Jurisdiction of Comelec and Local Election Disputes

JURIS DISCIPULUS
CASE# 1
G.R. No. 90336. August 12, 1991.*
RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS AND
GOVERNOR LEANDRO VERCELES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Election Law; The jurisdiction of
the Comelec is over popular elections, the elected officials of which are
determined through the will of the electorate.The Court agrees with the
Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular elections, the
elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. An
election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote. Specifically, the term election, in the context of the Constitution,
may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of
the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes which do not
characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay. Election
contests would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title
or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the
winner, is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute and
in the case of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the
proclamation of the winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed. The
jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up
of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong
barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective
members. The COMELEC exercises only appellate jurisdiction over election contests
involving elective barangay officials decided by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial
Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of the COMELEC over
the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of
the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular
level conducted by their own respective organization.
Same; Same; Same; Election protest of officers of the katipunan ng mga
barangay; The Secretary of Local Government has no power to assume
jurisdiction over election protest involving officers of the katipunan ng
mga barangay.Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general
supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that respondent
Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of
the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him
more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control
over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely
democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the
basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy
may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be
ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES
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presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the
Department with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the
limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments.
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments.
This state policy is echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that
the State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. To
deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the
elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy
of promoting the autonomy of local governments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The respondent Secretary not having the
jurisdiction to hear election protest involving officers of the FABC, the
recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts.Thus, the Court holds that
in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by respondent Governor and
declaring the election of the officers of the FABC on June 18, 1989 as null and void,
the respondent Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The respondent
Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers of
the FABC, the recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial
Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The respondent Governor has the personality
to file the protest.As regards the second issue raised by petitioner, the Court
finds that respondent Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section
205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang
panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the
said sanggunian, and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the
kabataang barangay provincial federation. The governor acts as the presiding
officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an interest in the election of the officers
of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If the
president of the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable circumstances
and is allowed to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan, the official actions of the
sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Hence,
respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of
the officers of the FABC.
Same; Same; Same; Law on Public Officers; The President of the
Philippines or his alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, has no
authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification
to be president of the federation of barangay councils.In the present
controversy involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the law is likewise explicit. To
be appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in the sangguniang
panlalawigan is the president of the katipunang panlalawigan. The appointee must
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meet the qualifications set by law. The appointing power is bound by law to comply
with the requirements as to the basic qualifications of the appointee to the
sangguniang panlalawigan. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the
Secretary of Local Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who does not
meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay
councils. Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is a member of
the federation but he was not even present during the elections despite notice. The
argument that Antonio was appointed as a remedial measure in the exigency of the
service cannot be sustained. Since Antonio does not meet the basic qualification of
being president of the federation, his appointment to the sangguniang panlalawigan
is not justified notwithstanding that such appointment is merely in a temporary
capacity. If the intention of the respondent Secretary was to protect the interests of
the federation in the sanggunian, he should have appointed the incumbent FABC
President in a hold-over capacity. For even under the guidelines, the term of office of
officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the date of their election until
their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified, without prejudice to the
terms of their appointments as members of the sanggunian to which they may be
correspondingly appointed. Since the election is still under protest such that no
successor of the incumbent has as yet qualified, the respondent Secretary has no
choice but to have the incumbent FABC President sit as member of the sanggunian.
He could even have appointed petitioner since he was elected the president of the
federation but not Antonio. The appointment of Antonio, allegedly the protege of
respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioners charge of political interference
by respondent Governor in the organization. This should not be allowed. The
barangays should be insulated from any partisan activity or political intervention if
only to give true meaning to local autonomy.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 90336 August 12, 1991

RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS and GOVERNOR LEANDRO VERCELES, respondents.
Balgos & Perez and Bugaring, Tugonon & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
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Juan G. Atencia for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:p
The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local Government over the katipunan ng mga
barangay or the barangay councils is brought to the fore in this case.
On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes,
composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of the Association of Barangay
Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members in
attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers.
Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente Avila of Virac,
Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran and Manuel Torres of Baras. The Board of
Election Supervisors/Consultants was composed of Provincial Government Operation Officer
(PGOO) Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as Chairman with Provincial Treasurer Luis A. Manlapaz, Jr. and
Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold Soquerata as members.
When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the
Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out.
The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding officer. Chosen
as members of the Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob and Sales.
Thereafter, the following were elected officers of the FABC:
President Ruperto Taule
Vice-President Allan Aquino
Secretary Vicente Avila
Treasurer Fidel Jacob
Auditor Leo Sales 1
On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to
respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,* protesting the election of the officers of the FABC
and seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.
In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of the
FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of respondent Governor denying the alleged
irregularities and denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in the election of
FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same time requesting for his
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appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected
President of the FABC in Catanduanes. 3
On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of
the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early
as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local
Government. 4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 4, 1989 but it was denied by
respondent Secretary in his resolution of September 5, 1989. 5
In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent
Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1) Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election
protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of
Barangay Councils;
2) Whether or not the respondent Governor has the legal personality to file an
election protest;
3) Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest,
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in nullifying the election;
The Katipunan ng mga Barangay is the organization of all sangguniang barangays in the following
levels: in municipalities to be known as katipunang bayan; in cities, katipunang panlungsod; in
provinces, katipunang panlalawigan; in regions, katipunang pampook; and on the national
level, katipunan ng mga barangay. 6
The Local Government Code provides for the manner in which the katipunan ng mga barangay at all
levels shall be organized:
Sec. 110. Organization. (1) The katipunan at all levels shall be organized in the
following manner:
(a) The katipunan in each level shall elect a board of directors and a set of officers.
The president of each level shall represent the katipunan concerned in the next
higher level of organization.
(b) The katipunan ng mga barangay shall be composed of the katipunang pampook,
which shall in turn be composed of the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan
and the katipunang panlungsod. The presidents of the katipunang bayan in each
province shall constitute the katipunang panlalawigan. The katipunang panlungsod
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and the katipunang bayan shall be composed of the punong barangays of cities and
municipalities, respectively.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local Government Code
empowering him to "promulgate in detail the implementing circulars and the rules and regulations to
carry out the various administrative actions required for the initial implementation of this Code in
such a manner as will ensure the least disruption of on-going programs and projects 7 issued
Department of Local Government Circular No. 89-09 on April 7, 1989, 8 to provide the guidelines for the
conduct of the elections of officers of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay at the municipal, city, provincial,
regional and national levels.
It is now the contention of petitioner that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon
the respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC,
the katipunan ng mga barangay at the provincial level. It is petitioner's theory that under Article IX, C,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective barangay officials.
On the other hand, it is the opinion of the respondent Secretary that any violation of the guidelines
as set forth in said circular would be a ground for filing a protest and would vest upon the
Department jurisdiction to resolve any protest that may be filed in relation thereto.
Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on Elections shall
exercise "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." The 1987
Constitution expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by granting it appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. 9
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to
appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, 10 the sworn petition contesting
the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office within 10
days after the proclamation of the results. A voter may also contest the election of any barangay officer on
the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines by filing a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court within 10 days after the proclamation of the results
of the election. 11 Only appeals from decisions of inferior courts on election matters as aforestated may be
decided by the COMELEC.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular
elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election
is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. 12 It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. 13 Specifically, the term
"election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
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voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes 14 which do not
characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay. "Election contests" would refer to
adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made
before or after proclamation of the winner, is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in
dispute 15 and in the case of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the
proclamation of the winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed. 16
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the
katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law
whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The COMELEC exercises only
appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials decided by the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of the
COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the
representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their
own respective organization. 17
However, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest
involving the election of officers of the FABC.
There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth
in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.
Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, See. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987,
** the
respondent Secretary has the power to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the
general supervision of local government units and on the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units."
Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided in See. 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the
Administrative Code, to wit:
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives,
policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;
Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by respondent Secretary in pursuance of his rule-making
power conferred by law and which now has the force and effect of law. 18
Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests jurisdiction upon the
respondent Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in relation thereto and consequently
declare an election null and void.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative
agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers. 19 The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is
dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon
themselves. 20 Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations. 21
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication
conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an
election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. An understanding of the extent
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of authority of the Secretary over local governments is therefore necessary if We are to resolve the
issue at hand.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general
supervision 22"to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 23 The general supervision is
exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government. 24
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of
checking whether said local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the
same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. 25 Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority
over such body. 26
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over
local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or
regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will
give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over
local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan
activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that
the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be
conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department
with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power
to general supervision over local governments. 27
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. 28 This state policy is
echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that "the State shall guarantee and promote
the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." 29 To
deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the elections of officers of
the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local
governments.
Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other
issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local
government units of such issuances. 30 To monitor means "to watch, observe or check. 31 This is
compatible with the power of supervision of the Secretary over local governments which as earlier
discussed is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local Government Code which grants
the Secretary power to issue implementing circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how these
issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and not control
over local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG Circular. 32 Any
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doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor
of the greater autonomy of the local government.
Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by respondent
Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the FABC on June 18, 1989 as null and void,
the respondent Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The respondent Secretary not having
the jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of the parties
is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the
protest. 33
The provision in DLG Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG Circular No. 89-09 which states that
"whenever the guidelines are not substantially complied with, the election shall be declared null and
void by the Department of Local Government and an election shall conduct and being invoked by the
Solicitor General cannot be applied. DLG Circular No. 89-15 was issued on July 3, 1989 after the
June 18, 1989 elections of the FABC officers and it is the rule in statutory construction that laws,
including circulars and regulations 34 cannot be applied retrospectively.35 Moreover, such provision is null
and void for having been issued in excess of the respondent Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch as an
administrative authority cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself.
As regards the second issue raised by petitioner, the Court finds that respondent Governor has the
personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of
the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the
said sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang
barangay provincial federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlalawigan. 36
As presiding officer of the sagguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an interest in the
election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly.
If the president of the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable circumstances and is
allowed to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan the official actions of the sanggunian may be
vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Hence, respondent governor is a proper party to
question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
As to the third issue raised by petitioner, the Court has already ruled that the respondent Secretary
has no jurisdiction to hear the protest and nullify the elections.
Nevertheless, the Court holds that the issue of the validity of the elections should now be resolved in
order to prevent any unnecessary delay that may result from the commencement of an appropriate
action by the parties.
The elections were declared null and void primarily for failure to comply with Section 2.4 of DLG
Circular No. 89-09 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the VicePresident shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." The rule
specifically provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or Vice-President who shall preside
over the meeting. The word "shall" should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., it must be
imperative or mandatory and not merely
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permissive, 37 as the rule is explicit and requires no other interpretation. If it had been intended that any
other official should preside, the rules would have provided so, as it did in the elections at the town and
city levels 38 as well as the regional level.. 39
It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the
meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a clear violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision. On
this ground, the elections should be nullified.
Under Sec. 2.3.2.7 of the same circular it is provided that a Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants shall be constituted to oversee and/or witness the canvassing of votes and
proclamation of winners. The rules confine the role of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants
to merely overseeing and witnessing the conduct of elections. This is consistent with the provision in
the Local Government Code limiting the authority of the COMELEC to the supervision of the
election. 40
In case at bar, PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the Board, presided over the elections. There was
direct participation by the Chairman of the Board in the elections contrary to what is dictated by the
rules. Worse, there was no Board of Election Supervisors to oversee the elections in view of the walk
out staged by its two other members, the Provincial COMELEC Supervisor and the Provincial
Treasurer. The objective of keeping the election free and honest was therefore compromised.
The Court therefore finds that the election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and
void for failure to comply with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.
Meanwhile, pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed a supplemental petition alleging that
public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated
Augusto Antonio as temporary representative of the Federation to the sangguniang panlalawigan of
Catanduanes. 41 By virtue of this memorandum, respondent governor swore into said office Augusto
Antonio on June 14, 1990. 42
The Solicitor General filed his comment on the supplemental petition
the Court dated September 13,1990.
43
as required by the resolution of
In his comment, the Solicitor General dismissed the supervening event alleged by petitioner as
something immaterial to the petition. He argues that Antonio's appointment was merely temporary
"until such time that the provincial FABC president in that province has been elected, appointed and
qualified." 44 He stresses that Antonio's appointment was only a remedial measure designed to cope with
the problems brought about by the absence of a representative of the FABC to the "sanggunian ang
panlalawigan."
Sec. 205 (2) of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) provides(2) The sangguniang panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, the vicegovernor, elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents of the
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katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial federation who shall
be appointed by the President of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, under Sec. 2 likewise states:
xxx xxx xxx
The sangguniang panlalawigan of each province shall be composed of the governor
as chairman and presiding officer, the vice-governor as presiding officer pro tempore,
the elective sangguniang panlalawigan members, and the appointive members
consisting of the president of the provincial association of barangay councils, and the
president of the provincial federation of the kabataang barangay. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Ignacio vs. Banate Jr. 45 the Court, interpreting similarly worded provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 on the composition of the sangguniang panlungsod, 46 declared as null
and void the appointment of private respondent Leoncio Banate Jr. as member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Roxas representing thekatipunang panlungsod ng mga barangay for he lacked
the elegibility and qualification required by law, not being a barangay captain and for not having been
elected president of the association of barangay councils. The Court held that an unqualified person
cannot be appointed a member of the sanggunian, even in an acting capacity. In Reyes vs. Ferrer, 47 the
appointment of Nemesio L. Rasgo Jr. as representative of the youth sector to the sangguniang
panlungsod of Davao City was declared invalid since he was never the president of the kabataang
barangay city federation as required by Sec. 173, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337.
In the present controversy involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the law is likewise explicit. To be
appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan is the president
of the katipunang panlalawigan. The appointee must meet the qualifications set by law. 48 The
appointing power is bound by law to comply with the requirements as to the basic qualifications of the
appointee to the sangguniang panlalawigan. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the
Secretary of Local Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum
qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.
Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is a member of the federation but he was
not even present during the elections despite notice. The argument that Antonio was appointed as a
remedial measure in the exigency of the service cannot be sustained. Since Antonio does not meet
the basic qualification of being president of the federation, his appointment to the sangguniang
panlalawigan is not justified notwithstanding that such appointment is merely in a temporary
capacity. If the intention of the respondent Secretary was to protect the interest of the federation in
the sanggunian, he should have appointed the incumbent FABC President in a hold-over capacity.
For even under the guidelines, the term of office of officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from
the date of their election until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified, without
prejudice to the terms of their appointments as members of the sanggunian to which they may be
correspondingly appointed. 49 Since the election is still under protest such that no successor of the
incumbent has as yet qualified, the respondent Secretary has no choice but to have the incumbent FABC
President sit as member of the sanggunian. He could even have appointed petitioner since he was
elected the president of the federation but not Antonio. The appointment of Antonio, allegedly the protege
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of respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner's charge of political interference by respondent
Governor in the organization. This should not be allowed. The barangays should be insulated from any
partisan activity or political intervention if only to give true meaning to local autonomy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the resolution of respondent Secretary dated August
4, 1989 is hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.
The election of the officials of the ABC Federation held on June 18, 1989 is hereby annulled. A new
election of officers of the federation is hereby ordered to be conducted immediately in accordance
with the governing rules and regulations.
The Supplemental petition is hereby GRANTED. The appointment of Augusto Antonio as
representative to theSangguniang Panlalawigan in a temporary capacity is declared null and void.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110120. March 16, 1994.*

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 127,
Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan
and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.
Administrative Law; Sec. 16 E.O. 192; A Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
under the office of DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions
of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication
of pollution cases.The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of
the environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a
business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No.
192, series of 1987, has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said
Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR
Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control
Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.
Same; Same; Adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the PAB
except where the special law provides for another forum; LLDA as a
special charter has responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna
Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.As a general rule, the
adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be
recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry
out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating
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the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon
and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological
systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of
its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned
declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or
disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government
offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or
enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the
LLDA for the development of the region.
Same; Same; LLDA has the power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order under RA. 4850 and its amendatory laws.Having thus
resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following
issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a cease and desist
order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the
facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City. The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
Same; Same; Same.The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the
City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open
dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No.
4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, cannot be stamped as an
unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms,
Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution. (Italics for emphasis) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly
authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; The power to make, alter or modify orders requiring
the discontinuance of pollution is also expressly bestowed upon LLDA by
E.O. No. 927, series of 1983.To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred
the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order in a language, as
suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the
defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984
which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of
1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is
a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power to make, alter
or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution is expressly and clearly
bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
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Same; While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has
only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a
settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.Assuming
arguendo that the authority to issue a cease and desist order were not expressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting
such authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental rule that
an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by
law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers
as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial
body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the
LLDA to issue a cease and desist order is, perforce, implied Otherwise, it may well
be reduced to a toothless paper agency.
Same; Same; PAB has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist
order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding
the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country.In
this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of
Appeals, et al., the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the
power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie
evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the antipollution laws of the country.
Same; Same; The relevant Pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that
pervasive sovereign power to protect the safety, health and general
welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and
animal life commonly designated as the police power.Ex parte cease and
desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot
be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety
of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such
as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The
relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power. x x x
Same; International Law; The Philippines is a party to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and The Alma Conference Declaration of
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1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.As a
constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of
non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state to
protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them. It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of
1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.
Same; The issuance of cease and desist order by the LLDA is the proper
exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory
laws.The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a
practical matter of procedure under the. circumstances of the case, is a proper
exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had
the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City
Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would
have been necessary. [Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals,
231 SCRA 292(1994)]

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127,
Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,respondents.
Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City
Government of Caloocan.
ROMERO, J.:
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The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the 350 tons
of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-free environment of
the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are
dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10,
1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.
Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA
has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in
Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2 with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking
to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the
water content of the surrounding area.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling
of the leachate 3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao
River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, 4 and clearance from LLDA as
required under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983. 6
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams
could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of
bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or
handling. 7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order 8 ordering the City
Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to
completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the
Camarin dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However,
sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting held in July 1992
among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and
LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to
settle the problem.
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After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA
issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias Cease and Desist
Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the
Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its
Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala
Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the
LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ
of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City Government of
Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety
and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial
jurisdiction. 9
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order.
Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the
time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the
pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others,
that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as
the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the
complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not
by the Regional Trial Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite
entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however, maintained during the
trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should have been treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the
consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from
enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from
dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of
the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer
for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking to nullify the
aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan
City denying its motion to dismiss.
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The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10, 1992 referring the case to the
Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due course to the petition,
required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of Appeals within
ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn.
Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from
exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government
of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12,
1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary restraining order and an
urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the calamitous situation that would
arise if the respondent city government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite
(i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow
the respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage problem."
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court of Appeals to immediately
set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the temporary restraining order
issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so lifted or
whether the restraining order should be maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the
Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals. 14 After the oral argument, a conference was
set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the General
Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representative and the Secretary of
DILG or his duly authorized representative were required to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and
review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage and in the event of a
rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10
days from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall
be deemed submitted for resolution. 15 Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the
dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA's cease
and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake
Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its
enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in
the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set aside and the
JHAPZ VILLARIA
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of
Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future dumping of garbage in
said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the proposal
attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby
adopted by reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining
and/or injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal
proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now
docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of
Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper
interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.
On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the
Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and containing until otherwise
ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the
environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin open
dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains
highly open to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit,
pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to determine the effects of
the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On
the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining
the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City Government of Caloocan has
territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law, authorizing the defunct
National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not
incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against any
person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or
program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals,
contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers
and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease
and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series
of 1983 which provides, thus:
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Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this
Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice
and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying
the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be
reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of
sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and
industrial disposal system or parts thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify
any permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or
abate pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or
instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its
implementing rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above
provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative quasi-judicial
functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the
corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these laws, the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order
which, in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold
question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws,
have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in
Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering
the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in
the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if
not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive
Order No. 192, series of 1987, 18 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National
Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and
functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19
JHAPZ VILLARIA
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As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be
recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the
declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and
power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect
the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the
discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the
LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and
projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private
persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for
the development of the region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's
jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the
open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken
without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850,
as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the
said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was
recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as
intermediary at the meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue:
Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act
No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the
dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop
dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in
violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot be
stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic
Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the
LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24(Emphasis supplied)
Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease and desist
order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar to the express grant
to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which,
admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would
be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order
in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority
need not necessarily be express.25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only
such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative
agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the
exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with
respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and
desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et
al., 27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease
and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable
standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. Theponente, Associate Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations
like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the
Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate
correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take
several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to
protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as
the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is
a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives
vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or
the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of nonimpairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote
JHAPZ VILLARIA
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in
mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference
Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right. 29
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of
procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under
its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been
complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal
steps would have been necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the
means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute
"necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue
implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous
clearance from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the
regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the
private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal
with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of
such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet
such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the
LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its
surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on the related
issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special
knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on
July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan from
dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
No. L-13827. September 28, 1962.

BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Elections; Commission Elections; Lack of power to punish for contempt in the exercise of
ministerial functions.The Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its ministerial functions,
such as the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different
municipalities, has no power to punish for contempt, because such power is inherently judicial in
nature. [Masangcay vs. Commission on Elections, 6 SCRA 27(1962)]
SUPREME COURT
Manila
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EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13827
September 28, 1962
BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Godofredo A. Ramos and Ruby Salazar-Alberto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General and Dominador D. Dayot for respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before the
Commission on Election with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing serial numbers l8071, l-8072 and l-8073 containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of
Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated
September 2, 1957, and its unnumbered resolution date March 5, 1957, inasmuch as he opened
said boxes not the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor,
and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens'
Party, as required in the aforesaid resolutions, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised
Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer of
Aklan designated by the Commission in its resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to
take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as
of their distribution, among the different municipalities of the province.
In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-respondents to appear and show
cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis of the aforementioned charge,
they all appeared before the Commission on October 21, 1957 and entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereupon, evidence was presented by both the prosecution and the defense, and on December 16,
1957 the Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as
charged and sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500,
with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail
of Aklan. The other respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the Commission on Elections as well as its
members the power to punish acts of contempt against said body under the same procedure and
with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said
section which grants to the Commission and members the power to punish for contempt is
unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the separation of powers that exists among
the three departments of our constitutional form of government. In other words, it is contended that,
even if petitioner can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision is null and void for
lack of valid power on the part of the Commission to impose such disciplinary penalty under the
principle of separation of powers. There is merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections
lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to petitioner in the decision subject of
review. We had occasion to stress in the case ofGuevara v. The Commission on Elections 1 that
under the law and the constitution, the Commission on Elections has only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any
JHAPZ VILLARIA
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, said, the
Commission, although it cannot be classified a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution
(Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial
functions insofar as controversies that by express provision law come under its jurisdiction. The
difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty which inherently is administrative in
character and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasi-judicial function of the Commission.
In the same case, we also expressed the view that when the Commission exercises a ministerial
function it cannot exercise the power to punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in
nature, as can be clearly gleaned from the following doctrine we laid down therein:
. . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any
judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt
as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly
said: 'The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders and mandates courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice (Slade
Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.S. v. Lee Hoc, 36 Phil., 867;In Re Sotto, 46
O.G., 2570; In Re Kelly, Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as
a necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its
exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power
to elicit testimony (People v. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an
administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid
(Langenberg v. Lecker, 31 N.E., 190; In Re Sims, 37 P., 135; Roberts v. Hacney, 58 SW.,
810).
1awphl.nt
In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation
the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an
administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the
distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. In fact,
Masangcay, who as provincial treasurer of Aklan was the one designated to take charge of the
receipt, custody and distribution of election supplies in that province, was charged with having
opened three boxes containing official ballots for distribution among several municipalities in
violation of the instructions of the Commission which enjoin that the same cannot be opened except
in the presence of the division superintendent of schools, the provincial auditor, and the authorized
representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens' Party, for he ordered
their opening and distribution not in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in said
resolutions. And because of such violation he was dealt as for contempt of the Commission and was
sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him
for contempt, and so its decision is null and void.
Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the question of
constitutionality raised by petitioner with regard to the portion of Section 5 of the Revised Election
Code which confers upon the Commission on Elections the power to punish for contempt for acts
provided for in Rule 64 of our rules of court.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from insofar as petitioner Benjamin Masangcay is concerned,
as well as the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him,
are hereby reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
G.R. Nos.
November 22, 1990.*
PANTRANCO SOUTH EXPRESS, INC., petitioner, vs. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and
BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO., INC., respondents.
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
Transportation; Public Service Law; BOT has ample power and discretion to decree or refuse
the cancellation of a certificate of public convenience issued to an operator as long as there
is evidence to support its action.There can be no dispute that the law (Section 16(n) of the
Public Service Act) gives to the BOT (successor of the Public Service Commission) ample power
and discretion to decree or refuse the cancellation of a certificate of public convenience issued to an
operator as long as there is evidence to support its action, as held by this Court in a long line of
cases, wherein it was even intimated that in matters of this nature so long as the action is justified
this Court will not substitute its discretion for that of the BOT.
Same; Same; Same; BOT has the power to take into consideration the result of its own
observation and investigation of the matter submitted to it for decision in connection with
other evidence presented at the hearing of a case.As We have ruled before, the BOT is
particularly a fact-finding body whose decisions on questions regarding certificates of public
convenience are influenced not only by the facts as disclosed by the evidence in the case before it
but also by the reports of its field agents and inspectors that are periodically submitted to it (see La
Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Mercado, G.R. No. L-19120, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA
343). Likewise, the BOT has the power to take into consideration the result of its own observation
and investigation of the matter submitted to it for decision, in connection with other evidence
presented at the hearing of a case.
Same; Same; Same; Mere failure to operate temporarily should not be a ground for
cancellation especially as when in the case at bar, the suspension of the service was directly
caused by circumstances beyond the operators control.Taking into consideration BLTBs
letter dated September 18, 1972, it acted in good faith when it did not immediately operate on those
lines and not because of a design to prejudice public interest. Certificates of public convenience
involve investment of a big amount of capital, both in securing the certificate and in maintaining the
operation of the lines covered thereby, and mere failure to operate temporarily should not be a
ground for cancellation, especially as when, in the case at bar, the suspension of the service was
directly caused by circumstances beyond the operators control.
Same; Same; Same; In the exercise of its power to grant or cancel certificates of public
convenience, the BOT is guided by public necessity and convenience as primary
considerations.In the absence of showing that there is willful and contumacious violation on the
part of the utility operator, no certificate of public convenience may be validly revoked (Manzanal v.
Ausejo, et al., G.R. No. L-31056, August 4, 1988, 164 SCRA 36). More importantly, what cannot be
ignored is that the needs of the public are paramount, as elucidated by the BOT in its order. In the
exercise of its power to grant or cancel certificates of public convenience, the BOT is guided by
public necessity and convenience as primary considerations. [Pantranco South Express, Inc. vs.
Board of Transportation, 191 SCRA 581(1990)]
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 49664-67. November 22, 1990.]
PANTRANCO SOUTH EXPRESS, INC., Petitioner, v. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and BATANGAS
LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO., INC., Respondents.
Parco, Sabillo, Regondola & Maronilla for Petitioner.
Pablito A. Gahol for BLTB Co.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; COMMON CARRIERS; CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE; BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION,

GIVEN THE POWER AND DISCRETION TO DECREE OR REFUSE THE CANCELLATION OF THE SAME IF
SUPPORTED WITH EVIDENCE; OTHER BASES FOR BOTS DECISIONS. There can be no dispute that the
law (Section 16 (n) of the Public Service Act) gives to the BOT (successor of the Public Service Commission)
ample power and discretion to decree or refuse the cancellation of a certificate of public convenience issued
to an operator as long as there is evidence to support its action, as held by this Court in a long line of cases,
wherein it was even intimated that in matters of this nature so long as the action is justified this Court will
not substitute its discretion for that of the BOT (see Javier, Et. Al. v. de Leon, Et Al., 109 Phil. 751; Santiago
Ice Plant and Co. v. Lahoz, 87 Phil. 221; Raymundo Transportation Co. v. Cedra, 99 Phil. 99; Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co., Inc. v. Castelo, 108 Phil. 394; Dagupan Ice Plant Co., Inc. v. de Lucero, Et. Al. citing Manila
Yellow Taxicab Co.; Inc., Et Al., v. Araullo, 34 O.G. 241; Sambrano v. Northern Luzon Transportation Co., 35
O.G. 2271). The BOT, in refusing to cancel the certificates of public convenience of BLTB, relied on these
pieces of evidence; (1) the letter of BLTB dated September 18, 1972; (2) reports/complaints from the
general public; (3) reports of its fieldmen; and (4) its own observations acquired thru inspection trips, all of
which form part of its records. As We have ruled before, the BOT is particularly a fact-finding body whose
decisions on questions regarding certificates of public convenience are influenced not only by the facts as
disclosed by the evidence in the case before it but also by the reports of its field agents and inspectors that
are periodically submitted to it (see La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Mercado, G.R. No. L-19120,
November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 343). Likewise, the BOT has the power to take into consideration the result of
its own observation and investigation of the matter submitted to it for decision, in connection with other
evidence presented at the hearing of a case (Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., Et. Al. v. N. & B. Stables Co.,
Inc., 60 Phil. 851 citing Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., Et. Al. v. Danon, 58 Phil. 75; Manila Electric Co. v.
Balagtas, 58 Phil. 429).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE FAILURE TO TEMPORARILY OPERATE THE TRANSPORTATION LINES SHOULD NOT BE A
GROUND FOR THE CANCELLATION THEREOF. Taking into consideration BLTBs letter dated September 18,
1972, it acted in good faith when it did not immediately operate on those lines and not because of a design
to prejudice public interest. Certificates of public convenience involve investment of a big amount of capital,
both in securing the certificate and in maintaining the operation of the lines covered thereby, and mere
failure to operate temporarily should not be a ground for cancellation, especially as when, in the case at bar,
the suspension of the service was directly caused by circumstances beyond the operators control
(Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. F.F. Halili, Et Al., 95 Phil. 694).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY NOT BE VALIDLY REVOKED IN THE ABSENCE OF WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS
VIOLATION BY THE UTILITY OPERATOR; BOT GUIDED BY PUBLIC NECESSITY AND CONVENIENCE AS
PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS. In absence of showing that there is willful and contumacious violation on the
part of the utility operator, no certificate of public convenience may be validly revoked (Manzanal v. Ausejo,
Et Al., G.R. No. L-31056, August 4, 1988, 164 SCRA 36). More importantly, what cannot be ignored is that
the needs of the public are paramount, as elucidated by the BOT in its order. In the exercise of its power to
grant or cancel certificates of public convenience, the BOT is guided by public necessity and convenience as
JHAPZ VILLARIA
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
primary considerations (see Dizon v. Public Service Commission, Et Al., G.R. No. L-34820, April 30, 1973, 50
SCRA 500).
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order seeking
to annul the order of public respondent Board of Transportation dated January 4, 1979.
The antecedent facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On August 5, 1971, the then Public Service Commission granted certificates of public convenience to private
respondent Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. (BLTB) for the operation of twelve (12) bus units on the
Pasay City Legaspi City line (Case No. 70-5749); six (6) bus units on the Pasay City Bulan, Sorsogon
line (Case No. 70-5750), and ten (10) bus units on the Pasay City Sorsogon line (Case No. 70-5751) (pp.
59-64, Rollo).
chanroble s law library : re d
On April 4, 1975, petitioner Pantranco South Express, Inc. (PANTRANCO) filed a complaint against BLTB
before public respondent Board of Transportation (BOT), docketed as Case No. 75-31-C, charging it with
abandonment of services on said lines from August, 1971 to April, 1975 and praying for the cancellation of
BLTBs certificates of public convenience (pp. 69-70, Rollo).
On March 24, 1976, in Cases Nos. 70-5749, 70-5750 and 70-5751, PANTRANCO filed an urgent petition
charging BLTB with abandoning said services from March, 1975 to March, 1976 and reiterating its prayer for
the cancellation of the certificates of public convenience (pp. 77-78, Rollo).
BLTB did not file any written answer either to the complaint in Case No. 75-31-C or to the urgent petition in
Cases Nos. 70-5749, 70-5750, and 70-5751. Rather, in a Motion dated July 26, 1978, BLTB, referring to
hearings before the BOT on March 24, 1977 and April 13, 1977, alleged (pp. 126-128, Rollo):
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"3. At said hearings, Respondent admitted non-operation of the bus services authorized in Cases Nos. 705749,70-5750 and 70-5751 and thus the need for Complainant to present evidence in both proceedings may
be dispensed with.
"4. At the said hearings, Respondent advanced affirmative defenses on Complainants Urgent Motion of
March 24, 1977 (sic) which Respondent, in its Rejoinder of May 5, 1977, adopted also as its affirmative
defenses with respect to Case No. 75-31-C.
"Briefly, these affirmative defenses are:
(a) Respondent actually registered under PUB denomination all the twenty eight (28) buses authorized for
operation under the certificates sought to be cancelled (Annex A);
(b) The following supervening factors which are beyond Respondents control however, arose and prevented
Respondent from operating the lines at issue:
(1) The gasoline crises starting 1971;

(2) The destructive big floods in 1972 and 1974;
(3) The general troubled conditions of peace and order in 1971 and 1972 leading to the declaration of
martial law;
(4) Starting 1973 and on to 1974,1975 and 1976 the nearly prohibitive cost of units and spare parts (if
available at all), the higher costs of operations and acute tire shortages particularly in 1974;
(5) All these, which are of general public knowledge and known to the Board, brought the whole land
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
transportation industry in what might be termed as in extremis condition causing the bankruptcy of many
operators, big and small; and
(6) Complainant Pantranco South Express, Inc. was not spared the ill effects of these adverse conditions to
the extent that up to the present it has not registered all the buses required for its regular bus operations
(Annex B, B-1).
"5. At the said hearings also, Respondent prayed that these incidents in these proceedings be considered
and decided in the light of present conditions which are:
(a) The certificates of public convenience of Respondent are still valid;

(b) Respondent is willing and desirous to operate (sic) the said certificates;
(c) Respondent has the capability to operate, in fact, has ready the full twenty-eight (28) buses needed for
full operation of the authorized services;
(d) Complainant is not operating all its authorized bus services for lack of sufficient rolling stock;
(e) The need for the services sought to be cancelled is patent, in fact, urgent at the present time; and
(f) That the public interest is paramount against other considerations such as the incidents in these cases."
cralaw
virtua1aw library
On January 4, 1979, the BOT issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 133, Rollo):
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"In view of all the foregoing, this Board, in addition to its rulings mentioned above
"1. Orders respondent to operate within fifteen (15) days from date hereof the whole complement of twentyeight (28) units authorized under the said certificates, utilizing for the purpose such units presently
authorized as RESERVES and inform the Board within ten (10) days from commencement of operation, the
makes and motor numbers of the units to be operated for each line and the case numbers under which they
are authorized for appropriate entry in the records of the above-entitled cases, and
"2. Orders the fine of P10,000.00 imposed above to be paid to this Board within ten (10) days from receipt
by it of a copy of this Order and declares the consolidated complaints filed in the above-entitled cases closed
and terminated.
"Failure of respondent/applicant to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be considered
sufficient cause for this Board to withdraw the authority herein granted.
"SO ORDERED."
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It rationalized the non-cancellation of BLTBs certificates of public convenience, as follows (pp. 128 A-133,
Rollo):
chanroble s virtual lawlibrary
"Obviously, cancellation of a certificate of public convenience is a penalty of the severest degree. Its
consequences are suffered not exclusively by the operator; it extends to the travelling public whose needs
for transportation facilities would further be aggravated by a diminution of needed services. Consequently,
where such a penalty is prayed for, this Board requires the evidence to be strong. Less than that this Board
must apply the less severe penalties provided for by law, but equally disciplinary in nature.
"Sec. 16 (n) of the Public Service Law empowers this Board to suspend or revoke any certificate . . .
whenever the holder thereof has violated or wilfully (sic) and contumaciously refused to comply with any
order, rule or regulation of the Board or any provision of this Act.. . .
"Sec. 21 of the same law provides that every public service violating or failing to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission shall be subject to a
fine not exceeding two hundred pesos per day for every day of service during which such default or violation
continues . . .
"A reading of both provisions would show that failure to comply with the terms and conditions of any
certificate of public convenience is basically punished with a fine, unless the violation is willful or
JHAPZ VILLARIA
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
contumacious, in which case the penalty of suspension, or cancellation may be imposed.
"Judged by the foregoing standards, this Board declares the evidence of the complainant to be sadly lacking
in elements that would qualify the respondents failure to operate as wilful and contumacious. True the
respondent did not operate on its certificate from the time it was granted on August 4, 1971 up to the
present. It had not justified its non-operation from said date up to September 2, 1972. But on September 2,
1972, the respondent justified its non-operation by writing to the Board, that because of unfinished portions
of the road it could not render the service authorized by the Board to be rendered. The Board never
overruled the Respondent.
"x
"At this point, it must be borne in mind that whether in the case of application for new services, or for the
cancellation of lines already granted, this Board must determine what the public need is.
"This leads us into discussing what the public need is in the areas covered by the certificates of public
convenience in question.
"The Board, in its desire to be responsive to public need, has always kept itself informed of actual and latest
transportation conditions in the provinces, including the Bicol region. Thru reports/complaints from the
general public, from reports of its fieldmen, and from its own personal observations acquired thru inspection
trips, this Board is aware that buses which are operating are very much less than what has been authorized.
This was officially confirmed in a meeting of provincial and Metro-Manila bus operators held in Malacaang
Palace on June 21, 1976, presided over by His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos himself.
"In Bicol region, for instance, in the past four years (1974, 1975, 1976 and 1977) PSEI (PANTRANCO)
registered and operated less than 50% of its authorized units:
Year Authorized Units Registered

1974 466 159 units
1975 (not available) 162 units
1976 453 227 units
1977 464 221 units
and among the lines not so operated or only partially operated, either through expiration of certificates,
petitioned suspension of operation or for sheer lack of units are long distance lines from Manila to the
provinces of Quezon, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Albay and Sorsogon aside from lines serving interprovincial and local needs in Quezon province and the whole Bicol Region. Among them are the following
lines which are concurrert in whole or in portions of the lines Pasay City Legaspi City, Pasay Sorsogon
and Pasay Bulan, all the said lines requiring the operation of some two hundred twenty seven (227)
buses:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"x
"The non-operation by PSEI (PANTRANCO) of these more than two hundred (200) buses clearly requires the
entry or operation of an equal number of buses. Any prohibition against an effort to fill up a public need
would be contrary to public interest.
"Public interest will better be served if respondent is allowed to operate the service authorized in its
certificate of public convenience. To cancel these certificates at a time when the clamor and demand for such
service have been increasing day to day, prodded by the peoples desire to avail of the excellent road
conditions, which in turn conduces to fast and convenient travel, would be to negate and turn back the clock
of progress which has been seeping steadily and constantly to the long neglected vast communal area that
is the Bicol Region. To authorize the operation of these services will complement the governments multipurpose development effort to hasten the Socio-Economic growth of these areas, notable among which are
the Philippines-Japan Friendship Highway, of which the routes covered by applicant/respondents certificates
traverse and the Bicol River Basin Development Project, a program designed to tap the rich natural
resources of the region."
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
Hence, the present petition.
On January 15, 1979, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the BOT from enforcing its January
4, 1979 order (pp. 147-148, Rollo).
chanroble s virtual lawlibrary
In this petition, PANTRANCO imputes grave abuse of discretion, acting without or in excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the BOT when it issued the questioned order, as indicated by several circumstance that it
enumerated. Among these, only the following deserve discussion:
1) refusal to cancel the certificates of public convenience of BLTB despite its abandonment and/or nonoperation on the subject lines since August 5, 1971 up to the present;
2) using as basis for its questioned order BLTBs letter dated September 2, 1972 (wherein it justified its nonoperation on account of unfinished portions of the road) which is not part of the records of the case; and
3) resorting to extraneous facts not supported by competent evidence as basis for its conclusion that the
demand of public need would be more paramount than the need to penalize BLTB.
For its part, BLTB contends that:
1) the cancellation or non-cancellation of its certificates of public convenience is addressed to the sound
discretion of the BOT;
2) its letter dated September 18, 1972 (erroneously referred to as the letter dated September 2, 1972)
forms part of the BOTs records; and
3) the BOT acted correctly in the exercise of its sound discretion and within its jurisdiction when it found that
the demand of public need would be paramount than the need to penalize it (BLTB).
There can be no dispute that the law (Section 16 (n) of the Public Service Act) gives to the BOT (successor
of the Public Service ommission) * ample power and discretion to decree or refuse the cancellation of a
certificate of public convenience issued to an operator as long as there is evidence to support its action, as
held by this Court in a long line of cases, wherein it was even intimated that in matters of this nature so long
as the action is justified this Court will not substitute its discretion for that of the BOT (see Javier, Et. Al. v.
de Leon, Et Al., 109 Phil. 751; Santiago Ice Plant and Co. v. Lahoz, 87 Phil. 221; Raymundo Transportation
Co. v. Cedra, 99 Phil. 99; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. v. Castelo, 108 Phil. 394; Dagupan Ice Plant Co.,
Inc. v. de Lucero, Et. Al. citing Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.; Inc., Et Al., v. Araullo, 34 O.G. 241; Sambrano v.
Northern Luzon Transportation Co., 35 O.G. 2271). The BOT, in refusing to cancel the certificates of public
convenience of BLTB, relied on these pieces of evidence; (1) the letter of BLTB dated September 18, 1972;
(2) reports/complaints from the general public; (3) reports of its fieldmen; and (4) its own observations
acquired thru inspection trips, all of which form part of its records. As We have ruled before, the BOT is
particularly a fact-finding body whose decisions on questions regarding certificates of public convenience are
influenced not only by the facts as disclosed by the evidence in the case before it but also by the reports of
its field agents and inspectors that are periodically submitted to it (see La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co.,
Inc. v. Mercado, G.R. No. L-19120, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 343). Likewise, the BOT has the power to
take into consideration the result of its own observation and investigation of the matter submitted to it for
decision, in connection with other evidence presented at the hearing of a case (Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.,
Inc., Et. Al. v. N. & B. Stables Co., Inc., 60 Phil. 851 citing Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., Et. Al. v. Danon,
58 Phil. 75; Manila Electric Co. v. Balagtas, 58 Phil. 429).
Taking into consideration BLTBs letter dated September 18, 1972, it acted in good faith when it did not
immediately operate on those lines and not because of a design to prejudice public interest. Certificates of
public convenience involve investment of a big amount of capital, both in securing the certificate and in
maintaining the operation of the lines covered thereby, and mere failure to operate temporarily should not
be a ground for cancellation, especially as when, in the case at bar, the suspension of the service was
directly caused by circumstances beyond the operators control (Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. F.F. Halili,
Et Al., 95 Phil. 694). In the absence of showing that there is willful and contumacious violation on the part of
the utility operator, no certificate of public convenience may be validly revoked (Manzanal v. Ausejo, Et Al.,
G.R. No. L-31056, August 4, 1988, 164 SCRA 36). More importantly, what cannot be ignored is that the
needs of the public are paramount, as elucidated by the BOT in its order. In the exercise of its power to
grant or cancel certificates of public convenience, the BOT is guided by public necessity and convenience as
JHAPZ VILLARIA
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
primary considerations (see Dizon v. Public Service Commission, Et Al., G.R. No. L-34820, April 30, 1973, 50
SCRA 500).
chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Apparently, PANTRANCOs purpose in instituting the proceedings for cancellation of BLTBs certificates of
public convenience is to remove it (BLTB) as a competitor in the business in which they are both engaged
(see Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. F.F. Halili, Et Al., supra), which is detestable. Experience has
demonstrated that healthy competition always redounds to the benefit of the commuters and the
development of transportation as a whole.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The order of the Board of Transportation dated January 4,
1979 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued on January 15, 1979 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
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No. L-17778. November 30, 1962.

IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS L. CARMELO, in his
capacity as Chairman of the Probe Committee, Office of the Mayor of Manila, petitionerappellant, vs. ARMANDO RAMOS, respondentappellee.
Administrative Law; Contempt Committed Against Administrative Bodies; Contempt under
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior
and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or
bodies, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is
done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (People vs. Mendoza;
People vs. Dizon, 49 Off. Gaz., No. 2, 541)
Same; Same; When Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code may be invoked.One
who invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code must first show that he has authority to
take testimony or evidence before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses.
(Francia vs. Pecson, et al., 87 Phil. 100.)
Same; Same; Same; Delegation by Mayor of Manila of power to investigate.The delegation
by the Mayor of Manila of the power to investigate city officials and employees appointed by him
does not imply a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose
appearance may be required by the compulsory process of subpoena.
Same; Same; Same; To what offices Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code pertains.
It is doubtful whether the provisions of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code are
applicable to the City of Manila, as these pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government. [,
6 SCRA 836(1962)]

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17778
November 30, 1962
IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS L. CARMELO, in his

capacity as Chairman of the Probe Committee, Office of the Mayor of Manila, petitionerappellant,
vs.
ARMANDO RAMOS, respondent-appellee.
JHAPZ VILLARIA
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
City Fiscal Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Armando Ramos for and in his own behalf as respondent-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
On February 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee "to
investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License
Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of this
Office (of the Mayor)." He named Mr. Jesus L. Carmelo as chairman of said committee.
It appears that the committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen working as a
bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear before it on June 3, 8, 9, 15 and 16 and
August 4 and 11, 1960, in connection with an administrative case against Crisanta Estanislao but
that Ramos, on whom the subpoenas were duly served, refused to appear.
Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administrative
proceedings," petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition to declare Armando
Ramos in contempt. After hearing, during which petitioner was required to show a prima facie case,
the trial court dismissed the petition. The lower court held that there is no law empowering
committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify
under oath. It also held that to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right against selfincrimination.
It appears that in a statement given to investigators of the Office of the Mayor, Ramos admitted
having misappropriated on several occasions, sums of money given to him by the owner of Casa de
Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and that this fact had not been discovered
earlier because Ramos used to entertain employees in the City Treasurer's office at Casa de Alba
where Ramos was a bookkeeper as stated above. The trial court held that to compel Ramos to
confirm this statement in the administrative case against certain employees in the Office of the City
Treasurer would be to compel him to give testimony that could be used against him in a criminal
case for estafa of which the owner of Casa de Alba was the offended party. From that decision,
petitioner appealed to this Court.
The main issue in this ease is the power, if any, of committee, like the committee of which petitioner
is the chairman, to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of
refusal.
The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt)1 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts
and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one
in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court,
as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (People v. Mendoza;
People v. Dizon, 49 O. G. No. 2, 541.)
Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows:
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Powers incidental to taking of testimony. When authority to take testimony or evidence is
conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or other
body, such authority shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer oaths and
summons witnesses and shall include authority to require the production of documents under
a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.
Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this Act, any one who, without
lawful excuse, fails to appear upon summons issued under the authority of the preceding
paragraph or who, appearing before any individual or body exercising the power therein
defined, refuses to make oath, give testimony, or produce documents for inspection, when
thereunto lawfully required, shall be subject to discipline as in case of contempt of court and
upon application of the individual or body exercising the power in question shall be dealt with
by the judge of first instance having jurisdiction of the case in the manner provided by law.
One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take testimony or
evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses. (Francia v.
Pecson, et al., 87 Phil. 100.)
Now, what authority to take testimony does petitioner's committee have from which the power to cite
witnesses may be implied, pursuant to section 580?
To be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about
such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies
involving certain city employees.
Petitioner contends that the Mayor of Manila has the implied power to investigate city officials and
employees appointed by him to the end that the power expressly vested in him to suspend and
remove such officials of employees (Sec. 22, Republic Act No. 409) may be justly and fairly
exercised. We agree with this proposition and We held so in the case of Pagkanlungan v. De la
Fuente, 48 O.G. No. 10, p. 4332. But We do not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such
power to investigation implies also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of
witnesses whose appearance may be require by the compulsory process of subpoena. Thus, in
denying this power to an investigating body in the Office of the Mayor of Manila, We said in Francia
v. Pecson, et al., supra: "Were do not think the mayor (of Manila) can delegate or confer the powers
to administer oaths, to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas."
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the Administrative Code are
applicable to the City of Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government.
Citing 50 Am. Jur. 449, petitioner contends that "the power of the investigation committee to issue
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses undoubtedly exists since only
complimentary to the power of the mayor to investigate, suspend and remove city officers and
employees, supra, is the recognized rule that where the statute grants a right, it also confers by
implication every particular power necessary for the exercise thereof." There is no merit in the
argument. In the first place, the authority cited speaks of statutory, grant of power to a body. Here,
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
We have seen that whatever power may be claimed by petitioner's committee may only be traced to
the power of the Mayor to investigate as implied from his power to suspend or remove certain city
employees. There is no statutory grant of power to investigate to petitioner's committee.
In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the appearance
of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is that the Mayor can not delegate this power to a
body like the committee of the petitioner. (Francia v. Pecson, et al., supra.)
Lastly, 50 Am. Jur. Sec. 428, p. 450 itself admits an exception to the rule invoked by the petitioner.
Thus, it is stated that "where the liberty and property of persons are sought to be brought within the
operation of a power claimed to be impliedly granted by an act because necessary to its due
execution, the case must be clearly seen to be within those intended to be reached." Here, no less
than the liberty of Armando Ramos is involved in the claim of the committee to the right to cite
witnesses.
We hold, therefore, that petitioner's committee has no power to cite witnesses to appear before it
and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for Us to
pass upon the other error assigned by petitioner as having been allegedly committed by the trial
court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
No. L-29274. November 27, 1975.*

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on
Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO
MANALASTAS. Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents.
Administrative law; Administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations in
proceedings for sole purpose of obtaining information on which future action of a legislative
or judicial nature may be taken.An administrative agency may be authorized to make
investigations, not only In proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings
whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial
nature may be taken and may require attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely
investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report
findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.
Same; Subpoena power of Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations
(PARGO) created under Executive Order No. 4 is not confined to mere quasi-judicial function
of that Agency but may be used to meet the very purpose for its creation, to forestall and
erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service.Such subpoena power operates
in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b), (e),
and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these subparagraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting
the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities
and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to
mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function would therefore imperil or inactivate the Agency in its
investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). x x x We see no reason to depart from the
established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.
Same; Administrative agencies may issue administrative subpoenas in the course of
investigations whether or not adjudication is involved and whether or not probable cause is
shown.Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of
investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown
and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a
specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to
one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the
subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the
discovered evidence so justifies. Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought;
it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the
proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light.
Same; Administrative agency has power of inquisition; it can investigate merely suspicion
that law is being violated or because it wants assurance that it is not.The administrative
agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to
get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not.
Same; Requisites for validity of administrative subpoena.In sum, it may be stated that a
subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the
agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant.
Same; Constitutional law; While the privilege against self-incrimination extends to
administrative investigations, any unnecessary extension thereof in an investigation whose
purpose is only to discover facts as a basis of future action would be unwise. Respondent,
however, may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege
against self-incrimination.We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in
administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings, x x x
Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that the respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing
any administrative charge. He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding
investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City of Manila with the object of submitting the
assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges. Since the
only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary
extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. Anyway, by all means, respondent may contest any
attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.
Same; Same; Constitutionality of Executive Orders may not be collaterally impeached.For
reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
the force and effect of statutes, cannot be collaterally impeached. Much more so when the issue was
not duly pleaded in the court below x x x The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it. [Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 68 SCRA 99(1975)]

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on
Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and
ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali
and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable
Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in
Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which
reads as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be
issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives,
attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas
in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent]
and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent]
under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the
President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations
(PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the
following functions and responsibilities: 3
b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and
corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other
activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to
submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos.
1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft
and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn
complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee
and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of
an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including
the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. 4
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency,
issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a
subpoena ad testificandumcommanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the
PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to
declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the
Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its
legality.
On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be
issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives,
attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas
in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent]
and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent]
under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration
first filed on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity. 6
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the
authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering,
the organization and the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions,
not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and
directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific
than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency
may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but
also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative
or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It
may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for
actions. 10
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from
Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness,
administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the
production of documents under a subpoenaduces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same
restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena
power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted subparagraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have
it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all
these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of
meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities
and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory
functions under
sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5)
fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see
no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.
Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under
the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses and the authority to require the production of
documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same
restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly
seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific
case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection
with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be
issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that an
administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is
a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative
subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or
when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or
things does not appear. 15
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations,
whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even
before the issuance of a complaint.17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge
or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the
investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence,
not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its
obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed
investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have
information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to
summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an
administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers
of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a
case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being
violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties
are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether
there is probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements
for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite;
and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn
statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous
transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited
from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably
relevant to the investigations.
We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations,
generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that
since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result in the
forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in
nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical
practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession.
Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any
administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of
anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled
facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of
investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege
would thus be unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any
attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.
A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the
President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would now
challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in
part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of
executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes 32cannot be collaterally
impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for
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adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it. 35
Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico
Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency
to issue.
WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside
and declared of no force and effect.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
G.R. No. 137473. August 2, 2001.*

ESTELITO V. REMOLONA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Right to Counsel; The right to counsel under Section 12
of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial
investigationthe exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies
only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.The submission of Remolona that his alleged extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
because he was not assisted by counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12
paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution deserves scant consideration. The right to
counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who
had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to
elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
Same; Same; Same; While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times
be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of
the charges and of the respondents capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such
body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel; The right to counsel is not
always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted
merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring
public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service.While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a
criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry
may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondents capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of
engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of
Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule
XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always
imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and
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employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing
conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Admissions made by a respondent during an administrative
investigation may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal.In the case at bar, Remolona
was not accused of any crime in the investigation conducted by the CSC field office. The
investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and whether there is a prima
facie evidence sufficient to form a belief that an offense cognizable by the CSC has been committed
and that Remolona is probably guilty thereof and should be administratively charged. Perforce, the
admissions made by Remolona during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify his
dismissal.
Same; Same; Dishonesty; The rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not
be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person chargedif a
government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if
said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office;
The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the
punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the
preservation of the publics faith and confidence in the government.It cannot be denied that
dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section
23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that
dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of
duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is
dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not
connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate
in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by
reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of
dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the
office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain
influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty
less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of
an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness
of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service. The
principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of
such officer, or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the
publics faith and confidence in the government.
Same; Judicial Review; The rule is that courts of justice will not generally interfere with
purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their
action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction.The general rule is that where the findings of
the administrative body are amply supported by substantial evidence, such findings are accorded not
only respect but also finality, and are binding on this Court. It is not for the reviewing court to weigh
the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence. Thus, when confronted
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with conflicting versions of factual matters, it is for the administrative agency concerned in the
exercise of discretion to determine which party deserves credence on the basis of the evidence
received. The rule, therefore, is that courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely
administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless
there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they
have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess of
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 of the Supreme Court clearly states
that in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, it is within the discretion of the Court
of Appeals to have the original records of the proceedings under review transmitted to it.
The transmittal of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the formal hearing before the
CSC is entirely a matter of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 of this Court clearly states that in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, it
is within the discretion of the Court of Appeals to have the original records of the proceedings under
review transmitted to it. Verily, the Court of Appeals decided the merits of the case on the bases of
the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the pleadings filed by the parties. [Remolona
vs. Civil Service Commission, 362 SCRA 304(2001)]
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 137473
August 2, 2001
ESTELITO V. REMOLONA, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The present petition seeks to review and set aside the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
dated July 31, 19981 upholding the decision of the Civil Service Commission which ordered the
dismissal of petitioner Estelito V. Remolona (Remolona) from the government service for dishonesty,
and the Resolution dated February 5, 19992denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Records show that petitioner Estelito V. Remolona is the Postmaster at the Postal Office Service in
Infanta, Quezon, while his wife Nery Remolona is a teacher at the Kiborosa Elementary School.
In a letter3 dated January 3, 1991, Francisco R. America, District Supervisor of the Department of
Education, Culture & Sports at Infanta, Quezon, inquired from the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
as to the status of the civil service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who purportedly got a rating of
81.25% as per Report of Rating issued by the National Board for Teachers. 4 Mr. America likewise
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disclosed that he received information that Mrs. Remolona was campaigning for a fee of P8,000.00
per examinee for a passing mark in the teacher's board examinations. -On February 11, 1991, then CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas issued an Order directing CSC
Region IV Director Bella Amilhasan to conduct an investigation on Mrs. Remolona's eligibility, after
verification from the Register of Eligibles in the Office for Central Personnel Records revealed "that
Remolona's name is not in the list of passing and failing examinees, and that the list of examinees
for December 10, 1989 does not include the name of Remolona. Furthermore, Examination No.
061285 as indicated in her report of rating belongs to a certain Marlou C. Madelo, who took the
examination in Cagayan de Oro and got a rating of 65.00%." 5
During the preliminary investigation conducted by Jaime G. Pasion, Director II, Civil Service Field
Office, Lucena City, Quezon, only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a written statement of
facts6 regarding the issuance of the questioned Report of Rating of Mrs. Remolona, which is
summarized in the Memorandum7 submitted by Director Pasion as follows:
"3.1 That sometime in the first week of September, 1990, while riding in a Kapalaran Transit
Bus from Sta. Cruz, Laguna on his way to San Pablo City, he met one Atty. Hadji Salupadin
(this is how it sounded) who happened to be sitting beside him;
3.2 That a conversation broke out between them until he was able to confide his problem to
Atty. Salupadin about his wife having difficulty in acquiring an eligibility;
3.3 That Atty. Salupadin who represented himself as working at the Batasan, offered his help
for a fee of P3,000.00;
3.4 That the following day they met at the Batasan where he gave the amount of P2,000.00,
requirements, application form and picture of his wife;
3.5 That the following week, Thursday, at around 1:00 P.M., they met again at the Batasan
where he handed to Atty. Salupadin the amount of P1,000.00 plus P500.00 bonus who in
turn handed to him the Report of Rating of one Nery C. Remolona with a passing grade, then
they parted;
3.6 That sometime in the last week of September, he showed the Report of Rating to the
District Supervisor, Francisco America who informed her (sic) that there was no vacancy;
3.7 That he went to Lucena City and complained to Dr. Magsino in writing . . . that Mr.
America is asking for money in exchange for the appointment of his wife but failed to make
good his promise. He attached the corroborating affidavits of Mesdames Carmelinda
Pradillada and Rosemarie P. Romantico and Nery C. Remolona x x x;
3.8 That from 1986 to 1988, Mr. America was able to get six (6) checks at P2,600.00 each
plus bonus of Nery C. Remolona;
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3.9 That Mr. America got mad at them. And when he felt that Mr. America would verify the
authenticity of his wife's Report of Rating, he burned the original."
Furthermore, Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that
his wife has no knowledge thereof, and that he did it because he wanted them to be together. Based
on the foregoing, Director Pasion recommended the filing of the appropriate administrative action
against Remolona but absolved Mrs. Nery Remolona from any liability since it has not been shown
that she willfully participated in the commission of the offense.
Consequently, a Formal Charge dated April 6, 1993 was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C.
Remolona, and Atty. Hadji Salupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty.8 A
formal hearing ensued wherein the parties presented their respective evidence. Thereafter, CSC
Regional Director Bella A. Amilhasan issued a Memorandum dated February 14,
19959 recommending that the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona be found guilty as charged and
be meted the corresponding penalty.
Said recommendation was adopted by the CSG which issued Resolution No. 95-2908 on April 20,
1995, finding the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona guilty of dishonesty and imposing the penalty
of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. The case against Atty. Hadji Salupadin was held in
abeyance pending proof of his identity.10In its Resolution No. 96551011 dated August 27, 1996, the
CSC, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Remolona, absolved Nery
Remolona from liability and held that:
"Further, a review of the records and of the arguments presented fails to persuade this
Commission to reconsider its earlier resolution insofar as Estelito Remolona's culpability is
concerned. The evidence is substantial enough to effect his conviction. His act of securing a
fake eligibility for his wife is proved by substantial evidence. However, in the case of Nery
Remolona, the Commission finds her innocent of the offense charged, for there is no
evidence to show that she has used the fake eligibility to support an appointment or
promotion. In fact, Nery Remolona did not indicate in her Personal Data Sheet that she
possesses any eligibility. It must be pointed out that it was her husband who unilaterally
worked to secure a fake eligibility for her.
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied insofar as
respondent Estelito Remolona is concerned. However, Resolution No. 95-2908 is modified in
the sense that respondent Nery Remolona is exonerated of the charges. Accordingly, Nery
Remolona is automatically reinstated to her former position as Teacher with back salaries
and other benefits."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision dismissing the petition for review
filed by herein petitioner Remolona. His motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was likewise
denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred:
"1. in denying petitioner's motion for new trial;
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2. in holding that petitioner is liable for dishonesty; and
3. in sustaining the dismissal of the petitioner for an offense not work connected in relation to
his official position in the government service."
The main issue posed for resolution is whether a civil service employee can be dismissed from the
government service for an offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with the
performance of his official duty. Remolona likewise imputes a violation of his right to due process
during the preliminary investigation because he was not assisted by counsel. He claims that the
extra-judicial admission allegedly signed by him is inadmissible because he was merely made to
sign a blank form. He also avers that his motion for new trial should be granted on the ground that
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case before the Regional Office
of the CSC was not forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Finally, he pleads that the penalty of
dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits is too harsh considering the nature of the offense for which he
was convicted, the length of his service in government, that this is his first offense, and the fact that
no damage was caused to the government.
The submission of Remolona that his alleged extra-judicial confession is inadmissible because he
was not assisted by counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12 paragraphs 1 and
3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution deserves scant consideration.
The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal
case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself
to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. 12
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging
the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic
Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on
discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in
administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether
there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and employees, with the
purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing conducted by the
investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution.13
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the investigation conducted by the
CSC field office. The investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and
whether there is a prima facie evidence sufficient to form a belief that an offense cognizable by the
CSC has been committed and that Remolona is probably guilty thereof and should be
administratively charged. Perforce, the admissions made by Remolona during such investigation
may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal.
The contention of Remolona that he never executed an extra-judicial admission and that he merely
signed a blank form cannot be given credence. Remolona occupies a high position in government as
Postmaster at Infanta, Quezon and, as such, he is expected to be circumspect in his actions
specially where he is being administratively charged with a grave offense which carries the penalty
of dismissal from service.
Remolona insists that his dismissal is a violation of his right to due process under Section 2(3),
Article XI (B) of the Constitution which provides that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause." Although the offense of dishonesty is punishable under
the Civil Service law, Remolona opines that such act must have been committed in the performance
of his function and duty as Postmaster. Considering that the charge of dishonesty involves the
falsification of the certificate of rating of his wife Nery Remolona, the same has no bearing on his
office and hence, he is deemed not to have been dismissed for cause. This proposition is untenable.
It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the
first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the
course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a
government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if
said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office.
The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties
correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample
opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of
the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys
and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct,
oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and
actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty
inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and
morale of the service.14
The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the
punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the
preservation of the public's faith and confidence in the government. 15
The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by
substantial evidence, such findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding
on this Court.16 It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency
on the sufficiency of evidence.17 Thus, when confronted with conflicting versions of factual matters, it
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is for the administrative agency concerned in the exercise of discretion to determine which party
deserves credence on the basis of the evidence received.18 The rule, therefore, is that courts of
justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical
manner such that their action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction. 19
We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no compelling reason to
deviate from the findings of the CSC and the Court of Appeals. The written admission of Remolona is
replete with details that could have been known only to him. No ill-motive or bad faith was ever
imputed to Director Pasion who conducted the investigation. The presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed remains unrebutted.
The transmittal of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the formal hearing before the
CSC is entirely a matter of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 of this Court clearly states that in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, it
is within the discretion of the Court of Appeals to have the original records of the proceedings under
review transmitted to it.20 Verily, the Court of Appeals decided the merits of the case on the bases of
the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the pleadings filed by the parties.
We likewise find no merit in the contention of Remolona that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh
considering that there was no damage caused to the government since the certificate of rating was
never used to get an appointment for his wife, Nery Remolona. Although no pecuniary damage was
incurred by the government, there was still falsification of an official document that constitutes gross
dishonesty which cannot be countenanced, considering that he was an accountable officer and
occupied a sensitive position.21 The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.22
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45685
November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for
respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review
the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The
People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and
thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining
further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction
rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano
Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine
Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad
interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
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The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on
October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the
case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine
jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony
and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934,
rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate
penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision
mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence
to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years,
six months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial
which were denied on December 17, 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on
December 18, 1935. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition forcertiorari in
November, 1936. This court, on
November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed
by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and
thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng on
November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act
No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his
petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal
record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila,
Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office
which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of
Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5,
1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by
section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1),
Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its
applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the
provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or
otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary
opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with
respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding
that "las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y
que todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia" and
concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the
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crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition
for probation for the reason that:
. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia
social que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario
acreedor de la misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las
suspicacias, podria levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite atisbar
en los procedimientos ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia
de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones enteramente differentes,
en menoscabo del interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto
judicial.
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the
resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This was
supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The aforesaid
motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of
counsel for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case
as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court.
Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid motion subsequently filed a
petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion for
leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu
Unjieng on the evening of July 30, 1937, and that he signed the same "without mature deliberation
and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person who invited me (him)."
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance
of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.
On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene
as amici curiaeaforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same and that, at all
events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were
members of the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August 10, 1937,
herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for
intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned
date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in
preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for
Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The
respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but
proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to
the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and
submitted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein
petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was
an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this
Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent
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inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a
temporary restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein
petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his
jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under
probation for the following reason:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply
only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to
chartered cities like the City of Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the
absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the City of
Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also true that Act
No. 4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only to those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a
probation officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not
be applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by
section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Officer willing to act
for the City of Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being
different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for
probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in
excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit
Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying
Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that:
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the
granting or denying of applications for probation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on
June 28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its rendition.
(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or
change the same.
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III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime
for which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous
but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation
of the respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became
imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to
commit his co-respondent to jail.
Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a
system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is
unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of
the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial
board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their
respective provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial
boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the
Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for
the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2,
Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First
Instance of different provinces without uniformity. In another supplementary petition dated
September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of
the Philippine Islands, concurs for the first time with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding
the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further
elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an
encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves. On
October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act No. 4221
not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive, but also constitute an unwarranted
delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On October 9, 1937,
two memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the
People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and
the other contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power,
were presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day,
October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection
of the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and, further, that the whole
Act is void: that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity of its laws; that the
private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the probation law as
unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the constitutional question in prohibition
proceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and
memorandums, challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the petitioners.
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As special defenses, respondents allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of
the writ of certiorari or of prohibition.
(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners is
the very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court and was still pending
resolution before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of
judgment before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
the same under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First
Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the execution will lie, this court
nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance has assumed
jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves.
(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial
court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be
tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court while sitting
in the probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."
(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question
submitted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action would not lie
because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although the
Probation Law does not specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal from
a resolution of the Court of First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this
jurisdiction that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to the
superior court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and executory for the reason that
the said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial within
the requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to resolve in view of
the restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.
lawphi1.net
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of the
trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to
the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing of the said
motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not
appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ
ofcertiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the
accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism
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because the accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an
irregular exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner
to file a motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial court could
have an opportunity to correct or cure the same.
(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court
retains its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with law
and justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts
and may be exercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition in
the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent
allege, said court cannot order execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the
appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation will be closed from the moment
the accused commences to serve his sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed.
[2d], 827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No.
4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional
memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section 11
of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in addition, that the private
prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the validity of Act No.
4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from questioning the validity of
the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first time before this court; that probation in
unavailable; and that, in any event, section 11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the
Act. The last memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed
out of time but was admitted by resolution of this court and filed anew on
November 5, 1937.
This memorandum elaborates on some of the points raised by the respondents and refutes those
brought up by the petitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we
noted that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng and in denying said application assumed the task not only of considering the merits of
the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final
pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt be final judgment.
While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense,
this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or
indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs,
averments, and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this court in Shioji vs.
Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of
First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be
no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands
conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the
intergrated judicial system of the nation.
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After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the
respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental
questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been
properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is
constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental questions
raised by the parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is
necessary. It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases
and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp.
76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary
actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the
remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus,
in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the
constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see, also, 12
C. J., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259
[affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed.,
845]), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo
warrantobrought in the name of the Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that the
constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783;
Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an
application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs.
Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for preliminary injunction where the
determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.)
The same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47
Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28
Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited).
The case ofYu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve years ago was, like the
present one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972,
popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the
constitutional issue was not met squarely by the respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised
"relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in
prohibition." This court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices
dissenting, held that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States which reversed the judgment of this court and held that the
Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question of jurisdiction, however, the
Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice, said:
By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme
court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior
tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts
are exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that
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court that the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a
defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court.
(Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in this case where a
new act seriously affected numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to
cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue
to the act's validity promptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly administration
of justice. The court relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52
Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs.
Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas.,
1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37
Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise
by demurrer to the petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both
parties ask a decision on the merits. In view of the broad powers in prohibition granted to
that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties.
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction
and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The
general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of prohibition will not lie
whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is
questioned, because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the
constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the
complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of
prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an
unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50
C. J., 670; Ex parte Round tree [1874, 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs.
Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84 A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs.
Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec.,
669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No.
4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons
after their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. It is true that at
common law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of the sentence is
recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including those of Massachusetts, Michigan,
New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874],
115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs.
Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the
leading case of Ex parte United States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E,
1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States
expressed the opinion that under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary
suspension, and brushed aside the contention as to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief
Justice White:
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws
and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to
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be conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently
possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to
wisely exert their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to
power here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets
inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of the proposition urged
upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is
observed that indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for
crime is legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the
purpose of executing the statute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise
beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed
by law and ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive
department.
Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge of
First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the conclusion
that the power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in
the judicial function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory authority, it does not
lie within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.) Both petitioner and
respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation
proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred
exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.
It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for
prohibition where the question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by
objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby
[1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional
issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the
trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of
the court below, declined to pass upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not
being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The respondent
judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762),
and McGlue vs. Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the
proposition that a court will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one
who has no interest in defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The
respondent judge further stated that it may not motu proprio take up the constitutional question and,
agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge,
conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he
can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility"
(Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is
constitutional. While therefore, the court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised
before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it was not raised by a proper party.
Respondents herein reiterates this view. The argument is advanced that the private prosecution has
no personality to appear in the hearing of the application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of
constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general rule, only those
who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision,
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it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the
jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the
constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons
interested in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to
concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not
follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is
true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity,
so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also,Cadwallader-Gibson
Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits
of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question
affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135,
144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the
question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on
appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on
the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a
determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville
& B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis Cordage Co. [1908], 214
Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co., [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.)
And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any
time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57
S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time
before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional
question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of
the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a
proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if
Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the
present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state
can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer
([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277
U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action
instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkins ([1889], 73
Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General,
instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining
corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was
unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer
of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general rule, only those
who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision,
it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where the
jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality
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will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect
to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue was
not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be
here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario,
26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the
exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality
of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases,
although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the
first time at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even
in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question,
though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary
to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S.
W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo. 685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs.
St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional
question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the
court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to
consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings,
we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the
hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private
prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not now
have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the
Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the
Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a
substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the
validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259
(affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed.,
845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of
the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312;
41 N.W., 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto
proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the
statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the
obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the
constitutionality of the statute was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through
Champlin, J.:
. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law
enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of
usurpation their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate
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answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is
unconstitutional, it is statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving
effect to justify action under it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the
supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow . . . The
legislature and the respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such constitutional
questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party
affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: "The people have a deep and vested
interest in maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of legislative
powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was
brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In
disposing of the question whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of
Kansas said:
. . . the state is a proper party indeed, the proper party to bring this action. The state is
always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.
"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded,
and need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds of fearing more
specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs.
Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General,
or county attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to
have the matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity (State vs.
Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience
to its terms (State vs. Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain
proceedings under its questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan.
App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197
S. W., 1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La.,
597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of
Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119
N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited, the
Supreme Court of Luisiana said:
It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the
duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of
the argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of
Tenth Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare,
Mayor of New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs.
Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not
forbid a district attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds if in conflict with
one which it is his duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the
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ruling was the judge should not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be
unconstitutional forbid the district attorney to file a bill of information charging a person with a
violation of the statute. In other words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute
unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it
must be decided in order to determine the right of a party litigant. Stateex rel. Nicholls,
Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition merely that an officer on whom a statute
imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he
considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from
responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority for
the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer,
should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the
ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.
It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to
support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in
conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two
statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is
compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is
unconstitutional. If it were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from
constitutional limitations in the enactment of criminal laws.
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the
state may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the
opposite direction. In fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated
is sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be invoked by the City Fiscal in
behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that
the validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act
and, not authorized challenge the validity of the Act in its application outside said city. (Additional
memorandum of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and 23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has
not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly
regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines
estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only
when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not
been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all
others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts
in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary
to the resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question with firmness,
where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature,
renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points." (Ex
parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9
Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary
whenever it is essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs.
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Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas.
1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272]; Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs.
Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co., vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N.
W., 605), as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked.
(12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagrara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney
vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws
his privilege to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the
Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed
upon by the courts; that may persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have
applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely take
advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been
at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on
the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has
assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385;
[1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207
N.Y., 533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327;
133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil.,
304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch
as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these
proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the
interest of the public welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we have determined to
overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have
here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this
point was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in support
of the view we have taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been
properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the
Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and
section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid
because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the
Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting aside
a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature
approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of
upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question
of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government
itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil.,
250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained
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by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have
taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this
oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the
Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations
of two of the three grand departments of the governments. (6 R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that
peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed
through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts
will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too
plain to require a citation of authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention to
the fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the
constitutionality of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question
was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity and
independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the President in his message dated
September 1, 1937, recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation
Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the Nationality
Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said
bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken
out from the statute books of the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It
is sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised
his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons which he may deem proper for taking
such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination of actual controversies
submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any manner
insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad constitutional power of veto but
which happens to be at the same time pending determination in this court is a question of propriety
for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these
circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking
what in our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary for us
to make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are
independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government
independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics,
indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see
it and as we understand it.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act
encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in
force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the
Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit
fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art. VII, sec. 11,
subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some respects. The
adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the
Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the
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offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2;In
re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like
the President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought
to light. The framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state
constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after conviction". So, too,
under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is
also the rule generally followed in the United States (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II,
sec. 2). The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an
impeachment; "but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and
determined, it is not understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." (Vide,
Ex parte Wells [1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323;
12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St., 457; 23 am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the
distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal from
office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole punishment
attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence,
inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment,
depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and
incapacity to hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes specific mention
of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such
conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the
President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly. We need
not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental changes. It is sufficient for our purposes
to state that the pardoning power has remained essentially the same. The question is: Has the
pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The
exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else.
". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by
any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or
authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning power,
since no person properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise any powers appertaining
to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution." (20 R.C.L., pp., ,
and cases cited.) " . . . where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or
implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such power itself
nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp.
838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then, confers any pardoning power upon the courts it is
for that reason unconstitutional and void. But does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Ex parte United
States [1916], 242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas.
1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed the
opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary
suspension and that the right to suspend sentenced absolutely and permanently was vested in the
executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish
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probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief Justice: ". . . and so far as the
future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of penalties as fixed to be subject, by
probation legislation or such other means as the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial
discretion as may be adequate to enable courts to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise
discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to them for judgment, recourse must be had
Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very nature of things adequately
complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National
Probation Association and others to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a federal probation
law. Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap. 521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18, sec.
724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and expenses of a certain number
of probation officers chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the
Supreme Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person sentenced
to imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power under
the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at which sentence
was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of the probation Act
was not considered but was assumed. The court traced the history of the Act and quoted from the
report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (Report No.
1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the following statement:
Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised
a form of probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state
probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States, 242 U.S., 27;
61 L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the
Supreme Court denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentenced. In the same
opinion the court pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to
exercise probation powers in the future . . .
Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation
legislation. In 1917, a bill was favorably reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed the
House. In 1920, the judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to the
House, but it was never reached for definite action.
If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference
to its treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the
states of the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law, and in all but twelve
states the law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders. (see, also, Johnson, Probation for
Juveniles and Adults [1928], Chap. I.)
The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. In
Riggs vs. United States supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:
Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration
have been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and
the constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach
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upon the pardoning power of the President. This case will be found to contain an able and
comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider,
and to it and the authorities cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d],
590, 594), as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit
(Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the Probation Act.
We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal
language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a
federal probation law as actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has been
assumed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently sustained by the
inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may
legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal
offenses. This conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542;
L.R.A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province of the Legislature
to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum
punishment." And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann.
Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The legislative power to set punishment for crime is very broad,
and in the exercise of this power the general assembly may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the
largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment
and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918],
108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the
penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the
courts particularly the trial courts large discretion in imposing the penalties which the law
prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in
the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict,
peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a
sentence merely because, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by
the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts being allowed in such case
to submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem
proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law provides for a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset one
another in consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the
result of such compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui
[1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the
courts to determine, within the limits of each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains
three periods, the extent of the evil produced by the crime. In the imposition of fines, the courts are
allowed to fix any amount within the limits established by law, considering not only the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, but more particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised
Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of the same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall
be imposed" upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who has not acted without
discernment, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime
which he has committed. Article 69 of the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete selfdefense", i.e., when the crime committed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of
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the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases
mentioned in article 11 and 12 of the Code, "the courts shall impose the penalty in the period which
may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or
lacking." And, in case the commission of what are known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having
in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon
him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.)
Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is deducted
form the entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art. 29); the
death penalty is not imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years of age, or where
upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are not
unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty (art. 47, see also,
sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3); the death
sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the
sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of age (art. 83); and when
a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, or while he
is serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the
personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal laws
is more clearly demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act. There is the
Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act
No. 4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting the courts large discretion in
imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended provides; "hereafter, in imposing
a prison sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
said Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same." Certain classes of convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded from the
operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203)
which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the
amendatory Act have become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of the
Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the National
Assembly. In this Act is again manifested the intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal
laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular cases of the penalties prescribed by law by
permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after
due hearing and after investigation of the particular circumstances of the offenses, the criminal
record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in reality decreed that in
certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of
probation are faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act comes in
conflict with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the
language of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for the
commission of a wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and within the
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limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of criminal
causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do." (Ex parte Bates, supra.) In Williams vs.
State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia
probation statute against the contention that it attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning
power lodged by the constitution in the governor alone is vested with the power to pardon after final
sentence has been imposed by the courts, the power of the courts to imposed any penalty which
may be from time to time prescribed by law and in such manner as may be defined cannot be
questioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it unlawful
for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by
probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive. (In
re Webb [1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W., 177; 9 Am. Crim.,
Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182 Pac., 927; Ex
parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041; 132 Am.
St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill, 287; 67 N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95
Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144;
150 S. W., 162;Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361;111 Pac., 291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga.,
509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E. 858; State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921],
43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton
[1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer vs.
Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5;
Murphy vs. States [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18
Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac., 392; Ex parte De
Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac.,
425; Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50;
91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise
[1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R.
A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle [1909], 156
Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs.
District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E.,
274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl., 875; State
vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parteBates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A.,
1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288;
23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55
Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928; People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn
[1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169;
149 N. W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918],
108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E.,
6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn.,
100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State
[1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165
S. W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932],
122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W.
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[2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802; 109
S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel. Tingstand vs.
Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to follow this long
catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the legislature to suspend
sentence by the establishment of a system of probation however characterized. State ex rel.
Tingstand vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393), deserved particular
mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided for the suspension of the execution
of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and required that the convicted person be placed
under the charge of a parole or peace officer during the term of such suspension, on such terms as
the court may determine, was held constitutional and as not giving the court a power in violation of
the constitutional provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide,
also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and
different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions
([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court
of Appeals of New York said:
. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as
understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their
nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of the
executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the
court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil
disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches
both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the
punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is
as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and
disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parteGarland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law. ed.,
366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149;
24 Law. ed., 442.)
The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the
principles governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments
upon the executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the
constitution were used to express the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or
by its representatives in the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed.,
421.) As this power was understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions
to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves and
pardons should abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its
own judgments, that criminal courts has so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and
different in their nature and character, were still left separate and distinct, the one to be
exercised by the executive, and the other by the judicial department. We therefore conclude
that a statute which, in terms, authorizes courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence
in certain cases after conviction, a power inherent in such courts at common law, which
was understood when the constitution was adopted to be an ordinary judicial function, and
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which, ever since its adoption, has been exercised of legislative power under the
constitution. It does not encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the executive, as
they have been understood and practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with approval in
Directors of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson, J.,
concurring, at pp. 294, 295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under
the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on
probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely terminated and the
probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been
terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found
that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the
period of probation, remains in legal custody subject to the control of the probation officer and of
the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and,
when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him.
(Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.)
The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far
from it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in
substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason its
application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed
applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal
law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no
conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for
this cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence.
Snodgrass vs. State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162), is
relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the power
to grant pardons and reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive by the
Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the courts by means of probation law
authorizing the indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We have examined that case and found
that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the probation statute of the state in
terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons to persons convicted of crime, it
also distinguished between suspensions sentence on the one hand, and reprieve and commutation
of sentence on the other. Said the court, through Harper, J.:
That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to
grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it being held that the
distinction between a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones
the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite
time. (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E.,
883), and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be hold in
conflict with the power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a
commutations is not but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment.
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In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme
Court of Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state enacted
in 1913, now found in sections 12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held the law valid
as not impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous decision penned by
Justice Holloway, the court said:
. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood meaning at
the time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend the
suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 1207812086. A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution
of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the
law inflicts for a crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed.,
640); It is a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a forgiveness of
the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49
Am. Rep., 71). "Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a
less penalty for the one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep.,
563; Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the
withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a
postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary
suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373).
Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section
12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been urged against parole
statutes which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the power of
pardon is granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to
the numerous cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,558,
reported in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The
pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and
complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.
(Riggs vs. United States [1926],
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)
2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive and is
not for that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue delegation of
legislative power?
Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate
and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these
departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the
highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
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The power to make laws the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the
Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1,
Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape
its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to
abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare
potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law
through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was established by Lord
Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its
way into America as an enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted
corollary of the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The
classic statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer
the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke
on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted
language: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the
constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the Constitution itself is charged. The power
to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve
itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor
can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the
people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.,
Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the
doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty
to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon
the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at
p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It
admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick
[1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H.,
279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by
local authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities; and hence while the rule is also
fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of the municipalities
exercising local self government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not
regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to
prescribed local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition
of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same
principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the
United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to Congress as a municipality
or city to the state government. (United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also sustained the delegation of
legislative power to the people at large. Some authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C.
J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442;
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Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the question of whether or not a state has ceased to be
republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a
judicial but a political question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56
Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked
upon with favor by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative
courts has been pretty well drawn. (Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488;
23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power may
be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of
the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or
export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the
Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may
by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." It is beyond
the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional
provisions, the President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon
the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and
shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court
adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to
authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and
to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf. Compaia General de
Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.) The general rule, however,
is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules
and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R.
C. L., pp. 177-179.)
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies
endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They
are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of
legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of
the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power
to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendiis at variance but, it can be broadly
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asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action
or the sufficiency thereof in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion.
In some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others
that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does
not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided
in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United States [1925],
295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947; People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson
Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L.,
title "Constitutional Law", sec 174.) In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards
in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply
in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has
been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent
case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority
extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the
various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces
are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at
all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the
provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that
it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The
plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual
surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County
Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec 68.) To the
same effect are the decision of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of
Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil., 660)
andCruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this court sustained the
validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and municipal
boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian
inhabitants to take up their habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial governor
and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held proper for the legislature to vest
in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the
importation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country make
this advisable or if deceased among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and
livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of
details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and
regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own decisions
would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29 Phil., 119;
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Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56
Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39
Phil., 660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the
hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by
proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L.,
116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard
([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United State ruled that the
legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also,
Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to
ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is
a mental process common to all branches of the government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins.
Co., supra; In reVillage of North Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis., 616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938;
Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field vs. Clark [1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup.
Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule
prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and
economic forces at work in this modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX;
Laski, "The Mother of Parliaments", foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard,
"Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the
orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement
in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in the following language
speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle which permits
the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are
such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is
granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the
legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given
circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other
circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative
official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the
ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by
which he is governed." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p.
1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971,
974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come
from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may
be left to such agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26
Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.) The legislature, then may provide that a
contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified
contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the
Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial
board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the
provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial
board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified
contingency. It is bound by no rule, limited by no principle of expendiency announced by the
legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may
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have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing
to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its
pleasure. The fact that at some future time we cannot say when the provincial boards may
appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the
various provinces will not save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet
be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain
specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body
other than legislature itself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the
operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions
provided that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus, section 28,
article I of the Constitution of Texas provides that "No power of suspending laws in this state shall be
exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article I of the Constitution of Indiana provides
"That the operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by authority of the General
Assembly." Yet, even provisions of this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon the
legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or
operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be
enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for
particular localities. In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was
said:
By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth, it
is declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never
to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such
particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that
declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of
rights passed in the reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of
the oppressive acts of James II, tending to subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and
the laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a
power of dispensing with and suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without
consent of parliament. The first article in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the
statute is, that the exercise of such power, by legal authority without consent of parliament, is
illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it is further declared and enacted, that "No
dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be allowed; but the
same should be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such
statute." There is an implied reservation of authority in the parliament to exercise the power
here mentioned; because, according to the theory of the English Constitution, "that absolute
despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere," is intrusted to the
parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160.
The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign
and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is
delegated to them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of the power in
question would be equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his right to protection,
"according to standing laws," whether exercised by one man or by a number of men. It
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cannot be supposed that the people when adopting this general principle from the English
bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to bestow by implication on the
general court one of the most odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of
England. It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and
to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and
advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant one should
be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like
circumstances are exempted.
To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog liable to
the owner of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a knowledge of it
vicious disposition. By a provision of the act, power was given to the board of supervisors to
determine whether or not during the current year their county should be governed by the provisions
of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that the legislature could not confer that
power. The court observed that it could no more confer such a power than to authorize the board of
supervisors of a county to abolish in such county the days of grace on commercial paper, or to
suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman [1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in
Missouri was held void for the same reason in State vs. Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.)
In that case a general statute formulating a road system contained a provision that "if the county
court of any county should be of opinion that the provisions of the act should not be enforced, they
might, in their discretion, suspend the operation of the same for any specified length of time, and
thereupon the act should become inoperative in such county for the period specified in such order;
and thereupon order the roads to be opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in
force." Said the court: ". . . this act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a
former act, and yet it is left to the county court to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The
act does not submit the question to the county court as an original question, to be decided by that
tribunal, whether the act shall commence its operation within the county; but it became by its own
terms a law in every county not excepted by name in the act. It did not, then, require the county court
to do any act in order to give it effect. But being the law in the county, and having by its provisions
superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court is . . .
empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the former act. When the
question is before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is urge
before us that the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative power, which under
our constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the state. In the
present case, the question is not presented in the abstract; for the county court of Saline county,
after the act had been for several months in force in that county, did by order suspend its operation;
and during that suspension the offense was committed which is the subject of the present indictment
. . . ." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other
localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in may
jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the
people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character
which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances.
"They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle
in the highways, may be differently regarded in different localities, and they are sustained on what
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seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not embraced within the ordinary
powers of municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless within the class of public
regulations, in respect to which it is proper that the local judgment should control." (Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that, while we do not deny the right of local selfgovernment and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local
authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general
of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject
of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in
Act No. 4221. True, the statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the
operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the
authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby
are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in
their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to
suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance
until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The
validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions.
(Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)
It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the
expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof.
"Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5
Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of
power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the
representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our
system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular
provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35
Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it should be borne in mind
that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of power and one of these time-honored limitations
is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which
prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1.
Constitution of the Philippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof,
and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal
protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of
the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.)
Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question not
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. (Connolly vs. Union
Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation
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discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable
basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S.,
28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13; Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41
Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The
classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911],
147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; State vs. Cooley, 56
Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79,
55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs.
Clough [1917], 242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Greene
[1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs.
Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation
officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be
in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming
within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while
another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is
obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate
the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which
case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each
and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that
hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of
the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its
provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer which is the
situation now and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the
City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not
made any appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations suggested
show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of
the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be
the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination
and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual
denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law
vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that
section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that
account bad. We see no difference between a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to
be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it
is within the constitutional prohibitions. (By analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275;
23 Law. ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia
[1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed., 567;
Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S., 703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U.
S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42
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Law. ed., 1012; Bailey vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed.,
Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed.,
1154.) In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation
(General Oil Co. vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs.
Clement Nat. Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If the law has the effect
of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases,
109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs.
Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W.,
1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act
be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but one province may
appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year and have probation during that
year and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent
years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here
indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of
laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a
rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed.,
666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)
lawph!1.net
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United States
([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that there was a
denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman vs. Lewis)
decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the equality clause does not
require territorial uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this case concerns the right to
preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58. No question
of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the equal protection of the laws was
the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of the City of Manila
(Act No. 813) and providing in section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first instance
of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination
in any case where the prosecuting attorney, after a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have
presented an information against him in proper form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the
arguments and the decision indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney although
not in the form had in the provinces was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila,
considering the peculiar conditions of the city as found and taken into account by the legislature
itself.
Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a
situation where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state from
final judgments of any circuit court, except those in certain counties for which counties the
constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The provision
complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that makes the
apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is
also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.
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Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the
next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.
In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and
the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into
a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the
constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process.
(Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in
Williams vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated
the well-established rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language:
. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order
to do this, the valid portion must be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislative would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they
could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86
N. E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District,
99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid
statute, which carries out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E.,
798.) The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main
purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L.
R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26
L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs.
Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich,
124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no
legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the
legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate.
(State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs.
Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U. S.,
601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.)
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers
were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may be
enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact that said section is, in our
opinion, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section
what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large
number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of that system. The clear
policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the
application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial
boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those
provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation
officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is
divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the
provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a
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probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without
a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.
Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer.
Every probation officer is given, as to the person placed in probation under his care, the powers of
the police officer. It is the duty of the probation officer to see that the conditions which are imposed
by the court upon the probationer under his care are complied with. Among those conditions, the
following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;
(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;
(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;
(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or
elsewhere;
(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer
concerning his conduct or condition; "(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g) Shall
remain or reside within a specified place or locality;
(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses
caused by his offense;
(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and
(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation,
promulgated in accordance with law.
The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of probation.
Under section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the submission of a report of the probation
officer and appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has complied with the conditions of
probation that probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from
supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is non-compliance with said conditions, as
reported by the probation officer, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said
probationer may be committed with or without bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity to be
heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the probation, and if revoked, the court shall order
the execution of the sentence originally imposed. Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation
officers: "It shall be the duty of every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation
under his supervision a statement of the period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct
them concerning the same; to keep informed concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and
encourage them by friendly advice and admonition, and by such other measures, not inconsistent
with the conditions imposed by court as may seem most suitable, to bring about improvement in their
conduct and condition; to report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said probationers at
least once every two months concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work;
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make such report as are necessary for the information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter
may require; and to perform such other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation
officer and as the court or judge may direct. The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as
parole officers for any penal or reformatory institution for adults when so requested by the authorities
thereof, and, when designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole officer of persons
released on parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without additional
compensation."
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the
provinces under section 10 of Act which provides as follows:
There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and
control, a Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by
the Governor-General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary
of four eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out
of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand
pesos to be disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is hereby authorized to appoint
probation officers and the administrative personnel of the probation officer under civil service
regulations from among those who possess the qualifications, training and experience
prescribed by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix the compensation of such probation
officers and administrative personnel until such positions shall have been included in the
Appropriation Act.
But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section are
clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section 11. It
may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10 abovequoted are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office known as the
Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Chief
Probation Officer. When the law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make
reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4); that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit the
probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall report to the "probationer officer" (sec.
3, par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer" to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully answer any
reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3,
par. 4); that the court shall notify "the probation officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation
(sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation officer who is in charge of a particular probationer in a
particular province. It never could have been intention of the legislature, for instance, to require the
probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer in the City of Manila, or to require a
probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him under
his care, to supervise his conduct, to instruct him concerning the conditions of his probation or to
perform such other functions as are assigned to him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are
provinces or groups of provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing on what the law
may be or should be and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom
and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is.
But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there.
Not for any purpose not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government
defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them
should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to
carry out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the salaries of probation
officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to receive such compensations as
the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation
Act". It was the intention of the legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of
the probation officers in the provinces or later on to include said salaries in an appropriation act.
Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other
things, the salaries of the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the
amount can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the
provinces. We take judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do
not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central
office, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than
that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said
act is complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in
our case there can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers.
Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have
been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the
"individualization of the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal
and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid in the
rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be reformed and
their development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity
for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of reform. (United
States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309; 312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The Welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The
benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while we believe that probation is
commendable as a system and its implantation into the Philippines should be welcomed, we are
forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of the repugnancy to our fundamental
law.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by
able counsel for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We have
examined the cases brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short
time at our command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the examination of the cases and
in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action which in
our opinion, is supported better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the general welfare.
(Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the conflict of authorities, we have
declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases brought to our attention, except where the point
or principle is settled directly or by clear implication by the more authoritative pronouncements of the
Supreme Court of the United States. This line of approach is justified because:
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(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United
States and the dual character of the American Government is a situation which does not
obtain in the Philippines;
(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with reference to
the Federal Government of the United States is not the situation of the province with respect
to the Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th Amendment, Constitution of the
United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871),
(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not
embrace the integrated judicial system of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran
[1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 1317);
(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New
York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . . new
developments of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co. vs.
Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX,
No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view
existing local conditions and environment.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly,
granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
No. L-76633. October 18, 1988.*

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER
ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.
Labor; Overseas Employment; Appeals; Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, proper;
General rule that decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the NLRC; Case at bar
comes under one of the exceptions, as the questions raised are questions of law; Absence of
objection by private respondent to petitioners direct resort to the Supreme Court.Ordinarily,
the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, on
the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its
subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the questions the
petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. Moreover, the private respondent herself has not
objected to the petitioners direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay
the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
Same; Same; Overseas employment and contract worker, defined; These definitions clearly
apply to the employee as he died under a contract of employment with petitioner alongside
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
petitioners vessel berthed in a foreign country.Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on
Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined as employment of a worker outside the
Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid
contract. A contract worker is described as any person working or who has worked overseas under
a valid employment contract and shall include seamen or any person working overseas or who has
been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner
under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen. These definitions clearly apply to
Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the
petitioner and alongside the petitioners vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign
country.
Same; Same; Same; Submission by petitioner of shipping articles to POEA and payments of
contributions to the Welfare Fund are tacit recognition of the nature of the employees
appointment at the time of his death.It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least
two acts which constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Sacos employment at the time
of his death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing,
formalization and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under
Executive Order No. 797. The second is its payment of the contributions mandated by law and
regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 for the
purpose of providing social and welfare services to Filipino overseas workers.
Same; Same; Receipt prepared by the office administering the Welfare Fund described the
subject of burial benefits as an overseas contract worker.Significantly, the office administering
this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondents signature, described the subject of
the burial benefits as overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco. While this receipt is certainly not
controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioners own previous acts, that the petitioner and
the Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.
Same; Same; Award of death benefits and burial expenses under Memorandum Circular of
the POEA.; Circular prescribing a standard contract by foreign and domestic shipping
companies deemed written into the contract with the employee and a postulate of the police
power of the State.The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial
expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became
effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both
foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
A similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board and had been sustained
in a number of cases by this Court. The petitioner claims that it had never entered into such a
contract with the deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should
have done so as required by the circular, which specifically declared that all parties to the
employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use
this employment contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of
employment contract effective that date. In the second place, even if it had not done so, the
provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with Saco as a
postulate of the police power of the State.
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Same; Same; Delegation of power; Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of
the law cannot be delegated; What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the
law may be enforced.The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion
as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the
discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment
of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
Same; Same; Same; Accepted tests to determine whether or not there is valid delegation of
legislative power.There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz., the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to
prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
Same; Same; Same; Principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the 3 major
powers of the government, but is especially important in the case of the legislative power.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many
instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers
have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative
power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had
led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its nondelegation the exception.
Same; Same; Same; Reason for the frequent delegation of power by the legislature.The
reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society
has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot
be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.
Same; Same; Same; Reasons for delegation of legislative powers are particularly applicable
to administrative bodies; Delegated power to issue rules to carry out the general provisions
of the statute is called power of subordinate legislation.The reasons given above for the
delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With
the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority
to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the power of
subordinate legisla-tion.
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Same; Same; Same; Administrative bodies implement the broad policies by promulgating
their supplemental regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code.With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on
the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Same; Same; Same; Memorandum Circular No. 2 which prescribes a model contract is not
challenged by the employer.Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.
The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of cases without
challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in
requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in
the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of
overseas Filipino workers to fair and equitable employment practices.
Same; Same; Same; Sufficient standards of delegation of legislative power.Parenthetically, it
is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards public interest in People v.
Rosenthal, justice and equity in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, public convenience and welfare in
Calalang v. Williams, and simplicity, economy and efficiency in Cervantes v. Auditor General, to
mention only a few cases. In the United States, the sense and experience of men was accepted in
Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and national security in Hirabayashi v. United States.
Same; Same; Same; Payment of death benefit pension, funeral benefit burial gratuity to
private respondent will not preclude allowance of private respondents claim against
petitioner which is specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino
seamen.It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit
pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid of P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the
Social Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial
gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance
of the private respondents claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the
standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of
1984.
Same; Same; Same; Provisions under the standard contract of employment for Filipino
seamen pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 2 are manifestations of the State for the
working class consistently with the social justice and protection of the working class
provisions of the Constitution.The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the
State for the working class, consistently with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in
the Constitution calling for the protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest.
Same; Same; Same; Due process, not a case of; Administrative agencies vested with two
basic powers, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial; Power of administrative agencies to
promulgate implementing rules and regulations and interprets and applies them, not violative
of due process as long as the cardinal rights in the Ang Tibay vs. CIR case are observed.
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One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close this case. Its argument that it has
been denied due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has
also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative
agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first
enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to
interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates
on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and Exchange
Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram
Regulatory Board and Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources
and so on ad infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been
accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process
as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations are observed.
Same; Same; Same; Doubts regarding the rights of the parties are resolved in favor of private
respondent under the principle that those with less in life should have more in law.
Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor
of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that
those with less in life should have more in law.
Same; Same; Same; When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the
scales of social justice, capital should be counterbalanced with sympathy and compassion
the law must accord to labor.When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on
the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counterbalanced by the
sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to
be given the opportunityand the rightto assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as
a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of
capital but its active and equal partner. [Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, 166 SCRA
533(1988)]

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.
Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is
challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case
as the husband was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been
filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted
of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the
errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the
questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent
himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure
would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797,
promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to
protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the
Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employeeemployer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract
workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on
Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other benefits"
arising out of such employment. 2
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not
compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee
and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to
appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission.
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas
employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined
as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying
international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is described as "any person
working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen" 4 or
"any person working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local employer,
foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include
seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under
a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern
Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 6
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit
recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its
submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the
exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797. 7 The
second is its payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for
Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and welfare
services to Filipino overseas workers."
Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent's
signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano
Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own
previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be
an overseas employee.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the
Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered
overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its
shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the
Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly
appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the definitions given be considered seamen
nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the
POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984.
This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier
been required by the National Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this
Court. 10 The petitioner claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but
that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as required by the circular,
which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any
ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01 February 1984
and to desist from using any other format of employment contract effective that date." In the second
place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into
the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the
POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents
an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No.
797, reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had
itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the
POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive
contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, notwhat the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter
subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate Court 12 which annulled
Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase "may
see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden
with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still,
the limitations that the officers must observe when they make their distribution. There
is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee
as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving
commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation
of legislative powers.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many
instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers
have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative
power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had
led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its nondelegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society
has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot
be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant
peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute.
This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed
thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer.
The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is
not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers
to "fair and equitable employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest"
in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience and
welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor
General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was
accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United
States. 20
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It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of
P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social
Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from
the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private
respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract
of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that
Section C. Compensation and Benefits.
1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall
pay his beneficiaries the amount of:
a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers
b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and
master electrician
c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.
2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate
and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is
entitled to under Philippine laws. ...
3. ...
c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the
owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not
exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses.
The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the
National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows:
Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.
All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the
Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be granted,
in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the seaman or his
beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment contract approved by the
NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law and the Philippine
Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance
with such laws.
The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class,
consistently with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the
protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest.
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been
denied due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also
sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative
agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first
enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to
interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates
on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and Exchange
Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram
Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources
and so on ad infinitumon their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been
accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process
as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations 21 are observed.
Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor
of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that
those with less in life should have more in law.
When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law
must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the
right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which
he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal
partner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary
restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
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G.R. No. 111812. May 31, 1995.*

DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Civil Service Commission; Administrative Law; Test of a Valid Subordinate Legislation;
Statutory Construction; In subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies, all
that may be reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of
administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing
or enabling statute.Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of
detail in the statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the
governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little
need (or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability
of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively
complex subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies
so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated
legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by
the governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied in respect of Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.
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Same; Same; Retirement; The extension of service of government retirees who have reached
sixty-five years of age is an area that is covered by both P.D. 1146 and the Administrative
Code of 1987.We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the
present Civil Service lawfound in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25
July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987and not alone P.D. No. 1146,
otherwise known as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977. For the matter of
extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is
covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. This is crystal clear from
examination of many provisions of the present civil service law.
Same; Same; Same; The physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing
in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be
expected from individual persons.We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of
permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no
reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service
Law. The physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in
fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons.
Same; Same; Same; Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more
specifically par. 1 thereof, is valid and effective, and the doctrine in Cena v. Civil Service
Commission, 211 SCRA 179 (1992), is modified accordingly.Our conclusion is that the doctrine
of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective.
Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No.
27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is
vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or
employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of
government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions
of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990. [Rabor vs. Civil Service Commission,
244 SCRA 614(1995)]

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 111812 May 31, 1995

DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
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FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the
government service as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years.
Sometime in May 1991, 1 Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City,
advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached the age of
sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government
service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" 2 issued by the
Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this "Certificate
of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years
service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the following date "2/28/91."
Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional Director of
the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the
foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action [should] be taken on this matter."
In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City Mayor
Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:
Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C.
No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which is hereunder
quoted:
Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained the service, except
for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall
not exceed six (6) months.
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador [M.]
Rabor as Utility Worker in that office, is already non-extend[i]ble. 3
Accordingly, on 8 August l991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter of Director
Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for work effective August 16, 1991." 4
Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated 14 August 1991, asking
for extension of his services in the City Government until he "shall have completed the fifteen (15)
years service [requirement] in the Government so that [he] could also avail of the benefits of the
retirement laws given to employees of the Government." The extension he was asking for was about
two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and very able to perform the duties and
functions of [his] position as Utility Worker," Rabor sought "extension of [his] service as an exception
to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President." 5 This request was denied by Director
Cawad on 15 August 1991.
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29 January 1992 seeking
reconsideration of the decision of Director Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the President referred Mr.
Rabor's letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission on 5 March 1992.
In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service Commission dismissed the
appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the action of Director Cawad embodied in the latter's letter of 26
July 1991. This Resolution stated in part:
In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be allowed to continue rendering services as
Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) year service requirement under
P.D. 1146.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part:
1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to
complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement shall be
allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are
regular members of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of not exceeding one (1)
year.
Considering that as early as October 18, 1988, Rabor was already due for
retirement, his request for further extension of service cannot be given due
course. 6 (Emphasis in the original)
On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-594 of the Civil Service
Commission this time invoking the Decision of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service
Commission. 7 Petitioner also asked for reinstatement with back salaries and benefits, having been
separated from the government service effective 16 August 1991. Rabor's motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Commission.
Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the Office of the Mayor, Davao City, again
requesting that he be allowed to continue rendering service to the Davao City Government as Utility
Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement under P.D. No. 1146. This
request was once more denied by Mayor Duterte in a letter to petitioner dated 19 May 1993. In this
letter, Mayor Duterte pointed out that, underCena grant of the extension of service was discretionary
on the part of the City Mayor, but that he could not grant the extension requested. Mayor Duterte's
letter, in relevant part, read:
The matter was referred to the City Legal Office and the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, in the advent of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Cena
vs. CSC, et al. (G.R. No. 97419 dated July 3, 1992), for legal opinion. Both the City
Legal Officer and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission are one in these
opinion that extending you an appointment in order that you may be able to complete
the fifteen-year service requirement is discretionary [on the part of] the City Mayor.
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
Much as we desire to extend you an appointment but circumstances are that we can
no longer do so.As you are already nearing your 70th birthday may no longer be able
to perform the duties attached to your position. Moreover, the position you had
vacated was already filled up.
We therefore regret to inform you that we cannot act favorably on your
request. 8 (Emphases supplied)
At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a Letter/Petition dated 6 July 1993
appealing from Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 and from Mayor Duterte's letter of 10 May 1993.
The Court required petitioner Rabor to comply with the formal requirements for instituting a special
civil action ofcertiorari to review the assailed Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In turn, the
Commission was required to comment on petitioner's Letter/Petition. 9 The Court subsequently noted
petitioner's Letter of 13 September 1993 relating to compliance with the mentioned formal requirements
and directed the Clerk of Court to advise petitioner to engage the services of counsel or to ask for legal
assistance from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 10
The Civil Service Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its comment on 16
November 1993. The Court then resolved to give due course to the Petition and required the parties
to file memoranda. Both the Commission and Mr. Rabor (the latter through PAO counsel) did so.
In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls squarely within the ruling of this
Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission. 11
Upon the other hand, the Commission seeks to distinguish this case from Cena. The Commission,
through the Solicitor General, stressed that in Cena, this Court had ruled that the employer agency,
the Land Registration Authority of the Department of Justice, was vested with discretion to grant to
Cena the extension requested by him. The Land Registration Authority had chosen not to exercise
its discretion to grant or deny such extension. In contrast, in the instant case, the Davao City
Government did exercise its discretion on the matter and decided to deny the extension sought by
petitioner Rabor for legitimate reasons.
While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old, the Court considers that it must reexamine the
doctrine ofCena and the theoretical and policy underpinnings thereof. 12
We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena.
Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metropolitan Manila,
on 16 July 1987. He reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on 22 January
1991. By the latter date, his government service would have reached a total of eleven (11) years,
nine (9) months and six (6) days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena requested the Secretary of
Justice, through the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to
extend his service to complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the
full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. If Cena's request were
JHAPZ VILLARIA
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
granted, he would complete fifteen (15) years of government service on 15 April 1994, at the age of
sixty-eight (68) years.
The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission on whether or not Cena's
request could be granted considering that Cena was covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27,
Series of 1990. On 17 October 1990, the Commission allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his
service from 22 January 1991 to 22 January 1992 under its Memorandum Circular No. 27.
Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without success. He then came to this Court, claiming
that he was entitled to an extension of three (3) years, three (3) months and twenty-four (24) days to
complete the fifteen-year service requirement for retirement with full benefits under Section 11 (b) of
P.D. No. 1146.
This Court granted Cena' s petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992. Speaking through Mr. Justice
Medialdea, the Court held that a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of
government service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age
Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government service for such period of time as
may be necessary to "fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement. The Court also
held that the authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one vested in the head of the
agency concerned. Thus the Court concluded:
Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) and
Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to
extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government to complete the fifteen-year
service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D.
1146. 13 (Emphases supplied)
The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning"
of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety:
Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a
member who
(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;
(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and
(3) is separated from the service.
(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be
compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with at least fifteen (15)
years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he
shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed the fifteen (15) years.
(Emphases supplied)
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has often been invoked in
respect of retirement statutes:
Being remedial in character, a statute granting a pension or establishing [a]
retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of persons
intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well-being of
government employees may be enhanced. 14 (Citations omitted)
While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2)
administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be granted
to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age.
The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, which
should be quoted in its entirety:
TO : ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND AGENCIES OF THE
NATIONAL/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING GOVERNMENT- OWNED
AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS.
SUBJECT : Extension of Service of Compulsory Retiree to Complete the Fifteen
Years Service Requirement for Retirement Purposes.
Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 90-454 dated May 21, 1990, the Civil Service
Commission hereby adopts and promulgates the following policies and guidelines in
the extension of services of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years service
requirement for retirement purposes:
1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to
complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement
shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service
who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one
(1) year.
2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to
complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement
who entered the government service at 57 years of age or over upon
prior grant of authority to appoint him or her, shall no longer be
granted.
3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement of retirement shall be filled not later than
three (3) years prior to the date of compulsory retirement.
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree
who meets the minimum number of years of service for retirement
purposes may be granted for six (6) months only with no further
extension.
This Memorandum Circular shall take effect immediately. (Emphases supplied)
The second administrative issuance Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President,
dated 14 June 1988 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, this Office has been. receiving requests for reinstatement and/or
retention in the service of employees who have reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years, despite the strict conditions provided for in Memorandum Circular
No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as amended.
WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more strictly to the
law providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 years and, in extremely
meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond the age of 65 years to six (6) months
only.
WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 or on the
retention in the service of officials or employees who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 yearsshall not be retained in the service, except for
extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not
exceed six (6) months.
All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the government
including government-owned or controlled corporations, are hereby enjoined to
require their respective offices to strictly comply with this circular.
This Circular shall take effect immediately.
By
authorit
y of the
Preside
nt
(Sgd.)
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JURIS DISCIPULUS
CATALI
NO
MACA
RAIG,
JR.
Executi
ve
Secret
ary
Manila, June 14, 1988. 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative regulations by,
firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the
Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T.
Cena.
We turn first to the Civil Service Commission's Memorandum Circular No. 27. Medialdea, J. wrote:
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of
an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166,
October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators,
L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952,
December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29
SCRA 350). . . . . The rule on limiting to one the year the extension of service of an
employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years,
but has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no
relationship or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into
effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of
carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply
perceived omissions in P.D. 1146. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum No. 27, took a
very narrow view on the question of what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is
permissible and valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted with this Court's earlier ruling
in People v. Exconde, 17 where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:
It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a nondelegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter
may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for
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the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into
effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to
standards that the law prescribes. 18(Emphasis supplied)
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 19 the Court, in sustaining the validity of a MECS Order which established
passing a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a prerequisite for
eligibility for admission into medical schools in the Philippines, said:
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority
by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily
broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v.
Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970])
The standards may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the
non-delegation objection is easily met. The Standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained in Calalang v. William is "safe transit upon the roads."
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the
1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in
Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these
considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the nondelegation principle. 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis partly in the original and partly
supplied)
In Edu v. Ericta, 21 then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the abstract and very general nature of the
standards which our Court has in prior case law upheld as sufficient for purposes of compliance with the
requirements for validity of subordinate or administrative rule-making:
This Court has considered as sufficient standards, "public welfare," (Municipality of
Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 [1917]); "necessary in the
interest of law and order," (Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 [1919]); "public
interest," (People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]); and "justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case," (International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of
Labor, 17 Phil. 602 [1940]). 22 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be
implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling
statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for
implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to
anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex subject
matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so important and
unavoidable. All that may be reasonably; demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation
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consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the
governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied in respect of Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.
We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the present Civil
Service law found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise
known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of
service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by both
statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination of many
provisions of the present civil service law.
Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987 Administrative Code provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
Sec. 12 Powers and Functions. The [Civil Service] Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt
plans and programsto promote economical, efficient and effective personnel
administration in the government;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the development and
retention of aqualified and competent work force in the public service;
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the
Civil Serviceincluding extension of service beyond retirement age;
xxx xxx xxx
(17) Administer the retirement program for government officials and employees, and
accredit government services and evaluate qualifications for retirement;
xxx xxx xxx
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such
other functions as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
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It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil
Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission
was acting as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies,
standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the
government." 23 It was also discharging its function of "administering the retirement program for
government officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement."
In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code with providing
leadership and assistance "in the development and retention of qualified and efficient work force in
the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the "enforcement of the constitutional and statutory
provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement
of government officials and employees" (Section 16 [14]).
We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an
employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane
to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological
processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of
the service that may be expected from individual persons. The policy considerations which guided
the Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of service allowable for compulsory
retirees, were summarized by Grio-Aquino, J. in her dissenting opinion in Cena:
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that
extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1)
give a premium to late-comersin the government service and in effect discriminate
against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the
latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment
of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various
government examination but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who
have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their
government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age
pension. 24 (Emphasis supplied).
Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something that is, in itself,
quite appropriate. At the same time, however, we are bound to note that there should be
countervailing stress on the interests of the employer agency and of other government employees as
a whole. The results flowing from the striking down of the limitation established in Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and inequitable," as suggested by Mme. Justice
Grio-Aquino in her dissenting opinion. An employee who has rendered only three (3) years of
government service at age sixty-five (65) can have his service extended for twelve (12) years and
finally retire at the age of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the significance of the general principle
of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65) very close to the vanishing point.
The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel administration and
management in the Civil Service, are aggravated when Cena is considered together with the case
of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission. 25 Toledo involved the provisions of Rule III, Section 22, of the
Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which prohibited the appointment of
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persons fifty-seven (57) years old or above in government service without prior approval of the Civil
Service Commission. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 provided that a person
fifty-seven (57) years of age may be appointed to the Civil Service provided that the exigencies of the
government service so required and provided that the appointee possesses special qualifications not
possessed by other officers or employees in the Civil Service and that the vacancy cannot be filled by
promotion of qualified officers or employees of the Civil Service. Petitioner Toledo was appointed
Manager of the Education and Information Division of the Commission on Elections when he was almost
fifty-nine (59) years old. No authority for such appointment had been obtained either from the President of
the Philippines or from the Civil Service Commission and the Commission found that the other conditions
laid down in Section 22 of Rule III, CSRPAP, did not exist. The Court nevertheless struck down Section
22, Rule III on the same exceedingly restrictive view of permissible administrative legislation
that Cena relied on. 26
When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very strange results follow. Under
these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age may be appointed to the
government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of his service for the next fourteen
(14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that the general statutory
policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65) years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes
unenforceable. That general statutory policy may be seen to embody the notion that there should be
a certain minimum turn-over in the government service and that opportunities for government service
should be distributed as broadly as possible, specially to younger people, considering that the bulk
of our population is below thirty (30) years of age. That same general policy also reflects the life
expectancy of our people which is still significantly lower than the life expectancy of, e.g., people in
Northern and Western Europe, North America and Japan.
Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is
hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read
together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the
head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow
extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age
without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be
exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of
1990.
We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of
the President dated 14 June 1988. It will be noted from the text quoted supra (pp. 11-12) that the text
itself of Memorandum Circular No. 65 (and for that matter, that of Memorandum Circular No. 163,
also of the Office of the President, dated 5 March 1968) 27 does not purport to apply only to officers or
employees who have reached the age of sixty-five (65) years and who have at least fifteen (l5) years of
government service. We noted earlier that Cena interpreted Memorandum Circular No. 65 as referring
only to officers and employees who have both reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65)
and completed the fifteen (15) years of government service. Cena so interpreted this Memorandum
Circular precisely because Cena had reached the conclusion that employees who have reached sixty-five
(65) years of age, but who have less than fifteen (15) years of government service, may be allowed such
extension of service as may be needed to complete fifteen (15) years of service. In other
words, Cena read Memorandum Circular No. 65 in such a way as to comfort with Cena's own conclusion
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reached without regard to that Memorandum Circular. In view of the conclusion that we today reached in
the instant case, this last ruling of Cena is properly regarded as merely orbiter.
We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27
is fully compatible with Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65; this question must be
reserved for detailed analysis in some future justiciable case.
Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case, we believe and so hold
that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner
Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and
affirmed.
ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 166715.August 14, 2008.*
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ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)** OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN
R. SANDOVAL, petitioners, vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Bureau
of Customs, respondents.
Judicial Review; A constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act
being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.An actual case
or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial adjudication. A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for
adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being
challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Thus, to be ripe for judicial
adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to
himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.
Same; Where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.This
notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute.
Public Officers; Public Accountability; Public office is a public trustit must be discharged by
its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but
for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service
with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and
employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
Same; Presumption of Regularity; The presumption of regularity enjoyed by public officers in
the performance of their duties necessarily obtains in favor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and Bureau of Customs (BOC) officials and employees.Public officers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in
favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and
reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their
revenue-generation capability and collection. The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary
is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as
petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to
advance a declared public policy.
Same; Attrition Act of 2005 (R.A. No. 9335); Judicial Review; To invalidate RA 9335 based on
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but
also of the executive which approved it.A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong
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presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. To invalidate RA 9335 based on
petitioners baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it
but also of the executive which approved it.
Same; Same; A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is
not anathema to the concept of public accountability.Public service is its own reward.
Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A
system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the
concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry,
efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.
Same; Same; Equal Protection; Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is
equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situatedit is equality
among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial
differences in relation to the object to be accomplished.Equality guaranteed under the equal
protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is
equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial
differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things or persons are different in fact
or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), this Court declared: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does
not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within
which it is to operate.
Same; Same; Same; The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary; Since the
subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC), the incentives and/or sanctions
provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies.The equal protection clause
recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or
sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law
concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties,
fees and charges.
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Delegation of Powers; Test; A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and lays down a sufficient standard
when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.Two tests determine the
validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard
test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
Same; Civil Service; Security of Tenure; Inefficiency; Incompetence; The guarantee of
security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for
causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the
employee; RA 9335 lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant
factors affecting the level of collection, a standard analogous to inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under
civil service laws.RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be
dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is
accorded the employee. In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal
(when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service
laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and
compliance with substantive and procedural due process. At any rate, this Court has recognized the
following as sufficient standards: public interest, justice and equity, public convenience and
welfare and simplicity, economy and welfare. In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
Separation of Powers; Legislative Veto; Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per
se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers, but to forestall the
danger of congressional encroachment beyond the legislative sphere, the Constitution
imposes two basic and related constraints on Congressit may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power, and, when it exercises its
legislative power, it must follow the single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures
specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment;
Any post-enactment congressional measure should be limited to scrutiny and investigationany
action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
It is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines
the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
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prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch. However, to forestall the danger of
congressional encroachment beyond the legislative sphere, the Constitution imposes two basic
and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with
either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the
single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures specified under the Constitution,
including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment
congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress
power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter
pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the
President or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains
a right or power to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect;
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the
broad horizons of its legislative competenceit can itself formulate the details or it can assign to
the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with
those standards.Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a right or power to approve
or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach
a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of
the Constitutions diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or
implementing its own laws. Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national
policy within the broad horizons of its legislative competence. It can itself formulate the details or it
can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in
conformity with those standards. In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms
and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch
or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the
law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into
actual operation (contingent rule-making).
Congress; Statutes; Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not
pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the
calculated balance of powers established by the Constitutionin exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the Implementing Rules and Regulations based on a determination of
whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power
unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.Administrative regulations
enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to
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enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the
nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such,
they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until
they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of
approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not
they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a
power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Principle of Bicameralism; Presentment Clause; The requirement that the
implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their
effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on
presentment; A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambersit can
be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both
chambers.The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of
bicameralism and the rule on presentment. x x x Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact,
amend and repeal laws) is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the
House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers.
Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of
either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber
legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Same; Same; Same; Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for
approval or veto and in the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by
Congress can become a law.Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President
for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can
become a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of
the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot
take effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of Congress.
Same; Same; Publication; Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due
process clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of
Congressas such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive
branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law.Where Congress delegates the
formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established
in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the
hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it
becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations
become available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable
requisite of publication under the due process clause, the determination as to when a law takes
effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be
executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before
that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or
vetoing the law.
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Same; Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.From the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any
directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of
the law.
Same; Statutes; Partial Unconstitutionality; Separability Clause; The general rule is that
where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced; The presence of a
separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended
separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute.In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department
of Energy, 282 SCRA 361 (1997), the Court laid down the following rules: The general rule is that
where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability
clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than
complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of
the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had
supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x The exception to the
general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that
the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the
parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended
the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which
case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or
connected must fall with them. Administrative Law; To be effective, administrative rules and
regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation.To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full
if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA
9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation and became
effective 15 days thereafter. Until and unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and
effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee [Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251(2008)]

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
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G.R. No. 166715
August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS

SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO,
RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his
Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of
their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget
and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from
the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their
contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the
Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the
Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or
his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC
or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file
employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their
recognized organization.6
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Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the
allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures
for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with
the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance
evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and
regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations
of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose.9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus,
the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the
people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to
officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix
revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that
matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall
short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue
targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been
delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be
easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to
dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee
on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
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committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
question the petition for being premature as there is no actual case or
controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will
necessitate the exercise of this Courts jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents
acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional
issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward
system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to
invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335,
the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they
perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and
instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will
guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation
of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than
violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy
and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the
executive and the implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.
Actual Case And Ripeness
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication.10 A closely related
requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication.
And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental
act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it.11Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a
personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be
redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.12
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a
judicial controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further
overt act,13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim
or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are
unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to
themselves. On this account, their petition is procedurally infirm.
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This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the
constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The grave nature of their
allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in
favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.14
Accountability of
Public Officers
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and
justice, and lead modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his
own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust.
By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have
the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to
serve.
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials
and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging
the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue
targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection.15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it.
It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as
petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an
underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.
Petitioners claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC
officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only
without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality.
To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
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Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.16 To invalidate RA 9335 based
on petitioners baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be
rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives
for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the
concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces
dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of
deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which
awards to officers of the customs as well as other parties an amount not
exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws
against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme
Court said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate
and reward their zeal and industry in detecting fraudulent attempts to
evade payment of duties and taxes.
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled
to a reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax
and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335
establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will
be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of
the irregular performance of official duties. One of these precautionary
measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and
the BOC. The officials, examiners, and employees of the [BIR] and the
[BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or
acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for any
loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a
result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance
or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Equal Protection
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the
same conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among
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equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished.19When
things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in
law differently. InVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,20 this Court
declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it
be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences,
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of
enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized
as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the
classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in
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their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with
mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty
does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or
harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may
appear.21 (emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not
arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions
provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the
law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to the supervision and
control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be
appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary
[of the DOF], shall have the following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for
all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of
its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic
activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate
units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.24
xxx
xxx
xxx (emphasis supplied)
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On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs which shall
be headed and subject to the management and control of the
Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President
upon the recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter
referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees,
charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs
laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic
frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the
clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all
ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.25
xxx
xxx
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally
perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the
State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the
law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
Undue Delegation
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Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when
it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.27 To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in
fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the
provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing
for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing"29 the
delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives
Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be
sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the
Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the
following percentages:
Excess of Collection of the
Excess the Revenue Targets
Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to

Accrue to the Fund
30% or below
15%
More than 30%
15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the
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remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year

immediately following the year when the revenue collection target was
exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue
collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year
as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing
(BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the
BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies revenue
targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR,
and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.
xxx
xxx
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection

expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as
approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to
Congress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on
the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Boards authority and
identifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the agency
shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service
officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the
target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under
this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and
compliance with substantive and procedural due process:
Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
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1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not
exceeding two years in operation, as has no historical record of
collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation;
and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent
transferee in the middle of the period under consideration unless
the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or
potential nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however,
That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue
or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic
difficulties brought about by natural calamities orforce majeure or
economic causes as may be determined by the Board,
termination shall be considered only after careful and proper
review by the Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall be immediately
executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for
the separation of an official or employee from service under this
Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant
laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such as
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and
Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx
xxx
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and

employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only
means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes
other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the
employee.31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for
removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%)
with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection.
This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil
service laws.32 The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules
and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards:
"public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare" and
"simplicity, economy and welfare."33 In this case, the declared policy of
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optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC is infused with public interest.
Separation Of Powers
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby
created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven
Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by
the Senate President, with at least two senators representing the
minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the
minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter
become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the
purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated
by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved
the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of
implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to
confront the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the
concept of congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on
Elections34 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities
undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and
influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken
by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d)
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to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to
assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of
legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent
in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with
increased frequency to check the perceived "exponential accumulation
of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the 20th century,
Congress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to
the executive branch and the administrative agencies. Congress, thus,
uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies
perform their functions within the authority delegated to them. x x x x x x
xxx
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight
powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of
attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to
determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government
activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may
request information and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for
consideration of the agency involved.
xxx
xxx
xxx
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of
looking at the facts that are readily available, congressional
investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power
of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987
Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx
xxx
xxx
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c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its
oversight power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a
continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional
committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative
area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry
into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive
branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to
scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits
Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its
veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the
President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations
with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an
agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains
a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes
effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed
regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of
time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation
in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed
regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the
balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of
government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the
executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option
to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new
legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement
promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on
the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One proponent thus
explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the
policy is too deeply embedded in our law and practice. It suffices
to say that the complexities of modern government have often led
Congress-whether by actual or perceived necessity- to legislate
by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards,
leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an
executive officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves
their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may
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not have participated in or agreed with the development of those
aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the
reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress
proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is
the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing
law. But without some means of overseeing post enactment
activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to
determine whether its policies have been implemented in
accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative
intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue
encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any
post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure
beyond that would undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend that legislative veto
constitutes an impermissible evasion of the Presidents veto authority
and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial
branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto
enhances separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and
independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit
that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations
allow Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making
authority. They do not allow Congress to review executive proposals
before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for
ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast,
legislative veto permits Congress to participate prospectively in the
approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the
executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress.
They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by
Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its
chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that
legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to
retain control over the evolution and implementation of its policy as
declared by statute."
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme
Court resolved the validity of legislative veto provisions. The case
arose from the order of the immigration judge suspending the
deportation of Chadha pursuant to 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and
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Nationality Act. The United States House of Representatives passed a
resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to 244(c)(2) authorizing
either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the
executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the
United States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation
proceedings to implement the House order and the alien was ordered
deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the aliens
appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of
Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that
the House was without constitutional authority to order the aliens
deportation and that 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine on
separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared 244(c)(2)
unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from the issue of
separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the
presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto
was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to
the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the
passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the
President. x x x x x x x x x
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in
memorandum decision, two lower court decisions invalidating the
legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980. Following this
precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto
provisions although some of these provisions required the approval of
both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement of
Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even
exercised.35(emphasis supplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of
congressional oversight and considering the nature and powers of a
constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down
the provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not
only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law but also to
review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the Commission
on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the
constitutional independence of the Commission on Elections.36
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With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of
power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints
on Congress.37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with
either executive or judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures" specified under the Constitution,39 including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight
must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads
of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses
on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation40 and
(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant
to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.42
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers.43 It radically changes the design or structure of the
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Constitutions diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy
within the broad horizons of its legislative competence.45 It can itself formulate
the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for
making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those
standards.46 In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential
terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.47 Thus, what
is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it
formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into
actual operation (contingent rule-making).48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement
and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law
and are entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature
of a statute50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute
itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality
in an appropriate case by a competent court.51 Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated
balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not
they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial
power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected
to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment.52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
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Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal
laws)53 is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and
the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires
the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one
of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus,
assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative
veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the
same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter
the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If,
after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections,
to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for
or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within
thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a
law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for
approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill
passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the
Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming
that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take
effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of
Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be
approved by both Houses of Congress.54 Second, it must be presented to and
approved by the President.55 As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz56 and Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the approval of
bills:
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A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or
the Senate except for some measures that must originate only in the
former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the
measure and its referral by the Senate President or the Speaker to the
proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for
approval, with or without amendments, sometimes after public hearings
are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature or
purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common
authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is
at this stage that the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon
and amended when desired. The second reading is the most important
stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and
copies thereof are distributed at least three days before the third
reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their votes
and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate is
allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where
it will also undergo the three readings. If there are differences between
the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference
committee58 representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure
that if ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives will then
be submitted to the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress,
thereafter authenticated with the signatures of the Senate President, the
Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers59
The Presidents role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once
approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication.60
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Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it
has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the
law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of
the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of
the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled
by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of
publication under the due process clause,61 the determination as to when a
law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress.62 As such, it is only
upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch
acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the
role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to
approving or vetoing the law.63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that
requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law
after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that
allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by
the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the
law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as
unconstitutional. While there may be similar provisions of other laws that may
be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from
invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an
appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before us.64
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality
of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the other provisions of the law? Will it render the
entire law unconstitutional? No.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared
invalid by a competent court, the remainder of this Act or any provision
not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and
effect.
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In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the
following rules:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to
the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of
a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the
legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the
statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent
of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would
have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not
constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative
intent. x x x
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are
so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will
vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional,
or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be
carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void,
in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions
thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to
isolate and detach any invalid provision from the other provisions so that the
latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand
independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining
provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law which carries
out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards and
sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two
newspapers of general circulation66 and became effective 15 days
thereafter.67 Until and unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed
valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of
RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the
implementing rules and regulations of the law is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The
constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant
to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
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JHAPZ VILLARIA
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Jurisdiction of Comelec and Local Election Disputes

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Jurisdiction of Comelec and Local Election Disputes

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 90336 August 12, 1991

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

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as required by the resolution of

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ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

G.R. No. 110120. March 16, 1994.*

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

No. L-13827. September 28, 1962.

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September 28, 1962

BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, petitioner,

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

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ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

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1. CIVIL LAW; COMMON CARRIERS; CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE; BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION,

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chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) The gasoline crises starting 1971;

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

(a) The certificates of public convenience of Respondent are still valid;

cralaw virtua1aw library

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Year Authorized Units Registered

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

No. L-17778. November 30, 1962.

Republic of the Philippines

November 30, 1962

IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS L. CARMELO, in his

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

No. L-29274. November 27, 1975.*

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE & ELECTION LAWS CASES

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

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