Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78214 December 5, 1988
YOLANDA CABALLES, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ and
BIENVENIDO ABAJON, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by the
public respondent Ministry of Agrarian Reform , now the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), through its then Minister, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding the
existence of a tenancy relationship between the herein petitioner and the private
respondent and certifying the criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the
petitioner against the private respondent as not proper for trial.
The facts as gathered by the MAR are as follows:
The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square
meters (20 meters x 3 meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda
Caballes, the latter being the petitioner herein, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes This landholding is part of
Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters, situated at
Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. The remainder of Lot No. 3109-C was subseconsequently sold
to the said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other members of the Millenes
family, thus consolidating ownership over the entire (500-square meter) property in
favor of the petitioner.
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent
Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding,
paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner
likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce
thereof would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-1977, Abajon
planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but
continued to plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00
rental for the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea
Millenes.
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and
Yolanda Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close
to his house and pursuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern
portion of the landholding. Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on the land
occupied by his house, but his offer was not accepted. Later, the new owners asked
Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that they needed the property. But Abajon
refused to leave. The parties had a confrontation before the Barangay Captain of
Lawaan in Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts exerted by
the landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter simply
refused to budge.
On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that
immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from
the property without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut
down the banana plants on the property worth about P50.00. A criminal case for

malicious mischief was filed against Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 4003. Obviously, all the planting on the property, including that of the
banana plants, had been done by Abajon. On September 30, 1982, upon motion of
the defense in open court pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the referral of
the case to the Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary
determination of the relationship between the parties. As a result, the Regional
Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a certification 1 dated January 24, 1 983, stating
that said Criminal Case No. 4003 was not proper for hearing on the bases of the
following findings:
That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining
witness, which is devoted to bananas;
That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his
farmholding, which act is prohibited by law; and
That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations.
From the said certification, the petitioner appealed to the then MAR, now the
respondent DAR. Acting on said appeal, the respondent DAR, through its then
Minister Conrado Estrella, reversed the previous certification in its Order 2 of
February 3, 1986, declaring Criminal Case No. 4003 as proper for trial as "the land
involved is a residential lot consisting of only 60 square meters whereon the house
of the accused is constructed and within the industrial zone of the town as evinced
from the Certification issued by the Zoning Administrator of Talisay, Cebu."
Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Abajon, the respondent DAR, through its
new Minister, herein respondent Heherson Alvarez, issued an Orders dated
November 15, 1986, setting aside the previous Order 3 dated February 3, 1986, and
certifying said criminal case as not proper for trial, finding the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties, and that the case was designed to harass the
accused into vacating his tillage.
In the summary investigation conducted by the DAR, the former landowner, Andrea
Millenes, testified that Bienvenido Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the
produce of the land under his cultivation. The grandson of Andrea Millenes, Roger
Millenes, corroborated the testimony of the former, stating that he received said
share from Abajon. Roger Millenes further testified that the present owners received
in his presence a bunch of bananas from the accused representing or 50% of the
two bunches of bananas gathered after Caballes had acquired the property. 4
From these factual findings, the DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea
Millenes, the former owner, who had testified that she shared the produce of the
land with Abajon as truer thereof. 5 Thus, invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended,
which provides that "[T]he agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not
be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor
by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding"; and
that "(I)n case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession
of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR ruled
that 'the new owners are legally bound to respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their
claim that the portion tilled by Abajon was small, consisting merely of three (3)
meters wide and twenty (20) meters long, or a total of sixty (60) square meters." 6
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:
I. Respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez committed "grave abuse of power
and discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in holding that private respondent

Abajon is an agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating only a 60-square meter (3 x

20 meters) portion of a commercial lot of the petitioner.

tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under
existing tenancy laws. 10

II. Public respondents gravely erred in holding that Criminal Case No. 4003 is not
proper for trial and hearing by the court. 7

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy

relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the
produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical
and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing
gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tillersharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square
meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial
zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been
given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The
circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a
caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in
the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than
a tenant of the said portion.

We hold that the private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by RA
3844, as amended. To invest him with the status of a tenant is preposterous.
Section 2 of said law provides:
It is the policy of the State:
(1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the
land as tillers, owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of
Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to
industrial development;
xxx xxx xxx
RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm
land that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and
will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a
farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education with possible
allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves
to absorb yearly fluctuations in income." 8
The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the
500-square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and
corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic familysize farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas, and corn on a sixty-square meter piece
of land can not produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living
to meet the farm family's basic needs. The private respondent himself admitted that
he did not depend on the products of the land because it was too small, and that he
took on carpentry jobs on the side. 9 Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is
patently contrary to the declared policy of the law stated above.
The DAR found that the private respondent shared the produce of the land with the
former owner, Andrea Millenes. This led or misled, the public respondents to
conclude that a tenancy relationship existed between the petitioner and the private
respondent because, the public respondents continue, by operation of Sec. 10 of
R.A. 3844, as amended, the petitioner new owner is subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the supposed agricultural lessor (the former owner).
We disagree.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

The subject is agricultural land;
There is consent;
The purpose is agricultural production;
There is personal cultivation; and
There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between
the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a
cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of

Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it

is clear that the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea
Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA of 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply
stated, the private respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner.
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not
an agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him
should be declared as proper for trial so that proceedings in the lower court can
resume.
Notwithstanding our ruling that the private respondent is not a tenant of the
petitioner, we hold that the remand of the case to the lower court for the resumption
of the criminal proceedings is not in the interest of justice. Remand to the Municipal
Court of Talisay, Cebu, would not serve the ends of justice at all, nor is it necessary,
because this High Tribunal is in a position to resolve with finality the dispute before
it. This Court, in the public interest, and towards the expeditious administration of
justice, has decided to act on the merits and dispose of the case with finality. 11
The criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private
respondent for allegedly cutting down banana trees worth a measly P50.00 will take
up much of the time and attention of the municipal court to the prejudice of other
more pressing cases pending therein. Furthermore, the private respondent will have
to incur unnecessary expenses to finance his legal battle against the petitioner if
proceedings in the court below were to resume. Court litigants have decried the long
and unnecessary delay in the resolution of their cases and the consequent costs of
such litigations. The poor, particularly, are victims of this unjust judicial dawdle,
Impoverished that they are they must deal with unjust legal procrastination which
they can only interpret as harassment or intimidation brought about by their
poverty, deprivation, and despair. It must be the mission of the Court to remove the
misperceptions aggrieved people have of the nature of the dispensation of justice. If
justice can be meted out now, why wait for it to drop gently from heaven? Thus,
considering that this case involves a mere bagatelle the Court finds it proper and
compelling to decide it here and now, instead of further deferring its final
termination.
As found by the DAR, the case for malicious mischief stemmed from the petitioner's
affidavit stating that after she reprimanded private respondent Abajon for harvesting
bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter, with ill
intent, cut the banana trees on the property worth about P50.00.

This was corroborated by a certain Anita Duaban, a friend of the petitioner, who
likewise executed an affidavit to the effect that she saw the private respondent
indiscriminately cutting the banana trees. 12
The Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that "any person who shall
deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the
terms of the next preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief." 13
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are:
1. The offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
2. The damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destruction;
3. The damage was caused maliciously by the offender.
After a review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we rule that the aforesaid
criminal case against the private respondent be dismissed.
The private respondent can not be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in
cutting the banana trees because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the
land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns said crops including the fruits
thereof The private respondent's possession of the land is not illegal or in bad faith
because he was snowed by the previous owners to enter and occupy the premises.
In other words, the private respondent worked the land in dispute with the consent
of the previous and present owners. Consequently, whatever the private respondent
planted and cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him and not to the
landowner. Thus, an essential element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is
"damage deliberately caused to the property of another," is absent because the
private respondent merely cut down his own plantings.
WHEREFORE, the Order of public respondents dated November 15, 1986 is SET
ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 4003, is hereby DISMISSED. Let a copy of this decision
be sent to the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu for appropriate action. This
Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The subject land is a 25,000 square meter farmland situated in Cabuyao, Laguna,
and belonging originally to private respondent Ernesto Alzona and his parents in
equal shares. On July 5, 1970, they entered into a written contract with petitioner
Rafael Gelos employing him as their laborer on the land at the stipulated daily wage
of P5.00. 1 On September 4, 1973, after Alzona had bought his parents' share and
acquired full ownership of the land, he wrote Gelos to inform him of the termination
of his services and to demand that he vacate the property. Gelos refused and
continued working on the land.
On October 1, 1973, Gelos went to the Court of Agrarian Relations and asked for the
fixing of the agricultural lease rental on the property. He later withdrew the case and
went to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which granted his petition. For his part,
Alzona filed a complaint for illegal detainer against Gelos in the Municipal Court of
Cabuyao, but this action was declared "not proper for trial" by the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform because of the existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties. Alzona was rebuffed for the same reason when he sought the assistance of
the Ministry of Labor and later when he filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian
Relations for a declaration of non-tenancy and damages against Gelos. On appeal to
the Office of the President, however, the complaint was declared proper for trial and
so de-archived and reinstated.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City (which had taken over the
Court of Agrarian Relations under PB 129) rendered a decision dated April 21, 1987,
dismissing the complaint. 2 It found Gelos to be a tenant of the subject property and
entitled to remain thereon as such. The plaintiff was also held liable in attorney's
fees and costs.
The decision was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals. In its judgment
promulgated on November 25, 1988, 3 it held that Gelos was not a tenant of the
land in question and ordered him to surrender it to Alzona. He was also held liable
for the payment of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 86186 May 8, 1992

RAFAEL GELOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO ALZONA, respondents.
Balagtas P. Ilagan for petitioner.
Emil Capulong, Jr., for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The Court is asked to determine the real status of the petitioner, who claims to be a
tenant of the private respondent and entitled to the benefits of tenancy laws. The
private respondent objects, contending that the petitioner is only a hired laborer
whose right to occupy the subject land ended with the termination of their contract
of employment.

The basic question the petitioner now raises before the Court is essentially factual
and therefore not proper in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Only questions of law may be raised in this kind of proceeding. The settled rule is
that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on even this Court as
long as they are supported by substantial evidence. The petitioner has not shown
that his case comes under any of those rare exceptions on such findings may be
validly reversed by this Court.
It is true that in Talavera v. Court of Appeals, 4 we held that a factual conclusion
made by the trial court that a person is a tenant farmer, if it is supported by the
minimum evidence demanded by law, is final and conclusive and cannot be reversed
by the appellate tribunals except for compelling reasons. In the case at bar,
however, we find with the respondent court that there was such a compelling
reason. A careful examination of the record reveals that, indeed, the trial court
misappreciated the facts when it ruled that the petitioner was a tenant of the private
respondent.
The circumstance that the findings of the respondent court do not concur with those
of the trial court does not, of course, call for automatic reversal of the appellate
court. Precisely, the function of the appellate court is to review and, if warranted,

reverse the findings of the trial court. Disagreement between the two courts merely
calls on us to make a specially careful study of their respective decisions to
determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to the facts at
hand.
The Court has made this careful study and will sustain the decision of the
respondent court.
The contract of employment dated July 5, 1970, written in Tagalog and entitled
"Kasunduan ng Upahang Araw," reads pertinently as follows:
1. Ang Unang Panig ay siyang may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa,
sinasaka, na tumatayo sa Nayon ng Baclaran, Cabuyao, Laguna, na siyang gagawa
at sasaka sa lupa, samantalang ang Ikalawang Panig ay magiging upahan at
katulong sa paggawa ng lupa.
2. Ang Unang Panig ay gustong ipagpatuloy ang pagbubungkal at paggawa ng bukid
na binabanggit sa itaas at ang Ikalawang Panig ay may ibig na magpaupa sa
paggawa sa halagang P5.00 sa bawat araw, walong oras na trabaho gaya ng mga
sumusunod: Patubigan ng linang; pagpapahalabas ng mga pilapil; pagpapaaldabis
sa unang araw ng pag-aararo; pagpapalinis ng damo sa ibabaw ng pilapil;
pagpapakamot (unang pagpapasuyod), pagpapahalang at pagpapabalasaw
(ikalawa't ikatlong pagpapasuyod); isang tao sa pagsasabog ng abono una sa
pagpapantay ng linang; bago magtanim; isang tao sa pagaalaga ng dapog; upa sa
isang tao ng magbobomba ng gamot laban sa pagkapit ng mga kulisap (mayroon at
wala); sa nag-we-weeder; upa sa mga tao na maggagamas at magpapatubig ng
palay; magsasapaw ng mga pilapil at iba pa.
3. Ang Unang Panig at ang Ikalawang Panig ay nagkasundo na ang huli ay gagawa
sa bukid ayon sa nabanggit sa itaas bilang katulong at upahan lamang. Ang Unang
Panig bukod sa sila ang gagawa at magsasaka ay maaaring umupa ng iba pang tao
manggagawa sa upahang umiiral sang-ayon sa batas katulad ng pag-aararo,
pagpapahulip, pagpapagamas, pagbobomba, pagweweeder, pagsasabog ng abono,
pagbobomba ng gamot, pagpapatubig at iba pang mga gawain. Maaaring alisin ang
Ikalawang Panig sa pagpapatrabaho sa ano mang oras ng Unang Panig.
4. Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay hindi kasama sa bukid kundi upahan
lamang na binabayaran sa bawa't araw ng kanyang paggawa sa bukid na nabanggit.
It is noted that the agreement provides that "ang Ikalawang Panig (meaning Gelos)
ay may ibig na magpaupa sa paggawa sa halagang P5.00 sa bawa't araw, walong
oras na trabaho" (The Second Party desires to lease his services at the rate of P5.00
per day, eight hours of work) and that "Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay
hindi kasama sa bukid kundi upahan lamang na binabayaran sa bawa't araw ng
kanyang paggawa sa bukid na nabanggit.'' (The Second Party makes it known that
he is not a farm tenant but only a hired laborer who is paid for every day of work on
the said farm.)
These stipulations clearly indicate that the parties did not enter into a tenancy
agreement but only a contract of employment. The agreement is a lease of services,
not of the land in dispute. This intention is quite consistent with the undisputed fact
that three days before that agreement was concluded, the former tenant of the land,
Leocadio Punongbayan, had executed an instrument in which he voluntarily
surrendered his tenancy rights to the private respondent. 5 It also clearly
demonstrates that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, Alzona intended to
cultivate the land himself instead of placing it again under tenancy.
The petitioner would now disavow the agreement, but his protestations are less than
convincing. His wife's testimony that he is illiterate is belied by his own testimony to

the contrary in another proceeding. 6 Her claim that they were tricked into signing
the agreement does not stand up against the testimony of Atty. Santos Pampolina,
who declared under his oath as a witness (and as an attorney and officer of the
court) that he explained the meaning of the document to Gelos, who even read it
himself before signing it. 7 Atty. Pampolina said the agreement was not notarized
because his commission as notary public was good only for Manila and did not cover
Laguna, where the document was executed. 8 At any rate, the lack of notarization
did not adversely affect the veracity and effectiveness of the agreement, which,
significantly, Gelos and his wife do not deny having signed.
Gelos points to the specific tasks mentioned in the agreement and suggests that
they are the work of a tenant and not of a mere hired laborer. Not so. The work
specified is not peculiar to tenancy. What a tenant may do may also be done by a
hired laborer working under the direction of the landowner, as in the case at bar. It is
not the nature of the work involved but the intention of the parties that determines
the relationship between them.
As this Court has stressed in a number of cases, 9 "tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a
legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied
with and are not contrary to law, are even more important."
Gelos presented receipts 10 for fertilizer and pesticides he allegedly bought and
applied to the land of the private respondent, but the latter insists that it was his
brother who bought them, being an agriculturist and in charge of the technical
aspect of the farm. Moreover, the receipts do not indicate to which particular
landholding the fertilizers would be applied and, as pointed out by the private
respondent, could refer to the other parcels of land which Gelos was tenanting.
The petitioner's payment of irrigation fees from 1980 to 1985 to the National
Irrigation Administration on the said landholding is explained by the fact that during
the pendency of the CAR case, the Agrarian Reform Office fixed a provisional
leasehold rental after a preliminary finding that Gelos was the tenant of the private
respondent. As such, it was he who had to pay the irrigation fees. Incidentally,
Section 12, subpar. (r) of PD 946 provides that the Secretary's determination of the
tenancy relationship is only preliminary and cannot be conclusive on the lower court.
It is noteworthy that, except for the self-serving testimony of the petitioner's wife,
the records of this case are bereft of evidence regarding the sharing of harvest
between Gelos and Alzona. No less importantly, as the Court of Appeals observed,
the petitioner has not shown that he paid rentals on the subject property from 1970
to 1973, before their dispute arose.
A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who
himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household
cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent,
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. (Emphasis
supplied)
For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose
is agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of
harvest or payment of rental. In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant
of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de
jure tenant. 11

On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1) the

selection and engagement of the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power
of dismissal; and 4) the power to control the employee's
conduct although the latter is the most important element. 12
According to a well-known authority on the subject, 13 tenancy relationship is
distinguished from farm employer-farm worker relationship in that: "In farm
employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the agricultural
laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee thereof. In
tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the lessee
of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for the farm employer and for his
labor be receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a
profit. On the other hand, the tenant derives his income from the agricultural
produce or harvest."
The private respondent, instead of receiving payment of rentals or sharing in the
produce of the land, paid the petitioner lump sums for specific kinds of work on the
subject lot or gave him vales, or advance payment of his wages as laborer thereon.
The petitioner's wife claims that Alzona made her husband sign the invoices all at
one time because he allegedly needed them to reduce his income taxes. Even
assuming this to be true, we do not think that made the said payments fictitious,
especially so since the petitioner never denied having received them.

proposed to plaintiff that he would surrender the land in question to the latter if
plaintiff would convey to him another piece of land adjacent to the land in question,
almost one ha. in area, that plaintiff had also acquired after buying the land in
question, showing that defendant was not as ignorant as he would want the Court to
believe and had the advice of people knowledgeable on agrarian matters.
This Court has stressed more than once that social justice or any justice for that
matter is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a
pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to
tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its
sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because
they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must
always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the
petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

The other issue raised by the petitioner, which is decidedly legal, is easily resolved.
There being no tenancy relationship, the contention that the private respondent's
complaint has prescribed under Section 38 of R.A. 3844 must also fail. That section
is not applicable. It must be noted that at the very outset, Alzona rejected the
petitioner's claim of agricultural tenancy and immediately instituted his action for
unlawful detainer in accordance with Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. As it
happened, the said case was held not proper for trial by the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform. He then resorted to other remedies just so he could recover possession of
his land and, finally, in 1979, he yielded to the jurisdiction of the defunct Court of
Agrarian Relations by filing there an action for declaration of non-tenancy. The
action, which was commenced in 1979, was within the ten-year prescriptive period
provided under Article 1144 of the Civil Code for actions based on a written contract.
*

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974
TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano Manahan, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.
Virgilio M. Pablo for defendant-appellant.
Armando M. Laki for movant.

The Court quotes with approval the following acute observations made by Justice
Alicia Sempio-Diy:
It might not be amiss to state at this juncture that in deciding this case in favor of
defendant, the lower court might have been greatly influenced by the fact that
defendant is a mere farmer who is almost illiterate while plaintiff is an educated
landlord, such that it had felt that it was its duty to be vigilant for the protection of
defendant's interests. But the duty of the court to protect the weak and the
underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to the
landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. Besides,
defendant's economic position vis a vis the plaintiff does not necessarily make him
the underprivileged party in this case, for as testified by plaintiff which defendant
never denied, the small land in question was the only landholding of plaintiff when
he and his father bought the same, at which time he was just a lowly employee who
did not even have a house of his own and his father, a mere farmer, while defendant
was the agricultural tenant of another piece of land and also owns his own house, a
sari sari store, and a caritela. Plaintiff also surmised that it was only after defendant
had been taken into its wings by the Federation of Free Farmers that he started
claiming to be plaintiff's agricultural tenant, presumably upon the Federation's
instigation and advice. And we cannot discount this possibility indeed, considering
that during the early stages of the proceedings this case, defendant even counter-

ZALDIVAR, J.:p
This appeal from the decision, dated December 26, 1963, of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, was certified to this Court by the
Court of Appeals for the reason that the jurisdiction of an inferior court is involved.
During the pendency of this case before this Court, under date of April 29, 1972,
Atty. Virgilio M. Pablo, counsel for the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, gave notice to
this Court that said appellant died on April 3, 1964, and was survived by his children,
who are his legal heirs, namely: Salvador Pangilinan, Santos Pangilinan, Mariano
Pangilinan, Carlos Pangilinan and Pilar Pangilinan de Avante. For the purposes of this
case the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, therefore, is substituted by his heirs herein
named.
Under date of November 20, 1973, Atty. Amando M. Laki filed a motion with this
Court advising that appellee Trinidad Gabriel died on June 14, 1967, and was
survived by her heirs and successors-in-interest, namely: Corazon O. Gabriel,
married to Lamberto Ignacio; Ernesto O. Gabriel; Ester O. Gabriel, married to
Emmanuel Padua; Generoso O. Gabriel, Marciano O. Gabriel and Pablo O. Gabriel,

and prayed that appellee Trinidad Gabriel be substituted by her heirs herein named.
By order of this Court of December 4, 1973 the prayer for substitution was granted.
In its resolution dated April 19, 1967 certifying the case to this Court, the Court of
Appeals made the following findings, which We adopt:
On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga against Eusebio Pangilinan alleging that she is the owner of a fishpond
situated in barrio Sta. Ursula, Betis, Pampanga and measuring about 169,507 square
meters; that sometime during the last war she entered into an oral contract of lease
thereof with the defendant on a year to year basis, i.e., from January 1 to December
31, at a rental of P1,200, plus the amount of real estate taxes, payable in advance in
the month of January; that desiring to develop and cultivate the fishpond by herself,
she notified the defendant in a letter dated June 26, 1957 that she was terminating
the contract as of December 31, 1957; that upon request of the defendant, she
extended the lease for another year; that on November 19, 1958 she again wrote
the defendant that he should surrender possession of the fishpond on January 1,
1959, which demand he however ignored. Plaintiff accordingly prayed that the
defendant be ordered to restore the possession of the fishpond to her and to pay her
P1,200, plus the amount of real estate taxes, a year from 1959, attorney's fees and
costs.
The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case which properly pertains to the Court of
Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship
between the parties. Upon opposition by the plaintiff, the motion was denied. The
defendant thereafter filed his answer with counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that the
land in question was originally leased to him, also verbally, by the plaintiff's father,
Potenciano Gabriel in 1923 for as long as the defendant wanted subject to the
condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and the part which
was already a fishpond be improved at his expense which would be reimbursed by
Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease for whatever cause;
that when the plaintiff became the owner of the property through inheritance, she
told the defendant that she would honor her father's contract with the defendant,
and likewise assured him that he could continue leasing the property, whose original
rental of P400.00 a year had been progressively increased to P1,200.00, for as long
as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it personally. As a special
defense, the defendant reiterated the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to
take cognizance of the case.

It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of
helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 he became ill and incapacitated. His
daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over. She testified that she helps her father in
administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano
Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan and Aguedo
Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who were paid for the repair of the
dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher. He has
lived separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan. who is residing
near the fishpond, the other children of the defendant are all professions; a lawyer,
an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila. None of these persons has been seen
working on the fishpond.
The above are the material and pertinent facts upon which we enter this order.
After a study of the facts and in the light of the provisions of the Tenancy Law,
Republic Act No. 1199, particularly Sections 4 and 9, as amended. it seems clear
that his case does not fall within the purview of said Act. The lease contract is
manifestly a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. Considering the area of the
fishpond, 16 hectares, more or less, the fact that neither the defendant, who is
physically incapacitated, or his daughter is Personally cultivating the fishpond or
through the employment of mechanical farm implements, and the further fact that
the persons named above are not members of the immediate farm household of the
defendant, the conclusion is that no tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff
and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold that this Court is vested with
jurisdiction to try and decide this case. After this order has become final, the plaintiff
may request for the setting of the initial trial.
The defendant does not contest the findings of facts therein made by the trial court.
After the parties adduced their respective evidence on the merits, decision was
rendered wherein the trial court Pursuant to Article 1197 of the Civil Code, fixed the
period of the low up to June 30, 1964, the defendant on said date to surrender
possession of the fishpond to the plaintiff and to pay the rentals due the latter. The
plaintiff, on her part, was required upon surrender of on to her, to pay the defendant
the sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement of the expenses he incurred in improving
the fishpond, and upon failure by either party to pay the amount due the other, the
same would bear interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.

On February 12, 1962 the trial court issued an order herein below quoted in full:

A reconsideration by the defendant having been denied, he appealed to this Court

and assigned the following errors:

The plaintiff sinks to eject the defendant from the fishpond described in the
complaint which is under lease to the said defendant, who, however, refuses to
vacate. Instead, he has impugned the jurisdiction of this Court contending that the
action should have been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations, which has original
and exclusive jurisdiction, as their relationship is one of leasehold tenancy.

1. The lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as
that of a civil lease, in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines and not a
leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.

After the motion to dismiss was denied on the basis of the allegations of the
complaint, the parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of
determining which Court shall take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the fishpond is presently in the possession of the defendant, who
originally leased it from the father of the plaintiff. Upon the death of the said father,
the fishpond was inherited by the plaintiff. It is now covered by T.C.T. No. 1634 and is
registered in her name. It contains an area of 169,507.00 square meters. The rental
is on a yearly basis.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without
jurisdiction, the cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act.
NO. 1199 as amended.
3. The lower court erred in appreciating the evidence of the appellant particularly
the basis for the expenditure for the development of the fishpond in question.
4. The lower court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the appellant in them
easily amount of one thousand pesos for reimbursement and for seven hundred
pesos for the cost of the floodgate.

Anent the question of jurisdiction, it is an admitted fact that plaintiff leased the
fishpond to the defendant in 1943 without a fixed term, the annual rental payable at
the end of the year (Exhibit C, Deposition of plaintiff, Dec. 13, 1962, pp. 2 and 3). It
is likewise undisputed that the work in the fishpond consisted in letting out the
water so algae (lumut) would grow or if algae would not grow, getting some from the
river and putting them in the fishpond, changing the dirty water with fresh water,
repairing leaks in the dikes, and planting of fingerlings and attending to them; that
these were done by defendant, with some help; that he personally attended to the
fishpond until 1956 when he became ill; that thereafter his nephew Bernardo
Cayanan, who was living with him, helped in the work to be done in the fishpond and
his daughter Pilar Pangilinan helped in the management, conveying his instructions
to the workers (t.s.n., pp. 4-8, Magat).

Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant case?

Upon the foregoing facts, the defendant insists that the relationship between the
parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is
therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains in effect that since defendant has
ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of his
immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy
relationship between the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become
of civil lease and therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the
case.

Regarding the second requisite, it is to be noted that the land in question has an
area of 169,507 square meters, or roughly 17 hectares of fishpond. The question of
whether such a big parcel of land is susceptible of being worked by the appellant's
family or not has not been raised, and We see no need of tarrying on this point. So,
We pass to the third requisite, to wit, whether the tenant himself personally or with
the aid of his immediate family worked the land.

It does appear that the controversy on the issue of jurisdiction calls for the
interpretation of cultivating or working the land by the tenant personally or with the
aid of the members of his immediate farm household. 1
Those are the findings and conclusions of facts made by the Court of Appeals which,
as a general rule, bind this Court. 2
1. Let Us now discuss the issues raised in this appeal. First, was the relationship
between the appellee and appellant a leasehold tenancy or a civil law lease?
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease.
The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil
law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the
law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the
agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work
the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful
pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code,
whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws. 3
In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the
following requisites must concur.
1. That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with
members of his immediate farm household;
3. That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of
labor available from members of his immediate farm household;
4. That the land belongs to another; and
5. That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in
money or in produce or in both. 4

There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and
the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically
mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus
Section 46(c) of said Act provides that "the consideration for the use of sugar lands,
fishponds, salt beds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be
governed by stipulation between the parties". This Court has already ruled that "land
in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land." 5 The mere fact, however,
that a person works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold
tenant within the purview of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a
civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are complied with.

Assuming that appellant had previously entered in 1923 into an agreement of

leasehold tenancy with Potenciano Gabriel, appellee's father, such tenancy
agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally
because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's
immediate farm household work the land in question. Only the members of the
family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not,
who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the
farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm household" 6 The record
shows who helped work the land in question, and We quote:
It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of
helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 when he became ill and incapacitated.
His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan took over. She testified that she helps her father in
administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano
Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan and Aguedo
Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who were paid for the repair of the
dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher. He has
lived separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is residing
near the fishpond, the other children of the defendant are all professionals: a lawyer,
an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila. None of these persons has been
seen working on the fishpond. 7
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land.
Thus Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, defines a "tenant" as a
person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the
latter's consent for purposes of production sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the
same Act limits the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes
the land and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor
available from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same
Act requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his
immediate farm household work the land. It provides that leasehold tenancy exists
when a person, who either personally or with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a piece of
agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members

of his immediate farm household, belonging to, or legally possessed by, another in
consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both.
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available
from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do
not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; 8 and he who hires others
whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered
as having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of
Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship
between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a
leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. 9
2. Regarding the second assignment of error, We accordingly rule that the Court of
First Instance correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case at bar, this being a case
of civil law lease.
3. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the third and fourth assigned errors as these
are issues involving findings of facts which have been settled by the lower court, and
unless there is grave abuse of discretion, which we do not find in the record of the
case, We shall not venture to discuss the merits of the factual findings of the court a
quo.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
in its Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the
appellants.
This decision should apply to the heirs and successors-in-interest of the original
parties, as named in this decision. In consonance with the decision of the lower
court, the heirs and successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should
deliver the possession of the fishpond in question to the heirs and successors-ininterest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel; and said heirs and successors-in-interest of
appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should pay the heirs and successors-in-interest of
appellee Trinidad Gabriel the accrued rentals. From January 1, 1960, at the rate of
P1,200.00 a year, until the actual delivery of the possession of the fishpond as
herein ordered, with interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.
IT IS SO ORDERED

SECOND DIVISION
ORLANDO A. RAYOS,
G.R. No. 196063
FE A. RAYOS-DELA PAZ, represented by
Present:
DR. ANTONIO A. RAYOS, and
ENGR. MANUEL A. RAYOS,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
Petitioners,
BRION, PEREZ, SERENO, and
- versus REYES, JJ.
THE CITY OF MANILA,
Promulgated:

Respondent.
December 14, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition, captioned as a petition for review on certiorari and declaratory relief,1
assails the Order of 6 January 20112 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49,
denying reconsideration of the trial courts Order of 11 March 20103 which denied
the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz,
and Engr. Manuel A. Rayos.4
The Facts
The present case originated from a complaint for eminent domain filed by
respondent City of Manila against Remedios V. De Caronongan, Patria R. Serrano,
Laureano M. Reyes, Paz B. Sison, Teofila B. Sison, Leticia R. Ventanilla, Rosalinda R.
Barrozo (defendants), docketed as Civil Case No. 03108154.
In its Complaint,5 the City of Manila alleged that it passed Ordinance No. 7949
authorizing the City Mayor to acquire by expropriation, negotiation or by any other
legal means the parcel of land co-owned by defendants, which is covered by TCT No.
227512 and with an area of 1,182.20 square meters. The City of Manila offered to
purchase the property at P1,000.00 per square meter.
In their Answer,6 defendants conveyed their willingness to sell the property to the
City of Manila, but at the price of P50,000.00 per square meter which they claimed
was the fair market value of the land at the time.
In the course of the proceedings, Laureano, one of the defendants, died on 1
December 2003 and was substituted by his son petitioner Manuel A. Rayos.
Meanwhile, petitioner Orlando A. Rayos intervened while petitioner Fe A. Rayos Dela
Paz was added as a defendant.
On 7 December 2009, petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr.
Manuel A. Rayos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) Ordinance No.
7949 is unconstitutional and (2) the cases of Lagcao v. Labra7 and Jesus Is Lord
Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila8
apply squarely to the present case.
On 11 March 2010, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court ruled
that the motion to dismiss did not show any compelling reason to convince the court
that the doctrine of stare decisis applies. Petitioners failed to demonstrate how or
why the facts in this case are similar with the cited cases in order that the issue in
this case be resolved in the same manner. The trial court disposed of the motion to
dismiss in this wise:
In view of the foregoing, and after intense evaluation of the records on hand, the
Motion to Dismiss cannot be granted.

In order to prevent further delay to the prejudice of all the proper parties in this
case, continue with the trial for the determination of just compensation on July 7,
2010 at one oclock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.9
On 6 January 2011, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners filed with this Court the present petition reiterating the arguments in
their motion to dismiss, namely, (1) Ordinance No. 7949 is unconstitutional, and (2)
the cases of Lacgao v. Labra10 and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v.
Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila11 apply squarely to this case.
The Ruling of the Court
We deny the petition.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable.12 An
order denying a motion to dismiss does not finally dispose of the case, and in effect,
allows the case to proceed until the final adjudication thereof by the court. As such,
it is merely interlocutory in nature and thus, not appealable.13 Section 1(c), Rule 41
of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Clearly, no appeal, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, may be taken from an
interlocutory order. In case of denial of an interlocutory order, the immediate
remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, since the trial courts order denying the motion to dismiss is not
appealable, petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to
assail such order, and not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. For being a wrong remedy, the present petition deserves outright
dismissal.
Even if the Court treats the present petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
which is the proper remedy to challenge the order denying the motion to dismiss,
the same must be dismissed for violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts. This
well-settled principle dictates that petitioners should file the petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, and not directly with this Court.
Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.14 However, such concurrence in jurisdiction
does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum.15 In Heirs of
Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,16 citing People v. Cuaresma,17 the Court held:

This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is

shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an]
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In short, to warrant a direct recourse to this Court, petitioners must show
exceptional and compelling reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This petitioners failed to do.
Petitioners merely rehashed the arguments in their motion to dismiss, which consist
mainly of unsubstantiated allegations. Petitioners invoke the cases of Lagcao v.
Labra18 and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City)
of Pasig, Metro Manila19 in challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7949
without, however, showing clearly the applicability and similarity of those cases to
the present controversy. Neither did petitioners explain why Ordinance No. 7949 is
repugnant to the Constitution. Nor did petitioners specifically and sufficiently set
forth any extraordinary and important reason to justify direct recourse to this
Court.20
Likewise, assuming the present petition is one for declaratory relief,21 as can be
gleaned from the caption of the petition, this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction over such a petition. While this Court may treat a petition for declaratory
relief as one for prohibition22 or mandamus, over which this Court exercises original
jurisdiction,23 it must be stressed that this special treatment is undertaken only in
cases with far reaching implications and transcendental issues that need to be
resolved.24
In the present case, there is absolutely nothing which shows that it has far-reaching
implications and involves transcendental questions deserving of this Courts
treatment of the petition as one for prohibition or mandamus.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112526

October 12, 2001

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN B. AMANTE ET AL.
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals1 affirming the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board2 (hereafter DARAB) ordering the compulsory acquisition of
petitioner's property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the
registered owner of two parcels of land, situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao,
Laguna covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, with a total area of 254.6 hectares.
According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean
potable water to the Canlubang community, and that ninety (90) light industries are
now located in the area.3
Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby
destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil
case4 with the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, seeking an easement of a right of way to
and from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the
ejectment of private respondents.
In October 1986 to August 1987, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court,
Cabuyao, Laguna separate complaints for forcible entry against respondents. 5
After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under
the CARP.
On August 11, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Cabuyao,
Laguna issued a notice of coverage to petitioner and invited its officials or
representatives to a conference on August 18, 1989. 6 During the meeting, the
following were present: representatives of petitioner, the Land Bank of the
Philippines, PARCCOM, PARO of Laguna, MARO of Laguna, the BARC Chairman of
Barangay Casile and some potential farmer beneficiaries, who are residents of
Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was the consensus and recommendation of
the assembly that the landholding of SRRDC be placed under compulsory
acquisition.

On August 17, 1989, petitioner filed with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO), Cabuyao, Laguna a "Protest and Objection" to the compulsory acquisition of
the property on the ground that the area was not appropriate for agricultural
purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the
occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as
beneficiaries.7
On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC chairman
answered the protest and objection stating that the slope of the land is not 18% but
only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically viable for agricultural
purposes, as evidenced by the Certification of the Department of Agriculture,
municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna.8
On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a summary investigation report
and forwarded the Compulsory Acquisition Folder Indorsement (CAFI) to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (hereafter, PARO). 9
On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his endorsement of the
compulsory acquisition to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C. Visperas of the Bureau of Land
Acquisition and Development, DAR forwarded two (2) Compulsory Acquisition Claim
Folders covering the landholding of SRRDC, covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T84891 to the President, Land Bank of the Philippines for further review and
evaluation.10
On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent
two (2) notices of acquisition11 to petitioner, stating that petitioner's landholdings
covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800
hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two letters 12 separately addressed to
Secretary Florencio B. Abad and the Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting not only the amount of compensation
offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2) notices of acquisition.
On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB for summary
proceedings to determine just compensation under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16.
On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim folders previously referred for
review and evaluation to the Director of BLAD mentioning its inability to value the
SRRDC landholding due to some deficiencies.
On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S. Galvez wrote Land Bank
President Deogracias Vistan to forward the two (2) claim folders involving the
property of SRRDC to the DARAB for it to conduct summary proceedings to
determine the just compensation for the land.

On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating
that its property under the aforesaid land titles were exempt from CARP coverage
because they had been classified as watershed area and were the subject of a
pending petition for land conversion.
On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned over the two (2) claim
folders (CACF's) to the Executive Director of the DAR Adjudication Board for proper
administrative valuation. Acting on the CACF's, on September 10, 1990, the Board
promulgated a resolution asking the office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
to first resolve two (2) issues before it proceeds with the summary land valuation
proceedings.13
The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1) whether the subject
parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory Acquisition Program of the
CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land conversion of the parcels of land may be
granted.
On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the Undersecretary
for Operations (Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations) and the Regional Director
of Region IV, submitted a report answering the two issues raised. According to them,
firstly, by virtue of the issuance of the notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and
notice of acquisition on December 12, 1989, the property is covered under
compulsory acquisition. Secondly, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990,
Section IV D also supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said property.
During the consideration of the case by the Board, there was no pending petition for
land conversion specifically concerning the parcels of land in question.

stated that the parcels of land subject of the case were classified as "industrial Park"
per Sanguniang Bayan Resolution No. 45-89 dated March 29, 1989.14
To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the lands to the farmer
beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991, petitioner filed a petition 15 with DARAB to disqualify
private respondents as beneficiaries. However, DARAB refused to address the issue
of beneficiaries.
In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24,
rendered a decision,16 finding that private respondents illegally entered the SRRDC
property, and ordered them evicted.
On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a memorandum directing
the Land Bank of the Philippines to open a trust account in favor of SRRDC, for
P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC property.
On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated a decision, the decretal portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby orders:
"1. The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory
coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation
(Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 81949 and 84891 with an area of 254.766
hectares) in Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby affirmed;

On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all the parties
interested, setting the hearing for the administrative valuation of the subject parcels
of land on March 6, 1991. However, on February 22, 1991, Atty. Ma. Elena P.
Hernandez-Cueva, counsel for SRRDC, wrote the Board requesting for its assistance
in the reconstruction of the records of the case because the records could not be
found as her co-counsel, Atty. Ricardo Blancaflor, who originally handled the case for
SRRDC and had possession of all the records of the case was on indefinite leave and
could not be contacted. The Board granted counsel's request and moved the hearing
to April 4, 1991.

"2. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation the amount of Seven Million Eight Hundred FortyOne Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Sixty-Four centavos
(P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the two (2) Transfer
Certificates of Title mentioned above. Should there be a rejection of the
payment tendered, to open, if none has yet been made, a trust account for
said amount in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation;

On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board for the latter to resolve
SRRDC's petition for exemption from CARP coverage before any administrative
valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board.

"3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with dispatch
Transfer certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 and new one be issued in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and
encumbrances;

On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and subsequently,
different dates of hearing were set without objection from counsel of SRRDC. During
the April 15, 1991 hearing, the subdivision plan of subject property at Casile,
Cabuyao, Laguna was submitted and marked as Exhibit "5" for SRRDC. At the
hearing on April 23, 1991, the Land Bank asked for a period of one month to value
the land in dispute.

"4 The Department of Environment and Natural Resources either through

its Provincial Office in Laguna or the Regional Office, Region IV, to conduct a
final segregation survey on the lands covered by Transfer certificate of Title
Nos. 84891 and 81949 so the same can be transferred by the Register of
Deeds to the name of the Republic of the Philippines;

At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning Administrator
Generoso B. Opina was presented. The certification issued on September 8, 1989,

"5. The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its
Municipal and Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to take immediate
possession on the said landholding after Title shall have been transferred to

the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the same to the
immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as
determined by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna." 17
On January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. B-233318 ruling that respondents were builders in bad faith.
On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review
of the DARAB decision.19 On November 5, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision affirming the decision of DARAB. The decretal portion of the Court of
Appeals decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB decision dated September
19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation ventilating its case with the Special Agrarian
Court on the issue of just compensation."20Hence, this petition.21
On December 15, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution which reads:
"G. R. Nos. 112526 (Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al.) Considering the compliance, dated December 13, 1993,
filed by counsel for petitioner, with the resolution of December 8, 1993
which required petitioner to post a cash bond or surety bond in the amount
of P1,500,000.00 Pesos before issuing a temporary restraining order prayed
for, manifesting that it has posted a CASH BOND in the same amount with
the Cashier of the Court as evidenced by the attached official receipt no.
315519, the Court resolved to ISSUE the Temporary Retraining Order
prayed for.
"The Court therefore, resolved to restrain: (a) the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board from enforcing its decision dated December 19,
1991 in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001, which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals in a Decision dated November 5, 1993, and which ordered,
among others, the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
through its Municipal and Provincial Reform Office to take immediate
possession of the landholding in dispute after title shall have been
transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines and to distribute
the same through the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the
farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian Officer of
Cabuyao, Laguna, (b) The Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, and all persons acting
for and in their behalf and under their authority from entering the
properties involved in this case and from introducing permanent
infrastructures thereon; and (c) the private respondents from further
clearing the said properties of their green cover by the cutting or burning of
trees and other vegetation, effective today until further orders from this
Court."22
The main issue raised is whether the property in question is covered by CARP
despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the
enactment of R. A. No. 6657.

Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of private land:
compulsory and voluntary. In the case at bar, the Department of Agrarian Reform
sought the compulsory acquisition of subject property under R. A. No. 6657, Section
16, to wit:
"Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For purposes of
acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
a.) After having identified the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to
the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and
post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and
barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said
notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay corresponding
value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18,
and other pertinent provisions hereof.
b.) Within thirty (30) days from the date of the receipt of written
notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his
administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer.
c.) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay
the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30)
days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of
the government and other muniments of title.
d.) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct
summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and
other interested parties to submit fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is
deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case
within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
e.) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment,
or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon
the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this act,
the DAR shall make immediate possession of the land and shall
request the proper Register of Deeds to issue Transfer Certificate
of Titles (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to
the qualified beneficiaries.
f.) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter
to the court23 of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.

In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and

farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a
notice of acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and
post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the
place where the property is located.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the landowner, his
administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of
the offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days from the
execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the
owner the purchase price. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed
of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within
thirty days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the
DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative
proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP
representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just
compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission,
the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount
of just compensation.
Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or
lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or
in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of
the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer
beneficiaries. Any party may question the decision of the DAR in the special agrarian
courts (provisionally the Supreme Court designated branches of the regional trial
court as special agrarian courts) for final determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to
hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Under Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the
identification of the land, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries. However, the
law is silent on how the identification process shall be made. To fill this gap, on July
26, 1989, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989, which set the
operating procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows:
A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), with the assistance of the
pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall:
1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP in
his area of responsibility; the masterlist should include such information as
required under the attached CARP masterlist form which shall include the
name of the landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax
declaration number.

2. Prepare the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title
(OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase I and II of the CARP except
those for which the landowners have already filed applications to avail of
other modes of land acquisition. A case folder shall contain the following
duly accomplished forms:
a) CARP CA Form 1MARO investigation report
b) CARP CA Form No 2 Summary investigation report findings
and evaluation
c) CARP CA Form 3Applicant's Information sheet
d) CARP CA Form 4 Beneficiaries undertaking
e) CARP CA Form 5 Transmittal report to the PARO
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the abovementioned forms have been examined and verified by him and that the
same are true and correct.
3. Send notice of coverage and a letter of invitation to a
conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the Compulsory Case
Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said conference meeting shall also be
sent to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC representatives, the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) representative, and the other interested
parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property.
He shall discuss the MARO/BARC investigation report and solicit the views,
objection, agreements or suggestions of the participants thereon. The
landowner shall also ask to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the
meeting shall be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form
an integral part of the CACF.
4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO).
B. The PARO shall:
1. Ensure the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his MAROs.
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of the
land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, series of 1988. The valuation worksheet
and the related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the
PARO and all the personnel who participated in the accomplishment of
these forms.

3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through
ocular inspection and verification of the property. This ocular inspection and
verification shall be mandatory when the computed value exceeds
P500,000 per estate.
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, together
with the duly accomplished valuation forms and his recommendations, to
the Central Office.
The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy
each of his report.
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition
and Distribution (BLAD), shall:
1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO, review,
evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property covered by
the case folder. A summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared
and duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel directly
participating in the review and final valuation.
2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized
representative, a notice of acquisition (CARP Form 8) for the subject
property. Serve the notice to the landowner personally or through
registered mail within three days from its approval. The notice shall include
among others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition, and the amount
of just compensation offered by DAR.
3. Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value, the BLAD shall
prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the order of acquisition.
However, in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) shall conduct a summary administrative hearing to determine just
compensation, in accordance with the procedures provided under
Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of
the DARAB's decision on just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and
submit to the Secretary for approval the required order of acquisition.
4. Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or upon
deposit of payment in the designated bank, in case of rejection or nonresponse, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of
Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the property is transferred,
the DAR, through the PARO, shall take possession of the land for
redistribution to qualified beneficiaries."
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands under
the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required information. The
MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered
by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of Coverage" and a "letter

of invitation" to a "conference/ meeting" over the land covered by the CACF. He also
sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives of the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property
and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At the
meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) who shall complete the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and
verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory when the computed
value of the estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the valuation, the
PARO shall forward all papers together with his recommendation to the Central
Office of the DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land
Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) shall prepare, on the signature of the Secretary
or his duly authorized representative, a notice of acquisition of the subject property.
From this point, the provisions of R. A. No. 6657, Section 16 shall apply.
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the
notice of coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the
landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other
interested parties pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of
acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of
invitation to a conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are
steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The
implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power
of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the
landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking
contemplated is not mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.
In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question.
However, payment of just compensation was not in accordance with the procedural
requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account
as was done by DAR.
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, we held that "The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt of the landowner
of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either." 24
Consequently, petitioner questioned before the Court of Appeals DARAB's decision
ordering the compulsory acquisition of petitioner's property. 25 Here, petitioner

pressed the question of whether the property was a watershed, not covered by
CARP.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067) provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water
or overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of
Natural resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be
promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by
the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may
damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or
interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or
administration of such waters."
Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and
enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds."
Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so why was the Casile
property titled in the name of SRRDC? The answer is simple. At the time of the
titling, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not declared the
property as watershed area. The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as
"PARK" by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as
certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution 26 voiding the zoning
classification of the land at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land is
now classified as agricultural land.
The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is
an exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent domain. "A zoning
ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land
uses as present and future projection of needs."27
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform28 we held that lands
classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL may not be
compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries.
However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that
subsequent studies and survey showed that the parcels of land in question form a
vital part of a watershed area.29
Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in dispute is a "watershed or part
of the protected area for watershed purposes." Ecological balances and
environmental disasters in our day and age seem to be interconnected. Property
developers and tillers of the land must be aware of this deadly combination. In the
case at bar, DAR included the disputed parcels of land for compulsory acquisition
simply because the land was allegedly devoted to agriculture and was titled to
SRRDC, hence, private and alienable land that may be subject to CARP.
However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth study, survey and
reassessment. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a

vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. In a report of
the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the
DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river
watersheds, they concluded that:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the
heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the
Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict
with proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger
the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge
detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of
the Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below.
On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers
which acts as recharged areas of the Matang Tubig springs. Considering
that the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of the
Matang Tubig structures they couldn't care less even if it would be
destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life
support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected
by it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource
water. x x x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound
watershed management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing
activities like road building and erection of permanent infrastructures.
Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are
immediately stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds would
cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degredation threatens the
livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope
that an acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and
program be immediately formulated and implemented before the
irreversible damage finally happens.
Hence, the following are recommended:
7.2 The Casile farmers should be relocated and given financial
assistance.
7.3 Declaration of the two watersheds as critical and in need of
immediate rehabilitation.
7.4 A comprehensive and detailed watershed management plan
and program be formulated and implemented by the Canlubang
Estate in coordination with pertinent government agencies." 30
The ERDB report was prepared by a composite team headed by Dr. Emilio Rosario,
the ERDB Director, who holds a doctorate degree in water resources from U.P. Los
Banos in 1987; Dr. Medel Limsuan, who obtained his doctorate degree in watershed
management from Colorado University (US) in 1989; and Dr. Antonio M. Dano, who

obtained his doctorate degree in Soil and Water management Conservation from U.P.
Los Banos in 1993.

To resolve the issue as to the true nature of the parcels of land involved in the case
at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.

Also, DENR Secretary Angel Alcala submitted a Memorandum for the President dated
September 7, 1993 (Subject: PFVR HWI Ref.: 933103 Presidential Instructions on the
Protection of Watersheds of the Canlubang Estates at Barrio Casile, Cabuyao,
Laguna) which reads:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. SP No. 27234.

"It is the opinion of this office that the area in question must be maintained
for watershed purposes for ecological and environmental considerations,
among others. Although the 88 families who are the proposed CARP
beneficiaries will be affected, it is important that a larger view of the
situation be taken as one should also consider the adverse effect on
thousands of residents downstream if the watershed will not be protected
and maintained for watershed purposes.
"The foregoing considered, it is recommended that if possible, an alternate
area be allocated for the affected farmers, and that the Canlubang Estates
be mandated to protect and maintain the area in question as a permanent
watershed reserved."31

In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and
determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its
coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer
beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the temporary restraining order issued
on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final decision on the case.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most
important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important
human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water
for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property
but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an "intergenerational
responsibility" that needs to be answered now.
SECOND DIVISION

Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB
hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has slopes of 18% and
over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No. 6657, Section
10, provides:
"Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest
reserves, reforestration, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds
and mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production
centers, church sites and convents appurtenent thereto, communal burial
grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by
the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers, and
all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act."

GR. No. 132477

August 31, 2005

JOSE LUIS ROS ET AL

vs.
DAR, HON. ERNESTO GARILAO, in his capacity as DAR secretary, and DIR
JOSE LLAMES, in his capacity as director of DAR-Regional 7

Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed
parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP
because of its very high slopes.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili,

Balamban, Cebu. By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municipal
Council of Balamban, Cebu, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands.[1] On
03 April 1995, the Provincial Board of Cebu approved Balambans land use plan and
adopted en toto Balambans Municipal Ordinance No. 101 with the passage of
Resolution No. 836-95 and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8, respectively.[2] As part of
their preparation for the development of the subject lands as an industrial park,
petitioners secured all the necessary permits and appropriate government
certifications.[3]
Despite these permits and certifications, petitioner Matthias Mendezona received a
letter from Mr. Jose Llames, Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Regional Office for Region 7, informing him that the DAR was disallowing the
conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed him to cease and
desist from further developments on the land to avoid the incurrence of civil and
criminal liabilities.[4]
Petitioners were thus constrained to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo
City a Complaint dated 29 July 1996 for Injunction with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. T590.[5] In an order[6] dated 12 August 1996, the RTC, ruling that it is the DAR which
has jurisdiction, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.[7] It justified the
dismissal in this wise:
A perusal of Section 20 of the Local Government Code expressly
provides that the Municipalities through an Ordinance by the
Sanggunian may authorize the reclassification of the agricultural
land within their area into non-agricultural. Paragraph (e) of the
aforesaid Section, provides further: that nothing in this Section
shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the
provision of Republic Act 6657. In an opinion of the Secretary of
Justice, quoted: With respect of (sic) conversion of agricultural land
to non-agricultural uses the authority of the DAR to approve the
same may be exercise (sic) only from the date of the effectivity of
the Agrarian Reform Law on June 15, 1988. It appears that the
petitioners had applied for conversion on June 13, 1995 and
therefore the petitioner (sic) are estopped from questioning the
authority and jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
The application having been filed after June 15, 1988, the
reclassification by the Municipal Council of Balamban was just a
step in the conversion of the aforestated lands according to its
purpose. Executive Order No. 129-A, Section 5, The Department
shall be responsible for implementing Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform and for such purpose it is authorized to (J) approve or
disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural land into non-agricultural uses. Said Executive Order
amended Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3644 which clearly
mandates that the DAR Secretary (sic) approve or disapprove
conversion are not impliedly repealed. In fact, under Section 75 of
Republic Act 6657 the above laws and other laws not inconsistent
of (sic) this act shall have suppletory effect. Further, Section 68 of
Republic Act 6657 provides: No injunction, restraining order,
prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower court
against the Department of Agrarian Reform, DENR and
Department of Justice in their implementation of the program.
With this provision, it is therefore clear (sic) when there is conflict
of laws determining whether the Department of Agrarian Reform
has been exclusively empowered by law to approve land

conversion after June 15, 1988 and (sic) the final ruling falls only
with the Supreme Court or Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Application for
Restraining Order is hereby ordered DENIED and the main case is
DISMISSED, this Court having no jurisdiction over the same.[8]

In an order dated 18 September 1996, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners.[9] Petitioners filed before this Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[10] In a resolution[11] dated 11 November 1996,
this Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.[12] Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the said resolution but the same was denied in a resolution dated
27 January 1997.[13]
At the Court of Appeals, the public respondents were ordered[14] to file their
Comments on the petition. Two sets of comments from the public respondents, one
from the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Office[15] and another from the
Office of the Solicitor General,[16] were submitted, to which petitioners filed their
Consolidated Reply.[17]
On 02 December 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [18] affirming the
Order of Dismissal issued by the RTC.[19] A motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners was denied in a resolution dated 30 January 1998.[20]
Hence, this petition.
The following issues[21] are raised by the petitioners for resolution:
(a) Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to
industrial use by the Municipality of Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its
authority under Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991 (the LGC) has the effect of taking such
lands out of the coverage of the CARL and beyond the jurisdiction
of the DAR;
(b) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction may be dismissed
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction;
(c) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction is an appropriate
remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining development works
on the subject lands;
(d) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had
authority to issue a writ of injunction against the DAR.

In sum, petitioners are of the view that local governments have the power to
reclassify portions of their agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set forth in
Section 20[22][23]of the Local Government Code. According to them, if the
agricultural land sought to be reclassified by the local government is one which has
already been brought under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) and/or which has been distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, then
such reclassification must be confirmed by the DAR pursuant to its authority under
Section 6522 of the CARL, in order for the reclassification to become effective. If,

however, the land sought to be reclassified is not covered by the CARL and not
distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, then no confirmation from the DAR is
necessary in order for the reclassification to become effective as such case would
not fall within the DARs conversion authority. Stated otherwise, Section 65 of the
CARL does not, in all cases, grant the DAR absolute, sweeping and all-encompassing
power to approve or disapprove reclassifications or conversions of all agricultural
lands. Said section only grants the DAR exclusive authority to approve or disapprove
conversions of agricultural lands which have already been brought under the
coverage of the CARL and which have already been distributed to farmer
beneficiaries.
The petition lacks merit.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through
the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However,
agricultural lands already reclassified before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 are
exempted from conversion.

Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988. Municipal Ordinance No. 101 of
Balamban, Cebu, which reclassified the subject lands, was passed on 25 March
1992, and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board of Cebu, which
adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 101, was passed on 03 April 1995, long after Rep.
Act No. 6657 has taken effect. Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
...
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised
thereon.

Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, provides:

. . . True, the DARs express power over land use conversion is
limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded have,
after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and
the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes. But to suggest that these are
the only instances when the DAR can require conversion
clearances would open a loophole in R.A. No. 6657, which every
landowner may use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform
program. Hence, it should logically follow from the said
departments express duty and function to execute and enforce the
said statute that any reclassification of a private land as a
residential, commercial or industrial property should first be
cleared by the DAR.

The requirement that agricultural lands must go through the process of conversion
despite having undergone reclassification was underscored in the case of Alarcon v.
Court of Appeals,[24] where it was held that reclassification of land does not suffice:
In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject
landholding was merely reclassified. Conversion is different from
reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use
of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by
the Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other
hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the
requirements and procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly,
a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically
allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment
of the tenants. He has to undergo the process of conversion before
he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.

To further clarify any doubt on its authority, the DAR issued Administrative Order No.
12 dated October 1994 which reads:
Administrative Order No. 12
Series of 1994
SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED AND REVISED RULES AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING CONVERSION OF ARICULTURAL
LANDS TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USES
I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
The guiding principles on land use conversion is to
preserve prime agricultural lands. On the other hand,
conversion of agricultural lands, when coinciding with the
objectives of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law to
promote social justice, industrialization, and the optimum
use of land as a national resource for public welfare, shall
be pursued in a speedy and judicious manner.
To rationalize these principles, and by virtue of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3844, as amended, Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 27, P.D. No. 946, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129A and R.A. No. 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) has issued several policy guidelines to regulate land
use conversion. This Administrative Order consolidates
and revises all existing implementing guidelines issued by
the DAR, taking into consideration, other Presidential
issuances and national policies related to land use
conversion.

II. LEGAL MANDATE

A.

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is

mandated to approve or disapprove applications
for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses,
pursuant to Section 4(i) of Executive Order No.
129-A, Series of 1987.

B.

Section 5(i) of E.O. No. 129-A, Series of 1987,

vests in the DAR, exclusive authority to approve
or disapprove applications for conversion of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial,
industrial, and other land uses.

C.

D.

Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known

as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize
under certain conditions, the reclassification or
conversion of agricultural lands.
Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54,
Series of 1993 of the Office of the President,
provides that action on applications for land use
conversion on individual landholdings shall
remain as the responsibility of the DAR, which
shall utilize as its primary reference, documents
on the comprehensive land use plans and
accompanying ordinances passed upon and
approved by the local government units
concerned, together with the National Land Use
Policy, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No.
129-A.

III. DEFINITION OF TERMS

A. Agricultural land refers to land devoted to agricultural
activity and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land
(Section 3[c], R.A. No. 6657).
B. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a
piece of agricultural land into some other use.
C. Reclassification of agricultural lands is the act of
specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized
for non-agricultural uses such as residential,
industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land
use plan. It also includes the reversion of nonagricultural lands to agricultural use.
...
V. COVERAGE
These rules shall cover all private agricultural lands as
defined herein regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced. It shall also include agricultural
lands reclassified by LGUs into non-agricultural uses, after

June 15, 1988, pursuant to Memorandum Circular (M.C.)

No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President and
those proposed to be used for livestock, poultry and swine
raising as provided in DAR Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1993.
In the case of Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,[25] we held:
Our ruling in the Natalia case was reiterated in National Housing
Authority v. Allarde (318 SCRA 22 [1999]).
The Court of Appeals reliance on DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of
1990, is in order. In the said opinion, the Secretary of Justice
declared, viz:
Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view that with
respect to conversions of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No.
6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve
such conversions may be exercised from the date of the laws
effectivity on June 15, 1988. This conclusion is based on a liberal
interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DARs mandate and
extensive coverage of the agrarian reform program.
Following the DOJ opinion, the DAR issued Administrative Order
No. 6, Series of 1994, stating that lands already classified as nonagricultural before the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6657 no longer
needed any conversion clearance:

I. Prefatory Statement
In order to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances,
based on DOJ Opinion No. 44, the following guidelines are being
issued for the guidance of the DAR and the public in general.
II. Legal Basis
Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657 states that agricultural lands refers to the
land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 has ruled
that, with respect to the conversion of agricultural lands covered
by RA No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to
approve such conversion may be exercised from the date of its
effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands that are already
classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before 15 June
1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.

The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by

Rep. Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of
the Local Government Code. The Code explicitly provides[26] that nothing in this

section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of

Rep. Act No. 6657.
It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the
complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This Court, in Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. De
Villena,[27] found occasion to reiterate the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from
resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For
agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their

implementation of the program.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42666 dated 02 December
1997 affirming the order dated 12 August 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. T-590 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2)
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources. This law divested the
regional trial courts of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian
reform matters.
Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all
agrarian reform matters. The pertinent provision reads:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby
vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources.
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence
but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or
controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in
accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case.
Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to
achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every
action or proceeding before it. . . .

Finally, the third and fourth issues which may be summed up into whether or not an
injunction is the appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining
petitioners in developing the subject land, we rule in the negative. Section 68 of Rep.
Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue
Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or
mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of
Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural

FIRST DIVISION
GR. No. 183409 June 18, 2010
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC (CREBA)
VS
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the
enforcement of Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No.
01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 05-07,1[1] and DAR Memorandum No. 88,2[2] for
having been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the
aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.
Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized

1
2

and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella
organization of some 3,500 private corporations, partnerships, single proprietorships
and individuals directly or indirectly involved in land and housing development,
building and infrastructure construction, materials production and supply, and
services in the various related fields of engineering, architecture, community
planning and development financing. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named
respondent as he is the duly appointive head of the DAR whose administrative
issuances are the subject of this petition.

Thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended certain

provisions8[8] of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly
addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.

The Antecedent Facts

By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of

housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment
and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner
and its members but more so of the whole nation.

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No.

07-97,3[3] entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, which consolidated all existing
implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The aforesaid rules
embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands
reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15
June 1988.

To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate
development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88
on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all
land use conversion applications.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued

DAR AO No. 01-99,4[4] entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses, amending and updating the previous
rules on land use conversion. Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands,
to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional
and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of
agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond the effect of which is
to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that
previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial,
industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 66575[5] on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 206[6] of Republic Act No.
71607[7] and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such
uses.

In its Memorandum, petitioner posits the following issues:

I.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS
THAT HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL,
INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES.
II.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION AND GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY ISSUING
AND ENFORCING [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] WHICH SEEK
TO REGULATE RECLASSIFIED LANDS.

On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another

Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled 2002 Comprehensive Rules on
Land Use Conversion, which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 0199, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 0102 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or
to another agricultural use.

III.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE
LOCAL AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.

3
IV.

WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE DUE

PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE[S] OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

V.

6
7

WHETHER MEMORANDUM NO. 88 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE

POWER.9[9]
The subject of the submission that the DAR Secretary gravely abused his
discretion is AO No. 01-02, as amended, which states:
Section 3. Applicability of Rules. These guidelines shall
apply to all applications for conversion, from agricultural to nonagricultural uses or to another agricultural use, such as:
xxxx
3.4
Conversion of agricultural lands or areas that
have been reclassified by the LGU or by way of a Presidential
Proclamation, to residential, commercial, industrial, or other nonagricultural uses on or after the effectivity of RA 6657 on 15
June 1988, x x x. [Emphasis supplied].
Petitioner holds that under Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No.
8435,10[10] the term agricultural lands refers to lands devoted to or suitable for the
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock,
poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm
activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by a person whether natural or juridical, and not classified by the
law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. When the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, however, issued DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, he included in
the definition of agricultural lands lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988. In
effect, lands reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or
other non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural
lands for purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. In so doing, petitioner
avows that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction as he has no
authority to expand or enlarge the legal signification of the term agricultural lands
through DAR AO No. 01-02. Being a mere administrative issuance, it must conform
to the statute it seeks to implement, i.e., Republic Act No. 6657, or to the
Constitution, otherwise, its validity or constitutionality may be questioned.
In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was
made in violation of Section 6511[11] of Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to other
agricultural uses, such as the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have
been reclassified by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988.
According to petitioner, there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in
any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to
require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion
authority. Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, the

Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner further asseverates that Section 2.19, 12[12] Article I of DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, making reclassification of agricultural lands subject to the
requirements and procedure for land use conversion, violates Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 7160, because it was not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall
be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or that the DARs approval or
clearance must be secured to effect reclassification. The said Section 2.19 of DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local
autonomy under Section 25,13[13] Article II and Section 2,14[14] Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
Petitioner similarly avers that the promulgation and enforcement of DAR AO No. 0102, as amended, constitute deprivation of liberty and property without due process
of law. There is deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law
because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DARs
jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from
legitimate use on pain of administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is
discrimination and violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased in favor of the
peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society.
As its final argument, petitioner avows that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is not
a valid exercise of police power for it is the prerogative of the legislature and that it
is unconstitutional because it suspended the land use conversion without any basis.
The Courts Ruling
This petition must be dismissed.
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.15[15]
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,16[16] citing People v. Cuaresma,17[17] this Court
made the following pronouncements:

12
13
14

15

10

16

11

17

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of

certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals,
and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum
for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for
that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out
in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Courts docket.18[18] (Emphasis supplied.)

registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec. Zamora, 24[24] on status
and existence of a public office; and (e) Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona,25[25] on the socalled Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President which modified the approval
of the conversion to agro-industrial area.26[26]
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently
set forth special and important reasons to justify direct recourse to this
Court and why this Court should give due course to this petition in the first
instance, hereby failing to fulfill the conditions set forth in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v.
Melicor.27[27] The present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of
Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do
so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this petition.
Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari,
in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or
illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No.
88. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a Petition for Declaratory Relief over which this
Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. 28[28] Section 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1)Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the
precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to
be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a
trier of facts.19[19]

(2)

This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts,
and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest
and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ
of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. 20[20]
Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the
following cases: (a) Chavez v. Romulo,21[21] on citizens right to bear arms; (b)
Government of [the] United States of America v. Hon. Purganan, 22[22] on bail in
extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections v. Judge Quijano-Padilla,23[23]
on government contract involving modernization and computerization of voters

Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on

appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
(a)

23

18

24

19

25

20

26

21

27

22

28

All
cases
in
which
the
constitutionality or validity of any
treaty,
international
or
executive
agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation,
order,
instruction,

ordinance, or regulation is
question. (Emphasis supplied.)

in

With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not
have original jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only questions
of law are involved.

implement the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. In the
process, he neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto
himself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. A Petition for
Certiorari is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit on this matter, viz.:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment must be rendered annulling
or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer.

Even if the petitioner has properly observed the doctrine of judicial

hierarchy, this Petition is still dismissible.
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within
the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.29[29]
The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1)
the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.30[30]
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction
means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is
not authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the
conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it
are wanting.31[31] Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or
authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or
with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority. 32
[32] Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.33[33]
In the case before this Court, the petitioner fails to meet the abovementioned requisites for the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform in issuing the assailed DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, as well as Memorandum No. 88 did so in accordance with his mandate to

29
30
31

A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where

it has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties
are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the
rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which
applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x
x required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.34[34]
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed
with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights
of the contending parties.35[35]
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance
and enforcement by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No.
01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of his quasilegislative and administrative functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
In issuing the aforesaid administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
never made any adjudication of rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said
that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 0102, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised any judicial or
quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and administrative functions.
Furthermore, as this Court has previously discussed, the instant petition in
essence seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of
the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. Thus, the
adequate and proper remedy for the petitioner therefor is to file a Petition for
Declaratory Relief, which this Court has only appellate and not original jurisdiction. It
is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances

32

34

33

35

unconstitutional and illegal because certiorari is confined only to the determination

of the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to declare the aforesaid
administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal. Emphasis must be given to the
fact that the writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never
issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.36[36]
At any rate, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the
instant petition should still be dismissed.
Executive Order No. 129-A37[37] vested upon the DAR the responsibility of
implementing the CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the successful
implementation of the CARP, Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorized the
DAR to establish and promulgate operational policies, rules and regulations
and priorities for agrarian reform implementation. Section 4(k) thereof
authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring
or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses. Similarly,
Section 5(l) of the same executive order has given the DAR the exclusive
authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for
residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided
for by law. Section 7 of the aforesaid executive order clearly provides that the
authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the [DAR] and the
discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform x x x.
Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June
1988 have been included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in
the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules
and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the authority
to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the
definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers
to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to nonagricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context
of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.
More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which
Opinion has been recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified that
after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been
given the authority to approve land conversion. 38[38] Concomitant to such authority,
therefore, is the authority to include in the definition of agricultural lands lands not
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses
before 15 June 1988 for purposes of land use conversion.

In the same vein, the authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to

include lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands finds
basis in jurisprudence. In Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform,39[39] this Court has
enunciated that after the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, agricultural lands,
though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion,
jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands, which are
already reclassified before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 which is 15 June
1988, are exempted from conversion. 40[40] It bears stressing that the said date of
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 served as the cut-off period for automatic
reclassifications or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR
conversion clearance or authority. 41[41] It necessarily follows that any
reclassification made thereafter can be the subject of DARs conversion authority.
Having recognized the DARs conversion authority over lands reclassified after 15
June 1988, it can no longer be argued that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform was
wrongfully given the authority and power to include lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June
1988 in the definition of agricultural lands. Such inclusion does not unduly expand
or enlarge the definition of agricultural lands; instead, it made clear what are the
lands that can be the subject of DARs conversion authority, thus, serving the very
purpose of the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.
The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in
violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those nonawarded lands and reclassified lands by the LGUs or by way of Presidential
Proclamations on or after 15 June 1988 is specious. As explained in Department of
Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, it is true that the DARs express power over
land use conversion provided for under Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is
limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded have, after five years,
ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the
locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes. To suggest, however, that these are
the only instances that the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a
loophole in Republic Act No. 6657 which every landowner may use to evade
compliance with the agrarian reform program. It should logically follow, therefore,
from the said departments express duty and function to execute and enforce the
said statute that any reclassification of a private land as a residential, commercial or
industrial property, on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June
1988 should first be cleared by the DAR.42[42]
This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals 43[43] that reclassification of
lands does not suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ from each other.
Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into

39
40

36

41

37

42

38

43

some other use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of
specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to
the requirements and procedures for land use conversion. In view thereof, a mere
reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to
change its use. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted
to use the agricultural land for other purposes.44[44]
It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and
conversion that agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion
before they can be used for the purpose to which they are intended.
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DARs conversion
authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15
June 1988.45[45] The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic
reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR
conversion clearance or authority.46[46] Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural
lands is already subject to DARs conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not
suffice to use the agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to
change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands.
It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done by the
LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations because either way they must still
undergo conversion process. It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands
shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not automatically convert
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other purposes. As explained in DAR
Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 1994, cited in the 2009 case of Roxas &
Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW and the Department of Agrarian Reform,47[47]
reclassification of lands denotes their allocation into some specific use and providing
for the manner of their utilization and disposition or the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential,
industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan. For reclassified
agricultural lands, therefore, to be used for the purpose to which they are intended
there is still a need to change the current use thereof through the process of
conversion. The authority to do so is vested in the DAR, which is mandated to
preserve and maintain agricultural lands with increased productivity. Thus,
notwithstanding the reclassification of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses,
they must still undergo conversion before they can be used for other purposes.
Even reclassification of agricultural lands by way of Presidential
Proclamations to non-agricultural uses, such as school sites, needs conversion
clearance from the DAR. We reiterate that reclassification is different from

conversion. Reclassification alone will not suffice and does not automatically allow
the landowner to change its use. It must still undergo conversion process before the
landowner can use such agricultural lands for such purpose. 48[48] Reclassification of
agricultural lands is one thing, conversion is another. Agricultural lands that are
reclassified to non-agricultural uses do not ipso facto allow the landowner thereof to
use the same for such purpose. Stated differently, despite having reclassified into
school sites, the landowner of such reclassified agricultural lands must apply for
conversion before the DAR in order to use the same for the said purpose.
Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of
Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must undergo the
process of conversion, despite having undergone reclassification, before agricultural
lands may be used for other purposes.
It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public
agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose,
i.e., public school, etc., because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary.
As held in Republic v. Estonilo,49[49] only a positive act of the President is needed to
segregate or reserve a piece of land of the public domain for a public purpose. As
such, reservation of public agricultural lands for public use or purpose in effect
converted the same to such use without undergoing any conversion process and
that they must be actually, directly and exclusively used for such public purpose for
which they have been reserved, otherwise, they will be segregated from the
reservations and transferred to the DAR for distribution to qualified beneficiaries
under the CARP.50[50] More so, public agricultural lands already reserved for public
use or purpose no longer form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture.51[51] Hence, they are outside the coverage of
the CARP and it logically follows that they are also beyond the conversion authority
of the DAR.
Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) including lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June
1988 in the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended,
and; (2) issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, subjecting to DARs
jurisdiction for conversion lands which had already been reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988.
Similarly, DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the
reclassification of agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of
land use conversion procedure or that DARs approval or clearance must be secured
to effect reclassification, did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs.

44

48

45

49

46

50

47

51

Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 states that:

SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or
municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian
after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the
reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of
their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the
land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2)
where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by
the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification
shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural
land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
xxxx
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent
(5%): Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to
agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered
Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, shall not be affected by
the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into
other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
xxxx
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as
repealing, amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of
R.A. No. 6657.
The aforequoted provisions of law show that the power of the LGUs to
reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute. The authority of the DAR to approve
conversion of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural
uses has been validly recognized by said Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 by
explicitly providing therein that, nothing in this section shall be construed as
repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, does not also violate the due process
clause, as well as the equal protection clause of the Constitution. In providing
administrative and criminal penalties in the said administrative order, the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform simply implements the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of
Republic Act No. 6657, thus:
Sec. 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. The following are
prohibited:
xxxx
(c) The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural
land into any non-agricultural use with intent to avoid the
application of this Act to his landholdings and to disposes his
tenant farmers of the land tilled by them;
xxxx
(f) The sale, transfer or conveyance by a beneficiary of
the right to use or any other usufructuary right over the land he

acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to circumvent

the provisions of this Act.
xxxx
Sec. 74. Penalties. Any person who knowingly or
willfully violates the provisions of this Act shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) month to not more than
three (3) years or a fine of not less than one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) and not more than fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.
If the offender is a corporation or association, the officer responsible therefor shall
be criminally liable.
And Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8435, which specifically provides:
Sec. 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature
Conversion. x x x.
Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion
shall be penalized with imprisonment of two (2) to six (6) years, or
a fine equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the
government's investment cost, or both, at the discretion of the
court, and an accessory penalty of forfeiture of the land and any
improvement thereon.
In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties,
after determining, in an administrative proceedings, that violation
of this law has been committed:
a. Consolation or withdrawal of the authorization for land
use conversion; and
b. Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and
subsequent conversion applications that they may file with the
DAR.
Contrary to petitioners assertions, the administrative and criminal penalties
provided for under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, are imposed upon the illegal or
premature conversion of lands within DARs jurisdiction, i.e., lands not reclassified
as residential, commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural uses before 15
June 1998.
The petitioners argument that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is unconstitutional,
as it suspends the land use conversion without any basis, stands on hollow ground.
It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the
instruction of the President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime
agricultural lands for real estate development because of the worsening rice
shortage in the country at that time. Such measure was made in order to ensure
that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice cultivation and production may
be carried into. The issuance of said Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the
general welfare of the public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any
basis.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 131457

August 19, 1999

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON.

REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO
D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely, respondents' and intervenors'
separate motions for reconsideration of our Resolution dated November 17, 1998, as
well as their motions to refer this case to this Court En banc.
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated
November 17, 1998, wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for
reconsideration of our earlier Decision or April 24, 1998, as a result of which the
Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said motions for
reconsideration inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the Court
sitting en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution. Respondents
and intervenors also assail our Resolution dated January 27, 1999, wherein we noted
without action the intervenors' "Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The
Matter To The Court En Banc" filed on December 3, 1998, on the following
considerations, to wit:
the movants have no legal personality to further seek redress before the
Court after their motion for leave to intervene in this case was denied in the
April 24, 1998 Decision. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration of the
said decision, with a prayer to resolve the motion to the Court En Banc, was
also denied in the November 17, 1998 Resolution of the Court. Besides,
their aforesaid motion of December 3, 1998 is in the nature of a second
motion for reconsideration which is a forbidden motion (Section 2, Rule 52
in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). The
impropriety of movants' December 3, 1998 motion becomes all the more
glaring considering that all the respondents in this case did not anymore
join them (movants) ill seeking a reconsideration of the November 17, 1998
Resolution.1

Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their
"Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For
Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For
Issuance Of A Restraining Order)" on December 3, 1998, accompanied by a
"Manifestation and Motion"2 and a copy of the Registered Mail Bill3 evidencing filing
of the said motion for reconsideration to this Court by registered mail.1wphi1.nt
In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and intervenors
pray that this case be referred to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as
their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were
resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three,
was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this
Court en banc, relying on the following constitutional provision:
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc:
Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the Court sitting en banc.4
A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the
intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and
matters, on the other hand, such that cases are "decided" while matters, which
include motions, are "resolved". Otherwise put, the word "decided" must refer to
"cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters", applying the rule of
reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the abovequoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution
where these words appear.5
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred
to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required
three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence,
the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not
"matter". The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains
to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no
decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc.
On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing
party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the
motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is
still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the
division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the
voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is
not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of
this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
It is the movants' further contention in support of their plea for the referral of this
case to the Court en banc that the issues submitted in their separate motions are of

first impression. In the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Antonio M. Martinez during the
resolution of the motions for reconsideration on November 17, 1998, the following
was expressed:
Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of
no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court En Banc.
Specifically, the issue of whether or not the power of the local government
units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer
novel, this having been decided by this Court in the case of Province of
Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held that local
government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or
reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The dispositive
portion of the Decision in the aforecited case states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision
of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the
trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondent's property (b) orders the trial
court to suspended the exportation proceedings; and (c) requires
the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private
respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
xxx

xxx

x x x(Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a

unanimous vote of all five (5) members of the Second Division of this Court,
Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of the opinion that the matters
raised by movants are nothing new and do not deserve the consideration of
the Court en banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court in the resolution
of movants' motions for reconsideration would be inappropriate.6
The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispose
of the earlier motions for reconsideration of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is
flawed. Consequently, the present motions for reconsideration necessarily partake of
the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which, according to the clear and
unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is prohibited.
True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even
then, we have ruled that such second motions for reconsideration must be filed with
express leave of court first obtained.7 In this case, not only did movants fail to ask
for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that
there are exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for
reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court
en banc, the motions subject of this resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the
motions for reconsideration which have been denied in the Resolution of November
17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations contained therein have already been raised
before and passed upon by this Court in the said Resolution.

The crux of the controversy is the validity of the "Win-Win" Resolution dated
November 7, 1997. We maintain that the same is void and of no legal effect
considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President had
already become final and executory even prior to the filing of the motion for
reconsideration which became the basis of the said "Win-Win" Resolution. This
ruling, quite understandably, sparked a litany of protestations on the part of
respondents and intervenors including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of the
rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching
effects, the case was disposed of on a technicality. The situation, however, is not as
simple as what the movants purport it to be. While it may be true that on its face the
nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule
pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for reconsideration, the
underlying consideration therefor was the protection of the substantive rights of
petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban are quoted in
the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, viz.: "Just as a losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case." 8
In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested
appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of
Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be benefited by the
development of the property. The issue in this case, therefore, is not a question of
technicality but of substance and merit.9
Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule once
and for all on the legal standing of intervenors in this case. In their present motions,
intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they have
already been issued certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while
they are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been identified by the
DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property. These arguments are, however,
nothing new as in fact they have already been raised in intervenors' earlier motion
for reconsideration of our April 24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion
of Mr. Justice Martinez, intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal
farmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantive interest over the subject land
inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. Rather, their right is limited only to
a just share of the fruits of the land.10 Moreover, the "Win-Win" Resolution itself
states that the qualified beneficiaries have yet to be carefully and meticulously
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform.11 Absent any definitive finding of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested
with sufficient interest in the controversy as to be qualified to intervene in this case.
Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite
standing in view of the nullity of the "Win-Win" Resolution. No legal rights can
emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following incidents, namely: intervenors'
"Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc,"
dated December 3, 1998; respondents' "Motion For Reconsideration Of The
Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This
Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order),"
dated December 2, 1998; and intervenors' "Urgent Omnibus Motion For The
Supreme Court Sitting En Banc To Annul The Second Division's Resolution Dated 27
January 1999 And Immediately Resolve The 28 May 1998 Motion For Reconsideration

Filed By The Intervenors," dated March 2, 1999; are all DENIED with FINALITY. No
further motion, pleading, or paper will be entertained in this case.

SO ORDERED.