Pastor v.

CA
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983.
FACTS:
Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.)
andSofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate
and allowance of analleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition: a
legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter, the probate
court appointedQuemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not covered or affected by the
holographic will.Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for reconveyance
of alleged properties of estatewhich included the properties subject of the legacy which were in the names of spouses Pastor
Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimedto be the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The probate court issued an
order allowing the will to probate. Theorder was affirmed by CA and on petition for review, the SC dismissed the petition
and remanded the same to the probate courtafter denying reconsideration. For two years after remand of the case to the
probate court, all pleadings of both parties remainedunacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set the hearing on
the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr.and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance
suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit their respective position papers.
While the reconveyance suit was still pending in another court, the probatecourt issued Order of Execution and Garnishment,
resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS andruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was
not inofficious. Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly toQuemada the 42% royalties due to decedents
estate, of which Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee.Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his
assignees
was
ordered
garnished
to
answer
for
the
accumulated
legacy
of Quemada.
Being immediately executory, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment. Theoppositors
sought reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the probate court ordered suspension of payment of all royaltiesdue
Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositors motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr.
andhis wife filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari
and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing thewrit of execution and garnishment issued by the
probate court. However, said petition was denied as well as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review
by certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.
RULING:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a
rule,the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
Probate Courtmay pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in aseparate action to resolve title.The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate
Order allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive
portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was
not resolved. For it confined itself to the questionof extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing
a special administrator. Thus it allowed andapproved the holographic will with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same
having been duly authenticated pursuant to therequisites or solemnities prescribed by law. It declared that the intestate
estate administration aspect must proceed subject to theoutcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of
real and personal properties.The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate
inventory, considering that theissue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still
pending. It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with
finality the question of ownership of themining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the
dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directedspecial administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
JIMENEZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 184 SCRA 367 (1990)
DOCTRINE: The probate court, as a rule, cannot pass with finality on issues affecting ownership of property. Jimenez holds
that this limitation applies also to proceedings in intestacy where an intestate court can only pass upon on issues of title on a
provisional basis only. And despite a ruling of the intestate court on the matter, the parties are not barred by res judicata from
instituting a separate and subsequent action to thresh out the matter.

FACTS: The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson produced 4 children, namely Alberto,
Leonardo, Sr. Alejandra and Angeles. During the existence of the marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired 5 parcels of land in
Pangasinan.
1. After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with
whom he begot the 7 petitioners.
2. Lino died on Aug. 11, 1951 while Genoveva died on Nov. 21, 1978.
3. April 1979, Virginia Jimenez (Virginia) filed a petition praying to be appointed as the administratrix of the properties of
the deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva. Enumerated in her petition were the supposed heirs of the spouses,
which
included herein co-petitioners and the four children of the union of Lino and
Consolacion.
4. October, 1979 - Private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. (Leonardo Jr.) son of Leonardo Jimenez Sr., file a motion for the
exclusion of his fathers name and those of Alberto, Alejandra and Angeles from the petition, as they are children of the
union of Lino and Consolacion and not of Lino and Genoveva and because they have already received heir inheritance
consisting of 5 parcel of lands in Pangasinan.
5. March 23, 1981 - Petitioner Virginia was appointed administrator of the Intestate Estate of Lino and Genoveva.
6. May 21, 191 - She filed an inventory of the estate of the spouses Lino and Genoveva including 5 parcels of land in
Pangasinan.
7. Leonardo Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory on the ground that these had already been
adjudicated to Leonardo Sr., Alberto, Alejandra and Angeles by their deceased father Lino.
8. September 29, 1981 - The probate court ordered the exclusion of the 5 parcels of
land from the inventory. On appeal the CA dismissed the petition for the annulment of order of the probate
court dated in September 29, 1981, because Genoveva had admitted that the subject parcel of land had been adjudicated to
the children of the previous nuptial; and the subject properties could not have been acquired during the marriage of Lino to
Genoveva because they were already titled in the name of Lino even prior to Lino and Genovevas marriage. 9. 2 years
after, petitioner filed an amended complaint to recover the possession/ownership of the subject 5 parcel of land as
part of the estate of Lino and Genoveva and to order private respondents to render the accounting of the produce. The private
respondents moved to for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by prior judgment and by
prescription and laches.
10. On the other hand the petitioner contend that the action was not barred by prior judgment because the probate court had
no jurisdiction to determine with finality the question of ownership of the lots which must be ventilated in a separate action;
and the action instituted in 1981 was not barred by prescription or laches because private respondents forcible
acquisition pf the subject properties occurred only after the death of petitioners mother, Genoveva in 1978.
11. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, IAC likewise dismissed the said
complaint.
ISSUE: WON in a settlement proceeding, the lower court has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and whether res
judicata exist to bar petitioners present action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the 5 parcel of land.
HELD: No
Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a general rule, a probate
court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the probate court's findings are not conclusive, being
prima facie, a separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. The patent reason
is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. It has been held that in a special
proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot
resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.
Res judicata does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions. Specifically in Sp. No. 5346, is an action was
for the settlement of the intestate estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy, while Civil Case No. 16111 was an
action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. While admittedly, the CFI of
Pangasinan had jurisdiction, the same was merely limited jurisdiction. Any pronouncement by said court as to title is not
conclusive and could still be attacked in a separate proceeding. Civil Case No. 16111, on the other hand, was lodged before
the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, in the exercise of the court's general jurisdiction, in the determination of the issue of
ownership of the disputed properties. Since the determination of the question of title to the subject properties in Sp. No. 5346
was merely provisional, petitioners are not barred from instituting the appropriate action in Civil Case No. 16111.
Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It was
also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.
2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was
procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.
3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will invalid
on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is
null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.
Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will
RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain
provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.
The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the
nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look
into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at
the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

FAUSTO E. GAN v. ILDEFONSO YAP

G.R. No. L-12190
August 30, 1958
FACTS:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving
properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with a petition for the
probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any
testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge, refused to probate the alleged
will. A seventy-page motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was
in the handwriting of the testator?
HELD:
NO. The court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only
medium of proof. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the
evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to
that clear and distinct proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11.

Rodelas v. Aranza
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
Relova, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed
by the appellees on the ground that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.
2. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot
stand in the place of the original.
Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy
RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.
Baltazar vs. Laxa, April 11, 2012
Facts:
Paciencia, childless and has no siblings, was a 78 year old spinster. She made herlast will and testament in favor of her
nephew Lorenzo Laxa (respondent) and his wifeand two children. She treated Lorenzo as her own son. The said will was
executed in thehouse of a retired judge, Limpin, and was read twice to Paciencia. Present on the execution of the will were
three witnesses and one of which is Dra. Limpin, the daughter of Judge Limpin. The formalities of signing the will by the
testator and the witnesses were fulfilled. The will remained with Judge Limpin until Lorenzo, four years after the death of
Paciencia, filed a petition for the probate of the will and for the issuance of the letter of administration. Petitioner Baltazar filed an
opposition to Lorenzos petition
averring that the properties subject to the will belongs to his predecessor in interest, Mangalindahan. Later on, Baltazar was
joined with several other petitioners contending that Paciencias will was null and void because ownership of the properties had not been
transferred. Few more reasons raised by the petitioners were that the will was not executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law, and that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the execution. RTC ruled
that Paciencia was of unsound mind during the execution of the will, however, the CA reversed such decision and granted the
probate of the will of Pacencia. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but such was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue(s): (1)
Whether or not the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance
for probate.
(2)Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred in ruling that petitioners failed to prove that paciencia was not of sound
mind at the time the will was allegedly executed.
Ruling:
(1)Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New
Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express dire
ction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Art. 806.
Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and thewitnesses. The notary public shall not be
required to retain a copy of the will, or fileanother with the Office of the Clerk of Court.The signatures of the testatrix,
Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the
notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitlystates the critical requirement
that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the
Will in the presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to theWill in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
(2) The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of
the petitioners.The appellate court agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful doesnot necessarily
make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of

unsound mind. Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be
sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper
objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof tothe contrary.The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of
making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will.It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no
matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold
said allegations. "The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix]has willed that
[her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such
desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby."
This, coupled with Lorenzos established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses,
as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt
the balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.
OZAETA vs. CUARTERO G.R. No. L-5597 May 31, 1956 26
FACTS: Maria Cuartero and Rosa Gonzales both claimed that they were married to Carlos PalancaTaguinlay in 1929 and
1945, respectively. The marriage of Rosa to Carlos had been duly established by testimonial and documentary evidence. One
of the pieces of evidence presented was the will executed by Carlos Palanca wherein he declared that he married Rosa
Gonzales in which marriage they had eight children.
ISSUE: Whether or not the declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as conclusive evidence of an
existence of a fact during the life time of the testator
RULING: Declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as conclusive evidence of an existence of a fact
during the life time o f the testator of the said Will . Palanca executed his will and he made the solemn declaration in said
document that since 1923 and for some years there after he maintained amorous relations with Maria Cuartero and had by
her six natural children whom, according to him, he had liberally fed and support ed. H e said nothing about having married
Maria ; on the contrary, he declared that for grave reasons he regarded her unworthy o f being the guardian o f the persons
and property of his children by her and so appointed Felisa Joson de Fer nandez and the Philippine National Bank as
guardians of their persons, and property respectively. On the other hand, in the same will he spoke of his marriage to Rosa
Gonzales and the eight children he had by her, which children according to him were legitimated by reason of their
subsequent marriage. Said declaration in the will may not be taken lightly, as a statement of little significance. When he
made said statement he was about 76 years old and must have felt that he had not many years left to live.
Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80 he wedJosefina who was then 28 years old.
But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss,Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in
English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to
probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister. Accordingto the notary public who notarized the testators will,
after the testator instructed him onthe terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to
come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but
the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution
was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June1983 because he did not
like the document to appear dirty.
Petitioners argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceivingPlacido to sign it. Deception is
allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the executionand the attestation of the will.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will.2. W/N the signature of Placido in the
will was procured by fraud or trickery.
HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds ofproperty he owned, the extent of his
shares in them and even their location. As regardsthe proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife
as
sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fr
aud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subjectof it is cheated. It may be of such
character that the testator is misled or deceived as tothe nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may
relate to someextrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led tomake a certain will which,
but for fraud, he would not have made.The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at
thetime of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the willonly upon a showing of credible
evidence of fraud.Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, theconflict between the
dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a notarial will be
executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to itssupposed execution and
attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by thenotary public and instrumental witnesses