1.

Agtarap vs Agtarap

Facts: On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court Pasay City, a verified petition for the
judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin).
The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any known debts
or obligations.
During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia),5 and second with Caridad
Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had three childrenJesus (died without issue),
Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria,6 Joseph, and Teresa7).
Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926. They also had three childrenEduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes
(survived by her daughter Cecile).
At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City, Joseph, a grandson
of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been appropriating for himself
P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of a regular
administrator.
In addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming and declaring the named compulsory heirs of
Joaquin who would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto the named
heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law; and (c) entitling the distributees the right to
receive and enter into possession those parts of the estate individually awarded to them.
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for initial hearing and directing Eduardo
to cause its publication.
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting the allegations in the petition, and
conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa alleged that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with
Lucia, and that, upon Lucias death in April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject
properties. They said that their residence was built with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the
expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manongs
Restaurant) was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner.
RTC, on October 23, 2000, issued an Order of Partition.
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolutio denying the motions for reconsideration of Eduardo and
Sebastian, and granting that of Joseph and Teresa.
It also declared that the real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It
also directed the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the
heirs.
However, before the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA.
CA dismissed their appeal.
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both motions. Hence, these petitions ascribing to the
appellate court that The Court Of Appeals Erred In Dismissing The Decision Appealed From For Lack Of Merit
And In Affirming The Assailed Resolution, 2001 Of The Lower Court Holding That The Parcels Of Land Covered
By Tct No. 38254 And Tct (No.) 38255 Of The Registry Of Deeds For The City Of Pasay Belong To The Conjugal
Partnership Of Joaquin Agtarap Married To Lucia Garcia Mendietta
Notwithstanding Their Registration Under Their Existing Certificates Of Title As Registered In The Name Of
Joaquin Agtarap, Casado Con Caridad Garcia.
Under Existing Jurisprudence, The Probate Court Has No Power To Determine The Ownership Of The Property
Described In These Certificates Of Title Which Should Be Resolved In An Appropriate Separate Action For A
Torrens Title Under The Law Is Endowed With Incontestability Until It Has Been Set Aside In The Manner
Indicated In The Law Itself.

Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the issue regarding the ownership of the subject real properties.
Held: yes
we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only
to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise such court merely exercises special
and limited jurisdiction.
As held in several cases,17 a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there
poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort
to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination
of ownership in a separate action.18 Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question
is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership.
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of
Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More
importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate
courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
2. Suntay vs cojuangco suntay
Facts: Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our
Decision2 in directing the issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III)
and respondent.
The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both
petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with
legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with
dispatch. No costs.3
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse,
Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federicos and Cristinas
only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the spouses Federico and
Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel
Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabels parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabels parents, along with her
paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel
Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her among others with infidelity .
The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco.
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights
to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court.

On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristinas death, Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren,
Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over Cristinas estate. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that:
(1) as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedents estate;
(2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the
administration thereof;
(3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years;
(4) the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III
and Nenita;
(5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated
to protect the integrity of the decedents estate;
(6) the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and.
(7) Isabels allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of
representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabels parents
marriage being declared null and void.
However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a
voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate
children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedents estate on his behalf in the
event letters of administration issues to Federico.
Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfathers opposition,
alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the
estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as
administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate:
the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC , revoked the Letters of Administration
issued to Emilio III, and appointed isabel as administratrix
issue: WON isabel is more qualified to be the administratix of the estate of Cristina
Held: yes
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court.
We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristinas estate, giving weight to his interest in Federicos
estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and Isabel, we considered that:
Emilio III:1. was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged
him as their grandchild;
Federico2. claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their
conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
Cristinas3. properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those of her husband, Federico, because
her share in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
Emilio III4. is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the latters estate as a direct
heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals Decision in favor of her sole administratorship
based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.

Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of
preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil
Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and
disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that:
(1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an heir of the decedent;
(2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a next of kin of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his
appointment as administrator thereof;
(3) Emilio IIIs actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically
demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and
(4) there is no basis for joint administration as there are no opposing parties or factions to be represented.
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to
act as administrator of the decedents estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his demonstrable interest in the
subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina,
as a co-administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider our decision of
16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court:
6.SEC.When and to whom letters of administration granted.If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(aTo the surviving) husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;
(bIf such surviving) husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(cIf there is not) such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This
order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the
appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrators interest in the estate.9 This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate.
The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of
the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an
order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedents estate must demonstrate not only an
interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the administration of a decedents estate
presupposes the surviving spouses interest in the conjugal partnership or community property forming part of the
decedents estate.11
Likewise, a surviving spouse is a compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of administrator of a decedents
estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section
6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the
surviving spouse and the next of kin.
In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that x x x [w]hen an
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the
trust alone, x x x.
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit of the
estate and those interested therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a

decedent or the determination of a persons suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in
the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled
jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators:

in

Philippine

and

American

(1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests
represented;15
(2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased;
(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexingone to settle;16
(4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best
interests of the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have
another competent person associated with him in the office
The next of kin has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to
the decedents property [citations omitted]. It is generally said that the nearest of kin, whose interest
in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. Among members of a
class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next
of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in the estate and
glossed over the order of preference set forth in the Rules.
We gave weight to Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in Cristinas estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant
facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of such position by the foregoing
survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto
entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor
adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78.
Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.31
Given Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedents legitimate grandchildren and
undoubted nearest next of kin, the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate,
cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court 32 and
depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we reiterate
Isabels and her siblings apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
The bitter1. estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the
other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as adverse
interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;
Corollary2. thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as co-administrators may
result in prejudice to the decedents estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
Emilio3. III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristinas estate, has not looked after the estates
welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a
suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator
of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator of the subject estate in
2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice
thereof as evidenced by the following:
Emilio III,1. despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory, omitted in the partial
inventories34 he filed therewith properties of the estate35 including several parcels of land, cash, bank
deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section
1,36 paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Emilio III2. did not take action on both occasions against Federicos settlement of the decedents estate
which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly belonging to said estate (whether wholly or

partially), and which contained a declaration that the decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs,
except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.

3.Lee vs RTC of Quezon City

Facts:
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6, 1956. At the
time of the companys incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died.
He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio
Ortaez)
and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and
her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez).2 Recognized by the decedent, Dr.
Juvencio P. Ortaez and declared by the intestate court as lawful heirs of Dr. Ortaez in its resolution dated
September 22, 2000; Rollo, pp. 203-214.
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortaez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch
(now Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Dr. Ortaez
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition for letters of
administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a special administrator.
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Pao, then presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose Ortaez
joint special administrators of their fathers estate. Hearings continued for the appointment of a regular administrator
(up to now no regular administrator has been appointed).
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez submitted an inventory of the estate
of their father which included, among other properties, 2,0293 Inventory and Accounting of Properties of the Estate;
Rollo, p. 572. shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing
50.725% of the companys outstanding capital stock.
On April 15, 1989, the decedents wife, Juliana S. Ortaez, claiming that she owned 1,014 4 Deed of Sale with Right
to Repurchase; Rollo, pp. 55-56. Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with
right to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group.(FLAG), represented by its president,
herein petitioner Jose C. Lee.
Juliana Ortaez failed to repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was
consolidated by petitioner FLAG in its name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortaez, acting in his personal capacity and claiming that he
owned the remaining 1,0115 Deed of Sale of Shares of Stock; Rollo, pp. 57-58. Philinterlife shares of
stocks as his inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of
herein petitioner FLAG, represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee.
After one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose
Ortaez failed to repurchase the same.
It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate proceedings at the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortaez and her two children, Special Administrators Rafael and
Jose Ortaez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares
of stock) among themselves. This was the basis of the number of shares separately sold by Juliana Ortaez on April
15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortaez on October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein petitioner FLAG.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings (hereafter referred to as
private respondents Enderes, et al.) filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife
shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.

On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of private respondents Enderes, et al. and appointed
private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares
of stock.
Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the memorandum of agreement dated
March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial
settlement of the decedents estate. These motions were opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.
On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of
sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again opposed by Special Administrator Jose
Ortaez.
On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale of
the Philinterlife shares of stock and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes as special
administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer any shares of
stock for her to administer.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special Administrator Jose Ortaez
for the approval of the deeds of sale for the reason that:
Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a sale of a property of the estate without an
Order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. Since the sales in question were
entered into by Juliana S. Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez in their personal capacity without prior approval of the Court,
the same is not binding upon the Estate.
WHEREFORE, the OMNIBUS MOTION for the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stock and release of Ma.
Divina Ortaez-Enderes as Special Administratrix is hereby denied. 6
On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another order granting the motion of Special Administratrix Enderes
for the annulment of the March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement or extrajudicial partition of estate.
The court reasoned that:
In consonance with the Order of this Court dated August 11, 1997 DENYING the approval of the sale of Philinterlife
shares of stocks and release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes as Special Administratrix, the Urgent Motion to Declare.
Void Ab Initio Memorandum of Agreement dated December 19, 1995. . . is hereby impliedly partially resolved insofar
as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stock are concerned, in particular, No. 5, 9(c), 10(b)
and 11(d)(ii) of the Memorandum of Agreement.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 4, 1982 executed by Juliana S.
Ortaez, Rafael S. Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez as partially void ab initio insofar as the
transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stocks are concerned. 7
Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the intestate court, Jose Ortaez filed, on December 22, 1997, a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied his petition, however, ruling
that there was no legal justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose
Ortaez, his brother Rafael Ortaez and mother Juliana Ortaez during the pendency of the settlement of
the estate of Dr. Ortaez, without the requisite approval of the intestate court, when it was clear that
there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the sale made by Jose
Ortaez and his mother Juliana Ortaez to FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly appropriated for themselves,
without approval of the intestate court, was void.8
Issue: WON the extrajudicial settlement executed by the legitimate children of jose is valid
Held: No.
From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortaez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed
Ortaez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extra judicially partitioning the intestate estate among
themselves, despite their, knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement
of the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortaez and her
children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party
(FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.

RD:
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code
which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the
moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted
to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors
shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir may only
sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein.

In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and
1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending
the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause
the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying the invalid sale?
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the
nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or
fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless.
In other words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate courts power to annul unauthorized or
fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final adjudication.