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ABSTRACr
Since Peter Geach coined the phrase in 1966 there has been much discussion
to avoid it. I think that this consensus of scholars is mistaken. I think that what
Geach has labeled a fallacy is no fallacy at all, but a perfectly innocent conse-
Plato is committed to (PD) in the Meno. The Meno also contains a famous discussion of the difference between episteme and doxa (97a ff.). If we understand
what Plato meant by episteme we can see that he must be committed to (PD);
but we can also see that (PD) has none of the harmful consequences Geach attributes to it.
is made. Plato links the concept of episteme explicitly with the concept of logos;
the connection between the terms may have been analytic.
I. Introduction
Since Peter Geach coined the phrase in 1966 there has been much dis-
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Geach believed that "(B) in fact follows from (A)."2 He believed that these
two propositions constitute a fallacy because they present an incorrect
view of knowledge:
We know heaps of things without being able to define the terms in which we
express our knowledge. Formal definitions are only one way of elucidating terms;
a set of examples may in a given case be more useful than a formal definition.3
Geach has had many respondents. All have wanted to show that the
Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues is innocent of Geach's charge. In
general their strategy has been to argue that Socrates is not committed
many things that suggest that he believes in (A), but Robinson speaks
represent the views of the historical Socrates, argued that the principle
only emerges in a set of "transitional dialogues" in which Plato's views
were supplanting those of Socrates.5 Other scholars have argued that the
Socrates of the early dialogues is committed not to (PD) but to some
weaker principle or principles that do not have the epistemological con-
2 Ibid.
I Ibid. I think that the general view of knowledge underlying Geach's position,
which I shall discuss further below, bears some resemblance to the view Protagoras
defends in the "Great Speech" (Protagoras 320c-328d), especially at 327e-328a, where
he indicates that eveiy Greek has sufficient knowledge of the Greek language to be
able to teach it. I don't mean to suggest that Protagoras's view and Geach's are iden-
6 For example, Gerasimos Santas, "The Socratic Fallacy," Journal of the History
of Philosophy 10 (1972), 127-141; Alexander Nehamas, "Socratic Intellectualism,"
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1986), 275-316
(cf. esp. 277-293); and John Beversluis, "Does Socrates Commit the Socratic Fal-
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All of these strategies have been challenged. The most thorough discussion of (PD) is Benson,8 who concludes that the best explanation for
Vlastos, op. cit., 1-31 (cf. esp. 23-26); Paul Woodruff, "Expert Knowledge in the
Apology and Laches: What a General Needs to Know," Proceedings of the Boston
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1987), 79-115, and "Plato's Early Theory
8 Hugh H. Benson, "The Priority of Definition and the Socratic Elenchus," Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 8 (1990), 19-65.
10 See Beversluis, op. cit., 212, who describes the result of accepting Geach's
premises as "a hopeless epistemic impasse," Woodruff, who writes that "the trouble
with believing in priority of definition is that it would paralyze inquiry if it were true"
("Expert Knowledge," 91; Woodruff may only be interpreting Geach, not endorsing
his conclusion; however, he says Geach "represents a fairly broad consensus") and
Santas, op. cit., 129. Exceptions to this general rule are Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral
Theory (Oxford 1977), 40-41, and Benson, op. cit.
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elenctic dialogues, but not from the transitional dialogues, the dialogues
in which, according to a common account, Plato first introduces his own
remove the fallacy from the elenctic dialogues, and thus from Socratic
philosophy, only to inflict it upon Plato. It attempts to save Socrates from
the project of isolating a "pure Socratic" phase of thought within the early
dialogues that is free from epistemological and metaphysical assumptions,
whether or not that first stage is taken to be a faithful record of the views
fallacy" in some dialogues but not in others. If commission of the "Socratic fallacy" is a blunder, how could Plato have carefully avoided com-
mitting this blunder in the early, elenctic dialogues (while asserting things
very much like it), only to embrace it in the transitional dialogues? Even
if his role in composing the early dialogues was more that of Socrates'
has, is it reasonable to think that Plato did not realize this, and that, like
a fool, in the transitional dialogues he rushed in where his angel had previously feared to tread? Given what we know about Plato's philosophical
(A2) If you do not know the definition of F, you cannot know any-
I I find the critique of this project found in Charles H. Kahn's classic essay, "Did
Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?," Classical Quarterly 31 (1981), 305-324, and later
works completely convincing, though I do not agree with his alternative account of
the relations among the dialogues or his chronological placement of the Gorgias.
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At Meno 71b Socrates states, "I have no knowledge about virtue at all.
And how can I know a property of something when I don't even know
what it is?" The question clearly invites a negative reply; and, a negative
reply would commit Plato to Beversluis' (A2). He is not so clearly committed to (Al); however, as Benson has put it, the best explanation for
his acceptance of (A2) is his acceptance of (PD). Whether Socrates in this
dialogue represents the historical Socrates, Plato, or a combination of
both, he seems committed to the principle that gives rise to the "Socratic
fallacy."
13 Irwin has used the distinction between episteme and doxa, though without specifically invoking the Meno passage, in developing his own answer to Geach's problem.
Irwin accepts the standard English translations of these terms as "knowledge" and
"belief"; his solution is, in a nutshell, that Socrates denies he has knowledge but not
true belief. This solution is, of all the published responses to Geach I am aware of,
the closest to the one I propose below; unlike Irwin, however, I have serious reservations about the adequacy of the usual translations, and as will become clear below I
do not accept the claim that the alternative to Platonic episteme is a cognitive state
similar to what we would describe in English as true belief. Beversluis (op. cit., 217ff.)
discusses the Meno passage in the course of a critique of the "true belief" theory; his
discussion is an excellent example of the project of purifying the early dialogues from
the epistemology of middle Platonism. Since this paper concems a dialogue in which
that epistemology emerges, his comments do not have a direct bearing on it.
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how "F"' is used, but that this account need not take the form of an explicit definition or a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for its applications. The second claim is less radical, and perhaps thus more plausible,
than the first. I suspect, however, that the first, stronger view is behind
Geach's objection.
Philosophers who accept this dictum and the philosophical framework
out of which it arises will think that Plato has made a straightforward and
simple error in demanding explicit definitional knowledge from his interlocutors. They may also argue that the error is not simply an error in the
philosophical theory of meaning, however, but an error in the philosoph-
the ordinary use of episteme. Thus, the issue becomes not simply one
involving the use of certain Greek or English terms, but one of the legit-
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of things we can't define; and if that is so, the Socratic view would not
in that way.'4
Now it is tempting to respond that Plato was not talking about knowledge but about episteme, and that neither Plato nor the Greek philosophers
An examination of rival philosophical accounts of meaning and knowledge is beyond the scope of this paper (and beyond the competence of its
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Geach's view it is possible for a person to say, correctly, "I know how to
use the word X but I don't have any idea how to define X, or say what
X essentially is." For some terms, such as color terms and terms for common substances such as water or salt, this seems unproblematic; but even
here we must be aware of the problem of the borderline case. Is that color
a dark shade of yellow or a light shade of orange? The liquid in the glass
looks like water and tastes like water, but how can we be sure it is water?
after all, or at least that one's knowledge is incomplete; and if that is true
in the case of terms like "yellow" and "water," it would seem a fortiori to
be true of terms like "brave" and "holy." Indeed, even if one finds the
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Geach might respond that his point holds at least for obvious and
this far, however. Doubtless it was fear of reaching just such a conclusion that led Geach to object to principle (A) in the first place. Nor do I
think that Plato would want to do so. Though he might harbor doubts
about the ordinary hoplite, I'm sure he would agree with Laches that
Socrates' behavior in the retreat from Delium was brave, and that we can
be certain it was (cf. Laches 18la-b). The question he would raise in such
situations is not whether the concept applied to the case but whether the
cognitive certainty on the part of the observer amounted to knowledge.
Now if we take seriously the account given in the Meno of the distinction between knowledge and right belief, I think it is clear that what Plato
requires for knowledge is something very close to what Geach attributes
cates, the opinions of this person are no less true than those of the person
with knowledge, and no less reliable a guide to action. Plato might have
added that the person with right opinion might be no less certain of the
truth of a given judgment than the person with knowledge. Though he
generally thought that opinion was less stable than knowledge because it
'' Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3d ed. (New York 1958), Part 1,
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inconsistent in a person with true opinion stubbornly sticking to that opinion through all attempts to persuade him to change his mind. What makes
for knowledge, then, is not certainty or practical reliability but the ability
ing for something he can use as a standard to judge all cases of piety,
and this sounds very much like what Geach describes in (A). But he also
says there (6d) that this standard is a form; and, though scholars differ as
to whether that term commits Socrates to a theory of Forms, there is no
doubt that Plato does develop such a theory in the middle dialogues, and
that in the Phaedo he explicitly invokes Forms as principles of explanation. The Meno passage links the ability to give an account with the
Doctrine of Recollection (98a). Although earlier in the Meno Plato sug-
17 At Meno 81d Socrates states that, since all nature is akin, when one has recollected a single item of knowledge one may eventually recollect everything else. At
Phaedo lOld he suggests that the hypothesis that there are Forms is to be justified by
appeal to higher hypotheses, and that one must continue to ascend the hypothetical
ladder until one reaches "something adequate." In the Republic (VI, 51 lc-d) it is made
clear that the unhypothetical first principle that puts an end to the ascent is the Form
of the Good.
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must be able to give an account of what he knows (cf. Phaedo 76b), and
quite another to require complete knowledge, expressed in essential definitions of a Form reached through the process of Recollection. But it
does not follow from the fact that the metaphysical and epistemological
elaboration Plato gives to the simple criterion may be unreasonable that
the criterion itself is; and it should be remembered that it is the simple
criterion, and not its metaphysical elaboration, that Geach objects to.
depends, as the cause of that fact and no other, and further, that the fact
could not be other than it is." (71blO ff.) As he defines the faculty of episteme in Nicomachean Ethics VI.3, it is "the capacity to demonstrate"
(1139b3 1). Aristotle limits the scope of episteme to necessary truths, and
demands for these not just a rational account but a demonstration that
shows their necessity. These restrictions are so different from those we
place on knowledge that translators are prone to mark them by translating episteme as "scientific knowledge" rather than simply as "knowledge."
18 Gail Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII," in Stephen Everson, ed.,
Epistemology (Cambridge 1990), 106. For a detailed discussion of the relation between
episteme and logos, with many additional references to passages in the Platonic corpus,
see Jon Moline, Plato's Theory of Understanding (Madison 1981), ch. 2, esp. 33-43.
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This is not the place to discuss the propriety of this translation; I simply
note that the term on which Aristotle places these restrictions is the same
term that translators translate as "knowledge" in Plato: episteme. Episteme
is the state with which Geach's principle (A) is concerned.
without knowing what the nature of virtue is. I suggest that what this implies is that Socrates thinks he can have no logos, no rational account of
the teachability of virtue without a logos of the nature of virtue. In general,
he can have no rational account of the properties of an object without
having a rational account of the nature of the object.
Is this a false view of the nature of knowledge? It certainly seems to
can be taught, for I've seen it done. X passed on his virtue to Y by teaching; I don't know how he did it, but he did it nonetheless." For again,
what Socrates is looking for is a rational account that explains how virtue
can be taught, and it seems reasonable to think that such an account
requires an account of what virtue is. It does not matter that there is a
sense of "know" in English that dispenses with the rational account, for
that sense isn't the one Socrates has in mind. He is not waiting for information about cases of successful teaching of virtue; rather, he is seeking
to understand how those instances could have taken place.
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rational account of its nature.19 But (A) is not a claim about the certainty,20
or the empirical basis of our beliefs; it is about the kind of account
required to turn a belief, even an empirically grounded and dogmatically
held belief, into episteme. It may in the end turn out to be a mistaken
principle, but it doesn't seem to me to wear its falsity on its face. It isn't
so obviously false a principle that I'd want to label it a fallacy.
The reader might well object at this point that showing that (A) is not as
(A) entails (B). Let us turn, then, to an examination of (B). It states "that
it is no use to try and arrive at the meaning of 'T' by giving examples
of things that are T." Now scholars have noted that Socrates' actual practice in the dialogues is not in accord with this principle: he uses examples
1' This seems to be what Geach means when he suggests that the principle is
morally harmful because someone who proved unable after repeated attempts to
explain why swindling is unjust might come to doubt that it was unjust (372). It is
true that someone might come to that conclusion, but there is nothing in (A) to suggest that he or she should. Note that Socrates, who sees more definitions go down in
flames than anyone, never succumbs to such moral uncertainty.
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But Geach might respond, "So much the worse for Socrates' practice. If
(B) follows from (A), Socrates is not entitled to make use of examples in
use of examples did follow from (A) that would not mean that the search
for general criteria was pointless. A process such as recollection might put
measurably aided by the use of examples, so let us ask how the prohibition of the use of examples is supposed to follow from (A). Here is Geach's
argument:
If you can already give a general account of what "T" means, then you need no
examples to arrive at the meaning of "T"; if on the other hand you lack such a
general account, then, by assumption (A), you cannot know that any examples
of things that are T are genuine ones, for you do not know when you are predicating "T" correctly.22
But is Geach right about this? (A) says that one cannot know that a term
"T" is correctly predicated unless one can give a general criterion for the
correct predication of "T." When applied to examples, this means that one
cannot know that an alleged example of T is a genuine example until one
It is not necessary for me to know that an alleged example of a general term T is a genuine example in order to use this example in my search
21 Beversluis, op. cit., 212. Cf. Santas, op. cit., 129-134.
22 Geach, op. cit., 371.
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the class from those that merely appear to. It is not necessary to know
beforehand that all of the putative examples in the initial set are genuine.
It is not necessary to know, in the case of any particular example, that it
amount of confidence that at least some of the examples in the initial set
are genuine. It is the discovery of general criteria, which is the aim of the
sible environments in which instances of courage can be sought. To pursue his investigation he needs nothing more than this.
As we have seen, Plato is willing to say that someone knows something only when that person is able to give an account of what he knows.
When the case is that of predicating a term of an alleged example, the
that term. If one is searching for such a general criterion, one obviously is
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not in conscious possession of it, and in that sense one cannot know that
I think that, for Geach's objection to hold, and for (B) to follow from
(A), it would have to be the case that a lack of a general criterion for
what it is to be a T must produce in the investigator such a degree of confusion that he or she is unable even tentatively to identify examples of T.
We have seen that this is not the case. Therefore, (B) does not follow
from (A). Plato may, without logical error, make use of examples in seeking general definitions of terms. It seems clear also that he may, without
logical error, follow another practice that he constantly employs in the
early dialogues: he may propose alleged examples as counterexamples to
definitions proposed by his interlocutors.
The procedures by which Socrates attempts to discover general criteria
for the use of terms in the early dialogues are not purely inductive ones;
he does not simply attempt to assemble a sufficient sample of instances
of the term and then abstract from these examples a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for the application of the term. Rather, examples are
rived. Though the Platonic procedure differs from the more familiar induc-
VI. Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the "Socratic fallacy" is not a fallacy. I
have argued that Geach's (A), which has come to be known as the Priority
logos. The fact that this principle emerges explicitly for the first time in
a transitional dialogue, the Meno, means that we ought to be suitably cautious about attributing it to Socrates in the early dialogues. On the other
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hand, I have also argued that Plato's acceptance of (A) does not commit
him to (B), so that the consequences Geach feared do not arise. Thus,
there is no reason not to use (PD), as Benson has argued, as a unifying
principle behind many specific Socratic remarks in the early dialogues
about what we can know, and under what conditions we can know it.23
Santa Clara University
23 I thank Hugh Benson and Elizabeth Radcliffe for their comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
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