CHAPTER 20 RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (1986)

TEEHANKEE, C.J.
FACTS:
Former Senator Ninoy Aquino was assassinated while descending from his plane that had just landed at
the Manila International Airport.
The military investigators reported within a span of 3 hours after the incident that the man who shot
Aquino was a communist-hired gunman, whose identity was revealed only days later as Rolando
Galman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.
Pres. Marcos established a Fact Finding Board (the Agrava Board Justice Corazon Agrava, Atty.
Salazar, Dante Santos, Ernesto Herrera and Amado Dizon) to investigate the case due to large masses
of people who joined in the 10-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom.
Both majority and minority reports of the Agrava Board were one in rejecting the military version,
contending that the killing was not a communist plot but a military conspiracy; stating that "the evidence
shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the
staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military
conspiracy, not a communist plot.
o Minority report 6 persons who were at the service stairs as plotters and Gen. Luther Custodio was
essential to the implementation of the plan
o Majority report 26 persons headed by Gen. Fabian Ver were all acting in conspiracy with one
another in the premeditated killing of Ninoy
Despite the reports, Pres. Marcos insisted that evidence shows Galman was the killer.
Petitioners Saturnina and Reynaldo Galman together with 29 other petitioners, filing the present action
alleging the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan of serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
resulting in the miscarriage of justice for want of due process of law.
o They also prayed for the immediate issuance of a TRO restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan
from rendering a decision in the pending criminal cases and that judgement be rendered declaring
a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before it and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal
by an unbiased prosecutor.
The Court resolved by 9-to-2 votes to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted
petitioners a 5-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent
Tanodbayan a 3-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.
But 10 days later, the Court by the same 9-to-2-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and
to lift the TRO. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from
receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served
on them).
o Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal
ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the
people are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime
charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability and declaring Rolando
Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence
submitted by the prosecution.
o Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had
become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Mar. 6, 1986 the Manila Times published an article entitled Aquino Trial a Sham, which had for its
context the revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera that the graft court were convinced by
Marcos to whitewash the criminal cases.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice
and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law.
o The Court granted the motion to admit second motion for reconsideration
Respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy and invoked that the issues had become moot and
academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayans judgment of acquittal of all respondentsaccused, further arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy
is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by
clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity.
SC appointed a 3-member commission (Vasquez Commission Ret. Justice Conrado Vasquez, Ret.
Justice Milagros German, and Eduardo Caguioa) to hear and receive evidence of the charges of
collusion and pressure
The Vasquez Commission submitted its report with an affirmation of the secret meeting held in
Malacanang wherein Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran to handle the case (w/o raffling it) and for the
entire tribunal to have all of the accused acquitted

ISSUES:
Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause
RULING:
NO.
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial
courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in
criminal cases is denied due process.
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can
be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. Thus, since the respondent
Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction, no double
jeopardy attaches to it.

Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of
due process.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial
court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged
against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.

US V. TAN TENG (1912)

JOHNSON, J.
FACTS:
The defendant raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the
victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private
parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told
her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police.
Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his
clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The
policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the
Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the
defendant. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The
defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his
right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendants rights against self incrimination
RULING:
NO.
The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was
neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his
body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority.
The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may
be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him
may be used as evidence against him.

VILLAFLOR V. SUMMERS (1920)

MALCOLM, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to submit her body to
the examination to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the order on the ground that such
examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she
was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical
examination required by the court.
ISSUE:
W/N the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
RULING:
NO. It is not a violation of her constitutional right. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its
corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will
be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary.

BELTRAN V. SAMSON (1929)

ROMUALDEZ, J.
FACTS:
Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the
respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right
against self-incrimination since such an act would make him furnish evidence against himself.
ISSUE:
W/N the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and
determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within
the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.
RULING:
The respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely from compelling the petitioner to
take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means
that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of
producing documents or chattels in one's possession.
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled
to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or
chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which
does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.
Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not
be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible
to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling
upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in
evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre (reason or
justification for being or existence) of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent
persons.

CHAVEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS (1968)

SANCHEZ, J.
FACTS:
The judgment of conviction herein challenged was rendered, was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle (one
Thunderbird car together with its accessories. Information was filed against the accused together with other
accused that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy
Lim, took the vehicle.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three accused (the Does) who have not been identified nor
apprehended, pleaded not guilty.1wph1.tDuring the trial, Fiscal grecia asked roger Chavez to be the
first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only
be an ordinary witness not a state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client.
But the judge ruled in favor of the fiscal stating that What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate
him and there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including
the accused that If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to
interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this
witness to the question would incriminate him.
Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE:
W/N constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been violated
RULING:
YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain
silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his
own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness.
There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal,
and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has
been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague
and uncertain evidence."

PEOPLE V. BUSCATO (1976)

ANTONIO, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by Isidro (Boy) Buscato and Nestor Dalud from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, convicting them of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and imposing upon them
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The basis of the conviction were the extrajudicial confessions obtained through physical, mental and
moral coercion exerted upon them.
S/Sgt. Jorge Vargas declared that he conducted the investigation of Nestor Dalud with the aid of a
policeman of Sultan Kudarat, who acted as interpreter. Nestor Dalud allegedly voluntarily confessed his
participation in the slaying of Rodolfo Lim. Another accused Jabib Tan, who purportedly
escaped/absconded (was never present during trial), allegedly confessed to him that he participated in
the planning of the killing and robbing of the victim, Rodolfo Lim. Nestor Dalud, on the other hand,
admitted having struck the victim with a piece of bamboo, while Boy Buscato stabbed the victim with a
Batangas knife and afterwards got the wallet and other valuables of the victim. They then placed the
victim inside a sack. These confessions were reduced to writing and subsequently sworn to by Jabib
Tan and Nestor Dalud before the Clerk of Court, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Cotabato. Nestor
Dalud also purportedly tape-recorded his confession.
The trial court, however, was persuaded that the extra-judicial confessions of Nestor Dalud and Jabib
Tan were voluntarily and freely given by them to the investigators.
But the Solicitor General agreed with the appellants and submitted, in lieu of brief for the appellee, a
manifestation recommending acquittal of appellants Nestor Dalud and Isidro Buscato. The thrust of the
Solicitor General's contention is that the evidence of the prosecution does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support their conviction.
Nestor Dalud's recital of the means and methods employed by the investigators in extracting his
confession cited specific overt acts of coercion upon him to confess to the commission of the crime.
He testified that he and his co-accused were arrested and confined in the PC stockade in Cotabato City;
that for two days, they were not allowed to go out of the stockade; that while they were at the stockade,
the guard on duty would sometime call them one-by-one, and as soon as they reach the iron grills, the
guard would pull their hands and then box them; that on the morning of January 15, 1973, he and his
co-accused were brought to the Office of the PC Company; that he was investigated in the presence of
his two-co-accused; that Sgt. Soriano was writing the answers given by him; that at that time, Sgt.
Soriano was drunk and in fact made Dalud drink the Tanduay liquor he had with him; that every time he
would refuse to answer, Sgt. Soriano would box him; that Sgt. Soriano was forcing him to admit that he
and his companions were the ones who killed Rodolfo Lim and when he refused, he was boxed and
pushed by Sgt. Soriano causing him to fall face flat on the cement floor; that he became unconscious as
a result thereof.
The maltreatment which Nestor Dalud and thereafter, to Isidro Buscato, had to undergo that day was
merely a prelude to more cruel and barbaric torture for 3 more days.
ISSUE:
W/N the extrajudicial confessions alone obtained through coercion are valid to render judgment
RULING:
No. The Court said that the lower court did not make any conclusion concerning the credibility of the
confessions, rendering no reason not to accept the testimonies at face value.
The circumstances notwithstanding, the lower court still looked upon the confession as free of infirmity. But,
that was clearly an error. The constant course of decisions forbid the admission of any confession obtained
under force or coercion. A conviction resting on such proof, and such proof alone, certainly cannot be
allowed to stand.

The failure of Nestor Dalud to complain of the torture he had undergone is not a guarantee of the voluntary
character of his confession. He was appraised beforehand by Sgt. Jorge Vargas of the consequence of his
failure to sign the confession before the Clerk of Court. On another side, Isidro Buscato denied that he ever
made a confession. In fact, all throughout the investigation and despite the maltreatment he underwent, he
stoutly maintained his innocence. Like Nestor Dalud, he named names and recited specific overt acts in his
painful recollection of the methods employed to extract his confession. Isidro Buscato's testimony, taken in
relation to that of Nestor Dalud, show that the PC investigators have an impressive array of third-degree
methods in extracting confessions.
Again, independent of the afore-mentioned extrajudicial confessions, there is no other evidence which
would directly link the appellants to the crime. It appears, moreover, that such confessions were procured
by force, violence or threats. They are, therefore, inadmissible and cannot be used as evidence to prove the
guilt of the appellants.
Further, the constitutional right of a person against self-incrimination precludes the use of confessions
obtained from them through force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate free will.
The doctrine that one accused of crime cannot be compelled to testify against himself is predicated upon
principles of humanity and civil liberty. The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in the
protests against the abuses and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons. It was erected
as an additional barrier for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power.

PEOPLE V. GALIT (1985)

CONCEPCION, JR., J.
FACTS:
In the morning of August 23, 1917, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of
her house in Montalban, Rizal, as a result of 7 wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt
instrument. More than 2 weeks thereafter, police authorities picked up Francisco Galit, an ordinary
construction worker to answer for the murder. In NBI, agent Carlos Flores conducted a preliminary interview
of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. But the following day, he allegedly
voluntarily executed a salaysay admitting his participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated
Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. The controversy was Galit had been
obtained and interrogated almost continuously for 5 days, to no avail as he consistently maintained his
innocence. The investigating officers began to maul him and torture him physically. The NBI agents covered
his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. With Galits will having been
broken, he admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they
prepared. Galit was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide, in an information filed before the
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig and was sentenced to suffer death penalty.
Upon appeal, the accused denied participation in the commission of the crime. He claimed that he was in
his house in Marikina when the crime was committed in Montalban. He also assailed the inadmissibility of
the extra judicial confession extracted from him through torture, force and intimidation as described
earlier, and without the benefit of counsel. Also, he averred that he was not fully informed of his rights
before the interrogation, as his rights were stated in a lengthy manner followed by the question of whether
he was ready to make his statement, to which he replied: Opo. without actually understanding and
completely grasping the thought of the statement/question.
Accused was acquitted.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the extrajudicial confession be made admissible even if obtained through torture and
maltreatment
2. W/N the long question, followed by a monosyllabic answer satisfies the requirements of the law that
the accused be informed of his rights
RULING:
1. No. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and
not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the
accused is his alleged confession obtained through torture. As stated in Sec. 12 (par. 2 and 3), Art. 3
of the Constitution, no torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against the accused and any confession or admission obtained in violation
of this shall be inadmissible in evidence.
2. No. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of
the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there
should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or
language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing
that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not
know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he
had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even
contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At
the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These
constitute gross violations of his rights.

MORALES V. ENRILE (1983)

CONCEPCION, JR., J.
(Note: This case does not deal with custodial investigation per se. It is more of Chapter 18 The Writ of
Habeas Corpus. There was very little about torture or maltreatment, as where it was mentioned in the book.
Plus the Court did not talk about the merits of the case because it said it does not have jurisdiction over the
issue or torture and maltreatment so the Court simply stated the rules regarding custodial investigations
under the Constitution.)
FACTS:
In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St.,
Quezon City. They were charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that
they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among them
the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail.
They also air the charge that they were subjected to maltreatment and torture; that they did not have the
opportunity to present their defense before the inquest fiscal and therefore asked this Court to order the
reinvestigation of the charges against them. Acting on such plea, the Court in a resolution en banc ordered
the City Fiscal of Quezon City to conduct such reinvestigation and at the same time appointed the Fiscal to
act as commissioner of the Court and receive evidence of the charges made by petitioners before it of
alleged torture and violation of their constitutional rights, particularly the right to counsel. Upon the City
Fiscals submission of his report on the reinvestigation, he affirmed the existence of a prima facie case for
rebellion against petitioners and several others.
ISSUE:
W/N Morales et. al were illegally detained; and
W/N the petitioners rights in lieu of custodial investigation were violated
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the detention is legal because of the prima facie case for rebellion against the
petitioners. As regards petitioners alleged maltreatment and torture, the Court did not answer if there was
indeed violation of their rights during the custodial investigation due to lack of jurisdiction involving such
matters (The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts). Nevertheless, the Court reiterated that the Constitution
mandates that:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel,
and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Also, at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the detainee of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone
he chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. During the period of his detention, he shall have the right
to confer with his counsel at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, alone and privately, in the
jail or any other place of custody.

GAMBOA V. CRUZ (1988)

PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a
warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2,
Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several others.
The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner,
complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the
Identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay
on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit
down in front of her.
On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner.
On 22 August 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. On 2 April 1980, the
prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its case.
On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court
that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980, petitioner filed
said Motion predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the
absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was afforded his rights to counsel and to due process
RULING:
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such
point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation,
for the commission of an offense.
When petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been held yet to answer
for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled
to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the
services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United States Federal Supreme Court, 378 US 478, 1964).
Since petitioner in the course of his Identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a
criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the
accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to counsel and
due process as the confrontation between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was identified
in the police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He was, therefore, not
interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what he professes, the police did not, at
that stage, exact a confession to be used against him. For it was not he but the complainant who was being
investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter was being
investigated. Petitioner's right to counsel had not accrued.
On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive
and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to,
and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process
abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The case at bar is far from this situation.

PEOPLE V. BARROS (1994)

FELICIANO, J.
FACTS:
That on September 6, 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the P.C.
Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate No. ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan,
Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both
M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw accused carrying a carton, board the
bus and seated himself on seat No. 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued
and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station,
called C2C Fernando Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat No. 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the
carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who the owner of the carton
was but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C
Bongyao invited the herein accused to the detachment for questioning as accused was the suspected
owner of the carton containing marijuana. As both P.C. officers Yag-as and Ayan saw accused, Bonifacio
Barros carrying that same carton when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan. That upon entering the
detachment the carton was opened in the presence of accused and accused Barros was asked if he owned
the carton of marijuana and accused denied this. That when accused denied ownership of the carton of
marijuana, the P.C. officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Barros as the owner of the
carton of marijuana. That during the oral investigation of accused, he finally admitted ownership of the
carton containing [four] 4 paper-wrapped packages of dried marijuana.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court deprived the accused of his right to due process by ignoring the manifest absence of
the mandatory warrant in the arrest and search of the accused
RULING:
The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is
not absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of
moving vehicles. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the
contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some
criminal offense.
It would appear that there existed no circumstance which might reasonably have excited the suspicion of
the two (2) police officers riding in the same bus as appellant Barros. They asked the police officers at the
checkpoint at Sabangan to inspect the box allegedly carried by appellant Barros apparently on a mere
guess that appellant Barros might be carrying something in the nature of contraband goods. There was, in
other words, nothing to show that appellant Barros was then in the process of "actually committing" or
"attempting to commit" a crime. There was, moreover, nothing on the record that could have reasonably led
the two (2) police officers to believe that "an offense had in fact just been committed" when appellant Barros
boarded the bus at Chackchakan or when he was asked whether he owned the box here involved at the
checkpoint in Sabangan. The two (2) police officers, according to the record, had no "personable knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested (appellant Barros) had committed it." There was, in brief, no
basis for a valid warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally nonpermissible and invalid. The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure i.e., the four (4) kilos of marijuana
should therefore not have been admitted in evidence against appellant Barros.

PEOPLE V. COMPIL (1995)

BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS:
On 23 October 1987, just before midnight, robbers struck on MJ Furnitureslocated along Tomas Mapua
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwelling of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary
Jay. The intruders made their way into the furniture shop through the window grills they detached on the
second floor where the bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of the robbers forthwith herded the two
(2) maids of the owners into the bathroom.
Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other furniture store, the Best Wood Furniture,
along Tomas Pinpin Street, also in Sta. Cruz. His wife Mary had earlier retired to their bedroom. Sensing
however that something unusual was going on outside, Mary opened the door to peek. Suddenly, a man
placed his arms around her neck while another poked a balisong at her nape. She was pushed back into
the bedroom and ordered to open the drawers where she kept money. A third man ransacked the bedroom.
They then tied her hands behind her back, stuffed her mouth with a towel, and took off with some
P35,000.00 in cash and pieces of jewelry worth P30,000.00.
Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of the housemaids herded into the bathroom,
heard Manuel agonizing amid a commotion in the ground floor. After noticing that the two (2) men guarding
them had already left, the helpers, Jenelyn Valle and Virginia Ngoho, dashed out of the bathroom and
proceeded to the bedroom of their employers. Upon seeing Mary, the two (2) maids untied her hands and
took out the towel from her mouth. They then rushed to the ground floor where they saw Manuel sprawled
on the floor among the pieces of furniture which were in disarray. He succumbed to thirteen (13) stab
wounds.
After being positively identified by Jenelyn Valle as one of the workers of the Jay spouses, accused Marlo
Compil who was lying on a couch was immediately frisked and placed under arrest. According to Jenelyn,
Compil turned pale, became speechless and was trembling. However after regaining his composure and
upon being interrogated, Compil readily admitted his guilt and pointed to the arresting officers the
perpetrators of the heist from a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compil was then
brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further investigated. On their way back to Manila, he
was again questioned. He confessed that shortly before midnight on 23 October 1987 he was with the
group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers who his companions were and his
participation as a lookout for which he received P1,000.00. He did not go inside the furniture shop since he
would be recognized. Only those who were not known to their employers went inside. Compil said that his
cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated that after the robbery, they all met in Bangkal,
Makati, in the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio Pakit, where they shared
the loot and drank beer until four-thirty in the morning. Then they all left for Quezon and agreed that from
there they would all go home to their respective provinces. The day following his arrest, accused Compil
after conferring with CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz and in the presence of his sister Leticia Compil, brother
Orville Compil and brother-in-law Virgilio Jacala, executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Patricio Balanay
of the WPD admitting his participation in the heist as a lookout. He named the six (6) other perpetrators of
the crime as Jose Jacale, Baltazar Mabini, Amancio Alvos, Rogelio Pakit, a certain "Erning" and one
"Lando," and asserted that he was merely forced to join the group by Jose Jacale and Baltazar Mabini who
were the masterminds: According to Compil, he was earlier hired by Mabini to work for MJ Furnitures where
he was the foreman.
An Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo Compil. Assisted by a counsel de oficio he
entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned. After the prosecution had rested, the accused represented by
counsel de parte instead of adducing evidence filed a demurrer to evidence. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Br. 49, denied the demurrer, found the accused guilty of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused was not apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and seek the assistance
of counsel
RULING:
It is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the
house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was
further questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating
information. In all three instances, he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his
participation therein. In all those instances, he was not assisted by counsel.
The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to extract
incriminatory statements from accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed
extrajudicial confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus we said that admissions obtained during custodial
interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of
counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.
What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to have fully explained to the
accused who did not even finish Grade One, in less than ten (10) minutes as borne by the records, the
latter's constitutional rights and the consequences of subscribing to an extrajudicial confession.
While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it mentions details which could
not have been merely concocted, and jibes with the other pieces of evidence uncovered by the
investigators, still we cannot admit it in evidence because of its implicit constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless,
we find other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE V LUCERO (1995)

244 SCRA 425
PUNO, J.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was convicted for robbery with homicide.
While he was in custodial investigation the accused told Pfc. Pursal that he had no lawyer, thus one
was provided for him in the person of Atty. Peralta as his counsel de oficio who was present at the
start of the custodial investigation. Counsel explained to the accused his constitutional rights (right to
remain silent, that he is not obliged to give any statement to the investigators, and that even if he
has already given a statement, he may refuse to sign it) but Atty. Peralta observed no reaction from
the accused and gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.
Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of a friend and the CIS investigator began taking down Luceros
statement.
Next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two CIS agents to the lawyers house with his
confession. Atty. Peralta asked Luvero whether he gave the statements voluntarily, and the latter
answered yes, thus Peralta signed the confession to authenticate it.
Apparently during the custodial investigation no counsel was around while accused gave his
extrajudicial confession which was used against him as evidence in court and merit his conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused may be admissible during the trial
RULING:
NO.
Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession.
The constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be
provided with a counsel. This is a constitutional guarantee to protect the accused against the hostility and
duress from the authorities during custodial investigation. Any confession or statement made without the
presence of a counsel during the investigation is deemed to be inadmissible as evidence in court. It appears
that when the accused was taken with his statements his counsel was not around. Therefore his
extrajudicial confession cannot be used as evidence against the accused during his trial. The court erred in
admitting it as evidence and as a basis of conviction therefore the accused is acquitted.

PEOPLE V. SUAREZ (1997)

REGALADO, J.
FACTS:
Estrelita Guzman was robbed and was killed in her own house.
Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his wife, Marivic Suarez, also the victims adopted
daughter, could get at once any property that Marivic might inherit from Estrellita upon the latter's death.
In exchange for the job, Suarez would allow the other accused, Reyes & Lara, to steal what they wanted
from the house, in addition to giving them P100,000.00 after one month from the killing of Estrellita.
Two of the accused, Reyes and Lara, gave their sworn statement detailing what transpired from the
planning until the execution of the crime.
Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and on the circumstantial evidence adduced by
the prosecution, the trial court found Suarez, Reyes and Lara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
with homicide.
While Suarez and Reyes have already accepted the trial court's verdict, Lara now questions the lower
court's decision by challenging the admissibility of their extrajudicial declarations. He claims that their
extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation and without the benefit of an
effective counsel.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not accused Laras extrajudicial confessions were freely and voluntary given and without
the benefit of an effective counsel
(2) Whether or not a re-enactment of the crime in absence of counsel is admissible in evidence against
the accused
RULING:
(1) YES. After a thorough review of the records of the case, we agree with the lower court's factual finding
and conclusion that the extrajudicial confessions of accused Reyes and appellant Lara were freely and
voluntarily given and that their retraction and claims of violence and coercion were merely belated
contrivances and efforts at exculpation. Their claim that they were forced to sign their respective
statements was sufficiently refuted by the witnesses for the prosecution who were present on the day
and time the duo gave and signed their sworn statements.
We find no merit in appellant's contention that Atty. Saunar was not Reyes' own choice as counsel for
the interrogation. While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another
one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised
any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.
Here, while the lawyers of the accused were provided by the NBI, the accused never signified their
desire to have a lawyer of their own choice. Thus, we also disagree with appellant's claim that the
lawyer who assisted him in his waiver came in only after he had executed his waiver. His own
statements show that he waived his rights in the presence and with the advice of Atty. Rodolfo Dahiroc.
(2) NO. The pictures of the reenactment depicting Lara's role in the commission of the crime cannot be
utilized as evidence of his participation as a principal therein as that reenactment was conducted without
any lawyer assisting appellant.
The Court ruled that reenactments are covered by the right against self-incrimination. Atty. Ranin
himself admitted on the witness stand that no lawyer assisted Lara during the reenactment because he
could not find any available lawyer at that time who could act as his counsel.

PEOPLE V. SERZO (1997)

Rights of the Accused
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo
Casabal after the latter rescued minors being held by the former.
Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits.
The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared
without counsel, so the court appointed a counsel de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the arraignment
be reset so he can engage the services of his own counsel however, during the arraignment, he still
appeared without one. The arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by the counsel de officio.
During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counsel
RULING:
NO. The accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages of the proceedings.
While the right to be represented by counsel is absolute, the accused's option to hire one of his own choice
is limited. The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle
with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and the offended party to speedy and
adequate justice.
In the case at bar, appellant had been given ample time to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his
subsequent appearances in court without such counsel and his act of allowing this situation to continue until
the presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even appears that he was merely
delaying his own presentation of evidence on purpose to the prejudice of the offended party, the trial court
and the orderly administration of justice. Furthermore, appellant did not demonstrate in what way the
services of his counsels de oficio were unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance substantiating his claim
that he was not effectively represented. In short, he was afforded a chance to be heard by counsel of his
own choice, but by his own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such right. It taxes the mind to think
that, almost two years since appellant first invoked his right to be represented by counsel de parte, he still
could not find one who would suit his needs and desires. Neither did he cooperate with his court-named
lawyers. The facts of this case do not constitute a deprivation of appellant's constitutional right to counsel
because he was adequately represented by three court-appointed lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano
and Atty. Garcia.
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system
where an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also a recognition
of the accused not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has the power to take his life or
liberty.
The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal.
Recently, RA 7438 provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel.
The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must balance the private against the state's
and offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right is waivable as
long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.

PEOPLE V. ARCIAGA (1980)

GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS:
This case involves an automatic appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance convicting
Adriano Arciaga and Crispin Custodio with the crime of forcible abduction with rape. The Assistant
Fiscal accused Adriano Arciaga, Boy Rivera, Marcelino Gonzales, as Principals, Crispin Custodio and
Ambrosio Magtipon as Accomplices, of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape. Since the accused
Boy Rivera and Marcelino Gonzales remained at large up to the time of the rendition of the judgment
while the accused Ambrosio Magtipon was just apprehended, only the accused Adriano Arciaga and
Crispin Custodio were tried and convicted for forcible abduction and rape.
The peoples version of the facts is as follows: Accused Adriano Arciaga, Boy Rivera and Marcelino
Gonzales, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and forcibly take and carry away one Adoracion Hernandez from a
tricycle she was riding and thereafter brought her to Morong, Rizal and to Sta. Maria, Laguna, where the
accused Adriano Arciaga by means of force, threats and intimidation did then and there willfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with Adoracion Hernandez against her will and consent. While the
accused-appellants presented a different story, claiming that Adriano Arciaga and Adoracion Hernandez
were sweethearts and that in order to free themselves from the restrictions of Adoracion's parents who
had continuously and persistently disapproved of their relationship, they agreed to elope.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial courts findings will be sustained considering the credibility of the witnesses.
HELD:
No. The rule is well-settled that "the trial court's findings will be sustained unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which
has been misinterpreted" because the trial court is in a better position to decide the question of credibility,
having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and having observed their behavior and manner of
testifying. Where the judge who rendered the decision is not the judge who heard the case on the merits, as
in the present case, the rule, however, need not be followed and the exception should be unhesitatingly
applied when there are certain in dubitable facts favoring accused-appellants' innocence that were not taken
into account. The disparity of prosecutions witnesses as to how the abduction was carried out, the
inconsistency of complainants charge of rape to human experience, the physical injuries sustained and the
letter to her parents, which were insufficient to prove the force and violence in the commission of the
charge, and the proclivity of the complainant in giving false testimony were facts favoring the accusedappellants innocence that were not taken into account.
Besides, no inference of guilt may be drawn against an accused upon his failure to make a statement of any
sort. The neglect or refusal of the accused to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used
against him. Most importantly, an accused has the right to remain silent. Such silence cannot be used as
presumption of his guilt. The accused in this case cannot be faulted merely for failure to give any statement
before trial. The rules do not make it a condition precedent for a witness to give his affidavit before the
witness stand. The procedure is simply to adopt safeguard the parties from recalcitrant witnesses. The
testimony of the injured should not be received with precipitate credulity. When the conviction depends on
any vital point on her uncorroborated testimony, it should not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor
are free from suspicion. The lone testimony of the woman must be clear and free from serious contradiction
her story must be impeccable and must ring true throughout or bear the stamp of absolute truth and candor.

PEOPLE V HOLGADO (1950)

MORAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
Frisco Holgado was charged in the Court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because
according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive,
kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby
depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty." Holgado pleaded guilty without the benefit of a
lawyer and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the
latter. Two days later, the trial court rendered judgment, finding Holgado guilty and sentencing him the
penalty of prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree, as minimum,
or 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, with
costs. Holgado appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court
has four important duties to comply with: (1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney
before being arraigned; (2) After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of
an attorney; (3) If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him; and (4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a
reasonable time therefor. Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record
discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he
desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an
attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure one or to assign an attorney de oficio. One of the great
principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be
heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not
show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the
commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on
this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed
instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court
became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same
had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere
statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the
court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified
plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.

PEOPLE V. RIO (1991)

PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
Convicted of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the Regional Trial Court, accused-appellant Ricardo Rio
interposed his appeal and as a consequence, the clerk of court of said branch forwarded the records of the case to the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, forwarded the records of the case to the Supreme Court in view of the
penalty imposed upon the accused. The accused-appellant, in two (2) letters addressed to Division Clerk of Court
Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due
to his poverty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is still entitled to the right of counsel
HELD:
Yes. In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have
an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court
should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor, or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own.
This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial court. It continues, even
during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an
intent to appeal. Even where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire
into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the
court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the accused
subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life must have more in law."

PEOPLE V. RAMIREZ (1976)

FERNANDO, J.
FACTS:
Felipe Ramirez was accused with rape by Felicisima Briones, the daughter of his common law wife. Briones alleges
that he raped her on two occasions: September 27, 1967 and October 2, 1967. Briones said that she was forced by
Ramirez to have sexual intercourse with him and that she fought really hard but eventually gave in because he
overpowered her. It was only after five months of being pregnant that she confided to her mother and when his
grandfather who told them to file the case. Briones gave birth to a child on May 22, 1968 (seven months and twentyfive days after the first sexual act). Ramirez contends that he should be given or considered innocent since his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court must give credence to the plea of Ramirez on the basis that the accusations towards him
were not proven beyond reasonable doubt
RULING:
Even from the most objective standpoint, doubts about his guilt for the crime of rape, not fanciful but real, cannot be
erased. There is much evidence that proves that there had been prior relations between the two long before the
alleged rape happened. It is clear that there was no rape that happened. It was believed that it was consensual
between the two. Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr., the medico-legal officer did not help the case of the complainant because it
may be inferred from her lacerations that they may have been made even prior to the alleged rape. It is also not usual
that a woman gives birth earlier than nine months especially when it is a first child. Rape was not committed thus the
decision is reversed and set aside. Appellant Felipe Ramirez y Camatis is acquitted with costs de oficio.

PEOPLE V. MONTES
RELOVA, J.
FACTS:
During the late afternoon of October 16, 1966 (not October 18, 1966 as alleged in the complaint) Paula
Lonzo and Masning Kingay were walking together on their way to the house of the former when their
way was blocked by appellant Tony Montes and Wagtingan Montes. Tony Montes grabbed Masning
Kingay while Wagtingan Montes took hold of Paula and each of the accused pulled their victims to
separate secluded places and then and there succeeded in abusing them, each to his own victim It was
because of the alleged rape of Masning Kingay that caused her to commit suicide on October 18, 1966,
or two days after the supposed incident.
Paula Lonzo filed the criminal complaint against Wagtingan Montes, while the mother of the deceased
Masning Kingay filed the corresponding complaint against herein appellant Tony Montes. Eventually,
Wagtingan Montes married Paula Lonzo and, as a consequence, Criminal Case No. 3756 against
Wagtingan Montes was dismissed. The case against Tony Montes proceeded to trial.
The lower court thus concluded that Tony Montes ravished Masning Kingay who took her life because of
what happened to her and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua for having indirectly caused her
death.
RULING:
The Solicitor General admitted that from the evidence submitted, the fact of the commission of the rape has
not been established. It has not been shown that Kingay had sexual intercourse with the accused nor that it
was against her will and was done with the use of force and intimidation nor that she was deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, much less, that she was at the time under 12 years of age. It is true that
the accused Tony and Wagtingan Montes admitted in court that they were with Kingay and Lonzo on the
date the latter were allegedly raped by the former, but they denied having raped the two women. There is,
therefore, absence of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, to show that Kingay was raped, or that she was
raped by the appellant. Under the circumstances there is no need to discuss the arguments raised by the
appellant. It should be noted, however, that the decision of the lower court is not clear as to what crime the
accused was convicted of. He was sentenced "to serve a life imprisonment for having indirectly caused her
death", which may indicate that the accused was convicted of the crime of homicide If this is so, the lower
court is in grave error for he was never charged with said offense; he was accused of and tried for rape.

ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2001)

BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS:
An information is filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. 'Asiong Salonga' and
'Jose Velarde,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas and John Does & Jane Does of the crime of Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder)
June, 1998 to January 2001: Estrada himself and/or in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who
are members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
and/or other persons, by taking undue advantage of his official position, authority, relationship,
connection, or influence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire by himself, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth of P4,097,804,173.17 thereby unjustly enriching
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or
means
Received P545,000,000.00 in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit, by himself and/or in connection with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane Does, in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling
Diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or misusing directly or indirectly, for his or their
personal gain and benefit, public funds of P130,000,000.00, more or less, representing a portion of
P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No.
7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, John Doe
a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does & Jane Does
For His Personal Gain And Benefit, The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) To Purchase
351,878,000 Shares Of Stocks, More Or Less, And The Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000
Shares Of Stock, More Or Less, Of The Belle Corporation worth P1,102,965,607.50 and
P744,612,450.00 respectively and by collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, commissions or percentages by reason of said purchases
which became part of the deposit in the equitable-pci bank under the account name Jose Velarde
By unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares, percentages, kickbacks, or any form of
pecuniary benefits, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, P3,233,104,173.17 and depositing
the same under his account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-Pci Bank
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. It suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. It dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. It abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
April 4, 2001: Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Information.
April 25, 2001: Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable
cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused
June 14, 2001: Estrada moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than 1
offense Denied
Estrada filed a petition for certiorari are:
1. The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
2. The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process.
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it
ISSUES: W/N the Plunder Law is constitutional (consti1)

RULING:
YES. Petition is dismissed. Plunder Law is constitutional.
Miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the Plunder Law
Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the
accused to determine the nature of his violation.
Combination- at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration series - must be two
(2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine - a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law
o The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction
o A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
o The statute is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects:
it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of what conduct to avoid
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle
o As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is
vague in all its possible applications
Over breadth Doctrine - a governmental purpose may NOT be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms
Over breadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
The over breadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases
Constitutional Law Over-breadth Doctrine and Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine

PEOPLE V. CRISOLOGO
PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
Zosimo Crisologo alias Amang, a deaf-mute, was charged for robbery and homicide committed on 1 May
1976 in Calamagoy, Poblacion Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. Accused was allegedly informed of the charged
against him through sign language but apparently no sign language expert or representative was available.
The accused through a counsel de oficio waived the reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. Trial
proceeded without any evidence being presented on his part. Finally, without the services of an expert in
sign language ever being utilized at any stage of the proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and sentenced to die by electrocution. Executive clemency was
recommended, however, in view of the accused's infirmity and his nearly ten-year detention as a suspect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was given due process of law and the insufficiency of the purely circumstantial
evidence presented to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence be in his favor
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to
the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have
communicated the accused's own version of the circumstances which led to his implication in the crime,
deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the
accused's final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances. The absence of a
qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the
accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The
accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined
was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings
where his life and liberty were at stake. The Constitution of this state expressly provides that an accused
has a right to be heard by himself and counsel, also, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation;
against him, and, further to be confronted by the witnesses, who are to testify against him. In constructing
this constitutional provision it needs no discussion in deciding that all this must be done in a manner by
which the accused can know, the nature and the cause of the accusation he is called upon to answer, and
all necessary means must be provided, and the law so contemplates, that the accused must not only be
confronted by the witnesses against him, but he must be accorded all necessary means to know and
understand the testimony given by said witnesses, and must be placed in a condition where he can make
his plea rebut such testimony, and give his own version of the transaction upon which the accusation is
based.

PEOPLE VS SALAS
QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
A 60 year old woman, identified as Virginia Talens was found lying dead in a canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico,
Pampanga. She was last seen alive at about 3:00 o'clock early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando Pangan and
Richard Pangan who were with her going home coming from the wake of one Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and
Richard Pangan testified that accused was with them in going home at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of March
6, 1992.
Orlando and Richard Pangan reached first their house and left the two on the way and that was the last time
Virginia was seen alive. Police Investigator Gonzales who immediately responded upon report, recovered at the
scene a pin, the victim's wristwatch, earring, a ring and P135.00 money; he likewise found on March 9, 1992 when
he continued his investigation bloodstain on the front door of the house of the accused which bloodstain when
submitted for examination was found to be of human blood.
One Resultay was with Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of March 5, 1992 in going to the wake, who claims
that Virginia had money on a purse as while they were on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng she saw Virginia got
money from her purse a P500.00 bill but as she had no change she instead took P8.00 from her other pocket.
Orlando Accused did not anymore report for work at Sta. Ana, Pampanga, was no longer to be found and was last
seen at about 3:00 morning together with Virginia Talens on their way home coming from the wake. He returned
only on September 19, 1992 at Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico, Pampanga where he was ultimately
apprehended by the Mexico Police on September 22, 1992 after chancing on a radio message by the police of
Arayat to their Provincial commander that a vehicular incident occurred at Arayat, Pampanga where one Elmer
Salas was the victim and was hospitalized at the district hospital at Arayat, Pampanga where he used the name of
Rommel Salas and not Elmer Salas.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
RULING:
In this case, there was no eyewitness nor direct evidence, either to the robbery or to the homicide and none of the
things allegedly stolen were ever recovered. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix from which the trial
court may draw its findings and conclusion of culpability. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential when to
insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons free.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis excepting
that of guilt. All the circumstances established must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing solely to the accused, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the author of the
crime. The facts and circumstances consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence
can constitute evidence which, in weight and probative value, may be deemed to surpass even direct evidence in
its effect on the court.
The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant hastily abandoned
his house in Barrio San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since childhood, on that very date. Appellant
was nowhere when his co-worker and barriomate, Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellants house to fetch him for
work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant also abandoned his job as a painter in Sta. Ana,
Pampanga, on March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving behind an unfinished painting project. He was not
seen again from said date. Police investigators found human bloodstains on the front door of appellants house, on
his clothing, and on his yellow slippers after the victim was killed. Despite efforts of the police to find appellant as
the principal suspect, a fact known to appellants family and neighbors, appellant did not present himself to the
authorities. Appellant was apprehended only a full six (6) months after the date of the crime, following his
confinement in a hospital in Arayat, Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When
hospitalized, appellant used the alias Rommel Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas. These circumstances
denote flight, which when unexplained, has always been considered by the courts as indicative of guilt.
Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying a winning streak
when her son, Ramil Talens, came to fetch her but which he failed to do because his mother was winning, and she
refused to leave. The purse of Talens containing cash was gone when her corpse was found in the canal with a
stab wound and bruises. What was left was a safety pin which victim used to fasten the missing purse to her
clothes.
The foregoing circumstances, together, lead to no other conclusion except that appellant robbed and killed the
victim.

MANOTOC, JR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FERNAN, J.
FACTS:
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the
Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in US for a certain time, went home to file a
petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Such was
granted. However, pending disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of
Immigration not to clear him for departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued.
There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be
fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP
respectively. He was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.
Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to
US relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was
also denied by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the
SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad.
According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted
him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated
RULING:
NO.
The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his
constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he
may be placed beyond the reach of courts.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration thereof, as
well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able to show the necessity of his travel
abroad. He never indicated that no other person in his behalf could undertake such business transaction.
Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. According to SC, the order of trial court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the provision on right to travel.

PEOPLE V. GALANO (1977)

TEEHANKEE, J.
FACTS:
On October 1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the municipal court of Batangas against
private respondent Gregorio Santos (Santos). Santos was arrested and pleaded not guilty in his
arraignment. His case was heard on its merits but on September 1964 he jumped bail. As a result, his bail
bond was forfeited and the case against him was archived by the municipal court. Nine years later the
accused was re-arrested and the trial of his case was resumed.
On October 1974, pending trial, Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Batangas
court did not have territorial jurisdiction over the case since the crime was committed in Manila. Finding the
motion meritorious, the Batangas City Court dismissed the case against Santos for lack of territorial
jurisdiction. A month later, complainant Juanito Limbo refiled the same case against Santos in the Fiscals
Office in Manila but Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds of prescription and double
jeopardy. On December 1975, the CFI of Manila, presided over by Hon. Ricardo Galano, issued an order
dismissing the case on the ground that the offense had already prescribed.
ISSUE:
W/N the accused can invoke double jeopardy as a defense
RULING:
No, Santos (accused) cannot invoke double jeopardy as a defense. To constitute double jeopardy, there
must be: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) filed before a competent court; (3) to which the defendant
pleaded; and, (4) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. Santos, intent on thwarting his prosecution, filed a motion
to dismiss the information on grounds of prescription and double jeopardy. There is manifestly no jeopardy,
because he was not acquitted by the Batangas court which on the basis of the evidence could neither
convict him because it was thereby shown to have no jurisdiction over the offense.
When the City Fiscal of Manila upon complainant's instance refiled on July 29, 1975 the same case against
respondent accused in the Manila court of first instance, (after having conducted a preliminary
investigation), it is clear that not even a year of the ten-year prescriptive period had been consumed.

OLAGUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION (1987)

GANCAYCO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged with Subversion. Consequently, the Chief-of Staff of the AFP
created a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34 to try the criminal case against the
petitioners. They were found guilty of by respondent military commission and sentenced to death on
December 4, 1984. They filed a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the
Supreme Court, questioning the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. Respondents invoked that the creation of
the Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon a previous case Aquino v Military Commission No.
2. Petitioners contend, however, that the ruling in said case must be overturned because it is now
inapplicable since the Martial Law has already been lifted.
ISSUE:
W/N military tribunals had jurisdiction to try cases of civilians
RULING:
No, military tribunals had no jurisdiction to try cases of civilians, which fell under the competence of the
ordinary courts even during the period of martial law. In the case of Aquino v Military Commission No. 2, the
Court held that, Martial law creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil
jurisdiction and renders offenses against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by
military tribunals. The Court relied on the dissenting opinions in the Aquino case. As explained by Justice
Teehankee in his separate dissenting opinion in said Aquino case, Judicial power is vested by the
Constitution exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are duly established by law.
Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have exclusive power to hear and determine those matters
which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen. Since we are not an enemy-occupied territory nor are
we under a military government and even on the premise that martial law continues in force, the military
tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are
properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly functioning.

CRUZ V. ENRILE (1988)

NARVASA, J.
FACTS:
Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in the Supreme Court to test the legality of the continued
detention of 217 so-called "political detainees" arrested in the nine-year span of official martial rule and
committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand trial for common crimes
before various courts martial; if any of these offenses had any political color, this had neither been pleaded
nor proved. Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and only 26 confirmed as military personnel. 115
accused had been condemned to die, 46 were sentenced to life imprisonment, 9 others were meted prison
terms of from 20 to 30 years; 41 were given prison terms of 10 to 20 years; and 3 were meted prison terms
of less than 10 years. As of the date of filing of the petitions, the sentences of 68 had become final upon
their approval by the Office of the President, 75 cases were pending review in either that Office or before
the Board of Military Review, while the appeal or review of the remaining 73 cases either had been
expressly suspended pending the outcome of these petitions, or are simply not dealt with in the records.
Presidential amnesty was granted to Virgilio Alejandrino, yet to this date he remains a prisoner at the
Penitentiary, as do Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patano, Andres Parado and Daniel Campus,
although they were acquitted of the charges against them, and Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los
Santos, who appear to have fully served the sentences imposed on them by the military commissions which
convicted them. The petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the establishment of all military
tribunals as well as General Order 8 ordaining their creation, and the nullity of all the proceedings had
against them before these bodies as a result of which they had been illegally deprived of their liberty.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners cases may be retried without subjecting the accused to double jeopardy
RULING:
No breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense would result from the retrial of the petitioners' cases, for the simple reason that the
absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardy
from attaching. Valid previous proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be
raised by the accused in the second prosecution. In fine, the Court holds that the merits of the indictments
against all these civilians are solely for the civil courts to weigh and decide upon after due proceedings.
Otherwise stated, they are entitled to the retrial they have explicitly requested of their respective cases in
the civil courts.

TAN V. BARRIOS (1990)

GRINO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
A proclamation was made by former President Marcos which authorizes the AFP Chief of Staff to create
military tribunals to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to
them. The petitioners, together with 12 others, were arrested and charged of the crimes of murder and
illegal possession of firearm but were acquitted of the charges. Later on, the said proclamation was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court stating that the power to interpret laws is vested upon the judicial not
executive department. Then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez assigned Prosecutor Hernani Barrios to
conduct a reinvestigation in the case which involves the petitioner herein, and if there is a sufficient
evidence, to prosecute the case in the court of competent jurisdiction. Barrios filed an information without
conducting a reinvestigation in the RTC, citing the case of Cruz vs Enrile. The petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to annul the information filed by Barrios because they had already been acquitted
of the same by the Military Commission. Furthermore, they asserted that Barrios exceeded his jurisdiction
and gravely abused his discretion in reprosecuting them which would amount to the violation of their right to
protection against double jeopardy.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion in reprosecuting the petitioners
2. Whether or not their acquittal in the charges filed against them bars the subsequent prosecution for
the same offense
RULING:
1. The respondents herein exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion in reprosecuting the petitioners. It is a cardinal rule of procedure that a courts judgment or order in case
shall not adversely affect persons who were not parties to the same self case. The Cruz vs. Enrile
case, cited by the respondent, cannot be applied for the party therewith was not given their day in
the court. In the present case, the petitioners were tried and acquitted after they had been accorded
a fair trial by the court martial during the period of martial law.
2. The acquittal of the petitioners bars any subsequent prosecution for the offense. The doctrine of
operative facts applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-accused; that the
principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over the civilians should not be
allowed to obliterate the operative facts that in the particular case of the petitioners, the proceedings
were fair, that there was no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process. Because of
these established operative facts, the refilling of the information against the petitioners would place
them in double jeopardy. The rule of finality is a constitutional mandate; that a single prosecution is
all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment, enables him to treat what had transpired
as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty
imposed, and is bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself is time consuming and expense- producing for
the state as well. It has been referred to as res judicata in prison grey. The ordeal of a criminal
prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases the state to do so. Furthermore, depriving
the petitioners of the protection of the judgment of acquittal rendered by the military commission in
their particular case would amount to an ex post facto law which is prohibited in our Constitution.

PEOPLE VS THE CITY COURT OF SILAY (1976)

MUNOZ-PALMA, J.
FACTS:
Private respondents herein were charged under the RPC with falsification of the sugar cane weight report
card or tarjeta, which is a private document showing the weight of sugar cane belonging to Deogracias de
la Paz. After the prosecution presented its evidence, the private respondents moved to dismiss the charge
against them on the ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their guild beyond
reasonable doubt. The judge granted their motion on the ground that there could be no use of falsified
document since there is no falsified document. Hence, this petition was filed. The private respondents
claimed that granting this petition would place them in double jeopardy since the case filed before them was
dismissed by the respondent court. On the other hand, the People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy
is untenable since the case was dismissed upon the motion of the accused and the dismissal made with
their consent had waived their defense of double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the continuance of the case against the private respondents, after its dismissal was set
aside, would tantamount to double jeopardy
RULING:
Yes. While it is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused, this was
a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced
and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the
merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. Also, it is correct that the judge who handled the case
erred in dismissing the case. But though an error was made by the trial court in acquitting the accused, it
cannot be remedied now by an appeal because it would place the accused in double jeopardy and to
continue the criminal case against the petitioner after he had already been acquitted would be putting him
twice in jeopardy of punishment of the same offense.

SALCEDO VS MENDOZA (1979)

MAKASIAR, J.
FACTS:
A case (homicide through reckless imprudence) was filed against the petitioner. Upon the arraignment, the
petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. When the case was called for a trial, postponement was requested by
the fiscal twice. After two postponements, it was pushed through on March 28, 1987 but no prosecuting
fiscal appeared for the prosecution leading to the dismissal of the case. A private prosecutor, who withdrew
his appearance from the case and reserved the right to file a separate civil action, moved for its
postponement in order to give the prosecution another chance because they intend to request the Ministry
of Justice to appoint a special prosecutor to handle the case but the trial court denied the motion. According
to the trial court, although the government is interested in the prosecution of this case, the Court must also
take into consideration the interest of the accused for under the Constitution, he is entitled to a speedy
administration of justice. However, a motion to reconsideration was filed by the prosecution twice: first was
denied and the second was granted; and the trial court asked both parties to submit within 5 days their
respective pleadings but failed to comply. Later on, respondent judge set aside the order of dismissal and
scheduled a new trial. Hence, this petition. According to the petitioner, the dismissal of the case against him
was equivalent to an acquittal and reinstatement of the same would place him twice in jeopardy for the
same offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reinstatement of the case against the petitioner would result to double jeopardy
RULING:
Yes. The dismissal of a criminal case predicted on the right of the accused to speedy trial amounts to an
acquittal on the merits which bars the subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense. Failure
of the prosecution to appear on the day of the trial makes the accused entitled to a speedy trial and
dismissal of the case on the said ground would also bar another prosecution for the same offense. As a
general rule, a dismissal upon the motion or with the express consent of the accused win not be a bar to the
subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense, as provided in the Rules of Court except
when the dismiss was predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial upon his own motion or express
consent, it amounts to an acquittal which will bar another prosecution of the accused for the same off ense.
And any attempt to prosecute the accused for the same offense will violate the constitutional prohibition that
no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

**ESMEA V. POGOY (1981)

AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly
forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5,000 from the bank to be given to them
because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No trial
came in after the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on another date. Sometime later, Judge
Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received a
telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent
judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the priests telegram
did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the complainants reason
to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the
case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of
influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to complainants failure
to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy
RULING:
Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been
dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the
case filed. The dismissal was due to complainants incapability to present its evidence due to nonappearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the defendant
for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present, that one, there
is a valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and
third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. In the case at
bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the
accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata
and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In the case, it was evidently shown that the
accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its termination which
would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which would make the
case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents
as well for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be
a bar to further prosecution.

DE LA CAMARA V. ENAGE (1971)

FERNANDO, J.
FACTS:
Mayor de la Camara was arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation
in the killing of 14 and the wounding of 12 other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co. 18 days later, the
Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed cases of multiple frustrated murder and for multiple murder against the
petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo. On January 14, 1969 an application for bail was filed by
petitioner which was granted and the amount was fixed at the excessive amount of 1,195,200.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amount of the bail bond is excessive
RULING:
Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charge with capital offense when the evidence of guilt is
strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach.it
is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his
defense is weak, would simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is
intended as a a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted.
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So
the Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, that the amount of 1,195,200 is clearly violative of this constitutional
provision under the circumstances. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the
amount required as bail could not possibly exceed 50,000 for the information for murder and 25,000 for
other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice
did recommend that total sum of 40,000 for the two offenses.
The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1)
ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character
and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7)
probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other
cases."

ODCHIGUE-BONDOC V. TAN (2010)

CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary, herein
respondent. Petitioner denies the allegations. The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor
for the Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any
reversible error. The CA set aside the DOJ Secretarys resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondents petition for review without therein expressing
clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based). Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that
the requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of courts of justice, and it
does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ. Respondent counters
that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power
2. Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power
RULING:
1. No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making powers. A preliminary investigation is
not a quasi-judicial proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine the
guilt of innocence of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the determination whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasicourt, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused.
2. No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for
review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.
Sec 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.

MIRANDA V. ARIZONA (1966)

WARREN, C.J.
FACTS:
The Supreme Court decision on Miranda v. Arizona addressed (4) different cases involving custodial
investigations. In all cases, the defendant was not informed of his rights at the outset of the interrogation
process, and was subsequently interrogated by police officers, detectives and prosecuting attorneys
while isolated from the outside world.
In the titular case, Miranda was arrested and, after being identified by the complaining witness,
interrogated by police officers. This led to a signed, written confession which was presented to the jury.
Miranda was found guilty and sentenced to prison for 20-30 years.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Mirandas constitutional rights were not violated when the
confession was obtained.
ISSUE:
W/N statements obtained from individuals who were interrogated without first being informed of their rights
are admissible against said individuals in court
RULING:
In reversing the Supreme Court of Arizonas decision, the U.S. Supreme Court stated,

the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

Therefore, a defendant must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning if he so desires.
Mirandas conviction was consequently overturned.

PEOPLE V. MACAM (1994)

QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
The case is an appeal on a previous decision from the Regional Trial Court, in which Danilo and Ernesto
Roque were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and were sentenced to
suffer Reclusion Perpetua.
The titular Eduardo Macam, as well as Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., were co-accused with
the appellants of the aforementioned crime. The accused pleaded not guilty.
One of the accused, Danilo Roque, contended that their warrantless arrest and their identification,
without counsel, by the prosecution witness in a police line-up violated their constitutional rights under
Section 12, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N the warrantless arrest and uncounseled identification of the accused were violative of their
constitutional rights
RULING:
The right to counsel is extended to critical stages of prosecution, which includes the police line-up. After the
start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is
considered inadmissible. However, the prosecution did not present the evidence garnered in the police line up. As such, the exclusionary sanctions cannot be applied. At the same time, the appellants did not object
to the in-court identification made by the prosecution witnesses; the same witnesses who had identified
them beforehand in the police line-up. Lacking any objections, the prosecution need not show that said
identifications were of independent origin.
As for the warrantless arrest, the appellants are estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest, as
they had not done so at the earliest possible time; the matter being raised for the first time in the appeal. As
they had not moved to quash the information before the trial court, and in fact had voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by pleading not guilty, any irregularities in their arrest have
been deemed cured.

DE LA TORRE V. COURT OF APPEALS

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:
The case is on appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals which, in turn, affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City finding Alejandro B. de la Torre guilty for the qualified theft of
several MERALCO electric meters.
De la Torre, along with others, was taken to the NPD headquarters for investigation. He was
subsequently identified from a line-up by a witness as a perpetrator of the theft. Following this, he was
tried and found guilty of the crime.
De la Torre appealed to the CA, contending, among others, that his constitutional rights were violated
during the custodial investigation for the case. The CA however affirmed the RTCs decision and
subsequently denied reconsideration.
In this appeal, de la Torre alleged that his constitutional rights under Section 12, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution were violated when he was not informed of his Miranda rights to silence and to counsel. He
further pointed out the exclusionary rule in par. 3 of Section 12, claiming inadmissibility of the evidence
garnered against him in violation of the constitutional provision on his right to the presence of counsel.
ISSUE:
W/N de la Torres constitutional rights violated when he was identified in a police line-up without the
presence of counsel
RULING:
In stark contrast with its ruling on the Macam case, the court ruled that the right to counsel only arises when
the investigating officers start questioning the detainee for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions,
or any information from the accused. This, evidently, does not include a police line-up.
As de la Torre was merely included in a line-up of (8) persons and was, in fact, not questioned during the
police investigation, the court ruled that there was no basis for the allegations that his rights as a suspect in
a custodial investigation were violated.

GUANZON V. DE VILLA (1990)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
The forty one (41) petitioners, claiming to represent the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests
and are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before th[e] Court, filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police officers from conducting Aerial
Target Zonings or Saturation Drives in Metro Manila. In their petition, they claim that the "saturation drive"
or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in Tondo, Manila were unconstitutional. To support such claim,
they specifically alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search
warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without
nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely roused from their sleep by banging on the
walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like
cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The
petitioners claim that in all these drives, the following acts were committed:
1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours, police
and military units without any search warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one
residence and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of them are in
civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.
2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of
their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some in the process), and then ordering
the residents within to come out of their respective residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows, the men are ordered to
strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks and other imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted by the raiders, some of the
members of the raiding team force their way into each and every house within the cordoned off area
and then proceed to conduct search of the said houses without civilian witnesses from the
neighborhood.
5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders ransack their homes, tossing
about the residents' belongings without total regard for their value. In several instances, walls are
destroyed, ceilings are damaged in the raiders' illegal effort to 'fish' for incriminating evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing frequency that their
money and valuables have disappeared after the said operations.
7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome intrusions are arrested on
the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that take them to detention centers where they are
interrogated and 'verified.' These arrests are all conducted without any warrants of arrest duly issued
by a judge, nor under the conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest. Some hooded men are
used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration of the period wherein they
can be legally detained without any charge at all. In other instances, some arrested persons are
released without charge after a few days of arbitrary detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at the residents during these
illegal operations.
10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-spot beatings, maulings and maltreatment.

11. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders are subjected to mental and
physical torture to extract confessions and tactical information. (Rollo, pp. 2-4)
In their defense, the respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, alleged that the accusations of the
petitioners were total lies. Respondents contend that the Constitution grants to government the power to
seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning
were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said
drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the
actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the saturation drives performed by respondents involved acts which violated human rights.
RULING:
Yes. In the meantime, the Supreme Court enjoined the acts violative of human rights alleged by petitioners
as committed during the police actions until such time as permanent rules to govern such rules are
promulgated.
The Supreme Court remanded the petition to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City
where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations and where specific erring parties
may be pinpointed and prosecuted.
The Supreme Court likewise forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of National Defense, and the Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary Integrated
National Police for the drawing up and enforcement of clear guidelines to govern police actions intended to
abate riots and civil disturbances, flush out criminal elements, and subdue terrorist activities.
ON SATURATION DRIVES AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
When saturation drives may be conducted without having to secure search warrants and without
violating the Bill of Rights Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military
may go out in force to the combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels
and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating
the Bill of Rights.
Duty of the court to stop the transgression and encroachment upon the rights of the individual
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the
court to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state may not encroach
upon the rights of the individual. It is the duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the
present petition where the petitioners do not complain they were victims of the police actions, where no
names of any of the thousands of alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to stop
all police saturation drives, as long as the Court is convinced that the event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so inspite of the
alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents "to submit themselves voluntarily for
character and personal verification." We cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the
petitions and admitted by the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers and
policemen committing certain abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the
essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled
areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A
show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. A
blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one-on-one
confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals are easily
procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices because all
concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.

BERNARDEZ V. VALERA (1962)

DIZON, J.
FACTS:
Between 7:30 and 8:00 o'clock in the evening of February 18, 1961, immediately after a hot exchange of
words between petitioner Meneleo B. Bernardez and Pedro Benedito inside the New York Restaurant
located in the poblacion of Bangued, Abra, the former fired several shots at the latter, hitting him on the left
chest, left forearm and in the lumbar region, and likewise hitting Cpl. Reinerio Buenafe, causing his
instantaneous death. The following day Lt. Antonio C. Garcia, P.C., filed a complaint for frustrated murder
against petitioner in the Justice of the Peace issued the corresponding warrant of arrest and fixed the bail at
P15,000.00.
On the 21st of the same month an amended complaint for murder and frustrated murder was filed with the
same court, its pertinent allegations reading as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of February 1961, in the municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named Accused armed with a
Llama Pistol Caliber .380 with magazine and several rounds of ammunition and with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation by the use of stealth, ruse and strategy with treachery did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shot one Atty. PEDRO BENEDITO, a lawyer by profession and on account of
which gunshot wounds were inflicted by the aforesaid accused on the different parts of the body of Atty.
PEDRO BENEDITO. In the same occasion while Corporal Reinerio Buenafe a member of the Philippine
Constabulary stationed in Bangued, Abra, having actually seen that Atty. Pedro Benedito was already falling
down to the ground on account of the gunshot wounds inflicted by the said accused went to the succor of
Atty. Pedro Benedito. While Corporal Reinerio Buenafe was in the act of succoring the wounded Atty. Pedro
Benedito was shot at by the Accused thereby hitting Corporal Reinerio on a fatal portion of his body which
caused his almost instantaneous death. That with respect to the crime committed by the accused, the
accused had already performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of MURDER
BUT COULD NOT produce it on account of the stoppage of the pistol of the Accused after killing Corporal
REINERIO BUENAFE to death and due to the immediate medical attention to Atty. Pedro Benedito
although his physical conditions is under prognostic observation in the Abra Provincial Hospital.
CONTRARY TO LAW, and with the aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime to wit: 1) that
the crime was committed by the use of Firearm and, 2) By the use of stealth and strategy. Generic
Circumstances of treachery and qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and that Corporal
Reinerio Buenafe was an Agent or a Person in Authority.
The Justice of Peace admitted the amended complaint and issued another warrant but recommended no
bail.
Immediately after the shooting incident petitioner voluntarily surrendered himself and his pistol to M/Sgt.
Jose G. Estolas, P.C., and was thereafter detained at the Philippine Constabulary stockade located outside
the poblacion of Bangued, where he remained so detained until he was transferred to the Abra Provincial
Jail where he continues to be under detention up to the present.
Petitioner filed with the court a motion for bail, to which the prosecution objected upon the ground that
petitioner was charged with murder and the evidence of his guilt was strong.
After the parties had submitted the incident for resolution, the respondent denied the same. Thereafter,
claiming that the respondent, in so doing, had committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a refusal
to comply with a ministerial duty, as a result of which petitioner was illegally detained; he filed the present
petition for Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari or Prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent was justified in denying the petition for bail mentioned heretofore

RULING:
The case of the prosecution is based on the sworn statement of Pedro Benedito, the substance of which is
to this effect: that prior to the shooting incident there was a long-standing grudge between him and
petitioner; that in the afternoon of February 18 when affiant passed in front of the house of one Regino
Bernardez, where petitioner and his wife were standing, petitioner asked him for the sum of P50.00 as
advance payment for the amicable settlement of a criminal case filed by a client of petitioner charging
Benedito with having run over and killed an old woman in Lagangilang two years before, and that petitioner
was enraged when he refused to pay the amount; that between 7:00 and 8:00 in the evening of the same
day, he (Benedito) had some drinks at the New York Restaurant located in the poblacion of Bangued,
together with Sgt. Estolas and Cpl. Buenafe, while petitioner, his wife and another woman were in the same
place occupying another table; that after affiant and his companions had left the restaurant they were
followed by petitioner who asked him to return to the restaurant for some more drinks; that they returned to
the place and took beer; that in the course of their conversation petitioner remarked that it was strange that
although they were relatives he seemed to be unfriendly towards him, and when affiant denied this,
petitioner stood up and drew his gun; that although affiant immediately grabbed petitioner's hand, the latter
started firing at him; that after being hit, he fell down on the floor and sought cover under one of tables; that
petitioner kept on firing and one of the shots hit and killed Cpl. Buenafe who had entered the restaurant and
attempted to approach Benedito, telling petitioner at the same time to stop firing.
While the charge against petitioner is undeniably a capital offense, it seems likewise obvious that the
evidence submitted by the prosecution to the respondent judge for the purpose of showing that the
evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong, is not sufficient to establish that the offense committed by petitioner, if
any, was that of murder. On the basis of the sworn statement of Benedito himself petitioner could only be
held liable for homicide. It must be observed in this connection that a person charged with a criminal offense
will not be entitled to bail even before conviction only if the charge against him is a capital offense an d the
evidence of his guilt of said offense is strong. In the present case, as already stated, the evidence submitted
by the prosecution in support of its opposition to the motion for bail could prove, at most, homicide and not
murder, because it does not sufficiently prove either known premeditation or alevosia.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent judge denying the motion for bail filed by
herein petitioner in Criminal Case No. 1089 of the Justice of the Peace Court of Bangued is hereby set
aside, and said respondent is hereby directed to order the release of petitioner upon the filing and approval
of a bail bond in the sum of P25, 000.00.

PEOPLE V. SOLIS (1984)

ESCOLIN, J.
FACTS:
Before this Court on automatic review is the decision of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial
Court) of Sorsogon, imposing the supreme penalty of death on appellants Jaime Solis, Arsenio Manchos
and Bernardito Kintanar, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Solis, Arsenio Manchos and Bernardito Kintanar GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide with the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, superior strength, disregard of the victim's age, 'morada' or the crime was committed in the victim's own
dwelling, and that all the accused were armed at that time with bladed weapons; and the Court hereby (1) imposes
upon all these three accused the supreme penalty of DEATH; (2) orders all of them to indemnify jointly and severally
the legal heirs of Herminio Corsita in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (12,000.00) Philippine Currency;
and (3) to pay pro rata the costs of this suit."

Appellants were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide, aggravated by the circumstances of
superior strength, nighttime and disregard of the age of the victim, the latter being 70 years of age at the
time of the incident. The three accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, Atty. Odelon Ginete, pleaded not
guilty to the information. At the initial hearing on June 19, 1969, Atty. Ginete moved for postponement of the
trial on the ground that the accused were considering the possibility of changing their prior plea of "not
guilty" to "guilty". The court granted the motion and the hearing was reset to July 24 and 25, 1969.
On July 24, 1969, Atty. Ginete failed to appear. However, accused Solis informed the court that Atty.
Carranza, their counsel de parte, would appear on the next day to represent all the accused. On July 25,
1969, Atty. Carranza did not appear in court. Upon assurance by the accused that they had already
contracted the services of Atty. Carranza, the court granted the withdrawal of Atty. Ginete as counsel de
oficio, and transferred the trial to November 3, 1969. On said date, the accused manifested that they had
not yet secured the services of counsel and that "their friends and families are trying to raise money to pay
for the services of a counsel of their choice." Hence, the court again transferred the hearing to December 4
and 5, 1969; but in order to avoid further delay, the court appointed Attys. Ruben Paps, Antonio Dugan and
Tedosio Dio, Jr. as attorney's de oficio for each of the accused.
On February 5, 1970, Atty. Paps informed the court that he and his co-attorneys de oficio had agreed
among themselves that only Atty. Dio would handle the defense for all the accused. After the accused had
expressed their conformity to such manifestation, the court granted the withdrawal of Attys. Paps and
Dugan as counsel de oficio. Whereupon trial was commenced.
Upon termination of the evidence for the prosecution, Atty. Dio manifested that the accused were waiving
their right to adduce evidence. Then he asked for dismissal of the charge on ground of gross inadequacy of
the evidence to justify conviction. The court denied the motion and reset the continuation of hearing on June
26, 1970 in order to afford counsel sufficient time to study the record of the case and examine the exhibits
presented by the prosecution. On the last mentioned date, Atty. Dio, manifested anew that the accused
were waiving their right to adduce evidence, and that the case be considered submitted for decision. He
likewise moved for dismissal of the information on ground of insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.
Acting on said manifestation and motion, the court declared the case submitted for judgment and ordered
the parties to submit written memoranda.
On November 13, 1970, the trial court promulgated its decision imposing the death penalty on the three
accused for the crime of robbery with homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the three accused were denied of their right to counsel

RULING:
This contention is devoid of factual basis. Appellants were arraigned on April 11, 1969, but actual trial did
not start until February 5, 1970, or ten (10) months later. This was due to frequent postponements caused
by their failure to secure the services of a lawyer of their own choice. Their alleged counsel de parte, Atty.
Carranza, never appeared in court. If they were indeed sincere in their desire to secure the services of a
lawyer of their own choice, that period of ten months was more than sufficient for them to do so.
Besides, during the proceedings a quo, appellants never informed the trial court of their desire to be
defended by a lawyer of their own choice; neither did they protest the appointment or the actuations of their
counsel de oficio. It has been held that where a counsel has been assigned to a person on trial and such
counsel has acted without objection from the accused, the latter's conviction cannot be set aside on the sole
ground that said counsel was not of his own choice.
As to the claim that the trial court erred in not requiring them to testify in order to ascertain from them the
veracity and voluntariness of their confessions, suffice it to state that not one of the accused had even
intimated that said confessions were extracted through violence or coercion. In view of their express waiver
to present evidence in their defense, the trial court had no alternative but to decide the case on the basis of
the evidence adduced by the prosecution (Abriol vs. Homeras, 84 Phil. 529). In People vs. Omar (L-7137,
April 30, 1955) this Court held
"The trouble with appellant's case is that he chose not to present evidence to account for his presence on the spot
immediately after the fusilade - even in the face of incriminatory evidence linking him to it. Not that unfavorable
deduction of guilt may be drawn from defendant's silence. The principle is that although the accused is not required to
testify in his own behalf, nor required to produce witnesses, yet he runs the risk of an inference from non-production of
evidence (U.S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil. 486). What we mean is that, when the mass of evidentiary details point to the
general conclusion of guilt, the accused who fails to produce exculpatory evidence cannot expect the court to imagine
or surmise possible circumstances which might justify rejection of such factual conclusion."

The slaying of Herminio Corsita during or on the occasion of the robbery, wherein they admittedly
participated, makes all of them guilty of the crime charged. Well entrenched is the rule that whenever a
homicide has been committed as a consequence, or on the occasion, of a robbery, all those who took part
therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, although some did not actually take
part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. However, for lack
of necessary votes, the death sentence imposed upon the accused-appellants Jaime Solis, Arsenio
Manchos and Bernardito Kintanar, who have been under custody for fifteen (15) years, is hereby reduced to
reclusion perpetua. Costs against the accused. The civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim is
hereby increased to P30,000.00.

FLORES VS. PEOPLE

GR L-25769 | December 10, 1974
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused for robbery. Information was filed in
December 1951. They were found guilty of the crime charged in November 1955. Notice of appeal was
file in December 1955. It was until February 1958 that action was taken by CAa resolution remanding the
records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material
for the disposition of the case. Such resolution was amended dated August 1959 which granted the
petitioners to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on new facts may be received and a
new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered. The case was returned to the lower court but nothing
was done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear despite the 6/7 dates set for such
hearing. Furthermore, when the offended party took the witness stand, his testimony was characterized as
a mere fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime and even failed to identify
the 2 accused.
The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. 5 more years
elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought dismissal of the case against them due to
inordinate delay in the disposition (from December 1955- May 1965). CA was unresponsive
notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second MR dated
January 1966. CAs defense is that the case was not properly captioned as People of the Philippines and
without Court of Appeals being made a party to the petition.
ISSUE:
WON constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated
HELD:
YES. Petition for certiorari was granted. Orders denying Motion to dismiss as Motion to Reconsideration
are set aside and nullified. Criminal Case against petitioners was dismissed.
Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. An
accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. The Constitution does not say that such
right may be availed only where the prosecution of a crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It
does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where a person is
prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner
in which it is authorized to be commenced.
Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation. There should not be too much significance
attached to the procedural defect (refer to CAs defense). CA failed to accord respect to this particular
constitutional right amounting at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion.

PADILLO V. APAS
G.R. No. 156615; April 10, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.
FACTS:
On complaint of herein petitioner Nicolas Padillo, Badere Apas and Kasuagi Ladjarani were charged
before Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court at Bongao, Tawi-Tawi (the court) for Estafa in an
Information filed on February 28, 1996.
The records show this case was filed with this Court way back on February 28, 1996. Before the
accused were arraigned on July 18, 1996, the proceedings in this case were postponed thrice at the
instance of the private complainant Nicolas Padillo through the private prosecutor, Atty. Victor
Alfredo O. Queniahan who later withdrew his appearance. After the arraignment, and before todays
scheduled trial, the scheduled hearing of this case have been postponed several times four
times at the instance of the prosecution, four times at the instance of both the prosecution and the
defense who filed either joint or separate motions for postponement, and one time at the instance of
the defense.
Motions for reconsiderations were filed by the Public prosecutor and on the third instance, the trial
court denied the motion by Order of December 16, 2002.
Hence, the private complainant, through his new counsel, filed the present Petition for
Certiorari assailing the orders of the trial court dismissing the case against the accused and denying
the motions for reconsideration. He argues that the dismissal of the case violates his right to due
process of law and that the accused cannot invoke double jeopardy as the dismissal was with his
consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not dismissal of the case violates hisprivate complainant- right to due process of law and that
the accused cannot invoke double jeopardy as the dismissal was with his consent
HELD:
YES. Since the prosecution, by repeated motions for postponement, caused the delay of the proceedings
from the time the information was filed on February 28, 1996 from which time the test of the violation of the
right to speedy trial is to be counted, the dismissal of the case, on motion of the accused, amounts to
acquittal. At all events, from the above-detailed statement of the case which reflects the failure of the
prosecution to present any evidence within years and the attention the court drew to the fact that the
accused have been opposing the postponement and invok[ing] their constitutional right to speedy trial, the
dismissal of the case on motion of the accused was in order.

COJUANGCO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
It has been more than three (3) years since the Information in Criminal Case No. 22018 was filed with
respondent Sandiganbayan. More than one and a half (1/2) years have elapsed since the Office of the
Special Prosecutor filed its Manifestation seeking the dismissal of the case. Based on the Office of the
Special Prosecutors finding of the absence of probable cause, petitioner filed on December 13, 1996, an
Urgent Motion To Dismiss. Three times, on March 24, 1997, June 18, 1997 and January 23, 1998,
petitioner has sought resolution of his Urgent Motion To Dismiss. These notwithstanding, the dismissal of
the information as to petitioner remains pending and petitioner continues to be under criminal indictment -constrained to suffer without justification in law and the Constitution, the humiliation, the restraints to liberty
and the tormenting anxieties of an accused.
Respondents concede that there has indeed been some delay but deny that it amounted to a violation of
petitioners right of speedy disposition of his case. They cite as justification the reorganization of the
Sandiganbayan on September 23, 1997 wherein it was reconstituted into five (5) Divisions; (2) the filing of
motions by petitioner seeking affirmative reliefs from the Sandiganbayan; (3) the failure of petitioner himself
to invoke his right to speedy resolution of his pending motions prior to the filing of this petition; (4) the heavy
caseload of respondent court.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners basic rights to due process, speedy trial and speedy disposition of the case have been
violated as to warrant dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018
HELD:
YES. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. It should be
emphasized that the factors that must be taken into account in determining whether this constitutional
rights has been violated are as follows: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for such delay and (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
As in previous occasions, the Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that structural reorganizations and the
ever increasing case load of courts have adversely affected the speedy disposition of the cases pending before
them.
In the instant case, however, the Court finds that delay concerns the resolution of petitioners Urgent Motion to
Dismiss, which is an offshoot of the Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommending the
dismissal of the case. Such delay is now far from excusable. Petitioners Motion to Dismiss has been filed as
early as December 13, 1996 and, on three occasions, petitioner has moved for the urgent resolution of this
motion. What further militates against further delay in resolving this case is the fact that the government
prosecutors themselves concede that this case is of paramount importance, involving as it does the recovery of
the ill-gotten wealth or government funds, unlawfully used or misused by persons close or perceived to be close
to the Marcoses. Respondent court declared in its Order dated February 17, 1997 that the matter would be
deemed submitted for resolution upon compliance with the Office of the Special Prosecutor as to whether there is
indeed no probable cause against petitioner, which compliance was submitted by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor on March 17, 1997. Under these circumstances, the Court does find the period of more than one year
that elapsed for resolving petitioners motion to dismiss quite long, considering that all pertinent pleadings
required by the Sandiganbayan were already submitted.
Even if petitioner himself might have contributed to said delay, as contended by respondents, in our view it is
best that the case be resolved on the merits by the Sandiganbayan with due regard to petitioners right to due
process, speedy trial and speedy disposition of the case against him and his co-accused.

LOUISIANA EX REL. FRANCIS V. RESWEBER (1947)

REED, J. (U.S. Supreme Court)
FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted in a state court of murder and sentenced to be electrocuted. A warrant for his
execution was duly issued. He was prepared for electrocution, placed in the electric chair and subjected to a
shock which was intended to cause his death, but which failed to do so, presumably because of some
mechanical difficulty. He was removed from the chair and returned to prison; but another warrant for his
execution at a later date was issued.
ISSUE:
WON the other warrant for his execution violates the principle of double jeopardy
RULING:
1. Assuming, but not deciding, that violations of the principles of the double jeopardy provision of the
Fifth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment would
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment -a) The proposed execution would not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment
b) It would not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.
2. The proposed execution would not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
3. The record of the original trial, showing the warrant of arrest, the indictment, the appointment of
counsel, and the minute entries of trial, selection of jury, verdict, and sentence, contains nothing on
which this Court could conclude that the constitutional rights of petitioner were infringed at the trial.
To determine whether or not the execution of the petitioner may fairly take place after the experience
through which he passed, we shall examine the circumstances under the assumption, but without so
deciding, that violation of the principles of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments as to double jeopardy and cruel
and unusual punishment would be violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As
nothing has been brought to our attention to suggest the contrary, we must and do assume that the state
officials carried out their duties under the death warrant in a careful and humane manner. Accidents happen
for which no man is to blame. We turn to the question as to whether the proposed enforcement of the
criminal law of the state is offensive to any constitutional requirements to which reference has been made.
First. Our minds rebel against permitting the same sovereignty to punish an accused twice for the same
offense. But where the accused successfully seeks review of a conviction, there is no double jeopardy upon
a new trial. Even where a state obtains a new trial after conviction because of errors, while an accused may
be placed on trial a second time, it is not the sort of hardship to the accused that is forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Second. We find nothing in what took place here which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in the
constitutional sense. The case before us does not call for an examination into any punishments except that
of death. The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain
in the execution of the death sentence. Prohibition against the wanton infliction of pain has come into our
law from the Bill of Rights of 1688. The identical words appear in our Eighth Amendment. The Fourteenth
would prohibit by its due process clause execution by a state in a cruel manner
Third. The Supreme Court of Louisiana also rejected petitioner's contention that death inflicted after his prior
sufferings would deny him the equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This
suggestion, insofar as it differs from the due process argument, is based on the idea that execution, after an
attempt at execution has failed, would be a more severe punishment than is imposed upon others guilty of a
like offense. That is, since others do not go through the strain of preparation for execution a second time or
have not experienced a nonlethal current in a prior attempt at execution, as petitioner did, to compel
petitioner to submit to execution after these prior experiences denies to him equal protection. Equal

protection does not protect a prisoner against even illegal acts of officers in charge of him, much less
against accidents during his detention for execution. Laws cannot prevent accidents, nor can a law equally
protect all against them. So long as the law applies to all alike, the requirements of equal protection are met.
We have no right to assume that Louisiana singled out Francis for a treatment other than that which has
been or would generally be applied.
Fourth. There is a suggestion in the brief that the original trial itself was so unfair to the petitioner as to
justify a reversal of the judgment of conviction and a new trial. Petitioner's claim in his brief is that he was
inadequately represented by counsel. The record of the original trial presented to us shows the warrant for
arrest, the indictment, the appointment of counsel, and the minute entries of trial, selection of jury, verdict
and sentence. There is nothing in any of these papers to show any violation of petitioner's constitutional
rights. Review is sought here because of a denial of due process of law that would be brought about by
execution of petitioner after failure of the first effort to electrocute him. Nothing is before us upon which a
ruling can be predicated as to alleged denial of federal constitutional rights during petitioner's trial. On this
record, we see nothing upon which we could conclude that the constitutional rights of petitioner were
infringed.
Francis was successfully executed the following year.

**ESMEA V. POGOY (1981)

AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly
forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them
because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No trial
came in after the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on another date. Sometime later Judge
Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received a
telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent
judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the priests telegram
did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the complainants reason
to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the
case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of
influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to complainants failure
to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy
RULING:
Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been
dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the
case filed. The dismissal was due to complainants incapability to present its evidence due to non
appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the defendant
for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present, that one, there
is a valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and
third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. In the case at
bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent
jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the
accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata
and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In the case, it was evidently shown that the
accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its termination which
would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which would make the
case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents
as well for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be
a bar to further prosecution.

SALONGA V. PAO (1985)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen almost killed himself and injured his younger
brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in
Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures at the
birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in Los Angeles, wherein
petitioner Jovito R. Salonga, his wife, including Lovely appeared with other guests.
Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with subversion, illegal
possession of explosives, and damage to property.
On September 12, 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati.
On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast.
Romeo Lovely was presented during the conference, and in his interview, stated that he had driven his
elder brother, Victor, to the petitioner's house in Greenhills on two occasions.
The next day, newspapers came out with stating in effect that petitioner had been linked to the various
bombings in Metro Manila.
On the night of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at three big hotels in
Metro Manila, namely: Philippine Plaza, Century Park Sheraton and Manila Peninsula.
On October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the
International Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the PICC, a small bomb exploded.
Within the next twenty-four hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against
persons who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One
of them was herein petitioner.
Jovito Salonga, was thus charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after he was
implicated, along with other 39 accused for two reasons:
o Because his house was used as a "contact-point"; and
o Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should
reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately" during Dazas birthday celebration.
On October 21, 1980, the military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the Manila Medical
Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed
him under arrest. The arresting officer showed the petitioner the ASSO form which however did not
specify the charge or charges against him.
For some time, the petitioner's lawyers were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until this
Court in the case of Ordoez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., issued an order directing that the petitioner's
right to be visited by counsel be respected.
The petitioner was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room without
windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. He was not informed why he was transferred
and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority.
Subsequently, the petitioner was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed
"under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or
charges
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a "Notice of Preliminary
Investigation" in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused),
stating that the preliminary investigation of the said case had been set, giving petitioner 10 days from
receipt of the charge within which to file his counter-evidence. According to petitioner, that up to the time
martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he had not received
any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing petitioner, among others of having violated
Republic Act No. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation to Article 142
of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights of the accused, petitioner herein, were violated when he was charged for the
violation of RA 1700.
RULING:
YES.
More important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the
citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and
vexatious prosecution.
The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty
persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists.
Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a victim of the still unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings,
was arrested at the Manila Medical Center while hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was
not informed of the nature of the charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him until this
Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him. Only
after four months of detention was the petitioner informed for the first time of the nature of the charges
against him. After the preliminary investigation, the petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint but the same
was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information
after finding that a prima facie case had been established against all of the forty persons accused.
The prosecution likewise, had not come up with even a single iota of evidence linking the petitioner to any
proscribed activities of the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the
complaint. Lovely had already testified that during the party of former Congressman Raul Daza which was
alleged to have been attended by a number of members of the MFP, no political action was taken but only
political discussion. Furthermore, the alleged opinion of the petitioner about the likelihood of a violent
struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted, assuming that he really stated the same, is
nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. No man deserves punishment for
his thoughts.
The SC adopts the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and, therefore, stands on a
higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of
expression is a fundamental postulate of the constitutional system. This must be so because the lessons of
history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition
of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This Court
is particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon mere
criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of
political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments.

PEOPLE V. OBSANIA (1968)

CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, filed a complaint for rape with robbery against Willy
Obsania. She claims that the accused, who was armed with a dagger, raped her on the roadside in the ricefields at
a barrio while she was alone on her way to another barrio.
After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant
provincial fiscal filed a subsequent information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the
above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs".
The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that the
complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the
fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity.
The court granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by
the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' did not give the Court
jurisdiction to try the case."
From this order of dismissal, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not "lewd designs" is an indispensable element which should be alleged in the complaint.
2. Whether or not the present appeal places the accused in double jeopardy
RULING:
NO.
First, it is clear that the complaint here satisfies the requirements of legal sufficiency of an indictment for rape as it
unmistakably alleges that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant by means of violence and
intimidation. In a complaint for rape it is not necessary to allege "lewd design" or "unchaste motive", for to require such
averment is to demand a patent superfluity. Lascivious intent inheres in rape and the unchaste design is manifest in
the very act itself - the carnal knowledge of a woman through force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years of age.
Second, in order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites
must have obtained in the original prosecution:
a) a valid complaint or information
b) a competent court;
c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the court a quo was a competent tribunal with
jurisdiction to hear the case; and the record shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
Moreover, the converted dismissal was ordered by the trial judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The case
was dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, and thus the dismissal will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense because the accuseds action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of
his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the
merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even
upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under *Sec. 9, Rule 117, if the indictment against him
is revived by the fiscal.
*When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and
after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

PEOPLE V. ADIL (1977)

BARREDO, J:
FACTS:
The first criminal complaint (Case No. 3335) filed against respondent Margarito Fama Jr. charged him
for assaulting and attacking complainant Miguel Viajar. The former was accused of hurling a stone
against the latter and hitting him on the right cheek which resulted in physical injuries requiring medical
attendance for a period of 5 to 9 days.
The accused entered a plea of not guilty.
Meanwhile, complainant Viajar filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo charging Atty.
Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and respondent Margarito Fama, Jr. with serious physical injuries arising from
the same incident alleged in above Criminal Case No. 3335.
After conducting a preliminary investigation the Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an
information, but only against respondent Fama Jr., (Case No. 5241) for serious physical injuries but with
the additional information that the attack had resulted in a permanent scar on the face of the
complainant, and the deformation on his right face.
Fama Jr. filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5241, claiming that since he
was already charged and pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 3335, he would be in double jeopardy,
if Case No. 5241 were to be prosecuted.
The Fiscal after filing Case No. 5241, sought the dismissal of Case No. 3335, but the Municipal Court
did not act on said motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second complaint filed against the accused places him in double jeopardy
RULING:
NO.
When Case No. 3335 was filed in the inferior court, the charge against Fama Jr. had to be for slight physical
injuries only, because according to the certification of the attending physician, the injuries suffered by the
offended party Viajar, would require medical attendance from 5 to 9 days only "baring complications." When
the complaint was filed, only three days had passed since the incident in which the injuries were sustained
took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said
offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already been filed and the wound on
the face of Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent. Expert evidence is not
needed for anyone to understand that the scar or deformity that would be left by a wound on the face of a
person cannot be pre-determined.
When the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that
in such case there is no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an
offense that was then inexistent. Stated differently, if after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes on
which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new
and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.