IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION
Case No. 3:16-cv-729

BRAXTON DAVID WINSTON, II, DANIELLE

ADELE HILTON LOMBARD, JAMIE
MARSICANO, DHRUV PATHAK,
SAMANTHA POLER, MARY FRANCES
SCOUT ROSEN, and ASHLEY S.
WILLIAMS,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

v.
CITY OF CHARLOTTE and CHIEF KERR
PUTNEY, in Official Capacity as Chief of the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department,
Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
As set forth more fully in Plaintiffs Complaint, which is incorporated by reference
herein, and the attached exhibits, in the hours and days following the fatal shooting of Keith
Lamont Scott at the hands of Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) officers on
September 20, 2016, Plaintiffs and others experienced and witnessed numerous incidents in
which Defendants implemented policies designed to target and punish demonstrators, and to
deter them from continuing speech and assembly activities. These activities were often not
preceded by warning or opportunity to disperse, advanced no legitimate law enforcement
objective, and were designed to cause distress. As outlined in Plaintiffs Complaint and
accompanying exhibits, such activities have included:

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Chemical agents and flash bombs fired without notice, warning, or opportunity to
disperse;
Chemical agents and flash bombs used in circumstances not necessary to protect public
safety;
Chemical agents and flash bombs used against individuals who were not resisting arrest;
Chemical agents, flash bombs, excessive force, and arrest as forms of punishment for
engaging in constitutionally protected speech;
The use of unjustified physical forceby hand, baton, rubber bullets, bicycle, and other
implementsagainst non-violent protesters for engaging in constitutionally protected
speech.
These acts are what Plaintiffs are asking this Court to enjoin. In the aftermath of unrest in

other cities following police-involved shootings, where law enforcement overreacted to

protesters constitutionally protected activities, federal courts have provided such relief. See, e.g.,
Templeton v. Dotson, No. 4:14-cv-2019-CEJ (E.D. Mo. 2014) [Doc. 12] (entering temporary
restraining order against law enforcement in St. Louis city and St. Louis County in wake of
protests). [Exhibit A]
Our Nation and the hard-fought liberties found in our Constitution are built on a
foundation of free speech, dissent, and protest. Since its very founding, the United States has
seen its citizens taking to the streets and sidewalks to make their voices heard. The residents of
Charlotte have every right to engage in this proud tradition, and have good reason to do so.
Plaintiffs, and others like them, have since attempted to engage in peaceful protest on the
streets and sidewalks of Charlottethe very places which the Supreme Court has described as
having immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and [which], time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
But in Charlotte, citizens exercising their constitutional rights have been met by police
dressed in full riot or paramilitary gear. They have been assaulted with rubber bullets, tear gas,

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and brute force. In short, CMPD has not facilitated the exercise of protesters constitutional
rights to which they have each sworn an oath. Instead, they have met words with weapons, and
peace with violence.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek an immediate order enjoining Defendants from violating
their constitutional rights to assemble and demonstrate in ongoing efforts to raise awareness and
consciousness concerning issues of police transparency, police accountability, and the frequency
of deaths of African-American men and women at the hands of police. Plaintiffs ongoing efforts
also seek to promote peace amongst and between protesters and officers. The specific relief
being sought by Plaintiffs is detailed in the attached proposed order.
II. BACKGROUND
In the hours and days following the fatal shooting of Keith Lamont Scott on September
20, 2016, Plaintiffs and hundreds of other similarly-situated protesters engaged in
constitutionally protected activities, including planned and spontaneous demonstrations. Among
other things, Plaintiffs and many others demanded transparency from CMPD and the City of
Charlotte, justice for the family of Keith Lamont Scott, justice for the other victims of police
violence, and safety. Plaintiffs and many others also sought to bring attention to the indignities of
racialized policing in communities of color, and advocated for reform of longstanding police
practices that do little to make communities saferand which instead incite fear and breed
distrust between law enforcement and communities of color.
These demonstrations, which garnered national and international attention, were met with
an outsized and unjustified militarized police response. As detailed in the attached exhibits,
Plaintiffs and others faced opposition to these constitutionally protected demonstrations by
Defendants in the form of intimidation and threats. Plaintiffs and others witnessed and endured

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Defendants use of excessive force. While engaging in non-violent, non-resisting civil

disobedience, Plaintiffs and others were subjected to close range pepper spray and physical
violence designed to inflict punishment. This response violently and unjustifiably discouraged
the speech and assembly rights of Plaintiffs and countless others.
Defendants conduct demonstrated an unmistakable willingness to engage unwarranted
and excessive force under the color of law. Defendants aggressively deployed chemical agents,
including tear gas and pepper spray, without warning or justification. Defendants use these
chemical agents to target and punish demonstrators speech and assembly activities and disrupt
their ability to pursue constitutionally protected activities. The use of these chemical agents was
not required to establish or maintain public safety. Such actions by Defendant were conducted in
an effort to chill Plaintiffs federal and state constitutional rights to free speech and assembly.
III. IMMEDIATE RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiffs wish to continue exercising their constitutional rights. Indeed, Plaintiffs believe
that public demonstrations are essential to raising awareness of important issues of public
concern and that this message cannot be adequately conveyed through other means. Yet
Plaintiffs and other protesters have suffered depravations and injuries as a result of Defendants
actions for doing just that. And they have every good reason to believe similar violations will
occur when they resume demonstrations. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that this Court issue a
temporary restraining order enjoining Defendants from the aforementioned constitutional
violations. Plaintiffs federal and state constitutional rights will be denied, and irreparable harm
will result, if this Court does not issue this immediate relief.
Plaintiffs, through undersigned counsel, formally informed Defendants of their
grievances on Tuesday, October 18, 2016, at 6:04 p.m. [Exhibit B] Plaintiffs letter to

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Defendants detailed their concerns and made clear that this was a time-sensitive matter. [Exhibit
C] Earlier today, October 21, 2016, Defendants, through counsel, responded to undersigned
counsel. Following multiple email communications, it became clear to undersigned counsel that
no satisfactory agreement could be reached between the parties.
IV. ARGUMENT
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 allows issuance of a temporary restraining order if there is notice to the
adverse party and an opportunity for a hearing.
Plaintiffs seeking a temporary restraining order must establish four elements, including
that: (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in
absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and, (4) an injunction
is in the public interest. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
(2008). See also Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 333 (4th Cir. 2013).
Injunctive relief is appropriate and necessary here. There is no question that this case
involves a serious legal questionno less than the enforcement of freedoms that lie at the core of
the First Amendment. Both the balance of equities and the public interest weight heavily in favor
of ensuring that the government respects those rights. In addition, Plaintiffs have a likelihood of
success on the merit and they risk immediate and irreparable harm through Defendants actions,
including physical injury, the violation of constitutional rights, and the curtailment of future
exercise of their constitutional rights.
1. Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated a Likelihood of Success on the Merits.
First Amendment Claim
The First Amendment reflects a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. New York Times Co. v.

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Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Speech on matters of public concern occupies the highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection. Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983). The protests in Charlotte involve questions about how law
enforcement agencies engage with the populations they are charged with protecting and serving.
That the protests here involve matters of public concern is self-evident, and such speech lies at
the very core of the constitutions protection. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215
(2011). The First Amendment prohibits any governmental action or policy that interferes with
the right to peaceably assemble or to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Here,
as further explained in Plaintiffs Complaint, Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated
demonstrators have engaged in such political protest.
The Court has long made clear that political speech is indispensable to decision-making
in a democracy, and that the courts play a critical role in its protection. N.C. Right to Life, Inc.
v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 296 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978)). See also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (noting that a
peaceable sit in at the site of the State Government to protest government action is the most
pristine and classic form of First Amendment expression). Demonstrations, an integral form of
political speech, take place in the public streets and sidewalksthe archetype of a traditional
public forum. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988). See also Edwards, 372 U.S. at 229.
Consistent with the traditionally open character of public streets and sidewalks, the Supreme
Court has held that the governments ability to restrict speech in these locations is very limited.
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014). The government is sharply circumscribed
in its authority to restrain expressive activity in places which by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate. Perry Educ. Assn v. Perry Local

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Educators Assn, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Public places, such as streets and sidewalks, that are
associated with the free exercise of expressive activities are considered, without more, to be
public forums. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); see also Snyder, 131 S. Ct.
at 1218 (observing that the Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to public streets as the
archetype of a traditional public forum); Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,
469 (2009) (noting government entities are strictly limited in their ability to regulate private
speech in such traditional public fora as public streets and parks); Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (finding that courts need not make any particularized inquiry into the
precise nature of a specific street because all public streets are held in the public trust and are
properly considered traditional public fora).
The enforcement of even any law impacting speech in public forum space thus merits
serious scrutiny from this Court. Specifically, any government act to silence speech may not
burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the governments legitimate
interests. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S 781, 798-99 (1989). In Charlotte, it is clear
that defendants are in fact burdening substantially more speech than necessary to protect those
interests.
The Supreme Court has long applied the clear and present danger test to determine if
police interference in protests is constitutional. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5
(1949) (reasoning that freedom of speech must be protected against censorship or punishment,
unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises
far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.). Here, witness accounts reveal no
evidence of such a clear and present danger in the cited demonstrations.
Further, when police seek to restrict the constitutionally protected, political speech and

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assembly of protesters, they must narrowly tailor the means of their restriction in order not to
burden protected conduct. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529.

See also NAACP v. Claiborne

Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982) (reasoning that [t]he right to associate does not lose
all constitutional protection merely because some members of the group may have participated in
conduct . . . that itself is not protected.). Here, Defendants targeted use of tear gas and
chemical agents did not just incidentally affect protected constitutionally protected rights to
assemble and protest; instead these practices have resulted, and will continue to result, in a
deterrent impact on potential participants like Plaintiffs. Similarly, the indiscriminate and
punitive use of tear gas towards people who pose no threat instills fear in participants and deters
future participation.
Even if the police determine that a demonstration must disperse, that determination
cannot be used as an excuse to punish participants through chemical agents or to make the
experience so frightening or hurtful so as to deter future participation. Yet that is what has been
occurring in Charlotte in the nights following the shooting of Keith Lamont Scott. CMPD
officers employed chemical agents in massive quantities and in areas where protesters were
peaceful, orderly, and posed no threat to public safety. This overreach alone renders it
unconstitutional. To the citizens caught in the gas, however, the tactics demonstrate more
intentionality in their brutality and a desire to prevent all but the most hardened demonstrators
from continuing to demonstrate.
Fourth Amendment Claim
The Fourth Amendment requires that law enforcement, if it must use force, do so in a
reasonable manner. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Excessive force is force
greater than reasonably necessary in light of the law enforcement interest at stake. See Florida v.

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Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504 (1983).

Over the course of recent demonstrations, citizens were detained or seized by the
manner in which the chemical agents and tasers were deployed. A person is seized by the
police when an officer by means of physical force terminates or restrains his freedom of
movement through means intentionally applied. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254
(2007). CMPDs actions of corralling demonstrators, preventing their escape, and pummeling
them with tear gas constituted seizures.
It is not necessary that the government intended to detain a particular person. Rather
intentionality is satisfied when the termination of freedom of movement [occurs] through
means intentionally applied. Brower v. Cty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis in
original). An unintended person [may be] the object of the detention, so long as the
detention is willful. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (quoting Brower, 489
U.S. at 596).
Reasonableness of force used to affect a particular seizure is determined by careful[ly]
balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment
interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396
(internal citations omitted). See also Turmon v. Jordan, 405 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2005).
In determining whether Defendants actions were objectively reasonable in an
excessive force inquiry, the Court considers: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers; and (3) whether the suspect is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The
pertinent question is whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of
seizure. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985). An officers good intentions will not

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make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
Here, it is difficult to assess the justification for the detentions of nonviolent protesters as
there was no notice or reason provided.
Moreover, tear gas is never justified for use on trapped or detained individuals. Tear
gas is a dangerous chemical agent designed to incapacitate. Any trapped individual exposed to
the gas must be immediately moved to an open, ventilated area. After global objections to the
widespread use of tear gas and chemical herbicides by the United States in Vietnam, the United
Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 2603A (1969) reaffirming that use of chemical
agents like tear gas is contrary to the international law and the 1925 Geneva Convention Protocol
prohibiting the use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases in warfare.
Existence of CMPD Policy
In further support of Plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiffs will likely
establish that the conduct of CMPD officers reflects a policy decision dictated by the
departments policy maker: Defendant Putney.
In Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that
municipalities may be liable for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief under 1983 where
the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality. Id. at
690. Supervisory liability may attach to a municipality where the plaintiff can show: (1) that the
supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct
that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the
plaintiff; (2) that the supervisors response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show
deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) that

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there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisors inaction and the particular
constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Randall v. Prince Georges Cty., 302 F.3d 188,
206 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)).
CMPD officers in myriad situations, at different geographic locations, and across the
span of several days, conducted themselves in punitive ways. All of these officers could not
have taken the same actions over a period of days without some orders, directions or review by
superiors. Indeed, similar demonstrations elsewhere in the nation reveal significant oversight by
internal policymakers who have guided the actions of officers on site. See Abdullah v. Cty. of St.
Louis, Mo., 52 F. Supp. 3d 936, 944-45 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (finding a custom in Ferguson Police
Dept.s practice of enforcing a requirement that demonstrators keep moving).
2. Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated a Likelihood of Irreparable Injury.
In First Amendment cases, a courts decision on the remaining injunction factors
typically follows from the initial determination that [Plaintiffs] likely will succeed at trial. Doe
v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1993). The question of irreparable
injury does not focus on the significance of the injury, but rather whether the injury, irrespective
of its gravity, is irreparable-that is, whether there is any adequate remedy at law for the injury in
question. Sierra Club v. Martin, 71 F. Supp. 2D 1268, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 1996), rev'd on other
grounds, 110 F.3d 1551 (11th Cir. 1997); Canal Auth. v. Florida, 489 F. 2d 567, 575 (1974).
There is no amount of money that can compensate for having been wrongfully silenced by ones
government. Indeed, [t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Here,
such injury is threatened and, for many whose participation in demonstrations has been curtailed
by CMPDs use of force, has already occurred. Plaintiffs wish to continue expressive activity

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without fearing of injury by Defendants officers. See Abdullah, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 948-49 (E.D.
Mo. 2014) (finding irreparable injury in Ferguson Dept.s practice of threatening to arrest
demonstrators who failed to keep moving). Furthermore, if Defendants practices are not
immediately enjoined, Defendants will continue to violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights to be
free from excessive force and unreasonable seizure.
3. The Balance of Equities Tips in Plaintiffs Favor.
The recent killing of Keith Lamont Scott has resulted in a tremendous response in the
community of Charlotte and throughout the nation. Mr. Scotts death occurred merely two days
after the fatal shooting of Terrance Crutcher at the hands of law enforcement in Tulsa,
Oklahoma.
Mr. Scotts death at the hands of CMPD officers, coupled with the lack of transparency in
the following investigation, reinforced the longstanding mistreatment of communities of color by
police. People have taken to public streets and sidewalks in the Charlotte area in a series of
spontaneous and planned peaceful expressive demonstrations to express concern over racialized
police violence. Those engaging in action have done so as part of a political protest, pursuant to
their rights under the United States Constitution and North Carolina Constitution. Their purpose
is to seek justice for the deaths of young black men, women, and children at the hands of police,
to bring attention to issues of police violence and racialized policing in communities of color, to
advocate for reform of policing practices, and improve safety for all involved.
During the course of these demonstrations, Plaintiffs and others experienced and
witnessed numerous incidents in which Defendants implemented policies designed to target and
punish demonstrators, and to deter them from continuing speech and assembly activities. These
activities were often not preceded by warning or opportunity to disperse, advanced no legitimate

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law enforcement objective, and were designed to cause distress. As outlined in Plaintiffs
Complaint and accompanying exhibits, such activities have included:

Chemical agents fired without notice, warning, or opportunity to disperse;

Chemical agents used in circumstances not necessary to protect public safety;
Chemical agents used against individuals who were not resisting arrest;
Chemical agents, excessive force, and arrest as forms of punishment for engaging in
constitutionally protected speech;
The use of physical force by hand, with batons, and the use of rubber bullets against nonviolent protesters for engaging in constitutionally protected speech.
Declaration of demonstrations as unlawful assemblies as justification to use chemical
agents, without narrowly tailoring the use of force to avoid targeting lawful and
nonviolent protesters engaged in protected speech.
These acts reflect a policy and practice in which the Defendants consistently used

chemical agents and physical force to punish and cause pain to demonstrators.
Plaintiffs, who intend to protest again in the near future, thus have basis to fear that they
will be further harmed by the behavior of the Defendants officers. Plaintiffs wish to continue
exercise their free speech and assembly rights as protected by federal and state constitutional
law, but are fearful that they will be forced to either forego exercising their rights or be
threatened with future distress, physical injuries and bodily harm, pain, fear, humiliation,
embarrassment, discomfort, and anxiety.
In stark contrast, Defendants will not suffer harm if an injunction is issued. Defendants
are agents of the government, and harm to the government is de minimis when an injunction
orders compliance with federal law.
4. An Injunction is in the Public Interest.
The public interest favors protecting core First Amendment freedoms. Abdullah, 52 F.
Supp. 3d at 948 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (finding that the public interest favored enjoining Ferguson
Police practice of threatening arrest if demonstrators failed to keep moving). See also Iowa Right
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to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir. 1999).
The modest interim relief requested by Plaintiffs balances the needs of the Defendants to
maintain order while protecting the constitutional rights of demonstrators. Relief would require
that any use of chemical agents be preceded by a warning, an opportunity to exit and a
continuing ability to egress; employing chemical agents only as a last resort to prevent threats to
public safety; and not employing chemical agents in enclosed space. These modest proposals
respond directly to the concerns of the Plaintiffs and do not require a compromise of public
safety. While Plaintiffs frustration is significant, their proposed remedy is modest, comports
with constitutional standards, and constitutes sound public policy.
V. PLAINTIFFS REQUEST THE BOND BE SET AT A NOMINAL AMOUNT
The computation of [an injunction] bond amount rests within the trial courts
discretion. Maryland Dep't of Human Resources v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 976 F.2d 1462,
1483 (4th Cir. 1992). A nominal bond may suffice where the risk of harm is remote to the
enjoined party. Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 421 n.3 (4th Cir.
1999). Further, federal courts have consistently waived the bond requirement in public interest
litigation, or required only a nominal bond. See, e.g., Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1126
(10th Cir. 2002) (where a party is seeking to uphold the public interest, a minimal bond amount
should be considered); People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 766 F.2d
1319 (9th Cir. 1985) (no bond); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972) (no bond); Sierra
Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 1985) (bond of $20). Here, nominal bond should issue
because Defendants will endure no hardship in employing less coercive means to serve the law
enforcement interests at stake.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter a
preliminary injunction and, pending the preliminary injunction hearing, that this Court schedule
an emergency hearing and issue a temporary restraining order for the relief requested herein.

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Dated: October 21, 2016

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jacob H. Sussman
Jacob H. Sussman (N.C. Bar No. 31821)
jsussman@tinfulton.com
/s/ S. Luke Largess
S. Luke Largess (N.C. Bar No. 17486)
llargess@tinfulton.com
/s/ Cheyenne N. Chambers
Cheyenne N. Chambers (N.C. Bar No. 48699)
cchambers@tinfulton.com
Tin Fulton Walker & Owen, PLLC
301 East Park Avenue
Charlotte, NC 28203
Telephone: (704) 338-1220
Fax: (704) 338-1312
/s/ C. Scott Holmes
C. Scott Holmes (N.C. Bar No. 25569)
scott.holmes@nccu.edu
North Carolina Central University
Civil Litigation Clinic
640 Nelson Street
Durham, NC 27707
Telephone: (919) 530-7463
Fax: (919) 530-7982
/s/ David Hall
David Hall (N.C. Bar No. 38206)
davidhall@southerncoalition.org
/s/ Anita S. Earls
Anita S. Earls (N.C. Bar No. 15597)
anitaearls@southerncoalition.org
Southern Coalition for Social Justice
1415 West NC Hwy. 54, Ste. #101
Durham, NC 27707
Telephone: (919) 323-3380
Fax: (919) 530-7982
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this date, I electronically filed the foregoing paper with the Clerk
of Court by using the CM/ECF system. All participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users
and will be served by the CM/ECF system. Courtesy copies have also been emailed to opposing
counsel for Defendants.

Date: October 21, 2016

/s/ Jacob H. Sussman

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