Julius Eric T.

Alcantara
JD 1 - 2
CANON 5
Samar Mining Company vs Francisco Arnado
FACTS: In 1958, Rufino Abuyen won a labor case against Samar Mining Company.
Abuyen was awarded compensation plus hospitalization expenses for a disease he
incurred while working for Samar Mining. The decision was rendered by Pompeyo Tan,
a labor lawyer duly appointed by Francisco Arnado, a regional administrator of the
Department of Labor. In 1961, Samar Minings lawyer, Atty. Benedicto Arcinas, filed an
action for certiorari before CFI Cebu contending that Tan has no authority or jurisdiction
over said case because he was a mere labor lawyer who had no authority to render
the award being complained of. CFI Cebu dismissed the petition of Arcinas.
Meanwhile, in the same year, the Supreme Court made a ruling in the case of Caltex v.
Villanueva (L-15658, August 21, 1961) that duly appointed hearing officers by regional
administrators of the labor department may issue awards. Notwithstanding this ruling,
Arcinas still filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal has merit.
HELD: No. It is obvious that the purpose of the filing is just to delay and prolong the
litigation in the hope of draining the resources of the poorer party and of compelling it
to submit out of sheer exhaustion. The conduct of Atty. Arcinas is hardly compatible
with the duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or
defeat the same. The Supreme Court ordered Samar Mining and Atty. Arcinas to
shoulder the litigation costs of this case jointly and severally.

Vda. de Bacaling vs. Laguna

FACTS: Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential
land where petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, constructed a
residential house Unable to pay the lease rental an action for ejectment. The filing of
said case spawned various court suits such as petition for certiorari, which
further prolong the litigation process.
ISSUE: Should the petitioners counsel deserved condemnation before SC.
HELD: Yes. The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous
attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment
case and to prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and
her counsel deserves the vigorous condemnation of this Court, because it evinces a
flagrant misuse of the remedy of certiorari which should only be resorted to in case of
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by a inferior court. A recourse of this kind
unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and simply wastes the precious time
that they could well devote to really meritorious cases.

Case Digest: Roxas v. CA

FACTS: Petitioner Melania Roxas ("Melania") is married to Antonio Roxas ("Antonio"),
although they are already estranged and living separately.
Melania discovered that Antonio leased to Respondent Antonio Cayetano ("Mr.
Cayetano") their conjugal lot in Novaliches without her knowledge and consent.
Thus, Melanie filed a case before the RTC praying for the annulment of the contract of
lease between Antonio and Mr. Cayetano.
Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole ground that the complaint
states no cause of action.
The RTC Judge resolved said Motion by dismissing Melania's complaint.
ISSUE: W/N a husband, may legally enter into a long-term contract of lease involving
conjugal real property without the consent of the wife.
HELD: No. (Case remanded to the RTC by the SC)
Even if the husband is administrator of the conjugal partnership, administration does not
include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets
unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty.
As stated in Black's Law Dictionary, the word "alienation" means "the transfer of the
property and possession of lands, tenements, or other things from one person to
another ... The act by which the title to real estate is voluntarily assigned by one person
to another and accepted by the latter, in the form prescribed by law." While
encumbrance "has been defined to be every right to, or interest in, the land which may
subsist in third persons, to the diminution of the value of the land, but consistent with the
passing of the fee by the conveyance; any (act) that impairs the use or transfer of
property or real estate..."
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a lease is an encumbrance and/or
alienation.
Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of things, one of the parties binds
himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a
period which may be definite or indefinite...." Thus, lease is a grant of use and
possession: it is not only a grant of possession.

In the contract of lease, the lessor transfers his right of use in favor of the lessee. The
lessor's right of use is impaired, therein. He may even be ejected by the lessee if the
lessor uses the leased realty.
Therefore, lease is a burden on the land, it is an encumbrance on the land. The concept
of encumbrance includes lease, thus "an encumbrance is sometimes construed broadly
to include not only liens such as mortgages and taxes, but also attachment, LEASES,
inchoate dower rights, water rights, easements, and other RESTRICTIONS on USE."
Moreover, lease is not only an encumbrance but also a qualified alienation, with the
lessee becoming, for all legal intents and purposes, and subject to its terms, the owner
of the thing affected by the lease.
Thus, in case the wife's consent is not secured by the husband as required by law, the
wife has the remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the contract.