Miller, Aristotle and The Origins of Natural Rights

Aristotle and the Origins of Natural Rights
Author(s): Fred D. Miller Jr.

Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Jun., 1996), pp. 873-907
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AND THEORIGINSOF NATURALRIGHTS

ARISTOTLE
FRED D. MILLER, Jr.
In
Nature,
three main
and Rights
in Aristotle's
Justice,
to Aristotle:
that a metaphysical
theses
of the foundations
part
tice
is central
of political
to practical
philosophy;
and that
politics;
I attributed
Politics,
is
theory of nature
the virtue of jus
a fully just constitution
that
will
the rights of citizens.

The third thesis
and protect
is espe
respect
a widely
it challenges
because
shared view
that
cially controversial
is a modern
the concept
of rights
which
is
discovery
(or innovation)
alien to the thought
of Aristotle
and of classical
writers
and
altogether
this currently
established
view
is itself
However,
generally.
recent development.
in the nineteenth
Commentators
comparatively
thinkers
and much
century
Aristotle's
observed,
he
which
of the
based
ars were
and
correct,
politics which
totle's
he
right which
ought
in a society
earlier schol
to enjoy
that these
I argued
equality."1
a philosophical
I offered
reconstruction
a theory of justice and individual
included
over
The
disagreement
form unavoidably
some
twentieth
translated
and explicated
century
in terms of "rights."
Politics
For example,
Ernest
Barker
as bound
to do the duty
to
"Plato thinks of the individual
is called as an organ of the State: Aristotle
thinks of the indi
as deserving
the
on (proportionate)
vidual
whether
Aristotle
involves
recognized
over what
of Aris
rights.
in
rights
disagreement
rights are,
is no con
is still highly
contested.
There
how rights are to
"(a) right" is to be defined,
or
how
is
to
be theoretically
in par
be applied
grounded,
rights theory
a good reason
to dismiss
ticular circumstances.
This is not, however,
and
the theory of rights

sensus
how
concerning
the
issue
modern
of whether
rights
itself
are
in Aristotle:
for Aristotle,
rights
is concerned
about the moral
and legal
there
theorists,
like
status
to: Social Philosophy

and Policy
Correspondence
Center,
Bowling
Green State University,
Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0188.
Ernest
Barker, The Political
Thought
of Plato and Aristotle
(London:
in chapter 4 of Fred
Methuen
and Company,
1906), 235. I cite other examples
D. Miller, Jr., Nature,
and Rights
in Aristotle's
Politics
Justice,
(hereafter
Oxford
University
Press, 1995).
NJR) (Oxford:
The Review
of Metaphysics
49
(June
1996):
873-907.
Copyright
1996
Metaphysics

by The Review
of
874
FREDD. MILLER, Jr.
of the
within
individual
the community,
and he expresses
this in terms
issue is worthy
of study not only because
it
of Aristotle's
of justice
conceptions
understanding
of claims
of justice.
lead to a deeper
can
The
and the common
good,
foundations
itmay
but also because
light on the
a theory of po
shed valuable
of human
since he offers
rights,
on
a
litical justice which
theory of human nature.
metaphysical
I shall discuss
here
the principal
issues
the place
of
concerning
are
in Aristotles
which
raised by the preceding
politics
essays.2
rights
to make
I seeks
clear the features which
Section
Aristotle's
theory of
theoretical
is based
shares
justice
(and does not
the relation
tion II considers
share) with modern

rights
of rights to the concepts
theories.
Sec
of justice
and
III concerns
the politi
in Aristotles
Section
theory.
(or desert)
of rights in Aristotle's
and whether
this makes
cal dimension
thought,
to play a serious
and precarious"
role in his polit
them too "derivative
in
IV addresses
ical theory.
Section
Aristotle's
pro
problems
viewing
merit
"best
posed
cusses
the
theorists
as a regime
of rights.
section
Finally,
on which
Aristotle
and modern
constitution"
fundamental
issue
the place
disagree:
in the exercise
of liberty
of individual
V dis
rights
rights.
forms.
for exam
of rights take varied
Consider,
accounts
have a right
of what
it is that individuals
ple, the opposing
to. Libertarians
have only the right to nega
maintain
that individuals
Modern
tive
liberty,
In contrast,
to welfare,
theories
from
is, to freedom
contend
social democrats
that
the
initiation
that all
of force
individuals
by others.
are entitled
use
that the government
coercion
require
or
some
to
in
to
services
others.
order
persons
provide
goods
against
as a rights
as to who should be counted
There are also disagreements
holder.
which
Many
may
persons
(including
those
in various
religious
groups)
2The
of Metaphys
following articles appear in this issue of The Review
"Aristotle on Human Nature and Political Virtue," pp. 731
ics: Julia Annas,
"Justice and Rights in Aristotle's
Politics," pp. 859-872;
753; John M. Cooper,
Richard Kraut, "Are There Any Natural Rights in Aristotle?" pp. 755-774; Rod
of Freedom,"
erick T. Long, "Aristotle's Conception
pp. 775-802; A. S. Mc
Grade, "Aristotle's Place in the History of Natural Rights," pp. 803-829; and
I cite these es
Malcolm
pp. 831-858.
Schofield,
"Sharing in the Constitution,"
this is not
says in parentheses
by page number, and by author's name where
obvious.

THEORIGINSOF NATURALRIGHTS
hold that all living persons
875
(including unborn babies) have the right to
be violated
while many
others deny that
life, which would
by abortion,
have any rights.
human
fetuses
this din of discordant
Through
rights
a
a
concordant
theme
be
discernible:
is a
may
claims,
however,
right
a member
which
claim
has against
the
of justice
of a community
other members
vidual
rights
has moral
munity
This
open.
rights
every
of justice
indi
supports
individual within
the com
to protection.
leaves
obviously
is the
what
example,
claims
derivable
merely
Are all rights merely
ble?
there
Further,
relation
between
many
questions
and
justice
rights:
or are
of justice,
a deeper
theory
moral
Are
concepts?
rights based
or are they in some sense objectively
grounded?
or are some rights indefeasi
prima facie
claims,
from
irreducible
are
the disputes
object of a rights
what
is the ultimate
basic
right, and, if so, does

or a right to welfare?
omy,
theory
and
standing
formulation
fundamental,
on convention,
rights
and a claim
abstract
For
are
of the community.
if it entails
that each
it consist
And who
to above:
of application
alluded
to
claim: is the right
life the most
a
in
fundamentally
right to auton
belongs
to the rights
community
of rights holders? Although it is (almost universally) agreed today that

all living human
beings
or "brain-dead"
unborn
would
possess
human
Some
theorists
confer
tions,
These
tribes, and families,

and other questions
beings,
"collective"
or on artificial
are
the
and
contemporary
rights
theorists,
serve to distinguish
the rights theories
John
individual
ual
rights
He
Cooper
has a direct
rights which
have an important
place
to a distinctively
modern
points
is first
fully
fairly
explicit
things.
perfectly
rights
entities
as corporations.
intense
debate
among
such
of
subject
the disparate
which
issue
are
answers
to
them
in contention
today.
the nature
of
concerning
on my thesis
bearing
in Aristotle's
political
line of thought which
that
individ
philosophy.
he remarks
it is already
arguably,
moral
and mere
persons
can
"an ancient
thinker
like Aristotle
Cooper
(p. 863) argues,
as such, vol
well find important
value
in individual
persons,
and on their own understandings
and choice,
in the
engaging
locate
that make
the preeminent
ing, through cooperation

ual
over
controversy
and
animals,
plants.
on groups
such as na
is still
nonhuman
by Hegel?although,
distinction
between
expressed
in Kant's
untarily,
good activities
can
a fundamental
raises
there
rights,
so conceived.
goods
as an important
good
a good one; and he

life of a community
as such achiev
in individuals
value
political
the
in the public life of the society, their individr
However,
the exercise
he does
not
of one's
individual
and
cannot
will

envisage
simply
in
876
FREDD. MILLER, JR.
own subjectivity,
one
out for oneself,
in one's
what
working
things
will find good, and then doing or enjoying
This is
them, as so selected.
what Hegel
calls the 'principle of subjective
freedom'?the
idea that in
in each of
of infinite worth
this power we have something
possessing
us
If a theory
of
individual
indeed presup
rights does
of
then
there would
subjective
freedom,"
"principle
to
it
to support
that
is anachronistic
the thesis
argument
individually."
the Hegelian
pose
be a strong
the
ascribe
language
However,
of rights
to Aristotle.
Cooper
(p. 865)
One can agree
himself
suggests
that modern,
in the way
that Hegel
this
a way
of addressing
of
theories
"full-fledged
and that the
suggested
difficulty.
rights" arose historically
in many
of rights have a central
ories
contemporary
place
political
of the importance
because
theories
upon the "principle
widely
placed
We might
that this his
freedom."
of subjective
reject the implication
tory is "part of the very concept
lians we can see the usefulness
political
noting
Cooper
of an
theory
that he did not
thinker
ancient
recognize
"On this basis,
continues,
but also justified,
titled,
and interpreting
Now
itself
of this
in using
of a right."
Yet, as post-Hege
the
"rights" in explicating
like Aristotle,
while
carefully
term
subjective
then, we
the
freedom
can claim
language
as a core
value.
not only to be en
in translating
of rights
Aristotle."
regarding
Aristotle
Cooper's
as talking
question
of rights
of whether
"it is legitimate
or natural
rights
to
in
of justice,
so
not
while
of
prin
Hegel's
endorsing
particular,
legal rights too,
answer
in
In
the
affirmative.
I
of
of
course,
would,
subjectivity,"
ciple
commentators
have
that recent
the first place, Cooper may be correct
describe
and
like Aristotle
be
thinkers
of "rights" to earlier
imputation
is
of
If
this
the
the
have
embraced
analysis
rights.
Hegelian
they
are simply mistaken,
it is
because
these commentators
case, however,
of
sub
not the case that all theories
of rights assume Hegel's
principle
resisted
the
cause
such as the
justify
rights on other grounds,
or
of flourishing
in a neo
value
the ultimate
of human
life,
sanctity
sense.
to such theories,
the specific
Aristotelian
right to
According
that such a right is indispens
is justified
liberty
only on the grounds
or
for the
that it is necessary
of human
able for the protection
life,
jectivity.
achievement
Other
theories
of flourishing.
(I shall
say more
about
this
in section
V.)
What is distinctive about a theory of rights as such is that it prohibits

to ad
as unjust
in order
of individuals
and their ends
the sacrifice
or of groups
vance
of individuals.
individuals
of other
the interests
a theory of rights is opposed
to a normative
theory
Thus, for example,

THEORIGINSOF NATURALRIGHTS 877

as act utilitarianism,
in order
interests
such
which
sanctions
the sacrifice
of the
individ
to promote,
"the greatest
roughly
speaking,
the
for
number."
greatest
good
a theory of rights
Aristotle's
theory of political
justice
supports
an
he understands
sense.
because
in
individualistic
That is,
justice
when
Aristotle
the common
equates
political
justice with
advantage
ual's
he understands
"common"
in an indi
ouî(|)8qov),3
(xoivrj)
sense.
I am using
the term "individualistic"
in a special
sense here,
in which
to "holistic."4
it is opposed
On the holistic
view
so
is
with
the
overall
that
it
the
sanctions
justice
equated
advantage,
as
a
sacrifice
to
of individual
in order
citizens
make
the polis
whole
(t? xoivfi
vidualistic
some citizens
the majority)
off, or the benefitting
(for example,
at the expense
of others
on
the minority).
In contrast,
(for example,
the individualistic
common
must
the
the
view,
fully just polis
promote
better
of its members,
in the sense of the mutual
rather
advantage
advantage
than at the overall
must
That
aim
at
it
virtue
the
and
is,
advantage.
a
of each and every citizen,
not at
collective
happiness
goal attained
as
a
or
the
not
some mem
in
whole
but
its
which
by
polis
by
members,
to the exclusion
bers
partake
ism reflects
ard
Zeller
Aristotle
from
Plato:
demands
that
the whole
interests
of the
with
Plato
satisfaction
garded."5
extreme
purely
which
morally
of others.
a deep metaphysical
this as the
perceived
"In politics
is the Universal,
with
individuals:
of all
the
individual
individualism,
self-confined
which
and
that
activity,
fundamental
as
Aristotle
of divergence
of
central
point
Individual.
The former
the
its ends without

that
latter
it should
that have
to make
a further
regard to the
be reared upon the
a true
title
distinction
to be
example,
the good of the individual

and moderate
individualism,
includes
good
other-regarding
acts
of
courage,
3See Politics
re
between
that
self-regarding,
the individual
for
the
realise
holds
individual
political
to the individual.
Edu
point
in metaphysics
interests
it is necessary
However,
recognizes
virtuous
should
Aristotle's
commitment
is
generosity,
3.12.1282b 16-18; cf. Nicomachean

Ethics
(hereafter NE)
8.9.1160al3-14.
5.1.1129bl4-19,
41 am using "individualistic"
in a narrow sense to characterize
a theory
of justice.
In applying
it to Aristotle
I do not mean
to imply that Aristotle
thinks that the good varies from individual to individual, that the good is de
fined by subjective
choice or desire,
that individuals
should be free to do
whatever
they wish, and so forth.
5Eduard Zeller, Aristotle
and the Earlier
trans. B. F. C.
Peripatetics,
Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), 2:224-6.

878
FRED D. MILLER, Jr.
of each
I argue
and justice.
friendship,
individualist
theory
and
of justice
individual.6
every
that Aristotle
which
to a moderate
subscribes
is concerned
with
It is in this crucial
sense
the happiness
I contend
that
entails a theory of rights.

theory of justice
Aristotle's
does differ deeply
from
Nonetheless,
theory of justice
he lacks a concept
modern
because
theories?not
of rights, but be
a political
cause he presupposes
and theoretical
context
at
radically
that Aristotle's
variance
city-state
community
with
the modern.
Most
is the role of the polis
important
on Aristotle's
in his political
The
is
account
polis
thought.
out of more
which
forms
develops
naturally
primitive
that
association,
is, households
the
"attaining
and
"complete"
the good
life.7 The
state?an
association
polis
does
or
a
of
as
and villages,
and it is distinguished
limit of self-sufficiency"
and aiming
at
not correspond
to the modern
political
a monopoly
over the legitimized
use
possessing
a
one
com
definite
of force within
area?which
is only
geographical
of
modern
Rather
the
is
for
Aristotle
the most
society.
ponent
polis
as
as
well
the most
Aris
authoritative,
Hence,
inclusive,
community.8
of the political
is a fused
attributes
concept,
polis
combining
now generally
to civil society
state with
ascribed
features
(including
and
other
forms
of
economic,
association).
religious,
totle's
Aristotle
and
that
jtoXxtixov
argues that a polis
a human
?
is by
being
These
doctrines
ov).9
to which
ogy, according
to natural
rected
ends,
itself exists by nature (eoTi fyvoe?)

nature
assume
living organisms
like the proverbial
a political
Aristotle's
animal
natural
(fyvoei
teleol
are
di
entities
self-moving
acorn which
into an
grows
for this in detail in chapter 6 of NJR and can only

61present the evidence
here. Aristotle's
refer briefly to a few important passages
critique of Plato's
a critique of the communistic
in Politics
2 not only contains
Republic
of property and child-rearing,
with an explicit
but also concludes
schemes
"the polis as
critique of Plato's (alleged) claim that the lawgiver should make
a whole" happy without
to
of
the
its
individual
members
happiness
regard
connects
the
In Politics
3.6.1278b21-4
Aristotle
explicitly
(5.1264M5-24).
common advantage
(to xoivrj oi^(j)8Qov) with the noble life falling to each
as that order under
"the best constitution"
(?xccoTO)) individual. He describes
act in the best way and live
which
anyone whatsoever
might
(ogtioouv)
evidence
is provided by his arguments
Additional
blessedly"
(7.2.1324a23-5).
to property
and
should have access
that all citizens of the best constitution
education
(see section II below).
1.2.1252b27-30.
'See Politics
1.1.1252a4-6.
sSee Politics
1.2.1253al-3.
9See Politics

879
THEORIGINSOF NATURAL
RIGHTS
oak
tree.
Analogously,
every polis exists by nature, since the first communities

ture]. For it is their end (T8ô?) and nature is an end.
what each thing is when
its coming to be is completed
each thing, for example, of a human being, a horse, or a
also [are by na
For we say that
is the nature of
household.10
more
that the polis

is prior by
Aristotle
contends
radically,
sense
are
in the
nature
to the individual
human beings
that individuals
not self-sufficient
when
from the polis.
That is, they
they are separated
can perform
or achieve
their natural
their function,
end, fully only
Even
human
they are citizens of a polis.11 Hence,
to a self-sufficient
condition
only if they belong
when
Although
the polis is by nature a collective
exist
beings
political
in a natural
community.
entity (jtAijBo? ti t?]v
in the strict
and thus not a substance
2.2.1261al8),
(jy?oiv; Politics
a
sense
a
it
human
is
natural
extension
of
substances
(as
being
is),
can be in a natural
is analogous
to them.
As an organism
and
(healthy)
or unnatural
(diseased)
ral (just) or unnatural

natural
(just)
constitution.
(jy?oiv), whereas
fyVOlv).12
This
(unjust) condition.
or not
condition
A
condition,
correct
a deviant
depends
constitution
constitution
the polis
Whether
on whether
is according
is contrary
can be
in a natu
the polis
it has
is in a
a correct
to nature
(xaT?
to nature
(na??
to explain Aristotle's
dis
helps
of rights.
he af
First, because
agreement
on the polis, he would
firms
of the individual
the radical dependence
not accept
notion
of a prepolitical
"state of nature."13 Accord
Locke's
a panoply
to
of rights to life,
Lockean
individuals
possess
theory,
ing
liberty,
naturalism
theory of political
with most modern
theories
and property
in the state
of nature,
but
they voluntarily
enter
are the
All translations
10Politics 1.2.1252b30-4
(author's translation).
author's unless otherwise
indicated.
the role of nature in Aristo
Regarding
I am in substantial
tle's ethics and politics,
agreement with Annas, pp. 731-6.
see Miller, NJR,
For further discussion
of Aristotle's
political
naturalism,
chap. 2, and-,
"Naturalism," in The Cambridge History
of Ancient Politi
cal Thought,
ed. Malcolm
Schofield
and C. J. Rowe (Cambridge: Cambridge
of interpretations
of Aris
A useful overview
University
Press, forthcoming).
is Allan Gotthelf,
in Final Causal
totelian teleology
"Aristotle's Teleology,"
and Human
ed. R. F. Hassing
D.C.: The
ity in Nature
Affairs,
(Washington,
Catholic University
of America Press, forthcoming).
nCf. Politics
1.2.1253al8-29.
12Cf.Politics
3.17.1287b37-41.
13
to Locke, in the state of nature all mankind
"one
According
comprise
See Second Treatise
under the law of nature.
community"
9.218, cited by
Long, p. 784 n. 37.

FREDD. MILLER, Jr.
880
state
the political
rights more
effectively,
On this view
the legiti
it respects
the antecedently
to safeguard
these
collective
enforcement.
in order
their
by authorizing
of
macy
government
on whether
depends
or
If the government
defined
individual
natural
fails to protect
rights.
most
individuals
violates
their rights,
retain rights
it,
impor
against
its commands,
rebel against
it, and replace
tantly the right to disobey
in contrast,
it with another.
For Aristotle,
political
rights could not be
from
derived
can
sense
the polis
natural
because
in the full
justice
preexisting
rights
in
be
found
the
Individuals
have
only
polis.
rights within
other
the rulers, but there is no
individuals,
against
including
of rights against
the polis
in Aristotle.14
Nor would
Aristo
suggestion
tle have promulgated
such
rights of man
a list of
as are
"self-evident"
truths
in the American
invoked
concerning
Declaration
human
of In
dependence.15
Aristotle
Nonetheless,
community
historical
par
seed
grew
rights
did
excellence?the
out
in the
of which
late medieval
the political
recognize
rights within
was
Greek
this
the
city-state?and
the more
familiar
theories
of natural
and
early modern
eras.
II
No
a precise
to
counterpart
noun
substantival
"(a) right," and some view this
reason
for concluding
that Aristotle
and other ancient
not have had a concept
of rights.16
It does not follow,
single word
the modern
English
as a decisive
Greeks
could
in classical
Greek
was
14
This
a notion of
is not to rule out the possibility
of reconstructing
remarks. For exam
from some of Aristotle's
"rights against the government"
ple, he seems to imply that there could be a "right of revolution" when he
says, "Those who excel in virtue would
engage in faction most justly of all,
but they do this the least; for these alone have the best reason to be unequal
He also
Politics
5.1.1301a39-bl.
[that is, superior] without
qualification";
see
strive against
the rulers justly or unjustly;
may
says that dissidents
2.1302a28-9,bl2-14.
15Here I agree with Schofield,
p. 833. Cf. Miller, NJR, 91.
16
See, most notably, Alasdair Maclntyre,
After Virtue (Notre Dame: Uni
in any ancient
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 67: "There is no expression
our
or medieval
translated
'a
expression
by
right' until the
language correctly
in He
lacks any means
close of the Middle Ages: the concept
of expression
or medieval,
before about 1400, let
classical
brew, Greek, Latin, or Arabic,
alone in Old English, or in Japanese as late as the mid-nineteenth
century."

as Bernard
For,
resources
the linguistic
to make
rights
and Bernard Williams
point out in a dif
the German
word
cannot
be
Schadenfreude
lacked
that Aristotle
however,
claims.
881
ferent
Knox
context,
although
into a single English
translated
its meaning
word,
to English
to infer from
is familiar
that it is implausible
They argue, by analogy,
to "self,"
lacks
that Homer's
vocabulary
precise
counterparts
or "consciousness,"
that he could not have had these
ideas.
speakers.
the fact
"mind,"
On the contrary, Williams
ferences
between
Homer
in terms
of which
the same
Nature,
istotle's
"beneath
the terms that mark
dif
contends,
net of concepts
lies a complex
and ourselves
are
actions
and this net was
particular
explained,
as
for Homer
Justice,
Greek
the same work

When
it is for us."17
Along
similar
and Rights
in Aristotle's
Politics,
an ample
of
locutions
supply
as modern
"rights" locutions.
has
I began
study of these
and the different
locutions
Iwas
lines
I argued
in
4, that Ar
chapter
to do substantially
by the par
senses
of "rights" which were
allel between
them
dis
W.
H.
and
the
theorist
Hohfeld.18
by
analysed
Briefly
tinguished
legal
one person X might
four senses
in which
stated, Hohfeld
distinguished
Y: first, X has a right in the sense
have a "right" against
another
person
my
struck
case F has a correlative

to A against Y, in which
duty to X to
a
a
to
creditor's
claim
of
repayment
(for example,
debt); second,
to do A against
X has a right in the sense of a liberty or privilege
F, in
of a claim
do A
which
no duty to Y to forbear
from doing A (for example,
his own property);
liberty to consume
third, X has a right
or power
case Y
of an authority
to A against
Y, in which
case X has
an owner's
in the sense
has a correlative
a police
officer's
doing A (for example,
a
sense of
in
and
X
has
the
fourth,
someone);
right
case X has no liability
F's doing A, in which
to
against
a
witness's
self-incrimina
(for example,
immunity
against
liability
to X's
to arrest
authority
an immunity
doing A
tion). These
F's
correspond
to distinct
locutions
in Aristotle:
Shame and Necessity

17Bernard Williams,
of Cali
(Berkeley: University
fornia Press, 1993), 34; cf. Bernard Knox, The Oldest Dead White European
Males
(New York: W. W. Norton,
1993), 43-4.
as Applied
in Judicial
18Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions
Haven:
Yale
Hohfeld's
University
Press, 1923).
Reasoning
(New
analysis has
as well as legal the
been adopted widely by moral and political philosophers
orists in the twentieth century.

882
FRED D. MILLER, Jr.

Hohfeld
Aristotle
claim
t? ?ixaiov
liberty, privilege
eôuoia
authority,
power
xuqio?
immunity
ocxuqo?,
In support
of this interpretation
translators
and commentators
had
of
"entitlements,"
authors which
"rights,"
other Greek
lators
and
had
and
come
totle's
lexicographers.
the objection
that
Greek.
there
I noted
instances
rendered
these
the
like, along
taken this way
cumulative
is no
in which
locutions
single
evidence
word
for
earlier
in terms
occurrences
with
been
This
a?eia
in
trans
by modern
to over
suffices
"(a) right"
in Aris
sense
A right in its most
an in
is a claim of justice which
general
has against
other members
of a community.
This notion
is
Ta ?ixaia),
in Aristotle's
Greek
the
expressed
by t? ?ixaiov
(plural,
substantive
neuter
formed
from
the
definite
article
and
phrase
adjec
dividual
tive,
literally,
"the
just
<thing>."
In
the
context
(a|i(|)iG?r|Tr|Gic) just things are the things which
of
another
says that justice
justly against
party. When Aristotle
tue through which
individuals
"have their own things,"19 he
agreement
with
Simonides
that justice
consists
disputation
one party claims
in each
is the vir
is in close
person
having
what is owed to him.20 John Cooper (pp. 868-72) and Malcolm Schofield
can sometimes
both agree that to ?ixaiov
and its cognates
(pp. 843-8)
as "the right" or "a right," although
be translated
reserva
they express
tions about
the significance
of this fact, and they take issue with my
of
passages.
analyses
particular
Cooper
(p. 868) states that "one ought to
in translation
the more
literal term
preserve
no claim right is being
not necessarily
because
that is not all
sages by the term, but because
or may
I agree
that the
be, expressing."
and "just" should
?ixaiov
be preserved
and
used
the
"claim
cumbersome
right."
I also
phrase
"just-claim
that
t? ?ixaiov
agree
'just' or some derivative,

in these pas
indicated
that, as used there,
connection
between
that
it is,
to
is precisely
I
why
than merely
right" rather
ex
and its cognates
may
wRhetoric
1.9.1366b9-10.
1.331c3-4.
20Cf. Republic

press
ample,
more
883
"a right" in a passage

such as 4.4.1291a39-40;
for ex
a
as
a
"the just" may also refer to
citizen's
duty such
duty to
concern
service.
main
in
Jus
my
military
However,
Nature,
than
perform
was
to refute the claim that Ar
in Aristotle's
Politics
tice, and Rights
istotle was oblivious
to rights, and I consequently
the con
emphasized
was
in which
texts
to assert
t? ?ixaiov
used
the just claims
of
even
of the community.
if Coo
against members
Hence,
that claim rights are not all that is being
in
per is correct
expressed
these passages,
it is sufficient
for my argument
if they are a significant
is asserted.
part of what
individuals
Cooper
v as
?ixai
lowed W.
(pp. 869-70)
"just-claim
L. Newman,
objects
in particular
to my translation
at Politics
3.1.1275a8-10.
Here
rights"
who
translates:
"nor are
those
of i?v
I fol
citizens
who,
[as
in political
of undergo
usually
do,] share
rights to the extent
is that metics
Aristotle's
ing trial and suing."21
point
(or resident
often have the right to represent
in lawcourts
themselves
either
alients)
metoeci
to bring suit or to defend

to remark
that in some
themselves
polises
these
do not
fully?that
is, they
things
themselves
in the lawcourts?but
tive
(jtQOOTaTri?).
is nothing
"forced"
Given
have
the
must
that this
or "noxiously
suits. For Aristotle

goes
against
the resident
aliens
do not partake
be assigned
own
is Aristotle's
theory-driven"
about
right
a legal
to speak
on
of
for
representa
there
explanation,
this explanation.22
21
W. L. Newman,
The Politics
of Aristotle
(Oxford: Clarendon
Press,
translation:
"Nor is a
1902; reprint, Salent: Ayer, 1986), 3:133. Cf. Robinson's
man a citizen because he shares in the rights of a citizen so far as to sue and
be sued, since a commercial
treaty may confer that right"; Richard Robinson,
Politics Books 3 and 4 (Oxford: Clarendon
trans., Aristotle's
Press,
1962).
Several other translators give the passage
similar treatment; see Miller, NJR,
99 n. 31 for references.
22
Cooper (p. 869 n. 25) also disputes my construal of the continuing pas
1275al0-ll:
"for this (to?to)
to those who have a commu
also belongs
sage
nity as a result of treaties, for these [rights] (Taiha) also belong to these per
sons (toutoi?)."
in the second clause refers back
Cooper argues that toutoi?
to "those who have a community
as a result of treaties" in the first clause.
This may be right, but I did not take toutoi?
this way because
"this" (touto)
in the first clause clearly refers to the partaking of Ta ?ixaia
(which is the an
so that on this construal
tecedent of "these" [Ta?Ta] in the second clause),
the second clause becomes
it is logically equivalent
because
to
redundant,
the first clause.
This may be why W. D. Ross bracketed
the second y?g
clause (which is missing
from the fl1 family of manuscripts)
in his edition of
the Politics
even on Cooper's
(Oxford: Clarendon
Press,
1957). However,
Ta ?ixaia can be translated as "rights" in the second clause, that is,
construal,
"for these [rights] also belong to those who have a community
as a result of
treaties."

FRED D. MILLER, Jr.
884
that "?ixaiov
and its cog
agrees
qualifiedly
can sometimes
be translated
'(a) right'" (p. 833), and that "in a
concerns
treatment
of political
it is true that Aristotle's
justice
Malcolm
nates
sense
Schofield
because
from an account
of
community'"
one
can
a
account
derive
objective
right (that is, justice)
corresponding
it significant
of subjective
he
finds
However,
right
that,
(pp. 843-4).
whereas
Latin construes
ius and iustitia
with possessives,
"although
'rights within
Greek
lations
could
the political
have
done
so (for example,
to be found
are rare, and are not
to k\ibv ?ixaiov)
such formu
in the pages Plato and Aristo
to discussion
of justice"
This remark
is generally
(p. 845).
occur.
not
such
do
For exam
because
true, but
decisive,
expressions
Demosthenes
contemporary,
ple, a legal brief by Aristotle's
(384-322
with
the plural form of Ta ?ixaia
the possessive
B.c.), contains
(24.3).
tle devote
to curry favor pri

to the jury that it is "easier
protests
certain
than to stand up in defense
of your
persons
[that
the
?ixai
Often
the
posses
is,
(tcov U|18T8qcov
citizen's]
rights
v)."23
in Greek,
the definite
sive pronoun
is unnecessary
because
article
The
plaintiff
vately with
of a possessive
when
there is no
takes the place
pronoun
commonly
as to the possessor.24
the subject
of the sentence
is
doubt
Typically
common
of Ta ?ixaia.
Aristotle
follows
the
the possessor
Further,
is just, the winner
of saying
that when
the verdict
Greek
practice
or "gets" the just thing and that when
this happens,
"has," "acquires,"
to say
one has "one's own thing."25 There are also resources
in Greek
"to plead
the
the rights of Y against Z, for example,
that X is pleading
v jcq??
x? ?ixaia
you" (k?yeiv
against
rights of others
?jtsq t?)v ??A
v\ia?)
or
v\x(bv
jtq?? to?? ?Xkov?).26

what
he has a just
ceiving
"to plead
your
rights
others"
against
In such contexts
claim
to, so
that
toi ?ixaia
vt?eq
(k?yeiv
one of the parties
is re
it is not at all surprising
the translation
of J. H. Vince in Demos
23Demosthenes
24.3, following
Harvard University
vol. 3 (1936; reprint, Cambridge:
Press,
1986).
sentence
is accurate because
the preceding
translation
speaks of the
persons as "stealing your property."
objectionable
rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard Uni
24See H. W. Smyth, Greek Grammar,
versity Press, 1974), 287 n. 1121.
uses the verbs xvyx?veiv
Aristotle
and exav
25Cf.NE 5.4.1132al9-29.
inMiller, NJR, 98 n. 28.
and other writers use Axxji?aveiv. See the references
15.25. Cf. 15.29 which states that "the laws grant an
26See Demosthenes,
common
share
of
and
private rights (t?ov i?i v ?ixai
v) within the con
equal
as opposed
to "the rights of
to both weak
stitution
and strong persons,"
are defined
Greek
by the
v)" which
[city-states]
(t?jv cEX?rjvix v ?ixai
cities
the
weak.
for
strong
thenes,
Vince's

that other
translators
as
pression
an individual
see why
dentious
"a right"
against
one would
and
commentators
in such
contexts,
other members
resist
such
885
have
often
translated
the ex
a right
is a just claim by
of the community.
It is hard to
since
a rendering,
unless
one
relied
on
ten
about the meaning

of "a right."
assumptions
some
also
of my examples
Schofield
that
do not
objects
(p. 847)
so that the 'rights' inter
have to be interpreted
in the way
I suggest,
not
is
but
because
these ex
pretation
"possible,
probable."
However,
it is more
than not that
probable
legal disputation,
or
is
at
claims
It
any rate, that
just
noteworthy,
rights.27
for Ta ?ixaia
does accept
in the im
"rights" as a translation
involve
amples
involve
they
Schofield
portant
passage
at Politics
3.12.1282b23-30:
For perhaps some would say that the offices ought to be distributed un
to prominence
in any good thing whatever,
equally according
although
in any remaining respects they do not differ at all but happen to be simi
lar. For persons who are different have a different just-claim right and
claim of merit
(to ?ixaiov xai t? xaT vaîav). But if this is true, those
who are prominent with respect to complexion,
size, or any good what
soever will have an excess possession
of political rights (t?ov jtoA.itix?ov
?ixai
v).
for
rights" or at least "just claims"
v (the genitive
v ?ixai
T v jtoXiTix
of Ta TtoXiTix? ?ixaia)
in
here,
the
Sinclair/Saunders
translation
Schofield
quoted by
cluding
(p. 853).28
Let us note the significance
of this locution.
Schofield
(p. 853) remarks
Most
translators
use
"political
27Lycophron's view that law is "a guarantor of men's

rights against one
another"
3.9.1280M1
v) at Politics
(where
(eyyuriTric ?Xkr(koi<; t?ov ?ixai
v as "fair dealings")
translate tcdv ?ixai
should be
p. 15, would
Schofield,
remark that law courts are concerned
with
compared with Demosthene's
"the rights [of citizens]
v;
against each other" (tcov jiq?? ??Ar|?,ou? ?ixai
13.16).
28InNJR,
100 n. 35 I cite a number of translators who use "political
Irwin and Gail Fine translate
rights" or "just claims." More recently, Terence
as "politically just <claim>,"
the expression
in Aristotle:
Selections
(India
napolis: Hackett,
1995). Cooper (pp. 871-2) suggests the more noncommittal
"the just things of politics,"
that is, political offices or functions.
expression,
seems
ar
too
this
indefinite.
it is true that Aristotle's
However,
For, although
the distribution
of re
gument is based on distributive
justice, which concerns
as well as rights, the present context makes
it clear that the parties
sponsibilities
to the dispute are alleging that they have just claims?that
po
is, rights?to
litical office because
they have superior attributes.
Cooper himself concedes
that the context
is one in which
in which different groups
there is a dispute
within
the polis are making
claim to political
office by appeal
to justice
That Aristotle
is primarily concerned with political
(1283al5-17).
rights is
also evident from his example of the minas
inPolitics
3.9 (discussed
below).

886
FRED D. MILLER, Jr.
uses
it is unusual,
and that Aristotle
it here perhaps
"because
he
wants
for once
to introduce
the notion
of political
However,
rights."
v between
tcov
what
is unusual
is the insertion
of the word
jto?mx
that
and ?ixai
occurs
v, which
because
Aristotle
litical rights, that is, rights to political

the heirs
among
or other rights.
is here
talking
about
po
If the dispute were
office.
to an estate,
in question
the rights
would
be property
Schofield
to
meth
my "interpretative
(p. 847) objects
odology," contending that I should have first attended to key passages

inwhich Aristotle discusses political rights and then interpreted other
texts
first to analyze
my strategy was
However,
its cognates,
I argue,
these are most
where,
in terms of "rights." Then I turned to the special
understood
Ta icoîTix?
at Politics
that
?ixaia,
is, political
rights
in the
light of them.
Ta
of
and
?ixaia
the uses
plausibly
case
of
3.12.1282b23-30.
Otherwise
tle was
to mean
supposed
in this passage.
even
However,
Hohfeld's
proximate
not have
it would
use
if Aristotle's
clear what
are qualified
which
by rights,
been
of t? ?ixaiov
Aristo
as "political"
is conceded
to ap
remains whether
Aris
right," the question
As remarked
above
in section
rights have any bite.
I, these
as
mu
do have force because
Aristotle
the
understands
justice
totle's
"claim
rights
tual advantage,
that is, as promoting
the good
for each and every
at length in
of the community.
I argue for this interpretation
member
in Aristotle's
and Rights
Justice,
Politics,
chapter
Nature,
6, and I
can only briefly
in
it here with Aristotle's
7
illustrate
Politics
argument
in the best
that every citizen
reasons
should
that "a polis
Qi??o? ti) of it but by viewing
remarks
quently
land, one
that
each
a right to property.
He
a
not
part
happy
by viewing
the citizens."29
He subse
(jtdvTa?)
constitution
be
has
called
all
individual
should
.receive
two
parcels
because
such
of
an
to town and the other
in the country,
to
to
is
fair
and
in
addition
the
I'oov
xai
just (t?
arrangement
?ixaiov),
if the
that
will
consideration
this
promote
unanimity
policy
pragmatic
That Aristotle
is invaded.30
thinks
the best constitution
protects
polis
the
close
interests
which
he
best.31
After
of each
explains
stating
and
the
every
sense
citizen
in which
that his constitution
is clear
his
from
best
is excellent
a later passage
in
constitution
is the
because
w Politics
7.9.1329a23-4.
30See Politics
7.10.1330al5-18.
31See Politics
7.13.1332a32-8.

all of the
are
citizens
zens
could
he
excellent,
be excellent
each
"even
(xa65
be more
the latter would
ing excellent],
follows
from
that
remarks
without
887
if all
exaoTOv)
choiceworthy;
That is, even
each
(xa65 exaoTOv)."32
to promote
sense
the good of the polis
in a holistic
secure
to
it
is
better
the
of
each
and
tage,
happiness
this
is what
giver
best
Aristotle's
should
be concerned
Schofield
and
Kraut,
an
such
constitution
with
does.
the education
both
however,
role in Aristotle's
citi
the
(jtavTa?)
of the citizens
[be
for all (jcovtoc)
if it were
possible
of overall
every
It follows
advan
and
citizen,
that the law
of all of the citizens.

question
whether
rights
as
Schofield
play
important
politics.
argues
in the passage
at Politics
cited
3.12.1282b23-30,
above,
political
or desert
role. The reference
to merit
rights have only a derivative
(to
xot5 aîav)
means
reveals what Aristotle
Schofield
really
by justice.
that
"In fact such rights are nothing

but a function
of the
contends,
no
deserve.
role
within
the
things people
They play
explanatory
logic
of the hypothesis
Schofield
my
[under consideration]."
acknowledges
or desert
thesis that for Aristotle
the merit
of a person
is the basis for
(p. 854)
rights, but argues

(p. 852) that a right becomes
thereby
idle cog to the machine
of explanation
and analysis."
Schofield
contends
that we should
understand
Aristotle's
po
his
political
"an
simply
Hence,
litical
a share" rather than "having a

"deserving
and office.
Kraut (p. 760-2) also relies on a distinc
right" to citizenship
tion between
and
Schofield
who maintains
deserts,
but, unlike
rights
that rights trivially
from deserts,
follow
Kraut argues
that rights do not
follow
from
duty
deserts
whom
deciding
right
would
in terms
discourse
to be
at all.
of
He
out
points
to a conference,
as a speaker
even
if she
to say that we owe her an
to invite
invited
be wrong
to invite her,
we are
if, for example,
a candidate
does not have a
that
or that she has
is the most
"it
deserving:
that we have a
invitation,
a right to be invited"
(p. 760). This
the relation
about
between
deserts
in intuitions
apparent
divergence
and rights is illuminating.
it supports
my own
Indeed,
or desert
is part, but only part, of Aristotle's
conception
The account of political justice inPolitics

ory of distributive
says
that
justice
"everyone
agrees
inNicomachean
that
^Politics
7.13.1332a35-8.
Politics
refers
3.9.1280al8
refers toNE 5.3.1131al
1-14.
the
to NE
just
Ethics
view
of justice.
3 is based on the the

5.33 There
in distributions
5.3.1131al4-24;
that merit
Politics

Aristotle
ought
to be
3.12.1282b20
FRED D. MILLER, Jr.
888
is the
does not say that merit
to some merit,
yet everyone
according
some
same thing; advocates
it
advocates
of democracy
is
say
freedom,
of
and others
of oligarchy
say it is wealth,
good birth, and advocates
of
merit
is
To
determine
which
standard
it
is
virtue."34
say
aristocracy
correct,
community
oligarchic
it is necessary
and
conception
a correct
to have
its ultimate
end.
of justice
and
of the political
the mistaken
understanding
first considers
Aristotle
its underlying
of the polis:
view
and came together for the sake of pos

if they formed a community
share in the polis in so far as they shared in prop
they would
sessions,
seem to be strong. For
erty. Thus the argument of the oligarchs would
if one person has contibuted
[only] one mina35 out of a hundred but an
all the rest, it is not just for the first person to get
other has contributed
an equal share with the second.
the amount to be
[This is so whether
or the proceeds
from this.36
distributed
is] the original contribution
For
is clearly
point
to a share of the proceeds
The
that each
partner
proportionate
in Kraut's
who
example
speaker
spective
a contribution
does
cooperate
them has
for mutual
not
have
advantage,
this
just claims
against
as
is correctly
understood
virtue of distributive
the particular
cooperation
justice
of course
entails
justice
If justice
that
do
each
of
in the universal
for mutual
is necessary
advantage,
for such coop
notion
the oligarchs'
rejects
but he
to acquire
and protect
property,
view of the polis as a community
cooperat
to take place.
Aristotle
of the polis as a joint venture
the more
accepts
general
for
mutual
advantage.
ing
right?
The pro
or made
has not participated

of claim. When
individuals
however,
the others.
sense
eration
sort
a just claim?a
to his contribution.
has
The
polis
is, more
specifically,
a community
life. This is, as we say, living happily

and self-sufficient
in a complete
one should suppose
that the political
and nobly. Therefore,
community
is for the sake of noble actions, but not for the sake of [merely] living to
the most to such a community
those who contribute
gether. Therefore,
are equal or greater accord
more
in
those
who
than
the
polis
participate
or
to political
to
but
freedom
virtue, or
unequal
family
according
ing
to wealth but inferior accord
than those who are prominent
according
ing to virtue.37
34A^5.3.1131a25-9.
35Amina was worth about a pound
100 drachmas.
3.9.1280a25-31.
^Politics
s>Politics 3.9.1280b40-1281a8.
(15.2 oz. troy) of silver and equalled

889
THE ORIGINS OF NATURAL RIGHTS

In discussing
Aristotle
the
that
dispute
the offices
argues
one
"contributes
whether
to
over
the
function
of the community.38
ou|i?aXX8o9ai)
The
that Aristotle
suggestion
merit
or desert39
telian
distributive
(a?ia)
other:
on one
rather
side
than
in Politics
political
rights
distributed
justly
are
of rights
of X
_
~
Merit of Y
The
8QYov
in terms
justice
overlooks
is a kind of equation,
with
justice
of the equation
and claims of right
Merit
3.12,
the basis of
(e?c t?
(or work)"
understands
in terms
on
of
that Aristo
claims
(?ixaiov)
of merit
on the
right of X
The right of Y
More
that the merits
entails
of the partners
precisely,
justice
(X
a
to
and Y) and what
have
claim
be
they
just
proportionately
equal.40
This
is not surprising
since
distributive
is the virtue which
justice
it
to
makes
for individuals
their re
cooperate
possible
by equalizing
tion,
entitled
Justice
theory
that
deviates
one
of the parties
receives
It is noteworthy
that John Rawls
is, when
to.
occurs
Injustice
from the right hand
and benefits.
contributions
spective
distribution
of benefits
that his own

of distributive
theory
justice.
to the same
belongs
He also
observes
more
when
side
or
remarks
tradition
that
the actual
of the equa
less
than he
is
in A Theory
of
as Aristotle's
"the principles
of
cf. 9.1281a4-8.
38See Politics
This presents a problem for
3.12.1283al-3,
Kraut's "analogy with
the crafts" (p. 772): "From the fact that the doctor
should promote
the good of those who are ill, it does not follow that they
have a right to be treated by him." The analogy fails, because,
although Aris
totle compares
the lawgiver and politician
to a craftsman,
there is an impor
tant difference:
are concerned with a community
the lawgiver and politician
whose members
ruler
and
for mutual advantage.
(including
ruled) cooperate
a constitution which protects
it is their task to establish and maintain
Hence,
the rights of the participants.
39The English words
"desert" and "merit" have backward-looking
and
connotations
The example of distributing mi
respectively.
forward-looking
nas on the basis of prior contribution
involves desert.
The example of dis
to
to
flutes
those
best
them
involves
merit.
Because
tributing
play
qualified
the polis is an ongoing community
of overlapping
it is reason
generations,
able that both desert and merit would be involved in Aristotle's
use of ?îa.
is highly simplified,
40This account
since communities
generally consist
of many members,
with complex
standards of merit or desert, and a wide ar
ray of objects to which the members make claims. The subtlety and power of
account are demonstrated
Aristotle's
in an illuminating
essay by David Keyt,
"Aristotle's Theory of Distributive
in A Companion
to Aristotle's
Justice,"
Politics, ed. David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (Oxford: Blackwell,
1991).

890
FRED D. MILLER, Jr.

. . .
provide
of society
social
sic
justice
institutions
of the benefits
different
employs
these principles
are far more
Rawls
prescribed.
Nonetheless,
on the function
of political
justice.
agrees
(p. 856) says that "(a) right in contemporary English us

"
Schofield
thought
"no modern
to life one must
The underlying
use
theorist
one's
which
one
with
holds
talents
idea behind this conception

under
the conditions
to contrast
be
age would
ordinarily
Kraut remarks
that
'desert'.
that
to benefit
in order
Similarly,
to retain
the community.
of the right to life is that
be undemand
rights must
conceive
them, lies in having
a modern
of others;
right carves
to contrib
from the task of having
possesses
rights, as we
ing. For the value of having

some protection
from the demands
one is relieved
out a zone in which
ute
in articulating
liberal and egalitar
Aristotle
Aristotle
the right
from Aristotle's
methodology
conclusions
and his
those which
here with
of assigning
in the ba
rights and duties
define
the
distribution
they
appropriate
of social cooperation."41
Rawls
of course
and
and burdens
a very
ian than
a way
to the common
to view
tend
mere
regard
claims
theorists
good" (p. 763). It is true that many modern
now
entitlements
and that many
rights as unconditional
to be the proper
need
rather
than desert
basis
for just
against
has the
surfer
imply a nonproductive
as a diligent
This
gardener.
are
some modern
rights theories
the
This
community.
sustenance
to
right
same
lead one
might
encouraging
couraging
holds
that
could
to question
whether
an ever accelerating
proliferation
a sense
of personal
responsibility.
of entitlements
Aristotle
and dis
in contrast
to those who
be accorded
full political
rights should
a full contribution
to the community.
to make
able and disposed
so
should
be
educated
members
tential
properly
contributing
longer
rights
assume
can
they
able
based
such
to
Po
that
are past their prime and no

Those who
rights.
should
have
full political-rights
provision
contribution
any
they can still make.
Generally
enter
is capable
of cooperating
and
being who
exercise
on what
free human
naturally
some
form of community
into
ing
jected
are
to despotic
rule.
are
should
such
However,
linked to the fact
be treated
justly and not

holds
generally
a theory
that right holders
sub
that
are or have
inextricably
rights
to the com
been contributors
contributors)
(or are at least potential
a
a
view
claim.
have
which
Such
may not ac
they
just
munity
against
41John
Press,
Rawls, A
1971), 4, 10-11.
Theory
of Justice
(Cambridge:
Harvard

University
cord with
theory
modern
welfare
liberalism,
but
891
it is surely
as a
admissable
of rights.
Ill
in section
As mentioned
and
would
of political
I, Aristotle's
theory
justice
so that he
his doctrine
of political
naturalism,
rights presupposes
a Lockean
not accept
state
of nature
as a point
of departure
the justification of the political state. With this inmind
for
I stated that
had a theory of natural

rights in the sense of "rights based on
natural
in a pre-polit
justice" but not in the sense of "rights possessed
ical state of nature."42 However,
Richard Kraut (pp. 757-60)
and Roder
Aristotle
that there is a basis for a

argue persuasively
in Aristotle.
use of pas
natural rights
They make
can
communities
says that certain
nonpolitical
ick Long (pp. 780-6)

theory of pre-political
Aristotle
sages where
both
war
that making
in order to enslave
foreign
are
"natural
and
where
he
they
(unless
slaves");
implies
can obtain
even
that justice
to a slave.43 Although
in relation
I took
to show that Aristotle
these passages
forms
of
inde
justice
recognized
be just; where
ers is unjust
he
implies
of the polis,
I did not see this as supporting
natu
pendent
pre-political
as
a
ral rights because
describes
Aristotle
natural
of
justice
part
politi
cal justice
inNicomachean
Ethics
5.7. However,
I am now persuaded
can be used
a ver
to support
by Kraut and Long that these passages
sion of natural
treatment
of natural
rights. Aristotle's
justice as a part
of political
is
consistent
with
the
of
nat
justice
possibility
nonpolitical
ural justice.
Since justice applies wherever
an as
there is community,
sociation
ralness
such
or
as master
justice
free man
naturally
tice and a violation
I still maintain,
forms.
Instead,
can be considered
in terms
of natu
of whether
it occurs
in a polis.
If a
regardless
were
into slavery,
coerced
this would
be an injus
of his natural
to a
rights even if he did not belong
that even in a "state of nature" human
have
beings
This implies
polis.
certain natural
rights,
that political
and slave
as the right not to be enslaved.

that Aristotle
would
notwithstanding,
such
justice and rights could be derived from

when
Aristotle
42Miller, NJR, 90-1.

43These
are discussed
passages
shows
how
the polis
in Miller, NJR,
comes
84-6.

not
accept
nonpolitical
to be from
FRED D. MILLER, Jr.
892
more
of community,
such as households
and villages,
is to show
that the polis
is their end or nature
because
basic
purpose
forms
his
it is
is more
are.
for the good

life and thus
than they
perfect
a
to
of
is
free
and equal
peculiar
community
justice
at
the good life. Although
the polis arises out of
aiming
are natural,
not
communities
which
this is a necessary,
self-sufficient
For
political
human
beings
more primitive
of the polis.44
Even
if the jus
for the naturalness
condition
sufficient,
were
within
the
basic
communities
tice of the more
preserved
polis,
not guarantee
that the polis
itself was just. The polis must
this would
if it is to be in a natural
the right sort of end and structure
also have
condition.
both natural
contains
justice
political
con
he does not mean
that a political
and conventional
justice,
justice
can be partitioned
exclusive
natural
and con
into mutually
stitution
When
Aristotle
ventional
branches.45
ventional
features.
and
nature,
lawgiver.
that
says
The
conventional
For
arrangement
example,
is natural,
precisely property
same
law may have both natural

and con
in so far as it promotes
human
on the choice
in so far as it depends
of the
be natural
It will
Aristotle
but
would
there may
is distributed
argue that a private-property

in how
be considerable
leeway
to individuals and regulated by the
laws.46
if rights
involve
conventional
factors,
no
in
have
This
is
evident
Aristotle's
then natural
theory.
place
rights
for
view
that
of
the
Aristotle's
in his discussion
requirements
(pp. 764-5)
on circumstances.
Aristotle
will vary depending
approves
citizenship
Kraut
evidently
in Politics
zens,
but he
that
holds
be citi
that both one's parents
requiring
to this rule.
It
that there may be exceptions
a
in the case of the colonists
polis,
starting
to
it may be necessary
due to war or plague
1.2 of the custom

recognizes
cannot
obviously
apply
and if there is a shortage
Because
recruit outsiders.
of the element
of who
should
the question
here,
to a natural
settled
by appeal
tively
on this point,
similar
Kraut
is correct
of the U.S.
The framers
rights theory.
tion
upon
many
conventions
which
could
of contingency
and conven
cannot
be a citizen
be defini
right
issues
to citizenship.
Although
natural
arise for modern
constitution
not
be
also
justified
1.2.1252b30-l.
44See Politics
45SeeiV#5.7.1134bl8-24.
more
this interpretation
461 develop
and defend
toAristotle's
Natural Law and Justice," in^4 Companion
had
a priori
to decide
by ap
fully in "Aristotle
Politics.

on
THEORIGINSOF NATURALRIGHTS 893

to the natural
peal
However,
pendence.
with
tally consistent
this
for
requirements
body should
consist
of the
The polis will

virtue.
"The polis of our prayers"
each
conventional
complement
the lawgiver
other.
Nature
provides
for evaluating
institutions
and
laws, but he
political
into account
If the lawgiver
variable
circumstances.
a standard
also
take
a constitution
finds
reform
fabric
that the citizen

7.9, arguing
are capable
of the polis who
of
then be in a natural,
fully just condi
is realized when
the natural
and the
inhabitants
tion.
must
Inde
of slavery.)
in Politics
citizenship
full moral
with
of
to be fundamen
supposed
not true, for
this was
(Of course,
Aristotle
discusses
moral
Similarly,
theory.
in the case
example,
in the Declaration
invoked
rights theory
were
the conventions
which
is in an
he should
condition,
try to
not disrupt
he should
the social
a constitu
not offer the citizens
inferior
it where
possible,
although
in the process
and he should
tion beyond
their grasp.
like Solon,
Rather,
are
best constitution
of which
they
capable.47
he
should
offer
them
the
IV
Aristotle's
"best
described
constitution,"
to embody
in Politics
7-8,
is sup
on my
and
justice
political
fully
hence,
interpreta
to protect
and respect
individual
rights. As a result, the lawgiver
aim at the happiness
of each and every citizen,
rather than at the
or at the good
of the greatest
number"
of the
happiness
"greatest
posed
tion,
must
"whole
in a holistic
polis"
that Aristotle's
each
and
exclusion,"
tions must
trasts
sense.
Richard
objects
(pp. 769-72)
aim at the good of
that the constitution
requirement
entails
of non
every citizen
only the very weak
"principle
is a citizen,
that "if someone
institu
then civic
namely,
to promote
be designed
his good to some degree."
He con
this with
"the much
stronger
individual
maximizing
that, "no citizen
well
Kraut
happiness,"
is required
to make
even
if such a sacrifice
being,
of others."
good
However,
Kraut's
of
that is, "the principle
to me, namely
ascribes
a modest
sacrifice
in his own
principle,"
which
he
even
would
"weak"
contribute
principle
to the
greatly
too
is clearly
47Plutarch, Lives, Solon, XV.2. Solon's policy is commended

in the American Federalist
no. 38.
Madison
Papers,

by James
FREDD. MILLER, Jr.
894
to capture
weak
As we
intention.
Aristotle's
have
seen,
on
he argues
for
that the polis
the
Further,
for citizens
the grounds
property
rights
to
all
its citizens.48
be called happy with
respect
to attain what
is to enable
the citizens
aim of the educational
system
universal
should
is
it is possible
for
choiceworthy
is, the highest
good
some citizens were
to attain.49
A system
in which
"to
equipped
our
not
the
of
would
be
best.
is
"polis
prayers"
(Aristotle's
degree"
for them,
most
them
some
that
are all merely

above average.)
like Lake Wobegon
where
the citizens
seems
On the other hand, Kraut's
impossibly
"strong" principle
a
Ar
dilemma
relies
false
Kraut's
upon
dichotomy.
However,
strong.
a
is
not
of
istotle's
happiness
conception
(as
conception
"maximizing"
not
of one person
the complete
in utilitarianism)
whereby
happiness
out the happiness
The presupposition
of the best
of others.
crowds
are compossibly
re
ends of the citizens
is that the natural
constitution
are
does not bar
the fact that some of the citizens
alizable:
flourishing
from
citizens
other
that
It follows
the political,
realizable
property,
are compossibly
in the best
is still a strong
in this sense
constitution.
requirement
Compossibility
own view
it is hardly
in Aristotle's
and may be hard to satisfy?indeed,
are deep-seated
ever
of interest
conflicts
Where
there
satisfied.
other
and
rights
inhabitants
the
among
the
good
jiIo??),
flourishing.
of the citizens
life,
that
lawgiver
is, devise
the natural
Nonetheless,
ple for Aristotle,
sisting
ends
of
because
must
of
to a
resort
a second-best
ends
he
not
or power.
come
into
the realistic
are scarce.
assumption
Rather, Aristotle
as
that
of
incapable
the
sailing"
(?8UT8QO?
or even worse.50
compossible
understand
wealth
like maximizing
individuals
would
inevitably
maximization
are
of individuals
does
are
them
"second
constitution
in a state
if we make
other
some
or where
in princi
as con
happiness
On such a view
conflict
the means
understands
with
the
each
for
required
the happiness
of the
activity
is, flourishing
8uoai|iiovia,
ac
virtuous
in contemplation
and ethically
consists
soul. Flourishing
so
one
that
individual's
to
the
is
mean,
flourishing
subject
tivity, which
of others.
the self-actualizing
into conflict with
need not come
activity
of
each
individual
that
are
on Aristotle's
Goods
like wealth
or power
goods:
a natural
they are not
to be accumulated
limit,
namely,
the amount
48See Politics
49Cf. Politics
7.9.1329a23-4.
7.14.1333a30.
50See Politics
4.11.1295a25-34;
without
one
needs
external
merely
but
only up to
bounds,
Since
for flourishing.
view
cf. 3.13.1284bl9.

895
is to promote
the flourishing
of the in
the aim of the just constitution
a
can
set
of indi
it
realizable
compossibly
citizens,
prescribe
can serve as a regulative
the best constitution
vidual
Thus
rights.51
and politicians,
who
ideal for lawgivers
should
strive to approximate,
dividual
as best
they
can
ally advantageous
at the good life.52
in their
particular
circumstances,
a
in
self-sufficient
cooperation
it does
Further,
zens of the best polis
not
could
follow
from my
not be expected
of mutu
community
interpretation
to assume
half of the polis, for example, by defending
ideal
the
aiming
that
the
citi
on be
burdens
it if it is attacked by for
or by holding
even if this prevented
them
political
office,
eign enemies
not
from philosophizing.
thinks
that
Aristotle
citizens
have
Indeed,
these rights
in a re
only political
rights but also the duty to exercise
this is consistent
However,
aims at the happiness
of
a
to
that Aristotle
subscribes
moderate
sponsible
way.53
best constitution
sume
tice
and
to a moderate
intellectualist
with
the
thesis
that
the
if we
also
as
the citizens
individualist
view
of happiness.
characteristic
view
On
of jus
this view
includes
the noble
activities
of the citizen,54
happiness
so
such as military
that
Aristotle
not
does
service,
enjoin us to "con
at any cost" and neglect moral
virtue.55 What makes
the best
template
51Cf. Politics
states that "e??aiôvia
7.3 which
is a sort of action, and
the actions of just and temperate persons
involve many noble things as an
and goes on to argue that flourishing
end" (1325a32-4),
correctly understood
does not require conflict and despotic
rule (1325a34-bl0).
On the natural
limit to acquisition
of external goods such as property, see Politics
1.8, which
I discuss
inNJR, 317-21.
52This
is developed
in chapters 7 and 8 of NJR.
interpretation
53
Aristotle
commits
says that if someone
suicide, he does injustice not
no
one
to himself
suffers
but to the polis,
(because
voluntarily
injustice),
as a citizen; see NE
he is shirking his responsibilities
because
presumably
cf. Plato Phaedo 62bl-8
for the religious version of the argu
5.11.1138a9-14;
ment).
54See Politics
7.3.1325a32-4.
55For a
see David Keyt,
defense of moderate
persuasive
intellectualism,
in Aristotle,"
inEssays
"Intellectualism
in Ancient
Greek Philosophy
ed. J. P.
Anton and A. Preus (Albany: SUNY Press,
Kraut has de
1983), 2:364-87.
fended an interpretation
of Aristotle which
is closer to strict intellectualism
on the Human
in Aristotle
Good (Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
and controversial
issues of interpretation,
1989). This involves complicated
which cannot be argued here. The main point is that the moderate
individual
ist interpretation
is correct) permits
to make
the citizens
(which I believe
in the form of virtuous actions,
concessions
personal
including laying down
their lives in defense of the polis.

896
FREDD. MILLER, Jr.
constitution
plete
is that
best
in each
virtue
and
it
Nonetheless,
"best" constitution
its institutions
every
are designed
com
to promote
citizen.
is evident
to modern
readers
that
Aristotle's
is seriously
flawed.
C. C. W. Taylor
characterizes
as "an exploiting
a
the polis of our prayers
of free
elite,
community
to pursue
riders whose
the good
life is made
ability
possible
by the
to
others
that
and
adds
that
the
of
so-called
pursuit,"
willingness
forgo
com
ideal polis
is "characterized
Some
by systematic
injustice."56
mentators
the flaws
find
of the best
endorsement
it would
so egregious
constitution
that
must
they believe
have been
that Aristotle's
Alter
ironic.57
was
guilty of bad faith in represent

as unqualifiedly
have
just, or else he must
errors
some
in
out
the details.
The
committed
staggering
working
concerns
to us that the polis
the fact that it is obvious
central problem
in Politics
7-8 does not satisfy
the account
of political
described
jus
natively,
ing his
tice
ideal
seem,
Aristotle
constitution
in Politics
3. For
not promote
the common
of a minority
of the inhabitants.
the constitution
does
the advantage
but only
advantage
a minority
in which
it is unjust
in the same way an as oligarchy,
Hence
rule for their own benefit
at the expense
of the
of wealthy
individuals
poor.
offered
an account
In Politics
7.8-9
I have
problem.
two groups:
slaves
bers.
of why
he divides
Aristotle
the
failed
inhabitants
this
into
and adjuncts
members
genuine
(the citizens)
(including
to
the
Political
and metics).
justice applies
only
genuine mem
a
cannot
inferior beings who
The slaves are naturally
comprise
polis because
an abundance
non-Greek
(Europeans)
best polis
of happiness
and choice.58
There
is
they are incapable
most
of the
of such natural
slaves,
evidently
including
a
reason
of
because
have
deficit
barbarian
nations,
they
or of spirit
to war
goes
One of the purposes

(Asiatic).59
those who merit
is to enslave
Moreover, Aristotle has (admittedly bad) arguments

rule
to recognize
of the polis
over
natural
slaves
is just and
advantageous
for which
being
the
slaves.60
inPolitics
for the slaves.
1 that
Met
toAristotle,
56C. C. W. Taylor, "Politics," in The Cambridge
Companion
ed. Jonathan Barnes
University
Press,
1995), 250;
Cambridge
(Cambridge:
cited by Annas, p. 9.
57For
A Study of Aris
and Statesmen:
example, Mary Nichols, Citizens
and Littlefield,
totle's Politics
1992), 145.
(Lanham: Rowman
3.9.1280a31-4.
58See Politics
7.7.1327b23-38.
59See Politics
7.14.1334al-2.
60See Politics

897
have no basis for complaint

because
they are mem
foreigners
and they are presumably
from their
bers of other polises
benefitting
or
in
the ideal polis,
Aris
presence
go elsewhere.
they would
Hence,
ics and
could
totle
have
lis of our prayers

Julia Annas
tains
ural
serious
in a sincere
believed,
is just.
objects,
injustices
inegalitarianism.
the farmer
but misguided
that
way,
the po
that Aristotle's
ideal polis also con
however,
cannot
in terms of his nat
which
be explained
to two main
She points
The first in
problems.
if we are speaking
of whom
Aristotle
says
class,
to our prayers,"
to be slaves.
they ought
ideally or "according
"But,"
assumes
she says (p. 740), "Aristotle
that the slaves
in question will not
volves
be natural
tion on
chance
combine
far from
to func
power
enough
reasoning
as better motivated
if given the
they are envisaged
as
of achieving
to
and
freedom,
having
enough
intelligence
measures
are not taken."
if precautionary
forces and revolt,
slaves;
their own,
the passage
However,
another way.
It does
same nationality,
but
ited sort
lious,
similar
thought
to
cites
she
say
that
it also
so that
they will
they should
or else
lacking
the
non-spirited
the farmers
ought
can be understood
(7.10.1330a25-33)
the farmer-slaves
says
be useful
that
with
be barbarian
slave.
to have
they
not
is evidence
inferior,
servile
be of the
be of the spir
and not rebel
regard to work
serfs with a nature
This
an
not
should
should
(xr\v fyvoiv)
that Aristotle
nature.61
Annas
to Aristotle's
to explain
promise
rightly points
embarrassing
as
a
is
to
to
it
hold
out
better
freedom
all
the
Un
slaves."
"why
prize
Aristotle
in his sur
does not keep
the promise
however,
fortunately,
so
we
are
as
to
that
to
forced
he had
what
conjecture
viving writings,
quite
that can be safely

I think, is that in some
inferred,
some
it
is
in
better
for
unspecified
way
unspecified
to be offered
freedom
to all the slaves.
This passage
by itself, how
in mind.
The most
circumstances
ever, does not show

as naturally
free.62
that Aristotle
regards
the slaves
of the
ideal polis
Annas (pp. 740-53) points out another difficulty involving Aristo

tle's
treatment
workers.
of the class
The word
of ?avauooi,
that is, mechanical
is
pejorative;
and, as Annas
?avauooc
or menial
remarks,
it
61
to be implicitly criticizing
Newman
understands
Aristotle
practices
such as the Spartans who kept Greeks as helots and slaves. Newman's
inter
is supported by the fact that Aristotle
pretation
explicitly criticizes helotry in
Politics
The Politics of Aristotle,
3:393-4.
2.9; see Newman,
62I discuss different approaches
to this passage
inNJR, 242 n. 127.

898
FRED D. MILLER, Jr.

no
modern
is a rough
precise
counterpart,
although
"vulgar"
Aristotle
of the polis which
is most
says that the citizens
equivalent.
a
or
not
to
live
mercantile
of
way
nobly governed
ought
vulgar
life, be
has
cause
such
a way
vulgar
workers
of
life is low-born
and
for the polis.65

However,
class consists
of free workers.
necessary
the vulgar
states,
out that Aristotle
does
so that he
inferior,
gar workers
and
not
is not
to virtue,63
opposed
and
that
political
they are
rights64 although
in contrast
to the farmers, Annas
not possess
should
she points
Further,
are naturally
workers
that the vulgar

on a natural
difference
argue
relying
between
vul
citizens.
In fact, however,
workers
in his ideal
Aristotle
is vague
does not
about
the
status
of vulgar
should
be
He
say whether
polis.
they
or slave,
com
in contrast
to the case of the farmers.
Newman's
as slaves rather than disenfranchised
treats the vulgar workers
mentary
free
freemen.
between
He
calls
the
citizens
3.4.1277a37
contrast
at 7.4.1326al8-20
and
"a large number

of slaves, metics,
and for
in
the
"It
from
is
evident
what
follows
may
polis:
counts
here among
in
?o?Xoi,
just as he does
?dvauooi
The
latter
characterizes
the
artisan
passage
sqq."66
vulgar
as
a
who
works
with
his
hands
form of slave.
T8xv?tt]?)
which
eigners"
that Aristotle
to Aristotle's
attention
be
(? ?avauooc
a polis
in which
Aristotle
could envisage
the vulgar workers
Further,
were
slaves.
For he says that "in ancient
times in some places
the vul
so
are
was
or
slave
that
many
gar class
[vulgar persons]
foreigner,
notes
most
Newman
that "even at Athens
handi
such even now."67
craftsmen
may
have
been
slaves
or aliens
as late as the time
of Aristo
a large
the Athenian
undoubtedly
tle, though
citizen-body
comprised
textual
evidence
New
number
of ?avauooi."68
the
Hence,
permits
in Aristotle's
ideal polis
that the vulgar workers
man's
interpretation
should
be slaves or foreigners.
What
of the main
are
issue
raised
as to whether
by Annas,
however,
to the citi
to be naturally
inferior
I criticized
Aristo
this crucial
issue.
the vulgar workers

supposed
zens?
She is quite right to press
the allegedly
tle's arguments
concerning
deleterious
effects
63See Politics
64Cf.Politics
65See Politics
cf. 3.5.1278al7-21.
1328b37-40;
cf. 1278a8-ll.
1329al9-21,
4.4.1291al-2.
The
Politics ofAristotle,
3:342, cf 3:374.
66Newman,
*7Politics 3.5.1278a6-8.
3:175.
68Newman, The Politics of Aristotle,

of vulgar
899
remarks
(p. 748), apart from this issue, there is a
labor;69 but, as Annas
are excluded
from the citi
inhabitants
if certain
of injustice
problem
and they
to the citizens,
inferior
zen body when
they are not naturally
a necessary
for the po
service
as a result of performing
are excluded
lis.
Iwas
inferior
should
the vulgar class as

that Aristotle
regards
taking it for granted
The citizens,
to the citizens.
free,
being naturally
by nature
activi
from
their
vulgar
upbringing,
during
refrain,
especially
slavish
their souls vulgar,
these will make
just as doing
How
them
to
make
slavish.70
tends
or
with
slaves
consorting
things
for such a
has no argument
is right that Aristotle
Annas
ever, although
it. Unfortunately,
whether
he believes
remains
the question
view,
ties because
Aristotle
again,
class
in the
says
actually
ideal state.
very
passage
Aristotle
where
8.7.1342al8-25,
One
little about
which
distinguishes
the nature
may
bear
on
two audiences
of the vulgar
this issue is
for music.
on the one hand the free and

there are two sorts of spectator,
of vulgar persons, menial
on the other the crude consisting
educated,
should also be
and
contests
this
of
others
and
sort,
spectacles
workers,
Just as their souls are diverted from
offered to the latter for relaxation.
the natural condition
(jraQeaTQa?i[i8vai tt]? xaT? (?)uaiv e^sco?), so also
and strained and over colored tunes.
are there deviations
of harmonies
But since
Aristotle
be understood
could
in the ideal state
as saying that the crude spectators

takes the pas
souls.71 Annas
defective
have naturally
have unnatural
as
that the crude spectators
indicating
sage differently,
initial endowments.
or mistaken
ends, not that they have unnatural
the text
However,
I agree
while
then,
for failing to show
fallen
and vulgar
into explicit
unjust
treatment
farmers
In conclusion,
reading.
can be seriously
faulted
such as the
in so far as groups
either
supports
evidently
that Aristotle
with Annas
is just
the polis
are concerned,
workers
that
self-contradiction
of
such
groups.72
I do not
consciously
the
However,
by
agree
that he has
sanctioning
fact remains
the
that
8.2.1337b5-21.
69See Miller, NJR, 244-5; also cf. Politics
cf.
7.17.1336a39-41.
70See Politics
2.1337b5-21,
8.6.1341b8-15;
71Cf. Problems
the verb JtaQ8aTQ?(|)0ai is used for a
4.26.879b27, where
is either by
This work
perversion
arising from a natural sexual incapacity.
or an early Peripatetic
author.
Aristotle
72
that
that the text is indecisive but contends
Cooper, p. 9. 12 concedes
can hardly have seriously
intended that there were no native-born
Aristotle
citizen body.
outside of the fully educated
free persons
Cooper maintains
citizens
disenfranchised
second-class
that Aristotle must have recognized
sense falls within the common advantage
in some extended
whose advantage

FREDD. MILLER, Jr.
900
"the polis of our prayers"

the full embodiment
of political
represents
common
can
in
and
the
which
all
of
the
citizens
compos
justice
good
a high form of flourishing.
their rights and achieve
It
sibly exercise
as a regulative
in more
thus serves
ideal to guide the lawgiver
realistic
and
cases.
challenging
in section
theory of rights does not ac
I, Aristotle's
or liberty the central place
it has in most modern
theo
to endorse
inclined
and other au
ries, so that he is more
paternalistic
or
thoritarian
freedom
Nonetheless,
liberty does have a
regulations.73
As
remarked
cord
freedom
place
Greek
in his
theory.
I use
terms.74
(??-8U6sQo?)
tyrannical
for
priate
catchword
associated
person
rule was
slaves
I must
the corresponding
First,
briefly
explain
as
a
"freedom"
translation
for 8?,8u98Q?a. A free
a slave, and
was
for the Greeks
with
contrasted
equated
but not
of the Athenian
with
self-rule
This
?ôuoia.
verb
related
8^80ti means,
someone
to do something.
a sense
close
despotic
free
rule,
that
is, the rule appro

was
a
"freedom"
Hence,
persons.75
remarks, was
democracy
and, as Aristotle
I use "liberty" to translate
of the citizens.76
or "ability," and the

"possibility"
"it is possible
for
(or open)"
generally,
a
terms
context
In political
and legal
these
criticizes
de
to "liberty." Following
Aristotle
Plato,
noun means,
have
with
generally,
to promote.
the rules are supposed
(Cooper would prefer not to call
Al
"second-class
citizens," but it is hard to regard them otherwise.)
in
his
and
Civic
Animals
"Political
essay,
Friendship"
(cited
though Cooper's
n. 18) is a valuable discussion,
I see no textual evidence
for his solution to the
second-class
citizens partak
recognizes
problem he cites, i.e., that Aristotle
or
is
their
served
of
that
second-hand
by
doing so. Nor
justice
happiness,
ing
about
about Cooper's problem,
do I see any evidence
that Aristotle worried
free native inhabitants of the best polis were happy.
whether
disenfranchised
for this is that Aris
The simplest
explanation
(and inmy view most plausible)
in the
that there were not any free native noncitizens
totle simply assumed
turns to more realistic scenar
It is only when Aristotle
polis "of our prayers."
the question
of how justice can be
4-6 that he addresses
ios in Politics
cf. 4.11.1295a25-34.
achieved with an inferior population;
73See Miller, NJR, 248-51.
is a brief summary of Miller, NJR,
74The rest of this paragraph
101-4,
references.
extensive
which provides
1279a21.
75Cf.Politics
3.6.1278b32-4,
6.2.1317a40-bl7.
76See Politics
which
them

THE ORIGINS OF NATURAL RIGHTS
901
for identifying
the abil
mocracy
?ôuaia,
?êuBe?ia with unrestricted
one wants,
which
makes
freedom
into
ity to do whatever
degenerate
an
and
the
into
anarchic
condition.77
Aris
license,
polis
Nonetheless,
totle
thinks
that
that
possess
in political
offices.79
I argue that the terms
close
of the just polis are free and equal78 and

the liberty to partake
liberties, most
notably
the citizens
the citizens
of
the
and 8^80ti
?ôuoia
locutions
which
rights
parallels
That is, they indicate
leges" or "liberties."
not prohibited
from performing.
Schofield
can
as
"be interpreted
constitutional
8^80Ti
to thinking
tomed
in such
terms"
(pp. 839).
in certain
Hohfeld
actions
contexts
are
called
"privi
the agent
is
that ?ôuoia
and
which
concedes
rights
However,
accus
by those
as he points
out,
the idea of ?ôuoia is not tied directly to the idea of justice, and that
an ?ôuoia may
exercise
it. But
be of little or no value
these
a Hohfeldian
entails
seem
points
only
A bare
liberty right.
the absence
of a duty
if one
lacks
the wherewithal
to underscore
the parallel
to a claim
in contrast
liberty,
or claim of justice.
It is also
necessary
to
with
right,
to
between
distinguish
merely
having
liberty and having
effective
liberty,
and between
it. Although
individuals
liberty and valuing
having
may
not value a right which
a
have
confirmed
bachelor
they
(for example,
this does not make
it any
may set no great store in the right to marry),
less of a right.
The point
of liberty rights for Aristotle

has to be understood
in
of their place within
his general
of
constitutional
theory
rights.
I have pointed
to the significance
of his final definition
of the
Hence,
in Politics
citizen
3.1:
terms
Who the citizen is is therefore evident from the foregoing.

For we now
or ju
in deliberative
say that he who has the liberty to partake (tôvoia)
dicial office is a citizen of this polis, and that the polis is the multitude
of
such people which
is sufficient
for self-sufficient
to
without
life,
speak
qualification.80
77Cf.
ibid. This connection
is made
Just as Plato connects the democratic
of democracy
as
by the partisans
principle of free speech (irapp^cria)
Demosthenes
liberty (eôvoia)
(Republic
8.557b4-6),
(51.19) remarks
citizens partake of a common
"he who
that, because Athenian
constitution,
wishes has the liberty to speak" (too ?oiAofievo)
^?yeiv s^?v).
78See Politics
1.7.1255b20; cf.iV#5.6.1134a26-8.
79See Politics
3.1.1275M8-19.
8012 75b 17-21. As Irwin and Fine remark, "In contexts
such as this 'have
a right' would be appropriate"; Aristotle:
468 n. 14.
Selections,
well.
with

902
FREDD. MILLER, Jr.

This
is a revision
of his
earlier
statement
"a citizen
that
without
is defined by no other thing than partaking in judgment
qualification
For Aristotle,
office."81
involves
possess
indeed, being a citizen
a
of
wide
to
for
elect
office
hold
range
political
ing
rights:
example,
or to de
for office,
to prosecute
ers, to be eligible
alleged malefactors,
a
fend oneself
in lawsuits.
the
essential
of
citizen
is
However,
right
and
the
liberty
to partake
or judicial
of deliberative
office.
Against this interpretation Schofield (p. 842) suggests that eôuoia

refers
merely
final definition
to the
may
view,
1275M7-21
ble.
Schofield's
However,
In this chapter
Aristotle
tions
of the citizen
and finds
or omits
actual
participation
offices
"indefinite"
applies
the
On
citizens.
of them wanting
at 1275a22-3
The definition
to be
(that
is, with
to all of
those
implausi
of proposed
defini
because
it includes
each
has
man or juror, and Aristotle

which
that
view.
3.1 seems
of Politics
reading
a series
considers
views.82
noncitizens
and
a potential
Aristotle
is only defining
citi
apparently,
at 1275a22-3
and the earlier definition
best fits his
Schofield's
zen at
for political
"potential"
participation
not in fact be Aristotle's
considered
to
revised
indefinite
cover
citizens
terms)
such
in terms
who
as assembly
then says that the definition

so-called
citizens
of
hold
(oqiojioc)
is "nearly this sort of

even this defini
with
out a difficulty
he then points
thing."83 However,
someone
even
in some polises
be a citizen
if he
may
tion, because
to
does not actually
hold office.
The previous
definition
de
applied
mocracy
However,
but
not
an assembly.
of oligarchy
lacking
of
is
the
citizen
of cor
capable
(?ioqio|io?)84
to certain
"the definition
forms
1275a22-3.
^Politics
82In support of his view that 1275a22-3
gives the "official definition",
Schofield
it, "A citizen is best defined without
qualification
(p. 841) translates
not by any of the other distinctions
but by snaring in ju
[sc. just mentioned],
Schofield's
to nothing
dicial decision
and rule." However,
"best" corresponds
to modify
in the Greek, and he takes ?jtX?oc, "without qualification"
the verb
But cut?xb? probably modifies
?Q??eTai, "is defined."
jioX?tt]c, "citizen," as in
sense
sentence:
"We are seeking the citizen in the unqualified
the preceding
The Politics of Aristotle,
3:135.
(toy oijtX?oc jroA.?TT|v)";cf. Newman,
1275a33-4.
^Politics
"determination"
here
84Schofield
(p. 840) objects that ?ioqiojio? means
so that Aristotle
is correcting
rather than "definition,"
his interpretation
as such.
rather than correcting
the definition
of the definition
However,
means
at
"definition"
because
Aristotle's
1275bl3,
point
?iooioîo? probably
revision of the 1275a33-4 definition
is that his previous
(that is, inserting "in
Immanuel Bonitz's Index Aristote
definite" before "office") will not suffice.
as the
lis (1870; reprint, Berlin: De Guyter,
1961) gives notio ac definitio

903
in such oligarchies
because
the citizen
is one who
is defi
rection,"85
nite (namely,
in term) regarding
his office.
he
offers
final
his
Hence,
in the passage
definition
cited above, beginning
with
the words,
"Who
the citizen
is
evident
therefore
from
the
which
is,
implies
foregoing,"
view of the subject.86
considered
If it is granted
that political
liberties
have a place within
Aristo
tle's theory of political
is it? I have argued
that
important
rights, how
a
in
central
have
less
than
modern
liberal
because
they
place
theories,
an
as
Aristotle
valued
but
external
liberty
only
good rather than as an
that
it is his
essential
constituent
tle might
not
have
of the human
what
that is, rights which

whether
one's
having
T. H.
end.
Irwin
Hence,
calls
agent
has
plausibly
"morally
them
is morally
that Aristo
distinctive
could not be justified ultimately
rights,"
in terms of
all things considered.87

the necessity
of these
"concessions,"
allow for "a right to do wrong"
and that
best,
Roderick
Long questions
and argues
that Aristotle
does
he views
freedom
and liberty as not merely
valuable.
the first
intrinsically
Concerning
attention
I granted
instrumentally
but also
as
calls
issue, Long (pp. 778-9)

for optional
the
rights, where
the right either to do or not do a given act. Long also argues
a virtue
to exercise
that in order
such as generosity
the
to the fact
that Aristotle
allows
sense for ?iooiojxo?

at 1275b 13 and cites several parallels,
the
including
at 3.8.1279b20.
of democracy
?iOQiofxo? (definition)
^Politics
3.1.1275M3.
statement
86Schofield
that the person who
(p. 842) also cites Aristotle's
shares in the positions
of honor is "most especially"
(ji?XiOTa) called a citizen
this is not intended as a definition
of the citizen.
It
However,
(3.5.1278a36).
is noteworthy
that Politics
3.5 follows a discussion
of whether
the good citi
zen and the good human being are one and the same, and the chapter begins
is true, that is, whether
his final definition
the citizen is
by asking whether
one who has the liberty (eêcrriv) to take part in rule, or disenfranchised
vul
should be counted as citizens (1277b33-5).
gar persons
Although he also de
scribes the latter as "those who do not partake of offices" (oi? \m\ î8T8?tiv
this follows trivially from the fact that they do not have the liberty to
??xwv),
take part. Aristotle
different sorts of constitution
and
goes on to distinguish
different kinds of citizen. The vulgar person cannot be a citizen of an aristoc
When
racy where offices (Tifxai) are based on virtue and merit (1278al5-21).
Aristotle
speaks of the person who is "most especially
(jicdi?Ta) called a citi
zen" at 1278a36, he is referring to the best specimen,
the citizen of aristoc
that a human
racy. This use of îcx?xGTamay be compared with the statement
being is more
(?l?XXov) of a political animal than other animals (1.2.1253a7
of political animal; cf. His
8), although other animals satisfy his definition
1.1.487b33-488all.
tory of Animals
87See
Miller, NJR, 116.

904
FREDD. MILLER, Jr.
donor must
have
the optional right either

therefore
agents must
to act virtuously
course
of action
totle would
or another.
hold
to make
have
seems
Long
individuals
have
that
a gift or not.88 In order

one
the liberty to follow
correct
in asserting
that Aris
some choices
to make
the right
will
fail to act virtuously.
Even
if
they
on the basis of their promise
Aristotle
to vir
justifies
rights ultimately
tuous life, it does not follow
that one possesses
any given right only if
one is actually
it in a virtuous manner.
an an
This suggests
exercising
even where
it is possible
swer
to Kraut's
violate
a bad
that every
worry
that
(p. 767)
person's
citizen has
that on Aristotle's
by taking his
to the external
rights
view
property.
one would
Aristotle
not
holds
for example,
rights
prop
goods,
he needs
in order
to exercise
virtues
such as generosity
erty, which
and friendship
in a virtuous
manner.
This
that the property
implies
holder has the liberty to choose
to do what he ought to, and he retains
this right even if he acts in a stingy manner.
such rights
Nonetheless,
are far more
in Aristotle's
are
circumscribed
than
in mod
theory
they
ern
liberalism.
common
for
The
use.
and Aristotle
ously,
sufficiently
citizen
He
is expected
to make
his property
available
be educated
to conduct
himself
virtu
should
would
hold
probably
he should be subject
that
if his vicious
to social
flagrant
fines.89 Hence,
it would
be misleading
including
as endorsing
a "right to do wrong"
in the modern
also challenges
my claim
Long (pp. 787-98)
said,
moral
perfection,
tution."90
Long's
full
First,
is
legal sanctions,
to interpret Aristotle
sense.
that Aristotle
regards
of
instrumental
I
value.
good
merely
not be unlimited
should
liberty but
is achieved
to
the
consti
through
conformity
or liberty as an external
"The aim of the individual
freedom
do
behavior
and
justice
claim
which
critique
here, but
contains
valuable
I would
like
that Aristotle
my
treats
to which
I cannot
insights
to respond
to his main
points.
as an external
liberty
(?ôuoia)
on his argument
at NE
that the practice
10.8.1178a23-b7
virtue requires
"external
for example,
generos
equipment":
is based
good
of ethical
ity and
justice
require
property
(xQr\\iaxa),
and
temperance
requires
liberty
(?uva|ii?),
from this that the contemplative
life
gues
more
self-sufficient:
whereas
noble
action
courage
(?ôuoia).
is superior
requires
power
requires
ar
Aristotle
because
many
88Cf. Politics
2.5.1263bl0-15.
89Cf.NE 10.9.1179b31-1180a5.
'?Miller, NJR, 250-1.

it is
external
905
does not need them, at any rate for his activ

"the contemplator
things,
even
so
to
is
and
by them with
ity,
speak hindered
regard to his con
as
that Aristotle
This
indicates
views
liberty
templation."
(?ôuoia)
an external
good.
On
the other
hand,
is correct
Long
to point
out
that
freedom (??,8uG8Q?a)and liberty (?ôuoia) are not identified by Aris

so that
totle,
freedom
mentally
the sake
also
the above
an external
the condition
passage
does
not
show
that Aristotle
on Aristotle's
Freedom,
for one's
of existing
good.
own
sake
view,
rather
regards
is funda
than
for
that it is part of the human

end.
a
so
in
that
it
Nonetheless,
implies
voluntary
condition,
living
or tyrannical
is incompatible
with despotic
Aristotelian
rule.92 Hence,
to
not
is
with
lib
freedom
involves
but
it
be
identified
merely
liberty,93
of another.91
This
implies
freedom
Thus he rejects
the democrats'
identification
of freedom
with
erty.
one wishes,
the liberty to do whatever
and maintains
that living for
not as slavery
the constitution
should
be regarded
but as salvation.94
was
A similar sentiment
II during a visit
John
Paul
by Pope
expressed
to the United
States:
a nation
One hundred thirty years ago, President Lincoln asked whether
in liberty and dedicated
to the proposition
"conceived
that all men are
created equal" could "long endure."
is no
President
Lincoln's question
less a question
for the present
of Americans.
generation
Democracy
a shared commitment
cannot be sustained without
to certain moral
truths about the human person and human community.
The basic ques
tion before a democratic
In
society is, "How ought we to live together?"
can society exclude moral truth and
seeking an answer to this question,
. . . Surely it is important for America
moral reasoning?
that the moral
truths which make freedom possible
should be passed on to each new
of Americans
needs to know that free
generation.
Every generation
not in doing what we like, but in having the
dom?freedom?consists
right to do what we ought.95
This
is closer
as "the right
of freedom
understanding
to Aristotle
than to those contemporary
to do what
rights
we
theories
ought"
which
91See
1.2.982b26.
Metaphysics
92See
Politics
4.10.1295a22-4.
in an attempt to drive
12.12.1075al8-23
93Long (p. 794) cites Metaphysics
a wedge
between
in
and
this context
However,
eôuoia.
8^8?tiv
?A,eu08Q?a
rather than political
(verb form of zôvola) means metaphysical
liberty: it is
not open to the free members
to act according
to chance,
of the household
because
have
been
habituated.
presumably
they
morally
94See Politics
5.9.1310a31-6.
95
Homily delivered October
8, 1995 in Oriole Park at Camden Yards in
Baltimore.
Text printed in the New York Times, 9 October
1995, p. B15.

906
FRED D. MILLER, Jr.
are wedded
to the principles
that the right
function
of rights
is to define
the primary
conduct.
Aristotle's
citizens
to the good and that

neutral
of
spheres
morally
a conception
of the moral
life, and
to lead flourishing
moral
lives.
share
the role of rights is to enable

reservations
Aristotle's
is prior
them
about
liberty,
as well
as about
equality,
the Aristote
for the complicated

between
help to account
relationship
and early modern
lian political
tradition
theory
rights
tailed by A. S. McGrade.
Aristotle
and the medieval
made
to the framework
contributions
within
important
which
modern
came
theorists
to
think
which
is de
Aristotelians
for political
in terms
of
thought
"natural
taking root before Wil

rights." The idea of natural
rights was arguably
as early as the twelfth
liam of Ockham
it is also
century,96
although
true that orthodox
Aristotelians
resisted
the more
libertarian
and egal
of the new
of natural
itarian tendencies
theories
Especially
rights.
non-Aristotelian
was
which
critics
of slavery premised
the critique
upon the natural
is already
in Aquinas
of all human
evident
and
beings, which
equality
in later Aristotelians
is explicit
like Francisco
de Vitoria
and Barto
lom? Las Casas.
On the other hand Aristotle
the principle
provided
equal
modern
human
Ockham
wielded
should
beings
is a widely
ural rights tradition.
be
against
treated
recognized
all
forms
equally.
seminal
figure
of
slavery:
naturally
in the modern
nat
He defined the notion of the right of use (ius
one ought
as "a licit power
of using an external
utendi)
thing of which
own
fault and
not to be deprived
one's will, without
one's
against
one
can call
one
if
has
without
reasonable
and
been deprived,
cause,
a right
Jean Gerson
defined
the depriver
into court." More
generally,
as
"an immediate
dance
with
faculty
a dictate
of
or power
right
to someone
pertaining
Historians
have
reason."97
in accor
been
im
in these definitions,
upon power
(potestas)
by the emphasis
pressed
idea of "subjective
and how this forms the basis for the modern
right."
This is not merely

rights
are
in some
the idea that rights belong to subjects, but also that

way
expressions
of their
free wills.
Hence,
ius be
96In addition to the work of Brian Tierney cited by A. S. McGrade,

p. 808
n. 10, see McGrade's
own essay, "Rights, Natural Rights, and the Philosophy
ed. Nor
of Law," in The Cambridge
of Later Medieval
Philosophy,
History
man Kretzmann,
Kenny, and Jan Pinborg
Anthony
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
Press, 1982).
University
97Cf. McGrade
dierum,
citing Ockham, Opus nonaginta
(pp. 818-20),
animae,
chap. 3.
chap. 2, and Gerson, De vita spirituali

comes
in modern
linked to libertas
closely
a decisively
modern
McGrade
turn,
this was
in which
Aristotle
arguably
subjective
ably
prepared
a doctrine
promotes
of objective
argu
right, which
nature
of human
understanding
of a range of natural
and developed
powers
and other rights theorists
continued
Ockham
consisting
Moreover,
istotelian
rights
theory.98
Although
(pp. 820-1) points out ways
for it. The doctrine
of
the way
right presupposed
out of an Aristotelian
developed
superior
907
or abilities.
to invoke
Ar
for example,
that the just government
principles,
political
the advantage
of the ruled and that rule over free persons
is
con
to rule over slaves
Even
the
modern
p. 822).
(McGrade,
on
is congenial
to Aristotle's
emphasis
rights as powers
or potentiality
as a central notion
in every branch
of knowl
of a right as a licit power
and it is not surprising
that a concept
on Aristotle
have appealed
to political
theorists
schooled
(cf.
ception
dunamis
edge,
would
of
pp. 826-7).
McGrade,
I have argued
that Aristotle
as "natural rights" theory,
known
lels between
his political
to focus on political
tend
came
to be
is a progenitor
of what
to paral
and I have called attention
and modern
theories.
Some scholars
theory
discourse
rather than political

and
thought
to argue that political
is intelligible
vocabulary
only in terms of "rheto
a
to
rics" and "language
concrete
context.
political
belonging
games"
a
as
tend
to emphasize
result
discontinuities
between
different
They
epochs.
is wary
This
of retranslation
understanding
ences
between
able
is evidently
of ancient
attitude
to look
shared
terms
Aristotle's
ideas.
ancient
and modern
for continuity
In this spirit
philosophy.
idence
for nascent
rights
by Schofield
into modern
Undeniably
there
(p. 856-7), who

as a strategy
for
are
differ
deep
reason
it is
but
political
views,
as change
in the history
of political
ev
that there is the compelling
argued
as well
I have
in Aristotle.
This
serves
to
illuminate
the
in which
he applies
the principle
of justice
in his constitution
and
to
understand
how
modern
natural
theories?so
helps
rights
in detail from his political
an important
different
theory?became
part
way
also
of his
us
intellectual
legacy.99
Bowling
Green State University
98Brian Tierney has shown that ius is tied to potestas

and libertas as
as
the
twelfth
See
his
of
Natural
early
century.
"Origin
Rights Language: Texts
and Contexts,
10 (1989): 615-46.
1150-1250," History
of Political
Thought
991 am grateful to Liberty Fund and to all of the conference
participants
for many valuable
insights.


Miller, Aristotle and The Origins of Natural Rights

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Aristotle and the Origins of Natural Rights

Author(s): Fred D. Miller Jr.

This content downloaded from 181.47.9.12 on Fri, 1 Nov 2013 11:20:07 AM

AND THEORIGINSOF NATURALRIGHTS

the rights of citizens.

the theory of rights

to: Social Philosophy

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FREDD. MILLER, Jr.

and the common

but also because

share) with modern

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(including unborn babies) have the right to

right, and, if so, does

of rights holders? Although it is (almost universally) agreed today that

tribes, and families,

ing, through cooperation

a good one; and he

in the public life of the society, their individr

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FREDD. MILLER, JR.

What is distinctive about a theory of rights as such is that it prohibits

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THEORIGINSOF NATURALRIGHTS 877

its ends without

the good of the individual

3.12.1282b 16-18; cf. Nicomachean

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FRED D. MILLER, Jr.

entails a theory of rights.

argues that a polis

itself exists by nature (eoTi fyvoe?)

for this in detail in chapter 6 of NJR and can only

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every polis exists by nature, since the first communities

that the polis

the polis is by nature a collective

entity (jtAijBo? ti t?]v

ral (just) or unnatural

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FREDD. MILLER, Jr.

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the same work

case F has a correlative

Shame and Necessity

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FRED D. MILLER, Jr.

(a|i(|)iG?r|Tr|Gic) just things are the things which

one party claims

'just' or some derivative,

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"a right" in a passage

to bring suit or to defend

suits. For Aristotle

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FRED D. MILLER, Jr.

are rare, and are not

to curry favor pri

jtq?? to?? ?Xkov?).26

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about the meaning

27Lycophron's view that law is "a guarantor of men's