Event and form: two themes in the Davos-debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst

Cassirer
Author(s): Oswald Schwemmer
Source: Synthese, Vol. 179, No. 1, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS AND THE
QUESTION OF HUMAN CULTURE: INTRODUCTIONS TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF ERNST
CASSIRER (March 2011), pp. 59-73
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Synthese (201 1) 179:59-73

DOI 10.1007/sl 1229-009-9628-3

Event and form: two themes in the Davos-debate

between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer

Oswald Schwemmer

Received: 3 July 2008 / Accepted: 3 February 2009 / Published online: 30 September 2009

Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract The article reconsiders the Davos-debate between Martin Heidegger and
Ernst Cassirer to reassess the discussion of interrelations and differences of their phi-

losophies. The focus is the fecund motifs of thought that each philosopher presents.
These are worked out by dispersing the contexts. Heidegger's primary motifs of
thought are identified through the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard as the question of
finitude understood as continuance of the event and as the act of understanding the

event. The primary motif of thought in Cassirer's philosophy is identified with the
question of form and formation. It is argued that it is possible to think the motifs
of event and form in connection with each other. The focal point of connection
between their philosophies is uncovered in the relations of form between persons - in
the rigorous practice of promising and demanding. The philosophies of Heidegger and

Cassirer are thus read in a way where they productively enhance each other without
minimizing the differences of their motifs of thought.

Keywords Cassirer Heidegger Philosophy of symbolic forms Event Lyotard

Practice

The Davos-debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer has incited many
interpretations. Especially the question as to who, as a matter of fact, turned out to
be the winner in this debate has been raised repeatedly. As is well known, the participants at the time gave an unanimous and definite answer: the new Heideggerian

Originally the article was written in German and appeared as "Ereignis und Form. Zwei Denkmotive in der
Davoser Disputation zwischen Martin Heidegger und Ernst Cassirer," in D. Kaegi and E. Rudolph, eds.,

Cassirer - Heidegger. 70 Jahre Davoser Disputation (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002), pp. 48-65.

. Schwemmer ()
Berlin, Germany

e-mail: SchwemmerO@philosophie.hu-berlin.de

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thinking showed the very limits of the long-established, and, from the viewpoint of the

listeners, also antiquated neo-Kantianism in an all too obvious way. The often referred
to flour dust that the Cassirer mime Emmanuel Lvinas let trickle out of his wig and his

trousers, was supposed to capture Cassirer's old-fashioned philosophy in an striking

way that invited one to smile at the neo-Kantian idea of 'Bildung' within philosophy
and at the philosophy of culture. 1

The temptation to pose anew the question of who won suggests itself, as well as to
answer the question in a radically different way, bearing in mind the historical experiences of National Socialism in particular and in view of the search for orientation in
the frequently mentioned "culture wars". Actually, it is very probable that the attempt

to reassess the Davos-debate quickly will lead to a dismissal of the question regarding
the winner and the loser, and instead will open a search for the intellectual themes

we, despite Heidegger's and Cassirer's polemical and apologetic remonstrations, can
connect to. It appears to me that we still have such investigations in front of us and
it is still not clear, which sustainable motifs of thought can be sifted out from the
philosophical conceptions of the two opponents.
I purposely talk of "sifting out he motifs".2 After all, it is the entrenched nature of
the contexts into which the two philosophical positions are filed or file themselves,

which in many ways complicates an active and ongoing reception of their philosophies. With regard to Heidegger, it seems especially to be the context of heroic or elitist
solipsism and, connected with it, the debasing of cultural history as the history of fal-

lenness - emphasized by Heidegger himself - which construes his thinking as unique

and complete. With regard to Cassirer, on the other hand, the loyalty to Kant of his
philosophical style invites to perceiving him not as an independent thinker, but as an
interpreter or representative of neo-Kantianism - prominent and erudite, yet a philosopher of a school of little originality, whom one only with the greatest efforts and distort-

ing reinterpretations can make productive for questions concerning our present time.

If one dissolves these two rigid contexts, indeed attributable to the personal style
and philosophical self-promotion of Heidegger and Cassirer, and rather relates to their

thinking in an eclectic way, then one does find basic themes of our intellectual tra-

ditions. Depending on the perspective adopted, one can understand these as being
distinct of one another or as supplementary to one another, but at any rate as being
placed in lively tension with each other. Regarding Heidegger, the dissolving of his
context has already been attempted for a long time. With regard to Cassirer, most of
this work is still ahead of us. Pertaining to Heidegger, the dissolving of his context
appears to me especially successful in the attempts and outlines of Jean-Francois Lyotard writing on the "event", but also in the, as similarly concerned works of Emmanuel
Lvinas and Jacques Derrida. Ernst Cassirer, however, has to be liberated from the
neo-Kantian profile and, as it appears to me, misinterpretation. Doing so will in order
to make the themes clearer, and thus make a revival of the Davos-debate and, in this
sense a continuation of it, rewarding.

1 Compare the preliminary report on this happening by Grnder in his contribution Cassirer und Heidegger
in Davos 1929 . The scene to which I refer is described briefly on p. 300.

2 The German verb ' herauslsen' has been translated to 'to sift out' by the translator.

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1 Heidegger and the philosophy of the event

Let us start with Heidegger. In comparison to Cassirer, two ambivalent motifs can be
identified. The first, which Heidegger himself presents under the rather academic title
of "finitude", concerns continuance in the event. With this motif of thought, Heidegger

adheres to a tradition which in the twentieth century especially through the work of

Henri Bergson,3 was kept alive and given a provocative radicality.

Heidegger's reception of this motif is no less radical. In a certain sense it is even
an intensification of the Bergsonian criticism of the specialisation connecting to any
conceptualisation4 of events of consciousness, of actions, and of life. Heidegger's criticism can be reformulated in terms of an extensive criticism of the transition from the

event to the form. For, when I try to depict an event in whatever way I concurrently

move away from the event itself so as to create a new reality instead, a new kind of
reality, which is structured differently than the reality of the event. In particular, this
new reality of my representation does not have the character of the event, the charac-

ter of appearing and of disappearing, of merging into something and of changing in

itself - in other words, the special character, which in the philosophy of Heidegger is
discussed under the title of "temporality".
The representation as such is a sameness to which I can refer repeatedly. And, from
the point of view of this very identity and with regard to the event being depicted,

it also aims at assigning an identity to this event. The thus created assignments of
identity form a net of assignments in which the world is organised for us, in which it

becomes manageable, in which we can plan our actions and give a place for our afflic-

tions. We thereby give the world its shape and shape ourselves to be those creatures,
who develop an identity - a collective and a personal identity - and attribute it to one
another. We can characterise the new actuality of the representations as the actuality
of the form. The form is that which goes beyond events and their inner temporality,
that which gains a lasting identity in its continually being identifiable, and that which

in this sense transcends the finitude of our existences, which literally consist of the
sequences of events in our life.
Heidegger insists that we must envisage this move from event to form and thereby
realize our way of escaping the actuality of our temporal existence. We must then
refocus our attention on the occurrences of our existence, on our Dasein as "the basic

event in which human existence and thereby every problematic aspect of existence

3 The allusions in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit ( Being and Time), p. 24 and 571 n. (of the German edition)
show, definitely, that Heidegger had taken notice of Bergson. However, Heidegger uses these short references, in order to show contrast with the Bergsonian understanding of time. Which role Bergson de facto
plays in the philosophy of the twentieth century is a field of research still to be investigated. Compare here

the ground-breaking work of Mirjana Vrhunc, Bild und Wirklichkeit. Incidentally, Henri Bergson is one
of the main authors with whom Cassirer argues. Thus, Bergson, with 52 citations in the so-called "fourth
volume" of the Philosophie der symbolischen Formen , is the most often mentioned author. However, the
issue here is mostly the Bergsonian understanding of intuition.
4 Even though Bergson talks flatly about translating experience into language and symbolisation in general,
his references to art and, not least of all, his own philosophical expositions show that he, as a matter of fact,
concedes certain kinds of conceptual generalisations that result in a homogenisation of what is depicted

conceptually.

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becomes essential itself."5 Only then will it be possible for us to fulfil the task of
philosophy, that is, "to throw the indolent aspect of the human being, the aspect where

man merely uses the works of the spirit [i.e. concepts, pictures or further forms of
depictions], back in the hardness of destiny."6
The radicalism with which Heidegger here decries the realm of forms as the "indolent aspect of the human being" shows, on the one hand, a perspicacious noting of the
difference of all forms to the actuality of the events, and thus also of the appeasement,

which is bestowed on the anxious soul of humankind by virtue of this very realm
of forms - an appeasement, which culture, or more exactly, the "works of the spirit"

as collective thoughtlessness, as symptoms of the mere " das Man " make visible. On
the other hand, however, the critique of culture henceforth becomes an all inclusive
enterprise for which no differentiations with regard to successful or non-successful,
appropriate or inappropriate forms are needed any more. This already is a critique of
culture as such, the mere assertion of difference without differentiations.

This kind of critique can at any time and anywhere be turned against anybody
engaged in investigations into the structures of knowledge and understanding, into the

cultivation of skills, or into considerations concerning different judgements. The crit-

ical gesture only gains its philosophical edge through an explicit self-reference to its
own radicalism. Hereby it is always possible to claim that the efforts of everybody else

are not radical enough. Not least the rhetorical force, which goes together with such

radical attacks, may have carried away and convinced many readers of Heidegger just as in Davos. It is the rhetoric of "only this and nothing else". Nothing else can
obtain validity, because it is not thought radical enough. Only that which Heidegger
claims is radical, can indeed be so.
However, one can take Heidegger's critique beyond its lack of determinacy, where
it is in danger of turning into a mere gesture, and provide it, for example, with the
sort of determinacy which Lyotard lends it. Lyotard indeed draws attention to the fact
that thinking through the form demonstrates a general pattern as such. It is the pattern

of a self-concluding and self-completing totality, a thinking of system. This thinking

appeals to its inner logical consistency and completeness and of its conclusive possibilities. For such thinking, something is already true or convincing, if it is a result of

the possibilities to conclude within the system; that is, as the traditional formulation
amounts to: if it is true due to conceptual or logical reasons. Such a "metaphysical"7
system, as Cassirer would put it, produces its justifications internally and insists at the
same time upon the fact that those aspects that remain outside cannot make any claim

5 Cassirer and Heidegger (1991, p. 289).

6 Cassirer and Heidegger ( 1 99 1 , p. 29 1 ).

7 Compare here Cassirer' s remark that philosophy, which, in the face of expectation, arises as "the highest

instance of unity" of our knowledge as well as our spiritual orientation in general, turns into "dogmatic
metaphysics": "However, the dogmatic systems of metaphysics satisfy such expectation and claim in an
incomplete way only. For, instead of mediating the opposition in breadth and depth, they stand in the middle
of the fight themselves [...], they represent one aspect of the opposition only, despite of the conceptual uni-

versality for which they strive. For, they mostly are metaphysical hypotheses of a certain logical, aesthetic
or religious principle. The more they close themselves up in the abstract generality of this principle, the
more they isolate themselves from singular aspects of spiritual culture and of the concrete totality of their
forms" (Cassirer 2002a, p. 11).

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on truth. Due to its asserted and practised exclusiveness, Lyotard dubs such a system
a totality. And since this totality defines itself in virtue of its justificatory thinking, he

speaks of a logical totality and its justifications.

The thinking through forms is blamed for such tendency towards totality because
the transition from event to form in linguistic or symbolical depictions of events creates

connections and patterns of connections, which at the outset force every depicted event
into a determinate context of connections, or, as Lyotard says, into a context of intercon-

nections. Such a context of interconnections captivates vision by showing everything

as a specific something in the system, in its totality. However, vision thus caught ceases

to be capable of seeing beyond. Truth becomes an internal matter with which no one
is allowed to interfere. Truth becomes the property of that person who controls the
system. This is a critique, further pursued in regards to National Socialism, of the kind
of form-thinking that invokes Heidegger, if his demand for totality is pried open.

A second motif, also outside of the Heideggerian context, which merits attention
is Heidegger's discussion of the Kantian idea of an " exhibitio originaria ". This " ex hibitio", which Kant mentions in connection with the "imagination of schematism",
Heidegger extends in meaning to encompass the "originality [...] of a free giving of
self that itself depends on an acquiescence". It is this giving and receiving, which
Heidegger emphasises. Here, according to Heidegger, the finitude of the human being
shows itself: "The human being is never infinite and absolute in the creation of beings

themselves (Seiendes), but he is infinite in the sense of an understanding of Being

(, Sein )."8 And this understanding of Being is to be grasped in terms of a giving itself
and an acquiescence.
By emphasizing this aspect of the motif of finiteness, Heidegger stands in opposition
to the philosophical tradition in which the generation of the world and the self, as well
as the setting of the world and the self, most intimately determine the human being as
an intellectual and spiritual being. In this connection one must not only think of Fichte.

Modern philosophy, insofar as it strives to conceive of the human form of existence,

from the cogitans sum of Descartes through the idealistic philosophy of existence up

to the philosophy of the "free personality" of Ernst Cassirer, can be understood as a

philosophy where self-forming or self-setting characterises the peculiar possibility of
this form of existence, as well as the setting of its task and goal. Cassirer formulates it
in the following way: "It [the free personality] is only form in virtue of giving to itself

its form".9 And even where, as in the philosophy of substance, the basic philosophical
question is set not by the human form of existence, but by the character of the Being of

all things, we can find the basic philosophical motif of our tradition in the thought of

the setting of the self. The theory of Spinoza, having its roots in Stoicism, according

to which the "actual essence of the thing as such" (ipsius rei actualem essentiam)
consists in the " conatus ", " quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatuiT ,10
places this motif into a memorable formula.
8 Cassirer and Heidegger (1991 , p. 280). The original German quotations read: "die Originalitt [. . .] des
freien Sichgebens, worin eine Angewiesenheit auf ein Hinnehmen liegt," and "Der Mensch ist nie unendlich
und absolut im Schaffen des Seienden selbst, sondern er ist unendlich im Sinne des Verstehens des Seins."

9 Cassirer (1993, p. 249).

10 de Spinoza (1925, 3rd part, Prop. 7).

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Heidegger's view - in a likewise popular formulation - is expressed in the distinction that we cannot do justice to our authentic potentiality-for-Being by setting
ourselves in one way or the other, but only in virtue of exposing ourselves to the
other. In the context of Heidegger's philosophy, however, we have to realise, that this
otherness is not to be conceived of in terms of the other person, but in terms of something other. Heidegger does not outline a philosophy that is related to the other human

being, neither does he outline a philosophy of becoming oneself in view of the other
human being, whose demands, as Emanuel Lvinas emphasises,11 already reach me
in the encounter with his or her bare existence and countenance. Heidegger entrusts
the exposure to otherness to the indeterminacy of the event, inasmuch as the latter in

one way or another raises me from the everydayness of Being-in-the- World. Here as
well one can separate the question from the Heideggerian context and thus give room

to a philosophy of human otherness, by all means a philosophy of the everydayness

of our life circumstances, and the concrete encounters with other humans. The basic

Heideggerian motif, that becoming oneself cannot be conceived of as a settling of

oneself, but rather as the exposure of oneself to the otherness of the other, an exposure

which one must accomplish alone, continues to be a central point in the comparison
to Cassirer.

2 Cassirer's philosophy of form

In fact, one can characterize Cassirer's philosophy on the whole as a philosophy of
form and formation - a becoming form, a giving of form, and as a forming of oneself.12 Thus, Cassirer offers a decisive answer to Heidegger's question in Davos as to
the human path to infinity and correspondingly how human beings can take part in
infinity: "In no different way but through the medium of form. This is the function of

form, namely that the human being, by way of transforming his existence {Dasein) into

form, that is, by converting every experience inside himself into an objective figure
0 Gestalt ) in which he himself objectifies himself, leads finitude towards something
new, not by being radically free from the finiteness of his starting point (for, this is
still related to his own finitude), but by growing out of finitude. And this is immanent

infinitude. The human being cannot make a leap from his own finitude into a realistic

infinity. However, he is capable of and has to be capable of the metabasis, which leads
him from the immediacy of his existence towards the region of pure form. And he
possesses his own infinity exclusively in this form."13
Here we again have to disperse with the contexts - though these are contexts Cassirer is being placed into and that he himself has not (or only in virtue of a linguistic
assimilation to these has) developed in his own thinking. As mentioned, I am primarily
referring to the context of neo-Kantianism which probably up until now has presented
the greatest hindrance for an independent reception of Cassirer's philosophy. In spite of

1 1 Compare here also Ricoeur (1996). An intensive discussion with Emmanuel Lvinas can be found on

p. 403-409.
1 2 I have chosen this characterisation as the leitmotif of my book on Cassirer, compare Schwemmer ( 1 997).

1 Cassirer and Heidegger ( 1 99 1 , p. 286).

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formulations of Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy, one should neither read Cassirer
in terms of being a neo-Kantian nor in terms of being a Kantian. An attentive reading

of Cassirer's philosophy has to disclose the particular nuances of this philosophy, and
has above all to perceive the changes in meaning resulting from them. Presently I will
bring up four issues.

(1) According to Cassirer, it is not a universally identical, at all times and in every
cognitive process transcendental subject that constitutes our cognition and guarantees

its objectivity. Rather, cognition develops in the historical endeavours of individuals

who themselves live and think in historically developed symbolic worlds. Universally
binding knowledge is thereby indeed a goal. However, it is a goal without a guarantee
of accomplishment and which may emerge in virtue of individual efforts only, that is,
in virtue of working with and confronting the knowledge of others. Universality as
goal, individuality as way - this is the formula to grasp Cassirer's point of view in a
concise way. Cassirer himself states:
The general that reveals itself to us in the spheres of culture, language, art, reli-

gion, and philosophy is thus always individual and universal at the same time.
For, in this sphere the universal is only capable of being intuited as the deed of

individuals, because only as such a deed can it acquire actualization and real
fulfilment.14

(2) A second point concerns a related question, that is, the question of the unity of
reason. As a matter of fact, the respective utterances of Cassirer give a confusing por-

trayal: On the one hand, Cassirer emphasises clearly: "Every genuine basic spiritual
function shares one decisive trait with cognition, namely, that an original constructive

and not simply reconstructive power is inherent in them all. The basic spiritual function implies an independent energy of spirit in virtue of which the simple existence of

appearances receives a definite 'significance', a peculiar ideal content. This is valid

for art as well as for cognition, for myth as for religion. [...] None of these formings
can be merged into the others, nor can they be deduced from the others, rather each of

them denote a determinate spiritual way of conception and constitute in and through

themselves a particular aspect of 'reality'."15

On the other hand, Cassirer has just as clearly "pointed at a general problem: at
the task, that is, of a general systematics of symbolic forms."16 He does speak of

a "system of symbolic forms",17 of a "philosophical systematics of spirit",18 of a

14 Cassirer (2006, p. 156).

15 Cassirer (2001b, p. 7). Compare here the formulation in the study on the conceptual form of mythical
thinking of 1922: "Language and religion, art and myth display an independent structure being significantly different from other spiritual forms. Each of them poses a peculiar 'modality' of spiritual opinion
and spiritual formation." Each of these modalities turns out to be "a peculiar organ of understanding of the
world and a quasi ideal creation of the world having its special task and right next to theoretical-scientific
knowledge" (Cassirer, 2003b, p. 8).

16 Cassirer (2003a, p. 78).

17 Cassirer (2007, p. 18).
18 Cassirer (2001b, p. 12).

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"system of manifold expressions of the spirit"19 and also of a "grammar of symbolic

forms".20 However, if one reads Cassirer's statements regarding philosophical systematics or grammar of the symbolic forms in their proper context it becomes apparent
that Cassirer certainly does not have in mind a theoretically generated unity, i.e. a

unity which could only be created in virtue of a philosophical system. With reference to Hegel, Cassirer explicitly rejects such a unity.21 Indeed, unity only consists
of and arises through the fact that all the figurations of the spirit are forms of symbolizing. However, through symbolization, the spirit is fixed to historically set and
extremely different mediums of articulation. The common ground of these mediums
consists precisely in their historicity and plurality. The unity of reason can thus neither, as in Kant, be accomplished in virtue of the unity of the transcendental ego, nor

can it, as is the case in Hegel, be grounded on the basis of the unity of a dialectical

system. If one wants to talk about a unity of reason at all, it should be conceived
as the condition for the possibility and the task of passing from one symbolic form
to another; hereby is meant the action of relating the symbolic forms critically and
constructively to one another without suspending the enduring differences between
these.

(3) We thus arrive at a third point, possibly having caused the greatest confusion:
the emphasis on the aspect of action in our knowledge which we find both in Kant
and in Cassirer. However, whereas Kant is talking about the acts of understanding,
Cassirer has real acting in the world in mind. For Kant, acts of the understanding are
defined normatively and thus are regulated forms of our thinking, that in terms of their

correct or false course are not historically contingent. To actually act in the world,
however, is permeated with contingency from start to finish. To claim that Cassirer

has to be referred to as a Kantian because he, too, bases his philosophy upon human
action is to turn a blind eye to the fundamental difference between a normative and a

historical conception of action.

(4) The fourth point is so obvious to me, that it is difficult to understand why it
has not long ago been recognised as a decisive difference between Cassirer's philosophy and the different varieties of Kantianism. Cassirer never tires of emphasising
that "every thinking and every sensible intuition and perception [rest upon] an initial
ground of feelings",22 and he positively sees the source of culture, and thereby every
symbolic forming in human expressive life, as lying in the first moment of the transfor-

mation of an overwhelming impression to the form of an expression. Time and again

he tries to capture this moment in terms of a really dramatic visualisation:

19 Cassirer (2001b, p.19).

20 Cassirer (2001b, p. 17). "If it was possible to gain a systematic overview of the different directions of
this kind of expression, if it was possible to show the typical and consistent patterns, as well as their peculiar

grades and inner differences, the ideal of a 'general characteristic' for the whole of the spiritual creations
(analogous to the way Leibniz posed it for knowledge), would be fulfilled. We would then possess some
sort of grammar of the symbolic forms as such, in virtue of which special expressions and idioms as we
know them from language and art, myth and religion would be encompassed and generally determined"

(Cassirer, 2001b, pp. 16-17).

21 Compare Cassirer (2001b, pp. 15-17).

22 Cassirer (2002a, p. 112).

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In the transformation of the merely bestial terror into astonishment, moving in

a double direction composed of contrary aspects, that is, fear and hope, shyness

and admiration, by and in this way seeking in the sensible excitation a solution
and expression for the first time, the human being stands at the threshold of a
new spirituality.23

When, on the one hand, the human being is devoted to a momentary impression and is 'possessed' by it, and when, on the other hand, the highest tension
between himself and outward reality shows itself, when the outer being is not
simply looked at and intuited, but when it overcomes human beings all of a
sudden and in an unmediated way as the affect of terror or as the wish being
satisfied and dissolved, then the vital spark infects him: the tension is solved by
the subjective excitation becoming objective, by appearing to the human being
as god or as demon. Here we stand in front of that mystical-religious and original

phenomenon, which has been attempted to be captured in terms of the concept

of a 'momentary god' by Usener.24
This emotional and expressive foundation of our spiritual accomplishments and of
our culture does not simply add a third dimension to the Kantian cognitive dimensions

of intuition and concepts, rather, the whole conception of cognition is changed on the

basis of this addition: it opens up this conception by incorporating the emotional and
expressive dimensions of our existence. With this in mind Cassirer can state: "The philosophy of symbolic forms does not primarily direct its gaze towards purely scientific
and exact knowledge, but towards all directions of understanding of the world. It seeks

to grasp this world understanding in its multiplicity, in the wholeness and the inner
differences of its expressions."25 These statements are, to be sure, not neo-Kantian
any more.

As regards Cassirer's relation to Kant, Cassirer has himself styled a remark which
can also be transferred to his relation to neo-Kantianism. His book on Kant commences

with exactly this remark: "Goethe has once in view on Kant stated that all philosophy
has to be loved and lived in order to obtain significance for life."26 Cassirer makes this

Goethian view on Kant his own. This view on philosophy tries to capture the fullness
of human love and life and thus it also turns to the emotional and expressive dimension
of human life.

3 Event and form. The Davos-debate from an extended perspective

Along these lines we arrive at the motif which is introduced by Cassirer's philosophy - once again not without ambivalence - in the Davos-debate. A motif which
was not understood by Heidegger, because he only saw the neo-Kantian in Cassirer. Whereas Heidegger can be read as the philosopher of the event, Cassirer can be
23 Cassirer (2002a, p. 93).
24 Cassirer (2003c, p. 257).
25 Cassirer (2002b, p. 14).

26 Cassirer (2001a, p. 1).

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understood as the philosopher of form. For Heidegger, a philosophy of form at the

outset indicates a philosophy of fossilization, of hardening, of self-determination and
persisting determination that closes itself off from the authentic possibility of being
able to be ( Seinknnen ). Indeed, there are formulations where Cassirer talks about

"foothold and persistence",27 "resting points"28 or "bases"29 being created through

the symbolisation, and also about "excavating certain unchanging basic figurations,
partly conceptual and partly intuitive, from the stream of consciousness," and that
"instead of thein flowing content, [...] the closed and persistent unity of form" comes

to appearance.

For Cassirer, however, this "closed and persistent unity of form" is not the warding off of changes nor of turning to otherness, but precisely the condition of it. This

is a conception opposed to Heidegger's philosophy and, in particular, to Simmel's

philosophy of life with its complaint about the "tragedy of culture".31 Even though
Heidegger's philosophy cannot be subsumed under the philosophy of life, it does share
with it the conviction that the spiritual and cultural forms, insofar as they provide us
with "resting points and bases", close our actual ability to be ( Seinknnen ) and our
authentic potentialities which only the experience of living life opens.
Cassirer, in comparison, claims that the opportunity to lead a spiritual life, to create

anew, and to reach the freedom of a responsible self-determination, is only possible

through form-giving. For, according to Cassirer, the life of the spirit can only commence with the creation of a realm of forms and thus a realm of symbolic forms. It is
then possible to create and dissolve new configurations, to bring them in connection
with and take them apart from one another. Life without form remains concealed to
itself. "A grasping of life is only possible as long as life does not remain plainly within
itself. It has to give itself a form; for it is just in this otherness of form that it attains, if

not its reality, then at least its 'sight'."32 Or, expressed differently: "The basic pattern

of human existence seems to be that the human being does not just merge with outer
impressions, but that he subdues this fullness by giving it a determinate form, a form
which originates from himself, from the thinking, feeling and willing subject."33

This shaping of forms is, as Cassirer states, "directed towards the infinite";34 it
never comes to an end, and maintains us thereby in a spiritual movement of life that
27 Cassirer (2002b, p. 120): "It is the force of language that gives the formations of myth footing and
continuance. f...l Language gives the possibility of recovery and recognition
28 Cassirer (2001b, p. 44): "All consciousness shows itself for us in terms of temporal event. However, in
the midst of this event, certain areas of 'guises' are supposed to be singled out. [...1 All these guises still
appear to belong to the lively and ever renewing process of consciousness in an immediate way: and yet the
spiritual ambition to gain certain points of footing and quit is still dominating. Thus, consciousness keeps
the character of a continuous flow. However, it does not elapse into indeterminacy, but is ordered around
firm centres of form and meaning."

29 Cassirer (2002a, p. 39).

30 Cassirer (2001b, p. 20).
31 Compare here the essay of Georg Simmel: Der Begriff und die Tragdie der Kultur (1911). Cassirer
refers to this essay of Simmel in Cassirer (2007).

32 Cassirer (2002b, p. 45).

33 Cassirer (2006, p. 154).
34 Cassirer (2006, p. 155).

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69

is never closed nor closing itself towards the new. It is this kind of infinity which
Cassirer, in regards to the "immanent infinity",35 points out to Heidegger and claims
is broken off in Heidegger's philosophy. The infinitude thereby is not to be understood

in terms of a continuous self-empowerment or self-improvement (in whatever way):

What the human being carries out is a process of making objective, that is, a
contemplation of oneself in the spheres of the theoretical, ethical, and aesthetic
form-giving. This process presents itself already in the first expressions of language and grows to be richer and more multifaceted in poetry, in the visual arts, in

the religious intuition, in the philosophical concept. All these convey the proper

human abilities and accomplishments, the human ' capacitas infinita ', to use a
phrase from Comenius. But this 'capacitas infinita ', this direction towards infin-

itude moreover implies a strict limitation of oneself. For, every form demands
a certain measurement and is bound to it in its pure appearance. Merely from
itself, as a simply free-flowing life, life cannot generate form; it has to collect
itself and in a sense compare itself in a determinate point, in order to be blessed
with form.36

What Cassirer expresses here in a somewhat abstract and formulaic way points, in
my opinion, to the deepest motive of his thinking as such and, thus, to this decisive
difference with Heidegger. The self-limitation that Cassirer addresses is on the one
hand an inner aspect of self-formation and belongs in this respect to the field of con-

cepts concerned with self-setting against which Heidegger points to free self-giving
(, Sichgeben ) and acquiescence (Hinnehmen) as indicating the way towards an authentic potentiality to be ( Seinknnen ). On the other hand, self-limitation originates in the

relation of persons to one another and in the mutual demands coming to the fore in
this relation. It is this second aspect which is decisive.

Cassirer himself characterises it as the decisive point of the Davos-debate considering it to be the common centre of the opposing positions of Martin Heidegger
and himself - namely that in "the world of the objective spirit", that is, the world of the

forms created by man within which he leads his spiritual life, a "bridge from individual

to individual is erected. [. . .] From existence ( Dasein ) a thread is spun which, through

the medium of such objective spirit, again connects each of us with the existence
Dasein ) of others. And, I believe, that there is no other way from existence (Dasein)

to existence (Dasein) except through this world of forms."37

In the debate itself, Cassirer refers to this as the only way of understanding oneself. However, in his overall conception of philosophy,38 the understanding of oneself
is embedded in a more fundamental context, that is, in the context of the relation in

35 Cassirer and Heidegger ( 1 99 1 , p. 286).

36 Cassirer (2006, p. 155).

37 Cassirer and Heidegger ( 1 99 1 , p. 292f).

38 At the time of the Davos-debate the three volumes of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923, 1925,

1929) had been published as well as The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (1928),
parts of his discussion of life-philosophy had likewise been written or were at least conceived, of although

they had not been published. Compare here especially those texts being published under the title Zur
Metaphysik der symbolischen Formen (1928), "Geist" und Leben, Das Symbolproblem als Grundlage der

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which we, as persons, stand to one another and in which we encounter each other. This

relation of persons is also mediated through the realm of forms. By expressing some-

thing, we present ourselves in this expression to the others. What we are as persons
towards others is what we have expressed to them. Generally, Cassirer formulates it
as the "basic rule controlling every development of the spirit: that the spirit reaches
its true and full inwardness only through its expression of itself."39

The relation to others, not being made a subject of this basic rule, brings a further

dimension into play. It is the dimension of the promise, within which morality and
justice develop. Because the forms in which we present ourselves exhibit our being
for others, they are also exclusively that which others can hold on to as they relate to
us. With our forms of presentation we, on the one hand, announce ourselves to others.
On the other hand, we thus also expose ourselves to others. What we have said and
done at one point remains part of our being for others, even if it may have already
been forgiven or forgotten. With our forms of presentation we say who we are. In this

sense, these presentations are a promise that we are what we have expressed, and that

we as such can be held accountable for being what we have expressed.40

Through this exchange relation of promise and demand, an association between

persons is established which ultimately is grounded in our personalities as such. For,
only in virtue of being persons and not being things can we promise something and
put demands to each other. In this connection, Cassirer quotes Nietzsche: "Nietzsche
[. . .] once said that the right explanation for the human being is that the human being is

an animal that can make promises."41 As already being grounded in our personality as
such, this relation belongs to the form of our personal existence and is as such a relation
of forms between persons. Thereby is not meant that the relation is realised every time

and everywhere as soon as human beings, as a matter of fact, encounter one another.
Rather, it implies that we have to realise this relation if we want to understand and

live our human existence as persons. Comprehension of this connection constitutes

both our moral insights and our legal norms. Comprehension of this can be established

when we realise that the forms we give to our lives are the forms of expressions and
presentations of persons facing one another, and that the development of our personal-

ity - up to the foundation of a "free personality" - exclusively can come about if and
insofar as we form our life. Thus, Cassirer portrays the highest imperative within the
realm of morality in terms of the "imperative of pure form".42
If one includes Cassirer's discourse on self-limitation in this understanding of form,

an understanding ultimately grounded in the relation of forms between persons, then

Footnote 38 continued

philosophischen Anthropologie (both in: Cassirer 1995, pp. 3-109) and the essay "Geist" und "Leben" in
der Philosophie der Gegenwart (1930); now in: Cassirer (1993, pp. 32-60).
39 Cassirer (2002a, p. 23 1 ).
40 Compare here the detailed exposition in Schwemmer (1997, p. 153ff).

Cassirer (2004, p. 223). Cassirer alludes to Nietzsche's Zur Genealogie der Moral. In the second part
(" Schuld ' , " Schlechtes Gewissen " and " Verwandtes ") Nietzsche says: "Is this not the paradoxical task that
nature has set itself regarding the human being, namely breeding an animal capable of promising? Is this
not the real problem of the human being?" (Nietzsche 1973, p. 799).

42 Cassirer (1995, p. 192).

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71

the one-sided assignment of setting oneself widens to incorporate the exposing of

oneself. In general, self-limitation as well as self-formation are both forms of selfrevelation, thus being forms of self-exposure, and forms of gaining oneself and "pos-

sessing oneself', assigned to the aspect of setting within the overall dichotomy of
setting and exposure. From Cassirer's point of view, however, it becomes obvious that
this dichotomy means a one-sidedness, which has to be overcome. The formation of
oneself, which is performed and lived in the relations of forms between persons, can
only succeed as the setting of oneself (promising) in the exposure to (the demands of)
others. Also, the exposure can only turn into an encounter between persons where the
settings are realised in and as the presentations of these persons.
Consequently, a way of thinking event and form in connection with each other thus

becomes visible. For Cassirer, it is indeed the forming - the forming of one's own
actions, of one's own expressions, of one's own productions and one's own life which depicts the event in which the relations of form between persons can gain their
reality. It is indeed an event of the kind which Jean-Francois Lyotard and, even more
so, Emmanuel Lvinas, would bring to mind. This junction of Heidegger's and Cassirer's motifs is not a flat levelling of radical positions nor an indolent compromise. This
is shown by the repeated look at the relations of form between persons, at the relation

between promising and making demands, as well as in the labour and effort required
by the accomplishments of form in virtue of which these promises and demands can
arise.

The relations of form between persons are the expressions of a rigorous practice,
where excusing oneself or others is barred in favour of actually measuring and account-

ing for oneself and others on the ground of what has been said and done. Incidentally,

this rigorous practice is not to be mixed up with the inflexibility of clinging to one's
demands pertaining to what was said and done. It can be understood in terms of the prin-

ciple, that the aspects of personality founded on promising and the related demands aspects related to, respectively, the traditional concepts of dignity and respect - may

never be ignored. Certainly, this rigorous practice is reconcilable with the acknowledgement and even the expectation that every human being always has the opportunity

to change. For, to be a person also means to have a potentiality to be, which unfolds in

the freedom of one's own way of living. Within such a rigorous practice, forgiving is
not only possible, it actually attains its meaning as an expression of the recognition of

other human beings as personalities capable of erring and repenting, thus, as persons

who can equally well continue as the same personality or develop and change their
personal image.
Cassirer's text On Basis Phenomena , is the most decisive one amongst the presently
published posthumous texts. There, he himself gives directions for an understanding
of the relations of form between persons in the open-ended sense, encompassing
forgiveness and more general changes in relations towards a person. Cassirer recognises three "steps" in which the human existence is challenged to lead a spiritual
life - Heidegger would call this a being-called-for ( Gerufensein ). This conception
holds that the spiritual life only gains unity after having passed through all the steps.
The first step is specified through the basic phenomenon of the I as it has been referred

to in the philosophy of consciousness from Descartes to Fichte. The second step is

arrived at through the turn "from the direction outward in the direction of others":
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"The basic phenomenon of love stands aside to the basis phenomenon of the I [...]: it
recognises other beings 'next to' itself and 'apart from' itself [. . .] and relates to them

productively [...] Due to this relation to others the human being gains a first clarity
about itself !"43 In the third step, finally, the objectification of life takes place. "How
do others recognise us? Not in virtue of how we live or are, but in virtue of the 'work'

we create [...], that is, as action and deed, as utterance and writ."44
In the context of our investigations, the decisive clue is found in this conception
of basic or original phenomena, in that all are opened out and put in a relation to one

another, either in the inwardness of consciousness, or in the outwardness of things

and events, via being exposed to the closed dimension of our spiritual existence as
the 'middle' dimension of love, i.e., the relationship between I and you. Cassirer
does not only mention the association with one another, and neither does he just
mention the understanding, but designates love as paradigmatic of the relationship
between I and you. This, I understand as an indication that the rigour of the relations of form between persons is conducive to the recognition of one's own being
and thereby of the other's being, and furthermore, the recognition that the being of
the other should be allowed to remain as it is. These features ultimately also involve
forgiveness.
The rigorous practice, which is peculiar to the relations of form between persons,
remains a radical notion, precisely because of this openness towards forgiveness. Here,
the meaning of radicality is one, which is capable of being realised in the everydayness

of our life, and which does not have to pass through the solipsistic "separation" being
referred to in Heidegger's "anticipation of death". In the first instance, it may surprise

us that Cassirer's philosophy is capable of being connected to a radical point of view.

Such a point of view, however, shows that it is worth trying to take up the Davos-debate

one more time and to investigate it anew: that is, as an associative advancement of
crucial motifs beyond the polemical context where at one's own position and thereby
one's victory are at stake.
Acknowledgement The editors would like to thank Frances Bottenberg for help with the English translation.

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