G.R. No.

L-1261
August 2, 1949
CATALINA OSMEA DE VALENCIA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
EMILIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Sato and Repollo for appellants.
Filemon Sotto for appellees.
PARAS, J.:

In an action instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the plaintiffs prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants,
from using the surname "Valencia." The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and this sustained by the lower court. Hence this
appeal by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs allege, on the hand, that they (except Catalina Osmea) are the legitimate children of the defendant Pio E.
Valencia in the latter's lawful wedlock with plaintiff Catalina Osmea; and, upon the other hand, that the defendants, (except
Emilia Rodriguez and Pio E. Valencia) are the illegitimate children of Pio E. Valencia with his common-law-wife, defendant
Emilia Rodriguez. It is accordingly contended by the plaintiffs that they alone have the right to bear the surname "Valencia," in
accordance with article 114 of the Civil Code which provides that legitimate children have the right to bear the surname of the
father. To complete their argument, the plaintiffs point out that, under articles 139 and 845 of the Civil Code, illegitimate
children (who are not natural) are entitled only to support.

We concede that the plaintiffs may use the surname of their farther as a matter of right by reason of the mere fact that they are
legitimate children; but we cannot agree to the view that article 114 of the Civil Code, without more, grants monopolistic
proprietary control to legitimate children over the surname of their father. In other words, said article has marked a right of
which legitimate children may not be deprived, but it cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the use by others of what
may happen to be the surname of their father. If plaintiff's theory were correct, they can stop countless inhabitants from
bearing the surname "Valencia."

The defendants' case becomes the stronger when it is remembered that, from all appearances, Pio E. Valencia (the father)
acquiesces in the adoption of his surname by the defendants. But even if he objects, the defendants can still use the surname
"Valencia," in the absence of any law granting exclusive ownership over a surname.

The appealed order is affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs against the plaintiffs and appellants.
Moran, C.J., Perfecto, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
OZAETA,. J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the affirmance of the order appealed from on the following ground: It appears from paragraph 5 of the complaint that the
defendant Pio E. Valencia has allowed his illegitimate children by his codefendant Emilia Rodriguez to bear his surname even after they
had reached the age of reason. From this allegation it may be inferred that since their birth these illegitimate children have been given
and have borne the surname of their father with the latter's consent. The plaintiffs predicate their case upon Articles 114, 139, and 845
of the Civil Code and Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Article 114 says that legitimate children shall have the right to bear the surnames
of their father and mother; and articles 139 and 845 say that illegitimate children who have not the status of natural children shall be
entitled only to support. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure for change of name. Upon the facts alleged in the
complaint, these statutory provisions are not sufficient, in my opinion, to entitle the plaintiffs to the relief sought by their complaint. The
mere fact that legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their parents and illegitimate children are entitled only to
support, does not necessarily imply that the father may not voluntarily permit his illegitimate children to bear his surname. Rule 103 is
not applicable because it is not alleged in the complaint that the twelve defendants who are alleged to be illegitimate children of their
codefendant Pio E. Valencia have illegally changed their surname from some other to that of Valencia. On the contrary we infer from the
complaint that since their birth they have always borne that surname with the knowledge and consent of their putative father.
I dissent from so much of the majority opinion a may convey the idea (1) that a person who claims to be the illegitimate child of another
may use or adopt the surname of the latter even against his will and without his consent, and without authorization from the court; and
(2) that any person is free to use any surname he may have a fancy for without the authorization of the court even though he may not
have originally borne that surname. Concerning the first idea, I am of the opinion that a person cannot adjudicate to himself a status
which adversely affects another without the latter's consent or without the intervention of the court. And as to the second idea, it is clear
from Rule 103 that a person cannot adopt a new name, or use one other than that he has originally borne, without complying with the
requisites provided for in said rule.

TAN vs. TROCIO

FACTS:
Tan filed a disbarment case against Atty. Trocio for allegedly raping her and as a result, she bore a son named Jewel. She gave birth to
Jewel during her marriage with Tal Lee Pok.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jewel is the illegitimate son of Atty. Trocio.
RULING:
Jewel Tan was born during the wedlock of Complainant and her husband and the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless
physical access between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been overcome by
adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of the Felicidad and her
husband, Tan Le Pok.
*
[A.C. No. 2115. November 27, 1990.]
FELICIDAD BARIAN TAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. GALILEO J. TROCIO, Respondent.
Jose A. Tolentino, Jr., for complainant.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

In a verified complaint, filed on 9 November 1979, complainant

Felicidad Barian Tan seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Galileo
J. Trocio for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
Complainant, owner and directress of Harlyn Vocational School in
Baroy, Lanao del Norte, declares that sometime in April, 1971, at about
8:30 PM, after classes were dismissed, respondent, who is the legal
counsel of the school, overpowered her inside the office and, against
her will, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. As a result, she
begot a son on 5 February 1972 whom she named and registered as
Jewel Tan. She avers that respondent used to support Jewel but
subsequently lost interest in doing so thereby neglecting to defray the
needed expenses for Jewels well-being. Complainant also alleges that
the respondent threatened her with the deportation of her alien
husband if she complained to the authorities since she was violating
the Anti-Dummy Law in operating the vocational school. This threat,
aside from the fact that Complainant is a married woman with eight
children and a school directress at the time of the sexual assault, made
her desist from filing a charge against the Respondent. However, after
eight years and thorough soul-searching, she decided to file this
administrative complaint.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Respondent, in his Answer, admits having acted as a lawyer of the
vocational school. In fact, he contends that he had also served as the
lawyer of the Complainant, her family and her parents-in-law. Thus, in
1971, he helped prosecute a case for robbery committed against
Complainants mother and sisters. Also, in March of 1976, when a fire
of unknown origin gutted the school, he assisted the complainant in
collecting P10,000.00 from FGU Insurance Group, and P40,000.00
from Fortune Insurance Corporation as indemnities. With regard to the
same case, he also represented complainant in a suit involving a
P130,000.00 claim against the Workmens Insurance Corporation
before the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte. Then in
1978, he was retained as a collaborating attorney by Complainants
family in an inheritance case. Further, her father-in-law had always
consulted him in matters affecting the formers store.
But respondent vehemently denies that he had sexually assaulted the
Complainant. He argues that her motivation in filing this charge was to
get even with him after having been humiliated when he declined her
request to commit a "breach of trust." He states that in the inheritance
case he handled for her family, Complainant insisted that he report to
her mother and sisters that he had charged a fee of P15,000.00
instead of the P2,500.00 he actually received so that she could pocket
the difference. He refused and told the Complainant to look for another
lawyer. She tried twice to make peace with him but was unsuccessful.

Rebuffed, she promised to get even with him. Thus, this

complaint.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Another reason why Complainant filed the present case, respondent
claims, is to escape her indebtedness to him representing his services
as legal counsel of the school which were unpaid since 1974 and the
accumulated honoraria from her fire insurance claims. These
obligations were left unpaid despite demand made when respondent
learned that Complainant had sold a piece of land in Agusan.
On 2 June 1980, the Court, acting upon the Complaint and the Answer
already filed, referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On 19 August 1980, said Office, upon the request of the Complainant
that the investigation be held in Lanao del Norte as she and her
witnesses could not afford to come to Manila, referred the case to the
Provincial Fiscal of said province for the necessary proceedings.
Between September and October of 1980, hearings were conducted
on the case. In a Report and Recommendation, dated 16 January
1981, the Provincial Fiscal stated that respondent failed to attend the
hearing despite the issuance of subpoena; that there was prima facie
evidence showing that respondent had committed acts violative of his
professional decorum; and, that he was recommending disciplinary
action against him. The records of the case were then forwarded to the
Office of the Solicitor General.
On 1 September 1982, the Office of the Solicitor General returned the
records to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte for re-investigation
on the ground that the investigation was conducted in the absence of
respondent, who did not appear despite subpoenas sent to him. Thus,
further proceedings were conducted by the Provincial Fiscal wherein
Respondent was allowed to submit a sworn letter, dated 13 December
1985, amplifying on the defenses contained in his Answer.
On 13 February 1986, the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte issued a
Resolution adopting his previous Report and Recommendation of 16
January 1981, which found prima facie evidence to hold Respondent
administratively liable. On the same day, the records of the case were
referred back to the Office the Solicitor General.
On 16 May 1986, the Office of the Solicitor General came up with its
own Report recommending that Respondent be disbarred for gross
immoral conduct. On 17 July 1986, as directed by the Court, the
Solicitor General filed a formal Complaint for disbarment against

Respondent. On 29 May 1990, the case was raffled to this Second

Division and was included in the latters agenda on 13 June 1990.

"x

Respondent has filed an Answer, Complainant her Reply, while

Respondents Rejoinder, as required by the Court, was received on 3
October 1990. The required pleadings being complete, this case is
now ripe for resolution.

"Q
You stated in your affidavit marked Annex A that you heard
Felicidad Barian Tan shouted (sic) for help on the evening of last
week of April, 1971, can you tell me or do you know why Mrs. Tan
shouted for help?

The issue for determination is whether or not Respondent should be

disbarred for immoral conduct. This, in turn, hinges on the question of
whether he had, in fact, sexually assault the Complainant, as a
consequence of which the latter begot a child by him.

"A
Yes sir. When I responded to the shout for help of Tan I
noticed that Atty. Galileo Trocio, hurriedly left the office leaving behind
Mrs. Felicidad Barian Tan.

We find insufficient basis to sustain Complainants charge.

The outrage allegedly took place during the last week of April, 1971.
Yet, no criminal charge was filed, and it was only about eight years
later, on 5 November 1979, that an administrative complaint was
presented before this Court. Complainants explanation that
Respondents threat to cause the deportation of her alien husband
should she report to anyone made her desist from filing a charge is not
credible as she had admitted having lost contact with her husband
when he learned of respondents transgression that very same evening
(p. 3, TSN, 16 October 1980, p. 46, Rollo). The fear that she speaks of,
therefore, had become inexistent.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Another factor that engenders doubt in the mind of the Court is the fact
that after the alleged incident, she continued having dealings with the
Respondent as if nothing had happened. Thus, by Respondents own
account, which was left uncontroverted by the Complainant, the former
assisted her mother and sisters prosecute a robbery case. Then in
March, 1976, she secured respondents services in claiming indemnity
from three insurance companies when a fire burned the school down.
Finally, respondent was retained as a collaborating attorney by
complainants family in an inheritance case. These subsequent
dealings are far from being the normal reaction of a woman who has
been wronged.
Complainants contention that Respondent continued supporting the
child for several years for which reason she desisted from charging
him criminally, has not been substantiated. Truth to tell, the fact that
she kept her peace for so many years can even be construed as a
condonation of his alleged "immoral conduct." It is likewise strange that
an unwanted son, as the child would normally have been, should, of all
names, be called "Jewel."cralaw virtua1aw library
During the investigation before the Provincial Fiscal, the complainant,
aside from herself, presented two other witnesses, Eleuteria Garcia
and Marilou Pangandaman, both her domestic help, to testify. Among
the three, it was Eleuteria who tried to establish the manner in which
the sexual assault took place. Thus:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"Q
Did you ask Mrs. Felicidad Barian Tan why she was
shouting for help?
"A
Before I could ask her the reason why she shouted for help,
she told me and Marilou Pangandaman that she was sexually abused
by Atty. Galileo J. Trocio.
"Q
What did you notice of Mrs. Felicidad Barian Tan when you
responded to her shout for help?
"A
She was crying and trying to fix her dress.." . . (p. 52-53,
Rollo)."cralaw virtua1aw library
However, how near to the crime scene said witness was, considering
that it allegedly happened in school premises, has not been shown.
Her credibility is thus also put in issue.
The testimonies of Complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman,
another maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and
Jewel, like playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing
enough to prove paternity, as Complainant would want us to believe.
The same must be said of Exhibits A, A1, B and B1, which are pictures
of Jewel and the Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness
to each other. Such evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity, and
much less would it prove violation of Complainants person and
honor.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
More importantly, Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of
Complainant and her husband and the presumption should be in favor
of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was
impossible. From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been
overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was
registered in his birth certificate the legitimate child of the Complainant
and her husband, Tan Le Pok.
WHEREFORE, this Complaint for disbarment must be, and is hereby
DISMISSED, for lack of convincing substantiation.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. I72471: November 12, 2012

ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner, v. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA, Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio) were allegedly neighbors. Eventually, they became
sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio allegedly assured her that he would support her. However, Antonio started to
evade her.
Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy
thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal
Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said
certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support Randy, which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Randy is entitled for support from Antonio.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
CIVIL LAW: support
Mirasol and Randys Complaint for support is based on Randys alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled
for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the
lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The Certificate of Live Birth and
baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that
the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries
with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they
cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
REMEDIAL LAW: questions of fact
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court. However, this rule admits of certain
exceptions such as when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of the CA is
based on misapprehension of facts. As this case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained to re-examine the factual
findings of the lower courts.
Petition is GRANTED.
*
Antonio Perla, petitioner v. Mirasol Baring and Randy Perla, respondents
C.R. No. I 72471 Nov. 12, 2012
FACTS:
1. MIrasol (and Randy) filed before the RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio.
2. According to Mirasol, she and Antonio had a common law relationship for 2 years, and that Randy was the result of their affair.
3. Randy was made to testify in Court, he said that he has been in the house of his Aunt Lelita (sister of Antonio),, and that the
Perla family treated him as a member of their family.
4. Antonio denied Mirasols allegations, saying that Randy isnt his (he came in Manila only after his graduation in 1981 and He
claimed that he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol only once which happened in the month of September or October of
1981).
5. Antonio also said that Randys birth cert. has a lot of inaccuracies.
RTC Antonio was ordered to support Randy (as illegitimate child).
CA upheld RTC decision.
ISSUE: WON Randy is entitled to receive support from Antonio.
HELD: NO. Respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio.

RATIO:
The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code which provide as follows:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
xxxx
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
xxxx
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father. However, said certificate has no
probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same.60 It is settled that [a] certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.61 We also cannot lend credence to
Mirasols claim that Antonio supplied certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonios denial in having any participation in the
preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not
present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in Randys birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained
discrepancies in Antonios personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are manifestations of Antonios nonparticipation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness
stand.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 33659. June 14, 1990.]
VICTORIA U. BALUYUT, MA. THERESA U. BALUYUT and MA. FLORDELIZA U. BALUYUT, all minors, represented by their mother
and guardian ad litem, NORMA URBANO, petitioners, vs. FELICIDAD S. BALUYUT and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Donald E. Asis for the Administratrix.
SYLLABUS
1.
CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; SUCCESSIONAL RIGHT OF ILLEGITIMATE NOT NATURAL CHILD; REQUISITE. Proof of
filiation of the petitioners to the late Enrique M. Baluyut is not sufficient to confer upon them any hereditary right in the estate of the
deceased. What is necessary to be established by an illegitimate not natural child in order that he may be entitled to successional rights
under Article 887 of the New Civil Code, is not the fact of his bare filiation but a filiation acknowledged by the putative parent. This has
been the consistent pronouncement of this Court since the reversal of the pronouncement in Reyes, et al. v. Zuzuarregui, et al., 102
Phil. 346 by the pronouncement in the case of Paulino v. Paulino, 113 Phil. 697, 700, 701, 702. In the Paulino case, it was held: "An
illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to support and successional rights from his putative or presumed parents must prove his
filiation to them. . . ." " . . . . "It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are deemed to have admitted that the appellant is the
illegitimate spurious, not natural child of the deceased Marcos Paulino. Such an admission, however, does not entitle her to inherit from
her alleged putative father. It is necessary to allege that her putative father had acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such
acknowledgment is essential and is the basis of her right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment the action
becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father."
2.
ID.; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; FILIATION; VOLUNTARY AND COMPULSORY RECOGNITION OF
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD; DISTINGUISHED. Filiation may be established by the voluntary or compulsory recognition of the illegitimate
(spurious) child. Recognition is voluntary when "made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing." It is compulsory when by court action the child brings about his recognition.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION; MODES OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT. There are two modes of acknowledgment
provided in the New Civil Code; one, by the voluntary recognition by the putative parent made in the record of birth, a statement before
the court of record, or in any authentic writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code) and two, by compulsory recognition under Article 283 of the
same law.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that
the petitioners were recognized by the deceased during his lifetime as his spurious children. The petitioners' records of birth, although
in the name of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was no authentic writing presented nor any statement in a court of
record which would prove that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY RECOGNITION; CASES OF. With regard to compulsory recognition, Article 283 enumerates
the cases where the father is obliged to recognize the child as his, namely: a) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period
of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception; b) when the child is in continuous possession of the status of a child of
the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family; c) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father; d) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRES HIGH STANDARD OF PROOF; CASE AT BAR. The grounds relied upon by petitioners for
compelling the heirs of Baluyut to recognize them as the heirs of the deceased were the alleged possession by the petitioners of the
status of recognized illegitimate spurious children and that they were conceived at the time when their mother cohabited with the
deceased. Since the petitioners were still minors at the time of the death of Enrique M. Baluyut, the action for compulsory recognition
was correctly filed by petitioners' guardian ad litem and mother, Norma Urbano. However, as correctly pointed out by respondent
appellate court, since the recognition sought in the case is compulsory, strictness in the application of the rules applies. We agree with
respondent appellate court that the evidence presented by petitioners failed to satisfy the high standard of proof required for the
success of their action for compulsory recognition.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza, all surnamed Baluyut, then minors, represented by their mother and
guardian ad litem, Norma Urbano, which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38069-R entitled "Felicidad S.
Baluyut, Administratrix-Appellant v. Victoria U. Baluyut, et al., Intervenors-Appellees." The decision brought to this court for review reversed the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (now Regional Trial Court) and dismissed the petition for intervention filed by petitioners in the trial court.
In Special Proceedings No. 1835, entitled "Intestate Estate of Deceased Enrique Baluyut," filed before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, herein
petitioners filed on April 29, 1965 a petition for intervention. The petition alleged that petitioners have a legal interest in the estate of the deceased
Enrique M. Baluyut; that petitioners-minors are the illegitimate children of the deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said deceased and petitioners'
mother and guardian ad litem Norma Urbano; that petitioners were conceived and born at the time when Norma Urbano cohabited with the deceased
while the latter was already married to Felicidad S. Baluyut; that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of children of the
deceased during his lifetime by direct overt acts of said deceased having supported and maintained them. The petitioners also alleged that they were
deliberately excluded from the estate of Enrique M. Baluyut (pp. 10-18, Record on Appeal).
Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed administratrix of his estate, opposed the petition for intervention (p. 20, Record on Appeal). On
May 8, 1965 (pp. 18-19, Record on Appeal), the trial court issued an order allowing the petitioners to intervene.
After trial, a decision (pp. 24-31, Record on Appeal) was rendered declaring the intervenors Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza the forced heirs of
deceased Enrique Baluyut and ordering administratrix Felicidad Vda. de Baluyut to pay P150.00 monthly support to Norma Urbano, guardian ad litem for
the three minor children. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders:
"1)
FELICIDAD VDA. DE BALUYUT, the administratrix to pay P150.00 as monthly support out of the Estate of Enrique Baluyut to Norma Urbano
guardian ad litem for the three minor children, Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza Baluyut.
"2)
That under Art. 887, (5) New Civil Code said children are forced heirs of the late Enrique Baluyut.
"3)
That they are entitled to their hereditary rights in said Estate of Enrique Baluyut under the provisions of the New Civil Code (pp. 29-30, Record
on Appeal)."
On February 15, 1966, the administratrix filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's decision. On February 22, 1966, the intervenors filed their
Objection to Appeal and Motion for Execution. The latter motion was based on the pronouncement in Salazar v. Salazar, L-5823, April 29, 1953, that an
order granting support pendente lite is final and executory.

On May 4, 1986, the trial court issued an order (p. 37, Record on Appeal) declaring that it considers intervenors' motion for execution as a motion for
reconsideration and amended the decision to the effect that it granted the minors Victoria, Theresa and Flordeliza monthly support pendente lite in the
amount of P150.00 payable every first day of the month to their guardian ad litem Norma Urbano.
On April 22, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment (pp. 19-41, Rollo) reversing the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and the intervenors' petition in intervention is hereby declared dismissed, without costs. The
order granting alimony pendente lite to the intervenors is hereby set aside." (p. 41, Rollo)
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of respondent Court of Appeals' decision was denied on May 24, 1971 (p. 53, Rollo). Hence, the instant petition
for review on certiorari filed on June 19, 1971.
On June 23, 1971, We gave due course to the petition (p. 57, Rollo). On July 1, 1971, We required the petitioners to file their brief (p. 58, Rollo).
Respondents, on the other hand, filed their brief on October 28, 1971 (p. 85, Rollo). On December 17, 1971, the petition was considered submitted for
decision (p. 87, Rollo).
On June 3, 1975, petitioners filed a "Motion and Manifestation" praying for the reinstatement of the order of the trial court to grant the petitioners monthly
support during the pendency of the case. The said order for monthly support granted by the trial court in its decision of May 4, 1966 was terminated in
the early part of 1971 (p. 90, Rollo). When asked to comment on the manifestation and motion of petitioners, respondents opposed said motion in view
of respondent Court of Appeals' finding that petitioners were not the recognized spurious children of deceased Baluyut (p. 113, Rollo).
On November 25, 1976, We granted petitioner's motion for continuation of their monthly support pendente lite effective June 1975 until further orders (p.
141, Rollo). After an exchange of pleadings by the parties regarding the order of this court on the matter of the continuation of petitioners' support
pendente lite, and after a motion filed by petitioners to cite administratrix for contempt, private respondents filed a manifestation on January 6, 1978,
informing this Court that: 1) the former administratrix Felicidad S. Baluyut was substituted by one of her daughters, Milagros B. Villar, as Special
Administratrix; and that 2) they have complied with the September 13, 1977 resolution of the court requiring them to show cause why they should not be
dealt with as in contempt for failing to obey the order to pay petitioners a monthly support pendente lite. Private respondents also manifested their
compliance by depositing with the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 1, a Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank check in the amount
of P4,350.00 representing the required support until October, 1977. Another PCIB check in the amount of P300.00 representing support pendente lite for
November and December, 1977 was also deposited with the trial court (p. 335, Rollo).
On February 19, 1980, petitioners, assisted by their guardian ad litem and private respondent Administratrix Milagros B. Villar, both parties assisted by
their respective counsel, filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss the petition in view of petitioners' filing of a "Petition for Withdrawal of Intervention" with the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga taking cognizance of the Intestate Estate of Enrique Baluyut. The petition for withdrawal was based on a waiver by
petitioners of any right or interest they may have on the estate of the deceased in consideration of the financial assistance granted them by the
administratrix of the estate (p. 371, Rollo). The petition for withdrawal of intervention was approved by the intestate court on February 14, 1980 (p. 369,
Rollo), while the Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant petition was noted by this court on April 13, 1981 (p. 372, Rollo).
The withdrawal of intervention in consideration of the financial assistance extended to petitioners by the administratrix of the estate of the deceased
Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 37, Rollo) is in the nature of a compromise settlement of the instant petition (p. 371, Rollo). Considering, however, that the issue
involved in this case is whether or not petitioners, Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza, all surnamed Baluyut are the acknowledged, spurious
children of the deceased, Enrique M. Baluyut, the Joint Motion to Dismiss the instant petition cannot be granted, acknowledgment, affecting as it does
the civil status of persons and of future support cannot be the subject of a compromise (pars. 1 and 4, Article 2035 of the Civil Code). (See Advincula v.
Advincula, L-19065, January 31, 1964).
The trial court found that petitioners are the illegitimate children of the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut. This finding was shared by respondent Court of
Appeals:
". . ., the testimony of Norma Urbano, supported by that of Liberata Vasquez on the one hand as against that of the administratrix who declared that she
and her late husband were always together and that of Cecilia Waters who testified that Norma had a suitor named Lieut. Alex on the other, leads us to
give credence to the proof of the intervenors specifically the testimony of Norma that the intervenors are in fact her illegitimate children with the late
Enrique M. Baluyut (p. 35, Rollo).
However, proof of filiation of the petitioners to the late Enrique M. Baluyut is not sufficient to confer upon them any hereditary right in the estate of the
deceased. What is necessary to be established by an illegitimate not natural child in order that he may be entitled to successional rights under Article
887 of the New Civil Code, is not the fact of his bare filiation but a filiation acknowledged by the putative parent. This has been the consistent
pronouncement of this Court since the reversal of the pronouncement in Reyes, et al. v. Zuzuarregui, et al., 102 Phil. 346 by the pronouncement in the
case of Paulino v. Paulino, 113 Phil. 697, 700, 701, 702. In the Paulino case, it was held:
"An illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to support and successional rights from his putative or presumed parents must prove his filiation to them.
Filiation may be established by the voluntary or compulsory recognition of the illegitimate (spurious) child. Recognition is voluntary when "made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing." It is compulsory when by court action the child brings about his
recognition . . ."
xxx
xxx
xxx
"It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are deemed to have admitted that the appellant is the illegitimate spurious, not natural child of the
deceased Marcos Paulino. Such an admission, however, does not entitle her to inherit from her alleged putative father. It is necessary to allege that her
putative father had acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment is essential and is the basis of her right to inherit. There being no
allegation of such acknowledgment the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father."
This was reiterated in the case of Republic v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 121 Phil. 261, where this Court held that:
". . . the illegitimate (spurious) child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from his parents, must prove his filiation and this may be done by
means of voluntary or compulsory recognition of the relationship. For this purpose, the provisions concerning natural children are held applicable . . ."
There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in the New Civil Code; one, by the voluntary recognition by the putative parent made in the record of
birth, a statement before the court of record, or in any authentic writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code) and two, by compulsory recognition under Article 283
of the same law.
Were the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his illegitimate spurious children?
There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased during his lifetime as his spurious
children. The petitioners' records of birth, although in the name of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was no authentic writing
presented nor any statement in a court of record which would prove that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased.
With regard to compulsory recognition, Article 283 enumerates the cases where the father is obliged to recognize the child as his, namely: a) in cases of
rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception; b) when the child is in continuous
possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family; c) when the child was conceived during the time when
the mother cohabited with the supposed father; d) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
The grounds relied upon by petitioners for compelling the heirs of Baluyut to recognize them as the heirs of the deceased were the alleged possession
by the petitioners of the status of recognized illegitimate spurious children and that they were conceived at the time when their mother cohabited with the
deceased. Since the petitioners were still minors at the time of the death of Enrique M. Baluyut, the action for compulsory recognition was correctly filed
by petitioners' guardian ad litem and mother, Norma Urbano. However, as correctly pointed out by respondent appellate court, since the recognition
sought in the case is compulsory, strictness in the application of the rules applies. We agree with respondent appellate court that the evidence presented
by petitioners failed to satisfy the high standard of proof required for the success of their action for compulsory recognition. Respondent court held:

"The combined testimony of Norma Urbano and her witness Liberata Vasquez insofar as the issue of recognition is concerned tends to show that Norma
was kept by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his mistress first in the house of Liberata and then in a house supposedly rented from one Lacuna. But this
Lacuna was not even presented to testify in support of the claim of Norma and Liberata that Baluyut rented his house for Norma. And, according to
Norma and Liberata, Baluyut visited Norma some twice a week in the house where she kept her as his mistress; that Baluyut paid the hospital bills for
the delivery of the two younger children of Norma. But, according to Liberata herself, it was not Baluyut who personally paid the hospital bills but he gave
the money for the payment of the hospital bills to Liberata and he requested her to pay the money to the hospital. This only shows that Baluyut was
hiding his identity as the father of the children of Norma, an act which is inconsistent with recognizing such children as his own.
"If Enrique did not want to hide being the father of the intervenors who were born at the Ortaez hospital, there was no need for him to ask Liberata to
pay the hospital bill of Norma for the delivery of her youngest child as Baluyut could have easily done this himself. There is not even evidence showing
that he visited Norma at the hospital when she delivered there. Coupled with the circumstance that Enrique tried to hide his being the father of the
intervenors, there is absence of positive and convincing proof that Enrique treated the intervenors as his children in all relations in society and in life. Far
from treating them in society as his children, he was hiding Norma and the intervenors from society and visited them only once in a while evidently only
to satisfy his sexual urge with Norma but with no genuine desire to have and treat the intervenors so as to confer on them the continuous possession of
the status of recognized illegitimate (not natural) children. There is not even any proof that he had brought out these intervenors to show them publicly
as his children. With the single exception of Liberata Vasquez, not a single neighbor of Norma in the rather populous area of Project 4, Quezon City, was
produced to testify on any act of Enrique to show his genuine desire to treat the intervenors as his very own in his actual relations. The foregoing
deficiencies in the intervenors' proof is fatal to their case.
'In order to prove the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, the acts must be of such a nature that they reveal, not only the conviction of
paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously' (Igar, et
al. vs. Vda. de Balingkit, CA, 60 O.G. 7792; Oos, et al. vs. Vda. de Oos, CA-G.R. No. 24646-R, July 22, 1964).
"The birth certificates Exhibits `A,' `B' and `C' of the intervenors do not help their case for these are not evidence of recognized filiation by the deceased
Enrique Baluyut because, firstly, they were admitted in evidence by the lower court merely as part of the testimony of the witnesses who referred to them
in the course of said witnesses' testimony and hence, they are not evidence of the facts stated in them. Secondly, they are merely evidence of the fact
that gave rise to their execution, that is, the fact of birth and nothing else, much less of recognition as they are not signed by Enrique Baluyut.
'In an action for compulsory acknowledgment under paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code, a birth certificate which, on its face, was not signed by the
supposed natural father is incompetent evidence on paternity, being in violation of section 5 of Act 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code' (Roces vs.
Local Civil Registrar, 54 O.G. 4950; Crisolo vs. Macadaong, No. L-7017, April 19, 1954; Bernabe, etc. vs. Lacodin, CA, 59 O.G. 3178).
"If birth certificates, which are unsigned by the presumed father as required by section 5 of Act No. 3752 and Article 280 of the Civil Code, are
incompetent evidence even to prove paternity alone, with more reason are birth certificates incompetent evidence to prove recognized filiation." (pp. 3639, Rollo)
Petitioners would have Us relax Our rule on strictness of the application of law regarding compulsory recognition as first laid down in the Javellana v.
Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393. They opined that the said case was in fact the forerunner of the liberal view that has found its way into the present provisions
of the New Civil Code governing paternity and recognition.
Petitioners failed to grasp the import of this Court's ruling in the Javellana case. That the case was the forerunner of the liberal view that has found its
way into our statute books, is true. But, the rule of liberality enunciated therein applied only to case involving voluntary recognition specifically in a public
document and not to cases of compulsory recognition. Thus,
"Upon the second point, whether a voluntary acknowledgment may be done incidentally in a public document, a distinction must be made between the
two kinds of acknowledgment: (1) voluntary, and (2) compulsory. In the former, recognition may be incidental, but in the latter, it must be direct and
express.
"In actions to compel the alleged father to acknowledge his natural child, based upon recognition in an indubitable writing, article 135, par. 1, of the Civil
Code, requires that the father must `expressly recognize his paternity.' This provision has been strictly construed by Spanish and Philippine
jurisprudence against the alleged natural child. Thus, in the Sentence of July 5, 1906, the Supreme Tribunal of Spain held in an action to compel
acknowledgment under article 135, that a mere allusion, more or less clear, by the alleged father to his supposed child, if there is no express recognition
of his paternity, is not sufficient. In the Sentence of April 8, 1915, that same Tribunal declared that there should be an indubitable documentary proof or
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, excluding deductions and conjectures. As to Philippine cases, the same rule has been adhered
to in several decisions by this court. Thus, in Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 4 Phil., 746, an action was filed to compel recognition of a natural child, based
in part on a letter of defendant telling the mother of his affection toward her and asking her to take care of the child. This court held that the letter did not
expressly recognize the child, under article 135. In Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1, the alleged father wrote the child a letter advising him how to
conduct himself. This court held that the letter did not contain an express recognition under article 135.
"But while in actions to compel recognition the foregoing principle is true with respect to indubitable writings according to article 135, par. 1 of the Civil
Code, however, in cases of voluntary acknowledgment in a public document under article 131, the law is more liberal and permits an incidental
recognition. . . ." (Javellana, et al. v. Monteclaro, et al., 74 Phils. 393).
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J ., is on leave.

CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner, vs. DIVINA BULING, Respondent.

G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012
SUMMARY
Single mother seeking child support through establishing filiation with ex-fiancee.
FACTS
In 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the
petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze, whose imputed paternity the petitioner denied. Trial ensued. She met the petitioner in 1992 in
a bank where they both worked. They became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. Sometime in September 1993, the
petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent in the formers rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo,
the respondents uncle. The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August
8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was pregnant. When told, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the respondent
but eventually backed out. The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up and
failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on demanding recognition of and support for their child. When the
petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite. The
petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with
the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for 3 months when he was informed of the
pregnancy on September 1994. During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondents motion, granted a P2,000.00 monthly
child support, retroactive from March 1995. RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The CA consequently set aside
the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order for monthly child
support. The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTCs ruling, and that the evidence on record is
insufficient to prove paternity.
ISSUE
W/N the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTCs findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal
support to his minor son Gliffze
DECISION
The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the ruling of the CA, sustaining the award of P2,000.00 monthly child support, not
finding any reversible error in the CAs ruling. In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the
putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. However, the petitioner
failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for
lack of evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical assertions. Since filiation is
beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

PeridO vs Perido
G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
Facts:
Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children. After Benita
died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children while his second wife died in 1943.
The petitioner alleged that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate. The lower court rendered its
decision that the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate. The plaintiffs appealed to the
Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and
Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido
Issue:
Whether or not the five (5) children Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat are legitimate?
Held:

The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish
regime. This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal
impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat.
Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are married to
each other. This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by
cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee this Court explained
the rationale behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage."
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.

Spouses Araceli Oliva De-Mesa, et. al v. Spouse Claudio D. Acero, Jr. et. al
G.R. No. 185064
January 16, 2012
Facts: On April 17, 1984 petitioner spouses Araceli and Ernesto De Mesa jointly purchased a parcel of land situated at No. 3 Forbes
Street, Mount Carmel Homes Subdivision, Iba, Meycauyan Bulacan while they were still merely cohabiting before their marriage. A
house was constructed in the said property which the petitioners then occupied as their family home after they got married sometime in
January 1987.
In September 1988, Aracelli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. in the amount of 100,000 pesos which was secured by a
mortgage over the subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against China Banking Corporation payable to Claudio.
The said check was dishonoured when it was presented for payment as the account from which it was drawn had already been closed.
The petitioners failed to heed Claudios subsequent demand for payment.
On April 26, 1990 respondent Claudio Acero filed a complaint for violation of (B.P. 22) against the petitioners. On October 21, 1992, the
RTC acquitted the petitioners but ordered them to pay Claudio the amount of P100,000 from the date of demand until fully paid.
On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Felixberto Samonte levied upon the subject property. On March 9, 1994,
the said property was sold on a public auction. Claudio D. Acero Jr., being the highest bidder, acquired the ownership of a parcel of land
formerly owned by petitioners Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa (Spouses De Mesa).. Thereafter, respondents Acero and
his wife Rufina (Spouses Acero) leased the subject property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable
to collect the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Spouses De
Mesa. The MTC ruled in Spouses Aceros favor.
In their defense, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) on
the basis that the subject property is a family home which is exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not
been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan. However, the RTC dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the RTCs Decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the family home is exempted from execution
HELD: Petition is DENIED.
Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It
is likewise without dispute that the family home, from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.
The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors except in
certain special cases. However, this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the
property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
For all intents and purposes, the negligence of Petitioners De Mesa or their omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives
rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family
Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the De Mesa to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the
sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.