INTRODUCING THE RISKS INDUCED BY EARTHQUAKES IN

CHEMICAL PROCESS QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

Ernesto Salzano, Anna Basco

Istituto di Ricerche sulla Combustione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche,
Via Diocleziano 328, 80125 Napoli (IT). E-mail: salzano@irc.cnr.it
Antonio Di Carluccio, Giovanni Fabbrocino
Structural & Geotechnical Dynamic Lab StreGa, School of Engineering, Campobasso (IT)

Abstract: Recent worldwide natural disasters have focused the public attention on the
damages which may derive from the interaction among industrial installation and natural
catastrophic events (Na-Tech risks). Indeed major industrial accidental scenarios involving
people, properties or environment may be induced by the loss of control of chemical
processes or equipment failures due to external impact, followed by the release of hazardous
materials or energy.
The analysis of Na-Tech risks is an intrinsically multi-disciplinary task and involves the
comprehension of the physics of different natural and industrial accidental phenomena.
Furthermore, overloading of emergency systems can change effectively and un-expectedly
the ability of preventing and mitigating accidents, thus bringing strong uncertainties to
classical risk assessment methodologies.
The paper defines general procedure for Na-Tech risks for the occurrence of major accidents
induced by earthquake, starting from the experience of authors in their town of residence,
where the likelihood seismic event is relatively high.
Keywords: Na-Tech risks, Risk assessment, Major accident, Natural Disaster, Earthquake,
Disaster management, Inherent safety

1. INTRODUCTION
Natural disasters occurred recently in Turkey, Texas, or China have highlighted the need of evaluating the risks of
major industrial non-nuclear accidents triggered by catastrophic natural events. Indeed, relevant accidental scenarios
involving workers and residents, properties or environment in the surroundings of installations may be induced by
the loss of control of chemical processes or equipment failure, followed by the release in the atmosphere of large
amount of hazardous materials. Increased public demand on these issues has been transferred also to the worldwide
scientific and technical literature in the last decade: Several papers have been aimed to the definition of specific
methodologies for the analysis of risks derived from the interaction of Natural events and Technological disaster
(Na-Tech risks) [Hazus, 1997; Cruz et al., 2004; Salzano et al., 2007]. However, a consolidated and shared
definition of Na-Tech risks is still missing, together with an exact collocation of this specific subject within
industrial risk science. The main reason is possibly due to the fact that Na-Tech risk evaluation is intrinsically multidisciplinary, and to the absence of shared and sound risk assessment methodologies. Furthermore, added
complexities may derive from the overloading of industrial or public emergency systems, which reduces the ability
of preventing or mitigating the effects of accidents, and from the scale of the natural phenomena, which can be even
over-national. Eventually, a review of the state of the art of the methodologies used to evaluate the industrial risk
associated to natural events is recommended.
In the context of industrial and chemical engineering, and more in general when the process industry is of concern,
specific efforts (mandatorily in Europe) are typically devoted to the qualitative and quantitative analysis of risks
derived from large industrial accidents (i.e. confined or unconfined fires and explosions, dispersion of hazardous
substances, either noxious or toxic) originated by the release into the atmosphere of large amount of mass or energy.
For the sake of brevity, discussion and reviews on industrial risks, software for risk re-composition, acceptability
criteria, and tools for process hazard assessment used currently worldwide are not reported here, but can be found

elsewhere, and in particular the CCPS guidelines on chemical process quantitative risk assessment (CPQRA)
[CCPS, 1989] or other classic textbooks on this subject [e.g. Lees, 1996]. The typical flow-chart of overall risk
procedure is however reported in Figure 1 (the fish-bone plot).
Identification of unwanted events
(Process Safety Analysis, HAZOP,
Event Tree,..)

Quantification of probability of
unwanted events (Reliability data,
Fault Trees)

Risk evaluation
(perception, comparison)

Industrial activity

Risk
2

Quantification of consequences of
unwanted events (damage analysis,
effect analysis)

4
Quantification of risks of
the activity

Acceptable activity

6
Measures to reduce risks
(technical, organizational)

Fig. 1. Fish bone of risk analysis

The procedure sketched in Fig. 1 is quite general: Apparently different risk assessment flow-charts or methodologies
may always be re-conducted to the fish bone plot.
Furthermore, the procedure can be referred to existing or new process plants. In the case of new equipment, project
designer usually takes into account natural impacts as snow, wind, or earthquake. Minimal requirement for structural
response of equipment when subjected to earthquakes are, for instance, compulsory in early design phases.
With reference to the specific case of construction of atmospheric storage tanks, for instance, API 650 (2003) takes
into account two response modes, for either anchored or unanchored tanks, with respect to earthquakes: a high
frequency response to lateral ground motion of the liquid contents that moves in unison with shell, and a relatively
low-frequency response of the liquid tank content that moves in the fundamental sloshing mode, which lead to
overturning action of the tank. Furthermore, design actions are related to the local seismic hazard expressed in terms
of expected reference seismic intensity measure, as US geographical map reporting seismic classification are
included.
On the other hand, structural engineers can use more complex methodologies as for instance Finite Element
Analysis or other methodologies (see for details ASCE, 1997). These tools are however sustainable when single,
even complex, case is considered or when designing new equipment design, whereas it becomes hard to use when
performing risk analysis of large installations or industrial areas, with several equipment to be analysed.
Furthermore, active or passive prevention and mitigation systems are rarely designed by taking into account possible
failures due to natural external impacts. Eventually, it is worth mentioning that the main aims of early phase design
are typically the loss of serviceability and economical issues for system recovering, whereas few concerns are
related to Na-Tech accidental scenarios which may possibly involve the population and environment located in the
surrounding of industrial installation.
Similar considerations apply to existing processes, even if in this case, some site-specific information on local
natural hazard are typically available, and the analysis is less general in terms of structural response.
More in general, we can then say that Node 2, 4 and 5 regard respectively with consequence analysis, risk recomposition and risk perception/comparison. These issues will not discussed here in details as they remain
essentially unchanged with respect to classical risk analysis procedure given in CPQRA, even if the final outcomes
of Na-Tech accidental scenarios involve typically people which is already under struggle for the same catastrophic
scenario, and some specific aspects of Node 5 should be considered.
Finally, only Nodes 1, 3 and 6 have to be re-considered in the light of Na-Tech events, keeping into account that an
elevated number of cases has to be analysed when quantitative risk assessment has to be performed, i.e.
simplification is mandatory. More specifically, when the natural event is the trigger of industrial disasters, the
following issues should be considered, within the procedure described by the fish-bone plot:
a) the nature, the likelihood and the intensity of natural event, which has to be considered for the identification of
unwanted event (Node 1);
b) the set of failure modes, for each intensity natural event (Node 1,3);

c) the definition of specific vulnerability functions of equipment, for each failure mode (Node 3);
d) the warning system for the natural events, which in some cases can last even days or weeks, as in the case of
hurricanes or volcanic eruption (Node 6);
e) the industrial emergency system failure due to the same natural event (Node 6).
2. METHODOLOGY
Unwanted industrial events may occur following un-expected routes when triggered by natural disasters. Large
release of hazardous liquid following the sloshing produced by earthquake effects or LPG release from pressurised
tank due to flooding are typically not considered as Top Events. Hence, risk analysts should have simplified tools to
be aware that, based on the site-specific geographical data, the risk of Na-Tech accident due to the structural failure
of equipment produced by the impact of natural event has to be analysed.
Quite clearly, the complexity of this multi-disciplinary analysis precludes walk-down evaluation. With specific
reference to earthquakes, for instance, several variables should be used for the complete definition of the impact of
seismic wave on industrial equipment. Just to cite some: the local attenuation of seismic wave into the ground, the
duration and frequency (for the response spectra) of seismic wave, the intensity of earthquake defined alternatively
by Peak Ground Acceleration, Peak Ground Velocity or Peak Ground Displacement. To this regard, Probability
Safety Hazard Assessment (PSHA), as defined originally by Cornell (1968), is of great help. The PSHA procedure is
nowadays used worldwide for the definition of the exceedance probability of occurrence of earthquakes in terms of
defined seismological seismic intensity parameter. Indeed large database, at least in western countries, are published
on governmental or scientific internet web sites, which give PGA exceedance curve for each latitude/longitude
selection. Following PSHA, Seismic Hazard (H) is related to the time interval T and PGA as follows:

H(T) Prob PGA

|T

(1)

where Prob represents the probability distribution function. This relation gives the probability H that a given PGA
exceeds the value of the constant during time interval T. Seismic hazard curves can be calculated for time T
correspondents to the Technical Service Life of equipment (TSL). In some cases, designers consider a Functional
Service Life (FSL), which is lower than the TSL [ISO 15686-1, 2000]. The introduction of a time parameter, TSL, is
the real difference within the time-free assessment performed by CPQRA. TSL can be in general considered as 50
years whereas FSL can be decided on the basis of equipment specificity, but the first option seems quite satisfying
the need of conservative choices on the safe side. With specific reference to seismic events, the Italian new code
NTC (2008) has introduced the parameter Vr (reference period for seismic action) as a function of nominal life (Vn)
and use (Cu) of the structure. For industrial installation the reference period for seismic action Vr is 75 years.
Similar procedures and methodologies for the seismic hazard H may be found or adopted for the prediction of
likelihood of any other real-life natural disaster (i.e. Hnat), provided any recurrence in time (and Poissonian
distribution function can be defined, as earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanic eruption), for any intensity parameter nat
which characterises the natural event. It can be then written, in general:

H nat ( nat , TSL)

Prob nat

| TSL

(2)

The use of a simple single-degree-of-freedom equation for the definition of natural hazard and its interaction with
industrial structures is a matter of debate in the scientific and technological community. However, in the framework
of industrial risk analysis, simplification can be accepted if considering that equipment are built worldwide with
similar structural design consideration and similar geometrical characteristics, thus reducing the number of degree of
freedom of analysis.
Once the likelihood of intensity of each natural event has been obtained, coupling this information with the
structural vulnerability of industrial equipment is essential. Quite clearly, complicated technique or tools for
equipment failure with respect to external impact can be used. However, though more detailed, cost/benefit analysis
and time effectiveness of complex modelling can be decisive on the simplification. This point is indeed part of a
more general debate on modelling. Levenspiel (2002) has discussed recently on modelling for the chemical
processes: His results can be applied also for risk analysis. Simple starting point, with increased complexity when
wished or necessary, has to be pursued in any case for the increase of knowledge and good engineering practise.

Eventually, we can write that for any natural event the convolution of site hazard and vulnerability of equipment
gives a structural total failure probability Pf,nat, calculated as the union of any possible equipment failure for each
natural event intensity nat. Then, it can be written:

Pf , nat

Ps,i

nat

H nat ( nat , TSL)

(3)

i 1
where Pf,i(nat) is the probability distribution function (PDF) for any structural failure mode i which may produce a
release of content. In other terms, the total failure probability of any equipment due to external impact is given by
considering all possible values of natural event intensity (nat) and all failure modes, combined with nat occurring
probability (i.e. Hnat) in a given time period T = TSL.
For the scope of CPQRA, however, the total failure probability should refer only to those structural failure modes
which evolve to relatively large release of hazardous materials in the atmosphere.
In this case, since specific failure mode cannot take place, given nat, if another mode has already led the system to
failure and to following release, events in Eq. 3 are mutually exclusive and Ps,nat union is given by the sum function.
Hence:

Pr, nat

i 1

Ps, i

nat

Pr, s, i

H nat ( nat , TSL)

(4)

where i.e. Pr,s,i is the probability that, for any specific failure mode, structural damages are able to produce large
release of hazardous materials. Quite clearly, those failure modes which are relevant only with respect to economical
loss or more in general loss of serviceability are neglected as Pr,s,i = 0.
Following this formalisation, Top Event can be finally defined as the accidental scenario which derives from the
release of large amount of hazardous materials following the impact of any natural event, for any possible structural
failure mode. Furthermore, as typically adopted in CPQRA, its probability of occurrence may be defined by Fault
Tree analysis, through cut-sets defined from known basic events and through probability gates AND or OR. New
specific Na-Tech cut sets can then be defined starting from set of basic event as defined by Eqs. 2-4.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The definition of the PDF for the specific structural failure with respect to the intensity parameter, Ps,i(nat), and the
evaluation of probability of release of hazardous material for any structural failure mode Pr,s are the main point of
the general procedure discussed in this paper. To this regard, we have recently developed some fragility functions
both structural and for the release of content with specific reference to atmospheric storage tank, either anchored or
un-anchored, and with respect to earthquakes intensity and geometrical parameters. Both structural and release PDF
have been first produced starting from large worldwide historical database on earthquake damages to water and oil
tanks. Details, and parameter of log-normal or probit function are given in Salzano et al., 2003. Results of these
analyses allow the definition of Top Event credibility, in the Node 1 phase, and the definition of probability of
occurrence of Top Event, in Node 3.
Here it is worth saying that many guidelines, papers and books give Ps,i(nat) correlation for atmospheric tank with
respect to seismic structural response or for other natural event impact (see for instance API 650, 2003; Eurocode 8,
1998; Malhotra et al., 2000; ASCE, 1997). However, the given correlations do not refer to release of content and do
not take into account all failure mode, whereas historical experience (observational analysis) include them all.
Nevertheless, when designing new tanks, the choice of Top Event and the definition of basic event for the Fault Tree
Analysis may be based on simple technical consideration on the correlation between release of content and structural
damage. Table 1 shows, for instance, the possible failure modes and the correspondent relevance of content release
for atmospheric storage tanks subject to earthquakes.
In the case of existing installation, other problems arise because risk analysts have often to face with the lack of
knowledge on equipment design, filling level, operating condition. That may happen, e.g., when industrial
installation are analysed by external, independent analysis, or when the number of equipment analysis is very high
or also when CPQRA of entire industrial areas are requested. To solve this issue, threshold values for the natural
event impact are useful, as the give a simple reference for the definition of Top Events, in Node 1 of fish bone plot.

With respect to earthquake, the threshold values for Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) refers to the minimum value
of PGA which has been calculated or observed to produce a large release of content from equipment. To this regard,
Table 2 shows the PGA threshold values for large release of content from atmospheric steel storage tank as obtained
by observational analysis, for any geometry (height/diameter ratio) and for two reference filling ratio [Salzano et al.,
2003, 2007, 2008]. As cited above, the PAGk values allow first, simple assessment of Na-Tech risks if used in
conjunction with the Hnat value and cut-off for the likelihood of the intensity of earthquake are defined.
Table 1: Failure modes relevant to CQPRA for atmospheric steel storage tank loaded by earthquake.
Failure modes
Elephant Foot Buckling
Base uplifting

Sloshing
Sliding

Collapse (Liquefaction)

Definition/Damage
Large axial compressive stresses due to beamlike bending
of the tank wall [Malhotra et al., 2000]
Overturning moment may be cause a partial uplift of base
plate; this vertical displacement can cause the failure of
tank wall and/or the failure of piping connection.
Roof or Top damage due to liquid movement
For un-anchored tank only: the horizontal relative
displacement between tank and base can cause the failure
of I/O piping
Rapid release of content due to total collapse of structure
for the ground liquefaction due to earthquake

Relevance of content release

Relevant if tank shell fails
Relevant but mitigation system
may be effective if still
working
Un-relevant, if concerning large
release of hazardous materials
Relevant but mitigation system
may be effective if still
working
Relevant but preventing actions
are possible

Table 2: Peak Ground Acceleration threshold value PGAk for large release of content as obtained from historical
database. PGA is expressed in gravity acceleration.
Tank
Anchored
Anchored
Unanchored
Unanchored

Fill level
Near full
50%
Near full
50%

PGAk (g)
0.275
0.577
0.118
0.164

The value of PDF parameters and threshold value obtained by observational analysis have to be confirmed by
structural modelling. Furthermore, observational PDF do not differentiate among failure modes. For the atmospheric
storage tank, probability density functions obtained by numerical analysis for the failure mode Elephant Foot
Buckling (EFB), have been then obtained and compared with previous results. To this aim, a set of 300 European
strong motions, all stiff soil records with a broad range of magnitude and distance, have been used and IDA
(Incremental Dynamic Analysis) methodology [Vamvatsikos & Cornell, 2001] has been adopted in order to evaluate
the structural vulnerability of atmospheric storage tanks. The analysis has been repeated for different volume
capacity, in order to assess the effects of geometry, and filling levels. Details of methodologies and PDF parameters
for the structural failure of atmospheric tank are discussed elsewhere [Di Carluccio et al., 2007; Kim & Kim, 2002;
Salzano et al., 2003, 2007, 2008]. A summary of first obtained results are given in Table 3, where threshold values in terms of PGA - for the non-zero probability of occurrence of the EFB failure mode, are reported. Similar
analyses are being produced also for pressurised equipment [Di Carluccio et al., 2008].
The numerical procedure should be then performed for any failure mode, for any equipment typology, in order to
proceed with overall Na-Tech risk analysis, and in order to address priority for the prevention of structural failures
of equipment.
AKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank the Dipartimento della Protezione Civile della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri for
financial support to the Center of Competence on Na-Tech risks given to IRC and the financial support provided by
the EU INTERREG program, project MEETING (Mitigation of Earthquake Effects in Towns and Industrial
Regional Districts).

Table 3: Peak Ground Acceleration threshold value PGAk as obtained numerically for Elephant Foot Buckling of
atmospheric anchored storage tanks. Filling level = 80%. PGA is expressed in gravity acceleration.
V [m3]
250
5000
30000

Tank Height (m)

7.55
10.8
18.5

Tank Radius (m)

3.25
12.25
22.75

PGAk (g)
0.50
0.25
0.07

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