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a r t i c l e in fo
abstract
Article history:
Received 13 January 2010
Received in revised form
5 February 2010
Accepted 6 February 2010
Owing to their style and economic impact, Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC countries) are
destined to become relevant actors in the new ocean governance. The following working hypothesis is
sustained: the BRIC countries, due to the potential of their maritime territories, can be considered to be
emerging maritime powers capable of displacing some of the historical maritime powers. This would
also entail a shift of strategic maritime space towards the southern hemisphere. Other emerging
maritime scenarios associated with the BRIC countries include the Russian Arctic, and the Indo-Pacic
ocean belt, or string of pearls, as it is known. Factors such as competitiveness, maritime leadership
and ocean governance are thus placed in a new economic and political context where they might be
redened and adapted to the circumstances of the BRIC block and other emerging countries, the
majority of which are subject to demographic pressure and a high degree of poverty. The most relevant
conclusions point to the emergence of a new type of neo-navalism, on the one handa BRIC version of
traditional sea power and, on the other, a possible threat to the EUs Integrated Maritime Policy under
pressure from strong competitiveness in a highly internationalised environment, forcing changes in its
original approach with its distinct social proles and commitment to latest generation rights.
& 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
BRIC
Sea power
Ocean governance
Maritime scenarios
EU Integrated Maritime Policy
1. Introduction
Brazil, Russia, India and China, countries whose initials have
given rise to the acronym BRIC, represent a model of economic
development characterised by a strong growth rate and a great
capacity to compete in a globalised world. From the territorial
perspective, BRIC countries are similarly characterised by their
size and demographic weight. Being coastal, all four countries cast
their sovereignty over large maritime areas, thus increasing the
already immense size of their territory. This also adds to their
resource availability, as well as their inuence and power on the
world geopolitical stage. Their political style and economic impact
mean they are destined to become important players in the new
governance of the oceans. The maritime policies of the states and
political bodies that have until now been the traditional trade and
industrial leaders may nd themselves subjected to pressures that
$
This article is based on the following research projects: MEC (SEJ2007-66487/
GEOG); JA (PO7-SEJ-2564), and SPICOSA (EU IPO36992).
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: vivero@us.es (J.L. Suarez de Vivero).
1
The expression naval power is understood in its historical sense as the
ideological basis for the expansion of trade and imperialism at the end of the 19th
century that led to (y) the creation of a modern maritime sector as a means to
revitalising and stimulating economic development based on maritime imperialism of a capitalist nature which, in turn, was based on solid naval strength [1].
0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2010.02.002
2
These were in 2008, according to the IMF: 5.1% in Brazil, 5.6% in Russia, 7.3%
in India and 9% in China [2].
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968
As a result they propose both the consolidation and institutionalisation of accords and dialogue, including the reform of the
United Nations Security Council, for example. It is also interesting
to highlight the idea of renegotiating both trade regulations
(especially any designed to restrict their growing foreign trade),
and also environmental regulations which would exacerbate the
ecological crises these countries are presently experiencing [4].
The maritime aspect of the BRIC countries throws up a number
of question marks while at the same time allowing hypotheses to
be suggested regarding the effect that these countries maritime
policies might have on a global scale and their effects on the
initiatives of countries and political bodies such as the European
Union, whose maritime policy is itself a response to the impacts of
globalisation and emerging economies.
The growth of BRIC countries economies and their expansion
over the oceans, both concerning maritime trade (China) and their
maritime space (particularly Brazil, Russia and India), are
sufciently signicant not only to alter the world geopolitical
map but to turn it on its head. The conguration of new regional
maritime scenarios (a swing or shift towards the southern
hemisphere), new areas of inuence (the massive presence of
India in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, and Russia in the
Artic), and access to new resources with a great strategic value
(hydrocarbons and biogenetic resources) are key issues that will
determine BRIC maritime policies. In this article the following
premises are assumed to be true: (i) the BRIC countries are laying
the foundations for emerging maritime power based on their
economic growth model, huge competitive capacity and access to
control over a wide-ranging maritime domain; this type of
maritime power might include a generally unprecedented, for
these countries, naval-military power component. Ocean governance and BRIC maritime policies might, on the one hand,
undermine and weaken the thus-far dominant positions that the
industrialised economies inherited from post-colonial maritime
power while, on the other hand, changes might be forced upon
international maritime regulations (including environmental
regulations) to bring them more in line with these countries
levels of competitiveness3; (ii) there will be a displacement of the
geo-strategic centre of gravity towards the maritime domain as a
result of the jurisdictional expansion of the BRIC countries
towards the EEZ and the extended continental shelf and of an
economy with a greater maritime element, to the degree that
these states (particularly China, India and the Russian Federation)
represent the continental power model over worldly power
according to the Mackinder postulates [5]. This displacement of
the continental and ocean mass would take place within the
context of a wider displacement of economic power from the west
to the east, with the consequent change of the geopolitical
landscape.4 It could therefore be suggested that Mackinders
popular concept of heartland might be replaced sometimes in the
future by the concept of heartsea.
This analysis of the maritime dimension of the BRIC block is
divided into three sections: (i) maritime geography as a startingpoint that allows the spatial bases of these states to be dened;
(ii) the geopolitical consequences of the combination of strong
maritime territory structures and high economic dynamism; (iii)
governance (or new ocean governance) adapted to the goals and/
or priorities of new actors in international relations.
3
This is something that might be laid at the door of many countries but would
be more pronounced in the BRIC countries as they head economic growth at a rate
that far outpaces the rest of the world, and they are genuine illustrations of the
growth-rst mentality [3, p. 57].
4
A change of the geopolitical framework on a global scale as the result of the
rise of wannabe powers (basically the BRIC countries) is addressed in the
National Intelligence Councils analytical forecasts [3,6,7].
2. Maritime geography
As a group of geographical entities, the BRIC countries bear a
certain weight on the global scale: they are home to 42% of the
world population and occupy 25.6% of emerged land (Table 1).
Individually they respectively head the rankings of population
(China), and land surface area (Russian Federation). This same
order of magnitudes also holds true for the oceans: the four
countries joint EEZ represents 9.2% of the world total5; the total
expanse of the BRIC block maritime jurisdictional area6
constitutes 4.5% of ocean surface area, and the total length of
these countries coasts is 18% of the world total. Russia, Brazil and
India generate extensive exclusive economic zones (over 2 million
square kilometres (583,000 n. sq. mi.) in all three cases) and their
relative locations, as well as that of China, provide them with a
wide-ranging maritime presence on a regional scale (Fig. 1). All
the BRIC countries are signatories to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea7 (UNCLOS); India and the
Russian Federation declared their exclusive economic zones
before the Convention was approved (1982) while Brazil and
China did likewise in the nineteen-nineties (Table 2). All four
countries have already initiated claims to their jurisdiction over
the continental shelf outside the 200 n. mi. limit.8 To be precise, it
was the Russian Federation that was the rst state in the
international community to present a proposal for delimitation
[9] (2001) to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf [10]; Brazil [11] was the second to do so (2004)
and both India [12] and China did the same on the same day in
2009, although the latter restricted itself to presenting a rst
information report [13]. The importance that this jurisdictional
area (the continental margin) has in extending these states
territorial sovereignty over the marine environment can be
appreciated in their percentages of the EEZ: 28.5% Brazil, 27.2%
India, and 16.9% the Russian Federation.
The BRIC countries project over the seas in four of the ve
oceans: the Arctic (the Russian Federation), the Atlantic (Brazil),
the Pacic (the Russian Federation and China) and the Indian
Ocean (India). Their greatest presence in the oceans can be found
around the Eurasian continent. This is especially due to the
Russian Federations rights of sovereignty over the Arctic Ocean
and Indias dual seaboards (the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian
Sea). This compacting of the Eurasian mass and its outlying waters
forms a connection between Chinese and Indian strategic areas
and the maritime trafc ows that link these countries with the
global network and, especially, with the mega-port and harbour
system of Eastern Asia. However, Brazil and its maritime space are
not located in the mainstream and have no links with the
principal strategic maritime world scenarios. It does introduce the
southern hemisphere into the block of emerging powers, how-
5
This calculation of the world total is made taking the surface area based on
the 200 nm line.
6
Exclusive economic zone plus extended continental shelf (continental
margin beyond 200 nm) claimed by this group of countries to date.
7
Brazil (22.12.1988); India (29.06.1995); China (07.06.1996); Russian Federation (12.03.1997). All four are also signatories to Part XI and (with the exception of
China) the Agreement on Straddling Stocks [8].
8
This process, which is dealt with by the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS), does not imply that the United Nations recognises any
sovereignty over the area in question. It is the responsibility of the CLCS to assess
the quality and scientic rigour of the proposal, not to solve territorial disputes.
There have indeed been reactions from a number of countries which have either
stated their reservations on the matter, or put forward arguments on certain
precise issues: notications have been made by Canada, Japan, Norway and the
United States in response to the Russian Federations proposal; thus far, a single
notication by the United States in response to Brazils; and notications
presented by Myanmar and Bangladesh in response to the proposal made by
India (see [9]).
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Table 1
Basic geographical data.
Pases
Population
(000)a
Land area
(sq. km)b
EEZ
Coast length
(km)b
sq. km
World
rankingc
EEZ/CL
Extended CS
(sq. km)/
dated
% ECS/EEZ
426
911,847e
17.05.2004
1,279,800f
20.12.2001
628,327g
11.05.2009
28.5
Brazil
195,493
8,514,877
3,191,827
14
7,491
Russian
140,367
17,075,200
7,566,673
37,653
200.9
India
1,214,464
3,28,263
2,305,143
21
7,000
329.3
China
1,354,146
9,326,410
879,666
36
14,500
60.6
16.9
27.2
Source: Author.
a
UN Population Division.
CIA Factbook.
c
Author from VLIZ (http://www.vliz.be/); Sea around us Project (www.seaaroundus.org/).
d
CLCS website (http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm).
e
Continental Shelf and UNCLOS Article 76. Brazilian Submission. Executive Summary. Brazilian Continental Shelf Survey Project, 2004.
f
[14].
g
Author.
b
EEZ boundaries
India EEZ
Arctic Circle
India extended CS
China EEZ
Brazil EEZ
ever, due to its territorial size and its resource potential, turning
the south-western Atlantic into an area of new global strategic
interest. It is in the marine areas of greater territorial complexity
(neighbouring states and opposed states, insularity and territorial
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Table 2
UNCLOS status.
Country
Brazil
Russian
India
China
UNCLOS
Ratication accession
Part XI
Agreement FS
22.12.88
12.03.97
29.06.95
07.06.96
25.10.07
12.03.97
29.06.95
07.06.96
08.03.00
04.08.97
19.08.03
This is the sum of the various EEZs and the surface area of the extended
continental shelf. The gure of 3 million sq. km. (875,000 n. sq. mi.) is used for
China, which includes its EEZ, its potential extended continental shelf and its
claims for sovereignty over a number of islands in the South China Sea [16].
10
See, amongst others, those prepared by the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) [3,6,7] with a maritime focus [17]. From an academic point-of-view, see:
International Futures (http://www.ifs.du.edu/).
11
Coinciding with the growing importance of Asia and particularly of China,
and from the European perspective (European Union Institute for Security
Studies), the arc that connects the immediate area around Europe with the Far
East (Suez-Shanghai) is emphasised [18].
12
According to International Futures (cit. by Rogers [18, p. 41]) Chinas
percentage share of world power in 2050 would be 23.07 compared to 15.98% for
the United States; Indias share would be 12.39%. The United States, together with
the European Union, Japan and Russia would develop negatively between 2009
and 2050. The 2025 Global Trends report (which cites the International Future
Model) states that in 2025 the United States will maintain its share of power over
China, despite negative development compared to China, India, Russia and Brazil,
which all increase their share of world power [3, p. 28].
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Table 3
Maritime scenarios.
Country
Maritime
jurisdictiona
(EEZ + ECS) sq km.
Key issues
Neighbour states
Remarks
Brazil
4,103,674
Oil-gas
Russian
8,846,473
Uruguay, Argentina,
French Guiana
USA, Canada, Denmark,
Norway
India
2,933,470
Shipping. Oil-gas
Shipping
Brazil is uncontested
leader
Under populated
region. Convergence
of great world
powers
Over populated. No
coastal countries in
the region (Indian
Ocean) to dispute
leadership. Chinas
security extends
over this region
Over populated.
Territorial Conicts
China
879,666
Oil-gas. Environment.
World shipping routes
Source: Author.
a
b
c
EEZ boundaries
China EEZ
India EEZ
India extended CS
Russian Fed. EEZ
Russian Fed. Extended CS
Source: Author based on
1. VLIZ, Maritime Boundaries Geodatabase
2. Oceans and Law of the Seas, Commission on
the Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS)
MARINEPLAN
University of Seville
Department of Human Geography
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half the people in the world live in the coastal countries around
these seas.15 With the claims for jurisdiction made to date, China
and India project their sovereignty over almost 4 million sq. km.
(1,166,000 sq. n. m.), although 6 million (1,750,000) could be the
nal gure (see note 9). As the greatest seaway for maritime
trafc in the world16 passes through the waters of the Indian
Ocean, and the western Pacic (Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Straits
of Malacca and Singapore, South China Sea and South East China
Sea), these two BRIC countries are considered to form a single
geo-maritime scenario: two areas of jurisdiction linked by the
powerful trade ow which hinges on the Asian straits, thus
causing great inter-dependance between the two states.17 This
said, as the country heading the strong growth not only in the
region but of the world economy, China is attributed the
geostrategic willand need to extend its inuence and power
over the maritime arc that stretches from the Arabian Sea to the
South East China Sea.18 Nevertheless, this concentration of
population and economic potential is not proportional to the
degree that these two powers command dominion over
neighbouring maritime areas. Although in both cases the
expectation of accessing conventional offshore energy resources
exists, strong economic growth maintains the high level of
dependance on energy resources and other raw materials, which
both aggravates the feeling of vulnerability and geostrategic risk,
and explains the two countries plans for military modernisation
(of the navy, especially) [19,28]. As such, lines of communication
are the dominant feature in this geo-maritime scenario, which is a
paradigm of the globalised world, with a high percentage of trade
ows originating from, or destined for, countries outside the
region [29]. The constriction of the maritime area available to
these two demographic and economic powers, in an area shared
by a high number of (continental and island) states (Table 3),
might lead to the creation of an expansive naval power in a quest
for greater security due to a marked dependance on trade ows in
an unstable environment.19
2.1.3. The Southern scenario
With Brazils growth, maritime expansion and leadership, the
southern hemisphere has assumed greater importance on the
world stage. This is one of the features that has to be stressed
since, in the new global geopolitical structure, and aside from the
shift of power from west to east, the Brazilian focus entails a
swing towards the southern hemisphere (Fig. 3). One contributing
factor to this is Brazils great maritime expansion on the back of
large quantities of recently discovered hydrocarbon reserves
15
The total joint population of China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Japan and the Philippines is almost 3.5 billion. Two of these nine countries have
populations of over one billion inhabitants and four, of over one hundred million
[25].
16
Thirty percent of world trade and 25% of the world eet passes through the
Strait of Malacca yearly [26]. The EUs maritime trade with Asia represents 26.25%
of all transcontinental trafc by sea; for the 20062016 period it is estimated that
container trafc between Europe and Asia will grow by 121% [18].
17
Both states are interested in the stability and security of the marine
environment across which the huge amounts of raw materials and commercial
goods generated by their high growth rates are shipped; this does not imply that
the historical differences between both will remain, although a strategic alliance
cannot be totally ruled out [27].
18
This arc is called the string of pearls; from an energy point-of-view, it is
vital for China, to which 40% of the new demand for oil in the world can be
attributed with seventy percent of the fuel being used in the country coming the
Middle East and Africa [28]. India, meanwhile, has a similar dependence on
external energy to China, with about 70% of the energy resources used in the
country being brought in by sea [19].
19
Although the piracy rate has dropped dramatically in the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore, intense activity continues, although focusing on local shing boats.
In other regards, it can be highlighted that the 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai
also came from the sea [29].
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EEZ boundaries
Brazil EEZ
Ecuatorial line
Brazil extended CS
973
MARINEPLAN
University of Seville
Department of Human Geography
Table 4
BRIC ports in the world top one hundred (2008).
Country
No.
ports
Brazil
Russia
India
China
Santos (44th)
St Petersburg (69th)
Jawaharlal Nehru (24th), Chennai (91st)
Shanghai (2nd), Hong Kong (3rd), Shenzhen (4th), Qingdao (10th),
Ningbo-Zhoushan (11th), Guangzhou (12th), Tianjin (17th), Xiamen
(22nd), Dalian (26th), Lianyungang (57 th), Suzhou (62nd), Yingkou
(79th), Zhongshan (81st), Yantai (82nd), Fuzhou (84th), Nanjing
(90th), Quanzhou (93rd)
1
1
2
17
2,532,900
1,697,720
5,112,993
126,020,000
0.63
0.42
1.26
31.17
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Table 5
BRIC country eets.
Country
Brazil
Russia
India
China
USA
World total
DWT
4,421,361
18,037,890
16,053,485
84,881,703
39,828,150
1,038,296,589
% of world total
0.43
1.74
1.55
8.18
3.84
100.00
Position in ranking
31st
14th
16th
4th
6th
No. vessels
Own ag
Foreign ag
130
1,532
474
1,900
855
16,798
14
579
60
1,403
914
19,515
% of world total
Position in ranking
0.40
5.81
1.47
9.09
4.87
100.00
31st
5th
18th
2nd
7th
21
The political goals included in the COS are understanding and protecting
the marine environment, and encouraging and supporting sustainable economic
opportunities among others [36].
22
The AOP is an integrated and comprehensive ocean policy that arose with
two aims of the greatest strategic interest: the full development of rights of
sovereignty over the EEZ and ensuring the ecologically sustainable development of
ocean resources both for the creation of wealth and in order to protect the
environment [37,38].
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MAP: Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the
sustainable Development of the Coastal Areas of the Mediterranean
MSFD: Maritime Strategy Framework Directive.
NL: Netherlands
NO: Norway
NZ : New Zealand
OSPAR: Convention for the protection and conservation the North-East
Atlantic and its resources.
PT: Portugal
RU: Russia
SCT: Scothland
Thematic Strategy: Thematic Strategy for the protection and conservation of
the marine environment.
UK: United Kingdom
UNCED: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
UNCHE: United Nations Conference of the Human Environment.
UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
UNFCCC COP-15: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (Copenhagen)
US: United States
WSSD: World Summit on Sustainable Development
23
24
Law of the Peoples Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone (1992) and Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the
Peoples Republic of China (1998).
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4. Concluding remarks
25
A social objective that has been stressed once again when the creation of a
specic social fund using the benets generated by the exploitation of marine oil
was proposed.
26
The different actions that should be undertaken to achieve said objectives
are coordinated by the member organisations of the Inter-Ministerial Commission
for Marine Resources, created in 1974 and regulated by a Decree in 2001.
establishment as a naval power founded in its huge recentlydiscovered offshore energy potential.27
In their position as territorial entities with a powerful
maritime projection, the BRIC countries dene new geopolitical spaces. The Arctic and Southern scenarios represent the
expansion of the ecumene towards new areas that hereto were
located outside the mainstream strategic economic centres.
The maritimisation of the Eurasian territories and economies, the planets economic and demographic core displaces
the worlds geopolitical centre of gravity towards maritime
space, which could be interpreted as a change in the essence of
classical geopolitical thinking.28 The EU, with its projection
over all the worlds oceans [51] is present in one of these new
scenarios (the Arctic) and has expressed an interest in this
space in its IMP (Northern Dimension policy).29
The BRIC countries maritime policies, spurred on by the
growth rate, the search for competitiveness and a strong
dependance on maritime trade to satisfy a constant demand
for raw materials, do not envisage advancing and universalising social rights and good management practices in maritime
activities as a priority. A comparison with the EUs Integrated
Maritime Policy (Table 6) provides signicant references in
matters of a social nature, such as the promotion of
professional careers and employment within a framework of
greater job security and raising seafarers work conditions to
be on a par with those found in EU regulations. The weakness
of the social aspect of BRIC policies is, therefore, its strength in
the highly competitive environment of the maritime world
exacerbated by the economic and nancial crisis.
The BRIC countries ocean development might represent a
threat for the approaches that inspire and guide the EUs
Integrated Maritime Policy, not only because of these countries internal dynamics (extremely extendible to other very
similarly-placed countries, such as Indonesia and South
Africa), but due to the alliances that they might forge with
other powers regarding aspects that are crucial to the
maritime economy. The outcome of the UNFCCC COP-15, with
a nal agreement that had been previously arranged between
the USA, China, India, Brazil and South Africa,30 is proof of how
the EU could be affected with regard to other intrinsically
global situations like maritime policy: supplanted by the joint
interests of the still greatest world power and a conglomerate
of emerging powers.
The BRIC phenomenon and the consequent conguration of
what could be termed the Blue BRIC put ocean governance in
a new geopolitical context. In territorial terms, about half the
surface area of the waters under national jurisdiction correspond to countries with a Human Development Index that is
either medium or low and which groups together two-thirds of
the States in the world. In turn, this majority of national
political entities, together with the remaining developed
States, are jointly responsible for 60% of the oceans that still
bear the legal status of high seas. All ocean space (40% under
national jurisdiction plus the high seas and the zone) must
therefore be governed by political systems that still require
signicant institutional improvements and progress in the
27
The approaches and goals of the National Defence Strategy (2008) are
interesting in this regardsea denial, control of maritime areas, power projection[50] and plans for the building of a rst nuclear submarine.
28
The concept of heartland or geographical pivot was formulated by
Halford Mackinder in 1905 in his work The Geographical Pivot of History [5].
29
The Commissions political vision in the IMP is formally expressed in a
document dated 2008 [52].
30
The international press reported on this circumstance: the agreement
struck between the USA and major emerging countries [5355].
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Table 6
EUs IMP responses to global challenges.
Global challenges
Action Plan: 6.3 Action on Mitigation and Adaptation to Climate Change/Action on risk reduction policies and their
economic impacts; coastal regions
Specic action: Community strategy for disaster prevention (2008); Development of strategy for adaptation to Climate
Change (2008)
Milestone: White Paper: Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for action, COM (2009) 147,
01.04.2009
2. Over-exploitation of natural
resources and key ecosystems for
producing food as a consequence of
the increase in the human
population
4.5 Air pollution by ships (promote use of shore-side electricity by ships at berth in EU ports. Evaluate options for EU
legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; 6.3 (b) Carbon capture and storage (Enabling legal framework for CCS
(2007)
Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2008/56/EC (Art. 1: to achieve or maintain good environmental status in the
marine environment by the year 2020 at the latest
Specic action: Support ECSA (European Community Shipowners Associations) and ETF (European Transport Workers
Federation) in their ongoing negotiations to transpose elements of ILO Maritime Labour Convention
Milestone: Agreement concluded by ECSA and ETF on the Maritime Labour Convention 2006, 19.05.08
Action Plan: 4.3 (a) Promotion of employment for seafarers
Specic action: Proposal for a directive on Article 139 ECT (implementation of ILO Convention)
Milestone: Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the Agreement concluded by the ECSA and ETF on the
Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 and amending Directive 1999/63/EC, COM(2008) 422, 02.07.08; Political agreement
in Council, 17 December 2008, EP approval 14 January 2009
Action Plan: 4.3 (b) Qualications of seafarers
Specic action: Action Plan on qualications of seafarers; 2nd semester 2009
Milestone: No
Action Plan: 4.3 (c) Exclusions of maritime professions from EU social legislation and working conditions
Specic action: Communication launching the reassessment of the exclusions of maritime sectors from EU labour law,
October 2007
Milestone: Reassessing the regulatory social framework for more and better seafaring jobs in the EU (rst phase
consultation of the social partners at Community level provided for in Article 138(2) of the Treaty), COM(2007) 591,
10.10.07
6. Relocation of economic activities.
Transfer from Northern Atlantic
development hubs to more dynamic
areas in Asia-Pacic area
Action Plan: 4.1 Development of multi-sectoral clusters and regional centres of maritime excellence
ARTICLE IN PRESS
rez de Vivero, J.C. Rodrguez Mateos / Marine Policy 34 (2010) 967978
J.L. Sua
978
quality of their democratic structure and participatory systems. As has already been demonstrated in other global issues,
the BRIC countries are capable of tilting policies of this type
(such as the ocean policy) towards positions that would
hamper the development of options like the EUs Integrated
Maritime Policy.
Acknowledgement
Research in Brazil-related aspects was done with the invaluable assistance of Pilar Carolina Villar (University of Sao Paulo,
Brazil).
GIS: Concepcion Jimenez Sanchez.
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