SECTION 16 - RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

DOMINGO PADUA, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE ERICTA, etc., RUNDIO ABJAETO, and ANTONIO G.
RAMOS, respondents.
Antonio de los Reyes for petitioner.
Lazaro A. Marques for private respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and
determination of causes. It should be their constant effort to assure
that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch.
Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except
on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests
entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge. It goes without saying,
however, that that discretion must be reasonably and wisely
exercised, in the light of the attendant circumstances. Some
reasonable deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or
tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full and
free presentation of evidence by all the parties, specially where the
deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any part. The
desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all
possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present
evidence and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's
being pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment.
... (T)rial courts have ... the duty to dispose of controversies after
trial on the merits whenever possible. It is deemed an abuse of
discretion for them, on their own motion, to enter a dismissal which
is not warranted by the circumstances of the case' (Municipality of
Dingras v. Bonoan, 85 Phil. 458-59 [1950]). While it is true that the
dismissal of an action on grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17
of the Revised Rules of Court is addressed to their discretion (Flores
v. Phil. Alien Property Administrator, 107 Phil. 778 (1960];
Montelibano v. Benares, 103 Phil. 110 [1958]; Adorable v. Bonifacio,
105 Phil. 1269 [1959]; Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. v. De la Gerna, L17631, October 19, 1966, 18 SCRA 390), such discretion must be
exercised soundly with a view to the circumstances surrounding each
particular case (Vernus-Sanciangco v. Sanciangco, L-12619, April 28,
1962, 4 SCRA 1209). If facts obtain that serve as mitigating
circumstances for the delay, the same should be considered and
dismissal denied or set aside ( Rudd v. Rogerson, 15 ALR 2d 672;
Cervi v. Greenwood, 147 Coloma 190, 362 P. 2d 1050 [1961]),
especially where the suit appears to be meritorious and the plaintiff
was not culpably negligent and no injury results to defendant (27

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C.J.S. 235-36; 15 ALR 3rd 680).<re||an1w> (Abinales vs. Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Br. I, 70 SCRA 590, 595).
It is true that the allowance or denial of petitions for postponement
and the setting aside of orders previously issued, rest principally
upon the sound discretion of the judge to whom they are addressed,
but always predicated on the consideration that more than the mere
convenience of the courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of
justice and fairness would be served thereby (Camara Vda. de Zubiri
v. Zubiri, et al., L-16745, December 17, 1966). When no substantial
rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest, the
corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed
accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow them (Rexwell
Corp. v. Canlas, L-16746, December 30, 1961). (Panganiban vs. Vda.
de Sta. Maria, 22 SCRA 708, 712).
In the civil action at bar, the Trial Court rejected the plaintiffs plea for
cancellation of one of three (3) hearing dates, the very first such plea
made by that party, upon a ground not entirely unmeritorious in the
premises, and under such circumstances as would not be productive
of any appreciable delay in the proceedings or any substantial
prejudice to the defendants, and summarily dismissed the complaint.
Such a dismissal was unwarranted and relief therefrom must be
accorded.
The action that was thus summarily dismissed had been brought by
Domingo Padua (petitioner herein) in the Court of First Instance at
Quezon City. 1 In that action Padua sought to recover damages for
the injures suffered by his eight-year old daughter, Luzviminda,
caused by her being hit by a truck driven by Rundio Abjaeto and
owned by Antonio G. Ramos (private respondents herein). Padua was
litigating in forma pauperis.
Trial of the case having been set in due course, Padua commenced
presentation of his evidence on December 6, 1973. He gave
testimony on direct exqmination in the course of which reference
was made to numerous documents, marked Exhibits B, B-1 to B-109.
2
At the close of his examination, and on motion of defendants'
counsel, the previously scheduled hearing of December 12,1973 was
cancelled, and Padua's cross-examination was reset on December
17, 1973. 3 However, the hearing of December 17,1973 was also
cancelled, again at the instance of defendants' counsel, who pleaded
sickness as ground therefor; and trial was once more slated to "take
place on March 6, March 7 and 13, 1974, all at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning." 4
After defendants' attorney had twice sought and obtained
cancellation of trial settings, as above narrated, it was plaintiff
Padua's counsel who next moved for cancellation of a hearing date.
In a motion dated and filed on March 1, 1974, 5 copy of which was

personally served on defendants' lawyer 6 Padua's counsel alleged

that he had "another hearing on March 6, 1974 in Tarlac Court of
First Instance entitled: Salud Dupitas vs. Mariano Abella, Civil Case
No. 4904 which is of 1966 stint, and said court in Tarlac is anxious to
terminate said case once and for all," and that the cancellation
would "at any rate ... leave plaintiff and defendants two (2) hearing
dates on March 7 and 13, 1974;" and on these premises, he asked
"that the hearing on March 6, 1974 ... be ordered cancelled." No
opposition was filed by the defendants to the motion, whether on the
ground that the motion had not been properly set for hearing, the
clerk having merely been requested to "submit the ... motion upon
receipt ... for the consideration of the Court," 7 or some other ground.
Apart from filing this motion on March 1, 1974, plaintiffs counsel took
the additional step of sending his client's wife to the Court on the
day of the trial, March 6,1974, to verbally reiterate his application for
cancellation of the hearing on that day. This, Mrs. Padua did. The
respondent Judge however denied the application and dismissed the
case. His Honor's Order, dictated on that day, March 6, 1974, reads
as follows: 8
When this case was called for hearing today, neither plaintiff nor
counsel appeared. The plaintiffs wife, however, appeared in Court
and informed the Court that the plaintiffs counsel had to attend to a
very important case in the provinces.
The hearing for today was fixed by the plaintiff himself in open court
after consulting his calendar and hence the Court will not grant the
postponement on the ground that the plaintiffs counsel had a very
important case in the provinces. Neither did the plaintiff himself
appear.
In view hereof, let this case be dismissed.
Padua moved for reconsideration, 9 but this was denied. 10 Hence,
this petition.
The Trial Court unaccountably ignored the fact that defendants'
counsel had twice applied for and been granted postponements of
the trial; that plaintiffs counsel had filed a written motion for
postponement five (5) days prior to the hearing sought to be
transferred, and this was the very first such motion filed by him; that
although the motion for postponement could have been objected to,
no opposition was presented by defendants, which was not
surprising considering that their counsel had himself already
obtained two (2) postponements; that the ground for cancellation
was not entirely without merit: the counsel had a case in the Tarlac
Court scheduled on the same day, March 6, 1974, which had been
pending since 1964 and which the Tarlac Court understandably was
anxious to terminate; that the Padua motion for postponement
sought cancellation of only one (1) of three settings, leaving the case

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to proceed on the two (2) subsequent hearing dates; and the motion
had been verbally reiterated by plaintiffs wife on the day of the
hearing sought to be cancelled, Under the circumstances, and in the
light of the precedents set out in the opening paragraphs of this
opinion, the respondent Judge's action was unreasonable, capricious
and oppressive, and should be as it is hereby annulled.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the Order of the
Court a quo dated March 6, 1974, dismissing the petitioner's
complaint, and the Order dated March 13, 1974 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE;
Civil Case No. Q-17563 is hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial
Court which has replaced Branch XVIII of the Court of First Instance
in which the action was pending at the time of dismissal, is
DIRECTED to continue with the trial of the petitioner's action and
decide the same on the merits in due course.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL, petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Arturo Zialcita for petitioner Francisco Flores.
Zosimo Rivas for petitioner Francisco Angel.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor
Vicente A. Torres for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:p
A plea based on the constitutional right to a speedy trial 1 led this
Court to act affirmatively on a certiorari proceeding for the dismissal
of a case then pending in the Court of Appeals. Considering the
length of time that had elapsed, it is readily discernible why an
inquiry into the matter is well-nigh unavoidable. The accusation for
robbery against petitioners Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel was
filed as far back as December 31, 1951. The decision rendered on
November 29, 1955 found them guilty of the crime charged. The
notice of appeal was filed on December 8, 1955. 2 For a period of
three years, until February 10, 1958, no action was taken by the
Court of Appeals. On that day, there was a resolution remanding the
records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the
testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the disposition of
the case. 3 Such a resolution was amended by a second resolution
dated August 5, 1959, which granted the motion for counsel of
appellants, now petitioners, to set aside the decision so that
evidence for the defense on certain new facts or matters may be
received and that a new decision in lieu of the old one may be
rendered in accordance with the facts as found. 4 Accordingly, the
case was returned to the lower court with the former decision set
aside so that the trial could be had, but nothing was done for about a
year because the offended party failed to appear notwithstanding
the six or seven dates set for such hearing. 5 It was further alleged
that when thereafter he did take the witness stand, his testimony
was far from satisfactory, characterized as a mere "fiasco" as he
could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime; there was
even a failure to identify the two accused. 6 Instead of rendering a
new decision, the former one having been set aside as required by
the Court of Appeals, the lower court merely sent back the records to
the appellate tribunal. 7 At that stage, five more years having
elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought the
dismissal of the cases against them due to such inordinate delay in
their disposition, which covered the period of December 8, 1955 to
May 10, 1965, a period of almost a decade; thus did they invoke
their constitutional right to a speedy trial. 8 Respondent Court of
Appeals was unresponsive, notwithstanding the vigorous plea on the

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part of counsel for petitioners, its last order being a denial of a
second motion for reconsideration dated January 28, 1966. In the
answer on behalf of the People of the Philippines, the facts as above
set forth were substantially admitted. However, a special and
affirmative defense raised was that the case was not properly
captioned, as the People of the Philippines, against whom it is filed,
is not a tribunal or an office exercising judicial functions and that
without the Court of Appeals being made a party to the petition, it
cannot be said that it stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. Moreover, on the merits, the view was expressed that under
the circumstances, it was not adequately shown that the right to a
speedy trial had been violated, as the Court of Appeals had taken all
the steps necessary to complete the transcript of stenographic notes
of the original trial.
On the above undisputed facts, there is more than sufficient warrant
for the conclusion that the right to a speedy trial, so zealously
guarded in both the 1935 and the present Constitutions, had not
been accorded due respect. There is thus merit in the petition.
1. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent
decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 9 "means one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, ... ." 10 Thus, if the person accused
were innocent, he may within the shortest time possible be spared
from anxiety and apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if
culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to the fate in store
for him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to
present any valid defense. As was also pointed out in Sarmiento:
"The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by
habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the
case." 11 The above ruling is a reiteration of the doctrine announced,
even before the 1935 Constitution, in Conde v. Rivera, 12 a 1924
decision. In that case, Justice Malcolm announced categorically that
the trial, to comply with the requirement of the then organic law, the
Philippine Autonomy Act, must be "free from vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays." 13 Further: "We lay down the legal
proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause,
secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than
a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus
to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his
liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom." 14
In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took
effect, People v. Castaeda, 15 where it was shown that the criminal
case had been dragging on for almost five years and that when the
trial did finally take place, it was tainted by irregularities, this Court

set aside the appealed decision of conviction and acquitted the

accused. As was pointed out by the ponente, Justice Laurel: "The
Government should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and
legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings
against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately
discharged from the custody of the law." 16 It was on the basis of the
above judgment that the dismissal of a second information for
frustrated homicide was ordered by this Court, where the evidence
disclosed that the first information had been dismissed after a lapse
of one year and seven months from the time the original complaint
was filed during which time on the three occasions the case was set
for trial, the private prosecutor twice asked for postponements and
once the trial court itself cancelled the entire calendar for the month
it was supposed to have been heard. 17 The same result followed in
Esguerra v. De la Costa, 18 where the first complaint was filed on
August 29, 1936, the accused having been criminally prosecuted for
an alleged abuse of chastity in a justice of the peace court but after
over a year and three months, with the lower court twice dismissing
the case, he still had to face trial for the same offense on a new
information, thus compelling him to resort to a mandamus suit to
compel the lower court to terminate the case was his right to a
speedy trial was violated, a remedy deemed appropriate by this
Court.
There was another occasion where Justice Laurel spoke for this Court
on this specific issue. That was in Mercado v. Santos. 19 Here, for a
period of about twenty months, the accused was arrested four times
on the charge of falsifying his deceased wife's will. Twice, the
complaints were subsequently withdrawn. The third time he was
prosecuted on the same charge, he was able to obtain a dismissal.
Then came on the part of the provincial fiscal, a motion for
reinvestigation. The lower court was in a receptive mood. It ordered
that the case be heard on the merits. The accused moved to dismiss,
but he did not succeed. He tried the Court of Appeals, but he failed
again. He elevated the matter to this Court; he prevailed. It was
stressed in Justice Laurel's opinion: "An accused person is entitled to
a trial at the earliest opportunity. ... He cannot be oppressed by
delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of
time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is
necessarily delayed." 20 The opinion likewise considered as not
decisive the fact that the provincial fiscal did not intervene until an
information was filed charging the accused with the crime of
falsification the third time. Thus: "The Constitution does not say that
the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the
prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It

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does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private
individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is
entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or
the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced." 21 The latest
decision in point, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 22 presented an even clearer
case. The information for damage to property was filed on August 3,
1959. There the matter rested until May 19, 1965, when the accused
moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion in his order of
July 10, 1965. Two more years elapsed, the period now covering
almost eight years, when the trial was commenced. When one of the
witnesses for the prosecution failed to appear, the provincial fiscal
sought the postponement, but the accused countered with a motion
for dismissal. The lower court acceded, and this Court sustained him,
even if thereafter it changed its mind and reinstated the case.
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial
should be speedy. In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of
trial has not been completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965,
when they moved to dismiss in the Court of Appeals, petitioners
could validly contend that they had not been accorded their right to
be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the
pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be
deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals
cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to
them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous
decision in the resolution of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly
premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That
is the sole basis for the conclusion reached by us considering the
controlling doctrine announced with such emphasis by this Court
time and time again.
2. That is about all that needs be said. The crucial issue has been
met. The decisive question has been answered. There is an
affirmation of the worth of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Not too much significance should be attached to the procedural
defect pointed out in the answer of the People of the Philippines that
the Court of Appeals should have been made the party respondent.
What cannot be sanctioned was its failure to accord respect to this
particular constitutional right. It did amount at the very least to a
grave abuse of discretion. Whatever deficiency in the pleading may
then be singled out, it cannot obscure the obvious disregard of one
of the most important safeguards granted an accused. To deny
petitioners the remedy sought would be to exalt form over
substance. At any rate, the petition could be considered, and rightly
so, as being directed at the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the defenses
that could have interposed to justify the action taken were invoked
by the People of the Philippines. They certainly did not avail. Our

decisions on the right to a speedy rial speak too categorically to be

misread. This is one of those situations then where, in the apt
language of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal,
"technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation." 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 16641-R entitled, People v.
Francisco Flores, et al., of September 28, 1965 denying the motion to

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dismiss as well as its order of January 8, 1966 denying the motion for
reconsideration, and the order of January 28, 1966 denying the
second motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside, nullified, and
considered of no force and effect. The criminal case against
petitioners in the aforesaid CA-GR No. 16641-R are ordered
dismissed. Costs de oficio.