Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio Factoran

Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted
pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former
position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the
issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must
first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that
by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by
her acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.
HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief
for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned,
cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising
from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

Wilfredo Torres vs Hon. Neptali Gonzales

In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the
condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of
estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of
Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme
Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon
because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve
the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences
of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned
convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he
was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached
the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC
which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted

conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Torres
Facts:
Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of two counts of estafa. The maximum sentence
would expire on November 2, 2000. In 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the
Philippines on condition he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Torres accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1986, upon recommendation of the Board
of Pardons and Parole, the President cancelled the conditional pardon because Torres had been charged with 24
of

estafa

and

convicted

of

sedition.

The wife and children of Torres filed before the SC a petition for habeas corpus praying for the immediate release
of Torres from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation
of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Is a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee a requirement for the President to determine whether
or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon?
Held:
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the
convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not
comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the
sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has
thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it
that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person
who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of
sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond
judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound
judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon
upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the
findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed
against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for thirteen (13) years in
apparent

violation

of

his

right

to

speedy

trial.

Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful.
In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of
conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond
judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.

Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the conditional
pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the
acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no
authority to interefer with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified
ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to
determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a
basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise
of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office.

Garcia vs. COA

Facts:
Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a Supervising lineman at the Bureau of Telecommunications.
He was accused of stealing some materials in their company. Thus, public respondents filed a criminal case
against him for qualified theft before a court and on the same ground respondents also filed an administrative case
in which petitioner was found guilty and was later dismissed from the service. With respect to the criminal offense,
petitioner was acquitted by the court due to insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner was then reinstated from his work
and is now claiming before the COA for his back salaries from the time of his dismissal up to present. But COA on
the other hand reluctantly denied his pleadings. Meanwhile, petitioner was extended an executive clemency
(absolute pardon) by the President. Still, respondent COA strongly refused to give due course to petitioners claim.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the
grant of executive clemency.
Ruling:
The Court ruled initially by explaining the mandate of Sec 19 Article VII of the Constitution and further articulates
that the bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the
administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. This can
be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby
directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner
need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the
issuance of the clemency.
Rodolfo Llamas vs Exec Sec Orbos & Mariano Ocampo III

Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an
administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was
found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not
less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can
resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases.
HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any valid
and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

Miguel Cristobal vs Alejo Labrador & Teofilo Santos

Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by the president but even prior to his
pardon he was already holding the position as the municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his
conviction. Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos should be excluded from the list of electors in
Malabon because he was already convicted of final judgment for any crime against property. This is
pursuant to CA 357 of the New Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that Santos is
exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his full civil and
political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property
responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.
HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative
by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power
does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning
power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority
has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not
only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present
case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from
voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command.
There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities.
When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences f conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is
conditional in the sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual
in nature involving no money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores the respondent to
full civil and political rights. Upon other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec
94 of CA 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the president, would lead to the
impairment of the pardoning power of the president, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead
furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature
except through legislative action.
People vs. Salle
Facts:
In 1991, Salle and Mengote were convicted of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson before the
RTC of Quezon City. Salle and Mengote appealed their case to SC on March 24, 1993.
In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of
the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the motion.
Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the
motion was necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison following the grant of a conditional pardon
by the President on December 9, 1993. She also stated that Mengote was also granted conditional pardon and
that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She prayed that the Court grant Salle's motion to
withdraw his appeal.
On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion. Mengote, however, did not file a motion to withdraw appeal.
After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the President may,
except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, grant pardon after conviction by final
judgment, the Court required (1) the Solicitor General and the counsel for accused-appellants to submit their
memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the conditional pardon and (2) the Presidential Committee for the
Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court why it recommended to the President the grant of the
conditional pardon despite the pendency of the appeal.

In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the conditional pardon granted to appellant
Mengote is unenforceable because the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in this Court
of his appeal.
On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that the conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid
and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it argues that although Mengote did not file a motion to
withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon
which resulted in the finality of his conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction
by the trial court is enforceable.
Held:
Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations,

and

pardons,

and

remit

fines

and

forfeitures,

after

conviction

by

final

judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after
conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is " final
conviction," as was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or
"conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a
case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused
commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the
death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his
right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality,
as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the
grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by
the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant
should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that
he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the
appellate court, as the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an
accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render
those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely
on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from
notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The
conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such

withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert
every possible effort to take back into his custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the
assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.
Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice
Facts:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 yearold daughter of his common-law spouse. The supreme penalty of death was to be imposed upon him. He then filed
motion for recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the
death penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress changed the mode of execution of the death
penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal
injection. Echegaray filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the
grounds that it constituted 1. cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due process, 3. a
violation of the Philippines obligations under international covenants, 4. an undue delegation of legislative power
by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation
of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a
ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty
Law, and has declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by
lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being
the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas
chamber); in addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or
impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
Issues: 1. Is the lethal injection a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment? 2. Is it a violation of our international
treaty obligations? 3. Is it discriminatory (pertaining to sec 17)?
Held: 1. No 2. Yes 3rd. Petition denied.
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment because
(1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug
to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) its implementing rules are
uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which
uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of mistakes in
administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death
penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In Harden v. Director of Prisons- punishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life. Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the
execution by lethal injection render said law cruel, degrading or inhuman? The Court believes not. Petitioner
contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which court will fix the time and date of execution, and
the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the court which
designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the
judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to
the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the
date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules
must be read in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the
judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the
President of his executive clemency powers at all times. Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen
(18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can
seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs. Petitioner also contends that the
infliction of wanton pain in case of possible complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is
an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders
lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated. First. Petitioner has neither
alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained
personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the
United States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the
convict, without any other evidence whatsoever. Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A.

No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the
performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the
death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely
incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give
pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments
are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished. The
cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment,
not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
2. Violation of international treaties? In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death
may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission
of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court. The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the most
serious crimes. Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.
3. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being discriminatory. SEC.
17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be
inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor
upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner contends that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an
express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating
that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after
delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period
following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of
sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year
reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioners view, tantamount to a gender-based
discrimination. Being an implementing rule, Section 17 must not override, but instead remain consistent and in
harmony with the law it seeks to implement.
Risos-Vidal vs. COMELEC
Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating
that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the disqualification cases
against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying
for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is
disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estradas right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes,
intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that
he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issue:

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder
which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?
Held:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President Estrada
does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not
deliberately intend to restore former President Estradas rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be
upheld based on the pardons text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to
wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
xxxx

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction;
and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of
statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states
that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that
attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of
the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12
of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of
an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national
position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon

conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective
office
have
been
restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the
unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble
is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because,
strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at
issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor
to
limit
the
scope
of
the
pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or
purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondents promise never to seek a
public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former
President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule
that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President
Estrada.

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest

G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005
Facts:
1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes
as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The
Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state.
3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of the
Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate
the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the
signature of the President.
The Supreme Court held NO.
1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he is also the
country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign
affairs.
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties but
this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to
be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations, to
ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.
Lim vs. Executive Secretary
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of the United
States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1 on January 2002. The Balikatan 021 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral

defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is rooted from the
international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial
aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon
building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on
September 11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng
Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-inintervention.
The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of future violation of
the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically
interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1 and no question of constitutionality is involved.
Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct
personal
injury.
ISSUE:

W/N

the

petition

and

the

petition-in-intervention

should

prosper.

HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new
petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
Doctrine
of
Importance
to
the
Public
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under
the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court
has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of separation of
powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming respect for each other's act, this Court
nevertheless
resolves
to
take
cognizance
of
the
instant
petition.
Interpretation
of
Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning
of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to
the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the
negative, in that United States personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this
agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article 32 contains provisos
governing interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of
interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The
Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the
context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context.
According to Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general rule of interpretation
and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not
constitute an alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the general rule.
The meaning of the word activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in
negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the history and intent of the
Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat
itself
-such
as
the
one
subject
of
the
instant
petition,
are
indeed
authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise participants may
not engage in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality,
"Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the United States government, and that the provision on
self-defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this
matter thereby becomes crucial. In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to
engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter
of
the
United
Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and international
agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec.
2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this case. The Constitution also regulates the
foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more
pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country,
or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct

exception.
International
Law
vs.
Fundamental
Law
and
Municipal
Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from international agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere.
Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing
equal,
not
superior,
to
national
legislation.
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of
pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification
for
its
failure
to
perform
a
treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: The Supreme Court shall have
the
following
powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final
judgments
and
order
of
lower
courts
in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
Ichong v. Hernandez: provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law,
or
that
it
is
subject
to
the
police
power
of
the
State
Gonzales v. Hechanova: our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental
law,
but,
also,
when
it
runs
counter
to
an
act
of
Congress.
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on
Philippine territory.
Bayan vs. Executive Secretary
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on
January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3)
votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21,
Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held
for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such
treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities
should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21,
Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in section 25, Article
XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
Secretary of Justice vs. Judge Lantion
FACTS:
In accordance to "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (RP-US Extradition Treaty), the Department of Justice received from
the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States attached with the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents on June 18, 1999. Mr. Jimenez was
charged with the following:
i. 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5
years/count)
ii. 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax;4 counts; Maximum Penalty:5 years/count)
iii. 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; 2 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
iv. 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; 6 counts; Maximum Penalty: 5 years/count)
v. 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts; Maximum Penalty: less than 1 year)
The Department of Justice denied Mr. Jimenez request for extradition documents based
on the following:
i. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary
requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and
admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements are under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069. Evaluation by the
Department of the documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal
cases. Thus, the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are not available. It
merely determines the compliance of the Requesting Government with the procedures and requirements under the
relevant law and treaty. After the filing of the petition for extradition, the person sought to be extradited will be
furnished by the court with copies of the petition.
ii. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition
requests. Furthermore, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides that the Philippine Government must
represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. Thus, it
must comply with the request of the United States Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject
information.
iii. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and
to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed
expeditiously.
Mr. Jimenez filed with filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition presided
over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation:
i. mandamus to compel the Department to furnish the extradition documents
ii. certiorari to set aside Departments letter dated July 13, 1999 denying his request
iii. prohibition to restrain the Department from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition
petition in court
iv. enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the
extradition
v. application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
Honorable Ralph C. Lantion ordered the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to maintain the status quo by refraining from
committing the acts complained of, from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the
United States Government, from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court and from performing
any act directed to the extradition for a period of 20 days from service of the order.
Hon. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines ordered Hon. Lantion to cease
and desist from enforcing the order. Due to transcendental importance, the Court brushed aside peripheral

procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684 and the TRO and proceded on the
issues.
ISSUE:
i. Whether or NOT the evaluation procedure is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation
of criminal cases
ii. Whether or NOT the twin basic due process rights granted by Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court on the
right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents and the right to submit
counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within 10 days from receipt is dispensable
iii. Whether or NOT the right of the people to information on matters of public concern granted under Sec. 7 of
Art. III of the 1987 Constitution is violated
HELD: DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
i.

NO.

Extradition Request
The Extradition Request (Sec. 4. PD 1069) is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs has the
executive authority to conduct the evaluation process which, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs
to a class by itself or is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely
an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power:
1) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers in form and
substance
2) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated
are not extraditable
3) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one
which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation.
The process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process (NOT an exercise of an
administrative body's quasi-judicial power) (Sec. 5. PD 1069 and Pars. 2 and 3, Art. 7 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty) that is indispensable to prosecution. The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing and
analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or
quasi-judicial functions.
In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising
judicial functions or merely investigatory functions applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate
extradition documents. If the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on
the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement
affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. Thus, the role of the
administrative body is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court. The
court has the power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. The evaluation procedure (in
contrast to ordinary investigations) may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee or accused
(Sec. 2[c] of PD 1069) at 2 stages:
1) provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request
This is because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest
of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Par. 1, Art. 9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) to prevent
flight but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days (Par. 4 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) or 20 days
(Sec. 20[d] PD 1069) if no request is submitted. Otherwise, he can be continuously detained, or if not,
subsequently rearrested (Par. 5, Art 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty)
2) temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Sec. 6,
PD 1069).
The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure is that:
1) there is yet no extradite; BUT
2) it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration
The evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Similar to the evaluation stage of
extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the
respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. The characterization of a treaty
in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do

with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.

In this case, the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999 (the
following day the Department of Justice received the request). Thus, the Department of Foreign Affairs failed to
discharge its duty of evaluating the same and its accompanying documents.
Extradition Petition
After delivery of the Extradition Request by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Justice, the latter
shall designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Par. 1, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The
attorney shall file a written Extradition Petition with the proper regional trial court, with a prayer that the court take
the extradition request under consideration (Par. 2, Sec. 5, PD 1069). The presiding judge shall issue an order
summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition. The judge may issue a warrant of
arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of
justice or to prevent flight (Par. 1, Sec. 6, PD 1069).
Extradition Hearing
The provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the
proceedings, shall apply during the Extradition Hearing (Par. 1, Sec. 9, PD 1069) The attorney may represent the
Requesting state. (Sec. 8, PD 1069). The Courts decision on whether the petition is extraditable based on the
application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty
or whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Par. 3, Article 7 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty) shall be final and immediately executory (Sec. 12, PD 1069) and appealable with the Court of
Appeals where the provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals
shall apply except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Sec. 13, PD 1069).
ii.

YES.

Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the twin rights of notice and hearing from a prospective
extradite. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. Petitioner contends that
United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.
Such argument, however has been overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make
available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy
cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not
even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by
statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.
However in this case, with the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an
abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies and certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that
are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated) it cannot
to be said to be urgent. Therefore, notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be
dispensed with and shelved aside.
iii. NO.
During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done;
hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would
already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have already made an official
decision to grant the extradition request.
USAFFE Veterans Association vs. Treasurer of the Philippines
DOCTRINE: Executive agreements may be entered into with other states without the concurrence of the Senate;
The act of appropriating funds to comply with an Executive Agreement constitutes a ratification thereof
SUMMARY (RECIT READY): The Romulo-Snyder Agreement was entered into by the Philippines and the United
States. The Philippines undertook to repay its debt of $35 million dollars, which was taken from funds initially
intended for the war effort in the Pacific. Petitioners contend that the Philippine Government had no authority to
return such funds to the United States and that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was invalid because it was not
approved by 2/3 of the membership of the Senate. The Court ruled that the Executive Branch, through its Foreign
Secretary, Romulo, had the authority to enter into such an agreement. Also, it held that because the agreement
was an Executive Agreement and not a Treaty, concurrence by Senate was unnecessary.
FACTS:

Romulo-Snyder Agreement was entered into in 1950

The agreement provided that the Philippine Government would return to the United States, in 10 annual
installments, a total of $35 Million dollars advanced by the United States to, but unspent by, the National
Defense Forces of the Philippines.
USAFFE Veterans Association (USAFFE) pray that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement be annulled and that
the money be used to pay all pending claims of the veterans represented by USAFFE.
Petitioners contend that U.S. Secretary of Treasury Snyder and Philippine Foreign Secretary Romulo had
no authority to enter the Romulo-Snyder agreement.

Historical Background

In 1941, foreseeing the War in the Pacific, US President Roosevelt called into service the Armed forces of
the United States and all Military Forces of the Military Commonwealth, through Proclamation No. 740 of
President Quezon
Control over the United States Army in the Far East (USAFFE) and the Philippine Army was given to
Gen. Douglas MacArthur
Public Act No. 353 of the United States provided an appropriation of $269,000,000 for the maintenance of
such Armed Forces
A total of P570,863,000 was directly transferred to the Philippine Armed Forces for:
o Payment in arrears for services rendered
o Supplies
$35 million remain unspent
President Quirino, considering the dire need of the Philippines, proposed to the US Government
that the $35 million be retained as a loan to be paid in 10 years
Romulo-Snyder Agreement was signed in Washington in 1950

ISSUE: Whether of not the concurrence of the Senate was necessary for the validity of the
Romulo-Snyder Agreement.

HELD: No. The Concurrence of the Senate was not necessary.

RATIO: The Romulo-Snyder agreement was an EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT not a treaty. 1

In the Case of Altman v US it was held that an international compact between two sovereign nations
dealing with commercial relations between the said countries is an executive agreement and not technically
a treaty.2
There are two types of Executive Agreements: (1) Presidential Agreements and (2) CongressionalExecutive Agreements.
o The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under either type of executive agreement.
Initially it was a Presidential Agreement
Subsequent ratification of congress through appropriation of funds turned it into a
Congressional-Executive agreement.
o Therefore, it was not necessary for the Senate to ratify the agreement in order for it to bind the
Philippine Government because it was an executive agreement and not a treaty.

Gonzales vs. Hechanova

FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources.
Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or
amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by the President of the
Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and
Corn administration and any other government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates
1 The distinction between executive agreements and treaties is purely a constitutional one and has no international legal significance.
2 Treaties require the concurrence of 2/3 of the members of Senate

that only private parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the government has already
constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and
3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional
system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. He may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may
not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an
executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

Vinuya vs. Romulo

FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA,
the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC,
established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines
during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and
OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the
San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years,
these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that the
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of
this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements
of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare
they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority
to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the
authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In
this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision
is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his
agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of
the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length
of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample
discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of
both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient,
and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its
subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means
and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal
person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in
international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their
cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the
position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have
not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty
of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation
or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn
between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In

view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they
are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are
mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent
authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.