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Sperm and Egg Donor Anonymity: Legal and Ethical Issues in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS (Leslie Francis ed., Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015)
(Draft April 28, 2015)
I. Glenn Cohen, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Faculty Director, Petrie-Flom
Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics
Gamete donor anonymity has become an increasingly active area of legislative,
bioethical, and empirical interest over the last decade or so. This chapter reviews and
discusses these developments. It begins by detailing the very different status of gamete
donor anonymity, contrasting the U.S. (where the law does not prohibit it) with the rest of
the world (where it has been largely prohibited by law) and examining the effects of these
policies. The next Part of this chapter examines the major arguments that have been
offered in favor of and against mandating non-anonymous gamete donation.
While I will focus on sperm donor anonymity, it is worth emphasizing that most of the
legal materials, as well as the ethical arguments, apply equally to egg donors. Why do
these literatures rarely highlight the egg side? Chauvinism is one possible answer, but
another is that the tradition of secrecy is much less firmly rooted on the egg side of the
business. Narratives of altruism, motherhood, helping another woman have a child, and
other forms of personalization are major tools of recruitment in egg donation. In contrast,
recruitment of sperm donors emphasizes work and payment and distances itself from
fatherhood (Almeling 2011). There may also be a longer history of the use of known
donors on the egg side.
One other caveat is in order. Throughout this chapter I will refer to gamete donors,
which is the most common term in the literature and in common parlance. Nevertheless,
as I have suggested elsewhere, the term is largely a misnomer. This is especially true in
the United States where the vast majority of sperm and egg donors are compensated not
only for medical expense or time off work but in a way that is meant to remunerate them
(Cahn 2012, 380-81).
This chapter unfolds as follows. Part I describes the widespread adoption of legal
prohibitions on sperm donor anonymity in most developed countries other than the
United States. It also examines the effects these changes in law have had on supply. Part
II examines the United States, where there is largely no legal prohibition on sperm donor
anonymity. As this Part shows, though, many donor-conceived children have turned to
non-legal means to try to ascertain the identity of their donor. Part III examines the big
ethical debate in this area head on should the state legally prohibit sperm donor
anonymity and require that all sperm donors put their identifying information into a
registry available to donor-conceived children at a specified age? Part IV considers some
peripheral debates. Part V concludes.

The Turning Tide: Moves towards Sperm Donor Anonymity Outside the
United States

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2600262

Most sperm donation that occurs in the United States proceeds through anonymous
donation (Kearney 2011; Sauer 2009, 922). While some clinics make the identity of the
sperm donor available to a donor-conceived child at age 18 as part of open
identification or identity release programs (Cahn 2012, 382-83), no U.S. law requires
clinics to do so, and the majority of individuals do not use these programs. There has
been litigation in the U.S. requiring the disclosure of a sperm donors identity in only a
single case of which I am aware (described below). By contrast, in Europe, Australia, and
elsewhere there have been significant legislative initiatives requiring that sperm donor
identities be made available to children after a certain age (typically when the child turns
18). Swimming somewhat against this tide, the U.S. has become an outlier. But before I
discuss the U.S., I will describe the lay of the land in the rest of the world and how it
a. Sperm Donor Anonymity Outside the U.S.
In 1985, Sweden became the first country to prohibit anonymous sperm donation by
requiring that donor-conceived children be able to receive identifying information about
their sperm donor when sufficiently mature" (Gottlieb, Lalos, and Lindblad 2000, 2052).
The law has an interesting intellectual origin, in that the driving force behind it appears to
be studies on the welfare of adopted children, which the Swedes extrapolated to donorconceived children (Dennison 2008, 8; Gottlieb, Lalos, and Lindblad 2000, 2052). The
Swedish effort was followed by a number of jurisdictions: Austria, Germany,
Switzerland, the Australian States of Victoria and Western Australia, the Netherlands,
Norway, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand (Dennison 2008, 8-9; Turkmendag,
Dingwall, and Murphy 2008, 283-84; Daniels and Douglass 2008, 137; De Jonge and
Barratt 2006).
The United Kingdom gives a good example about how these systems currently operate.
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA)s website announces to
prospective egg or sperm donors:
Those who donated sperm, eggs or embryos after 1 April 2005 are, by law,
identifiable. Any person born as a result of donation after this time is entitled to
request and receive their donors name and last known address, once they reach
the age of 18.
Donors who donated before 1 April 2005 are automatically anonymous. This
means that donor-conceived people can only access non-identifying information
provided by the donor at the time of donation.
As a donor, you have no legal rights to contact your donor-conceived offspring;
the decision to initiate contact is solely that of the donor-conceived child.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2600262

It is a right of those who donated before 1 April 2005 to choose to remove their
anonymity and potentially become identifiable to any children born from their
As a consequence of removing your anonymity, your donor-conceived offspring
may choose to make contact with you once they reach the age of 18. The HFEA
will try to contact you first using the details held on file to let you know that a
request for your contact details has been made. Before making this decision, you
may wish to consider how this could impact on you and your family. If you wish,
you can ask to speak to a counsellor at the clinic you donated at to talk through
the implications of re-registering as an identifiable donor.
Bear in mind that you may not be contacted by any donor-conceived offspring.
This could be for a number of reasons, including the possibility that they do not
know they are donor-conceived.
If you donate through an HFEA-licensed clinic, you will not be legally
responsible for any child born as result of your donation (Human Fertilisation
In terms of the information requested and available, the HFEA distinguishes between
identifying and non-identifying information it makes available to donor offspring at
different ages:
From 1 April 2005 this is the information the HFEA collected from you at the
time of donation:
your physical description (height, weight, eye and hair colour)
the year and country of your birth
your ethnicity
whether you had any children at the time of donation, how many and their gender
your marital status
your medical history
a goodwill message to any potential children
identifying information (your name, date of birth and last known address).
Donor-conceived people conceived after 1 April 2005, when they reach 16 years
old, are able to apply to the HFEA to receive the non-identifying information that
their donor provided (all information given by the donor except for their name
and last-known address).
Donor-conceived people conceived after 1 April 2005, when they reach 18 years
old are able to apply to the HFEA to find the information their donor provided,
including identifying information (Human Fertilisation 2009).

To emphasize a point I will raise later, the U.K. scheme (like most of the donor registries
in the world), makes information available to the resulting child about his or her donor
(not to the donor about the child), only if the child requests it at the requisite age (not if
the child does not request it), and the child can only know to request the information if
the child's parents inform the child that he or she is donor-conceived or the child figures
it out on his or her own and inquires. I have called this a passive registry, as opposed to
an active registry, which would call the child at the requisite age or otherwise inform
the child that he or she was donor-conceived (Cohen 2012b, 445-47). In practice, if an
active registry were put in place, the vast majority of parents would likely disclose the
information to their children earlier, knowing that otherwise this sword of Damocles
would drop.
b. Effects on Supply
i. Observational Studies
In general, countries that have prohibited sperm donor anonymity have seen at least a
short-term diminution in the pool of willing sperm donors. In 2010, Gaia Bernstein
devoted a significant portion of a law review article to determining the effects on supply
in various markets (1207-18). I provide here an adapted version of my previous summary
of her work (Cohen and Coan 2014, 718-19):
Sweden adopted sperm donor identification in 1985 and witnessed the number of children
born with donor sperm decline from 200 new donors per year just before the law came
into effect to thirty new donors per year by 1988. Reports also indicated that half the
hospitals that offered artificial insemination by donor closed their programs, both of
which commentators attributed to the change in the law (Bernstein 2010, 1207-08;
Bygedemen 1991, 266; Daniels and Lalos 1995, 1871-72). However, a 1995 study based
on data accumulated between 1989 and 1993 indicated a 65 percent increase in the
number of donors, from 69 new donors in 1989 to 106 in 1993, which some
commentators took as evidence that the prohibition on sperm donor anonymity only
caused an initial decline in the number of donors that was later overcome by recruitment
measures (Bernstein 2010, 1208; Daniels and Lalos 1995, 1872-73). Bernstein, however,
disputes that reading of the data, noting that no study has looked at the post-1995 data,
which are largely unavailable (Bernstein 2010, 1208). She suggests there is good reason
to suspect that dwindling donor participation remains a problem in Sweden, pointing to a
study showing a steady decline from 900 yearly inseminations in 1985 to 300 yearly
inseminations in 2005, shortages causing long wait-lists of six to 18 months for access to
insemination, and that earlier reports of a rebound may have been distorted and instead
reflected the fact that demand may have been lower in Sweden than in other countries
like the United States because, until 2005, lesbians were not allowed to use donor sperm
(Berstein 2010, 1208-09; Ekerhovd, Faurskov, and Werner 2008, 311-12)..Sweden's rules
about compensation have apparently changed over time: Sweden permits compensation
to sperm and egg donors, but since 2006 it has begun prohibiting trading in eggs and
sperm for profit, even though gamete owners who donate their gametes are still
compensated (Berstein 2010, 1209; Genetic Integrity Act 2006).

The Australian state of Victoria enacted laws pertaining to sperm donor identification in
two stages. First, in 1984, Victoria created a mandatory donor registry that went into
effect in 1988, but under this law no information could be released without the
contemporaneous consent of the donor. Then, in 1995, a new law that went into effect in
1998 allowed donor-conceived children to access information about donors once they
reach the age of 18 (Infertility Act 1984; Bernstein 2010, 1209). Reviewing the data,
Bernstein concludes that they show a consistent decline in the numbers of newly
registered sperm donors that is coincident in time with the passage of each of the laws
(Bernstein 2010, 1209-10; Szoke 2004, 358; Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment
Authority 1999; Hickman 1998, 5; Turkish Daily News 2005). The scarcity of sperm
donors has been further exacerbated by a 2006 law prohibiting compensation for sperm
donation beyond reasonable expenses (Prohibition of Human Cloning 2006; Bernstein
2010, 1211).
Data from the United Kingdom on the effects of sperm donor anonymity are more
difficult to interpret. By regulations that went into effect in 2006, all U.K. sperm donors
were required to put identifying information in a registry available to donor-conceived
children when they turn 18 (Human Fertilisation 2004). Although the number of newly
registered sperm donors has not declined from before the law changed, some contend that
this statistic is not particularly probative because there has been an increase in known
donorsfriends or relatives who donate for one person's exclusive usesuch that the
amount of sperm from unrelated donors available to most infertile patients for use has
significantly declined (Human Fertilisation 2013b; Bernstein 2010, 1211-12; Camber
2008).1 Bernstein also finds evidence supporting a decline in the availability of sperm for
reproductive use from the fact that IVF treatment cycles with donated sperm steadily
decreased from 939 in 2004 to 711 in 2007 and insemination treatment cycles with donor
sperm decreased from 6892 in 2004 to 3878 in 2007 (Bernstein 2010, 1212). However,
data from 2009 to 2010 released after her study suggest that these numbers rebounded
to where they were before the law change, although not for insemination (Human
Fertilisation 2012a). As Bernstein documents, reports from the actual British clinics in
the years immediately after the passage of the Act also suggested significant shortages
and longer wait times for those seeking to use donated sperm (Bernstein 2010, 1212).2

For a lengthier discussion of how to interpret the U.K. data, see Naomi Cahn's The New
Kinship (2012). Cahn suggests that in the U.K., [t]he real problem may not be a decline
in the number of donors or donations, but rather an inefficient system of treating women
with donor sperm, which can be corrected by improved record-keeping and
communication (Cahn 2012).
Benrstein cites several sources to claim that most clinics have a wait of at least two
years for donor sperm (Camber 2008); that a BBC survey of 78 of the 85 U.K. fertility
clinics indicated over six-month wait times for clients (Dreaper 2006); that some clinics
had long waits and stopped offering donor sperm (Grady 2008); and that other issues
exist (Edwards 2005; CBS News 2008). There are also more anecdotal data. For example,
Kim Mutcherson (2012) reports that when Canada made it illegal to pay men for their
sperm or women for ova in a 2004 law called the Assisted Human Reproduction Act . . .
the number of men in the country willing to sell their sperm dropped precipitously. In

Bernsteins read of the data is not shared by all academics working in this area. Naomi
Cahn (2012), for example, has written that while
requiring the release of information may have some initial impact on the number
of donors, predictions of drastic long-term effects appear overblown. Moreover,
such legislation may result in the development of new methods to recruit other
donors By changing advertising techniques to emphasize helping others rather
than the amount of payment, sperm and egg banks may be able to recruit donors
who care less about money and more about facilitating the creation of families.
But payment, rather than anonymity, does seem to remain a critical component;
when Canada outlawed payment for sperm donors, the sperm supply decreased
Observational studies such as these are useful, but they can only incompletely inform our
understanding of the policy choice that governments face. First, like most observational
designs, these studies have difficulty separating coincidence from causation, especially
since none of these studies has a comparison state that can be used to evaluate the results.
In particular, one might worry about preexisting secular time trends in donor participation
in the countries that adopted donor identification laws and also the possibility of reverse
causation in that adoption of these laws may be driven by these trends in donation and not
vice versa. There may also be omitted variables that affect both the rate of donation and
the propensity to pass legislation, such as anti-commercialization forces. Second, as
Bernstein has noted, during the relevant periods of these observational studies, changes in
infertility technology and practicesfor example, the introduction of more effective
procedures such as IVF and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI)make it more
difficult to determine whether the data show changes in the supply side alone or also
changes in the demand side, which could have reduced the need for sperm donors
(Bernstein 2010, 1210).
short order, all of the agencies that formerly sold sperm closed their doors save for one.
One 2010 newspaper article reported that there were only forty sperm sellers available in
all of Canada (Canadian Press 2010). It is also worth noting two reasons why this data
may not offer a complete picture. The first is the possibility that there may exist some
underground exchange of sperm or egg that tries to circumvent the non-anonymity
rules, for example through at-home insemination. Second, to anticipate a point I return to
at the end of this chapter, medical tourism for reproductive technologies (fertility
tourism as I have called it elsewhere (Cohen 2014)) may provide parents a way of
circumventing these rules through travel. We do not have that much data on the role that
anonymity plays in fertility tourism, but here is one petinent study: In a 2010 study by the
European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology of female patients seeking
reproductive technology services through medical tourism at forty-six clinics in six
popular European destination countries for fertility tourism, Shenfield and colleagues
reported that 18.9% of Swedish and 16.4% of Norwegian patients stated they travelled to
get anonymous sperm donation unavailable at home. (Cohen 2014, discussing Shenfield
et al. 2010)

Further, as Cahn and Bernstein note, because most of these countries also have in place
strict prohibition on sperm donor compensation (Sweden being a partial exception), these
observational studies are not optimally designed to investigate whether one can buy
sperm donor non-anonymity through increasing payment to donors.
ii. Interactions Between Compensation and Anonymity
Beyond these observational studies, I have conducted an experimental study with Travis
G. Coan to determine whether individuals would be willing to donate sperm nonanonymously in the U.S. if paid more.
We used an experimental design to assess the effects of donor information on preferences
for sperm donation. We conducted the study in March 2012 via an Internet sample of 393
males between the ages of 18 and 60 who lived in the United States at the time. We sent
subjects an invitation to participate in the study, which described the opportunity to
Learn about and share your opinions on the sperm donation process. After reading a
short study description, subjects choosing to participate filled out a short questionnaire
(15 questions) and earned points that are redeemable for an Amazon gift card. All
subjects who chose to participate in the study finished the questionnaire and spent a
reasonable amount of time processing it (i.e., between five and 10 minutes). Moreover,
prior to presenting subjects with the treatment, we asked them: Would you ever consider
donating sperm in the future? We collected and reported on data for both the full sample
of 393 subjects, as well as the subsample of individuals (n = 332) who would consider
donating sperm.
In our experiment, subjects were randomly assigned into one of two groups: a control
group in which respondents received information on donor confidentiality consistent with
current U.S. law (i.e., identifying information is protected by anonymity) or a treatment
group that received information on confidentiality consistent with current U.K. law (i.e.,
identifying information is not protected in that there is a mandatory registration
We used a double-bounded contingent valuation study design. Our results showed that
subjects in the donor-identified condition needed to be paid significantly more, on
average, to donate their sperm than those in the anonymous sperm donor conditions.
Anonymous sperm donors are typically paid around $75 per specimen in the United
States today (Spar 2006, 39). When examining our full sample of subjects (N=393), we
find that individuals in the control (anonymity) condition are willing to accept an average
of $83.78 to donate, while individuals in the treatment group are willing to accept an
average of $124.21. These estimates suggest that the cost of providing donor information,
at least in our sample, is roughly $40, and the results are significant at the five percent
level in a two-tailed test. The full sample, however, includes a number of subjects who
would never consider donating sperm, based on their answers to a pretreatment
questionnaire. When restricting our sample to include only those subjects who would

actually consider donating (n=332), we find the cost of providing donor information to be
roughly $31, on average, and again these results are significant at the five percent level.
In both cases, the loss of anonymity is associated with a considerable extra estimated
cost, although in absolute terms the cost of sperm is still relatively cheap, even with
these increased costs.
This price differential corresponds roughly to that of the one set of published data we
have on differential pricing in the United States (based on what donors are paid) for a
U.S. sperm bank that operates both anonymous and identity release programs. Gametes,
Inc., a major U.S. sperm bank, operates both anonymous and identity release programs:
in 2006, the bank paid $65 to anonymous sperm donors per donation and $100 to those
who donated as part of the identity release program (Almeling 2011, 121). It is worth
emphasizing, though, that participating in an identity release program is different from
participating in a mandatory registry of the type we tested in our experiment.
We are currently running a similar experiment on actual sperm donors at a large U.S.
sperm bank to help achieve greater ecologic validity; we hope to report that data soon.
We also hope at a future point to conduct similar research on egg donation; there are very
different gendered narratives propagated around becoming an egg donor, as well as a
quite different industrial organization and relationship to the intended parents that is
Outside of the U.S., many of the countries that ban sperm donor anonymity also prohibit
or limit compensation for sperm donors, so it is unclear whether increasing payment
could lawfully be used to solve any shortfalls in supply.

The U.S. Experience: Breaking Anonymity Through Legal and Extra-Legal


As discussed above, the U.S. is an outlier in that neither the federal government nor
individual states have imposed a true registry system that forbids anonymous gamete
donation. While several sperm banks with identity-release programs exist, prospective
rearing parents and prospective donors have to choose to use them. This differs from the
rest of the world where identification requirements are imposed and thus can benefit
(more on that below) the children born from these sperm donations whether or not the
genetic and rearing parents want to use an identified sperm donor. Even in the U.S.,
though, there have been some legal and extra-legal chinks in the armor of this regime that
I describe in this section.
a. Legal
In the U.S., there are but two instances of which I am aware where the law has in some
way compelled disclosure of sperm donor identities.

The first is by common law. Johnson v. Superior Court (2000), a decision by the
California Court of Appeals, concerned a child born from the sperm of an anonymous
sperm donor known as Donor 276 who supplied sperm for a California-based sperm
Diane and Ronald Johnson used that donors sperm to conceive their daughter Brittany.
Unfortunately, Brittany developed Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease
(ADPKD). The bank assured the Johnsons that the anonymous sperm had been fully
tested and genetically screened. Neither parent had ADPKD nor a family history of it,
leading them to believe that the donor was the source of the disease. The Johnsons
claimed that the bank allegedly knew about the donors mother and sisters family history
of kidney disease, hypertension, and neurological disorders, which were red flags for
ADPKD. They sued the bank and its employees for professional negligence, fraud, and
breach of contract. The Johnsons sought to take a deposition of Donor 276 to show that
the Donor had not misled the bank and thus the bank was at fault, but the bank refused to
release his identity. The bank noted that the contract with the sperm donor specified that
his identity would be kept in the strictest confidence unless a court orders disclosure for
good cause and claimed that releasing identifying information about the donor would
violate both the contract and the donors right to privacy (Johnson v. Superior Court
2000, 868).
The Court found that the promise of confidentiality in that contract conflicts with public
policy and was therefore unenforceable. While the court held that the donor had a right
to privacy under the California Constitution that included information about his identity,
they found that releasing his name for the purpose of allowing a deposition and releasing
some of his medical records was nonetheless appropriate. The court held that the donors
right to privacy is not absolute and must therefore be balanced against other important
interests (Johnson v. Superior Court 2000, 877). In this case, it identified three of those
interests that it felt won out, namely (1) the states interest in in making certain that
parties comply with properly served subpoenas and discovery orders in order to disclose
relevant information to the fullest extent allowable; (2) the states interest in seeking
the truth in court proceedings; and (3) the states interest in ensuring that those injured
by the actionable conduct of others receive full redress of those injuries (Johnson v.
Superior Court 2000, 878). In this case, the donor was the only independent witness that
apparently can reveal the extent of information he had disclosed to the bank, information
that was not only directly relevant to petitioners' claims, but [wa]s also relevant to
Cryobank's affirmative defense (Johnson v. Superior Court 2000, 878).
The court therefore ordered the release of the donors name and address for the purpose
of allowing him to be deposed, as well as the release of some of his medical records.
However, the court also indicated that his identity was to be protected to the fullest
extent possible and the identities of [his] family members are not to be disclosed
(Johnson v. Superior Court 2000, 879). It left to the lower court to decide how to do this,
but suggested that an order could be fashioned which would allow John Doe's deposition
to proceed and documents produced on matters relevant to the issues in the litigation but
in a manner which maintains the confidentiality of John Doe's identity and that of his

family. For example, the lower court could limit attendance at the deposition to the
lawyers and require that the deposition transcript refer to him merely as John Doe
(Johnson v. Superior Court 2000, 879).
While this case is good law in California, whether other courts would follow it in similar
situations remains an open question. More importantly, the case was premised on a
credible tort lawsuit against the sperm bank where the identification of the donor was
necessary to resolve the claim, which is an unusual setting that will not be present in most
cases. Moreover, even in this setting, the court is very careful to protect the identity of the
donor and limit the kind of information available about him. Altogether, this case does
not seem like a promising root on which to grow a robust doctrine of donor reidentification from judicial order.
If common law has not proven fruitful, what about legislative action? In the adoption
context, a practice long shrouded by secrecy, a number of states have mandated openness
by legislation. As one author notes: [S]ix states, including Alabama, Delaware, Maine,
New Hampshire, Oregon, and Tennessee, have revised their laws to grant adopted adults
direct access to their birth records and/or adoption records, while Kansas and Alaska
never closed their records in the first place (Sharp 2013, 526-27). This post-1970s
momentum as to adoption has engendered a similar movement as to sperm donation, but
with only one very limited success.
In 2011, the state of Washington passed a law mandating that sperm donors give fertility
clinics identifying and medical information which donor-conceived children can access at
age 18 (Wash. Rev. Code 26.26.750). While this appears to mirror the registries in
place in other countries, the Washington statute adds a loophole big enough to drive a
truck through: donors can opt-out of providing the information if the donor has signed
an affidavit of nondisclosure with the fertility clinic that provided the gamete for assisted
reproduction (Wash. Rev. Code 26.26.750 2011).
All in all, the existing U.S. legal landscape has not proven fertile for getting mandated
sperm donor identification. Indeed, at least one set of academic writers has suggested that
mandating sperm donor identification would violate the constitutional right to procreate
and right to raise ones child (Byrn and Ireland 2012). Others are more skeptical of this
kind of constitutionalization of rights related to sperm donation and use of sperm donors.3
In any event, until a state actually requires identification of sperm donors, no court will
have an opportunity to pass on this question.
b. Extra-Legal

In my own work I have stressed that for constitutional purposes it is important to divide
an omnibus right to procreate into rights to be a genetic, legal, or gestational parent, and
that there are doubts about whether the few constitutional cases on the subject adequately
support a right to be a genetic parent through assisted reproductive technology (Cohen
2011a, 513; Cohen 2008a, 1140-41).

Given the failure to establish legal rights to sperm donor identification in the United
States, many individuals have turned to extra-legal maneuvers to reconnect donors and
build alternative family structures.
The internet has enabled significant advances in finding ones donor, even when
anonymity is enforced by the sperm bank. The initiative that has received the most media
attention in the U.S. is the Donor-Sibling Registry. As Naomi Cahn (2012, 382-87)
describes it:
Thousands of people have begun to use the Internet to expand their kinship
circle and to create what they often think of as a unique extended family in
which they are raising children who are far-flung and yet intimately related.
Wendy Kramer and Ryan Kramer, her donor-conceived son, who together started
the Donor Sibling Registry (DSR) in 2000, have facilitated contact among more
than 8,500 genetically related people, including donors and half-siblings. The
sperm banks themselves have recognized this growing interest in connection. For
example, California Cryobank has established a Sibling Registry that is
designed for clients and their adult children who are interested in extending their
family circle, to help in identifying potential siblings. Moreover, sperm
banks are increasingly offering the option of open-identity donation to allow for
donor identification once offspring reach the age of eighteen.
Parents and offspring, as well as donors, may all search for one another. While
comparatively little research has been done in this area, as the secrecy
surrounding use of donor gametes dissolves and as genetic testing becomes more
sophisticated, more will become possible. The studies that do exist indicate a
variety of reasons that members of donor-conceived families search for donors
and for other offspring with the same genetic heritage, and that donors search for
their offspring. For example, one survey of almost 600 people who were members
of the Single Mothers by Choice organization found that slightly less than twothirds wanted their child to have the possibility of a larger extended family, and
half were interested in developing a relationship with other children who shared
the donor's genes. Higher levels of searching seem to be associated with
households without fathers, perhaps because not only are children in those
families more likely to know of their donor-conceived status, but also because of
the parents' openness and desire to create larger communities for their children.
Donor offspring may feel that part of their heritage is missing. Donor children
may experience a sense of loss for not having information about their biological
pasts or being able to establish a relationship with their gamete provider,
analogous to the experience of genetic bewilderment reported by some adopted

When it comes to relationships with biological half-siblings, the situation is,

again, quite complicated, involving the offspring as well as their parents. While
the offspring might choose contact, their parents may not. On the other hand, most
people feel overwhelmingly positive after some ticklish starts. Contact might
be occasional, at the level of sending holiday greetings, or much closer, with the
children growing up together and the parents bonding. Indeed, for many donorconceived offspring and their parents, they want contact, rather than simply
written information, and these contacts to lead them to some kind of family
feeling. Many people who have connected feel as though they are starting to
create a family, albeit not necessarily a close relationship. Wendy Kramer has
corresponded with many parents of donor-conceived children who are seeking
advice on how to navigate their new relationships. Some parents in the newly
formed donor groups simply want to trade basic information, while others want to
form groups that spend holidays together, forming familial-type relationships.
When I checked its current statistics at the time of writing this chapter, the Donor-Sibling
Registry claims to have helped connect 11625 half-siblings (and/or donors) with each
other and that its total number of registrants, including donors, parents and donor
conceived people, is 44387 (Donor Sibling Registry 2014).
As of now, in the United States, the relationship of anonymous donor to donor-conceived
child or donor-conceived child to genetic sibling is largely a non-legal one in that the
anonymous sperm donor is not the legal father of the child born through this process and
the genetic half-siblings do not have any legally recognized relationship to one another.
Indeed, as I have written elsewhere, there have been a few instances of anonymous
embryo creation where the same sperm and egg are combined to produce a batch of
genetically related embryos, with parts of the batch sold to different prospective parents;
this would create genetic full siblings (Cohen and Adashi 2013). Nevertheless, even such
full genetic siblings would ordinarily not have any legal relationship with one another.
All of this is in marked contrast with the world of known donors. There, courts have on
occasion held known sperm donors to be the legal fathers of their genetic children. Their
reasoning has turned on details as to whether a doctor performed the insemination,
whether a contract was in place, whether the genetic father engaged in post-birth contact
with the child and in what form, and whether the child would otherwise require public
assistance.4 Often these decisions also turn on peculiarities of state law, including which
of the multiple versions of the Uniform Parentage Act the state has put into place.
c. Legal Relationships and Anonymous Sperm Donation

See, e.g., Mintz v. Zoernig, 145 N.M. 362 (Ct. App. 2008); Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618
N.Y.S.2d 356 (1st Dep't 1994); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (1st Dist.
1986); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007); In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo.
1989); Kansas v. W.M. (unpublished, but a summary of which is available at

When it comes to anonymous sperm donation and the genetic relations they produce
(currently mostly half-siblings, but also eventually genetic grandchildren and the like),
the call, as we will see, has largely been for revelation of identity based on genetic
parenthood. What we have not seen is a call for legal recognition of these genetic
relations that is, for legal parenthood (or half-brotherhood, half-sisterhood, etc).
Perhaps alone among the major writers in this area, Naomi Cahn (2012, 416-17) has
floated a tentative balloon in this direction albeit only briefly in two paragraphs of her
major article The New Kinship, where she writes:
Once connections have been made, the newly formed donor-conceived family
communities may want more formal respect for their relationship. This does not
mean according parental status or providing all of the affirmative legal protections
accorded to families under American law. Instead, this might mean, for example,
that donor-conceived family communities could opt into a quasi-familial status
that would provide them with a weaker form of protection. Their biological
connections could give rise to some limited rights that depend on context and on
choice. As family law increasingly moves towards privatization, towards
customizing the meaning of family through mechanisms ranging from open
adoption agreements to cohabitation and premarital contracts, donor-conceived
family communities might be able to choose a weak form of legal recognition.
While my goal is not to set out a laundry list of policy prescriptions, this new
status could (potentially) provide various privileges and obligations. Members of
connected families might, for example, be eligible to take family and medical
leave for one another, to inherit, to act as a surrogate decision maker in cases of
illness, or to serve as a legal guardian in cases where the parents are incapacitated
or have died. It might also involve some form of recognition for sibling
associational rights, a step that would have a much broader impact on child
welfare. To provide administrative ease, the default rule would remain that these
rights are unavailable in the absence of explicit agreements otherwise.
The question of legal status presents an intriguing set of complications and new issues for
advocates of mandated openness for sperm and egg donors.
On the one hand, in order to get these kinds of systems of mandated registries passed, it
has been important to emphasize that this is only about information, and identityformation, not the imposition of parenthood. This is how it is emphasized, for example, in
the materials of the U.K. registry (Human Fertilisation 2012b). This is also important in
the claim that imposing such a registry will not cause the supply of donor sperm to dry
up, which would seem hard to argue in a world where legal parenthood came with the
donation. Finally, it would also disrupt the plans of many individuals who want to use
donor sperm to create their own families, for which information may be tolerable but the
addition of a stranger legal parent would not be.

On the other hand, it is not entirely clear why the reasons that motivate identityrevelation should not also motivate something more legal as well. If the claim, as we
shall see below, sounds in an understanding of a right of the donor-conceived child or at
least an important welfare-promoting interest, why limit the right to information? After
all, in many contexts the law has held that parental choices cannot waive rights of support
of resulting children (Cohen 2008b, 1128).5 So why not here as well? That focus on the
best interests of donor-conceived children seems in tension with Cahns suggestion that
any potential legal status be voluntarily assumed by the sperm donor who is the genetic
father of the donor-conceived child or by the genetic half-sibling. After all, genetic
siblings reared together (and indeed even those adopted in) have no say in whether they
are recognized by the law as a legal sibling to one another. Why should genetic half or
full siblings reared separately due to anonymous sperm or egg donation be treated
One answer is that we have a strong desire not to disrupt the existing legal relationships
between the parents rearing the children and the donor-conceived children by allowing
the stranger anonymous sperm donor to enter or by forcing his entry. But that argument
threatens to prove too much in that the revelation of identity information to donorconceived children also allows the personage of the stranger to enter the existing family
unit. Is it possible to argue that this kind of disruption is justified while disrupting
existing legal statuses (even if it adds new legal status rather than takes away the old
ones) is not?
So far, though, most writers in favor of sperm donor identification have not offered such
arguments because they have largely ignored the question of legal status or treated it as a
non-possibility. This is in some ways a shame because this is rich terrain worthy of
further exploration, even if it may take us to some places that might challenge the
underlying raison detre for identity revelation to begin with.

The Big Ethical Debate: Should We Legally Prohibit Sperm Donor


As the preceding Parts have detailed, the U.S. has diverged from most of the rest of the
world, which has, by force of law, prohibited sperm donor anonymity in favor of a
registry-type system. The big question for those interested in reproductive ethics is
whether the U.S. is wrong not to have adopted this approach. To answer that question I
will first try to clear away some underbrush by mentioning two common mistakes that are
made in the way people discuss this subject. I will then briefly set out the (now dominant
in most of the world) basic argument for adopting a legal prohibition on anonymity based
on the welfare interests or rights of donor-conceived children, as well as a less common
argument based on the interests of sperm donors and rearing parents themselves. After I

For specific cases, see S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996); Faske v. Bonanno, 357 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Mercer Cnty.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex. rel. Imogene T. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.

set out each argument, I will provide responses to each (full disclosure: the latter is the
side of the argument with which my work is most often associated).
a. Some Incorrect Starting Points
i. Identification not Medical Information
Many have written about anonymous sperm donation in terms of a donor-conceived
childs right to know his or her medical history (e.g. Johns 2013, 117-18; Ravitsky 2010,
671). This is an important interest of donor-conceived children, but it is not one
necessarily connected to the question of whether to prohibit sperm donor anonymity.
Sperm banks have endeavored, and government regulation thereof should push, to make
available to the parents of donor-conceived children the fullest possible medical histories.
Perhaps there should be an obligation to update these records, contractually enforceable
by banks against sperm donors, since the bounds of our technological prowess in
detecting diseases and dysfunction is constantly evolving.
But this is a good idea that is orthogonal to releasing the name and identifying
information about sperm donors, and the relationship is problematic in both directions.
On the one hand, it can be done without sharing the identity of the donor. On the other
hand, even in countries such as the U.K., where identities are made available to the child
at age 18, there is no guarantee that new medical information will be shared beyond what
the government already records the sperm donor may be unwilling to share or may now
be deceased.
Therefore, I think discussions of medical information are a red herring in the true debate.
The true debate is about access to the name and identifying information about a sperm
donor apart from his medical history. All that said, one can imagine a future where
access to medical information about a donor becomes identifying information. This
would require more sophisticated, low cost, and widely used whole genome sequencing
of the population and large-scale databases where that information can be searched in an
identifying way. While possible, I actually think that future is unlikely for at least the
short and middle term. For that time horizon, at least, medical and identifying
information will remain quite separate.
ii. Adoption versus Reproductive Technology
Many people who push for more openness in the gamete donation context point to the
data and also the legislative activities of the adoption movement (e.g. Cahn 2012, 8-9;
Garrison 2000, 900-01; Dennison 2008, 16; McGee, Brakman, and Gurmankin 2001,
2034-35). At a rhetorical level this is understandable, but it is not clear we ought to give
too much weight to this analogy.
On the data side, we should be cautious about extrapolating data from adoption into the
space of reproductive technology; we should instead focus on the data on actual sperm
donors and donor-conceived children and not assume that the problems or solutions

found in one literature necessarily line up with the other. For example, Brigitte Clark
(2012, 646-47) notes that although research on adopted children indicates that such
children need information about their birth as early as possible, no convincing research
has found a corresponding benefit in disclosing donor information to donor-conceived
children. In fact, research indicates that children who have not been told are well-adjusted
and generally stable.
Beyond the data, though, there is an important conceptual point about this discussion
related to an argument I will make below pertaining to the Non-Identity Problem. The
failure to mandate the identification of adoptive parents may, if the data back up the
claim, harm existing children. Those children would be better off if they were given
access to the identities of their genetic parents. The children in question, though, will
exist whether or not there is a policy of mandated openness. No (or at least very few)
parents decide whether to have children (or refrain from having an abortion) or when to
have children based on the rules relating to adoption openness for the very simple reason
that few if any individuals make the decision to get pregnant (or decide to fail to use
contraception, the more likely cause) anticipating putting the child up for adoption.6 By
contrast, when one decides whether to become a sperm donor, the rules pertaining to
anonymity versus mandated identification are likely to be at the center of ones
evaluation in the majority of cases. If, as I will show below, the choice of rules alters
when individuals donate sperm, whether individuals donate sperm, or which sperm ends
up with which egg, a different child will result. That makes the argument disanalogous to
the adoption case in that it will not improve the lives of children (as in adoption), but will
instead affect which children come into existence.
For these reasons, all resort to the adoption analogy should be heavily scrutinized.
b. Arguments from the Interests of Donors Themselves and from Rearing
Though somewhat more peripheral to the larger debate, one of the more interesting
arguments that has been made in favor of legally ending sperm donor anonymity draws
on an unexpected set of interest holders: sperm donors themselves, as well as the parents
who rear donor-conceived children.
As Naomi Cahn (2012) frames it in her landmark work The New Kinship

More may make decisions whether to abort based on the rules governing abortion, but I
imagine that is true in only a fraction of the cases. Even where it is true, there is still an
entity that already exists and the parents are deciding whether to terminate it or not. That
too is different from the case of deciding whether to conceive at all.
This section and the one that follows are drawn heavily from Cahn (2012) and Cohen
(2012b). Direct quotes from either source are cited, but other material from this dialogue
is not otherwise demarcated.

[A] new paradigm for donor-conceived families considers not just the child, but
also the interests of donors, parents, the donor family network, or the larger
community. Some parental interests could be furthered through this new
paradigm, interests such as making contact with genetically related offspring and
even the donor, ensuring the integrity of their own families, and respecting their
children's interests. A focus only on regulation, rather than relationships, also
overlooks donors' interests in becoming known and possibly establishing
connections with their offspring.
The claim would make a powerful argument if persuasive, since it would mean that
legally requiring sperm donor identification actually served, rather than set back, the
interests of the regulated parties (sperm donors and recipient rearing parents). There is,
however, a market-based solution to this concern that is already available: donors who
want their donor-conceived children to contact them, or recipients who want the donors
to have the option of connecting with their children, can opt for an open-identity donation
system, as discussed above. It would seem on its face, then, that mandating a one-sizefits-all solution that eliminated an option of anonymous donation and thereby required
everyone to be available for contact whether or not they want it, can by definition not
serve donors' and recipients' interests; the solution frustrates their ability to choose and
thus their ability to maximize their own welfare and carry out their life plans. Therefore,
one-size-fits-all regulation cannot be superior.
One potential response to this critique is that the real concern is what goes by the name of
affective forecasting or transformative experience or changed-selves problems (Cohen
2008b, 1774-80). The argument would be that donors or rearing recipient parents (or
both) will think they do not want to be identified, but will later in life change their minds
and want to connect with the resulting children.
There are several problems with this argument. First, there is the standard concern that
such arguments are unduly paternalistic. Second, there is no empirical evidence
demonstrating that this hypothesized change in preferences is likely to occur. In fact, it
seems equally possible that those who agree to a mandatory identification system later
want to undo that choice, and it is not clear why their transformative experience should
not be given equal weight. Finally, even on its own terms, the argument cannot support
the kind of donor registry in place in the U.K. and elsewhere that proponents of law
change in the U.S. would like us to adopt. In such a system, donor-conceived children
can (at the appropriate age) find out whether they were donor-conceived and, if they
were, determine the name of their donor. This argument would instead only support a
different kind of system: one where recipient parents can, after a change in preferences,
phone the registry and get the name of the donor, or where donor parents can phone the
registry and get the name of the recipients. If changes in preferences of parental donors or
recipients is the concern that motivates this argument, the standard registry does not serve
those interests because it relies on the child to initiate contact with the registry, which is
independent of the donor's or recipient's change in preferences.
Therefore, this whole line of argument strikes me as a non-starter.

c. Arguments to Prevent Harm to or Protect the Rights of Donor-Conceived

A second and much more common set of arguments that dominates the anti-anonymity
discourse is framed in one of two related ways: either (1) donor-conceived children are
harmed by the anonymity of their sperm donor genetic fathers, and revelation of that
identity or no secrecy to begin with would promote their interests; or (2) donor-conceived
children have a right to know their genetic fathers or at least their identity.8
The interrelationship between these two claims depends a lot on your moral theory. In
some views, especially that of consequentialists, the difference between the two are
direct: children have a right to know because knowing prevents harm or furthers the
interest of the donor-conceived children; here the right is the conclusion to an
argument, not the argument itself. For those with a more deontological bent, the two are
more separable: it would be possible, for example, to conclude that it would wrong
children to deny them access to their genetic parental information even if doing so does
not further the welfare of these donor-conceived children. For those with natural law
leanings, the right to know ones genetic parent might be thought to be inherent in our
nature, as human beings that live in a particular kind of idealized family structure. Others,
such as Vardit Ravitsky (2010, 670), have framed this as a human right (although she
does not specify if her conception of human rights comes from natural law or another
conception) that would attach even in the absence of any showing of harm to offspring.9
My own sense is that the majority of the literature, however framed, really is closer to the
consequentialist account in at least the following limited sense: if we became convinced
that it harmed children to give them access to their genetic fathers identity (or, if you
prefer, that anonymity regimes, not identification regimes, furthered the welfare of
donor-conceived children), then few if any would nonetheless push for legal prohibitions
on anonymity.
For that reason, it seems fair to say that the harm and benefit to donor-conceived children
are the central variables in the analysis, even if for non-consequentialists it may not be
the only thing that matters. That said, in a later section of this chapter I discuss more
deontological approaches that argue that children are wronged even when not harmed.

For examples of those framing this as a right to know, see Department of Health
1984, 24-25; Goodman 2006; Chestney 2001, 365; Ravitsky 2010, 665.
As a matter of positive law, Guido Pennings notes that a number of international
organisations have presented codes of rights which include articles that are relevant for
the question of the access to information about genetic origins . . . Especially Article 7 of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which gives the child the right
to know his parents as far as possible and Article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" (Pennings 2001, 2).

Someone who sought to resist an argument for legally prohibiting sperm donor
anonymity based on the welfare of donor-conceived child would have at least three kinds
of arguments to offer in response:
(1) Empirical: Show that there is no evidence that sperm donor anonymity hurts the
interests of donor-conceived children.
(2) Counterbalance: accept that the interests of donor-conceived children are harmed and
that the argument therefore pushes towards legal prohibition, but argue that the
interests/rights of recipient parents or sperm donors outweighs the harm to donorconceived children.10
(3) Undermine the Premises and Entailments: show that even if the data substantiate the
claim of serious harm and that this harm overcomes the countervailing interest of
recipient parents and sperm donors, the argument is nonetheless unpersuasive because it
relies on faulty premises or carries with it problematic implications.
In presenting reasons to resist the argument for legally prohibiting sperm donor
anonymity, I will focus on this last strategy. That is not to deny that the first two may also
be effective argumentative strategies even proponents of mandated donor identification,
such as Varditsky, candidly admit that data showing harm are currently hard to come by
and, because of the nature of the population, hard to study, at least in the short term
(Varditsky 2010, 670-71). But if the third argument I will offer is accepted, it is the most
powerful reason for rejecting this push for legally prohibiting donor anonymity, whatever
the data show. If the argument does not convince you, then you will have to consider the
empirical and counterbalance forms of argument.
i. Attacking the Underlying Premise: Can Donor-Conceived Children
Be Harmed? The Basic Argument
Many people coming from a family law background take as an organizing principle the
prevention of harm to existing children or, if you prefer, the protection of children's
welfare or best interests. I have argued elsewhere that it is a problem to transpose this
principle to justify regulations designed to protect children in the reproductive context;
if you succeed in altering when, whether, or with whom individuals reproduce, you run
afoul of Derek Parfit's Non-Identity Problem, an idea that has been recognized by courts
in less philosophical language in their rejection of wrongful-life tort suits (Cohen 2011a,
437; Cohen 2012a; Cohen 2011b, 13; Cohen 2012b, 435).
Without going too deeply into this other work, I will provide a quick summary: whenever
a proposed intervention will itself determine whether a particular child will come into
existence, child-welfare arguments premised on that child's welfare are problematic. As

The right to privacy of the donor child collides with the right to privacy of the other
participants. The weight of the right is partially determined by the importance of the
information for the identity of the child (Pennings 2001, 10).

long as the child will not be provided a life not worth living, the child cannot be said to
be harmed when its counterfactual was not existing or having a different child
(genetically speaking) substituted for it. For that reason, any intervention that will alter
whether, with whom, or even when individuals reproduce cannot be justified by concern
for protecting the resulting child's welfare unless the child would have a life not worth
living absent the intervention. Whatever you think about the harms of sperm donor
anonymity, they do not plausibly render a donor-conceived childs life one not worth
living or anything close to that line.
Legally prohibiting sperm donor anonymity is likely to alter whether and with whom
individuals reproduce. Such regulation may cause some would-be donors not to donate,
altering whether and with whom they reproduce. It also changes whether recipients
reproduce, in that some intending parents will be unwilling to engage in artificial
insemination if donor identification is mandated. Further, regimes that prohibit
anonymity usually ceteris paribus reduce the number of sperm donors, as has been the
experience in countries discussed above. If such regulation produced a true gamete
shortage, then we would end up with a de facto restriction on whether some individuals
seeking donors reproduce. But even if this regulation results only in waiting lists (as has
been the case in many countries discussed above), that too may de facto limit whether
individuals reproduce because some women seeking sperm donation will be at the end of
their fertility cycle and often multiple attempts are required to successfully inseminate.
But and I emphasize this point here because some who have responded to my work
have ignored it11 even if the quantity of gametes remained unchanged, that would not
be enough to avoid the Non-Identity Problem. As I wrote in 2012:
To deal with shortages caused by removing sperm-donor anonymity, many
countries try to recruit new sperm donors, thereby altering with whom individuals
reproduce. In Sweden and the Australian province of Victoria, recruitment
efforts have focused increasingly on the older, more altruistically motivated donor
as a way of rebounding from the initial dampening effects of the prohibition on
donor anonymity; one clinic in the Australian province of New South Wales even
flew Canadian students to Australia for complimentary vacations that required
sperm donations every second day. Furthermore, even if the same donors provide
sperm to the same recipients under either regime, regime choice may alter when

My good friend Naomi Cahn and I continue to duel (if that does not sound too
violent as to a scholarly disagreement between two friends) on this topic. In her most
recent thrust, she conveniently focuses only on the effects of shortages on Non-Identity
but ignores the point about changing with whom we reproduce, in effect confounding the
question of whether any donor gametes are available with the question of which sperm
from which donor meets which egg from which recipient, the relevant question for NonIdentity purposes (Cahn 2014, 1114). I think she also makes other mistakes as to abortion
and masturbation (Cahn 2014, 1114-15), but I have already explained those as conceptual
mistakes in other work I have written anticipating just these kinds of confusions (Cohen
2012a, 1212; Cohen 2011a, 437).

they donate (earlier in life versus later on) and thus when reproduction takes
Therefore, a prohibition on sperm-donor anonymity cannot be justified simply by
concerns of harm to children because the regulation would protect these
particular children out of existence, and there is no plausible argument that these
children would have a life not worth living (Cohen 2012b, 436-437).
Thus, because they are likely to alter when, whether, or with whom individuals
reproduce, bans on sperm donor anonymity cannot be said to improve the welfare of the
children that are born through sperm donor anonymity. They instead replace one
population of children (those who would have been born had sperm donor anonymity
been permitted) with another population (those who would have been born had it been
prohibited). They do not make children better off, they bring into existence other,
different, substituted children.12
That is a very bare bones reconstruction of the basic argument. Those who want a more
sophisticated understanding should consult my other work cited above, as well as the
work of Parfit and many others who have written about this problem in the context of
wrongful life and other areas of reproduction. I will, however, consider a few quick
objections and responses to my argument that those who seek to save the child welfare
justification for banning sperm donor anonymity could make.
1. First Attempt to Save the Child Welfare Argument: The
Last Judgment Problem
Can we reconstruct the argument for informing donor-conceived children as instead an
argument for reparation? For example: there is something that can be done after the fact
of birth to remedy the injury to the child, enabling it to access the identity of its donor
parent. Axel Gosseries ably presents one such argument as to the application of the Non-


One difference between sperm donor anonymity regulation and, say, the restrictions
put in place in some countries that prohibit IVF past a certain age is that the former
creates only what I have called an imperfect Non-Identity Problem while the latter
creates a Perfect one. For sperm donor anonymity bans, hypothetically there may exist
at least one child who would have come into existence in both the anonymity-permitted
and anonymity-prohibited regimesone child conceived when the same donated sperm
meets the same egg and for whom therule has no effect on whether, when, and with
whom reproduction takes place. (Cohen 2012b, 436 n.23). And as to that particular
potential child (or children), a child-welfare justification will be possible if he or she
would be better off with access to the identity of his or her donor genetic parent. (Ibid.).
But the number of children for whom this will be true is very small if non-zero,
indubitably much smaller than the universe of all donor-conceived children, and
elsewhere I have argued in depth that this very small subset of potentially harmed
children is not enough to justify this form of regulation (Cohen 2011a, 474-481).

Identity Problem in environmental contexts, which he refers to as the last judgment

problem (2008, 459-64).
Gosseries imagines a man trying to decide whether to bicycle or drive home from work
every day, with attendant effects on the environment experienced by present and future
generations. He chooses to drive. Gosseries then imagines that many years later the man's
now-seventeen-year-old daughter, who is an environmental activist, lambastes him for
making the environment so much worse by not bicycling. The man responds: [H]ad I
done so, you would not be here because the man would have come home at a different
time each day and thus slept with his wife at a different time and produced a different
child. The father continues: Since your life in such a polluted environment is still worth
living, why blame me? I certainly did not harm you (Gosseries 2008, 460).
Gosseries disagrees with the father. He suggests that when there is overlap between
generations (to at least some degree), then
As long as the father's pro-car choice was a necessary condition for his daughter's
existence, it remains unobjectionable [such that] his preconception actions are
immune to moral criticism when it comes to alleged harms to his daughter. . . .
However, as soon as the daughter is conceived, all the father's subsequent actions
no longer fall within the scope of the non-identity context [such that] we
should expect the father to catch up as soon as his daughter has been conceived in
order to be able, at the end of his life, to eventually meet [his obligations to her
with regards to the environment] (Gosseries 2008, 461).
Even if the harm to the environment the father has already inflicted is irreversible, says
Gosseries, he should act in such a way as to compensate for such negative impacts
through substitution measures (e.g.[,] replacing an extinguished species with new energysaving technology) (Gosseries 2008, 461).
Can we make the same claim here that the recipient parents who have sought to use
anonymous sperm donation should catch up by revealing the child's identity later on,
and that this justifies the legal prohibition on sperm-donor anonymity? The argument
would suggest that the obligation to reveal to the child his true genetic father or at least
to make sure this parentage information is available in the registry is like the obligation
identified by Gosseries in the environmental context of adopting energy-saving
technologies going forward.
I think such an approach fails because of what I call the anticipation problem. A legal
obligation for the sperm donor to place his name in a registry available to the child at age
18 is the very thing likely to alter donor and recipient behavior about when, whether, or
with whom they reproduce. Thus, a legally enforceable catch-up obligation feeds back
into the conception decision and thus is not immunized from the Non-Identity Problem.
Therefore, even as to sperm-donor anonymity, the Non-Identity Problem cannot be
evaded by justifying the regulation in the prevention of harm to the resulting child.

2. Second Attempt to Save the Child Welfare Argument: NonPerson-Affecting Principle Approaches
A different attempt to save the argument for harm to donor-conceived children
reconfigures it in a subtle but philosophically important way. It concedes that for reasons
associated with the Non-Identity Problem, it would not have been better for these donorconceived children had there been a sperm donor anonymity prohibited regime in place
(or if you prefer, it concedes these children are not harmed by a system that allows
anonymous sperm donation). It accepts that if the law changed, these children would not
come into existence, and other children would be born in their place instead. It then posits
that because these other children would have better lives (knowing their genetic parents),
that is a reason to favor adopting this policy.
Philosophers have referred to this as the non-person-affecting principle approach (e.g.
Parfit 1987, 359-61 & 364-65; Brock 1995, 273). One formulation of this view suggests
the world would be better off if instead of person A, who will experience serious
suffering or limited opportunity, person B, who will not experience those things, came
into existence that is, [a]lthough the person born with the condition in question would
not have been harmed by birth, the world is better off if a person without that harm had
been substituted in his place (Robertson 2004, 16). We can also understand this
argument to replace the best interests of resulting children with the best interests of a
resulting population, or as an obligation to produce the population of children with the
highest welfare possible. It is a claim that the world is better off even though no person is
made better off; the world is better in an impersonal sense.
I have critiqued this approach elsewhere as a justification for the regulation of
reproduction, including bans on anonymous sperm donation (Cohen 2011a). Among
other things, I think the non-person-affecting principle may be limited to cases in which
the same number of children will come into existence whichever way we set the
regulation, which is unlikely to be true of sperm-donor registries.13 It also faces other
problems: if the small population welfare deficits that allegedly result from anonymous
sperm donation are enough to justify bans on the practice, we should also endorse much
more significant regulation of coital and other reproductive technologies than we
currently do. The non-person-affecting principle relies on premises that support the
eugenics movements of old, which many find objectionable. Further, it seems to justify
equally well regulations requiring parents to have enhanced children, which some would
find objectionable. However, perhaps distinctions could be drawn with the old eugenics
movements on double effect kinds of grounds the old eugenics movements wanted
different children to be born, while here we want children who have access to the identity
of their genetic fathers to be born, but in so doing we cannot avoid bringing into
existence different children.. In any event,, the approach may have trouble grounding
criminal-law-type rules, such as making anonymous sperm donation illegal, depending on
one's theory of the moral limits of criminal law (Cohen 2011a).

The reason is complex and has to do with paradoxes implied by average and total
welfarist Approaches (Cohen 2011a).

At base, it is a theory of substitution. It is an argument that banning anonymous sperm

donation is justified not to improve the lives of donor-conceived children, but to replace
one group of children with another that we think has a higher welfare. At the very least,
this is a starkly different justification for banning anonymous sperm donation than most
donor-conceived people would identify with that it would have been better for the
world in an impersonal sense that they had not come into existence and had instead been
replaced by other children who knew their donor. When properly understood, I am not
sure that many donor-conceived children would champion that reason for ending sperm
donor anonymity.
3. Third Attempt to Save the Child Welfare Argument:
Wronging While Overall Benefitting
A third way of trying to save the child welfare justification for prohibiting sperm donor
anonymity in some senses breaks with the argument and becomes explicitly
consequentialist. I call this approach wronging while overall benefiting. The approach
concedes that because of the Non-Identity Problem, no child is harmed by the act of
anonymous sperm donation that produces him or her (because the child is not made
worse off compared to a counterfactual world in which he or she was not born), but a
child is nonetheless wronged even while overall benefitted by being brought into
Seana Shiffrin is the most prominent proponent of this view in legal circles, though she
applies it to wrongful life cases, not sperm donor anonymity (1999, 119-20). As applied
to sperm donor anonymity, this kind of argument would suggest that by depriving a child
of access to the identity of his or her genetic father, we have wronged the child, even if
we have not harmed the child since he or she has a life worth living.
Shiffrin rejects the comparative model that treats harm and benefit as two sides of the
same scale and its principle that one may inflict a lesser harm on someone simply to
benefit him overall, when he is unavailable to give or deny consent (Shiffrin 1999, 11922 & 127). What she endorses is instead an asymmetrical approach in which harm is
associated with non-comparative, absolutely bad states such as broken limbs, disabilities,
death, and significant pain, and benefit is associated with goods, such as material
advantage, sensual pleasure, and goal fulfillment (Shiffrin 1999, 120-25). Shiffrin then
distinguishes between two types of benefits, those that represent the removals from or
preventions of harm and a residual category she terms pure benefits (Shiffrin 1999,
124-25). She argues that it is permissible to inflict a lesser harm to remove or prevent a
greater harm, but wrong to inflict that same harm in order to confer a pure benefit, no
matter how large that benefit (Shiffrin 1999, 125-27). Shiffrins next move is to use this
idea to explain the right outcome in wrongful-life cases, suggesting that no one is harmed
by not being created being born confers on the child only a pure benefit and not the
avoidance of harm (Shiffrin 1999, 119-20).

One could apply the same principle to anonymous sperm donation. The argument would
be that by producing a child through anonymous sperm donation, one has harmed the
child in order to confer on it a pure benefit, which is wrongful.14 However, any attempt to
apply Shiffrin's approach to anonymous sperm donation seems likely to fail. Shiffrin's
argument is rich and complex, and thus my attempts to wrestle with it in other work are
quite involved (Cohen 2012a, 1244-64); for present purposes, I will merely summarize
why I think this approach is unlikely to save the argument for banning anonymity.
This approach leads to the conclusion that all acts of reproduction (not just wrongful life
or anonymous sperm donation) are prima facie wrongful a conclusion many will find
problematic. To the extent Shiffrin is open to the idea that the wrong caused by the
reproduction may be abated by love and support for the resulting child, it is not clear why
the recipient rearing parents do not adequately provide that love and support. Further,
because the argument relies on a non-comparative conception of harm, it is only as
plausible as that account, and others have suggested the account is problematic. The
intuition pump Shiffrin uses to generate the rule about harm and pure benefits may not
work on its own terms or apply in the reproductive context. Finally, even if this approach
can justify tort liability in wrongful life cases, it may run into problems justifying a
regulatory regime that seeks to prevent anonymous sperm donation altogether.
In any event, the approach is quite different from the ones put forward by the vast
majority of writers who oppose sperm donor anonymity. Therefore, even if it can clear
the objections I have raised, adopting this approach would require a dramatic sea change
in the reasoning of most proponents of sperm donor registries and may also carry other
implications that would make them uncomfortable. 15


I reiterate that Shiffrin herself has largely limited the ambit of her claim to an argument
for tort liability for wrongful life, so the argument under consideration is an extension of
her claims that she may not endorse.
While Shiffrins account does not exhaust arguments focused on wronging children
without harming them, it does seem to me to be the best developed such an account in the
literature. But while hers is an account of wronging, it is one that does depend on a notion
of harming, just a concept that harm is never outweighed by a pure benefit. Could one
imagine a version of the wronging concern related to sperm donor anonymity that does
not depend on any notion of harm? The claim would not be about the consequences to the
child of not knowing his or her genetic fathers identity psychological distress and the
like but perhaps a more existential claim of having an incomplete identity or lacking
the tools needed to form a complete identity. I am grateful to Leslie Francis for
suggesting this possibility to me. In the end, though, I am not sure that this reformulation
escapes harm, benefit, and the non-identity problem. If one pressed as to why we thought
this existential state was something that wronged the child, I think it could only be
understood in comparison to a state of being where the child existed without that
incomplete identity and a belief that one state was worse than the other. And once we get
into comparing one childs state of being against another one, I think we are back in the
throes of the non-identity problem.

4. Other Possible Approaches to Save the Child Welfare

There are still other possibilities open to defenders of banning sperm donor anonymity
that I think of as even less plausible. Under a virtue-ethics approach, one could argue that
the prohibition is needed to ensure that parents act in keeping with the virtues of
parenthood (e.g. McDougall 2005, 603). Under a legal-moralist approach, one could
argue for the use of criminal law or other regulatory tools to deter acts that neither harm
nor offend, but do undermine public morality, all in the name of maintaining traditional
family structures (e.g. Feinberg 1988, 3-4). Finally, under a reproductive externalities
approach, one can argue that costs to others outside of the donor-conceived child, rearing
parent, sperm donor triad exist and that it is wrong for members of society not in the triad
to bear those costs (e.g. Cohen 2012a, 1216-44).
Each of these approaches carries with it problems I have detailed elsewhere as
frameworks for regulating reproduction more generally (Cohen 2011a; Cohen 2012a).
They seem to suffer even greater deficits as theories for requiring sperm donor
identification. For example, on the reproductive externalities approach, it seems as
though any externalized costs caused by sperm donor anonymity are quite minor and well
below the threshold of costs that might make interfering with reproductive decisionmaking even approach a threshold of plausibility. In any event, one seldom sees
advocates for prohibiting sperm donor anonymity using these argumentative modes,
though the modes may be the last (however unwelcome) refuge if all else fails.
For all of these reasons, I find the argument for legally prohibiting sperm donor
anonymity to protect either child or parental welfare unsuccessful on its own terms. Next
I turn to a different attack on the argument. 16

Several other authors in this handbook also address the Non-Identity Problem. It would
take a whole chapter (or perhaps a book in itself!) to fully wrestle with how our views
intersect, conflict and branch out. But for the purposes of some intertextual discussion
between the chapters, let me say a few brief words on each:
DeGrazias chapter at one point seems to endorse a wronging without harming
approach similar to Seanna Shiffrins. My concern with that approach as applied to sperm
donor anonymity is telegraphed above and developed in much greater depth in Cohen
2012a, 1244-64). Later on, though, he specifies that this may not be the way to view true
Non-Identity Problem cases, and instead that in these cases [t]he parents act wrongly, it
seems, without wronging anyone in particular. In my view, the wrongdoing in nonidentity cases such as this must be understood in the impersonal, consequentialist terms
of making the world a slightly worse place than it would have been had they acted
responsibly. In such case DeGrazia seems to be actually endorsing the Non-PersonAffecting Principle Approach. I criticize thst views application to sperm donor
anonymity above and in greater depth elsewhere (Cohen 2011a). For what it is worth I
also think that parents who use anonymous sperm donors will not fail the first two of the
criterion DeGrazia proposes in his Chapter Parents owe their children (1) worthwhile
lives, (2) in which their basic needs are reasonably expected to be met, and (3) doing

more for them if they can without undue sacrifice; they may, however, run into
problems with the third criterion, depending on how we understand undue sacrifice in
the context of family privacy and procreative liberty.
Maleks chapter argues that the interest level at which a life is worth continuing to live
may not be the same as the interest level at which a life would be worth conceiving. I do
not think it is plausible to think that the life of an anonymously donor-conceived child
without access to the genetic fathers identity rises is problematic on either standard and I
do not think she believes the contrary, nor that anyone would claim otherwise. Maleks
distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators of this child deserves a much more
thorough discussion and (in my mind refutation) than I can give it in part of a footnote,
but my view is closer to Parfits: that it is linguistically sound but morally unpersuasive.
To use a biographical example: My mother was married without children before my
father. Imagine in possible world A she had conceived with her first husband and in
possible world B she conceived with my father. It is linguistically possible to use the nonrigid designator her first child to ask would it have been better for her first child had
she conceived the child with her first husband rather than her second? But it seems to
me to make no moral sense in judging her action to ask whether I would have been better
off had my mother had a child with her first husband instead of me. And what would we
do in the case that she had both of us? In favor of her view Malek argues (among other
things) that the non-rigid designation is more appropriate in the context of conception
decision-making because it more closely corresponds to the way potential parents
normally think about future children. But I venture to say that my mother would think
quite differently about a child with one husband as compared to a child with another!
Even if her view better adhered with the way potential parents in ordinary language
describe their views of producing children, I think that is far from dispositive. Ordinary
parents have not thought deeply about the ethics of reproduction and they may just be
wrong. It may also be advantageous for them to think about it in these folk ways even if
doing so is incorrect. That is, there may be second order benefits to proceeding as if
something false was true (such as, perhaps, belief that posthumous treatment of our body
affects our welfare). But we should not confuse these second order benefits with a belief
that the proposition is actually true. And the calculus looks quite different when we move
from folk beliefs about parenting to what the state is justified in doing in limiting the
liberty of would-be reproducers.
I am largely in agreement with the approach in Wassermans chapter (indeed he quotes
me!) that arguments about reproductive externalities turn out to be the best of the best of
a not-very good lot (2012a, 1220) in justifying the regulation of reproduction. As
applied to sperm donor anonymity, the externalized costs for society seems so small and
attenuated that I am, if anything, even more skeptical that they can justify legally
forbidding anonymous sperm donation. There are also other reasons to be skeptical about
reproductive externality approaches I offer elsewhere (Cohen 2012a) and will not
rehearse here.

ii. Attacking the Argument By Its Implications: The Analogy to

Sexual Reproduction
Even if one thought that prohibiting sperm donor anonymity was justified by concerns for
the harm done to donor-conceived children in not knowing the names of their genetic
fathers, the argument runs into a problem of underinclusivity. Why not apply the same
rule to sexual reproduction? In my work I have offered a modest proposal meant to
provoke readers along these lines:
In particular, why not require every individual who engages in coital sex with a
fixed probability of conception to put his or her name and contact information in a
registry mirroring the one endorsed [by advocates of sperm donor registries] with
the proviso that their names would be erased from the registry if there were no
evidence of pregnancy within a few months? This would encompass a one-nightstand registry in that never again would a child who results from a temporary
relationship suffer the harms which [these advocates find problematic and which
thereby call] out for governmental regulation. In fact, my hypothetical registrys
beneficiaries are broader still. There is evidence that misattributed paternity
believing like Luke Skywalker that your father is someone other than who he is
is not an insignificant phenomenon, with studies suggesting that it may affect as
few as one percent and as many as thirty percent of the population,
with most estimates clustering at two to five percent of the population. At age
eighteen, these children too could discover that their fathers are not who they
thought they were and thus avoid the harms that motivate [the] call for regulation.
To be fair, there are distinctions between my Modest Proposal and [these
registries for sperm donors]. Perhaps we have independent worries about the
misuse of data on our sexual partners, or we do not trust the government to erase
our names from the registry if no child results. There are, though, also ways in
which my registry might be thought of as more desirable than [the existing ones]:
mine seems less likely to have a chilling effect on the willingness to engage in sex
than [the sperm donor] registrys chilling effect on the willingness to engage in
donations. To the extent it would increase the use of condoms, my Modest
Proposal might be thought to have desirable spillover effects in reducing STD
transmission. It would also better enable the state to pursue child support from
deadbeat dads.

The strongest distinction between [sperm donor registries] and my Modest

Proposal is that sperm donors provide sperm with the intention of creating a
family while at least some of those affected by my Modest Proposal may not
(though there certainly are cases in which individuals seek to produce a child
together coitally but down the road the child is reared by a different father and
never knows its true genetic origin). Even when this distinction is operative,
however, it is not clear that it should make a difference. Courts routinely impose

parental status and support obligations upon men who are deceived into believing
their partners are using birth control or are incapable of reproducing. A
common theme in this case law is that whatever rights the father might have must
give way to the best interests of the child, who would otherwise go unsupported;
put another way, the right to support belongs to the child and only the child can
waive it. If one views information about a childs genetic parentage as a kind of
right of a child or duty that a child is owedand I think it is fair to characterize
[some registry advocates views as being] along these linesthen, just as in the
child support cases, I think there is a strong argument for extending the disclosure
right to coital-reproduction cases, even when reproduction happens by accident
(Cohen 2012b, 444-45).
More recently, An Ravelingien and Guido Pennings (2013, 33-41) have made a similar
argument that the same rationale that underlies prohibiting anonymity in assisted
reproduction should carry over to coital reproduction as well. They argue that
it would be discriminatory not to extend this right [to know] to naturally
conceived children with misattributed paternity. One way to facilitate this would
be through routine paternity testing at birth. While this proposal is likely to raise
concerns about the conflicting interests and rights of other people involved, we
show that similar concerns apply to the context of open-identity gamete donation.
Unless one can identify a rational basis for treating the two groups differently,
ones stance toward both cases should be the same (Ravelingien and Pennings
2013, 33).
Others, such as Daniel Sperling (2013, 60-62), have argued against this analogy. In
responding to Raveliengen and Pennings, Sperling notes among other things the
following distinctions:
[R]evealing the identity of the gamete donor, with whom the child is in no contact
whatsoever, may create very little effect on the relationship between the social
parents and the child, and/or between the genetic mother and the social father.
This is because disclosure is already made under open and sincere relationship,
reflecting also readiness of all parties to cope with familial and emotional
hardships, if and when they occur. . . . On the other hand, a mandatory DNA
testing under Misattributed Paternity cases, may, as Ravelingien and Pennings
admit, put pressure on the mother to inform the child about his or her genetic
father, and affect the sexual and procreative liberties of women more generally. If
positive, such testing could create serious tension between the social father and
the mother (if, for example the child were born as a result of an unknown affair,
or if the child seeks some contact with his genetic father), and/or between the
social father and the child, the nature of whose relationship would have changed
significantly following the testing. In the case where the child accesses his or her
birth certificate and gets in touch with the genetic father who will then refuse to
have contact with the child, a serious threat to the childs psychological wellbeing could be observed.

[Moreover,] even if some effects may result following disclosure of donors, one
can argue that under systems of open-identity gamete donations, rational people
who opt for donation should be presumed to give consent to risks of disclosure as
well as to the violation of their privacy, communicational, and familial interests.
According to this argument, the choice of the means of procreation
(technologically assisted reproduction) entails the acceptance of some limitations
on the freedom and well-being of all parties involved. On the other hand,
Misattributed Paternity cases do not represent the exercise of choice pertaining to
the means of procreation. At the most, they may reflect some choice as to the
circumstances leading to procreation, for example, when nonpaternity is the result
of the mothers adultery. Such choice may not necessarily justify imposing
detrimental effects on relevant parties (Sperling 2013, 61).
iii. Attacking (?) the Argument for Settling for Parental Disclosure
One can also find fault with the existing sperm donor registries by showing that they do
not go far enough. Unlike my prior point, which really is an attempt to provide a reductio
ad absurdum, I am more ambivalent about how to use the point I am about to make.
Some will read it and think it too serves as a reductio, while others might view it as a
friendly amendment to be championed to the existing registries. Either way, it suggests
the existing registries are not optimally designed for their ostensible purpose.
The registries in place in the U.K. and elsewhere are what I have called passive
registries children have to call the registry at age 18 to learn the identity of their donor
rather than what I have sketched as an active registry one that would itself contact the
child at age 18 to let the child know that he or she was donor-conceived and allow (but
not force) him or her to receive information about the donor (Cohen 2012b, 446). On the
arguments offered in favor of passive registries (especially when framed as a right to
know ones genetic origins), it is not clear why one should prefer the passive to the active
registry. In the shadow of a law mandating active registries it seems plausible that the
vast majority of parents would opt to inform their children of their donor-conceived
status rather than wait for a civil servant to do so. Either way, that seems better than the
passive registry. With a passive registry, to successfully fulfill its function it requires that
children be told by their parents or otherwise find out that they are donor-conceived.
Many recipient parents, especially heterosexual parents who can pass as the genetic
parents, will not disclose to their children that they were donor-conceived. Exactly how
many is up for debate, although one set of studies suggests that only five percent of
recipient parents disclose under anonymous sperm-donation programs, and that 30
percent of heterosexual recipient parents who have chosen identity-release sperm
donations still had not disclosed to their 12- to 17-year-old children that they were donorconceived (Golombok 2002, 966; Scheib 2003, 1120). It thus seems plausible that
passive registries will lead to something less than all donor-conceived children being
informed that they were the result of sperm donation. Therefore, for some subset of

donor-conceived children, possibly the majority, the harms anticipated (or if you prefer,
rights violations) will exist even in the face of the passive registry.17
The active registry does what the passive registry purports to do, only better. If the
arguments for the passive registry hold up, do they not also justify the active registry?
Indeed, do they not indicate it is preferable? Moreover, the active registry's benefits go
further still: the active registry seems fairer
because donor-conceived children of coupled heterosexual recipient parents
would be just as likely to detect their origins as children of same-sex recipient
parents and single recipient parents. Moreover, to the extent recipient parents
would no longer be able to pass as genetic parents to their donor-conceived
children, the active registry might decrease the tendency for rearing parents to
seek sperm donors who are racial matches for themselves, a practice some have
found objectionable (Cohen 2012b, 447).
And yet many champions of passive registries shy away from supporting active ones.
Why? It is not as though we think that the child who, like Nancy Drew, sleuths out her
donor-conceived nature is more deserving of this information than the one who has
passively accepted that her father is the man who has reared her (Cohen 2012b, 447).
The best one might do, I think, is to try to develop an intersectionality theory of the harm
or the rights violations in which one demonstrates empirically that the supposed harm to
donor-conceived children deprived of their donors identities is most pronounced for
children who already suspect they are donor-conceived (Cohen 2012b, 447). Another
way of framing the idea is that the relevant interest applies only those who have begun a
project of truth seeking not those who as yet do not suspect or do not wish to act on
their suspicions of their true genetic origin. Doing so would justify supporting a passive
registry but not an active one. Unless and until such empirical evidence has been
marshaled, though, I tend to think peoples discomfort with the active registry is
somewhat indicative of some lack of confidence in the premises underlying the argument
for the passive registry, though others may read it differently.
I also think the distinction between an active and passive registry nicely sharpens a point
on which registry proponents have been somewhat ambiguous. Is the harm (or rights
claim) actualized in all or merely some of the following cases: (1) a child who has no
suspicion he or she is donor conceived, (2) a child who suspects he or she is donor
conceived, wants to verify that fact, but has no interest in finding out who is his or her
genetic father, and (3) a child who suspects he or she is donor conceived and wants to
find out who is his or her genetic father? The argument typically is framed in terms of the
claims of the third kind of child, but what, in particular, of the first? This would take us
into some deep philosophical waters relating harm, including whether someone must
experience a harm or benefit in order for it to matter morally (Sumner 1996). It would


The passive registry also leaves open the possibility that children will inadvertently
determine they are donor conceived.

also take us into the question of whether there is a right not to know and what are its
I have not played hide the ball. I have been open in my skepticism as to the arguments
that have been offered for mandating by law sperm donor registries, while also pointing
out rejoinders to the critique where I see them. Hopefully the reader will get a good sense
of the argumentative playing field, even if I cannot claim neutrality.

Additional Issues

While I think the question of whether to legally prohibit sperm donor anonymity is the
main issue, I do want to close by briefly discussing a few issues that have appeared or
should appear at the periphery of the more central debate, and that in many ways deserve
more attention from scholars working in this area:
Accidental Incest: Some who have written in this area have worried that sperm donor
anonymity carries with it the threat of accidental incest that individuals conceived of
sperm donors will meet and have intercourse (Cahn 2009). In other work I have
suggested that these worries are interesting because much of the moral horror over incest
stems from the fact that children are reared together. To be concerned about accidental
incest may depend on premises about best interest of resulting children or forms of legal
moralism that I have elsewhere suggested are insufficient to justify legal regulation
(Cohen 2011a; Cohen 2012a). Of course, one might say the harm is not to the children
but to the adults who would like to avoid incestual sex for their own reasons. The only
point I want to make here is that the kinds of steps needed to avoid accidental incest do
not require the full blown revelation of parenthood to donor-conceived children in every
case. One could imagine a registry system that would allow donor-conceived individuals
to determine if they were genetically related to another individual without directly
revealing the identity of the sperm donor. In the case in which one half of the pair knows
its genetic origins, I suppose the other will be able to deduce its parenthood. But in cases
in which two donor-conceived children meet, they could determine if they were
genetically related without requiring identity revelation.
Reciprocity: While registry advocates would give donor-conceived children the right to
know the identity of their genetic fathers, there is a curious asymmetry in that they would
not allow the genetic fathers to have a right to know the identity of their genetic children.
There are distinctions one might offer for this, but it is not clear if they are entirely
First, one might argue that children never chose not to know their genetic fathers, while
fathers chose to participate in a sperm donation practice that would prima facie hide their
genetic childs identity. If one believes in the changed selves argument noted above,
though, one might press on why the donors Time 1 preference should control his right to
know his genetic offsprings identity given changes of feeling now that 18 years have
passed. Moreover, if there is a right to know ones genetic descendants, it is not clear it

should be waiveable in advance any more than a womans right to have an abortion
should be waiveable by contract (Cohen 2008a, 1189-95).
Second, one might note that the appearance of the genetic father into a family structure of
the rearing family might be disruptive to that structure, if he is not wanted. Of course,
allowing donor-conceived children to know they are donor-conceived and to attempt to
contact their genetic fathers is also disruptive of the family structure in which they are
reared. The question is whether the difference between the two disruptions is a difference
of degree or of kind, or whether one form of disruption is morally problematic while the
other is not.
Compensation and Anonymity: As I noted above from my own experimental work, it may
be possible to use carrots (additional compensation for donors) rather than sticks (legal
prohibition) to induce more sperm donors to become identified and thus improve access
by donor-conceived children. That assumes, though, that additional sperm donor
compensation does not offend anti-commodificationist laws. Many of the countries that
have prohibited sperm donor anonymity have also prohibited excess compensation. They
may have to choose between these policies to some extent in order to maintain their
supply of sperm.
Extraterritoriality and Circumvention Tourism: As I have discussed in my other work on
medical tourism (Cohen 2014; Cohen 2012c), whatever rules governments adopt on
medical services, some will try to circumvent those rules by traveling for services. This is
true for anonymous sperm donation as well. Individuals wishing to get sperm without
obligations of identification may travel to a place (like the U.S.) where the law permits
anonymity and/or get sperm from that place shipped to their home country. To what
extent should countries that prohibit anonymous sperm donation make their law apply
extraterritorially to their citizens that travel abroad or create barriers to these shipments?


The world is now divided. Most of the world legally mandates that sperm donors must be
identifiable and gives children the right to call a registry to find out identifying
information about their sperm donor. However, most of those countries do not take the
further step of requiring that the children be informed that they are donor-conceived; they
instead leave that in the realm of family privacy and parental discretion. The U.S., on the
other hand, is one of the lone holdouts; it does not prohibit sperm donor anonymity.
There is a raging debate as to whether donor-conceived children have a right to know
their origins or whether the premises and entailments of arguments for that result are
problematic. This chapter has introduced the reader to that debate, the underlying law,
and some peripheral issues.
I am thankful to Jack Balkin, Robert Blecker, Gaia Bernstein, Naomi Cahn, Dov Fox,
Axel Gosseries, Holly Fernandez Lynch, Cilla Smith, Jeannie Suk, and Mark Wu, as well

as audiences at the Boston College and New York Law School faculty workshops and the
Yale Law School Information Society Project workshop for helpful comments on this and
related work.
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Los Angeles: University of California Press.
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Donor Anonymity. Boston University Law Review 90: 1207-18.
Bernstein, Gaia. 2013. Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on Gamete Donor
Anonymity and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy. Indiana Health Law Review 10: 291324.
Blyth, Eric, and Lucy Frith. 2008. The UKs Gamete Donor Crisis A Critical
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Handicaps." Bioethics 9: 269-75.
Bygedemen. 1991. The Swedish Insemination Act. Acta Obstetricia et Gynecologica
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Technologies: Timing, Uncertainty, and Donor Anonymity. Boston University Law
Review 90: 1207-18.
Byrn, Mary Patricia, and Rebecca Ireland. 2012. Anonymously Provided Sperm and the
Constitution. Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 23(1): 1-28.
Cahn, Naomi. 2009. "Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line or the Curtain? for
Reproductive Technology." Harvard Journal of Law & Gender 32: 59-107.
Cahn, Naomi. 2012. The New Kinship. Georgetown Law Journal 100: 367-429.
Cahn, Naomi. 2014. "Do Tell! The Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring." Hofstra Law
Review 42: 1077-1124
Camber, Rebecca. 2008. Britain Faces Fertility Crisis as Loss of Donor Anonymity Sees
Sperm and Egg Donor Numbers Plummet. Mail Online, June 26.
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CBS News. 2008. U.K. Facing Sperm Donor Shortage: Experts Say Scarcity Prompted
by Reversing Confidentiality Laws. November 13.
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Donor Anonymity. Boston University Law Review 90: 1207-18.
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