " (5.0.2,
304 ) . Smith makes it clear that there is an intrinsic moral-aesthetic appeal
of the importance of protecting an infant. Despite this, Smith points out
that infanticide was an accepted practice in ancient Greece. He asks how
this could be, and suggests the answer is one of habituation to a naturally
repugnant behaviour due to exigent circumstances. Smith suggests that,
under the extremity of hunger or pursuit, it may be unavoidable to aban
don a child. However; what tended to happen was that the practice of
infanticide became established custom, for reasons of convenience. Smith
writes: "Uninterrupted custom had by this time so thoroughly authorized
the practice, that not only the loose maxims of the world tolerated this bar
barous prerogative, but even the doctrine of the philosophers, which
.
139
ought to have been more j us t and accurate, was led away b y the established
custom; and upon this, as upon many other occasions, instead of censur
ing, supported the horrible abuse by far-fetched considerations of public
utility" (5.0.2, 304).
The above comments could equally apply to war itself. Just as the phi
losophers and the populace h ave been "led away by established custom",
so too one can argue that p hilosophers and the populace within modern
history have been led away by the established custom of accepting war as
an acceptable social institution. The assumption within the discussion by
Adam Smith on infanticide is that there is a universal aesthetic-moral stan
dard that children ought n o t be killed, but that, due to circumstances, we
become habituated to such a practice. Adam Smith is here actually work
ing from a universal aesthetic-moral ethic of nonviolence, that is, there
may exist exigent circumstances where killing or abandonment may b e
necessary, yet such exigent circumstances ought n o t t o be accepted as cus
tom, and the doctrine of the philosophers ought to censure such
instances where such violent practice has become established custom. The
role that Adam Smith ascribes to philosophers, namely, that they ought to
be protesting infanticide, is pertinent, in that this arguably is a peace edu
cation role, protesting violent custom which is against natural aesthetic
i nclination.
5.4
5.4. 1
Kantian Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education
Kant's Anti-Aesthetic Ethics
The ethics of Immanuel Kant can be characterized as being quintessen

tially rational and non-aesthetic. Kantian ethics, as summarized by Ann e
Margaret Baxley (2003, p . 5 61 ) , represent a ) moral strength over recalci
trant emotions, b ) the autonomy of pure practical reason and c) self-rul e
over one's sensuous characte r. What makes the work of Immanuel Kan t
i mportant for aesthetic ethics is that most aesthetic philosophy regards the
aesthetics of Kant to be of central importance and that much of the mod
em separation of aesthetics and ethics can be traced to the work of Kant.
More than this, the opposition of Immanuel Kant to the unity of aesthetic
ethics gives an insight as to how this unity ought to be articulated, and
especially for the implications of this unity of aesthetics and ethics for
peace and for peace education.
The 1 764 work Beobachtungen uber das Gefuhl des SchOnen und Erhabenen
( Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime) is one o f
the so-called pre-critical works o f Immanuel Kant, although i t nevertheless
1 40
establishes much of the emphasis on the subjective nature of aesthetic

enjoyment which characterizes not only much of his later work, but also
modern aesthetics. Immanuel Kant was later to remark on the influence
that David Hume had on his philosophical work (AA.5.52 ) , and this partic
ular work can be seen as a response to the aesthetic morality of D avid
Hume, and a response to Hume's writing on aesthetics. Beobachtungen is
divided in to four sections, dealing respectively with the objects of feelings
of the beautiful and sublime, human attJibutes which we deem to be beau
tiful and sublime, the difference between the sexes in what is deemed
beautiful and sublime, and the difference between nations as to what is
deemed beautiful and sublime. The opening sentence of the work, how
ever, gives an i ndication of Kant's aesthetic program. Kant writes
(AA .2.205) that the diverse feelings of ertioymen t or displeasure rest not so
much upon the nature of external objects (iiusseren Dinge) that arouse
them, so much as upon each person 's own disposition to pleasure and
pain. Within this one sentence there is an indication as to why Kant is
driven to develop a rationalist system of ethics, namely, that the world of
feeling is subjective and thus ultimately unreliable.
Immanuel Kant developed further the notion of the subjectivity of all
human perception in Kritik der reinen Vern.unft ( Critique of Pure Reason) ,
the so-called Fi1st Critique, written 1 78 1 and revised 1 787. The work pre
sents Kant's transcenden talist epistemology, and in particular an epistemol
ogy operating within the limitations of human experience. One of the key
concepts of Kant is that of the transcendental aesthetic, where aesthetics
denotes a science of the principles of sensibility (AAA.30) ; although in his
subsequent writing Kant expands his understanding of aesthetics to
include the science of taste, that is, appreciation of the beautiful. Trimscen
dental is used by Kant here to denote going beyond the limitations of the
sensory. There is a crucial discussion at the beginning of a section dealing
with general observations on transcendental aesthetics, wherein Kan t sums
up his transcendentalist aesthetics. He writes: " . . . all of our expe1ience is
nothing but our imagined idea of received phenomena; the things which
we see are not by themselves what we see, nor are they the relations of the
things we see to what we see, so that if we let go of our subjectivity or the
sujective composition of our senses, all qualities, all relations of objects in
space and time, and indeed space and time itself, would disappear"
(AA.4.42 ) . Kant goes on to indicate that objects cannot exist as phenom
ena by themselves, but only in us, and that it remains completely unknown
to us what objects may be by themselves, apart from the receptivity of
human senses. Moreover this manner of perceiving objects is not necessar
ily shared by individuals (AA.4.43) . It is because of the subjectivity of aes
thetics, that Kan t is subsequently (in later writing) forced to the conclusion
that ethics must be rational rather than affective in basis.
1 41
The 1 785 Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Foundatio n for t h e

Metaphysics of Morals) is a brief work wherein Kant develops his ideas o f
non-aesthetic o r rational ethics. The work i s divided into three sec tions,
and the first deals with the importance of acting from will, rather than
inclination or consequences (AA-4.393-405 ) ; the second with the refine
ment of this through the distinction of the c ategorical from the hypothet
ical imperative , and the autonomy of the will (AA.4.406-445 ) , and t h e
third with the importance o f freedom, a n d especially freedom o f the will
(AA.4 . 446-463) . One of the ways to u nderstand Gru.ndlegung is through
the opening sentence of Section One, wherein Kant declares that the only
thing which can be conceivably and unreservedly deemed good is a good
will (AA.4.393) . Genuine beneficenc e is and can only be based upon voli
tion or autonomous will, and not upon any heteronomous factors such as
inclination , consequen ces, or obligation. The last is perhaps the most dif
ficult, as Kan t argues that whilst duty is paramount , our action ought to b e
motivated out o f a free decision t o act i n accordance with duty, a n d n o t
out o f a desire that we b e seen to be acting i n according to duty. T h e
notion o f t h e imperative i s one way Kant develops this idea o f acting
according to duty: hypothetical imperatives are those which are linked to
specific instrumen tal ends, although the c ategorical imperative is tha t
which is independe n t in itself.
There are many passages within Grundl.egung wherein Kant presents the
essentially rationalisti c and anti-inclina tional (and anti-consequentialist)
aspects of his ethics. As discussed previously, one of the key passages for a n
understand in g of the implications o f Kant for peace advocacy and peace
education is where he makes a brief comment on the Gospel command t o
love one's enemies (AA.4.399 ) . Kant argues that love as an inclination /
affection cannot be commande d, but good/ben eficence out of duty m ay
be commande d, even if that good/bene ficence is not out of inclination /
affection. Indeed, Kant argues that the only command that can be made i s
that one d o good o r act beneficently out of duty. The reason Kant gives for
this is that good/beneficence to our enemies is opposed by a natural and
overpower ing counter-in clination. Therefore good/ben eficence out o f
duty represents a practical love, whereas an affective o r inclinational love
for our enemies represents a pathologic al love. Put simply, Kant sees a n
affective love for one's enemies as unnatural, and therefore h e i s forced t o
define love i n what h e calls practical terms, although i n reali ty what Kant
presents is a very legal system. Much of his system of ethics can be inter
preted as an outworking of this practical or l egal love, especially through
the application of the universalizability principle (AA.4.42l ) , that is, acting
only on the maxim that one 's maxim should be a universal law.
The idea of a rational morality was further developed by Kant in the so
called Second Critique, the 1 788 Kritik der praktischen Vemunft (Critique o f
1 42
Practical Reason) . The Second Critique is similar to the earlier Grundle

gung, but whereas the Grundlegung works from formal common assump
tions of philosophy, the Second Critique works from formal definitions.
The Second Critique consists of two parts, the 'Doctrine of the Elements of
Pure Practical Reason ' and the much shorter 'Methodology of Pure Practi
cal Reason. ' Within both parts, Kant relentlessly pursues his theme of the
importance of a morality separated from inclination and based only upon
autonomous will. According to Kant, the practical rule is always the prod
uct of reason (AA.5.20) and for Kant practical reason rather than sensitiv
ity o r sensation ought to be the basis of morality. One of the key
underpinnings of the anti-aesthetic morality of Kant is the subjectivity and
thus variability of sensation and inclinations, and thus by definition these
cannot be the basis of morality (AA.5.21 ,22; AA.5.25, AA.5.38,39,
AA.5 . 58-62, AA.5.83,84) . Kant does concede that i t is a beautiful thing to
do good to others because of love and a sympathetic good will and to do
j ustice because of a love of order (AA.5.83) , although he is very quick to
emphasize that this can never form the basis of a rational morality. Not sur
prisingly, in the 'Methodology of Pure Practical Reason, ' Kant extols the
value of becoming free of sensuous attachments ( AA.5. 1 52 ) and further
concludes, with a typical rationalism, that "principles must be erected on
concepts ( Begriffe) ; on any other grounds there are only passing moods
which give a person no moral worth" (AA.5 . 1 57) .
One of the ways of unders tanding the anti-aesthetic ethics of Immanuel
Kant is through looking at the treatment of good and evil within the Sec
o nd Critique, and comparing this with the treatment of the concepts i n
Augustine. Kant expressly distinguishes moral good a n d evil from well
being and suffering (AA.5.59-62) . What separates moral good and evil
from mere well-being and suffering is that moral good and evil involves an
element of rational will. If we contrast this with the cosmology of August
ine, we find within Augustinian cosmology a much more aesthetic notion
of the universe as being good, and evil as constituting the deprivation of
that good. Augustinian cosmology also represents a much less individualis
tic notion of good and evil, as the notion of will in the ethics of Kant
assumes an individual and personal notion of good and evil. The notion of
moral good being associated with natural goodness and, conversely, evil
with the privation of that n atural goodness, is representative of a unity of
aesthetics and morality. Indeed it is arguable that much of the notion of
m orality today, as constituting what the individual does or wills, demon
s trates the long-term influence of the philosophy of Kant.
The contrast between Kant and Augustine becomes even more marked
in Kant's discussion of the command to "love God above all and your
neighbor as yourself' (AA.5.83) . Kant suggests that this can only be inter
preted as what he calls practical love, that is, ethical obedience. Kant goes
1 43
further and suggests that loving God out of inclination is pathological and
ultimately an impossibility, as God is not an object of the senses. Augustine
by contrast sees the action of loving God, in an expressly emotive sense, as
the natural state of humans. In terms of ethics, Kant suggests that it is
impossible that there should be a natural inclination to do good, for the
simple reason that if a rational creature could ever reach the stage of liking
to comply with all moral laws, then there would be no possibility of a desire
within the creature to tempt the creature to deviate from the laws. In other
words, a natural inclination to do good, would violate the central Kantian
notion of the free will of the individual .
Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique ofJudgment) , the so-called Third Critique
of Kant, was published in 1 790, and can be regarded as an extension of the
overall theme of subjectivity of p erception, found within the earlier two c ri
tiques. The work is divided into two parts, one entitled 'Critique of Aes
thetic' and the other 'Critique ofjudgment. ' In the former, Kant examines
aesthetic judgment, beauty and the sublime, and i n the latter he examin es
the organic unity of nature and the extent to which any teleological argu
ment for God can be derived from this. The linkage between the two parts
is that in both Kant concedes that there is some semblance of external real
i ty, although he returns to the anti-aesthetic theme of the earlier two c ri
tiques, namely, that epistemology and e thics must be entirely rational. He
argues that the aesthetic judgment assumes there is a claim to universality,
that is, it must entail an assumed claim to validity for all individuals
(AA.5.2 1 1 ,2 1 2 ) . However, despite this, the work itself commences with a
statement that whether we discern something is beautiful is a subjective
judgment (AA.5.203,204) , and this is a theme that continues throughout
the aesthetic discussion by Kant. Similarly, in the second part Kant con
cedes that there is an apparent teleology in the organic unity of nature,
and an apparent basis for a physico-theology; yet, despite this, Kant sees the
only basis for knowledge of God is faith, and obedience to the duty flowin g
from that faith.
One of the interesting aspects of the Third Critique is an apparen t
semantic shift from the First Critique. I n the First Critique, "aesthetic" is
used to denote a science of sensibility; in the Third Critique, "aesthetic" is
used to denote a science of taste. Yet there is a logical progression between
the two usages. Just as Kant argues from the subjectivity of sensations to the
subjective nature of all human knowledge, so too he argues from the sub
jectivity of taste, which is based upon sensations, to the subjective nature o f
all judgment o n beauty. I t i s the separation o f emotions from aesthetics
that leads Kant to differentiate j udgment of taste from delight in the agree
able (AA.5.204-207) . A judgment of taste must be disinterested deligh t,
completely independent of the actual existence of the object. A delight i n
the agreeable i s coupled with interest, i n that the agreeable is that which
1 44
his
the individual finds pleasing i n sensation . It is fair to say of Kant that
tors
fac
ing
determin
key
the
of
One
c.
relativisti
aesthetics are not entirely
with regard to judgmen t of taste is the purpose of the c reator of the partic
ular object, and view which is entirely in accord with the volitional empha
sis within the earlier Critiques.

in
One of the most i n teresting commen ts in the Third Critique is found
sub
the
f
o
feelings
r
u
o
discusses
Kant
where
,
0-264)
Section 28 (AA5.26
in
lime towards nature. Kant suggests that there are many things fearful
lives,
our
for
fear
n ature which can fill us with uneasines s, due to a natural
of
although the cessatio n of that uneasiness can lead to an agreeable state
place
common
from
us
raises
it
as
sublime
cially
e
joy. This experience is esp
seem
experien ce and gives us the ability to measure ourselves against the
com
ing omnipot ence of nature. This is the context for some problem atic
including
war,
of
s
aesthetic
ments by Kant on what might be called the
effect
reverence for the soldier, the sublime nature of war and the elevating
the
that
argues
Kant
.
263)
2,
(M.5.26
nation
a
of
r
characte
of war on the
appeal
more numerou s the dangers in time of war, the more sublime is the
of war, due to the fortitude which the dangers call forth . By contrast, pro
longed peace brings forth what Kant calls a commerc ial ethos, with atten
dant debasing self-interes t and cowardice.

he
Do the comments by Kan t on the sublime n ature o f war indicate that
later
his
of
much
was a bellicist? This would be in contrast to the thrust of
ing
work, which was directed towards means of avoiding war and establish
war
of
nature
sublime
the
on
Kant
by
t
statemen
peace. To some extent the
pro
(AA.5.262, 2 63) can be see n as a reminder of the extent to which war
vides an existential chall e n ge, just as .the dangers of n ature do. Elisabeth
Kiibler-Ross argues- alon g much the same lines in her On Death and Dying,
war
where she contends that we e njoy war as a form of death denial. "Is
face
to
need
a
"but
lly,
rhetorica
s
1bler-Ros
Ki
asks
else,"
perhaps nothing
of
death, to conquer and master it, , to come out alive-a peculiar form
war
of
e
challeng
tial
d enial of our own mortality" ( 1 973, p. 1 1 ) . The existen
to
is that in surviving war o n e enj oys the exhilaration of having been close
deep
some
thus
is
There
.
mortality
defy
to
g
death, and thereby seemin
logic to Kan t's stateme n t of the aesthetic appeal of war. Within his ethical
e
writing, Kan t stresses that, although aesthetic feeling may well re-enforc
of
one
be
to
ought
less
moral commitment, moral commitm ent neverthe
such
rational will o n ly. It is therefore quite consisten t that a peace advocate
is
this
and
war,
of
appeal
aesthetic
the
about
open
quite
be
as Kant should
upon
p recisely why Kant argues so strongly that ethics should not be based
i nclination and that the basis for peace should be a judicial-legal one.
5.4.2
1 45
Kant's Peace Works
The later years of Kant's life coincided with the commencement of the
re:olutionary wars of Europe, which were to last until 1 81 5 . Undoubtedly,
this would have been a factor in the i nterest Kant developed i n these later
years in peace advocacy, notably in the 1 795 work Zum Ewigen Frieden (Per
petual Peace) and the 1 797 work Metaphysik der Sitten ( Metaphysics of Mor
als ) . In both of these works the anti-aesthetic emphasis of Kant can b e
discerned: Kant takes what i s a statocratic and judicial-legal approach to
the problem of achieving peace. One of the themes of Ewigen Frieden is the
depravity of human nature (AA.8.355, M.8 . 38 1 ) and from this under
standing Kant declares that the natural state of individuals living in prox
imity is one of either open hostility or the constant and enduring threat o f
hostility (M.8.348) . Therefore peace is something that needs to b e estab
lished (M.8.349) . In judicial fashion, Kant uses the format of a peace
treaty, with Preliminary Articles, dealing with peace treaties, i ndependence
of nations, abolition of standing and mercenary armies, and treatment o f
prisoners, and the Definitive Articles, dealing with the importance o f
republican constitutions, world federalism, and cosmopolitanism, by which
Kant means to include free trade. Peace is not something which needs t o
be discovered or felt; peace, rather, is a problem o f government.
Within Metaphysik der Sitten one can find much the same statocratic and
judicial-legal emphasis on peace. The work is divided into two parts, the
first dealing with metaphysical first principles of right and the second with
the metaphysical first p ri n c iples of virtue. Kant discusses private rights,
i ncluding the right to property, and then proceeds to discuss public right,
comprising the right of states, the right of peoples, and the cosmopolitan
right. It is interesting that Kant finds it necessary to commence the discus
sion on cosmopolitan right, in Section 62, with a specific disavowal of uni
versal philanthropy. Kant writes: "The rational idea ( Vernunftidee) of a
peaceful, if not friendly, genuine community of all peoples on earth that
are i n direct contact with each other is not so much a philanthropic (ethi
cal) principle, but a principle dealin g with rights" (AA.6.352) . Philan
thropy or love of humanity is counter-moral for Kant, as it does not take
account of the true self-interest of human inclination. Peace can only be
achieved through recognition of mechanisms and processes that allow for
co-operation between peoples.
It can be argued that the Kantian approach to peace is consistent with
so-called realist international relations theory, one which sees human
nature i n pessimistic terms and not i ntrinsically i n clined towards peace.
The Kantian approach is perhaps summed up in the reference to peace as
Pflichtsbegriff, or a concept related to duty (M.8.362 ) . The idea that peace
should be a duty for humanity is one which is quite antithetical to the
1 46
Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Ed ucation
notion of the universal aesthetic appeal of peace; nevertheless, there are
1 47
a hidden aesthe tic element within his work, especially with regards to
some subtle and con tradictory hints of the aesthetic appeal of pea e within
peace. With
the work of Kant. There is, as it were, a ghost within the machine. In a sig
tendency towards peace, through cosmopolitanism and through growin g
nificant passage towards the end of the Third Definitive Article of Ewigen
Fri.eden,
Kant suggests that because there is now a worldwide community of
Ewigen Frieden,
Kant makes it clear that there is an inevitable
commercial i n terdependence. However, if this i s inevitable, why d o we

need to accelerate this process through the measures that Kant so meticu
peoples over the earth, a violation of rights in one place is fel t all over the
lously presents within
world, and indeed it is because of this that it is reasonable to believe that
erence to the destructiveness of war-bu t one cannot help why indeed this
there is progress towards universal peace

Appendices to
(AA.8.360 ) . Kant, within the two
Ewigen Frieden (AA.8.370-386) ,
engages in a discussion of
Ewigen Fri.eden? Within Ewigen Frieden Kant makes ref
is a problem-unless in fac t Kant feels for those suffering with such

destruction. The solution of Immanuel Kant to the problem of perpetual
the relationship betwee n politics and morality. H e argues for a priority of
peace may well be an organizational o n e . It is difficult, nevertheless, not to
morality (duty) over political expediency, through the contrast of the
identifY a strong emotional and aesthetic eleme n t underpinning his peace
moral politician and p o litical moralist. However, Kant also argues that,
hatever the ruthless and self-interested actions of nations, ultimately the
such a powerful and detailed treatise arguing for the necessity of peace.
advocacy; otherwise there would be no reason for Kant to bother to wri te
principle of morality n ever dies out in humanity, and that politics cannot
progress without givin g allegiance to some morality
5.4 .3
(AA.8.380) .
5.5
How Anti-Aesthetic is Kant Really?
On a surface level , the emphasis within the Kantian corpus is towards a

rational and judicial view of peace, one that con trasts with an emphasis on
inner o r cultural peace . In this sense the Kantian view of peace can be
described as anti-ae s th e tic. However a lingering doubt must be fel t over the
motivation of Immanuel Kant himself. Throughout his writings, Kant
emphasizes the autonomy of rationality and the importance of will. Kant
famously describes
enlightenment as freedom
to
think for oneself
(AA.8.35 ) . Lewis White Beck summarizes Kant by suggesting "the general

trend of his teaching appeared to be the elimination of all feeling from
morali ty"
( 1 960, p .
223 ) .
Nevertheless, Kant's relentless championing of
the importance of treating human beings as ends in themselves, rather

than means to an end, regardless of how noble that specific end might be,
does indicate that Kant himself was moved by a powerful aesthetic respect
for humanity. Kant himself presents this in rational form, in that he defines
the categorical imperative as ultimately self-serving. Yet this is not entirely
convincing. It is difficult not to suspect that beneath the rationalized basis
for ethical behavior presented by Kant there is aesthetic wonder. Indeed, at
times Kant lets this aesthetic wonder show. At the Conclusion to the Sec
ond Critique
(AA.5 . 1 61-1 63) , he fam01.1sly suggests that two things fill the
mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe
Erfurcht) :
(Bewunderung und
the starry heavens above and the moral law within. The correla
tion between the two is exactly what is suggested by aesthetic ethics.

An overview of the work of Kant on peace also prompts the question as
to how thorough his commitment to rationality is, and whether there is not
Modern Aesthetic Ethics and Peace E ducation
5.5.1
S!ilren Kierkegaard, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
S0ren Kierkegaard is known as an a nti-rationalist and existentialist phi

losopher, and it is thus not unexpected that one might identifY within the
work of Kierkegaard support for an aesthetic ethics. Such a proposition is,
however, not a simple one, as there is a bewildering variety within the work.
Indeed one of the elements of debate within Kierkegaardian studies is the
extent to which one can refer to a unity of thought within his work. More
over, even within many of his aesthetic works the re is arguably an element
of the denial o f the aesthetic for moral purposes. Ye t one of the aspects of
the work of Kierkegaard which makes his thought relevant for peace edu
cation and peace advocacy is the strong radical element therein. Kierkeg
aard claims ethics should be a matter o f inner reflection and will, rather
than conformity with outward systems. One of the s trongest themes within
the work of Kierkegaard is criticism of state and of cultural Christianity.
The latter represents a betrayal of the true religion ofjesus, which Kierkeg
aard interprets as a religion of love.
The writings of S0ren Kierkegaard c a n be conveniently divided into aes
thetic and religious streams. The maj o r aesthetic writings comprise th e
1 843 publication Enten-Ell.er: et-livsframent (Either/Or); the 1 843 dual pub

lications
Frygt og baeven
tion) ; and the
(Fear and Trembling) and
Gjentagelsen
( Repeti
1 845 publication Stadier paa livets vei (Stages on Life's Way) .
These works are n o t dogmatic treatises as such, but rather creative and dra
matic works that allow the reaqer to draw inferences from what is being
described . One o f the ways Kierkegaard does this is through the use of
1 48
pseudonyms: he deliberately avoids lecturing to his reader, but rather

wants to present a worldview which the reader may accept or reject. The
use of pseudonym by Kierkegaard i n many ways sums up his aesthetic
approach to ethics. In his later Afslutende Unvidenskabelig Efterskrift (Con
cluding Unscientific Postscript) , Kierkegaard articulates his theory of indi
rect communication, that matters ethical and religious can only be
communicated indirectly, by way of illustration. What is crucial is the ethi
cal decision of the reader to e mbrace what is depicted in these illustrations.
The complex relationship between aesthetics and ethics in the work of
S0ren Kierkegaard is reflected through the stages or spheres he presents.
In Enten-Eller; Kierkegaard presents two spheres through which individuals
operate , the aesthetic and the ethical. In the first volume, the world of the
aesthete is presented by an anonymous aesthete who lives only for plea
sure. In the second volume, the perspective is from a judge and family
man, enj oining the aesthete to reform and live for duty. The spheres of the
aesthetic and the ethical are again important themes in Frygt og baeven and
Gentagelsen. The former is a reflection upon the Hebrew narrative of the
command ofYahweh to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, and the extent to which
this can be considered ethical. Kierkegaard concludes that there is a sense
in which the religious dimension transcends the ethical, in that the ethical
represents the universal, but the religious dimension represents the per
sonal (KW6:54) . The latter work represents the correspondence of a young
man in love, who cannot commit to marriage because this entails an ethical
responsibility and would also involve dedication (repetition) to one per
son. The young man, paradoxically, can only cherish the one he loves after
he leaves her. The young man writes i n Gentagelsen, after h e realizes his
beloved has married another (KW6:220-222) , that he now understands
everything and existence seems more beautiful than ever.
The above works hint at the religious dimension as another sphere dis
tinct from the aesthetic and the ethical, and, in Stadier paa lives ve, Kierkeg
aard develops this tripartite analysis. In a letter to the reader
( KW l l :398-494) , Kierkegaard discusses all three spheres. Kierkegaard sug
gests that any union between the aesthetic and the ethical is a misalliance,
as ethical judgments are immediate and non-dialectic. Kierkegaard, how
ever, also concludes that the "religious then plays the same role as the
(a) esthetic, but as the superior; it spaces out the limitless speed of the ethi
cal, and development takes place. But the scene is in the internal, in
thoughts and dispositions which cannot be seen, not even with a night tele
scope" ( KW 1 1 :442 ) . Both the aesthetic and the religious, then, are the
realms of the subjective self, whereas what Kierkegaard calls ethics is uni
versal. Kierkegaard does contrast aesthetic outcomes and religious out
comes, in that one seeks after greatness and the other deliberately disdains
greatness. Nevertheless, both are based upon a reaction to the visible
1 49
world; aesthetics accepting and seeking after this, but the religious reject
ing this (KW1 1 :442,443) .
One way to summariz e the complex ethics o f S0ren Kierkegaard is
through the notion of a personali zed aesthetic-religious ethics. Such an
ethics involves a rejection of conformity to the state and its cultural
norms, and a radical commitm ent of conscienc e, based upon the ethics of
Jesus. There is a powerful c h ristocentr ic element and a powerful counter
cultural element within the ethics of Kierkegaard. He exults in the gospel
of suffering and in the narrowness of the way, anticipati ng the countercul
tural emphases within the work of Bonhoeffe r. As with Bonhoeffe r, the
christocen tric ethics forms a powerful basis upon which to build commit
ment to peace and peace advocacy and education. Within Kjerlighedens
gjerninger (Works of Love ) , Kierkegaard presents a radical vision of disci
pleship, that Christianity has nothing to do with what others do to us-the
only responsibility is to l ove others the way that God has loved us
( KW 1 6 :375-386) . The ethics which Kierkegaard espouses contrasts
strongly with the duty-boun d civic religion of Denmark. There is also a
strong aesthetic or interior element to the radical ethics as espoused by
Kierkegaard. Faith is subjective and n on-rationa l. Not unsurpris ingly, one
o f the favorite gospel images used by Kierkegaard is the command to con
sider the lilies of the fields and the birds of the air ( Matthew 6:24-38;
KW1 8) . It is a command to reflect upon beauty, and then to order one's
life accordingly.
5.5.2
Deweyan Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education
The work ofjohn Dewey presents an unusual source for aesthetic ethics,
as Dewey is rightly identified as a pragmatist philosoph er. Yet there is a
strong axiological theme within his work, and the key to his pragmatis m
was experience, suggesting that Dewey might properly be regarded as a
naturalistic philosopher. Moreover, th e theme of moral sensitivity is not too
difficult to discern within his writing. The work Ethics, written in 1 908 but
extensively revised in 1 932, comprised two parts: Part One, 'The Begin
n ings and Growth of Morality,' written by James Tufts, and Part Two, 'The
ory of the Moral Life,' written by John Dewey. In this treatment of morality,
John Dewey suggests that one of the earliest discoveries of morals is that
similarity of the judgmen t of good and bad in conduct with the recognitio n
of beauty and ugliness in conduct ( MW5:27 1 ) . Dewey suggests that it is n o
accident that the word "fair" has both aesthetic and moral implications. H e
writes approvingly o f the ancient Greek sophrosyne as a blending o f affec
tions into a beautiful whole, "essentially an artistic idea." Importantly,
Dewey identifies the modern mind as having lost a "sensitivity to aesthetic
1 50
values", and thus morality itself has, in the modern era, developed a cold
connotation.
The aesthetic ethics of John Dewey can be also seen emerging as a sub
tle theme in his program of education for a democratic society. As we have
seen, the democratic society for Dewey was very much one of peaceful co
operation. In the 1 9 1 6 work Democracy and Education, Dewey wri s of t e
importance of education for civic efficiency and good Citlzenshp
(MW9 : 1 2 7 ) . Dewey further suggests that the most important element m
such efficiency ;md indeed its only guarantee is intelligent sympathy. What
does he mean by i n telligent sympathy? Dewey w1ites (MW9: 128) that sym
pathy is more than a feeling, it is "cultivated imagination" for what people
have in common and rebellion at whatever unnecessarily divides them.
Imagination is a highly evocative and aesthetic concept, relating to the
active idea of forming an image from which we work. It is one of the link
ages between the D ewey aesthetic ethics and peace education. It is through
working on envisioning the commonalities rather than differences
between individuals that we work for a democratic and peaceful society.
John Dewey's 1 92 5 work Experience and Nature (LW1 ) is a difficult wor,
.
although within this he suggests an inductive metaphysics and a naturalis
tic aesthetics, to the effect that we establish meaning through experience
of nature, rather than applying meaning upon nature. Thus for Dewey
there is no theory of value separate from a theory of existence
(LW 1 : 295-326) . Dewey writes that "fidelity to the nature to which we
belong, as parts however weak, demands that we cherish our desires and
ideals till we h ave converted them into intelligence, revised them in terms
of the ways and means which nature makes possible" (LW 1 : 3 1 4) . Dewey
further asks, rhetorically, "Is there any intrinsic difference between the
relation of scientific inquiry to belief-values, of esthetic criticism to
esthetic values, and of moral j udgments to moral goods?" ( LW1 :320 ) .
Dewey clearly thinks not. Thus morality i s what works for a n effective and
enjoyable existence. This is a theme which Dewey recapitulates in the
1925 work Quest for Certainty, and especially in Chapter 1 0 , entitled 'The
Construction of Good' (LW4:203-228) . The pragmatism of Dewey does
not retreat fro m the world of feeling and sensitivity-rather the point of
feeling and sensitivity is that it should be linked to action, for the practical
needs of humankind.
Within the above works, John Dewey centers his discussion on the expe
riential and aesthetic nature of morality. However, in his 1934 work, Art as
Experience, Dewey effectively does the reverse, that is, centers the discussio ?
_
on the notion of art and defines this in terms of universal expenence. Th1s
work represen ts not so much a naturalistic aesthetics as a pragmatist aes
thetics, that art is a quality of doing and what is done rather than necessar
ily the production of a specific object as such. Thus knowing and enquiring
Aesthetic Eth ics and Peace Education
1 51
is an art, and i n deed the whole of life can be consid

ered an art. The so
called fine arts differ in degree, not i n kind , from the
rest of life. As Rich
ard Shusterman evocatively puts it (2000) , John Dewey
advocates living
beauty. The openin g chapter of Art as Experience is entitle
d 'The Live Crea
ture,' and within this Dewey decries the understandin
gs and habits w h ich
set art as a specifi c appreciation of works of art, and
which drives away aes
thetic sentim ent as the necessary ingred ient o f happin
ess. Dewey sets forth
his aim to recove r "the continuity of the (a) estheti
c experience with n o r
mal processes of living" (LW1 0: 16) . John Dewey comme
nces the conclu d
ing chapter, 'Art and Civilization, ' with a declara
tion that aesthet ic
experience is the means by which we develo p a civiliza
tion (LW1 0:329) . He
further suggests that to civilize is to i nstruct i n the
arts of life, and such
instruction means "comm unication and participation
in the values of l i fe
by means of imagin ation", with the works of art an
effective means of doin g
this (LW10: 339) .
One might be tempted to say that there i s someth ing
tautological about
John Dewey's argum ent on the import ance of life
as art. In effect, h e is
saying we value that which we find valuab le . Despit
e this, there is impor
tant suppor t for educat ion for peace within the notion
of art and civiliza
tion, as advanc ed by Dewey. It is not too d i fficult
to see the connec tion
between the peaceful society and the civilize d society
. Dewey suggests
(LW10 :339) that "civilization is uncivil becaus e human
beings are divided
into non-co mmunicating sects, races, nation s , classes
and religio ns". Edu
cation is a key means of civilizing individ uals and groups
: not by impos i n g
a set o f values or injunc tions upon them, b u t throug
h a process o f experi
menta tion, where by i ndividuals and group s grow to
understand their n a t
ural and shared i n terest in common experi ence and
common enj oymen t.
Once individ uals and groups unders tand this natura
l and shared intere st
in comm on e njoyme nt, then the proces s of communicat
ion becomes n a t
ural. Instruc tion i n the arts of life means instruc tion
in the arts which will
lead to peace.
5.5.3
Albert Schweitzer, Aesthetic Ethics, and Peace Education
One prominent writer of the twentieth c e ntury who advocated skepti

cism towards rationalism and a return to the mystical was Albert Sch
weitzer, who led a varied life as theologian, musicologist, ethicist a n d
medical missionary. The mystical theme within the work o f Schweitzer was
enunciated early within his theological and m usicological works, includ i n g
work on the historiography o fJesus, t h e mysticism o f Saint Paul, and t h e
mystical nature of the music o fJohann Sebastian Bach. Within the work o f
Schweitzer, religious faith and indeed the enjoyment o f art is n o t some-
1 52
1
I
thing which can be rationally demonstrated; rather it is something which

individuals u nderstand in their lived experience. Manuel Davenport com
ments that "ethical activity, like artistic activity, begins for Schweitzer with
the desire on the part of the individual for self-expression and communion
with others" ( 1 974, p. 46) . In terms of aesthetic ethics, the most important
contribution from Schweitzer came in the 1 923 work Kuturphilosphie (Phi
losophy of Civilization) , written very much as a contemplation upon the
destruction of World War L Two volumes of the work were published at the
time, although a third, based upon later notes from Schweitzer, has
recently been published. The initial two volumes were written very much to
a popular educated readership, although nevertheless contain considerable insight.
Within Kulturphilosophie, Schweitzer develops the importance of what he
calls life and world affirmation (Lebens/Weltbejahung). The notion is a pro
foundly aesthetic one, with ethical ramifications developed by Schweitzer.
One cannot h ave life and world affirmation without believing that life and
the world is inherently good and beautifuL The notion of life and world
affirmation leads on to the most famous of Schweitzerian concepts, that of
reverence for all life (Ehrjitrcht vor dem. Leben) . Interestingly, Schweitzer
relates ( 19 31 ) how the notion of reverence for life came to him in 1 9 1 5 on
a journey on the Ogowe River, in Africa. It is noteworthy that this concept
should come to him out of reflection upon his natural environment. The
concept, moreover, is entirely consistent with the earlier mystical and non
rationalist emphasis within the thought of Schweitzer. Why did not Sch
weitzer develop this notion further? The answer lies partly in the nature of
the notion of reverence for life. The emphasis within this concept was
upon right action: not in philosophical work, but rather in his practical
ethics, in Schweitzer's case, working as a medical doctor in Africa. Once
the principle of reverence for life had been stated, what was necessary was
for this to be put into practice.
The 1 923 work Kulturphilosophiewas a m u ted critique of a militaristic civ
ilization, although concentrating upon the rationalistic basis of the civiliza
tion rather than social structures as such. The implication of this work is
that a civilization more directed towards personal fulfillment would not be
a civilization willing to engage in the wholesale destruction of war. The
implication of reverence for life is that all life (including humanity) should
be honored. We avoid killing not because this is something we ought to do
but because this is something we want to do. It is thus not surprising that
an important elerrient in Schweitzer's ethical writing should be advocacy of
peace and disarmament. Schweitzer published only two tracts on peace,
although within both of these the commitment to a cultural approach to
peace is quite clear. Within his Nobel Lecture for the 1 952 Nobel Peace
Prize ( 1 972a, pp. 46-57) , Schweitzer emphasizes that there needs to be a
1 53
cultural force to contend with nationa lism, and suggests further

that "Only
when an ideal of peace is born in the minds of people will the institutio
ns
set up to maintain this peace effectively fulfill what is expected
of them"
( 1 972a, p. 5 6 ) . Within the publishe d radio address Peace or Atomic
War, Sch
weitzer conclud es with the hope that there will be a return of nations
and
peoples back to culture ( 1 972b, p. 45 ) . Culture, for Schweitzer,
is inter
twined with the notions of reverenc e for life and peace, and vice
versa.
5.5.4
Language, Beauty, Imagination, and Peace Education
In examini ng aesthetic ethics, i t is difficult to ignore linguistic philoso

phy. Ludwig Wittgenstein is perhaps best known as the analytic
philoso
pher who directed continental philosop hy towards a linguistic
turn,
somethin g which finds resonance in poststructuralist philosop hies
of the
last two decades of the twentieth century. With the 1 922 Tmctatus
Logico
Philosophicus, Wittgenstein suggests that the problems of philosophy arise
when we attempt to discuss and analyse that which can only be
shown .
Thus Wittgen stein can say (6.42 1 ) that ethics cannot be put
into words
( nicht aussprechen liisst) and is transcen dentaL From this he makes his
famous declarat ion that ethics and aesthetic s are one. The warning
against
metaphy sical theorizin g is continu ed with Philosophical Investiga
tions, writ
ten in 1 953 but published pos th u mously. Wittgenstein herein
declares
( 1 : 1 09 ) that we must "do away with all explanat ion, and descripti
on alone
must take its place . . . . Philosop hy is a battle against the bewitchm
ent of our
intellige nce by means of languag e ." He propose s that tradition
al philoso
phy erroneo usly seeks to find a meaning behind language; rather,
the
p hilosophical endeavor ought to be directed towards the way language
Itself works. Accordingly, ethics is n o t somethi ng which can be rationali
zed
as such. We can only analyze the language through which ethical
s tate
ments are framed, and, by implicat ion, ethics becomes what we
intuitive ly
know to be correct.
This importa nce of language for an aesthetic ethics approac h
to peace
educatio n is also reflected in the work of Elaine Scarry, within which
justice
and peace constitu te central themes. In her 1 985 work Body in Pain,
Scarry
suggests that the public language of war seeks to deny the reality
of the
bodily pain and bodily mutilation central to war. In effect, we
constant ly
need to beautify war to make it morally and aesthetically acceptab
le. It is a
theme very reminisc ent of the Erasmu s adagium on the beauty
of war.
Scarry also works upon an assumpti on of the unity of aesthetic and
ethics.
Scarry does not advocate peace educati on as such, although ,
as with Eras
mus, her own work could be consider ed an exercise within this
endeavor.
In her 1 999 work On Beauty and Beingjust, Scarry develops an idea
implied
l"
1 54
in her earlier work, namely, that beauty can lead us to justice and peace,
and that accordingly there can be aesthetic politics. A central idea is that
beauty tends to replication: we want more and more beauty. She posits pro
c reation as an instance of this, in that we find a partner whom we find
beautiful, wi.t h the view to recreating equally beautiful offspring. Scarry
writes: "People seem to wish there to be beauty even when their own self
interest is not served by it; or perhaps more accurately, people seem to
intuit that their own self-interest is served by distant peoples' having the
benefit of beauty" ( 1 999, p. 1 23 ) . The quest for beauty, in natural objects
or in relationship, is a natural one.
Yet if the quest for beauty is a natural one, why should we need to have
education in this? O n e answer is in the idea of education as initiation in
worthwhile activities, as dew:! loped by Richard Stanley Peters. Peters was an
influential educational philosopher, although he would also not normally
be considered a proponent of aesthetics ethics. The importance of the aes
thetic dimension of education, nevertheless, is a recurrent theme in his
writing ( 1964, 1 966) . The idea of education as initiation into worthwhile
activities, prominent within the work of Peters, assumes that there are spe
cific activities that are intrinsically valuable or worthwhile, and that the act
of valuing something intrinsically is important. I t is not too difficult to
assert that peac e , or the practice of peaceful relationships ought to be
regarded as a worthwhile activity into which students ought validly to be
initiated. Herbert Read promulgated a similar educational philosophy,
emphasizing the importance of aesthetic education and the unity of aes
thetics and morality for peace education ( 1 9 49 ) . Ultimately it is possible to
assert that all of education is undergirded by aesthetic judgments or j udg
ments as to what is beautiful and desirable. If we believe that peace, that is,
harmonious and co-operative relations between individuals and societies, is
a beautifu l thing, a valuable thing in itself, then we should not be ashamed
in having this as a stated objective within the curriculum. Put simply, peace
education can be thought of as encouraging the quest for beauty.
Opponents of an aesthetic ethics approach to peace education might
well suggest that notions of beauty or value should have no place in educa
tion, and certainly not within any rational or scientific approach to educa
tion. However, as Brian Easlea ( 1 973) argues, such an objection represents a
misunderstanding of the proper functioning of rationality and science.
Rationality fun c tions in concert with our aesthetic judgments. Further,
within science, we continually make implicit judgments about what is beau
tiful or desirable. Faihtre to recognize this is indicative of a scientism, or a
misunderstanding of the nature of the physical sciences. The most obvious
aesthetic judgmen t which undergirds the pure sciences is that the universe
is beautiful-if this were not an assumption, then there would be little rea
son for pure science, especially such sciences as astronomy. Peace too
1 55
should be seen as something beautiful and valuable. Ultimately there can

be no such entity as value-free education. The question is whether the val
ues expressed within education are defensible. In this case, peace does seem
a value and an entity that is defensibl e , and in particular defensible on the
grounds of aesthetic ethics. Peace is something intrinsically desirable.
The concept of beauty leads us into the concept of the future imagined
world of beauty, and the process of imagination through which we envision
this world of beauty. Indeed, one of the ways to see a nexus between aes
thetic ethics and peace education is through the concepts of imagination
and utopia. Many contemporary writers within peace education emphasize
this theme. In a series of lectures in the 1 930s, Maria Montessori emp ha
sized the importance of imagination for peace education ( 1972 ) . Johan
Galtung w1ites of the importance of "visioning a peaceful world" ( 1 99 1 ) .
He suggests that peace education needs to go beyond data and into imagi
nation ( 1 983, p. 283 ) , in that peace education involves more than present
ing the suffering and cost of war, but also presenting the eruoyment and
delight of peace. Thomas Berry refers to dreaming of what the earth might
be like ( 1 988) and Mary Watkins w1ites of dreaming/imagining p e ace
( 1 987, 1 988) . The peace workshops of Elise Boulding centre on imagin
ing/imaging the future, that is, asking students to describe what a world
would be like, twenty years hence, without wars and without weapons
( 1 988, 1 989, 1 99 1 , 1 994, 1 999, 2000a, 2000b, 2002) .
Maxine Greene identifies a nexus b e tween aesthetic and social imagina
tion, arguing that the harshness of the current world order can only be
acknowledged when we have in mind another state of affairs in which
things are better and advocating a mode of u topian thinking that "refuses
mere compliance, that looks down roads not yet taken to the shapes of a
more fulfilling social order" ( 1 995, p. 2) Greene sees the classroom as the
most accessible arena wherein individuals can be challenged to see alte rn a
tive futures, both individually and s ocially ( 1 995, pp. 32-43) . Similarly,
Sonia Sikka refers to the ontology of b eauty which implies "the existence of
another and better world, a transcendent reality in which the negative e le
ments of fac tual existence are somehow cancelled and redeemed" ( 1 9 98 ,
p. 243) . M y own work (2000) has identified the importance of historical
imagination, in imaging the way history might have been different. M ore
recently, Joh n Paul Lederach (2005) has identified the importance of
moral imagination for building peace.
A revival of the importance of beauty and aesthetics can also be identified
within much recent Chiistian theology, along with a concomitant rejection
of the rationalism implicit within the Englightenment. What makes this
important for our investigation is that peace and nonviolence are central
ideas within this revival. John Milbank and his radical orthodox collaborators
have pursued this theme. Milbank typically desciibes Christian faith as poet-
1 56
ics rather than knowledge as such ( 1 997, pp. 123-144) , an approach reminis
cent of the earlier Balthasarian emphasis that revelation needs to be
understood in aesthetic terms. Milbank's aesthetic Christology is strongly
linked to a recognition ofJesus' rejection of violence. In much the same way,
David Bentley Hart develops an aesthetics of Christian truth, wherein beauty
is located in the nature of the divine, and expressed through creation, salva
tion, and the eschaton (2003) . Hart is very much representative of an East
ern Orthodox tradition, yet the distinctive aspect of his theological aesthetics
is that violence represents a challenge to beauty ( 2003, pp. 35-1 5 1 ) . As a
Christian theologian, Hart sees the totality of violence as overcome by the
sacrifice of infinite beauty through the death-resurrection ofjesus (2003, pp.
344--394) . For Hart, beauty and violence are opposites. The above may serve
as an aesthetic or theologico-aesthetic basis for peace education.
5.5.5
1 57
logical acceptance of normality, which leads to a violent world. Even the

metaphor of vision is instructive, in that it suggests something which we
appreciate or envision rather than rationalize.
In discussing the culture of peace and educating for a culture of peace, i t
i s difficult to avoid the importance of earth-consciousness, something which
at the beginning of this chapter we suggested was linked to the simple reality
of being able to view the planet in pho tographs from space. It is noteworthy
that issues of social and ecological peace are now increasingly linked, with
the common theme of caring for the beauty of the planet, as recently
expressed through the Earth Charter movement (200 1 ) . The integlity o f
social and ecological peace i s not difficult to discern. Ifw e realize that we are
integrated with the environment, then it is logical that destroying each other
(through war) o r destroying the environment (through degradation) are
really aspects of the same destructive phenomenon. Within both a common
motivation is the beauty of the planet, of which we are part.
Aesthetic Ethics and a Culture of Peace
There are some curious potential connections between education for a

culture of peace and aesthetic ethics. Bernard Haring and Valentino Sal
voldi have suggested that the central problem of a culture of peace is
encouraging tolerance of that which is alien ( 1 995) . The above authors
argue that our sense of unease at that which is alien to us is. essentially an
aesthetic one, and thus the solution to the problem is educating our bodies
to dialogue with the senses, with the object of accepting other human
beings ( 1 995, p. 8 1 ) . Therefore, we need to "educate the senses" to consider
contact with diverse persons as richness and to discover the beautiful in
apparently upsetting situations ( 1 995, pp. 8 1 , 82 ) . The authors work
through each of the major senses, indicating exactly how this can he done
( 1 995, pp. 82-84) . According to Haring and Salvoldi, education for a cul
ture of peace is not so much a task to be implemented, but rather a process
of sensitization. Sherry Shapiro likewise sees peace education as a process of
encouraging a bodily oriented passion for peace and justice ( 1 998, 2002 ) .
More recently, Pierre Wei ! has also developed the aesthetic-ethic dimen
sions of education for a culture of peace, describing education for a cul
ture of peace in terms of the art of living (2002) . In a subtle variation,
Abelardo Brenes (2004) has developed an integrated model of peace edu
cation, which emphasizes harmony with one's body, self and others for edu
cation for a culture of peace. By contrast, the aesthetic emphasis of Weil is
not so much on sensory awareness, as an inner consciousness and vision.
Wei! suggests that we need a holistic rather than fragmentary vision of
peace, one that works from inner peace, and through this inner peace to
living in peace with others and living in peace with the environment. It is
this which will enable us to change what Wei! calls the normosis, or patho-
5.6
5.6. 1
Summation
Strengths and Weaknesses of Aesthetic Ethics

The obj ec tions to an aesthetic ethics approach to peace education have

been dealt with, in part, through the foregoing analysis of the contribu
tions of various Wliters within aesthetic ethics, and thus it is not necessary
in this instance to deal with these objections at length. Perhaps the central
problem with an aesthetic ethics rationale for peace education is that we
need to explain why it is that violence has such an extensive aesthetic
appeal, especially if we seek to assert that peace is naturally attractive to
humankind. The answer is to this is c omplex, as I have argued elsewhere
(2000) . In this investigation, however, i t has been suggested that in part the
answer is to be be found in the suggestion made by Erasmus-that much of
the enthusiasm for violence is found amongst those who have not directly
experienced violence.
However, beyond this, we need to ask why seemingly cultured and aes
thetically sensitive peoples and individuals can b e responsible for the most
appalling barbarity. One of the most obvious and often ited examples of
this is the European ' experience of fascism. There are three responses to
this important question . One is that the emergence of fascism is represen
tative of moral education which was/is decidedly n on-aesthetic in nature. I t
i s i n a system which subordinates personal feeling to duty that fascism
flomishes. The second is that the act o f killing itself works to dehumanize
1 58
the othe1 and desensitize the killer. We can become habituated to killing.
The third is that the very fact that we raise this type of objection is a phe
nomenological indicator of our own universal ethical sensitivity. In other
words, the fact that we find it inconsistent that a person should exalt in the
beauty of the world and yet engage willingly in killing is an indicator that
there is some aesthetic basis for peace.
Joanna Bourke ( 1 999, p. 32 ) insightfully suggests that what she calls the
'joy of slaughter" may reside in guilt, namely, that those involved in killing
o thers know they are committing a horrendous crime, and this provides a
sense of power. Thus those killing can " take immense delight in breaking
the highest m01a! law." It is interesting to analyze the above suggestion , for
i t is not the violence itself which is enjoyable, but rather the pleasure at
breaking social sanctions. It is for this reason that I argue that duty or social
sanction is a very problematic basis for peace education, something which I
have touched upon in the opening chapter, and a theme to which I return
in the concluding chapter.
5.6.2
Recapitulation
In summary, I argue that all of education is undergirded by aesthetic

j udgments or j udgments as to what is beautiful or desirable. If we bel ieve
. .
.
that peace, that is, harmonious and co-operative relations between mdivid
uals and societies, is a beautiful thing, a valuable thing in itself, then we
should not be reticent in encouraging this as a stated objective for educa
tion. Conversely, if war and avoidable social i ruustice are states whic h , p rop
erly understood, are not aesthetically desirable, then emphasizing this can
also be a valid objective for education. Education for peace can be validly
based upon education which emphasizes aesthetic sensitivity for that which
is aesthetically desirable.
C HAPT E R 6
THE ETHICS OF CARE

A N D PEACE E D UCATION
6.1
6.1.1
The E mergence of Care Eth i cs
Origins of Care Ethics
One of the most prominen t recent movements in ethics has been wha t
i s generally described as the ethics o f care. The ethics of care o r care ethics
is generally associated with the work of Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings,
although more recently a wider corpus of writing concentrating upon this
theme has emerged. Carol Gilligan 's 1 982 work, In a Different Voice: Psycho
logical Theory and Women s Development, suggests that there are two kinds o f
morality, one which emphasizes rules, rights and justice, and another that
emphasizes relationships and personal responsibility. The method of Gilli
gan 's major work is significant: she develops an ethical position, and yet
the work is based upon case studies of individual women dealing with ethi
cal dilemmas. It is a method developed further in the 1 992 work, coau
thored with Lyn Brown, Meeting at the Crossroads: Women s Psychology and
Girls ' Development. The narrative method of Carol Gilligan is an indicator of
the primary ethical thrust of care ethics, n amely, that ethics should be ori
ented towards the particular rather than the universal. Seen as such, the
ethics of care is in many ways a response to ethical systems based upon jus
tice-especially those associated with Lawrence Kohlberg and Immanuel
Kant-systems that emphasize rights and duties .. By contrast, an ethics of
care is based upon relational values, such as nurturing, kindness and com-
Peace Education: EXJploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations, pages 159-184

Copyright
2008 by Information Age
Publishing
1 59
1 60
',;;
passion. The ethics of care emphasizes that in determining practice the

decisive factor should be our concern for the other.
The application of care ethics to education has many exponents, and
one of the most articulate has been the educationist Nel Noddings, with
her 1 984 work Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education
Noddings suggests that caring should be seen as a "way of being in rela
tion " to others ( 1 984, p. 1 7 ) . Noddings distinguishes ethical caring from
natural caring. Ethical caring is where one recognizes and evaluates caring
as a specific means of relating to others (l 984, p. 83) , although ethical car
ing arises from natural caring. Noddings sees an ethics of care as especiaily
relevant to the practice of teaching. Teaching involves the construction of
community, both between teachers and with students. Noddings sees teach
ing as involving a special kind of attentive care or engrossment in the
needs of others ( 1 992, pp. 1 5 , 1 6 ) . She is also quite passionate that the need
for a caring approach to education should take precedence over curricu
lum concerns. She critiques curricula that are directed towards " a drive for
academic adequacy" and not directed towards "producing caring people"
( l995a, p. 366) , and contends that "we should want more fro m our educa
tional efforts than adequate academic. achievement and that we will not
achieve even that meager success unless our children believe that they
themselves are cared for and learn to care for others" ( l 995c , p. 676) .
At the outset it is not difficul t to see connections between an ethics of
care and the task of articulating an e thical rationale for peace education. If
we define peace as establishing co-operative and harmonious relationships,
then it is clear this is a major focus which peace education s hares with care
ethics. There is even an indication of the peace motivatio n of Nel Nod
dings in her own work. Introducing her work, Noddings laments that
"when we look at the world today, we see it wracked with fighting, killing,
vandalism and psychic pain of all sorts. One of the saddest features of this
picture of violence is that the deeds are so often done in the name of prin
ciple" ( 1 984, p. 1 ) . There is a minor contradiction within h e r position, in
that the disavowal of principles or universals is arguably not a complete
one, in that care itself becomes a universal or a principle. However, care
ethics is a response to deontological and utilitarian ethics, both of which
arguably have unleashed enormous suffering on the world within the mod
ern era, primarily through the institution of modern war, which, as Nod
dings correctly intimates above, is frequently motivated not by greed but,
paradoxically, by commitment to principle. Nodding's commitment to car
ing is very similar to the notion of ah sma,
i
or nonviolence. It is not surpris
ing therefore that Nel Noddings was selected to write the Foreword to a
recent work on education for a culture of peace (2004) , and has written an
entry on peace education and the e thics of care in a recent e n cyclopedia of
peace education (2008) .
The Ethics of Care and Peace Education
6.1.2
1 61
Critics o f Care Ethics
Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings h ave been extremely in fluential in

for
mulating care ethics, although it is useful to examine the implicati
ons of
subsequ ent formulat ions. Mary Katzenstein and David Laitin ( l
987, p.
263) suggest that an ethic of care is based on the fundame ntal convictio
n
that we do not owe a responsi bility toward "principl es of right or justice
abstracted from their social context but to ideas conjoined with
nam e d
( a n d thus contextualized) persons-family, lovers, schoolch ildren,
victim s
of sexual violence" and s o forth. Alison Jaggar ( l 992) suggests that
care
ethics is a reaction to tradi tional western ethics, an ethics that is
antipa
thetic to the private world of caring, and that emphasizes cultural
traits
such an independ ence, :tutonomy, separatio n, mind, reason, culture,
war
and death, against other cultural traits as interdep endence , commun
i ty,
connect ion, body, emotion , nature, i mmanen ce, peace and life.
Moreove r,
Jaggar suggests that care ethics emphasizes the ways of moral reasonin
g
that emphasize relations hip, particula ri ty and partiality over the ways
of
moral reasoning that emphas ize rules, universa lity and impartia
lity.
One of the interesting analyses of care ethics is in Virginia Held's
1993
work Feminist J\!Iomlity: Transforming Culture, Society and Politics,
wherein
.
Held contrasts care ethics with justice ethics. Care ethics stresses
the pri
vate world of family and those close to a person. Justice ethics stresses
the
public world of the state. Caring tends to be affective, whereas justice
ethics
ten to be rational, although reasonin g does or ought to enter into
caring
deos1on s. Care tends to be partial, whereas justice aims to be
impartia l.
The partiality of care ethics is not to specific principles or objectives,
but
rathe r towards specific persons . More recently, Virginia Held has
restated
the contrast in that justice is concern ed with rights and principl
es, whereas
care is concerned with context and needs (2004, p. 1 44) . Caring
"cultivat es
caring relations" (2004, p. 1 44) , arguably a foundational compon
ent for
both pece and peace educatio n . Yet the element of partiality is
a troublin g
one. It IS when one asks exactly which persons one ought to
be partial
towards that a potential weakness within virtue ethics is revealed
.
The notions of care and caring are contentious in themselves.
Robin
Barrow and Geoffrey Milburn complai n that care and caring have
become
fashwna ble words in educatio n, without specific meaning (l
990, p. 45) .
Susan Morris has suggested ( l 994) that care is not a simple concept
, but
rather representative of a multipli citious and complex experie
nce. Helga
Kuhse asserts ( 1 995, p. 2 1 0 ) that care is a "rich and ambiguous
notion" ,
.
and that care for another person
has connotations o f "concer n, compas
sion, worry, anxiety, and burden; the1e are also connotations
of careful
ness, that is, attentio n to detail, of respond ing sensitively to the
situation o f
the o ther, and there are connotations o f looking after, or providin
g for, the
..
1 62
other." Ann Diller ( 1 996, p. 1 6 1 ) sees an ethics of care as denoting a

change of ethical focus "from a pre-occupation with justification to a con
cern for better relationships", what she calls a relational ontology and a
concentration on co-operation. It is noteworthy that Diller gives the tacit
agreement between opposing troops on the Western Front during World
War One to limit hostilities as an instance of co-operative caring ( 1 996, p.
1 62 ) . The connection between care ethics and peace would seem to be
prima facie quite a recurrent one.
Care and caring may also be interpreted in a much wider way. Peta
Bowden ( 1 997) suggests that caring can only be understood through
examples rather than principles. She works through four instances of car
ing-mothering, friendship, nursing, and, significantly, citizenship . In a
sense, one of the dimensions of care ethics includes the caring citizen, and
all that this concept implies. This does represent an expand d concept of
"
the direc
and
society
the
for
care
will
carer
care ethics, implying that the
and
Ford
Maureen
operates.
she/he
which
within
tion of the society
Katherine Pepper-Smith ( 1 998) develop the notion of intelligibility as
being similar to that of caring: intelligibility implies an active and engaged
understanding. Thus, if we care for people we will work to understand
their position. Rita Manning has a similar notion of care ethics ( 1 999, p.
1 1 8 ) , describing it as a way of being that involves moral attention, sympa
thetic understanding, relational awareness, and active response. The idea
of care as understanding is a notion that finds resonance in the Gandhian
principle of understanding the truth of the other. Truth or satya is not
something that exists in abstraction. It exists in relationship.

Just as peace tends to be an open-ende d and arguably infinite concept,
so too, much the same observation can be made of care and caring. Paul
Smeyers suggests ( 1 999, p. 246) that "caring will always create moral dilem
mas (because the needs for care are infinite) and will therefore pose moral
problems that arise out of the particular location in which people find
themselves in various contexts of care." Maurice Hamington similarly sees
care as relational and contextual (200 l , p. 1 05 ) : "care is less concerned
with adjudication of individual acts and more concerned with the mainte
nance of right relationships in individual contexts." It is noteworthy that
Hamington suggests the peace activist and writerJane Addams represented
a modern care ethics, through what Hamington calls her politics of
embodied care (200 1 , 2004) . Quite simply, the idea behind embodied care
is that the human body, and the suffering that the human body endures,
both physical and psychic, is i mportant. Under this notion of embodied
care, Hamington argues that the human body is built for and to care. An
integrative notion of peace involves creating a situation of limiting avoid
able human suffering, and the way to work towards this goal is arguably
1 63
,
through an ethics of care. Such a goal may seem to be never achievable,
although it is, nevertheless, an important goal.
The criticisms that have been leveled at the ethics of care are instructive.
One strand of criticism centers on the contextual and thus arguably lim
ited and apolitical nature of an ethics of care. Hilde Nelson ( 1 992) sug
gests that an ethics of care is not appropriate for the professional context,
and particularly nursing, precisely because it restricts itself to intimates and
proximate strangers. Nelson s uggests that a p roblem with care as an orga
nizing principle for ethics is that it is "blind and indiscriminate" ( 1 992, p.
9 ) and does not actually tell us what to d o . Linda Bell ( 1 993, p. 36) suggests
that N o dding's notion of caring is 'too limited, too personal and, ulti
mately, too apolitical '. In similar vein, Susan Mendus ( 1 993) suggests that
the ethics of care is difficult to extend beyond the local and familiar and is,
therefore, of limited use in addressing the political problems of the mod
ern world. Diemet Bubeck ( 1 995) refers to the myopias o f Noddings, espe
cially that caring is limited to those in proximity to the carer. It is myopic to
believe that the direction of one's care should be limited to those with
whom one has direct contact.
A related strand of criticism centers on the supposedly indefinite nature
of caring. Helga Kuhse ( 1 997) endorses the notion of caring, but cautions
that caring cannot be an ethical guide in itself. Erich Loewy however is
much more direct in his criticism. Loewy describes the ethics of care as a
"concept in search of a framework" ( 1 995) , and is highly critical of what h e
sees as the n on-directive, contentless and anti-intellectual nature o f the
ethics of care ( 1 997, pp. 64-67) . Loewy suggests that in j ustice ethics we
ignore or at least suspect our inclinations-although in the ethics of care
we follow our inclinations. For Loewy this is a highly suspect means of for
mulating a system of ethics. It is relevant that violence is a major concern
for Loewy, and that ultimately he does implicitly endorse the importance o f
compassion. However Loewy expressly believes that compassion should be
extended to those outside the i m mediate circle of the individual. David Lis
man criticizes an ethics of care for a supposed relativism and lack of moral
principles ( 1996, pp. 5 7-66 ) . Lisman suggests that within care ethics the
different types of care are not sufficiently differentiated and that an ethics
of care is ultimately an ultra-subjective e thics. Lisman provides an interest
ing hypothetical example of a Concentration Camp Commandant to probe
the problem of caring, suggesting that the Commandant may well care for
the welfare of his subordinates, and thus satisfy the demands of an ethics o f
care. The Lisman example assumes that the Commandant does not have
direct contact with the inmates of the Concentration Camp and that it is
his subordinates who have direct contact with the inmates. Given such
assumptions, the example does serve to emphasize the arguable social and
social justice problems which an ethics of care creates.
1 64
The criticism that an ethics of care is limited to an inner circle of inti

mates and p roximates finds a focus when one examines Nel Noddings'
concept of engrossment, the idea that in assisting another there is open
ness, sensitivity and receptiveness towards the person being assisted ( 1 992,
pp. 1 5 , 1 6 ) . It seems fai r to say that within care ethics one can only be
engrossed with those with whom one has direct contact. At one stage Nel
Noddings suggested that American children ought not to feel any moral
obligation to care for the starving children of Mrica ( 1 984, p. 86) . Her rea
soning was that American children have no direct contact with Mrican chil
dren, although, significantly, Noddings has since attempted to retreat from
this rather stark position ( 1990) . Moreover, others such as Rita Manning
( 1 99 2 ) have suggested that we should care both for those with whom we
have immediate contact and those who are distant from us. The resolution
of the problem of the limited nature of care ethics is to see care ethics not
as an alternative to justice ethics, but rather as complementary to justice
ethics. Indeed, although the voice of care has been subordinated to the
voice ofjustice, this does not necessarily mean the voice ofjustice ought to
be ignored, but rather we need balance in formulating ethics.
It is this theme of reconciling or balancing a care ethics with a justice
ethics that seems to be a recurrent one in so many of the responses to an
ethics of care, interestingly, often without the particular author recogniz
ing or acknowledging that this approach has been taken by others. Those
who might be described as representing an i ntegrative approach to justice
and care would include Peta Bowden ( 1 997, 2000 ) ; Marilyn Friedman
( 1 99 3 ) ; Virginia Held ( 1 995, 2004) , Alison Jaggar ( 1 99 1 ) ; Daryl Koehn
( 1 998 ) ; Joy Kroeger-Mappes ( 1 994) ; Helga Kuhse, Peter Singer and Mau
rice Rickat-d ( 1 998) ; Edch Loewy ( 1995, 1 997 ) ; Andrew Mason ( 1 990) ;
Elisabeth Porter ( 1 99 1 , 1 999 ) ; Tara Smith ( 1 998) Anita Superson ( 1998) ;
Rosemarie Tong ( 1 993, 1 998a) , and Donald Vandenberg ( 1 996) . Even
those who are highly critical of care ethics frequently still acknowledge the
importance of care as a forgotten or neglected element within ethical con
sideration. Similarly, those who advocate an ethics of care are often not
rejecting considerations of justice as such, but rather suggest that justice
needs to be qualified and complemented by notions of care, and that the
notion of care needs to be an expanded one.
6. 1 .3
Preview
The i nvestigation i n this chapter examines the precursors to the ethics

of care, that is, writers and sources which reflect the emphases within the
ethics of care. The investigation then examines critical issues, such as the
limitations of care ethics and the extent to which care ethics necessarily
1 65
denotes a feminist ethics, and examines issues such as the importance of

relationship and trust in ethics and peace education, and the extent to
which the notion of care can imply support for war making. The final sec
tion of the investigation looks at the relationship between care and caring,
and healing, peace and education.
6.2
6.2.1
Precursors to Care Ethics and Peace Education
Aesara of Lucania, Care Ethics, and Peace Education
It is possible to argue that there is nothing new in the idea of an ethics

of care , and that there are precedents i n classical ethics. Aesara of Lucania,
normally described as a late Pythagorean , suggested in On Human Nature
that it was improper not to i nclude love and care in discussion about jus
tice. There is only a fragment of the above work remaining, although
within this fragment Aesara describes a tripartite soul of mind, spiritedness
and desire. Mind represents analytic thought. Spilitedness represen ts
strength and ability. However it is desire that denotes love and kindness.
Importantly, each part o f these is essential to the whole. Mary Ellen Waithe,
commenting on the system of intuitive natural law as developed by Aesara,
suggests that "the social law, the fam ilial law, and the personal moral law
are all characterized by love, whether in the form of compassion for others,
kindliness or self-esteem . This love i s analogous to that produced by the
third part of Aesara's soul, desire. This affective component of Jaw and jus
tice is fai r and is considerate of special needs and concerns. Justice is com
passionate and forgiving; it is individualistic in the sense that it can take
into account extenuating circumstanc es and reasons for non-complia nce "
( 1 987, p . 23) . The intui tive natural law o f Aesara of Luciania does seem to
anticipate many of the emphases of care ethicists, notably the emphasis o n
the priority of eating and kindness, o n the importance o f understanding
individual circumstanc es, and on the profoundly personalistic nature of
care ethics. Within the morality of Aesara there is a de-emphasis upon rules
as such. There is also a subtle emphasis upon peace, expressed through the
concept of harmonia. Women held the responsibility for producing har
monious relations in the home, just as men held the responsibility for pro
ducing harmonious relations in the city. In each case, harmony o r
harmonic relations depends very much upon a n integrative understandi ng
ofjustice and kindness.
1 66
The Ethics of Care and Peace Ed ucation
6.2.2
Religion, Care Ethics, and Peace Education
O ne of the strengths of an ethics of care is that one finds support for

such an ethics within most of the major world religious traditions. Within
the Hebrew tradition, and especially within the prophetic tradi tion, there
is a strong tradition of care for the oppressed and marginalized, founded
upon the loving-kindness or /used of Yahweh. This idea was developed
within the Christian tradition, through the concept of agapeistic, or altruis
tic concern for the other person. A number of writers dealing with care
ethics, such as Patiicia Benner ( 1 994) and Joel Green ( 1 994) , have pointed
to the dealings ofJesus with individuals as exemplifying an ethics of care.
Jesus was concerned with the needs of the other and it was this that deter
mined his actions in the situation, over against the demands of Jewish law
and tradition. Confucianism has a core concept of ren, meaning love or
kindness, or co-humanity. Within Buddhist and Hindu thought one can
locate a strong tradition of karuna, or compassion that aims at alleviating
the suffering of others. Within Islamic thought there is a strong tradition of
zakat, or of alms-giving to the poor. One might argue that a developed eth
ics of care is much more than that which is represented in the ideals of the
maj o r world traditions, and yet what is at the very least an implied ethics of
care within religious sources constitutes an important precedent.
6.2.3
Augustine, Care Ethics, and Peace Education
As discussed previously, Augustine is known for Christianizing virtue eth

ics, through adding the theological virtues of faith, hope and love to the
cardinal virtues as enumerated by Plato and others. However, caritas or
love is not merely one of the virtues for Augustine: it is a master virtue that
undergirds all others. In De civitate Dei ( 1 5.22) , Augustine defines virtue as
"rightly ordered caritas. " Caritas is normally translated as love, although
the notion of caritas as caring has been taken up by Jean Watson. Watson
writes in the field of professional eth:ics for nursing, although what she calls
primary carative factors could be equally applicable to education, and spe
cifically to peace education.
Moreover, examining the primary carative factors enunciated by Jean
Watson ( 1 985) indicates how an ethics of care can be seen as a basis for
peace education. The initial three carative factors are described by Watson
as establishing a philosophical basis for a science of caring. These factors
are the formation of a htimanistic-altruistic system of values, the i nstillation
of faith-hope, and the cultivation of sensitivity to one's self and others.
From this proceeds what might be called the more operational c arative fac
tors, such as the development of a helping-trust relationship, the promo
tion and acceptance of the expression of positive and negative feelings, the
1 67
promotion of interpersonal teaching-learning, the provision of a suppon

ive, and protective and/ or corrective environment. Peace education obvi
ously can be described in many ways. H owever, it is difficult not to allow
that the above carative fac tors provide a supportive basis for educating
individuals to peace.
6.2.4
Thomas Aquinas, Care Ethics, and Peace Education
If we contextualize an ethics of care as an ethics of love, then it is not

surprising that we should find precedents for an ethics of care in medieval
thought. Thomas Aquinas in Sumrn.a Theologica discusses beneficence o r
kindness a s a virtue (2/2, Q3 1 ) , and concludes that it i s a n outcome o f
caritas o r love. One o f the interesting aspects of the discussion by Aquinas
is that he anticipates many of the modern debates over the ethics of care .
In Articles 2 and 3, Aquinas deals with the issue of whether we are bound
to be kind to everyone and whether in kindness we are bound to be
kinder to those with whom we h ave a connection. Aquinas cites Augustine
in saying that since we cannot do good to everyone, that we should be
m i ndful of those who, by circumstances of place or time or other reasons,
are close to us. In Article 3 Response 3, Aquinas concludes that no gneral
rule can decide the issue, and that the i ndividual circumstances must be
taken into account. It is a c onclusion of which care ethicists would
approve, although Aquinas is at least aware of the problems inherent i n
the concept o f beneficence. Ultimately, one can suggest that peace educa
tion involves introduction of a person i n to actions of beneficence, benefi
cence being defined in Article 4 as the action of doing good and
benevolence as the desire to do good.
The Aquinas discussion of beneficence is instructive, as, in dealing with
the issue of the particularity of beneficence. Aquinas raises the issue of pa1
ticipation in war. In Article 3, Aquinas suggests that the greatest kindness
one can do to another is to come to that person's aid in time of war, even if
the person be a strange: Aquinas suggests from this that beneficence ought
not to be particularistic. Moreover, in Response 2, Aquinas argues that it is a
virtuous thing for a person to e ndanger his own life for the common good
of his country in time of war. One of the keys of an ethics of care is that such
care should be particularistic, that is, directed towards the specific person
with whom one has contact. Aquinas tends to move away from this particu
larism in his discussion on beneficence, but in so doing underscores the
importance of generalized beneficence for war. War is possible precisely
because it works upon nondirect beneficence. If we concentrate upon
doing good to specific people with whom we have direct contact, then par-
1 68
ticipation in war becomes difficult, if not impossible. In other words, killing

those we have direct con tact with is not an act of beneficence.
The discussion by Aquinas on benefic ence raises the issue of the extent
to which war necessarily i nvolves dehumanization of the enemy. Dehuman
ization of the enemy is a1guably central to the operation of war, and indeed
is behind the prohibition of fraternization with the enemy during time of
war. Fraternization undermines the dehumanization of the enemy and ulti
mately undermines the institution of war itself. O ne of the most powerful
statements of how war involves the dehumanized killing of the other, and
an interesting commentary on Aquinas, is in Erich Maria Remarque's 1 929
anti-war novel Im Westen Nicht M:ues (All Quiet on the Western Front) . In
Chapter 9, the hero, Paul Baumer, is under bombardment, scrambles into
a shell-hole, and there encounters a French soldier who has similarly taken
refuge. Without thinking, Baumer stabs the French soldier. As it happens,
the French soldier is only wounded, although he is slowly bleeding to
death, and Paul Baumer now ironically finds himself in the role of trying to
save the French soldier's life. Baumer retrieves personal papers from the
French soldier, and learns that he is actually Gerard Duval, a printer, with a
wife and child. When Baumer realizes that the French soldier Duval is
dying, he desperately tries to communicate to Duval, promising that he will
write to his wife. Eventually Duval dies. Baumer comes to the stark realiza
tion that he has killed not a French soldier, but Gera1cl Duval, the printer.
From an ethics of care perspective, what has happened with the
Baumer-Duval incident is that the individual has been confronted with the
other, not as a category, but as a particular person. Paul Baumer recoils
from what he has don e , with the implication that he wants to end his role
in killing others. However, soon after this event, he returns to his own
lines. At the end of Chapter 9, Paul now rationalizes what he has done as
something which, although distasteful, unavoidably happens in time of
war. A paradoxical element of this re-adj ustment to the killing of the
enemy is that i t is the direct contact with his comrades which prompts
Paul to adjust to what has happened. One can argue that an ethics of care
is fundamental to peace education in that within peace education we
attempt to humanize the enemy, to describe the enemy as individual
human beings rather than a category of the other. As Carly Heath argues
(2002) , it is through humanizing the enemy that we work towards educat
ing for nonviolence and social justice.
The centrality of caritas within the work of both Augustine and Aquinas
is arguably an ambiguous one: one should have a complete and outgoing
love towards others, and yet it precisely this love that will sometimes com
pel individuals to commit to war. On the strength of this, one could well
argue that such a caritas ethics is potentially more oriented to war than to
peace, and thus, not applicable to peace education. Such a view, however,
The Ethics
of C a re a n d Peace
Education
1 69
tends t ignore the overall thrust of the teachin g of Augustine

and Aquina s
on the JUSt war, i n that within this theory the just war is concess
ional rathe r
than proposi tional. Neither Augusti ne nor Aquinas support
s war a s
opposed to peace. Moreover, the resort to war is only justifi
ed within a
range of tight conditi ons, such as the defense of the
innocen t who are
thre atened with immine nt destruction . It is conceivable that
just war the
_
ory IS
an attempt at qualified care ethics, in that the ethics of care is
bal
anced by conside rations ofjustice and conseq uence.
6.2.5
Existentialism, Care Ethics, and Peace Education
It is not too difficul t to locate a strong existen tial theme within

care eth
ics. Noddings' formula tion of caring as a "way of being in
relation" ( 1 984,
P 1 7) and her formula tion of an ethic of care as
"a way of being in the
world" ( 1 984, p. 1 1 8 ) are decidedly existen tialist in theme. Moreov
er, Nod
dings expressly concedes that the language of care ethics
is very reminis
cent of existent ialist ethics ( 1 984, p. 4 ) , and particularly the
existentialis t
language of S0ren Kierkegaard. If one takes existen tialism
to denote an
outlook that truth cannot be objectified , but only experienced
in relation
ship, then it is not too difficul t to discern the connec tion.
In Kjerlighedens
G;ernznger (Works of Love ) , Kierkegaard writes of the importance
of love
for one's neighbour (KW 1 6:44-60) and the importance of
loving the peo
ple we see (KW1 6: 1 54-1 74 ) . Comme nting on the ethics of
care, Patrici a
Be nner -:v1tes that caring i s very much associa ted with meanin
g, a common
_
existentialist theme, and that meanin glessne ss can be though
t of as " a
place o f not caring" ( 1 994, p. 1 4 ) .
The naturalistic nature of care ethics has m u c h i n commo
n with the
Nietzschean critique of contemporaneous morality, and especial
ly contem
porneous Ch:istin morality. Friedrich Nietzsc he interprets life as being
m direct conflict wi th the principles of morality and
society. Nietzsc he cer
tainly did not articula te any form of e thics of concern
for the other
indeed just the opposit e . Howeve r he did rail against the
tyranny of princi
ples, and in particular he was opposed to the benevolence
that acted out o f
gilt o r religious obligation . The ethics o f care arguabl
y reflects a
N1etzschean rejection of principled ethics, in that whilst
care ethics sug
gests we should care for others in a purposeful manner, such
care should
not be based on epistem ological princip les as such . Benevo
lence should be
natural istic. Benevo lence is, from a care ethics perspec
tive, ontological
rather than deontological. Benevolence is, from a care ethics
perspective, a
way of being.
Yet the comparison of a Nietzschean e thics with the ethics
of care is an
interesting one, in that there are aspects of Nietzsc hean
ethics which can
1 70
The Ethics
be used to critique as well as support care ethics. Through his critique of

M.itl.eid (pity/compassion ) , Friedrich Nietzsche correctly identified that
ca1e and concern for the other can be a subtle form of indicating con
tempt for the other. Notably in the 1 887 work Zu-r Genealogie rler Moral
(Genealogy of Morals) , Nietzsche sees values associated with caring as the
expression of profound resentment (-resenthnent) , ultimately bet1aying a
."
subtle and hidden egoism. The valorization of caring mvolves an mverted
fantasy revenge, wherein those in power can be portrayed as evil and the
powerless can see their own weakness as goodness. Rather, Nietzsche pro
posed an ethics wherein the individual should exult in his/her own will to
power. In effect Nietzsche proposed a positive and open egoism.
Nietzschean interpretation presents an extremely contested field and
this applies particularly to the understanding of the critique of pity. artha
Nussbaum tersely comments ( 1 994, p. 1 39 ) : "Nietzsche objects to pity. No
fac t about his critique of morality is so widely known-or so variously under
stood." In defending the Nietzschean critique, Walter Kaufmann has sug
gested that Nietzsche is really proposing a healthy regard for the self,
suggesting that Nietzsche was only objecting to the ostentatious concern for
others which formed such a large part of the civic religion of his time ( 1 950,
pp. 363-364) . What makes the ethical critique by Friedrich Nietzsche so
important fo1 care ethics is that these concerns reflect many of the aiJobigu
ities within the notion of care itself. The tritique might also be apphed to
peace education and advocacy, in that these could be argued to constitute a
subtle form of egoism, wherein advancing the moral profile of the peace
advocate or educator is a hidden element within the endeavour.
6.2.6
Heideggerian Care Ethics and Peace Education
Martin Heidegge1 is the modem philosopher whose work most clear y

can be taken as a forerunner of care ethics. Heidegger never presented h1s
philosophy as constituting a basis for ethics, yet within the influential 1 927
work Sein u:nrl Zeit (Being and Time) one can discern major themes under
pinning an ethics of care, including how ontology/bein g is found in
_
_ the reahty
engagement with the world (ln-dmWelt-sein) , how care (So-rge) IS
of being (Dasein) , and how care and being are manifested through tempo
rality ( Zeitlichkeit) and everydayness (Alltiiglichkeit) . These are themes
expressed throughout Sein u.nd Zeit, although particularly within Sections
2 6 , 4 1 and 65. In Section 26, Heidegger arguably sums up his outlook by
suggesting that authentic being is found in everyday relationship (alltiigli
ches M.iteiu.andersein) ; who we are is to be found in how we relate to others.
The relational nature of on tology is an important aspect of care ethics, and
of Care and
Peace Ed ucation
171
this theme has been developed i n the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Paul
Ricoeur, two philosophers much influenced by the work of Heidegger.
If one is to discuss Martin Heidegger and care ethics, it is difficult not to
comment upon his collaboration with the Nazi Regime. It is not within the
scope of the book to deal with the extensive l iterature on this subject,
except to say that this was a brief collaboration, although it can, neverthe
less, be seen as indicative of a weakness of care ethics. If we are to care for
those in proximity to us, what then of those who are not in proximity, or
those who are not portrayed as being in proximity? The Nazi Regime, after
all, extolled the value of caring for one's own people and kind. Emmanuel
.
Levinas and Paul Ricoeur, both students of Heidegger, both attempt to
deal with this problem, not through rejecting the Heideggerian emphasis
on the other, but rather by suggesting a more thorough interpretation of
how being is found i n the other, and of how war and warlike societies
attempt to conceal the humanness of the other to us.
Nel Nod dings ( 1 995b, p. 1 9 3 ) , Myra Bookman and Mitchell Aoulafia
( 2000) have noted a connection between the work of Emmanuel Levinas
and the ethics of care, although Bookman and Aoulafia suggest this con
nection is not widely recognized in Anglo-scholarship (2000, p. 1 69) . Levi
nas was ofjewish origins and his family perished in the Holocaust-Levinas
himself was captured and served as a forced slave-labourer within the Third
Reich. Thus it is not surprising that dealing with peace and violence is a
crucial concern for Levinas. In the Preface to the 1 9 6 1 work Totaliti et
infini: essai su-r l'exterio-rite (Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority ) ,
Levinas establishes his theme that i t i s in the nature of war that war
becomes related to the concept of totali ty, whereas by contrast peace is to
be found in the individual identity of the other person, especially within
the face of the other person. This is a theme which Levinas develops
throughout this work, but especially in Section l .B . 7 (pp. 52, 53) and Sec
tion 3 (pp. 1 61-23 1 ) . In the Conclusion, at Section 4.G. 1 2 (pp. 281-284 ) ,
Levinas anticipates m01e recen t formulations of peace by suggesting that
peace is more than cessation of formal hostilities. Peace is relationship ,
represented by the acceptance of the other person , that is, the neighbor,
and by response to the radical i nj unction of the fac e of the other.
The idea of the priority of relationship over being, and thus over ontol
ogy and epistemology, is developed further by Levinas within the 1974 col
lection of essays Aut-rement qu.'etre ou au-dela del 'essence (Otherwise than
Being or Beyond Essence) , especially Chapter 3 . Thus Levinas applauds
what he calls a condition of one-for-another, as not being a commitment a s
such, for commitment involves a conscious act, but rather a condition o f
non-indifference to t h e neighbor (5. l .e) and describes philosophy not as
the traditional notion of the love of wisdom, but rather as constituting wis
dom in the service of love (5.3) . These are themes which resonate strongly
I
1 72
with care ethics, and with education for peace. One of the interesting
peace themes within the work of Levinas is the ethical primacy of peace
over violence. This is perhaps best illustrated in a comment on Genesis 32
( 1 984, p. 341 ) , wherein U!vinas examines Jacob 's reported fear and anxiety ,
upon hearing that Esau was approaching him with an armed force. Why
would jacob feel fear and anxiety? The answer according to Levinas is anxi
ety at the prospect of doing violence to someone whom he knows person
ally, that is, by face. The key to peace is encounter ing the other person as a
person, as indeed is the key to peace education.

The notion of care for the immediate other is an importan t theme also
within with the work of Paul Ricoeu r, and especially with the 1 990 work Soi
mem.e comm.e une autre (Oneself as Another) . As with Levinas, Ricoeur was
incarcerated by the Nazis, and so it is not surprising tha t the constmction
of a contemporary ethics is a recurrent theme within his work. One finds a
specific Ricoeurian emphasis on narrative, on how selfhood is constmcted,
and on the implicatio ns of this for ethics. In the 1 990 work, Ricoeur devel
ops a dialectical tie between selfhood and otherness . Selfhood can only be
constructe d through the other. In an Eliadeail sense, encounter with the
other is the way the sacred enters the profane. Thus Ricoeur sees benevo
lence and solicitude ( his word for care) not as something done out of duty
but rather inherent in selfhood ( 7.2, pp. 2 1 1-226) . Both Levinas and
Ricoeur represent a challenge to the traditional Cartesian cogito, the onto
logical separateness of the self. With both, one could say that we are not
because we think but rather because we relate.
6.3
6.3.1
Critical Issues in Care Ethics and Peace Education
Care Ethics as Feminist Ethics
One of the problematical aspects of the e thi:cs of care is the extent to

which such an ethics is necessarily a feminine or feminist ethic. Indeed,
many of the proponents of an ethics of care characterize such ethics as femi
nist or maternal ethics, and often the ethics of care is simply described as or
included as a category of feminist ethics. The paradox of such a situation is
that some of the strongest criticism of such a characteiization has come from
either feminist Ciitics or from those criticizing such characterization as re
enforcing traditional gender stereotypes", such as Sandra Bartky ( 1 990) ;
Claudia Card ( 1 990, 1 99 1 ) ; Tom Digby ( 1998 ) ; Ann Diller ( 1 996) ; Marilyn
Friedman ( 1993 ) ; Helga Kuhse ( 1 995) ; Elisabeth Porter ( 1 991 , 1 990) ; and
Donald Vandenberg ( 1 996) . My own position is that an ethics of care should
not be considered as necessarily feminine or female ethics, but, rather, there
The Ethics of Care a nd Peace Education
1 73
should be an inclusive ethics of care, emphasizing both male and female car
ing. In some ways recent oitical and popular literature on constructions o f
masculinity supports this. Robert Bly (200 1 ) argues that caring and nurtur
mg should not be considered values alien to what it means to be male.
Regardless of whether it is the case that caring is a specifically feminine
attribute, we still ought to be encouraging this attribute within males, devel
oping as it were a male sense of caring.
In a sense, the gendered nature of caring, or the pe1-ceived gendered
nature of caring, is central to the problem of care, and to the problem of
creating a caring and peaceful world. Diemet Bubeck ( 1 995, p. 1 60) cor
rectly suggests that if in conventional cultural conceptions women are the
care s, and femininity is associated with caring, then men are fighters and
warnors, and masculinity is associated with aggression. Bubeck argues
( 1995, p. 1 6 1 ) that, in conventional cultural conceptions, "femininity and
masculinity are also associated with different spheres: the former with the
private sphere of the home as a haven in the heartless world, and the latter
with the public sphere, i.e. the heartless world itself, consisting of both the
competitive sphere o f the economy and the site of political p;wer and war,
the state . . . .Women as carers have the magic ability to heal and undo in the
home whatever wounds the bad world has left on those entrusted to her."
The paradox of a gendered or feminized ethics of care, as is implied in the
Bubeck critique, is that such a system actually re-enforces this public-pri
vate dichotomy, the dichotomy of the heartless public world versus the car
ing piivate world. It can be argued tha t the task fm- a universal ethics of
care is to apply the same caring to heal and undo wounds in the public
sphere as happens within the private sphere .
What empirical evidence is there to support the gendered interpreta
.
tion of care? Simon Baron-Cohen (2003 ) suggests, controversially, there i s
evidence that males are neurologically more suited t o systemizing, whereas
f: males are neurologically more suited to caring. In an interesting perspec
tive on peace, lise Hakvoort and Louis Oppenheimer, writing in a collec
tion of essays on peace education, report that boys tend to see peace on a
global scale, as an absence of war between nations, whereas girls tend to
see peace as including personal relationships, as including friends or fam
ily not fighting ( 1 999, p . 74) . The Hakvoort-Oppenheimer finding is not i n
itself conclusive. One can argue that this reflects a socialized orientation
rather than any intrinsic orientation of a specific gender. In other words,
boys tend to be oriented towards the political because this is the way gen
der has been traditionally constructed, and girls tend to be oriented
towards the personal, similarly, because this is the way gender has been
constructed.
1 74
6.3.2
l
I
of Care
and P eace Education
1 75
they are in intimate or proximate contac t that they are

prepared to enter
into the activity of war. Ironically, an ethics of care can be
argued as a basis
for peace and peace educat ion, although to some extent
the same ethics
might be propounded as a basis of war.
It can be useful to think of an ethics of care as a secularized
or postmod
ern version of the ethic of love, as developed by Christia
n virtue ethicist s.
Zygmunt Bauma n in his Postmodern Ethics suggests that
contemporary
morality is "incurably aporeti c" ( 1 993, p. 1 1 ) , with a dearth
of universal
applicability and universal founda tions for morality. Bauma
n does not
refer to the ethics of care as such, although he points, in
phenom enologi
cal fashion, to the fact that we find ourselves in the other,
in alterity. He
implies that a contemporary ethics ought to comprise the
idea of caring for
the other. It is almost as if, within a society in which religiou
s foundations
for ethical action have long since been discarded, there
is a subtle selfish
basis for ethics, in that our self identity is bound up with
the way we act
towards others. Therefore as a matter of the survival of our
true selves, car
ing for others becomes import ant and ought to be regarde
d as a postmod
ern ethics.
Care as a Virtue
One of the issues raised within both critical and popular literature on the
ethics of care is the extent to which such an ethics constitutes a revived vir
tue ethics. A number of writers have either identified care ethics as a form
of virtue ethics or at least identified care or caring as a modern virtue, such
as Phil Barker (2000) ; Patricia Benner ( 1 997) ; Ruth Groenhout ( 1 998 ) ;
Margaret McLaren (200 1 ) ; N e l Noddings and Michael Slote (200 1 ) ;
Maldhu Prakash ( 1 985) ; Rucia Raatma (2000) ; Michael Slate ( 1 992, 1 998,
2000) ; Kenneth Strike ( 1 999) ; and Rosemarie Tong, ( 1 998b ) . It should be
explained that traditional virtue ethics does not mention caring as such.
Within Book 4 of Politeia, Plato records Socrates as suggesting that an ideal
society will support and reflect the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage,
temperance and justice. There is no mention of care. Similarly, Aristotle
does not mention caring as such, although within Books 8 and 9 of Nichoma
chean Ethics he does write extensively on the importance of friendship, a
theme taken up by many ethicists of care. Interestingly, Aristotle does draw
the distinction between eunoia ( goodwill) and philia (friendship ) . The strict
understanding of an ethics of care limits such care to those with whom one
has direct contact. A more expanded understanding, however, would
include goodwill to those with whom one does not have direct contact, that
is, with those whom one knows only through mediated contact.
The ethics of care can be thought of as reflecting and reviving the idea
of benevolence as a virtue, and David Hume is often regarded as the pre
eminent virtue ethicist of benevolence. According to Hume, in A Treatise of
Human Nature, 2 . 1 .6, 2 . 1 .7, 2. 1 .9, and 3.3.3, benevolence arises from sympa
, thy and imagination, and through both of these emotions we are ab\e to
place ourselves in the place of others. This may not be exactly the same as
care, but there are similarities. The ethicist Henry Sidgwick in his 1 874
work Methods ofEthics also places benevolence in a central position within
his system. For Sidgwick, benevolence is "a supreme and architectonic vir
tue, comprehending and summing up all others" ( 1 907, p. 238) . What is
striking about the theoreticians of benevolence and care ethicists is that
emotion rather than rationality plays a central role in determining appro
priate action. Indeed, the ethical discourse within the work of Sidgwick is
strikingly similar to the emphases within care ethics. The discussion by
Sidgwick on benevolence as a virtue is also noteworthy for the diffident
tone of the discussion. Sidgwick recognizes that one of the implications of
benevolence is that one will be prepared to commit to actions in the name
of patriotism, actions that often involve killing fellow human beings. Here
he touches upon the problem when understanding care ethics as a basis
for peace education that we h ave previously identified, namely, that it is
precisely because individuals care or feel care for the others with whom
The Ethics
6.3.3
Care Ethics as Situation Ethics
I
1 76
The Ethics of C a re and Peace Education
alternative to this paradigm: the overarching consideration should be that

we act out of an agapeistic or altruistic concern for the other.
6 . 3 .4
1 77
Ruddick is part of the problem, in that she re-enforces the oppositio nality
of male and female. The strange aspect of the work is that Ruddick con
cedes much of this. She concedes that both men and women contribute to
the phenome non of war. She concedes also that the peacefulness
of
women is mythical and that the peacefuln ess of motherin g is linked with
the loyalties upon which war depends. It is not surprising , therefore , that
the conclusio ns Ruddick draws are n ot optimistic ones. Ruddick declares
that "Among women it seems that mothers have the best c hance of infl u
ence. Militarists still count on mothers to bless the plans of the violen t,
including the violence for which their- children are recruited " ( 1 989, p
.
2 49 ) , and yet "if among women, mothers are the most able t o speak, they
may also be the least liable to be heard" ( 1 989, p. 250 ) . The reason is that
the experienc e of women is perceived to pertain to the private world of
caring, and to be alien to the supposedly real world of suffering and c o n
flict. I would argue that it is precisely this limited formulati on of care as a
quintesse ntially maternal or feminine phenome non that is crucial to the
impotenc e of one branch of the peace movemen t. In the words of Sara
Ruddick herself, "When they speak against war, mothers say j ust what any
one expects to hear" ( 1 989, p. 250) . I t is, o ne suspects, because of this that
the feminist protest against war and violence has been ignored and will
continu e to be ignored.
Joan Tronto neatly summed up the dichotomy of the feminist care eth
ics, in saying that, typically, men care about (issues) and women care for
(person s) ( 1 986, p. 1 84) . However it is within her 1 993 work Moral Bound
aries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care that Joan Tronto has taken up
the challenge for a more generalized and politicized ethics of care, sugges t
i ng that care should be extended into political life. Accordin g to Tronto,
the reason why care is not extended i n to political life is that there are artifi
cial moral boundaries that dominate our thinking: boundaries between the
moral and the political, boundaries be tween the public and private realms
,
and boundaries between personal experience and the world. The task for
ethics is to recognize these boundaries and to be prepared to transcend
them in practice. What makes education significan t is that it is during the
period of the education of the young that these boundaries are estab
lished. We are taught to accept tha t the political world is necessaril
y
i mmoral or amoral and we are taught that our personal view of the world
needs to subjugated to those we perceive to be authorities. In a sense, w
e
are taught n o t to trust ourselves. O n e challenge o f teaching peace i s
to
encourage an alternate view of the world.
Sara Ruddick, Care Ethics, and Peace Education
It has been thus far suggested that one of the major m otivations within
an ethics of care is establishing how we should move towards a more
humane and thus more peaceful world. There are some writers within the
tradition of care ethics who have made this connection more explicit, nota
bly Sara Ruddick, with her important 1 989 work Maternal Thinking: Towa-rds
a. Politics of Peace. The most telling section of the book is the discussion on
"Histories of Human Flesh", wherein Ruddick discusses the denial of the
physical (and the sexual ) , so prevalent within the western philosophical
tradition, and which is so crucial for militarism and the practice of war.
Ruddick suggests that a counter to this denial of corporeality can be found
in the experience of women, and particularly the experience of women in
nativity. For Ruddick caring is quintessentially (although not exclusively) a
maternal experience, and she advocates a recognition of maternal experi
ence and maternal thin king as the basis for a feminist politics of peace.
Maternal Thinking:Towards a Politics of Peace is a difficult book, precisely
because the author is often so difftdent about her own position. Moreover,
the problem with the thesis of maternal peace politics as advanced by Rud
dick is not that i t is wrong, but rather that it does not go far e nough. Rud
dick writes at some length, especially within the first half of the book, to
explain why she does not refer to parenting instead of mothedng, and why
she does not write about parental thinking and a parental politics of peace.
Ye t, her argument on this point is not convincing. Even her argument on
the importance of an awareness of the human body through the experi
ence of birth is a very limited one, for, logically, this would mean that those
women who have not given birth are excluded from maternal thinking. I
would like to suggest that care ethics as suggested by Ruddick needs to be
more universal, and should include fathering as well as mothering. Indeed
it can be argued that it is the dearth of effective fathering within modern
societies that produces young men so lacking in self-confidence and self
esteem that they need continually to prove themselves through violence
and war. As a consequence, participation in war or war-like conduct soon
becomes a male rite of passage. Even if the person who is the primary nur
turer in modern societies is female, this factor in itself is part of the prob
lem of modern societies and part of the problem of the institution of
modern war.
In a sense, the work by Ruddick provides a very powerful critique of
militarism from the perspective o f an ethics of care. Equally, however,
l.
1 78
6.3.5
Joseph Kunkel, Care Ethics, and Peace Education
Joseph Kunkel (2000) is another writer to make an explicit con ection

between the ethics of care and peace politics. At the outset, Kunkel Is skep
tical of the Ruddick thesis, precisely because the maternal instinct for pro
tecting children can be a motivation for violence. It is a criticism not
dissimilar to the criticism a decade earlier from Victoria Davion ( 1 990) .
Kunkel writes (2000, p. 1 1 6 ) : "My own oiticism of Ruddick's maternal
thinking concerns the transference of a caring attitude towards one's chil
dren to people seen as inimical to the mother-child relationship. I am
thinking about people who might be described as directly or indirectly
hurting or killing those children. Ruddick has not established that mothers
do not use violence to protect their children from violence perpetrated by
strangers." Indeed, the desire to care for others and the specific desire to
provide safety for one's children can be seen as a fundamental cause of war.
Ruddick does seem to acknowledge this reality within the second half of
her work, where she refers to the myth of maternal peacefulness and to the
reality that women will often be extremely patriotic in times of war.
We might characterize the Kunkel critique as highlighting the limited
nature of the Gilligan/Noddings ethics of care, wherein one cares for
those with whom one is relationally connected. However, one can argue
that the patriotism associated with such a limited ethics of care is indeed
not representative of authentic care. In most cases the call to prote t ne's
own children in time of war is actually a call based on an abstract pnnCiple.
That abstract principle ( that harm may come to one's children via the
enemy) may be extremely frightening and motivating, but it is nevertheless
an abstract principle, and the ethics of care specifically suggest that we
ought to act according to caring rather than to principles. In other wor s,
one could argue that the generalized call to engage in war represents a hid
den deontological ethics (we have a supposed duty to protect our loved
ones) or a hidden consequentialist ethics (if we do not defeat the enemy
our loved ones will supposedly suffer harm) , rather than a genuine ethics
of care as such.
Kunkel's most significant contribution to discussion on the ethics of
care and peace politics comes from his insight o n the nature of care.
Kunkel suggest that the nature of care is dialogical and the underpinning
of care is trust. The theme of care involving trust and dialogue has also
been explored recently by D a ryl Koehn ( 1 998) . Both trust and dialoue
have clear ramifications for peace politics. Kunkel works from Rogenan
therapy to suggest that dialogue is perhaps the authentic form of arin ?.
Dialogue is a significant way through which parents interact and tram chil
dren. Kunkel suggests that such dialogue and negotiation ought to be the
format through which we understand and transact international politics,
1 79
rather than having military forces resolve differences on the battlefield.

Ultimately Kunkel is what might be called an extended care ethicist, in that
he sees no reason why the care applied in the microcosmic domain of per
sonal connective relations cannot be applied to the macrocosmic soc;ial
and political realms. The key is respect and attentiveness to the other. Dia
logue is also a very key concept in educational theory, as expressed in the
dialogical educational theory and practice of Paulo Freire. It is not appro
priate here to give a detailed analysis of the educational theory and prac
tice of Freire, although an important element was the recognition of the
autonomy and dignity of the learner. Education is conceived not so much
as an authoritarian exercise of providing information to the learner, but,
rather, as a dialogue or conversation between the learner and the teacher,
with an important element of attentiveness to what the learner is saying.
Joseph Kunkel makes some further interesting comments on trust.
Essentially, he claims that the fundame ntal Hobbesian aggression principle
is wrong. Trust (and caring) underpins all significant human interactions,
including not only dating and loving and nurturing, but also employment,
business deals, health care delivery, social services, and participation in reli
gion, politics and international affairs. Kunkel refers to the primacy of trust
over aggression: "Trust is primary and distrust secondary. Trust is not built
upon agreements, but agreements upon trust. It is mutual trust that unde1
girds promises, contracts, and treaties. When distrust occurs, trust has
failed" (2000, p. 1 1 4 ) . The Hobbesian thesis that every person is an enemy
to the other is wrong precisely because everyday life is based on trust.
Kunkel writes (2000, p. 1 5) "Sometimes this basic trust is lost because of an
earthly disaster or as a resul t of the frightening things humans do to one
another. A breakdown of that natural human trusting occurs, and is
replaced by heightened subhuman anxiety. At such time the caring adults
among us give comfort till the nightmare is over, the fears are subdued,
and we return to our truly o riginal condition of trust."
Why is it, that Thomas Hobbes did not see this? Perhaps, the answer lies
in his own historical context of the English Civil War. What Hobbes was
describing was not the natural order of human affairs but rather the break
down of what is otherwise natural human trusting. The idea that caring is a
natural activity of human beings (or at least a natural activity of females) is
perhaps the core element of care ethics. What are the implications of this?
Simply that trust and caring (and a peaceful society) are not something
that we need to invent or create. Rather trust and caring are the natmal
order of human affairs, a natural order that is periodically broken by
trauma or by structural events. The implications for education are that
peace is not something that needs to be invented or created. Indeed, the
notion of the naturalness of care and trust (and peace) is substantiated by
the strenuous effort put into military training and propaganda. If care and
1 80
trust were not natural, if Thomas Hobbes was indeed correct, then such
expenditure of time and resources would hardly be necessary.
6.4
6.4. 1
The App l i cation of Care Ethics to Peace Education
Partnership, Relationship, and Rights
One writer who establjshes a specific nexus between caring and peace
education is Riane Eisler. The notion of assisting individuals to learn the
skills and habit of caring for life is one of the themes in recent work by
Riane Eisler ( 2000/2001 and 2004, pp. 32-34) . She sees caring as crucial in
education for a culture of peace; with a tripartite understanding of caring
for ourselves, caring for othen, caring for our natural habitat. What makes
Eisler interesting for an understanding of care ethics and peace education
is that her earlier work was on gender relations ( 1 987) , and particularly on
how a dominator model of gender relations is not an effective one, for
male or female. This theme continues in her more recent work, where she
advocates education for partnership rather than domination. It is interest
ing that care or nurturance for Eisler is not limited to the feminine sphere.
what Eisler calls the partnership society is a society of a culture of peace
and nonviolence, and it is the direct opposite of a dominator/ domination
society. The challenge is to teach the skills of partnership, that is, the skills
of caring for one's self, caring for others, and caring for the environment.
Overall there are many lacunae within an ethics of care. H owever,
despite these, i t is not difficult to summarize the commonality between an
ethics of care and peace education, or at least between an expanded ethics
of care and peace education. Peace education is ultimately about caring
relationships. This includes relationships between i ndividuals and between
collectivities, such as nation-states. In the case of nation-states, the com
plete breakdown of relationship is what we call war, and an important ele
ment in peace education is teaching about this breakdown in relationship
and attempting to prevent this in the future. The breakdown of relation
ships between i ndividuals is also a valid concern for peace education. The
existence of harmonious and co-operative relations at all levels is what we
call peace. Peace education aims to encourage such harmonious and co
operative relationships, between both individuals and collectivities. Simi
larly, the establishment of caring relationships is also the major concern
within the ethics of care. Indeed, Maxine Morphis and Christopher Ries
beck ( 1 990, p . 1 5 ) describe care ethics as relation-based ethics. As we have
seen in the earlier discussion, defining peace is a notoriously difficult pros
pect. The notion of peace, nevertheless, points to the maintenance of a
1 81
caring world. A peaceful world is not a world without suffering, as suffering

is part of the natural order: yet a peaceful world is where individuals will
care and work to alleviate suffering, including refusing to commit to
actions, such as war, that create unnecessary human suffering.
A further application of the ethics of care to peace education is that the
ethics of care involves a de-emphasis of rights and duties, and a re-focus
ing on caring for persons. What makes this so relevant for peace and for
peace education is that an importan t element of war causation is precisely
the insistence upon rights and duties, and especially national rights and
duties. An important element within b elligerent nationalism is the percep
tion that the collective rights of a people have been denied. This notion of
collective victim-hood may arise from recent events or it can be proj ected
back for generations. David Welch writes of the sense of national iustice
as a major cause ofwar ( 1 993, pp. 7-47) and on much the same theme Isa
iah Berlin refers to a sense of national woundedness as being important
for aggressive nationalism ( 1 980, p p . 333-355 ) . Similarly, an important
element within the demand upon citizens to serve their country in time of
war is the appeal to duty. This is not to suggest that the rights of peoples
and the concept of duty should be ignored completely. Within an ethics of
care, however, rights and duties are subordinated to, or at least balanced
with, care for individual persons, for real persons, rather than the inter
ests of, to use the telling phrase of Benedict Anderson, an "imagined com
munity" ( 1 990) . Put simply, within an ethics of care perspective, concerns
over national honor and duty to one 's country are subservient to caring
for individuals.
6.4.2
Caring, Healing, and Peace Education
There is an arguable nexus between peace education and the partiality

of the ethics of care. The ethics of care has a bias towards those who are
suffering, and those needing care. So too within peace education there is a
bias towards peace. Moreover, peace research is very much a normative
social science, with a focus upon care for those who are suffering and
encouragement of the development of the full potential of individuals.
One of the analogies often used for peace research is indeed one from the
caring professions. Just as medicine is a science that aims at caring for the
well-being of the individual, so too peace research is a science that aims a t
caring for the well-being o f society a n d societies, an analogy used b y Joha n
Galtung (EPR: l : l 70-1 72 , EPR: l :299-304) and Tarja Vayrynen ( 1998) . The
medical analogy is usually d rawn with reference to peace research ,
although i t i s also applicable to peace education .
1 82
The application of the ethics of care to peace education can be demon

strated in the classroom, especially through the importance of a nurturi ng
1 83
of an ethics of care are that it is focused o n a specific person and that it

does represent an important element of daily social relations. Moreover,
and encouraging relationship between teacher and student. It is significant
there is an important element wherein our own personhood is constructed
that the professional responsibility of a teacher is usually summarized by
out of relationships with immediate others. There is also an importan t
Parenting is a key aspect of
application o f c are ethics to peace education, i n that war and i njustice gen
the ethics of care. If the content of what is taught can be considered the
erally involves the dehumanization of those opposed to us or those who are
macrocosmic aspect of peace education, then the microcosmic aspect is
suffering. An important element of peace education can involve humaniz
the concept that the teac her acts
in loco parentis.
the relationship between teacher and student, within the milieu of the
ing the enemy and h umanizing those who are suffering. Put simply, care
classroom and institution. I t is not within the scope of this discussion to
ethics emphasizes that the other shares our common humanity.
give a detailed account of what is sometimes known as peaceful pedagogy.
The weakness of care ethics is that this can denote that we only care for
However, peace pedagogy includes developing and encouraging a warm
those in proximity to us. It can lead to selective compassion. That is perhaps
relationship with the student, having defined boundaries of behavior,
why, in Gandhian thought, there is a warning against individual attachme n t.
being concerned for the future of the student, and having behavior modifi
Worse still, the notion of caring can be used as a justification for war a n d
cation based upon understood consequences rathe r than blame. What one
social selfishness. In other words, the discourse of war and social selfishness
is attempting to achieve through teaching should always be a nurturing
is that because we care or ought to care for those close to us, we must be
and encouraging relationship, one that will encourage the student to see
prepared to take radical action which will support those close to us. Con
that peace, in the sense of harmonious and co-operative relationships, is a
quest is rarely used as a motivation for war, rather it is an appeal to care a n d
practical possibility.
protect those close t o u s who are in need o f protection. O r conversely those
The application of an ethics of care to the professional ethics of educa

tion is an area of ongoing examination. Pearl and Samuel Oliner ( 1 995)
not involved in the conflict are enjoined to care for their troops involved i n
have suggested that caring is a ubiquitous social phenomenon and an eth

ics of care is actually not a novel approach to human behavior. It can be
the conflict. T h e argument propounded in this chapter i s that there needs

to be a more universal ethic of care, or at least the ethics of care needs to be
balanced with other e th ical perspectives. With such qualifications, the e th
ar ued that an ethics of care approach has always u ndergirded education

and teaching, but it has rarely been identified and articulated as suc h . Sim
ics of care and the notion of care remain strong foundational sources for
been identified as such. In enunciating professional ethics, however, what

we are doing is making explicit what may have been implicit ethical
6.5.2
the concept and endeavor of peace education.
ilarly one might suggest that peace education or education-for-peace has

always been implicit within the educational project, although it has not
assumptions and educational practice. This is especially important for

peace education, where an analysis of the ethics of care can help elucidate
a rationale for this and other areas of educational endeavor.
Recapitulation
The ethics of care is ostensibly a recent development, although the re

have been numerous writers and som-ce s that have emphasized a relation
based system of ethics. The ethics of care is often referred to as feminist
ethics, although it is my contention that it i s important not to limit c a re
ethics as a specifically feminist ethics, but rather to articulate a universal
ethics of care. I t is not merely women who are caring, but, properly unde r
stood, both men and women. It is not too difficult to see the poten tial c o n
6.5
6.5.1
Summation
Strengths and Weaknesses of Care Ethics

The strengths and weaknesses of care ethics and a care ethics approach
I
'i
nection between care e thics and peace education. Peace is ultimately about
caring and relationships. This i n cludes relationships between individuals
and between collectivities such as nation-states. O n a deeper level, peace
also concerns the relationship of a person with o n e 's own self and the rela
tionship of humanity to the environm e nt. Moreover, care ethics implies a
to peace education have already been discussed within this investigation,
de-emphasis of rights and duties, both of which are linked with war. C o n
and thus it is only necessary to deal with these in review here. The strengths
versely, care ethics implies caring for individuals, which is central to peace.
1 84
Relationship is also crucial to the educational process, in that we learn

from nurturing and supportive relationships. Put simply, a care ethics
implies the importance of teaching students to care for others, which is
crucial to the task of peace education.
C HAPT E R 7
II
CO NCLU S I ON S
7.1
7.1.1
I
I
Review of I nvestigation
Recapitulation and Reflection
This investigation commenced with an articulation of the central p r ob

lem for peace education as comprising its universal acceptance, and that,
paradoxically, because of this, the re has been little exploration of the
philosophical foundations for peace education. Working in response to
this problem , I identified five ethical traditions, wherein possible p h ilo
sophical or ethico-philosophical foundations for peace education may be
argued. Within virtue ethics, peace may be considered a virtue and/ or
there may be virtues conducive to peacefulness, and accordingly p eace
education may be understood as education in that virtue or virtues.
Within consequentialist ethics, peace education may be understood as
education regarding the consequences of our action and inaction, both as
individuals and collectivities, and as demystifying the discourse of war.
Within conservative political ethics, peace education may be interpre ted
as emphasizing the importance of the evolution of social institutions and
the importance of order and lawful change. Within aesthetic ethics, pe ace
may be i nterpreted as something beautiful and valuable in i tself, and
peace education as emphasizing the importance of that beauty and value.
Within care ethics, care may be interpreted as a core element in peace,
and peace education as encouraging a fundamental trust and engagement
with the o ther.
Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and PhilosojJhical Foundations, pages
..Copyright
2008 by Information Age Pub l is h i n g
A l l rights of reproduction in a n y form reserved.
185-190
1 85
1 86
At the end of this investigation, the reader might conclude that there
has been a cautious and even tentative tone to this study. Is this not counte r
to what ought to be the case for a study in peace education? This tone is in
part a matter of dialectical method, looking at the arguments pro and con
at each stage of the i nvestigation. Indeed, if the justification for peace edu
cation were quite straightforward, then there would be no necessity for the
book. In each of the above five ethical traditions, I have examined the writ
ig of selected contributors, determining the extent to which the contribu
tJon of each might assist with enunciating an ethical basis for peace
education, but cognizant also of the extent to which the same writings
might not support peace and p eace education, and the extent to which the
specific ethical tradition might not provide support for peace education.
Beyond this, h owever, the cautious tone of the investigation represents a
deliberate attempt to avoid what is often a very authoritarian and dogmatic
tone to educational writing on peace education. It is precisely because writ
ers tend to be so passionately committed to peace education, and unde1
standably so, given the urgency of the problems involved, that a developed
foundation for peace education has tended to be overlooked .
7. 1 . 2
Metaphilosophical Considerations
I n the opening chapter, it was suggested that the study could be framed
as a postfoundationalist investigation into the possible ground s of peace
education. I suggested that postfoundationalism be unders tood in the con
text o f this investigation to denote rejecting an assumed or given authority
for a specific action or belief, but rather arguing, in dialectical fashion, for
a rationale for a specific action or belief. A postfoundatio nalist position
may thus be contrasted with both foundationalism , which posits an
assumed or irreducible authority for belief or actio n, and anti-foundation
alism, which posits there can never be any autho rity for action or belief.
For peace education , the p roblem can be framed thus: there has often
been an assumed authority for peace education, although, ultim ately, this
is destructive to the e nterprise of educating for peace , as it is not an argued
or developed authority. For any educational endeavor, there needs to be a
developed rationale or developable rationale. On the othe r hand, to sug
gest there can never be any developed rational/authori ty for belief or activ
ity is equally destructive, as i t leads to inaction and cynicism.
It is conceivable that the postfoundationalist approac h of this investiga
tion can be undergirded by a critical realist p hilosophy. Critical realism has
been a m<Uor philosophical school of thought throughout the past century,
although in recent decades has undergone something of a renasce nce,
much of this centered upon the transcenden tal critical realism of Roy
Conclusions
187
Bhaskar. As I have argued elsewhere (2003a, p. 73) , critical realism can be

summarized as a philosophy that emphasizes the importance of mind-inde
pendent reality, although recognizing that this mind-independent reality is
mediated through individual and cultural perception. Critical realism,
moreover, is sympathetic to multi-disciplinary studies and to the reality o f
the transcendent. T h e impact o f critical realism i s that i t stands as a rejec
tion of both o ntological and moral relativism. Put simply, if we accept that
the world is real, u n derstood as defined by critical realism, then how we act
in the world is of crucial importance-it makes a difference that we should
work for a peaceful world, and that we should educate for a peaceful world.
The connection of peace education with critical realism is one area of pos
sible future investigation from this investigation.
7 . 1 .3
Why Not Peace Education as an Educational Duty?
One of the arguable bases for peace education not developed within
this investigation is the deontological foundation. A deontological
approach is common i n peace advocacy, notably within the discourse
which underscores the duty of individuals to work for peace. The criticism
of such a deontological approach has been mentioned tangentially within
this investigation, although it seems now appropriate to gather some of
these strands together. In the opening chapter of the study, it was sug
gested that the problem of seeing peace education as exhortation is that
this is ultimately counter-productive, in that such exhortation engenders a
sense of powerlessness. Moral education involves far more than merely
exhorting others to do their duty, and i f peace education were only this
simple, then we would have experienced universal world peace long ago.
In subsequent chapters, a further problem with seeing peace as a duty was
intimated, in that duty carries with i t the genesis of violence. This can be
through the execution of patriotic duty or i t can even be, perversely,
through the objective of establishing peace i tself, in that once one sees
establishing peace as a duty, then the temptation to use violence to estab
lish that condition is omnipresent.
The pedagogical problems of a deontological i nterpretation of peace
education can be also elucidated through the notion of political correct
ness. If one sees peace education in terms of duty, and of exhortation to
duty, it is difficult not to see peace education in terms of being politically
correct. The discourse of political correctness is complex, and it is not
within the scope of this summary to discuss this fully. At one level, the com
plaint about a programme or initiative being political correct is merely an
opportunity to dismiss something an individual does not like. After all, who
determines what is politically correct o r politically incorrect? However,
1 88
appeal to
beyond this, the notio n of political correctness connotes an
we ought to do,
something which authorities or authority mandates thatale
reason. T?
out of duty, witho ut any real intrinsic or argued ration or
ologi
deont
a
er,
return to categories used earlier in this concluding hap rather than a
alis
cal basis for peace education represents a foundatwn
postfoundationali st basis for the enterprise of peace edtca uon.
7.2
7.2. 1
Impl ications of Investigation
The Need for a Holistic and Integrative Approach

to Peace Education
tion
If one takes an over-view of the ethical foundations for peace educa
of
eah
o
tions
limita
are
there
that
clear
es
outlined in this study, it becom
e
Identi
been
have
tios
limita
These
.
ations
these specific ethical found
the limi
and answered within the discussion, although only m part. Often
s an
witer
by
tations of a specific ethical tradition are acknowledged
ethi
smgle
any
er,
thinke rs within that ethical tradition. Ultimately, howev
hat
plete.
incom
as
ed
cal foundation for peace education must be regard
possible
is needed is a holistic approach to peace education, involving all any one
seeing
than
r
Rathe
tion.
philosophical ration ales for peace educa
regarded as
ethical found ation as being complete in itself, each should be ppro
ach to
ative
inter
or
ic
holist
a
comp lemen tary to the others. Such
_ the
With
g
keepi
m
much
very
also
is
tion
the foundations of peace educa
ative
United Nations emphasis on a culture of peace, based upon an mtegr
conce pt involving many aspects of peace (UNGA, 1 999) . . can stnd by
Why is it that no one ethica l rationale for peace educatiOn speCifically
itself? Again , critical realism can provide some assistance he1e,Roy Bhaskar
through the notio n of stratified reality, as develo pe bythrough a ar
p
in human action
( 1 978, 1 998) . When one attempts to expla
_
.
actiOn
of
view
ional
imens
ticular ethical tradit ion, one is taking a one-d
pece
and
peace
01
ati?n
found
l
Thus, any attempt to develop an ethica
d. The so!uuon
education from a single tradition will be necessanly limitethat
o nly m the
i
l,
ic
tolo
escha
is
reality
to the problem of stratified
_ whic
tle
future will it be possib le to stand outside of the hm1ta t1ons of stmgl
y, this
limit our dimen sion-al unde rstanding of human action . Intere
ted
-orien
future
eschatological emph asis in critical realism links with the understood as
nature of peace research and education, wherein peace ne in order to
part of the eschatological future, something which we imagi
make that eschatological future present.
:.
i ;
IS
I.
.1
Conclusions
7.2.2
Pedagogical Implications of the Investigation
7.2.3
Directions for Future Research
1 89
At the commencement of this investigation, some basic suggestions for

what constitutes peace education were given. I have, howeveJ generally
avoided exploring direct statements of practical approaches to peace edu
cation, on the grounds that this was outside of the stated ambit of the inves
tigation. Yet, within each of the five ethical rationales for peace education,
there are hints as to what some practical approaches to peace education
might look like. Peace education may be thought of as encouraging a com
mitment to peace as a settled disposition and enhancing the confidence of
the individual as an agent for peace; as informing the student on the con
sequences of war and social iJ:Uustice; as informing the student on the value
of peaceful and just social structures and working to uphold or develop
such social structures; as encouraging the student to love the world and to
imagine a peaceful future; and as caring for the student and encouraging
the student to care for others. Each of the above is implied in the ethical
foundations for peace education, as articulated in this investigation.
At the commencement of this investigation I also suggested that there
were three levels or stages of peace education, involving firstly the preven
tion of warfare, secondly the linkage of peace with cognate social concerns,
and thirdly intrapersonal and interpersonal relationships. The third stage
is crucial, and includes the how-to of peace education, in terms of what to
do in the classroom and in personal interaction. Intrapersonal and inter
personal peace is also a direct application of Gandhian nonviolence, in
that such theory indicates we ourselves ought to become the (social)
change we want. This is not to say that the overall social and political con
cerns of peace education ought to be ignored. Rather, the social and politi
cal concerns need to be balanced with practical and personal application.
The five specific ethical foundations for peace education give some indica
tions as to how this might be done, or at least how peace education might
be ethically supported. Just as an integrated understanding of the three lev
.els of peace education are crucial for an understanding of peace education
as a whole, so too an integrated understanding of the five ethical founda
tions for peace education enunciated i n this book is crucial for an under
standing of peace education as a whole.
It is a conventional conclusion to any research study to suggest that still

more research is needed, although in the emerging field of peace research
and education this observation seems particularly appropriate. In his final
publication before his death, Martin Luther King wrote at length of the
contrast between the technological advancement of humankind and what
1 90
he called the spiritual and moral immaturity of humankind ( 1 968) , a

theme previously identified within his Nobel Lecture ( 1 972) . Peace educa
tion is one means whereby we attempt to examine and address the spiritual
and moral immaturity o f humankind, and thus it is in the nature of this
task that more work will always be needed. One obvious area for further
research is elaboration of each of the five ethical bases for peace education
identified within this book. Further research may also be directed towards
the linkage between peace and contemporary theories of reality, such as
advanced in critical realism, and research into the pedagogical implica
tions of specific ethical rationales for peace education. Starting points, nev
ertheless, are important, and the ethical foundations we have identified
within this investigation remain an important starting point for the impor
tant task of establishing and enunciating an articulate and well developed
rationale for peace education within the contemporary world.
APPEN DIXES
APPENDIX 1 : ABBREVIATIONS
IBE
IPRA
UN
UNESCO
UNGA
UNICEF
International Bureau of Education

International Peace Research Association
United Nations
United Nations Educational Scienti fic and Cultural
Organization
United Nations General Assembly
United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
APPE N D I X 2: CITATION METHOD
The purpose of this prefatory note on citation method is to indicate how

more common works are referred to in this investigation. I have attempted
to comply with contemporary scholarly convention, especially in instances
where it is likely that many different editions of a particular work will be
available to potential readers.
The citation method for common w orks cited in this book is as follows:
Al-Qur'an. In compliance with Islamic practice, the name of the surat i s
stated. This is followed b y the surat number and verse i n brackets.
Aristotle. The standard Bekker notatio n is used where applicable. How
eve!, where possible, the citation m e thod refers to the specific section
of the work: Nicomachean Ethics, citation indicates the book and chap
ter; Politics, c itation indicates the book and chapter; and Metaphysics,
citation indicates book and chapter.
Peace Education: Exj>loring Ethical and Philosaphical Foundations, pages

Copyright.
2008
by Information Age Publishing
191-1 94
191
1 92
(Saint) Augustin e of Hippo. Citations are as follows: Confessio, citations

indicate the book and chapter; De civitate Dei, citations i n dicate book
and chapter; De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de rnoribvs Manichaeomm,
citations i ndicate book, chapter and paragrap h; De natura boni contra
Manichaeos citations indicate book and chapter; Enchiridion (Handbook)
on Faith, Hope and Love, citations indicate the chapter and section; and
Hornolies on the First Epistle ofjohn, citation indicates homily and section.
Bentham , Jeremy. Citations from An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation indicate chapter and section.
edi
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Citations are from the standard critical German
vol
relevant
the
by
followed
tion Dietrich Bonhoe.ffer Werke, cited as DBW,
ume and relevant page numbers.

of
Buddhist Scriptures. Citations from Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga ( Path
and
chapter
relevant
Purificat ion) are indicated by VM followed by the
section; citations from the Anguttara Nikaya or Gradual Sayings are indi
cated by AN followed by book ( nipata) and saying (sutta) ; citations
from the Samyutta Nikaya or Kindred Sayings are indicated by SN fol
lowed by the chapter (samyutta) and sub-chapter; and citations from
the Majjhima Nikaya or Middle Length Sayings are indicated by M N fol
lowed by the discourse (sutta) number.

Christian Scriptures (New Testament) . Citations indicate the name of the
book, followed by chapter and verse.
Dewey, John. References are made from the standard critical edition,
namely, The Collected Works ofJohn Dewey. This edition is divided into
three series, the Early, Middle and Later Works. Thus the citation indi
cates EW, MW or LW, as appropriate, followed by volume and the rele
vant page references, if applicable .

in
Erasmus , Desiderius. Citations are from the standard critical edition
citation
the
Thus
Erasmus.
f
o
Works
English language, namely, Collected
indicates CWE, followed by volume and the relevant page reference s, if
applicab le. The excep-t ion to this is the adagium Dulce bellum inexpertis
ly
(yet to appear in the Collected Works), which is thus cited separate
under AE, following by the p age number from the Barker edition of
the adages. Any reference to the Latin Leiden edition is indicated by
LB, followed by the volume number, the column number( s) and the
place in the column.
,
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Citations are from the standard critical education
namely, Gesammelte Werke, with the volume followed by page number.
The title of the work is indicated in the text.
Appendixes
1 93
'
Galtng, Johan. For most rec e n t works, citation is through date of publica
tiOn and page references. However for the 6-volume Essays in Peace
Research, which contains most of the significant earlier work of Johan
Gal tung, citation is indicated by EPR followed by volume and (if neces
sary) page numbers.
Gandhi, Mohandas/Mahatma. Citations are from the standard critical edi
tion, namely, Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, and are indicated by
CW followed by volume and page number. Where other Gandhian
writings are cited, this is indicated by the date and page number.
He brew Scriptures (TANAKH) . Citations indicate name of book, followed
by chapter and verse.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Citations from the works of Hegel utilize
the paragraph number for the specific work.
Heid: gger, Martin. Citations are from the Gesamtausgabe, indicating the
tttle of the book and the s ection.
Hobes, Thomas. Citations fro m De Give indicate chapter and section; cita
tions from Leviathan indicate chapter and paragraph .
Burne, David. Citations are as follows: references t o A Treatise of Human
Understanding indicate book/part/section; references to the first
enquiry (Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) and second enquiry
(Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals) are indicated by either
EHU or EPM, followed by the section, and paragraph according to the
1 993 Selby-Bigge edition; and references to the essay 'On the Standard
of Taste' are taken from Burne's Selected Essays, and are indicated by SE
followed by page number from the 1 993 Coply-Edgar edition.
Hutcheson, Frances. An Inquiry into the Original ofour Ideas ofBeauty and Vir
tue comprises two treatises, and thus references to this work are indi
cated with treatise/section/article . Similarly, A System of Moral
Philosophy comprises three books, and thus references to this work are
indicated with book/chapter/article.
Kant, Immanuel. Citations are from the standard German critical edition ,
namely, Kants Gesammelte Schriften. Citations are indicated with AA (the
standard abbreviation for the above German edition) , followed by the
volume and page number. The name of the book is i ndicated in the
text, and, where appropriate, the section is also indicated.
Kierkegaard, Soren. Citations are from Kierkegaard s Writings and are indi
cated by volume and page number.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Citations from Totalite et irifini indicate m ajor section
(number ) , chapter (capital letter) or conclusion (con ) , and sub-sec
tion with chapter (number) . Citations from Autrement qu 'etre, ou au-delii
de l 'essence indicate chapter and section.
1 94
Marx, Karl and Fried1ich Engels. Citations are from the standard critical
edition of Marx Engels Werk.e, cited as MEW, and followed by volume
and page number.
Plato. The standard Stephanos notation is used where applicable. However,
where possible, as in the case of Politeia, the book and section are also
indicated.
Ricoeur, Paul. Citations from Soi-meme comme un autre are indicated by the
s tudy number and section number, followed by page numbers.
(Saint) Thomas Aquinas ( 1 963- 1 975) . The major work is Summa Th.eologica
( also known as Summa Theologiae), which is divided into three parts,
namely, First Part, Second Part (with two subdivisions) , and the Third
Pan with Supplement. The citation thus indicates the appropriate Part
and subdivision (i.e., 1 , 2 / 1 , 2/2 and 3) , with the question indicated
(Q) and the particular article identified, as appropriate. For De Veritate,
citations refer to the question, followed by article and argument if
applicable.
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N AME I N DEX
A
Bartky, Sandra, 1 72
Bauman, Zygmu t , 1 75
Abraham, 1 23, 1 48
Baumer, Pau l , 1 68
Ackerma n , Peter, 84, 1 0 7
Baxley, Anne Margaret, 1 39
Addams, Jane, 1 6 2
Beck, Lewis White, 1 46
Aesara o f Lucania, 1 65
Bel l , Linda, 1 63
A l l e n , D e rek, 7 1
Bellah, Robert, -5 4
Ambrose, 34
Ben ner, Patricia, 1 66, 1 69, 1 74
Anderso n , Benedict, 1 8 1
Bentham,Jererny, 67-69, 72
Annas, Julia, 92
Berlin, Isaiah, 1 8 1
Anscom be, E l isabeth, 50, 6 1
Berry, Thomas, 1 55
Aoulafia, Mitchell, 1 7 1
Aristotle, 28-34, 50-5 1 , 55, 93-94, 1 22,
1 74, 1 9 1
Blai ney, Geoffrey, 1 03

Blake, Nigel, 1 7- 1 8
Aronowitz, David, 8 1
Bleiker, Roland, 1 2 1
Aspeslaugh, Robert, 1
Augusti n e
Bhaskar, Roy, 1 87- 1 88
of Hippo, Saint, 34-35,
Bly, Robert, 1 73
56-57, 1 22, 1 27- 1 30, 1 42- 1 43,

1 66- 1 69
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 45-48, 1 26, 149

Bookman, Myra, 1 7 1
Borba, Michele, 5 4
Boulding, E l ise, 1 , 1 02, 1 55
Boulding, Kenneth, 1 1 , 58, 1 04,
1 1 4- 1 1 5
Bach,Johan Sebastian, 1 5 1
Bai, Heeson , 1 1 9
Bourke,Joanna, 1 58
Bailey, James Wood, 84
Bowden, Peta, 1 62 , 1 64
Bainton, Roland, 132
Brameld, Theodore, 76, 79
Ballantyne, Edith, 5
Brenes, Abelardo, 1 56
Balthasar, Hans Urs von, 1 56
Bren kert, George, 7 1
Bantock, Geoffrey, 132
Brock, Rita,
Barker, P h i l , 1 74
Brock-Utne, Birgit, 1 , 49
49
Baron-Co h e n , Simon, 1 73
Brown, Dale, 27
Barrow, Robin, 1 6 1
Brown, Lyn, 1 59
Peace Education: ExploringEthical and Philosophical Foundations, pages 217-221

Copyrigh t
2008 by Information Age
Publishing
21 7
218
Name Index
Bubeck, D i emer, 163, 1 7 3

B u e n o d e Mesquita, Bruce, 1 0 3
Bultman n, Rudolf, 2 0
Hart, David Bentley, 1 56
Esau, 1 72
Burns, Robi n , 1
Falk, Richard, 1 07
Card, Claudia, 172

Carnegie, Kashonia, 1 75
Carr, D avid, 2 4
Ford, Maureen, 1 62
Hicks, David, 1
Hobbes, Thomas, 39, 66--6 7, 97,
1 34--136, 140, 1 74
Hooker, Richard, 23-24, 5 3-55
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 2 0
Counts, George Sylvester, 76, 78-79
Galtung,johan, l-2, 7 , 9- 1 1 , 1 4- 1 5 ,
Cox, Carol ine, 1 1 2
Howlett, Charles, 43
Cosgrove, D e n is, 1 20
Hume, David, 40, 66--6 7, 97, 1 34-- 1 36,
1 40 , 1 74
Hursthouse, Rosalind, 23-24, 53-55
1 7-1 8 , 65, 1 1 4- 1 1 5, 1 55, 1 8 1
1 89
D
Dave n p o rt, Manne!, 1 52
Davio n , Victoria, 1 78
Davis, Grady Scott, 58-59
Dewey, Joh n , 2 1 , 25, 43-44, 76-- 7 8, 1 0 1 ,
1 49- 1 5 1 , 192
Gautama Buddha, 1 25
Gier, Nicholas, 83
Glaucon, 1 22
Gordon, Haim, 1
Gray, John Glenn, 58, 1 33
D igby, To m, 1 72
D i l le r, A n n, 1 62, 172
Green, Joel, 1 66
Greene, Maxine, 1 55
Diot.oma, 1 2 3
Grob, Leona,-d, 1
Dowrick, Stephanie, 54
Groenhont, Ruth, 1 74
D1-1wel l , Marcus, 1 19
Grossman, Dave/David, 1 1 0
Duval, Gerard, 168
Guatarna
DuVal l , Jack, 84, 1 07
Gnrr, Ted, 1 1 3
( see Buddha)
Gnr-Ze'ev, Ilan , 1 8
E
Easlea, Brian, 1 54
Eato n , Marcia, 1 1 9
Ecco, Urnberto, 1 29
Eisler, Riane, 180
Eliade, M i rcea, 1 72
Elsh tai n , Jean Bethke, 58
Engels, Friedrich, 71-72, 194
Hamington, Maurice, 162

Hare, Richard Mervyn, 73-76
Harff, Barbara, 1 1 3
Harich, Wolfgang, 43
Lin, Susanne, 1
Lisman, David, 1 6 3
Loewy, Erich, 1 63-164
Luther, Martin , 35
Manning, Rita, 1 62 , 164
Jabri, Vivienne, 1 2 1
Jacob, 1 72
Jagga r, Alison, 1 6 1 , 1 64 , 1 75
Jesus of Nazareth, 27-28, 46, 48-49,
Marks, Stephen, 1 5
Marshall, Samuel, 1 1 0
Marx, Karl, 7 1 -7 2
Mason, Andrew, 1 64
McCarthy, Col ma n , 64
McLaren, Margaret, 1 74
Mendus, Susa n , 1 6 3
56--5 7, 94--95, 1 26, 1 4 7 , 1 49 , 1 5 1 ,
Meyet Michae l, 5 5
156, 1 66
Milbank, Joh n , 57, 155-156

Milburn, Geoffrey, 1 6 1
K
Kan t , Immanuel, 1 8, 24, 3 8 , 40-43, 8 1 ,
1 19 , 1 22 , 1 39- 1 47 , 1 59 , 1 9 3
Katzenste i n , Mary, 1 6 1
Kavel i n-Popov, Linda, 54
Hakvoort, lise, 173
Leve rkii h n , Andre, 1 1 9

Levinas, Emmanuel, 1 7 1- 1 72
Macy, joanna, 1 24
Isaac, 1 23, 1 48
Kaufmann, V\'alter, 1 70
Haavelsrnd, Magnus, 1-2
Lederach,john Paul, 155
Macintyre, Alasdair, 30, 5 1-52
Gilligan, Carol, 1 59 , 1 6 1 , 1 78
Giroux, Henry, 80-81
Lasley, Thomas, 1
Hutchinson, Frank/Francis, 1
44-45, 49, 83, 1 02, 1 1 5, 1 62 , 183,
Curle, Adam, 83
Laitin, David, 1 6 1
Lalman, David, 1 03
Hutcheson, Francis 65-66, 1 34
Gand h i , Mohandas/Mahatma, 2 7 ,
Craig, Leon , 92
Lawler, Peter, 1 1
Hill, Felicity, 5
F1e ire, Paulo, 80-8 1 , 1 79
Cooper, Joh n , 30
Ku nkel, Jose p h , 1 78-179
Held, Virgi nia, 1 6 1 , 1 64
Foucault, Michel, 1 2 1
C h risti, Renata, 1 0 1
Kuhse, Helga, 1 6 1 , 163-1 64, 1 72
Heidegger, Martin, 20, 1 70-1 7 1 , 1 93
Forcey, Linda, 1
Frichtl, Josef, 1 19
Casey, Joh n , 4 1
Hartmann, Nicolai, 42-43, 50
99-1 0 1 , 1 05-106
Friedman, Marilyn, 1 64, 1 73
Carson, Terrance, 1
Kroeger-Mappes,Joy, 1 64
Kiibler-Ross, Elisabeth, 144
Hege l , Georg Wilhelm Friedri c h ,
Foot, Phi lippa, 23
Calkja, Joac h i m James, 1 8
Kotva, Jose p h , 2 7
Hauerwas, Stanley, 27, 56--5 7

Heath, Carly, 1 68
Fletcher, joseph, 1 75
Cabezudo, Alicia, 1
Haring, Bernad, 156

Harris, Ian, 1-2
1 30-133, 153, 1 5 7
Burke, Edmund, 98-1 00, 1 05
Erasmus, Disiderius, 36-- 3 7, I 08,
Keega n , jo h n , 86
Kierkegaard, S0ren, 1 47-149, 1 69
King, Martin Lmher, 49, 83, 1 89
M i i i , James, 7 0
M i i i , John Stuart, 69-7 1
Milton, Andrew, 1 03
Mitchell, Edgar, 1 20 ,
Montessori, Maria, 1 55
Morphis, Maxi n e , 1 80
Morris, Susan, 1 6 1
Morrison, Mary, 1
Matt, Tracey, 1 1 4
Kirk, Russel l , 109-1 1 0
Koe h n , Daryl, 1 64, 1 78

Kohlberg, Lawre nce, 2 5 , 1 59
Nelson, Hilde, 1 63
219
220
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 50, 1 2 1 , 1 69-170

Noddings, Nel, 1 59- 1 6 1 , 163-164, 1 69 ,
1 7 1 , 1 74, 1 778
Nussbaum, Martha, 1 9 , 24, 1 70

0
O'Neil, Patrick, 103

O'Reilly, Mary, 1
Oakeshott, M i chael, 89, 1 0 1- 1 05
Oliner, Pearl, 1 82
Oliner, Samuel, 182
Oilman, Bertell, 1 8
Oppenheimer, Louis, l , 1 73
p
Paine, Tom, 98
Parker, Rebecca, 49
Paul ofTarsus, (Saint) , 27, 1 27 , 1 5 1
Pepper-Smith, Katherine, 1 62
Peters, Richard Stanley, 1 4, 8 1-82, 1 0 1 ,
1 54
Plato, 28, 30, 9 1 -93, 1 22-123, 1 28, 166,

1 74, 1 9 4
Popper, Karl, 1 0 1
Porter, Elisabeth, 1 64, 1 72
Portrnan, John, 1 37
Power, Kim, 1 27
Prakash, Maldhu, 1 74
Q
Quinton, Anthony, 89, 1 05-108
R
Raatma, Lucia, 1 74
Raviv, Am iran, 1
Rawls, John, 55
Read, Herbert, 1 64
Reardon, Betty, 1 , 6
Remarque, Erich Maria, 1 68
Rice, Suzanne, 2 4
Rickard, Maurice, 1 6 4
Ricoeur, Paul, 1 7 1 - 1 72, 1 9 4
Ridley, Matthew, 55-56
Riesbeck, Christopher, 180
Ritter, Joachim, 100

Roche, Douglas, 6
Roochnik, David, 1 23
Rorty, Richard, 25, 78, 1 2 1
RoserHhal, Michael, 3 8
Ruddick, Sara, 1 76-178
Rummel, Rudolph, 1 1 2-1 1 4
s
Said, Edward, 1 30
Salvoldi, Valentino, 1 56
Scarry, Elaine, 80, 153- 1 54
Schaff, Adam, 7 1
Scheffler, Samuel, 6 1
Schmidt, Alfred, 7 1
Schweitzer, Albert, 1 26, 1 5 1-153
Scruton, Roger, 89-90, 1 1 1- 1 1 2 , 1 19
See!, Martin, 1 1 9
Shapiro, Sherry, ! 56
Sharp, Gene, 84
Shils, Edward, 55
Shusterman, Richard, 1 20- 1 2 1 , 1 5 1
.
Sidgwick, Henry, 174
Sikka, Sonia, 155
Singer, Brent, 28
Singer, Peter, 1 20, 1 64
Sklair, Leslie, 1 20
Slote, Michael, 23, 1 74
Smeyers, Paul, 1 62
Smith, Adam, 1 30, 1 36- 1 39
Smith , David, 1
Smaith, Stephen, 1 0 1
Smith, Tara, 1 64
Socrates, 28-29, 92-93, 1 22-123, 1 74
Spinoza, Benedictus de, 37-40
Steutel,Jan, 24
Strike, Kenneth, 174
Superson, Anita, 1 64
Synott,John, 2
T
Teehan, John, 24
Thomas Aquinas, (Saint) , 29, 34-36,
5 1 , 1 29-120, 1 67
Tong, Rosemarie, 1 64, 1 74
Name Index
Townsend, Dabney, 1 35
Tront.o , Joan, 1 77
Tufts, James, 149
v
Van Huyssteen,Jan Wentzel, 1 9

Vandenberg, Donald, 1 64, 1 72
Vayrynen, Tarja, 1 8 1
w
Waithe, Mar-y Ellen, 165

Walzer, Michael, 58
Watkins, Mary, 155
Watson,Jean, 1 66
'Neber, Thomas, 1 0
Wei! , Pierre, 15()
Welch, David, 1 8 1
v\'elchrnann,Jenn i fer, 25
v'l'etzel, James, 57
Vl'illiams, Bernard, 57-58, 85-86
Vl'i Is, Jean-Pierre, 1 1 9
Vl'ittgenstein, Ludwig, 1 5 3
y
Yoder, John Howard , 2 7
221
SUBJECT I N DEX
A
Aesthetic judgments, 1 19, 154

Aesthetic politics, 154
Aesthetic ethics, xvi, 23, 24, 1 1 9- 1 58,
185, 1 89
Affirmat.ion, 1 5 2
Agent-centred ethics, 2 6 , 8 3
Aggression, 25, 3 2 , 1 3 1 , 1 33, 1 73, 1 79
Ahimsa, 24, 44, 45, 1 24
Alienation, 24
Alterity, 1 75
Altruism, altruistic, 6, 52, 53, 62, 136,
1 66, 1 76
Andreia, 3 1-34
Aparigraha, 44
Approbation, 66, 67, 1 35-138
Aretic, aretaics (see virtue ethics)
Art of l iving, 1 5 6
Art, artistic, 93, 1 1 2, 132-135, 1 49-152,
! 56
Assertiveness, 4, 32, 49, 54, 76, 1 1 5 , 1 2 6
Atheism, atheist, 37
Attributes of Allah, 131
Authentic being, 1 70
Autonomous will, 1 4 1 , 142
Autonomy, 14, 59, 8 1 , 82, 1 39, 1 4 1 ,
146, 1 79
B
Bag of virtues, 25
Basic education, 45
Beautiful names of Allah, 131
Beautiful people, 121
Beauty, xvii, 54, 65, 95, 1 1 9-158, 185
Beauty of war, !53
Beneficence, 26, 136, 1 4 1 , 167, 1 68
Benevolence, 26, 136, 1 4 1 , 167, 1 68
Blue Earth, 1 20
Brahmacharya, 44, 45
Buddhism, Buddhist, 26, 1 24, 1 25, 1 66
c
Cardinal virtues, 43, 1 66, 174

Care, xvi, 22, 159-185, 1 89
Care ethics (see ethics of care)
Caring, 157, 160-165, 1 69-1 7 1 ,
1 73-182, 189
Caring citizen, 162
Caritas, carative, 26, 34-36, 1 66-168
Categorical imperative, 42, 1 4 1 , 1 46
Celebrity, celebrities, 1 2 1
Change, social ch ange, xvi, xix, 7 , 28,
79, 89, 91, 94, 98, 106-109, I l l ,
1 1 4-1 1 7, 189
Character, 23-59
Character trait, 24, 40, 53, 55
Character utilitarianism, 24, 26
Charity ( see caritas)
Chivalry, 37
Christianity, Christian, 27, 34, 36, 39,
46, 48, 50, 56, 57, 94, 95, 1 20,
Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations, pages 223-230
Copyright 2008 by Information Age Publish ing

223
224

1 23, 126-133, 1 47, 1 49 , 1 55, 156,
1 66, 1 69 , 1 75 , 192
Christology, C hristological, 27, 1 26,

1 56
Culture of peace, 3-8, 1 5, 1 6, 30, 86,
Duty, xvi, 1 8 , 23, 2 4 , 33, 41-47, 50, 69,
96, 99, 1 05 , 1 1 5 , 1 1 6, 1 56, 157,
7 1 , 1 1 9, 1 20 , 1 24, 135, 1 4 1 - 1 49,
1 60, 1 80, 1 88
1 57, 1 58 , 1 72, 1 78, 1 8 1 , 1 87
Curriculu m , 1 4, 15, 76, 87, 154, 160
Civic efficiency, 7 7 , 1 5 0
Curr i c u l u m overload, 15
Civic vi rtue, 2 5 , 2 9 , 5 8
Custom , 94, 98, 105-109, 1 30, 138, 1 39
Civil courage, 47, 48

Civil rights move m e n t, 44
Civil society, 95, 99, 1 07

Civil war, 95, 96, 1 79
Death denial, 1 44
Civil i ty, 25, 55, 1 32
Declaration and Programme of Action

on a C u l ture of Peace, 7, 30, 1 1 5
Class struggle, 72
Declaration of the Right of Peoples to
Classless society, 72
Peace, 6
Classroom, 8 1 , 155, 1 82 , 1 89
Co-existence, 8 3
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 3
Common good, common social good,
D e fi c i e n cy, 20-32, 1 28
44, 52, 55, 8 1 , 1 67
D e fi n i n g peace, 1 0 , 1 1 , 180
Common inte rest, 56, 67, 1 1 6 , l l 7
Dehuman ization, 168, 183
Compassion, 4 5 , 54, 1 36, 1 38, 1 6 1 - 166,
Demerit, 1 3 7
1 70, 1 83
Conation, 37
Conduct, 25, 44, 58, 67-71 , 1 25 , 149
Confucianism, Confu c ian, 26, 1 66
1 49
Consequential is!. eth i cs, xvi, 22, 40,
50-53, 6 1-87, 1 34, 1 4 1 , 1 78, 185,

1 89
Conservative canons, 1 09
Conse rvative dispos i ti o n , 103-105, 1 1 7
Conservative peace, 9 1 , 103, 1 1 4
Conse rvative poli tical ethics, xvi, 22,
89- l l 7, 1 34, 1 85 , 1 89
Conservative p-i nciples, 94, 1 03, 109
Con t i n u i ty, 89, 9 1 , 94, 1 00-104,
109-1 1 2 , 1 1 6, 1 5 1
Coun ter-i nclin ational action, 1 1 9
Courage, 26, 28, 3 1 -3 7 , 42, 47, 48
Critical l i teracy, 80, 8 7
Critical pedagogy, 80, 8 1 , 87
Critical real ism, critical realist, xvi,
1 86-- 190
Fascism, 45-48, 74-76, 157, 1 7 1 , 172
Earth C h arter, 1 5 7
Fel i c i fi c calculus, 67, 72
Earthly c i ty, 1 29
Female, 1 73, 1 76-- 1 80
Earth rise, 1 20
Education for i n ternational understanding, 2
Egoism, 55, 62, 96, 1 36, 170
Embodied care, 1 62
Emotion, 33, 37, 4 1 , 76, 108, 1 37 , 1 39,
1 43, 1 47, 1 6 1 , 1 74
Empiricism, e m p i rical, 1 3, 18, 63, 93,
97, 1 00, 1 0 1 , 1 04, 1 35, 1 73
Enabling virtue, 83
Enemy, e n emies, 34, 36, 4 1 , 42, 5 1 , 92,
.
1 1 0, 1 38 , 1 4 1 , 1 68, 1 78, 1 79 , 1 8 3
Democracy, democratic, 4, 38-40, 43,
Enkratic/a rkratic problem, 32, 33
63, 77-79, 82, 93, 1 1 0, 1 1 3, 150
Epideictic, 1 7
Deontological ethics, 24, 33, 43, 1 0 ,
Epistemology, e pistemological, 1 69,
Desire, 2, 33, 37, 39, 52, 75, 86, 1 1 0,
171
Eschatol ogy, eschatological, 53, 63, 188
1 67. 1 78
Eternal recurrence, 1 2 1
Development education, 2
Dialectical, xvi, 1 8, 1 9 , 1 72, 186
Dialectical researc h , xvi,. 1 3 , 18, 1 9 , 1 86
Dialogical education, 1 79
Dialogue, 20, 28, 97, 1 56, 1 78, 1 79
D i lemma, 58, 85, 1 59 , 162
D i l e m m a of violence, 58
D i rect peace, 10, 35, 72
D i rect violence, 2, 9-1 1 , 1 6, 59, 65
Disarmament, 4, 5, 79, 1 52
Discourse, 1 2 , 1 7 , 19, 28, 42, 63, 69, 7 1 ,
76, 80, 99, 108, 1 1 9, 120, 1 30,
1 74, 1 75 , 1 85, 187, 192
Disposition, 30-39, 44-49, 53-58,
1 0 1 - 1 0 5 , 1 1 7, 140, 1 48, 1 89
1 76, 1 77, 1 83
Ferocity, 1 30
Fideism, fideistic, 1 7, 1 8 , 35
Forcible overthrow, 72
Forgiveness, 46, 54, 1 3 1
Four Noble Truths, 1 25
Friends, 34, 86, 92, 1 32 , 1 73
Friendsh i p , 3, 4, 29, 1 32, 1 33, 1 36, 1 62 ,
1 74
Futnres educati o n , 2
Gender, 4, 72, 173, 1 80, 1 8 7

General theory of educatio n , 2 1
Genocide, 1 1 3, 1 14
Ethical caring, 1 60
Gifts of the Spirit, 27
Ethical fanaticism, 47
Ethics of care, xvi, 22, 1 59-185, 1 89
Eudemonia, 30, 33, 53
Global democratic society, 79

Globalization, 1 07, 1 20
(;ood, 23, 26, 30, 35, 36, 44, 46, 5 1-58 ,
Eunoia, 1 74
62, 66, 69, 7 1 , 8 1 -86, 92,
Euteleia, 1 22
Everyday relationsh i p , 1 70
Everydayness, 1 02, 1 70
Evil, 36, 46, 48, 1 27-130, 1 37, 1 42 , 1 70
Excellence of c h aracter
Galtungian paradigm of peace, 1 1 , 6 5 ,

1 14
Equality, 4, 7 , 1 1 4
1 1 1 , 1 2 1 - 1 30, 1 4 1 , 1 43, 150, 1 65,
Deterrence theory, 1 03, 104
177, 180
Fem i n ism, femi n ist, 49, 1 6 1 , 165, 1 7 2 ,
E n l ighte n me n t, 24, 57, 89, 97, 1 25, 1 46
Demysti fi cation, demystify, 80, 86, 1 85

1 60 , 1 69 , 1 78, 1 87, 1 88
Fem i n i n e , fem i n i n i ty, 160, 1 72, 1 73,
Frater n ization, 1 68
Encou n t e r, 2, 1 68, 1 72
E ngrossmen t, 1 60, 1 64
Cruelty, 39, 1 30
C u l tmal violence, 1 1 , 59, 65
Faith, 3, 34, 35, 42, 96, 1 20 , 125, 133,

Fanaticism, 47, 73, 75
Democide , 85, 1 1 3, 1 1 4
Critical t h i nking, 73-76

Cultural peace, 7, 1 0 , 1 1 , 1 46
225
1 43 , 149, 151, 155, 1 66
Cupiditas, 34
City, 34, 50, 92, 93, 1 2 2 , 1 2 7
Conscience, 47, 69-7 1 , 80, 125,
Subject Index
(see moral
virtue)
1 4 1- 1 43
Goodwill, 42, 1 74
Grounded utopianism, 107
Guardian-e l i te, 1 23
Guest's Privilege, 57, 58, 85, 86
Excess, 30-32, 53
Existential chal lenge of war, 144

Existential ism, existentialist, 20, 1 44,
1 47, 1 69
Expected u ti l i ty t heory of war, 1 03
Exploitation , 83
Habit, 7 1 , 93, 97, 1 30, 1 35, 1 5 1 , 1 80

Habituation, 1 37, 1 38
Happiness, 29, 30, 65-69, 72, 74, 84,
151
226
26-28, 35, 36, 54, 1 30,

146, 156
Integrated peace, 7, 1 1 , 1 6, 30, 59, 72,
96, 1 35, 156, 157, 1 62, 1 88, 1 89
In tegrative power, 1 1 5
Integrity, 1 2 , 24-26, 48, 57-59, 85, 1 24,
157
Intellectual conservatism , 89-93, 98,
1 0 1 , 109-1 1 2, 1 1 6
Intellectual virtue, 29-33
Intelligence, 44, 54, 1 33, 1 50, 1 5 3
Intelligent sympathy, 1 5 0
9, 26, 28, 35,

38, 44, 53-55, 64, 82, 92, 1 05,
1 1 0- 1 1 2 , 1 20, 1 27-130, 154, 1 56,
158, 1 60 , 1 65, 180, 1 82
Healing, 1 65, 1 8 1
Heavenly city, 1 29
Hermeneutics, hermeneutical, xvi, 20,
29
Hesed, 1 66
Hexis, 30-33, 45, 48, 49, 53, 57-59, 189
H i msa, 45
Hope, 53, 64, 1 07, 1 26, 153, 1 66
Horror vacui, 1 20
Inner peace,
Human flourishing (see eudomonia)
4, 7
International law, 2-7, 66, 68, 70, 7 1 ,
1 05
International morality, 7 1
International peace, 1 06, 1 07, 1 1 6,
1 1 8, 136, 1 37
International relations, 1 2, 68, 80, 1 06,
1 2 1 , 145
Interpretation, 1 28, 1 30, 1 36, 170, 1 73,
1 87
Intimates, 163, 1 64, 1 75
Interpersonal, 2, 1 0, 1 67, 1 89
Intrapersonal, 2, 10, 2 1 , 44, 1 89
Islam, Islamic, 26, 130, 1 3 1
Islamic greeting, 1 3 1
H armony, harmonious,
Human rights,
2-4, 6, 8, 99, 104, 1 1 5

36, 37, 1 08, 1 3 1 ,
Humanism, h u m anist,
1 66
39, 54, 69, 90-93, 97-1 1 2 , 1 2 3 ,

1 29, 1 32, 1 50, 1 5 3 , 1 66, 1 74
Idealist, idealism, 1 2 , 93, 1 00
Ideology, 3 1 , 90, 104, 1 1 4
Imagination, imaginative, 63, 1 1 6, 1 22,
1 36, 1 5 0- 1 55, 174, 1 8 1
Imagined community, 1 8 1
Ideal
Imaging peace (see imagining peace)

Imagining peace,
Irnmobilisrn,
63, 155
International Decade for a Culture o f

Peace and Non-violence,
1 06
137, 1 38
Imperialism, 2 1 , 28, 78, 1 1 0
Impulse, 44, 52, 132
Inclination, 4 1 , 42, 52, 1 1 9 , 139- 1 45 ,
1 63
Inclusive peace education, 2
Impartial spectator,
Indifferent spectator
(see impartial
spectator)
Inequali ty,
2, 90
1 2- 1 7 , 96,
108, 1 47
Infanticide, 1 38, 1 39
Init.iatio n , 82 , 1 54
I njustice, 2, 1 0 , 1 4, 15, 49, 62, 64, 68,
70-72, 86, 87, 92, 98, 1 33) 1 5 8,
1 8 1 , 1 83, 1 89
In ner harmony, 35
Inevitability of violence, xvii ,
Judaism,Judaic,
1 48, 166
1 44-146
82
Jus i n bellum, 82
Jus ad bellum,
Just war, just war theory,
50, 94, 1 07,
1 3 1 , 1 69
3, 1 0, 1 1 , 14, 25, 28, 30, 3 1 , 35,
42, 54, 66, 71, 73, 77, 79, 83, 92,
1 09, I l l , 1 1 6, 1 24, 1 34-139, 1 32,
153, 156, 1 59, 1 6 1 - 1 64, 1 69, 1 74,
1 75
Justice,
K
Kallipolis,
122
Kalon
(see beauty)
1 66
Kindness, 54, 1 25, 1 36, 1 59, 1 65-1 67,
1 75
Kindness movement, 5 4
Knowledge, 7 1 , 93, 1 02, 1 04, 1 15 , 134,
1 43, 1 5 6
Karnna,
20, 52, 54, 73, 76, 80, 83, 98,

1 05, 1 1 5 , 1 22, 1 32 , 137, 1 5 3, 169,
192
Language of war, 52
Liberal, liberalism, 43, 55, 69, 70, 78,
101, 113
Liberationism, 80, 1 1 4, 1 25
Libertarian, 1 1 3
Love, 15, 1 6, 26, 27, 34-38, 4 1 , 54, 69,
83, 109, 1 1 5, 1 23, 1 33, 1 4 1 , 1 42,
1 45-149, 1 6 1 , 1 65, 1 68, 1 7 1 , 175,
1 89, 192
Language,
Mortality,
M
73, 1 76-180
Marxism, 71, 7 1
Male,
1 73
35, 38, 53, 1 66
Matern al, 1 72, 1 76-178
Mascu line, mascul inity,
Master vi rtue,
(see meson)
181
1 37
Meson, 30-34
Militarism, 56, 58, 83, 9 1 , l l 0, 1 1 6, 152,
1 76, 177
Military virtue, 3 1-32, 36
Misappmbation, 137
Moderation, 4 1 , 54, 93
Moral beauty, 1 23, 1 35, 1 36
Moral development, 25
Moral law, 143, 146, 1 58, 1 65
Moral persuasion, 3
Moral sense, 56, 1 34
Moral virtue, 29-34
Morality, 41-44, 50-53, 57, 6 1 -63,
66-7 1 , 74, 100, 1 2 1 , 1 34 , 1 3 5
Medical analogy,
Merit,
227
1 14
Mysticism, mystical,
Narcissism,
121
Nationalism,
40, 1 5 1 , 1 52
56, 78, 90, 108, 1 1 0, 1 5 3 ,
181
7 , 8, 1 0 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 73, 96,
1 0 1 , 1 0 1 , 1 06, 1 80, 183
Natural caring, 1 60
Natural law, 1 65
Nation-state,
37-40, 56, 96,

1 20, 1 32 , 1 49, 150, 1 65, 1 69
Naturalism, naturalistic,
39, 53, 66, 97, 99-1 0 1 ,

108-1 10, 1 20, 136-145, 1 5 1-1 5 4 ,
1 57, 1 60, 1 6 1 , 1 74, 179- 1 8 1
Nature, natural,
1 0, l l
75, 1 78
Negative peace,
Negotiation,
New age thought,
24, 54
Non-dialectical 1esearch,
Non-discrim i nation,
Mean
50, 1 23, 1 24, 130, 1 3 1 ,
Judicial-legal peace,
Subject Index
18
Non-inclinational morality,
41
2,
4, 7, 27, 44-50, 55-59, 64, 75, 76,
82-84, 94, 1 04, 107, 108,
1 24-126, 1 39, 155, 160, 1 68, 1 80,
1 89
Normativi ty, normative, 9, 12, 1 3 , 19,
71, 77, 82, 87, 90, 92, 1 1 4, 1 19,
181
Normosis, 156
Nonviolence, nonviolent resistance,
Nuclear war,
31, 50, 83, 79, 103, 1 06

0
37, 46, 47, 69, 96, 1 23, 1 24,

1 42, 1 43
O n tology of beauty, 57, 1 55, 1 62, 170,
171
Obedience,
Optimism, optimistic,
48, 132, 1 77
1 00, 1 05-108, 1 1 4, 143

Otherness, 172
Organicism,
Outlawing war,
1 72
Ove rdeman dingness,
84
228
Pacifism, pacifist, 32, 39, 74-76, 92, 1 07

pancalism, pancalist, 1 29
Pantheism, pantheist, 40
Paradigm of power, 1 1 5
Paradox of consequentialism, 84, 85
Paradox of virtue, 38, 58
Parental, 95, 176
Parenting, 1 76, 182
Particularism, particularistic, 27; 34,
46, 56, 57, 167, 1 75
Partnership, 1 80
Passion, 39, 52, 53, 78, 97, 1 09 , 1 24,
1 27, 1 3 1-138, 156, 1 60 , 1 6 1 , 1 86
Passivity, 1 1 , 32, 75, 8 1
Pathological love, 1 4 1 , 143
Patriotism (see nationalism)

Peace as a human right, 4, 6
Peace movement, 5, 45, 47, 1 2 1 , 1 24,
Postmodernism, postmodern, 12, 57,

1 2 1 , 1 75
Practical wisdom, 32, 33

Pragmatism, pragmatist, 2 1 , 25, 43, 78,
1 49, 150
Preaching peace, xvii, 16

Precedence effect, 85
Preference fulfillment, 73
Prudence, 30, 33, 4 1 , 106, 109, 1 1 0
Prejudice, 20
Presuppositionless exegesis, 20
Pre-understanding, 20
Privation, 12, 64, 80, 142
Privative theory of evil, 1 28
Proportionality, 82, 83
Proximity, proximates, 145, 1 63, 1 64,
1 75, 1 83
Public peace, 38
R
177
Peace plans, 9, 4 1 , 97
Peaceful society, 9, 39, 52-55, 77-8 1 ,
92, 1 3 1 , 150, 1 5 1
Peaceful world, 6 1 , 64, 82, 1 1 3, 1 55 ,
1 73, 1 7 6 , 1 8 1 , 1 87
Peacefulness, xvi, 43, 54, 55, 1 77, 1 78,
1 85
Peacelessness, 72, 95
Pedagogy, 8 1 , 87, 1 82
Perpetual peace, 9, 4 1 , 68, 1 0 1 ,
1 45-147
Personality, 26, 43
Pflichtsbegriff, 145
Philia, 3 1 , 147
Phronesis (see practical wisdom )

Pity, 1 36, 1 70
Political correctness, politically correct,
XV,
187, 188
Political education, 70, 104

Politicide, 1 1 3
Popular conservatism, 90
Popular culture, 24, 54, 83, 84, 1 20 ,
1 2 1 , 1 73, 1 74
Positive peace, 9-1 1

Postfoundationalism, postfounda
tional, 19, 186, 1 88
Racism, 83
Radical change, 89-1 17
Rational will, 142, 1 44
Rationalism, rationalist.ic, 1 1 , 2 1 , 35,
37, 39, 5 1 , 90, 97, 1 0 1 , 1 02,
1 40-142, 1 08, 147, 1 5 1 , 1 52
Rationality, 24, 37, 85, 97, 134, 146,
1 54, 1 74
Reasonableness, 47, 55
Relational ontology, 162
Relationship, 82, 1 32 , 154, 159-162,
1 66, 1 69-184, 1 89
Relativism, relativistic, xvi, 25, 5 1 , 1 1 4,

1 63, 1 87
Ren, 1 66
Renaissance, 36, 1 3 1 , 1 32
Repersonalization of morality, 121

Resentiment, 1 70
Resurrection, 27, 2 8 , 94, 126, !56
Resurrection virtue, 27
Reverence for life, 152, 153
Revolution, 72, 79, 83, 89, 98- 1 0 1 , 1 1 2,
1 14
Right to development, 4, 6
Rock music, 1 20, 1 2 1
Subject Index
Rules, 62, 70-73, 92, 132, 142, 159-1 67,
1 75
s
Sacrifice, 27, 47, 58, 123, 148, 156

Sacrifice trap, 58
Salvation, 27, 94, 96, 1 56
Sanction, 67-70, 1 58
Satyagraha, 44
Savagery, 1 30
Schadenfreude, 1 37,
Science, sciences, 3, 1 2, 1 9, 21: 29, 48,
99, 1 14, 1 34, 1 35, 1 40, 154, 1 66,
181
Selfhood, 1 7 2
Selfishness, selfish, 7 1 , 1 36, 1 75, 183

Sensitization, 1 5 6
Sermon on the Mount, 4 6
Settled disposition (see hexis)
Settled state ( see hex is)
Sex, 1 6, 127, 1 7 6
Shalomic peace, 1 2 4
Skepticism, 9 7 , 1 05-1 09, 1 1 2, 1 34, 1 5 1
Situation ethics, 1 75 , 176
Social justice, 1, 4, 77, 135, 163, 1 68
Social order, 1 5 , 45, 72, 78, 79, 9 1 ,
106- 1 17, 1 5 5
Social peace, 1 06, 1 07
Social reconstructionism, 76-82, 89

Social virtues, 66, 1 34, 1 35
Socialism, 78, 1 1 2 , 1 1 4
Soft law, 3
Soteriology, soteriological (seesalvat.ion)
Spiritual maturity/immaturity, 190
Spritual training, 45
Statocracy, statocratic, 7, 1 45
Status of peace education, 1 - 1 7
Status quo, 1 6, 1 8, 2 8 , 64, 7 2 , 8 0 , 8 1 ,
90, 95, 1 1 4, 1 1 6
Strangers, 1 63, 1 67, 1 78

Structural peace, 7, 35
Structural violence, 2 , 9-1 3 , 16, 50, 59,
63, 72, 1 1 4, 1 1 6
Sublime, 1 39-144
229
Suffering, 48, 49, 63, 68, 70, 7 1 , 9 8 , 9 9 ,

1 25, 133, 135, 137, 1 42, 147, 1 49 ,
155, 1 60, 1 6 1 66, 1 5 1 , 1 53
Surplus value, 72
Sustain table development, 4
Sympathy, 40, 48, 68, 1 1 9 , 132, 1 36,
1 37, 150, 174
T
Taste, 66, 1 22, 130, 135, 1 39-144

Teacher education, 6, 8
Teachers, 6, 8, 29, 78, 8 1 , 1 60, 1 79, 1 8 2
Teaching encounter, 2 , 1 72
Teaching peace, 8, 19, 64, 78, 87, 1 77
Telos, 30, 53
Theological virtues, 34, 166
Timocracy, timocratic, 123
Toleration, tolerance, 3, 4, 6, 38, 39,
54, 55, 72, 8 1 , 108, 1 38, 156
Traditionalism, 105-107
Transcendence, 1 09, 123, 1 24, 140,
153, 155, 186, 187
Transformational education, 80
Transformative intellectual, 81
Trust, xvi, 42, 54-56, 104, 1 66,
1 77- 1 80, 1 85
Truth, 23, 3 1 , 42, 44-48, 92, 108, 1 25,

1 29 , 1 56, 1 62, 169
Two-level utilitarianism, 73-76

u
U nderdemandingness, 84
UNESCO, xix, 3-8, 108, 1 1 0, 129
UNGA, 3, 6, 7, 30, 45, 1 1 5, 1 88
U NICEF, 4, 1 1 4
U nited Nations Charter, xix, 2, 3
U n ited Nations Disarmament Programme, 5
U n i ty of virtues, 29, 30
Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 3, 99
U niversal good, 85
U niversal law, 42, 1 4 1
Universalism, u niversalist, 35, 57, 97,
1 35
230
Utilitarian educator,
Uti litarian ethics
eth ics)
Utility,
66-68, 70, 83, 1 03 , 1 39
1 2 , 24, 65, 79, 85,

1 03, 1 06, 1 07, 109, 155
Utopia, mopian/ism,
Value-free education,
Vernunftidee,
Vice, vices,
33, 58, 72, 133, 189

95, 1 7 1 , 1 74
\Vise u t i l i tarian educator, 74
War, warfare,
Wisdom,
vVorld Congress on Disarmament Education,
4, 5
World Disarmament Campaign,

World household,
155
1 45
32, 34, 66, 1 35
Vienna Declaration and Programme of

Action,
74
( see consequential ist
Worldly Ch ristian ity,

Worthwh i l e activities
ABOUT TH E A UTHOR
48
1 3 , 38, 44, 54, 82,
1 54
V\'oundedness,
181
6, 22, 23-59, 65, 66,

83, 85, 92, 96, 109, 1 34-137, 145,
1 6 1 , 1 66, 1 67, 1 74, 1 75 , 185, 1 89
Vision, visioni ng, 1 2 , 46, 93, 94, 97,
106, 1 22, 1 24, 1 26, 1 28, 129, 13
149, 1 50, 155-157
Volition, 1 4 1 , 1 44
83
Vi rtue ethics, xvi,
Yahwism, Yahweh,
123, 124, 126, 1 48,
Dr. James Page holds a PhD in peace education with Southern Cross U ni
versity, and has taught extensively in a range of settings in both Australia
and internationally. He is currently the Australian co-ordinator for an
international research project examining social attitudes to peace and wat
1 66
Zakat,
1 66
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IJNIVERSIDAD PEDAGO.

Southern Cross University, Australia

INFORMATION AGE PUBLISHING, INC.

We are weak t da in ideal matters because intelligence

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Page,James Smith (195:1- ).

-John Dewey (1934,

1. Peace-Smdy and teaching-Moral and ethica l aspects. 2. Virtue ethics.

UHlVf'RS-IDAD PEDAGOGiCA N)'lo.CIONAt

G>,i'i)--- DON---- i111i ti"';..... -I'I".OO -J

Copyright 2008 Information Age Publishing In c .

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproducedJstored in a

The Cur re n t Status of P eace Educati on

The Problem of Peace Education

Curren t. Literature a n d Development.

The P.-ohlernat.ic Nature o f Peace Education .

Research M et hods and Assumpt ions

2.2. 1 Religion, Virtue Ethics, and Peace Education

ClassicalV irtue Ethics and P eace Educati on .

The Revival ofVi rt ue Et hi cs

Virtue Ethics and Peace Education

The Nature of the Investigation

Cri ti cal Is sues in P eace Research and Education

2.2.3 Aristotle, Virtue E thics, and Peace Education . . . .

Postclassical Virtue E thics and Peace Education

2 . 4 . 1 Nicolai Hartman n , Vi rtue Ethics, and Peace Education . .

Modern Virtue Ethics and Peace Education II . .

Strengths and vVeaknesses of Virtue Eth ics

Consequential ism Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Modern Consequentialism and Peace Education . . . . . . .

Ric\:lard Hare, Consequentialism, and Peace Education .

4 .2 . 1 Plato, Conservative Politics Ethics, and Peace Education . . . 91

Post-Classical Conservative Political Ethics

and Peace Education

and Peace Education . . .

and Peace Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Modern Conservative Political E thics and Peace Education .

and Peace Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

and Peace Education . . .

The Revival o f Aesthetic Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education .

and Peace Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . .

Classical Conservative Political E thics and Peace Education .

Conservative Political Theory and Ethics .

Michael Oakeshott, Conservative Political Eth i cs

The Revival of Conservative Poli tical Ethics . . . . . . .

and Peace Education . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Consequentialist Ethics and Peace Education .

Strengths and Weaknesses of Conseque n tialism . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4

Conservative Political Ethics and Peace Education. . . . . . . . . . . 89

Reasons for the Revival. .

Classical Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education

Modern Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education

The Emergence of Care Ethics

Origins of Care Ethics . .

The Ethics o f Care and Peace Education

Strengths and weaknesses of Aesthetic Ethics

Critical !sues in Care Ethics and Peace Education

Recapitulation and Reflection .

Kant's Peace Works . . . . .

Kantian Aesthetic Ethics and Peace Education . , . . . . . . .. 1 39

Partnership, Relationshi p , a n d Rights

The Application of Care Ethics to Peace Education .

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .