The effect of disgust propensity upon moral reactions and responses to moral

dilemmas.
Through history, two competing schools of thought have sought to determine the
mechanisms beneath human morality. One tradition contends that our sense of right
and wrong is brought about through logical, deliberative reasoning (Kohlberg, 1987),
while others argue that rapid emotional intuitions are the main contributors to moral
judgement (Haidt, Koller and Dias, 1993). Though these two opposing theories appear
mutually exclusive, there is new evidence that they not only exist together, but also
barely describe the complexity of human moral responses (Monin, Pizarro and Beer,
2007). In this study, we will ascertain how individual variations in a certain emotional
propensity (feelings of disgust) interact with both of these moral judgment processes.
The debate over whether morals arise from calculated reasoning or immediate,
passionate affect has existed since the time of the ancient Greeks (Haidt, 2001).
Within psychological circles, it was initially agreed that morality was produced by
rational thought (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1987). This rule-based system is propelled
by reason: rigorous, logical and stepwise arguments (Lapsley and Hill, 2008).
However, research by Haidt (2001) has pointed to a different conclusion, one best
summarized by the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM). According to the SIM, moral
judgements are determined by rapid emotive intuitions (gut feelings). Furthermore,
any arguments used to justify a moral stance are fabricated afterwards to defend the
original instinct (Haidt, 2001). More recently, a review by Monin, Pizarro and Beer
(2007) has suggested these two moral processing methods coexist in the brain. This
contention is supported by functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies
(Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley and Cohen, 2004) that have found functionally
antagonistic neuroanatomical correlates for logical reasoning and emotional reactions.
In fact, Monin, Pizarro and Beer (2007) further argue that this age-old reason-affect
dichotomy cannot capture the entirety of human moral life.
Before specifying the current studys rationale, it is important to define some
concepts. Firstly, moral judgement describes how humans gauge the conduct or
integrity of others, usually as being right or wrong (Haidt, 2001). Moral judgement
can then be divided into moral dilemmas and moral reactions (Monin, Pizarro and
Beer, 2007). Moral dilemmas, such as the two trolley dilemmas, generate conflict
between internal moral codes (Moore, Clark and Kane, 2008). The switch variant of
this dilemma forces one to choose between letting five people die to a runaway train,
or saving them by pressing a switch that diverts the train into the path of a single
person. Conversely, the more emotionally personal footbridge variant requires that
someone be physically pushed in the trains path. For resolving dilemmas, Green,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley and Cohen (2001), (2008) posit a dual process
model where two types of moral processing are employed: deontological processing,
which is rapid, automatic and affect-driven, along with utilitarian processing, where
consequences of actions are logically analysed so as to minimise harm.
On the other hand, moral reactions are quick, emotion-based responses to shocking
moral violations (Haidt, 2001; Monin, Pizarro and Beer, 2007), appearing in the
conscious mind without any prior reasoning. More specifically, Haidt and Graham
(2007) sub-divide moral reactions into five domains: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity,
ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity (Horberg, 2009).

Despite myriad investigations into how the reason-affect axis influences moral
judgement, the impact of individual variations in emotional processing has received
little attention. Horberg et al. (2009) showed a correlation between the tendency to
experience disgust and the purity moral domain, particularly with respect to moral
reactions. Similarly, Greene et al. (2001) found raised emotional investment when
people were faced with moral dilemmas with more affective salience (e.g. the
footbridge problem). As such, our study will examine whether individuals scores
upon certain emotional processing measures can be correlated with particular
responses towards moral reactions and dilemmas.
In accordance with Horberg et al. (2009), we will use disgust as the emotion of
interest, to be measured by the disgust propensity (DP) scale. The other main
psychometric measure employed is the Moral Foundations Questionnaire Judgement
Subscale (MFQ_J), for measuring participants ranking upon the five moral domains.
DP will then be correlated with the purity moral domain (MFQ_J_PURITY), the harm
domain (MFQ_J_HARM), as well as with responses to two moral dilemmas: the
aforementioned trolley dilemmas. Overall, we expect positive correlations between
DP and the two moral domains (since these are predicated upon moral reactions), and
negative correlations with utilitarian solutions to the moral dilemmas.
Thus, our hypotheses are that (1) DP and higher scores on MFQ_J_PURITY are
positively correlated, (2) DP and higher scores on MFQ_J_HARM are positively
correlated, (3) DP and utilitarian responses to the switch variant of the trolley
problem (the more impersonal dilemma) are negatively correlated, and (4) DP and
utilitarian responses to the footbridge variant (the more personal dilemma) are
negatively correlated.