*GR GENERAL REGISTER

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261

November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC.,
ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
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G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZONABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-inintervention,
vs.

FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE

VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO
LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS
BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY,
SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON,
MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO,
CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG,
ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES,
AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO,
CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC,
GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI
LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE
VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM
MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF
PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA
LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK
COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER
BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO,
JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
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G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C.
REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON
MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO,
EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO
TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE
TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME
BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA
LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE
RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS,
ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH
LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U.
SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND
EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE
VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE

SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ,
GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,
ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROSARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES
FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO
SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF
THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M.

MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL
BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF
CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY.
MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS
G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO
FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS
HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS
SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly
irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of
government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent,
dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such
today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal
courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of
the instant petitions whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political
crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of
conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the
issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance,
that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure
from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or
judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by
each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated
by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect
without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to
insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by
what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel
in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision
in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict,
the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility,
but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so
provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious
whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in
our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there,
has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption

of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to

abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases
and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. 24(Italics
in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of
powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon
the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period
of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v.
Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law
of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States
generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that
rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a
law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution,
the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm
acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of
the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation
of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers
are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and
is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers

are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To him, "[j]udicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in
that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any
branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in
the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 140560 May 4, 2000

JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and RICHARD ADVINCULA, respondents.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion;
I begin with the baseline proposition that the proper interpretation of Section 74 (b) of the Local
Government Code should depend on the edifying intent of our legislators. With due respect to the
majority, I wish to express my humble reading of the intent of our lawmakers, when they engrafted
the people's right of recall in the corpusof an laws. Our search should start with the Constitution
which provides the matrix of our rights. All our fundamental laws 1 set in stone the principle that "the
Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." An important component of this sovereign power is the
right of the people to elect officials who will wield the powers of government i.e., the power to make
laws and the power to execute laws. These powers are enormous and in the wrong hands can wreak
havoc to the people. Our laws therefore regulate their exercise. Among others, they set minimum
qualifications for candidates to elective public office. They safeguard the integrity of the procedure of

electing these candidates. They also established an independent COMELEC to enhance the
laboratory conditions under which elections must be conducted.

GENERAL ORDER NO. 5

DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE
TO SUPPRESS THE REBELLION IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
WHEREAS; over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with
authoritarian of the extreme left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right,
represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State - who
are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, ver a broad
front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS; these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;
WHEREAS; the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of
the national media;
WHEREAS; this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including
hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the people's confidence in government and
their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS; these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS; these activities give totalitarian forces of the both extreme Left and extreme Right the
opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS; Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the
democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS; the activities above described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects
constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the Philippine State and of the
Filipino people;
WHEREAS; Proclamation 1017 dated February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of
National Emergency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me
under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of
the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No.1017 dated February 24, 2006, do
hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men
of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.

City of Manila, February 24, 2006.

(Sgd.)
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
President of The Republic of the Philippines
By the President:
(Sgd.)
EDUARDO R. ERMITA
Executive Secretary

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989
RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO
BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY"
ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners,
vs.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and
data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the
democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican
system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system,
governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the
people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become
prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of
public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the
people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such
information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing
legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

G.R. No. L-1232

January 12, 1948

METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (METRAN), Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE MA. PAREDES, VICENTE DE LA CRUZ and ARSENIO C. ROLDAN, Judges of Court of
Industrial Relations, and THE NATIONAL LABOR UNION, Respondents.
In a republican state, like Philippines, government immunity from suit without its consent is derived
from the will of the people themselves in freely creating a government "of the people, and for the
people"-a representative government through which they have agreed to exercise the powers and
discharge the duties of their sovereignty for the common good and general welfare. In so agreeing,
the citizens have solemnly undertaken to surrender some of their private rights and interest which
were calculated to conflict with the higher rights and larger interests of the people as a whole,
represented by the government thus established by them all. One of those "higher rights," based
upon those "larger interests" is that government immunity. The members of the respondent Labor
Union themselves are part of the people who have freely that government and participated in that
solemn undertaking. In this sense-and a very real one it is-they are in effect attempting to use
themselves along with the rest of the people represented by their common government-an
anomalous and absurd situation indeed.
The case is radically different from a dictatorship, or an aristocratic, oligarchical, autocratic, or
monarchical government, where any similar immunity will be the creature of the will of one man or of
a powerful few. The principle is further grounded upon the necessity of protecting the performance of
governmental and public functions from being harrassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private
suits. (See also McClellan vs. State, 170, p. 662; 35 Cal. App., 605, 606) Where the government is
"of the people, by the people, and for the people," such immunity from suit will only be the
reaffirmation of the sovereignty of the people themselves as represented by their government in the
face of the obvious impossibility of constituting the entire people into one single body to exercise the
powers and enjoy the immunities of that sovereignty.

G.R. No. 197221

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is
incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be
hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the
people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.
The petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of
authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is
abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic government the
separation of powers.

Congress power to provide for the simultaneous holding of elections for national and local officials,
however, does not encompass the power to authorize the President to appoint officers-in-charge in
place of elective local officials, canceling in the process scheduled local elections. To hold otherwise
is to sanction the perversion of the Philippine States democratic and republican nature.
Second, constitutional provisions fixing the terms of elective officials serve the ends of democratic
republicanism by depriving elective officials of any legal basis to remain in office after the end of their
terms, ensuring the holding of elections, and paving the way for the newly elected officials to assume
office.65 Such provisions, which are found in the 1987 Constitution, are framed upon the belief that to
ensure democratic values, there must be periodic electoral exercises. By refusing to include hold
over provisions in fixing the terms of elective national and non-barangay local officials, the framers of
the 1987 Constitution guaranteed not only the elective nature of these offices 66 but also secured our
democratic values.
In reviewing legislative measures impinging on core constitutional principles such as democratic
republicanism, the Court, as the last bulwark of democracy, must necessarily be deontological. The
Court must determine the constitutionality of a law based on the laws adherence to the
Constitution, not on the laws supposed beneficial consequences. The laudable ends of
legislative measures cannot justify the denial, even if temporal, of the sovereign peoples
constitutional right of suffrage to choose freely and periodically "those whom they please to
govern them."83 The Court should strike a balance between upholding constitutional imperatives on
regional autonomy and republican democratic principles, on the one hand, and the incumbent
administrations legislative initiative to synchronize elections, on the other hand. Had it done so here,
the Court would have faithfully performed its sworn duty to protect and uphold the Constitution
without fear or favor.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I join Justice Carpios dissent and agree that the "[C]ongress power to provide for the simultaneous
holding of elections for national and local officials x x x does not encompass the power to authorize
the President to appoint officers-in-charge in place of elective officials x x x. To hold otherwise is to
sanction the perversion of the Philippine States democratic and republican nature," and so sustain
the holdover of the incumbent ARMM officials pending the election and qualification of their
successors.
Hence, this Court cannot expand the appointing power of the President to encompass offices
expressly required by the Constitution to be "elective and representative." The republican form of
government can only be preserved by ensuring that elective offices can only be filled by persons
voted by the electors.
Even the ponencia recognizes that the grant of the power to appoint the ARMM officials to the
President would trample on the democratic and republican nature of our government as "the
peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to be systematically withdrawn to
the point of fostering an undemocratic regime x x x. [It] would likewise frontally breach the elective
and representative governance requirement of Section 18 Article X of the Constitution." However,
the ponencia evades the application of its own observation to the present case on the ground that
"this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated under RA
10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance x x x will not
systematically be touched or affected at all."

G.R. No. L-22944

February 10, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CLAUDIA SAN JUAN and SEVERO SAN JUAN, defendants-appellees.
Francisco D. Abas for defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
This view, which thus far is purely from the perspective of legal technology, finds affirmation of its
validity when we realize that we are here dealing with the exercise of the right of suffrage which, in
the consensus of political philosophers of consequence, is the bedrock of all republican institutions.
The unadorned statement in Article V of the Constitution is a simple but sacred avowal of faith in the
efficacy and durability of the democratic process. It is a recognition that the people in their sovereign
character are the fountainhead of governmental authority, and that their right to participate in the
power process is indispensable for democratic government to constitute an effective instrument of
social control. In the phrase of Mr. Justice Jose Laurel
As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage,
whatever be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the
great reservoir of power must be emptied into receptacular agencies wrought by the people
through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government,
necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the
ultimate source of the established authority.3
Indeed, each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign will, that abiding
credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the starting
level of its expression and application, every assumption must be indulged in and every guarantee
adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen's free choice. For to impede, without
authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of the right of suffrage is to inflict the ultimate
indignity on the democratic process. As numerous as they are insidious are long-standing
techniques of terror and intimidation that have been conceived by man in derogation of the right
of suffrage which we have repeatedly and unqualifiedly condemned. When the legislature
provided in section 133 of the Revised Election Code an explicit and unequivocal guarantee of a
voter's free access to the polling place, it could have intended no purpose other than to maintain
inviolate the right to vote by safeguarding the voter against all manner of unauthorized interference
and travesty that surveyors of fear can devise. Every unlawful obstacle, by whatever means or
method, interposed to the free entry of a voter into the polling place to cast his vote, strikes at the
very heart of the right of suffrage.

G.R. No. 205852

KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS (KBP) and ABS-CBN
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Once again the Court is asked to draw a carefully drawn balance in the incessant conflicts between
rights and regulations, liberties and limitations, and competing demands of the different segments of
society. Here, we are confronted with the need to strike a workable and viable equilibrium between a
constitutional mandate to maintain free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, together
with the aim of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates, on one hand, and the imperatives of a republican and democratic state, together with
its guaranteed rights of suffrage, freedom of speech and of the press, and the people's right to
information, on the other.
2

In a nutshell, the present petitions may be seen as in search of the answer to the question - how
does the Charter of a republican and democratic State achieve a viable and acceptable balance
between liberty, without which, government becomes an unbearable tyrant, and authority, without
which, society becomes an intolerable and dangerous arrangement?
Fundamental to the idea of a democratic and republican state is the right of the people to determine
their own destiny through the choice of leaders they may have in government. Thus, the primordial
importance of suffrage and the concomitant right of the people to be adequately informed for the
intelligent exercise of such birthright. It was said that:
x x x As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever
may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir
of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their
Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it
implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised
citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority.
He has a voice in his Government and whenever possible it is the solemn duty of the judiciary, when
called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it. This,
fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with
utmost, with reasonable, liberality. x x x It has also been said that "[ c ]ompetition in ideas and
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms." Candidates and political parties need adequate breathing space - including the means
to disseminate their ideas. This could not be reasonably addressed by the very restrictive manner by
which the respondent implemented the time limits in regard to political advertisements in the
broadcast media.
56

57

G.R. No. 207851

July 8, 2014

ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA, Respondents.
The Court begins with general and undeniable principles.
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
28

Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the character of a republican

state and a public office, viz: A republic is a representative government, a
government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people
govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and
renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who
derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited
period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal.
Obviously, a republican government is a responsible government whose officials
hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to the
Constitution, at all times be accountable to the people they are sworn to serve. The
purpose of a republican government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion
of the common welfare according to the will of the people themselves. (Emphasis
ours and italics in the original)
29

In Tolentino v. COMELEC, Justice Puno likewise characterized the role of the electoral process in
the following wise:
30

The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republican framework because it
isthrough the act of voting that government by consent is secured. Through the ballot, people
express their will on the defining issues of the day and they are able to choose their leaders in
accordance with the fundamental principle of representative democracy that the people should elect
whom they please to govern them. Voting has an important instrumental value in preserving the
viability of constitutional democracy. It has traditionally been taken as a prime indicator of democratic
participation. (Citations omitted and italics ours)
31

G.R. No. 169834

April 20, 2006

PDP- LABAN, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history
of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep
certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting
executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional
Convention said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the
proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater
number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished." 1
History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to
abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray
for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under
review has come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong
presumption of constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the
Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression of
the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of the government that
contravenes its mandates.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

G.R. No. 205728

January 21, 2015

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.
MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
"The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." Article II, Section 1, Constitution
All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of the
fundamental and preferred right to expression of the electorate during political contests no matter
how seemingly benign will be tolerated.
This case defines the extent that our people may shape the debates during elections. It is significant
and of first impression. We are asked to decide whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
has the competence to limit expressions made by the citizens who are not candidates during
elections.
I like to reiterate over and over, for it seems this is the fundamental point others miss, that genuine
democracy thrives only where the power and right of the people toelect the men to whom they would
entrust the privilege to run the affairs of the state exist. In the language of the declaration of
principles of our Constitution, "The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them" (Section 1, Article II). Translating this
declaration into actuality, the Philippines is a republic because and solely because the people in it
can be governed only by officials whom they themselves have placed in office by their votes. And in
it is on this cornerstone that I hold it tobe self-evident that when the freedoms of speech, press and
peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to suffrage or asa
means to enjoy the inalienable right of the qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless. If
our democracy and republicanism are to be worthwhile, the conduct of public affairs by our officials
must be allowed to suffer incessant and unabating scrutiny, favorable or unfavorable, everyday and
at all times. Every holder of power in our government must be ready to undergo exposure any
moment of the day or night, from January to December every year, as it is only in this way that he
can rightfully gain the confidence of the people. I have no patience for those who would regard
public dissection of the establishment as an attribute to be indulged by the people only at certain
periods of time. I consider the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of
grievances, when exercised in the name of suffrage, as the very means by which the right itself to
vote can only be properly enjoyed.It stands to reason therefore, that suffrage itself would be next to
useless if these liberties cannot be untrammelled [sic] whether as to degree or time. (Emphasis
supplied)
198

G.R. Nos. 183591, 183572, 183893, 183951 and 183962 - THE PROVINCE OF NORTH
COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR
EMMANUEL PINOL, for and his own behalf, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP),
represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN
SULLIVAN, and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the
present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the socalled Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents.
I believe this is a prudent move on the part of the Executive Department. By the very essence of our
republican and democratic form of government, the outcome of our constitutional processes,
particularly the legislative process and the constituent process of amending the constitution, cannot
be predetermined or predicted with certainty as it is made to appear by the consensus points of the
MOA-AD. Consequently, it is beyond the authority of any negotiating panel to commit the
implementation of any consensus point or a legal framework which is inconsistent with the present
Constitution or existing statutes.
Moreover, our constitutional processes are well-defined by various provisions of the Constitution.
The establishment of a political and territorial "space" under a so-called Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) is nowhere to be found in the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the country's territorial and
political subdivisions as follows:
"The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided."2
SPP Case No. 10-009

April 27, 2010

IN RE: PETITION FOR ACCREDITATION AS COMELEC'S CITIZEN ARM FOR THE NATIONAL
AND LOCAL ELECTIONS SET ON MAY 10, 2010.
ONE VOTE MOVEMENT REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT PASTOR JOSE
GONZALES, Petitioner
It does not seek to achieve its objectives, goals or programs through violence of other unlawful
means, nor aim to propagate any ideology opposed to the principles of a republican and democratic
government, and that it will undertake to police its ranks and prevent infiltration by persons or group
of persons who may, directly or indirectly, destroy its character of non-partisanship and impartially."
c) That it shall not be under the influence whatsoever of any foreign government corporation, or
entity and shall not solicit or receive, directly or indirectly, any contribution or aid of whatever form or
nature from any government, corporation or entity, and that neither shall said organization nor any of
its members seek to achieve its objectives or programs through violence, or aim to propagate any
ideology opposed to the principles of a republican and prevent infiltration by persons;
G.R. No. L-30364

July 28, 1969

ANGEL C. BAKING and SIMEON G. RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

Instead, the decisive question for me is whether the admitted fact of continued detention for more
than eighteen years, after the penalty had been reduced to ten years imprisonment, constitutes a
denial of liberty without due process. That the Constitution prohibits. The historic role of due process
as a safeguard of freedom cannot be sufficiently stressed. It bears repeating that freedom is the rule
and restraint the exception. The eloquent language of the Chief Justice Concepcion in People v.
Hernandez 9 comes to mind: "Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and
vital in a republican state, like ours, to be denied upon mere general principles and abstract
consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of
our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of
section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6),
(7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of
several aspects of freedom."